Making a Living between Crises and Ceremonies in Tana Toraja

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Making a Living between Crises and Ceremonies in Tana Toraja

The Practice of Everyday Life of a South Sulawesi Highland Community in Indonesia

By

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CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS, TABLES, FIGURES AND ILLUSTRATIONS

Maps

Tables

Figures

Illustrations

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research project officially started in August 2001 as part of the research program 'Indonesia in Transition', financed by KNAW (Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences) and the departments of Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies at the Radboud University Nijmegen. Having obtained a MA in Development Studies and, in so doing, gained fieldwork experience on the effects of the economic crisis in Thailand, a whole new direction opened up. Not only did I need to study the history and context of a different Southeast Asian country (in this case Indonesia) and another language, I also had to absorb many aspects of another discipline, namely Cultural Anthropology. Some would argue that it is better to focus on a single discipline in one's education, rather than two, and it would definitely have shortened the process, but I have learnt that Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies have a lot to offer each other, and that their integration strengthens both fieldwork and analysis.

Both Development Studies and Cultural Anthropology offer studies into similar topics, but from different perspectives (which sometimes oppose each other), and employ different research methods. However, this new learning route has taught me that both perspectives are highly intertwined, and that only by integrating the two perspectives can the 'logic' behind the way people in Tana Toraja make a living between crises and ceremonies be thoroughly understood. In line with my own experiences, I hope that this thesis stimulates further exchanges between anthropologists and academics from development studies. If it is successful in this, it will contribute to research methodology, the core concepts and theories of both disciplines and, most importantly, reduce one-sided misinterpretations of complex societies, by over-emphasizing either culture or socio-economics, which often lead to unsuccessful governmental or NGO interventions.

According to Gupta and Ferguson (1997:1), 'the single most significant factor determining whether a piece of research will be accepted as (that magic word) "anthropological" is the extent to which it depends on experience "in the field" '. Field experience is shaped by the people who surround a researcher during his fieldwork. Here there is too little space to thank individually all the hundreds of individuals who have contributed to my fieldwork experience, but I would like to express my deepest gratitude to

all people of the villages of Palipu' and Kondo', and the other respondents in Tana Toraja, Makassar and Jakarta, for their hospitality, kindness, openness, help and cooperation. Without the support of these people, the research would have been impossible. Conducting research in the above villages and in the cities of Makassar and Jakarta has been a remarkable experience for me and offered some unforgettable memories.

I owe a debt of gratitude to the Djawa – Roma Andi Lolo family. Apart from introducing me into Torajan life and to key informants, they made my life in Makassar and Tana Toraja very enjoyable and made me feel at home. Nana, warmly welcomed me when I stayed in Makassar while Oom (papa Ekki) and Tante looked after me like their own child. Right from the beginning, I had a very special and strong bond with Oom, who did his utmost to assist me with my research and, probably because we were both 'outsiders' in some senses, he always seemed to understand my confusion about Torajan society. In many ways, he was my guide through the Torajan sociocultural labyrinth, taking me to interesting activities, rituals, landscapes, and people. On his twenty-year-old motorcycle, we travelled to all corners of Tana Toraja. On some occasions, he even invited people into 'our' home to explain the more complex aspects of Torajan society to me. In the evenings, we often sat on the veranda to have a drink, and discuss my new insights and information acquired that day. Oom was the most sincere and dedicated person I have ever met, and he has inspired me in many ways. I want to thank T.R. Andi Lolo for introducing me to his family.

The research could not have been accomplished without the assistance of Lewi Octavianus and Anda Parapak, who helped me in various ways throughout the entire project. In addition, I received a lot of help from Rimba, Diks Pasande, Hana Lura, Juliet Adriani, Anna Maryani, Daniel, Bernard, Yusuf, Natsir, Sanda, Yusniaty, Yusran, Yanti, Mery and Anita Tantu. I thank Esther Velthoen, Corry van der Ven and Jilles de Klerk, and Dias for introducing me to some important contacts in Makassar and for being friends during both the good and the more difficult times. I also thank Aurora Donzelli who was of great help in the initial phase of my research by joining me on various trips throughout Tana Toraja and by sharing her extensive knowledge of Torajan society. I really enjoyed our late night discussions.

Special thanks go to Frans Hüsken, Leo de Haan and Gerben Nooteboom. Frans's infinite knowledge about social science aspects that are central to my study as well as his long-standing experience with research in Indonesia were major sources of inspiration. While many thought that my aim of

combining multi-sited field research with the various socioeconomic, cultural, and political layers of Torajan society were overly ambitious, Frans always provided stimulation and encouragement, and helped me to present these ideas in a structured and understandable way. Leo fulfilled an important role, especially in the initial phase of my project, and by visiting me in Indonesia. Through our discussions and his critical comments, Gerben provided vital motivation throughout most of the project, especially at the times when I needed it most. I would like to thank Detlev Haude for stimulating me to embark on this project in the first place, for maintaining an interest throughout, and for his valuable comments on drafts during the writing process.

I thank the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences (KNAW) for sponsoring this research, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) for supporting the work in the field, and the departments of Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen for all the support and facilities that have enabled me to complete this project.

Articles on the themes of this book have been published along the way and discussed as workshop or conference papers in the initial stages of preparation. A paper on the 'Local Experiences of Indonesia's Total Crisis' was presented at the 2004 conference on 'Indonesia in Transition' convened by Henk Schulte Nordholt. Another paper on the various livelihood combinations and different perceptions of Indonesia's total crisis was presented at the fourth EUROSEAS conference in Paris (2004, convened by Ben White, Gerben Nooteboom and myself) and at an 'Indonesia in Transition' seminar in Yogyakarta (2005, convened by Irwan Abdullah). Some draft versions of planned papers were discussed at several of the 'Indonesia in Transition' workshops. I would like to thank all the conveners and participants of these conferences and workshops for their critical reading and comments on draft versions, but I should especially mention Hotze Lont, Ben White, Greg Bankoff, Irwan Abdullah and Henk Schulte Nordholt. Major parts of the material on highland politics in Chapters 4 and 5 have already appeared in a book edited by Coen Holtzappel and Martin Ramstedt (2009). Some of the work on resources and livelihoods in Chapter 7 has been published in books edited by Milan Titus and Paul Burgers (2008). I would especially like to thank these editors for their inspiring comments and editorial advice during the process of writing these papers.

I would also like to thank others who gave critical comments on earlier drafts of papers and chapters. Special thanks go to my friends and colleagues, particularly the Nijmegen Indonesia group (including Argo

Twikromo, Agus Indiyanto, Gerben Nooteboom, Iqbal, Made Kutanegara, Sukamdi and Togar Nainggolan), and Young CIDIN (Laurens Nijzink, Nienke van der Veen, Anouka van Eerdewijk, Willem Elbers, Hein de Haas, Jacqueline van Haren, Marisha Maas, Diana van Dijk, Alfred Lakwo, Achieng Ojwang, Theophile Djedjebi and Adelbert Kamanzi).

Many thanks to Giles Stacey for correcting and editing this book, and to Marije Rosing for helping me to enter the quantitative data into SPPS and, more than that, for really making this work into a presentable book. Also thanks to Theo van der Weegen for offering much needed assistance during the analysis of the quantitative data and to Lieve Jacques for having a last editorial look at the manuscript.

Finally, there are those nearest and dearest to me. First I would like to thank Mark and Natasja and my parents-in-law Wim en Truus for visiting me in the field. You made my time in Indonesia even more enjoyable, and your visits gave me new and fresh energy to continue the research. Thanks especially to Wim whose critical comments were very helpful during my fieldwork. I really enjoyed shooting a film with you at my research locations, and I hope the film will soon premiere. I would like to extend my deep gratitude to my parents who assured me of love, warmth and support.

Without doubt, most thanks go to my wife, Wendy, who has supported me in so many ways throughout the endeavour in good and bad times. Thank you for joining and cooperating with me during my fieldwork, for endlessly listening to my new findings and ideas, for accepting my distractions (even when we were together) and for ensuring that I got the most out of myself. I dedicate this book to our sons, Jing, Jurre and Sam.

CRISIS AND CEREMONIES: AN INTRIGUING PARADOX

The sound of a gong and drumbeat echo throughout the valley, announcing the arrival of a new group of guests at the ceremonial field. Large bamboo shelters surround the rectangular arena to accommodate the thousands of guests. At the centre stands a two-storey bamboo construction that contains the body of Ne'Sukku who died eleven months earlier, in June 2002. She will be carried to the family grave on the following day, after seven days of rituals. The arriving guests pay their last respects to the deceased woman in a formal procession and slowly walk around the ritual field, leading water buffalo and carrying pigs, jugs of palm wine and baskets of rice. Their names and gifts are announced to the guests already seated in the shelters around the field. One of Ne'Sukku's children carefully writes down all gifts that are brought in; already hundreds of buffalo and pigs, tons of rice in sacks, dozens of vats of palm wine and millions of rupiah. Relatives, friends and acquaintances come from far and near in the highlands of Tana Toraja to bring their gifts for the family of the deceased. Moreover, hundreds of migrants—who live all over Indonesia and beyond—have returned to Tana Toraja to attend this funeral ceremony. Some are wearing the latest fashions and are taking photographs with their digital cameras. Amid the bustling, men are hacking buffalo meat into small pieces for distribution among the guests. Slowly, the whole ritual field is covered with blood, bones and meat as tens of buffalo are slaughtered.

Watching this extravagant funeral ceremony and the tremendous mobilization of resources which it involves, one finds it hard to believe that Indonesia was affected by an economic and political crisis in the late 1990s. Moreover, this funeral is not an extreme event but typical of hundreds of similar funeral and *tongkonan* (ancestral house) ceremonies that continue to be organized every year.[1] One may ask what has been going on in this mountainous district? While Indonesia has suffered an economic

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[1] According to official accounts, in 2001 the number of ceremonies in Tana Toraja reached 2,045, of which 1,872 were funerals (BPKD Tana Toraja:2002). At these ceremonies a total of as many as 8,157 buffalo and 25,235 pigs were slaughtered.

crisis, Torajans[2] have still managed to pull enough money together to organize large ceremonies. Moreover, why are these funerals so important that thousands of local people and migrants find the time and money to participate? When I arrived in Tana Toraja in 2001, and again in 2002, to map the way in which people at the local level make a living in the aftermath of an Indonesian economic crisis that had led to a near virtual collapse of the national economy, I was thus confronted with people who spend most or all of their entire household budget on funeral ceremonies. Unravelling this paradox and through that obtaining a thorough understanding of the way in which Torajans make a living in times of economic crisis is the purpose of this study.

Tana Toraja is a mountainous region in the Indonesian province of South Sulawesi, which is probably best known for its beautiful scenery, colourfully painted houses with saddle roofs and spectacular funeral ceremonies (see Map 1.1). For years it has been among the most popular tourist destinations in Indonesia and a site for countless anthropological studies. Unlike most of the preceding researchers (see for example Nooy-Palm 1979a; Volkman 1985; Crystal 1974) who have documented cultural and symbolic aspects of such funeral ceremonies, I had prepared for a socioeconomic approach. When I entered the research scene, cultural aspects and ideals, such as the funeral ceremony, but also ancestral houses and honour and shame (*siri'*) seemed to imbue Torajan lives in all the domains. I assumed that there must be a different logic behind the way Torajans make a living than a perspective based solely on income, employment, consumption criteria and basic needs. Though it seemed appropriate to depart from livelihood studies, because these frameworks pay significant attention to individual agency, their formulation is still heavily based on the economy while political, social and cultural aspects remain contextual. In Torajan lives (as in those of most people's) much more is at stake than economic rationality. Behavior is equally influenced by what is socially and culturally valued and crucial. Besides the economy, human agents are embedded in various political, cultural and social structures that influence their practices. Most livelihood analyses appeared to be of little help in understanding the full complexities of everyday Torajan life

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[2] There are various spellings for the name of the people inhabiting Tana Toraja. The more common ones used in English language literature are Toraja, Toradja and Toraya. Because I find it confusing to use exactly the same name for the people as the area they originate from, I opted for the term Torajan when referring to a person who originates from the Tana Toraja region and Torajans to refer to the people from Tana Toraja. This approach is favored by Torajan linguistic experts at the Christian University of Tana Toraja (IKIP).

Map 1.1. Indonesia, Sulawesi island, Makassar, Tana Toraja and the research villages of Palipu' and Kondo'.
Source: The last 'Map from Sulawesi and Tana Toraja' adapted from Waterson (2003).

and to be overly focused on economic factors. As Sajogyo, the chairman of the Working Body of an Afro-Economic Survey of Indonesia, explained in 1971, 'If you want to understand the economy of my country, study our culture and our political system; if you want to understand our culture and our political system, study our economy' (Penny 1971:122). Through adding a broad spectrum of concepts and analytical approaches to the livelihood perspective, this study should deliver a more complete picture than existing livelihood and poverty studies.

Tana Toraja's people derive their living mainly from agriculture, livestock, tourism, government jobs and small-scale industry and manufacturing. Many Torajans have left their homeland in search of work, for education, or to escape the constraints of social stratification. Torajans tend to be ready to move from place to place and have a long history of out-migration, but at the same time most migrants maintain strong ties with kin in their homeland. Torajans have a strong sense of identity, and their extensive cultural repertoire (for example, ancestral houses and large funeral ceremonies) and sense of kinship still constitutes the frame of reference in most Torajan lives, whether at home or away. The increasing mobility of Torajans has led to a broad array of dispersed and/or fragmented networks that cut across political boundaries and span multiple localities. Contemporary Torajan society consists of networks scattered all over the world, with the largest densities in Indonesia, and major concentrations in Tana Toraja and Makassar,[3] the capital city of South Sulawesi. Therefore, a conventional, single-site 'exemplary' location, with an independently bounded set of relationships and activities is inadequate for a profound understanding of Torajan livelihoods.

Various economic, cultural and socio-political changes have taken place in Tana Toraja that are important for understanding the contemporary setting in which Torajans make a living. Given this, an exploration of the general lines and details of history as well as the systematic dynamics of the various transitional periods and local processes of the economic, cultural and socio-political domains form an important part of this study. By providing an extensive historical dimension, this study also tries to get a grip on the often confusing and contradictory ethnographic accounts of the social and political organization of Tana Toraja. Further, it aims to advance the ethnography of highland Tana Toraja as well as to further the comparative study of numerous similar societies. Torajans show both

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[3] The name 'Makassar' was formally reinstated on 13 October 1999 after it had been changed to Ujung Pandang in 1971. For a more detailed explanation, see Morrell 2001a.

unique characteristics as well as striking similarities to other ethnic groups in the Indonesian archipelago (most notably Minangkabau, Dayak and Bali Aga) and elsewhere in the world (for example, the Ashanti in Ghana, the highland people of central Luzon in the Philippines and the peasant communities, or *comunidades*, in the Peruvian central highlands).

Determining on an approach that goes beyond a purely economic perspective and takes into account the cultural realms requires both analytical accommodation and reconceptualization and has methodological implications for the way data are gathered. Methodologically, capturing such a complex object of study with no clear boundaries requires a move away from a 'conventional single-site location' to a research design with 'multiple sites' (Marcus 1995:95) that extends the description of the particular in detail toward a more holistic approach, or shifts from an ethnographic study of a single community to a method based on inter-local comparison—which proceeds by 'following the people', 'following the thing', and 'following the story'. The present account is the result of a multi-sited, multi-dimensional and multi-method piece of research in which I followed the Torajan people, their goods and their stories from the highlands to the city of Makassar and even to the Indonesian capital of Jakarta.

Makassar: A Transit City

A wall painting in the Protestant church in kampong RAMA shows an exquisite Torajan landscape with lush rice terraces stacked against mountain ridges stretching up to the sky. The mountain plateau is traversed by a swiftly flowing stream in which eye-catching white-spotted buffalo are bathing. On hillocks in the midst of the rice terraces stand large saddle-roofed houses decorated with colourful carvings. The place is a heaven on earth—at least that is what the painting on the church wall behind the altar leads you to believe. This church, named Gereja Toraja is about seven kilometres from the centre of Makassar. The abbreviation RAMA[4] stands for Rantepao-Makale, the only two towns in Tana Toraja itself. For a long time, the neighbourhood has been predominantly inhabited by Torajans, and it is the only place whose name directly reflects the ethnicity of the Torajan highlands. However, it is not difficult to discover that Torajans are

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[4] Most abbreviations in Indonesia have a double meaning; 'Rama' is also the name of an important Hindu god.

spread all over Makassar, from neighbourhoods of well-to-do citizens to
slum areas. At all corners of the city, particularly in the Indonesian-style
houses of the richer families, one finds ornamental elements of the façades
of typical Torajan houses. These better off residents work at the govern-
ment offices, high schools, hospitals, universities and small-scale indus-
tries, as well as in shops and out on the streets as vendors. In fact, Makassar
is the home of the largest Torajan community living outside Tana Toraja
with an estimated 70,000 Torajan migrants residing in the provincial capi-
tal of South Sulawesi.

The city port of Makassar is located on the southwestern tip of the
orchid-shaped island of Sulawesi (see Map 1.1) and has been the gateway
to the eastern archipelago of Indonesia for centuries. It has become a
microcosm of the people who originate from the populous province itself
and from the thousands of islands that make up the social fabric of eastern
Indonesia. Among these peoples, the Torajans constitute the fourth largest
ethnic group. They come to the city to work, study, buy supplies, enjoy
leisure activities, or simply because the city is a necessary transit point on
the way to or from other places in Indonesia and abroad. By bus, Tana
Toraja is a day's trip away from Makassar, which makes it difficult to trans-
fer immediately to connecting airplanes and boats on the same day as
one's departure. Most migrants regularly return to the Torajan highlands
(even from distant countries) for funerals and other important rituals.
These rituals seem to be an effective mechanism for maintaining strong
ties between migrants and Torajans in the highlands, even for second- and
third- generation migrants who were not born in Tana Toraja. As a conse-
quence, tens of thousands of Torajans travel through Makassar each year.

One example is Pa' Salusu[5] who lives with his wife, two children and
maid on the eastern edge of the city in a fairly large house. His house has
four guest rooms to accommodate the many visitors traveling between
Tana Toraja and Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Java or beyond. He often receives
distant relatives who show up unannounced to spend the night at his
house. Travellers who have stayed at his house have given it the apposite
name 'transit hotel'. In fact, Torajans in Makassar are orchestrating and
managing migrants' visits not only by providing a place to stay, but also
through making arrangements, such as buying or booking onward bus,
boat or airplane tickets. To some extent, they function also as intermediar-
ies between family members and acquaintances living in the highlands

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[5] False names are sometimes used in this book to protect the privacy of individuals
described.

and those overseas. The communication infrastructure in Tana Toraja is still rather limited, especially in the more remote areas, and Torajans in Makassar are often contacted first to relay a message to family members living elsewhere in the world. Nevertheless, given that thousands of Torajans living all over Indonesia and abroad return to the highlands to attend funeral ceremonies without receiving any formal invitation—something forbidden by Torajan custom—one can deduce that communication lines within the Torajan transnational network are highly effective.

While Makassar, through its favourable geographical location, is the central hub of the transnational or translocal Torajan network, the network itself gravitates toward Tana Toraja. Torajans might reside and live outside the highlands, but their focus in life is still centred upon Tana Toraja or, more specifically, their ancestral home; meaning both the physical structure and the group of people that belong to it. In other words, the social organization of the Torajan migrant community in Makassar is a reflection of the home society. Migrants are organized in so-called *kerukunan* (associations) that are based on kinship or place of origin in Tana Toraja, and social relations among them are often based on long-standing relationships between their families in the homeland. Moreover, the most respected and powerful Torajans in Makassar all originate from the highest social class in the highlands. Moving up the social ladder, or at least protection of their status, can only be achieved through particular performances in the highlands, especially in the ceremonial domain. This has led to an injection of migrant-money into Torajan rituals and, consequently, to an ever-increasing size, cost and extravagance of funeral ceremonies, and to the re-building of ancestral houses. Although migrants might have left Tana Toraja, they remain closely tied to their home family and, as such, even have a large influence over them and the broader region; in both a cultural and political sense. When local elections are due, Torajan politicians go to Makassar to lobby for support from the Torajan elites, thereby gaining the loyalty of their associates in Tana Toraja. If they have substantial objections, powerful migrants might even be able to prevent the implementation of particular policy measures in Tana Toraja. Therefore, the local district head and his entourage regularly visit Makassar to find support for their plans from among the urban Torajan elites. Further, on their visits to Tana Toraja, these well-educated elites often provide unsolicited advice to the district head on issues such as education, healthcare, employment, tourism and, to a lesser extent, agriculture.

In short, Makassar is the home of the largest Torajan migrant community in the world and houses many brokers that play a central role in the national and transnational networks of Torajans. The social organization of the migrant community is a reflection of the social structure in their homeland, and many migrants either transfer considerable financial sums to their relatives in Tana Toraja (mostly as contributions to funeral ceremonies) or interfere in the political affairs of the region. Clearly anyone interested in Tana Toraja needs to examine Makassar, or more specifically the Torajan community living there. Having acknowledged this fact, the researcher faces the question as to where these Torajan migrants actually come from? Or, to put it differently, how does the place they feel so connected with look like in a geographical, socio-political, cultural and economic sense?

Tana Toraja: A Social Labyrinth

The second time I arrived in Tana Toraja I made a confusing journey into the depth of Torajan life. After spending some time in the torrid and bustling city of Makassar, the pleasant mountain climate and serenity of Tana Toraja were a pleasant surprise when I got off the bus in the town of Makale, the administrative capital of Tana Toraja. A small, friendly looking man in his early sixties welcomed me and escorted me to a nicely decorated brick house, a few hundred metres from the bus stop. As I learned later, this was the restored ancestor-house of his wife's family, and my accommodation for the coming months. His wife, *Tante* (aunt), as I was expected to call her, had been born in this house and moved to the city of Makassar when she was 18 to continue her education. After graduation she found a position as a teacher at an elementary school on the island of Buton (off the south coast of Sulawesi). There she met her present husband, known as Oom (uncle) to me. Oom and Tante have taught all over Indonesia, from Buton to Irian Jaya to Makassar and to Pare Pare. After four decades of wanderings through the archipelago they returned to Tana Toraja in 1992. In the highlands they taught at a local elementary school in the village of Ge'tengan for eight years until they retired. Two years before they moved into the modernized family house where I had found accommodation.

During preparations for my fieldwork, I had already met Tante's younger brother who worked at the Indonesian Embassy in the Netherlands. He kindly offered me a room in his house in Makassar, and I gratefully

accepted. I spent some time there together with his niece (who took care of the house during his absence), a student nephew, a servant, a gardener and lots of other family members who often stayed overnight on their way to Tana Toraja or on their way back. This niece turned out to be the daughter of Oom and Tante, and Torajan hospitality is such that I was invited to stay with them in Makale.

My new base was a large house with a shiny tiled roof and a façade colourfully decorated with typical Torajan symbols such as buffalo, roosters, *kris*, and so on; but it was by no means one of the most impressive houses in Makale. Above the front door a small plaque showing the family name – a combination of the family names of Tante's father and mother. Tante's mother is associated with one of the noblest families in Tana Toraja, and staying with this family opened many doors during my research. South Sulawesi society is highly stratified, and starting from the bottom social rank would have been seen as highly inappropriate and definitely offensive. Living with a Torajan family of noble descent also gave me the opportunity to look behind the scenes of the rich set of rituals that abound in Tana Toraja, as the nobility are often involved in a large number of ceremonies. Although association with high status people does also have some drawbacks, I never encountered any problems in approaching lower status people, especially in the villages where I lived among people of all classes.

What struck me from the outset was the paramount importance of culture in the lives of most Torajans. Funeral ceremonies soon demanded recognition as a major influence on people's lives, and I discovered that my initial research outline was quite short-sighted; excluding ceremonies from any livelihood study of Tana Toraja would yield distorted results. During my visits to government offices, where I was looking for general figures about the economy and political organization of Tana Toraja, several civil servants or even all of them would often leave the offices to attend a funeral or house rebuilding ceremony. Throughout Tana Toraja, I often saw trucks, minibuses and cars full of people coming from and going to these ceremonies—easily recognized by their traditional clothes—and a few days after my arrival in Tana Toraja I found myself at a funeral ceremony, together with thousands of other participants. In one way or another, most conversations with Torajan people led to the subject of the funeral ceremonies, and when I raised the issue of the economic crisis in Tana Toraja, the standard answer was along the lines of 'It seems that there is no economic crisis in Tana Toraja because the funeral ceremonies are going on. In fact the size of the feasts is even increasing.'

Some added, 'There is no crisis because so many Torajan migrants still send money home and ceremonies can take place as usual.'

Torajan society is very status-conscious, and social interaction is patterned along class lines: noble class, middle class, commoners and slaves. Funeral ceremonies are important occasions where the status and wealth of individuals and whole families are actively articulated and validated, but even more importantly, they are the only occasion where this can be contested. To maintain their high status and by that their *siri'* (honour),[6] Tante and her family needed to spend a lot of money, time and energy on appropriate gifts. Since I was staying at the family house, I was in the midst of all these activities. Tante was responsible for recording the gifts of the family and more-or-less orchestrated the selection of gifts and collection of money involved in gift-giving. Based on past records, she determined the nature and value of the gift to be purchased for a forthcoming ceremony. Subsequently, Tante informed her brothers and sisters of the sum of money needed. All members contributed in accordance with their financial capacity, meaning that the ones in Jakarta, Makassar and abroad contributed most of the money. If a pig or buffalo had to be purchased, Tante sent her brother-in-law to search for an appropriate animal at the cattle market. Besides organizing the gifts, Tante had to appear at ceremonies as a representative of the family. At peak periods, this might amount to several ceremonies a week. Frequently Tante looked exhausted from meeting all these responsibilities. Because a high status person would never step into the public sphere of a ceremony without the support of an entourage, Tante always left for a ceremony in the company of several family members, either current residents of Tana Toraja or returning migrants.

The house itself apparently played a central role in keeping the family network together, since all migrant relatives visited the house on their return to Tana Toraja. Torajans have a great respect for their ancestors, and through this for the houses they founded. The ancestral house I was staying in had been recently rebuilt and no longer showed any similarities to the 'traditional' *tongkonan* except for some symbols on the façade. All the family members had contributed money toward the building and furnishing. As Tante is the oldest child of the founders, she was invited to move from her small house in Ge'tengan to the newly-built family house in

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[6] In fact, *siri'* is a complex notion that cannot be easily translated by only one word as it means both honour and shame. This will be further elaborated upon and explained in Chapter 6.

Makale. I came to understand that this modernistic house was much more than a material asset.

Since Torajans have allegiances to several houses from which their ancestors originated, a newcomer needs some time to unravel the composition and structure of the family. I was puzzled by the complexity of this house society and the obscurity of family boundaries and wondered whether I should concentrate on the household or on the family-group centred upon particular houses (*tongkonan*)? The *tongkonan* appeared to be the heart of Torajan society and influence most people's actions and behaviour. Other social relationships and organizations are also important parts of Torajan life, but the wealth and survival of the *tongkonan* and its members always seemed to come first. Irrespective of the size of the research unit I chose, I realized that socio-cultural connections are such an integral part (possibly even the major part) of any Torajan life that these connections could not be ignored in a study on livelihoods.

During further endeavours to discover Tana Toraja, my image of Torajan social organization became even more blurred. I was initially searching for a single exemplary or typical village to study from a social and economic point of view. Already overwhelmed by the complexity of the social organization and the cultural repertoire of the Torajan people, I found that the social and cultural ambience differed even between various localities within Tana Toraja, most notably between groups living in the northern or southern regions. This observation left me with the same question as the one that Barth (1993) posed for the island of Bali: 'Where then might be the type locality of Balinese [in my case Torajan] culture as it appears in our literature—the place where the anthropologist can find the desired "whole" represented—and what might be the area of its distribution?'

Most anthropologists who have entered Tana Toraja since the 1970s have focused on intensive but narrow data from study of a single village, from which they have made generalizations that fail to account for variations between villages. In addition, the growing attention given to the highlands has led to extensive media coverage and attracted a growing number of tourists from Europe, the United States and Australia. Much like the painting in the church in Makassar, all these trends have created an image of Tana Toraja as a mountain area covered with lush green rice fields, inhabited by a distinct, culturally homogeneous group of people that organize extravagant funeral rituals, live in carved ancestral houses, bury their dead in cliffside burial vaults and make effigies of the dead. Although that image does apply to some places, empirical facts show much more variation and require greater specificity.

The framework of ideals and ambitions, and the ways to achieve those ideals (such as through staging expensive funerals) differs considerably between the north and south. Since early times, the social organization in the south has been more complex, sophisticated and rigid than in the north. The feudal model of organization in the southern part unites a number of ritual-based communities that are ruled by a so-called *puang*, a chief from the highest class. These *puang* exercise considerable authority because blood ties determine status to such a degree that mobility between different social classes is rare. Conversely, people in the northern region of Tana Toraja hold firmly to the original, loosely structured social organization and put a strong emphasis on their democratic style as opposed to the oppressive domination, as they see it, of the southern *puang*. Birth rank seems to play a lesser role in the north, and most inhabitants can acquire status by acquiring wealth. The dynamics of this northern type of social stratification have intensified competition for social status, and consequently increased the number and size of funeral and house-building ceremonies where battles over status take place. In the south, only the *puang* families and their descendants organize extraordinarily large and expensive funeral ceremonies to protect or increase their social status. People from lower ranks hold much smaller and less costly ceremonies.

In line with the differentiation between north and south, defined by customs and 'tradition', at a higher level some people plead for a subdivision of the Tana Toraja district into northern and southern regencies, as that supposedly would correspond to the traditional socio-political organization that existed before the arrival of the Dutch colonial administration.[7] This struggle to fragment Tana Toraja unfolded after the political and administrative decentralization policy of the Indonesian government was launched in 2001.

Not only is there a socio-cultural divide between north and south; the areas also show striking differences in ecology, subsistence, land tenure and economic organization. The lush green rice terraces that spill down hillsides like giant steps, for which Tana Toraja is well known, are more characteristic of the north than the south. Moreover, the vast irrigated rice fields seen around the town of Rantepao are absent in the southern area. Consequently, the reason for migration and destinations of migrant

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[7] The district called North Toraja (Toraja Utara) was officially approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Jakarta by 2008, thus the region was separated from the district known as Tana Toraja.

Ill. 1.1. A panoramic view of rice fields in the North of Tana Toraja (photo by Edwin de Jong).

household members, and the extent of the remittances they send home, also differ between the two regions.

Nevertheless, these differences between regions should not be exaggerated. In broad outlines, many commonalities exist, and in most situations of interaction between Torajans, differences are underplayed. Besides, as Wikan (1990:xxiii) also noted for Balinese society, it is not enough to speak simply of differences between north and south. 'It is a ubiquitous feature of complex traditional civilizations that their institutions are locally variable, forms are prolific, and regionalism flourishes on all levels. This fact is often missed and regularly distorted in the usual format of anthropological studies'. To summarize, the existing image of Tana Toraja as an undifferentiated society does hold for several domains, but there are also notable differences between north and south, and even within each of them as considerable variations occur.

Crisis and Ceremonies: An Intriguing Paradox

The research for this book was done in a period during which Indonesia was in the middle of a lingering economic crisis and radical political change. The Asian economic crisis of mid-1997 deeply affected Indonesia

and brought about the collapse of the stock market, the closure of large banks, the bankruptcy of thousands of businesses, huge increases in unemployment and dramatic currency devaluations (Gérard and Ruf 2001:3). The dramatic collapse of the rupiah coincided with the worst drought in decades (attributed to El Niño), spilled over into the political domain, and eventually led to the downfall of the government, after which the long-awaited *Reformasi* took off (Manning and van Diemen 2000). Pressures to enhance democracy, efficiency and economic responsibility and accountability went hand-in-hand with pleas for decentralization from within Indonesia, notably from the richer regions, as well as from outside the country (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 2001). Sometimes these developments led to separatist movements and civil and religious wars, but more often they resulted in limited violent forms of ethnic cleansing in many of the islands outside Java.

On a macroeconomic level, the district of Tana Toraja had not been left unaffected by Indonesia's so-called 'total crisis'. By 1998, the economic 'growth' rate had dropped from around 10 percent to minus 3.4 percent (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2000b:12). Prices of food, fuel, medicines, education and imported products such as fertilizer, machinery and luxury goods rose rapidly while wages failed to keep pace. The rupiah prices of coffee, cocoa and cloves—the major cash crops grown in Tana Toraja at the time—shot up in mid-1997, reaching peaks in mid-1998. By 1999, however, prices slumped, and they had returned to 1996 levels by the end of 2002. Moreover, the local tourist industry collapsed completely in 2003 after the Bali bombings[8] and, further, thousands of Torajan migrants fled conflict (and employment) in areas such as Poso, East Timor, the Moluccas, Aceh and Kalimantan. Within Tana Toraja itself, struggles over boundaries and authority increased as a result of regional decentralization policies.

Paradoxically, when I arrived in 2001 and again in 2002–2003 when I returned to investigate the way in which the national economic crisis and political changes had affected the livelihoods of people at the local level, I ran into a large number of extravagant funeral and house-building ceremonies that did not show any sign of crisis. As a matter of fact, after watching these seemingly wasteful ceremonies that demanded a tremendous mobilization of resources, I found it hard to believe that Indonesia had

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[8] Around 200 people (mainly Australian tourists and Indonesians) were killed when Muslim extremists detonated a bomb in a café and discotheque in October 2002 in Denpasar on the island of Bali—the most popular tourist destination in Indonesia.

been in an economic and political crisis in the late 1990s. The ceremonies in which I participated were not unique but were representative of over two thousand similar funeral and house-rebuilding ceremonies that continue to be organized every year. What has been going on in this mountainous region? While Indonesia has suffered from an economic crisis, Torajans have still managed to pull enough money together to fund large ceremonies. Why are they still investing their money in these ceremonies rather than in daily necessities? Did the economic crisis simply bypass Tana Toraja? Did the Torajan people manage to turn the crisis to their advantage, or is something else going on that is hard to explain in financial terms? One might see a profound paradox here, and it became my purpose to unravel this through my study.

Lont and White (2003:131–3) argue in their account of the 'first years of crisis studies' in Indonesia that large-scale statistical studies had been very influential in creating the dominant image of the crisis outcomes. The main focus in these surveys was on the impact of the crisis on poverty and incomes, and also on employment and school enrolment:

> While the conclusions of large-scale statistical studies on the outcomes of the crisis are sometimes also used to speculate about the underlying dynamic of the crisis, i.e. the causal processes and mechanisms that generated these changes, the processes and mechanisms themselves remain to a large extent a 'black box', i.e. they are not directly analyzed. In short, large-scale surveys provide some details on the 'what?' and 'how much?' questions, but they can tell us little about the 'how?' and 'why?' questions.

In unravelling the paradox, I will shed some light on the 'black box' of processes and mechanisms that shape the way in which the economic and political crisis—like any other crisis—comes down to Tana Toraja and is articulated at the local level. Following this line, I will provide more details about the how and why questions.

Construing Everyday Life

In construing everyday Torajan life, some problems are of a general nature, but most have specific relevance to Torajan society and therefore need further explication. I start with people's livelihoods and the changes within them because the livelihoods approach considers capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. Its supporters (for example Ellis 2000; De Haan and Zoomers 2005:29–30) argue that the approach therefore offers a more complete picture than perspectives based solely on

income figures, employment numbers, consumption criteria or estimates of basic needs. However, when I arrived in Tana Toraja to map out the way in which Torajans make a living, I was confronted instead with a Torajan obsession with the dead. Everyday life is complicated by the incidence of various public events, of which the funeral is the most important. Almost everything Torajans undertake is dominated by their own, or their ancestors', prospective funeral. When a ceremony is held, some Torajans spend most of their household budget on it, at the expense of other aspects of wellbeing, such as nutrition, health and education.

Not only does the funeral ceremony absorb large amounts of capital but also the *tongkonan*, its rebuilding, and the ceremony to inaugurate its new or rebuilt structure. Seemingly, the *tongkonan* is made up of both material and immaterial wealth and is a pivotal institution in the life of Torajan people. All kinds of people seem to be obsessed by *tongkonan* and funeral ceremonies, but how do these cultural phenomena influence daily practices in making a living? And what is the logic behind the practice of keeping these institutions alive and even growing both in size and importance? Are they just basic 'vehicles of meaning', or a way to obtain wealth, status and power, or maybe both? When the everyday life of Torajans revolves around the funeral ceremonies and *tongkonan*, one cannot leave these realms unexplored. An understanding of the meanings people attribute to these ceremonies, and what is at stake for them in these symbolic arenas, will reveal whether these ceremonies are a means to make a living or a goal in themselves.

The principle of *siri'*, or prestige, appears to be another important element in the lives of Torajans. *Siri'* shapes the Torajan attitude and orientation in life and is the leitmotiv for many practices. The concept is shared by the people of South Sulawesi in general and is seemingly unique to the region. Nevertheless, through its ambiguous meaning (both honour and shame), the principle of *siri'* is difficult to grasp and understand for people born outside South Sulawesi. How, and to what extent, does *siri'* shape people's rationale behind everyday life? How determinant is *siri'* in various spheres of life? Is it just a framework of principles that guides people's practices, and which can be used voluntarily and variably, or is it a rigid and set leitmotiv for all daily life practices?

Like events (funerals and *tongkonan* ceremonies) and symbols (most prominently the *tongkonan* house and its accompanying artifacts), *siri'* is an expression, or consequence, of culture that entered my story incidentally, 'as a major influence in people's lives—something which channels human energy—but not as an object of interest in itself'(Wikan 1990:19).

Everyday life appeared to be much more than simply dealing with the economic and material objectives of life at the centre of most livelihood studies. Livelihood studies aim to be people-centred but usually 'envision man rather narrowly, as a *homo economicus* mainly occupied with using assets to obtain well-defined economic goals' (Kaag et al. 2004:54). In fact, life is as much a matter of satisfying what is culturally valued and crucial. Therefore, to understand everyday life, both the cultural and economic realms must be explored. This wholeness has to be grasped in order to understand what is really at stake in the life of Torajans.

Torajan society is highly differentiated (in economic, cultural, social and political senses) but, just as in many other Southeast Asian societies, the system is not rigid. The positions in it can be challenged and need to be defended at all times. Contests over prestige, status and wealth sometimes involve whole *tongkonan* groups and are quite demanding of time and capital. Traditionally, these contests took place solely in the ceremonial arena (most notably at funeral ceremonies), but since the Dutch entered the Torajan highlands in 1906, power struggles have extended to the political domain. Historical evidence shows that power and the political domain have been continuously changing. Torajan *adat* (customary and traditional) leaders and their adherents have been opting in and out of the political arena of the district, competing with 'newly born' elites who obtained power as representatives of nationalism, socialism/communism or ideological conservatism, or through the church, the military or simply with the support of money. The widening and narrowing political space for manoeuvre of each party often depended upon power and policy changes at regional or national levels.

After a long period of depoliticizing local customs and traditions by the New Order regime,[9] it is questionable whether the Indonesian decentralization laws of 1999 affected regional social differentiation in Tana Toraja by altering the rules for inclusion and exclusion from social and political networks. Do existing power relations change and, if so, who are the ones capable of entering the newly created political arena? Is it again the Torajan *adat* leaders and their adherents, or the 'new' elites who recently wielded power (irrespective of social status), or a mixture of both? Did other patron-client or similar relationships emerge or increase

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[9] The term 'New Order' refers to the period from 1965 to 1998 in which Indonesia was under the political leadership of President Suharto. The New Order was preceded by the Old Order, which started with the Declaration of Independence (1945) under the political leadership of President Sukarno.

in importance after the withdrawal of the strong state support to regional elites? And, finally, what effects do such changes in power relations have on Torajan livelihoods?

For a thorough understanding of contemporary Torajan livelihoods and changes within them we cannot therefore ignore power and politics. We need to explore not only the general lines and details of history but also the systematic dynamics of the various transitional periods and local processes, such as the formation of inter-elite coalitions and the local cycles of elite change involved. In other words, alongside the cultural and economic wholeness, we need 'a historically specific analysis of the exercise of power at different levels of society' (Hart 1989:31) or, as Bourdieu (1977, 1990, 1992) puts it, 'a sense of the social and political game'.

Various economic, cultural and socio-political changes have taken place in Tana Toraja that are important for understanding the contemporary setting. Yet alongside these transformations, the *tongkonan* has also broadened in concept and traverses regional and even national borders as its members leave the Torajan highlands in search of a living elsewhere. When living and working outside Tana Toraja, these people remain surprisingly bound to their homeland and in fact they have often left the highlands for the sake of improving the family's wealth. In this sense, the Torajan world does not stop at the borders of the highlands, and new networks emerge that are bound together through collective memories and images of a common place of origin. Consequently, while a study of the ways Torajans make a living could easily have been executed at the community level, let us say a century ago, today such research cannot avoid taking into consideration a transnational perspective. Therefore, we need to know what the Torajan diaspora looks like and how it came into being. Can we actually speak of a Torajan global world, or are we confronted with a number of independent Torajan enclaves scattered over Indonesia and beyond? How does this diaspora tally with geographical sites, what is its present scope, how are Torajans organized within and between its locations, what are the political, cultural and economic gravity points, and how sustainable is it? Finally, what does the Torajan transnational perspective imply for the ways people make a living in Tana Toraja?

Considering 'why life is worth the struggle' or 'what makes a life a good life' cannot in the Torajan case (and for all other societies) be explained in a Maslovian hierarchy of objectives such as food, shelter, health, and so on. Nor can we speak of 'erst das fressen und dann die moral' (food comes before morality) that underpins the livelihood concept. A livelihood implies a kind of hierarchy that is very ethnocentric, such as in 'dying for

the homeland'. However, such a hierarchy does not exist in the Torajan way of thinking. To better understand the paradoxes and complexities of Torajan livelihoods, or why Torajans live the way they live, this study needed an approach that goes beyond a purely economic perspective. Rather it needed to include both the cultural and economic realms, be positioned in the socio-political world and have a transnational perspective, placed against a historical background, while not losing sight of diversity and individual creativity.

Small Places and Large Issues

An attempt to frame the conceptual apparatus of local livelihoods differently on the one hand, and also to investigate the interaction between global and local changes and changing cultural notions on the other is quite ambitious. In this respect, this study fits into what Eriksen (1995) has called studying 'small places, large issues'.

Understanding the paradox and complexities of Torajan livelihoods cannot be achieved by entering a conventional, single-site, 'representative' location with an independent bounded set of relationships and activities, simply because these locations no longer exist in Tana Toraja (if they ever did). The increasing mobility of Torajans has led to a large cluster of dispersed and/or fragmented networks that span multiple localities and cross political boundaries. Consequently, the contemporary Torajan social field consists of networks scattered all over the world, with the largest densities in Makassar and Tana Toraja. So, if we are to single out one or more cases to study in order to find answers to the questions above, our research field should be defined in terms of a social category, rather than as a research unit that is defined by administrative boundaries. The chosen social categories should be an example of the overarching Torajan social field or clustering of networks. The question, however, arises, where do you enter the social field? Or, in other words, what is the correct procedure to use to select exemplary cases?

Yin (2003:10) argues that 'selecting the cases for a case study should not simply be a matter of finding the most convenient or accessible site from which you can collect data. The selection process needs to incorporate the specific reasons why you need a particular group of cases'. The cases in this study have been chosen as examples of a variety of people and their differing activities in making a living. After preliminary research, I found that the majority of the people in Tana Toraja were living in villages that

showed significant variation with regard to socio-political organization and stratification, cultural ideals and expressions (mainly through house-building and funeral ceremonies), natural environment, land tenure and economic organization. Notwithstanding these variations, there seemed to be some coherence between villages within both the northern and the southern regions of Tana Toraja. 'Local context' was, a priori, considered to be an important variable in my research for explaining the way people make a living, and it therefore was another important criterion for selection. Consequently, the selection of the cases needed to include at least one research site in the north and one in the south of Tana Toraja. A third precondition, or 'specific reason' as Yin calls it, was the integration of the research population into the larger Torajan social world. Studying the interactions between the transmigrant community and the villagers in the homeland, and their consequences for local livelihoods, requires at least the existence of a relationship between them. In reality, this was not a problem since there are hardly any (if any) villages left in Tana Toraja that do not have migrants and connections with migrant communities. Since the towns of Rantepao in the north and Makale in the south of Tana Toraja seemed important nodes within the Torajan translocal network, the two selected sites should preferably be located not too far away from these two towns and have some social or economic connections with them.

Taking all these specific desires into account, how does one select more-or-less representative locations in the north and the south of Tana Toraja? Yin (2003:10) argues:

> [w]hatever the reasons, the candidate cases should be screened beforehand, and you need to anticipate this as a step in your work plan. The screening process will involve collecting sufficient data to decide whether a case meets your pre-established criteria. The most desirable screening process will identify an array of candidate cases but without actually collecting so much data that the screening begins to emulate the conduct of the actual case studies.

To guard against searching for administratively bounded cases that do not tally with social reality, I selected one socio-cultural community in the southern and one in the northern region of Tana Toraja. The selection followed an introductory screening of the Tana Toraja region in which I visited villages across the region with important topics covered through interviews with key informants. The boundaries of the two selected *adat* communities were not defined by administrative borders but by descent from a common ancestor and a shared cultural repertoire.

Both *adat* communities were part of sub-districts (*kecamatan*) and were divided into lower-level groups based on kinship and customs. These smaller groups generally coincided with the administrative level of the *kampung* (village)[10] (village): a size appropriate for in-depth investigation and useful as an 'exemplary case'. The southern *adat* community, Tallu Penanianna, was comprised of five villages, and the northern one of 12 villages.

In order to avoid a screening of the candidate case studies (village) that would 'be so extensive that the procedure involved doing mini case studies' (Yin 2003:13), I collected empirical data on all 17 villages using Participatory Appraisal (PA) techniques. To conduct these PA reviews, six students (fluent in the Torajan language) were trained to carry out the various PA techniques and to report the results. The students visited the villages in pairs and gathered several groups of inhabitants together for the PA approach. They attempted to find participants of different ages and genders, and with different socio-economic backgrounds, in order to collect information from a group of people that reflected a broad spectrum of village society. Several research techniques were applied during these gatherings, such as (pairwise) ranking, mapping and group-interviewing.[11] The final analysis identified the village in each *adat* community that was most suitable for further study: Palipu' in the south and Kondo' in the north (see Map 1.1).

Palipu' is a southern Torajan village located in a broad valley at the foot of Kandora Mountain.[12] The valley floor of Palipu' is dominated by rice fields on the borders of which are houses that stand under canopies of bamboo and coconut trees. The rocky soil at the foot of the mountain is covered by clumps of trees bearing marketable fruits. Not surprisingly, the majority of the population are involved in the cultivation of a variety of cash crops, such as coffee, cacao, vanilla and cloves (see Table 1.1). The uneven distribution of wet-rice fields among Palipu's inhabitants excludes more than half of its farmers from rice cultivation. In this region,

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[10] Literally, the Indonesian term *kampung* means hamlet, while *desa* is usually translated as village. However, in this study I use the term 'village' to refer to a Torajan *kampung* because this fits better with the English connotation of 'village'.

[11] The PA techniques led to information about (1) livelihood activities; (2) migration; (3) social organization and institutions; (4) natural environment; (5) infrastructure; and (6) social stratification. Besides this information, the PA also provided an initial impression of the openness and cooperativeness of the *kampung*'s populations.

[12] According to Torajan mythology, the first Torajan man appeared on the top of Mount Kandora after he was sent down from heaven.

consanguine ties largely determine one's status and access to land, and upward mobility between social classes is rare. Given the near impossibility of increasing one's social status locally, and with that the limited access to land coupled with the lack of non-farming job opportunities, many villagers migrate to other areas. Sixty-seven percent of the households in Palipu' have at least one family member who has migrated to another location within the Indonesian archipelago. The majority of the villagers refrain from organizing large rituals; the exception being the *puang* (traditional rulers) from the highest class who organize ostentatious shows to protect their authority.

In contrast to Palipu', Kondo' depends solely on rice-growing (see Table 1.1). The land of the village of Kondo' stretches out from the banks of the Rangri River toward the mountain ridge of the same name. The houses stand in the midst of bamboo on the upland slopes, overlooking the rice fields that lie scattered across the lower regions of the village on the bank of the river. While, the soil in Kondo' appears fertile enough for rice growing, it is less so for perennials that are the major cash crops grown in the region. Typical of the northern part of Tana Toraja, social life in this village is centred on grand rituals (predominantly funeral and house-building ceremonies). Through a funeral ceremony, the Torajan self (place and status in society) is manifested and validated. Competition between ascribed

Ill. 1.2.   An overview of the case study village Palipu' (photo by Edwin de Jong).

Table 1.1.   Main characteristics of the research locations Palipu' and Kondo'.

Description		Palipu'	Kondo'
Total population in 2002		905	789
Migrants (in percentage)		30	33
Number of households		181	148
Average person per household		5.0	5.3
Gender (in percentage)	Male	49	51
	Female	51	49
Religion (in percentage)	Protestant (Toraja)	45	96
	Catholic	23	4
	Pentecostal	28	–
	Muslim	4	–
Educational level (in percentage)	Below school age	17	23
	Illiterate	14	22
	Primary school	37	37
	Lower sec. school	16	9
	Higher sec. school	14	8
	College/University	2	1
Number of (working groups) *saroan/borongna*		4	6
Number of ancestral houses (*tongkonan*)		40	36
Wet land (*sawah*)		59 ha.	36 ha.
Dry land		458 ha.	254 ha.
Total land		517 ha.	290 ha.

Source: Office of the Kecamatan Tondon-Nanggala and Lembang Kandora and data collected by author.

status and achieved wealth surfaces in a battle on the ceremonial field between blood ties and money (Volkman 1980:8). These extravagant and costly 'potlatches' drive Kondo's residents and their family members to travel far from their homeland in search of money (including to Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and Malaysia). Eighty-one percent of the households in Kondo' have absent migrant members and 42 percent of these households even have migrants living and working abroad, mostly in

Malaysia. Further, the socio-cultural group to which the people of Kondo' belong is well-known for its members' fondness for gambling.

The village of Kondo' thus differs in several dimensions from Palipu'. The most obvious differences are: (1) the extent to which inhabitants are involved in certain livelihood activities such as rice growing and cash crop cultivation; (2) the pliability of the social system in terms of ambitious life objectives and the practices centred thereon (such as organizing expensive funeral ceremonies); and (3) the reasons and destinations of migrant household members and the size of their remittances sent home. In many respects, the two villages represent extreme points on a scale of possible interlocal variation in the region, as well as illustrating some of the most fundamental and widely shared socio-political and cultural themes of the Torajan transnational community. A comparison between the two selected cases, therefore, makes it possible to generate insights into the relationships among the local contexts and structures in which people make a living as well as the wider translocal networks of which they are part.

I found it necessary also to enter the field from another angle, namely, from the standpoint of the Torajan diaspora. For that reason, I selected the

Ill. 1.3. Overview of the case study village Kondo' (photo by Wim Jakobs).

migrant community in Makassar as another case study. Makassar is home to the largest Torajan community outside Tana Toraja, one of the oldest urban destinations for Torajan migrants.and the city plays a central role in the translocal Torajan network through its geographical location. All these characteristics made the Torajan transmigrant community in Makassar not only an obvious, but also a pivotal, case in this study.

After screening the Torajan population in Makassar through interviews with several key people, I selected three sub-case-studies, or social categories, in order to study the interrelations between Toraja migrants and their kin in the highlands. One case involved the networks of the most influential Torajans, and their organizations, with regard to the development and implementation of government rule in Tana Toraja. The other two cases encompassed several migrants who originated from different households in either one of the research locales in Tana Toraja. By using snowball-sampling,[13] I identified the social environment in which these Torajan migrants in Makassar, and the households they belong to, are making a living. In this approach, respondents were not selected from the larger Torajan community in Makassar; the 'larger' research unit was rather constructed from a few individuals related to households in the research locales in Tana Toraja. Selecting a research unit in Makassar using this method had two advantages. Firstl, since the Torajan community in Makassar involves tens of thousands of people, this method enabled me to select a practically researchable sample of the Torajan community without being limited to a particular (administratively bounded) neighbourhood in Makassar. Secondly, in focusing on the various social networks of Torajan migrants in their own context, I am able to link these networks to Tana Toraja and consider the importance or otherwise of relations between actors in different locations in creating and securing a livelihood.

The construction of a multi-sited research field was not sufficient to study such large issues. Including socio-political, cultural-religious, economic and historical perspectives, I needed to adapt my own situation, as well as the techniques and methods used for data collection. Like many Torajan transmigrants, I therefore lived and conducted fieldwork in 'social fields' that spanned local boundaries, connecting societies of origin and

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[13] Snowball sampling is a method through which one develops an ever-increasing set of interviewees. You ask a participant—in this case the village headman's secretary in Kondo' and a widely-respected village elder in Palipu'—in the event under study to recommend others for interviewing, and each of the subsequently interviewed participants is asked for further recommendations (Babbie 1995:287).

settlement. This meant that I traveled back and forth from one research locale to another, often accompanying or following people from my research group. This perspective differs from previous migrant studies by involving wider networks rather than simply including remittances or visiting migrant households.

I have used a variety of specific research methods for gathering data on all levels and for the various dimensions of society. A fruitful exploration and description of a complex phenomenon such as Torajan livelihoods requires a combination of methods and techniques. So-called triangulation of different methods and techniques enhances the quality and reliability of the data. For these reasons, I opted for quantitative data collection techniques such as surveying as well as qualitative techniques such as participatory observation, informant interviewing, oral histories and participatory appraisal techniques.[14]

Outline of This Study

This book is essentially divided into five parts. The first part (Chapter 2) deals with the analytical framework that guides the empirical component of this study and the methodology used to make sense of a Torajan living. It aims to expose the weaknesses of current livelihood models and searches for guiding concepts or analytical approaches that can better analyze the paradoxes and complexities of Torajan livelihoods. The derived analytical framework, which includes components that have been lacking in livelihood studies, pays attention to cultural aspects, social space, transnationality and the actor-structure debate.

Rather than follow the 'normal' type of local case studies, the second part (Chapter 3) is a historically and geographically 'broad' exploration of the Torajan transnational community, with its characteristic social organizations and networks. In this part, the focus will be on the Torajan social world in its making. That is, the development of a large network of interconnected relationships among Torajans that span various locations within and beyond the highlands, and influences the actions of people within it in many ways. This chapter also includes the first Torajan hub, located in Makassar, used as a case study of a migrant community. I started with the Torajan migrant community, rather than in the rural area with

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[14] For those wishing a fuller exposition of the methodology I would like to refer to De Jong 2008a.

the villages where these migrants come from, to emphasize the difference between this study and a typical village study.

The third part (Chapter 4) describes the place to which the Torajan world is fixed, that is the place that gives the Torajan world its existence. This chapter is a historical account of the making of the Torajan homeland, in which both local Torajans as well as their migrant kin struggle over power, prestige and resources. The fourth part consists of chapters 5 through 7 and outlines the structural socio-political, cultural and economic aspects that shape the space in which Torajans must make a living. This part is centred around two exemplary Torajan hubs that are typical of those in the northern and southern parts of Tana Toraja: the southern village of Palipu' and northern village of Kondo'. This part thus forms a comparative investigation of two contrasting upland villages in terms of their socio-political, cultural and economic regional context. The objective is to understand the way in which translocal processes and networks are transformed into local livelihood practices and the role played by their distinct local social, political and economic structures and cultures. Parts two, three and four are preceded by a long historical account. The reason for this is simply that the contemporary setting in which Torajans make a living cannot be fully understood without an exploration of the general lines and details of their history. Moreover, by providing an extensive historical dimension, this study also aims to clarify the often confusing and contradictory ethnographic accounts and to fill in the gaps with new data drawn from interviews (oral history) and through archival research.

In the fifth part (Chapter 8), I try to achieve a more differentiated view of the ways in which Torajans make a living by identifying particular patterns of practices or livelihood styles. Most of the threads that were identified earlier are brought together in this chapter to reveal the various livelihood styles that can be found in the Torajan villages studied. Chapter 9 summarizes the principal findings of this study and contains a concluding discussion around the central paradox and themes of this book.

TORAJAN LIVELIHOODS: THE CULTURAL DYNAMICS OF ECONOMIC LIFE

Theory is something to do, not simply to read. The theoretical resources available to today's sociologists are enormous, but this doesn't mean that theoretical work can stop.[1]

In the introductory chapter, I observed that standard livelihood analyses appear to be of limited help in understanding the full complexities of everyday Torajan life. Although these models have improved the analysis of livelihoods by paying greater attention to individual agency, their formulation is still primarily based on the economy while the remaining (political, cultural, and religious) aspects are seen merely as context. Academics in the field of livelihoods have tried to integrate the social dimension by adding concepts such as social capital to their model but, as the term suggests, these are strongly translated into economic terms. The question is whether the emphasis should not be more on making a living, or a decent living, something that includes more than simply income or capital accumulation practices. In Geertz's words (1980), we should not look for the 'political' based on what we find in our own country; instead we should elaborate a 'poetics of life' by identifying relevant Torajan emotions and construing their actions in their own contexts. In so doing, what first appears to be a theatrical piece may later become real and as imagined as the imaginary. From this perspective, we should try to understand the whole 'Torajan theatre show' which embraces just as much struggles for power and status, symbolic expressions and social manifestations, as it does income accumulating activities.

In this chapter, I add a broad spectrum of concepts and analytical approaches to the livelihoods perspective that will better enable us to come to terms with Torajan livelihoods. As Hefner (1990) already noted in his account on the political economy of mountain Java in which he attempts to understand a Southeast Asian peasantry's experience of politics and economic change and the practical circumstances that

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[1] Calhoun quoted in: Calhoun, Gerteis, Moody, Pfaff and Virk 2002:19.

have constrained that peasantry's economic actions and conditioned its awareness: 'In recent years, a number of authors have commented that the study of political-economic change requires a new style of "middle-range" analysis.' To develop such an analysis, Hefner attempted to synthesize economic anthropology with a wider culturalist approach. While reasoning more or less in the same way as Hefner 'through a dialectical tacking between activity and constraint', in developing a new style of 'middle-range analysis' I will adopt a kind of 'practice theory' that includes concepts and approaches that stem from a variety of disciplines, such as development studies, cultural anthropology, sociology, economics and human geography. The attempt to put together several elements from these various disciplines should not be seen as a 'game of trial and error'. Rather, it is an attempt to construct a profound theoretical framework for the analysis of the complex empirical reality I encountered during my fieldwork, and in so doing the aim is to contribute to the theoretical discussion within livelihood studies.

Let me elucidate the perceived analytical shortcomings that provide my starting point. The first issue concerns the ostensibly unique Torajan obsession with ceremonies and their large contributions to them in material, emotional and social ways. For some, these rituals appear to be so important that they spend most of their entire household budget on them, at the expense of other aspects of wellbeing, such as decent food, healthcare and education. From such a perspective, a livelihood implies much more than the means for dealing with the economic and material objectives in life that are at the centre of most livelihood studies. Livelihood studies aim to be people-centred but usually 'envision man rather narrowly, as a *homo economicus* mainly occupied with using assets to obtain well-defined economic goals' (Kaag et al. 2004:54). However, much more is at stake in Torajan lives (as in most people's lives) than economic rationality; the aim is as much a matter of meeting what is socially and culturally valued and crucial. Therefore, the social and cultural dimensions of livelihoods are critically important in developing the analysis for this study. As Long (2000:196) argues, in order to understand people's livelihoods one should 'explore the issue of lifestyles and the factors that shape them'. In doing so, it becomes possible to look beyond resources as solely vehicles for making a living and to regard them also as an instrument for making life meaningful and to challenge the structures in which people make a living (Kaag et al. 2004:54).

The second problem faced in framing Torajan livelihoods relates to this issue of 'structures', or what Kaag et al. (2004:54) called the actor-structure

dilemma in livelihood studies. Livelihood analyses are very much aimed at people's agency, which is hardly surprising when we consider that they were developed as a counterbalance to the poverty alleviation approaches that focused solely on structure. Although human agency, 'the capacity to process experience, make decisions and act upon them' (Long 2000:195), is an important parameter in exploring people's livelihoods, it is certainly not the whole story. A full understanding requires bridging the actor-structure divide by introducing an alternative conceptual focus.

A third issue is that Torajans are agents in a social world. Torajan livelihoods are conditioned by, and part of, social relationships and networks, especially kinship relations. In practice, their livelihood practices can only be clearly understood by taking into account the social networks in which they are embedded, or what I prefer to call the 'social space' that shapes the ways in which people are able to make a living. According to Arce and Hebinck (2002:6), 'People's livelihoods are analytically situated and practised by people in social spaces with boundaries defined by social networks, relationships and identities. These spaces are fluid, constantly changing, and are shaped and constantly renegotiated by people themselves.' As the *tongkonan* in Tana Toraja seemed to fulfil a key function in anchoring people in a geographical space, a sound perspective on social space, and more specifically on kinship, requires input from studies on house societies.

The final issue concerns translocality or transnationality since a large part of the Torajan population now lives outside the highlands, elsewhere in Indonesia or even beyond. In contemporary social science, the concepts of translocalism and transnationalism have become increasingly popular to explain the connectedness of concrete local practices, and events with the 'wider context'.[2] However, in livelihood studies, the use of a translocal lens is still in its infancy. The majority of researchers in this field acknowledge, and some even emphasize, the importance of such a perspective on livelihoods but, as Mazzucato (2004:135) states, 'Most studies…still focus on livelihoods as being created, negotiated and fought for principally in one locality'. A translocal perspective on livelihoods avoids focusing on sedentary communities as the natural state of society and also 'moves beyond simplistic dichotomies of migrants as either moving for economic or political reasons'(Mazzucato 2004:136). Therefore, I would argue that the analysis should focus on the 'dynamics of livelihood' by including a translocal perspective.

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[2] See for example, Glick-Schiller et al. 1995; Portes et al. 1999; Vertovec 1999; Marcus 1995.

To come to terms adequately with the issues outlined above, the analysis should not dwell on the actor-structure dilemma, go beyond a single locality, and include time, the cultural dimension and the social space in which livelihoods are created, enhanced and secured. In trying to achieve this, the theoretical section of this book consists of four parts. The first part provides an overview of what is generally understood as a livelihood and how it is conceptualized.[3] This is essential since, before I come up with new concepts and analytical approaches that better enable me to grasp the full complexity of Torajan livelihoods, I have to make clear my point of departure. In the second and third part, I try to grasp some theoretical handles for the structure-agency dilemma through elaborating on the 'bridging' concept of style. In the following part, the focus shifts to the conceptualization of the 'social space' in which livelihoods are embedded, with an emphasis on kinship and house societies. In the fifth and final part of this section, I will come to terms with the concepts of place and translocality, or transnationalism, that form the basis for a better understanding of translocal livelihoods.

Reconceptualizing Livelihoods

The livelihoods perspective emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s as a reaction to the narrow macroeconomic development approaches that focused mainly on income, employment and the basics needed to alleviate poverty.[4] These latter approaches were dominating the poverty alleviation programmes (such as the World Bank's Structural Adjustment Programmes) of that time, and positioned the poor as passive victims. Dissatisfied with these structuralist and unitary approaches, social scientists and policymakers united to develop an approach that 'stressed diversity of poverty situations and the multidimensionality of the poverty problem and focused on the agency and the capability of actors, on "strengths" rather than "needs"' (Li 2000 in Kaag et al. 2004:52). Although the concept of livelihoods was not new and had been long used by other social scientists (for example Evans-Pritchard 1940; Kimble 1960; Pandit

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[3] It is not my intention to provide a complete overview of the genesis and development of the livelihood concept because this has already been done quite extensively by others (most notably Carney 1998; Kaag et al. 2004; De Haan and Zoomers 2005).

[4] The most notable contributions to the development of the dominant livelihood approach of that time derived from Chambers (1983), Swift (1989) and Chambers and Conway (1992), Carney 1998.

1965; Freeman 1975), this period was the first time that a clear framework for analysing livelihoods was developed.

In the following decade, the British Department for International Development (DFID) took a leading role in the further development of a framework for studying livelihoods (De Haan and Zoomers 2005:31). The DFID livelihoods framework appeared to be attractive to researchers and policymakers alike because of its clearly elaborated schemes, diagrams and definitions (Kaag et al. 2004:68). Currently, most livelihood research is inspired by such model-like analytical frameworks. Similarly, DFID made a major contribution to defining the concept of livelihood. The most widely-used definition of a livelihood is still the one developed and reformed by various DFID employees: a livelihood 'comprises the *capabilities*, *assets* (including both material and social resources) and *activities* required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future while not undermining the natural resource base' (Carney 1998, based on Chambers and Conway 1992:7). According to Ellis (2000:7), the value of this definition lies in its direct attention to the links between the assets (also including access) and the capabilities that people possess, since these enable or constrain their actions to create, maintain or enhance a livelihood. In this definition, a livelihood is seen as 'a highly complex, all encompassing concept, which is not restricted to the ecological or to the economic or productive aspects of life' (De Haan and Zoomers 2003:356). Notwithstanding the apparent comprehensiveness of the concept, this understanding does not substantially move away from the economic or material objectives of life.

Consequently, several academics[5] have put more emphasis on the equal importance of other criteria—in particular the cultural and social dimensions that shape people's identity and give them the capability to act (in an accumulative or coping way) on existing and new opportunities and constraints. Bebbington (1999:2022) states that:

> A person's assets, such as land, are not merely means with which he or she makes a living: they also give meaning to that person's world. Assets are not simply resources that people use in building livelihoods: they are assets that give them the capability to be and to act. Assets should not be understood only as things that allow survival, adaptation and poverty alleviation: they

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[5] Most notably, Bebbington 1999; Long 2000; De Haan and Zoomers 2005; Mazzucato 2004; Kaag et al. 2004.

are also the basis of agents' power to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that govern the control, use and transformation of resources.

Long (2000:197) also stresses the importance of including the social and cultural dimensions in livelihood studies; and uses Wallman's contribution (1984) for pointing to the fact that a livelihood is much more than 'finding or making shelter, transacting money, getting food to put on the family table or to exchange on the market place'. According to Long (2000:197), a livelihood encompasses:

> value choice, status issues, identification with or distantiation from other modes of living and types of social persons. It implies both a synchronic pattern of relationships existing among a delimited number of persons for solving livelihood problems or sustaining certain types of livelihoods, as well as diachronic processes. The later cover actors' livelihood trajectories during their life course, the types of choices they identify and take, and the switches they make between livelihood options. Livelihoods are both individually and jointly constructed and represent patterns of shifting inter-dependencies.

In this respect, Long (2001:241) also states that livelihoods 'are made up of practices by which individuals and groups strive to make a living, meet their consumption necessities, cope with adversities and uncertainties, engage with new opportunities, protect existing or pursue new lifestyles and cultural identifications, and fulfil their social obligations.'

Echoing Bebbington and Long, other authors continue to stress that livelihoods should be considered as a dynamic and holistic concept (for example, Ellis 2000; De Haan 2000). However, often these authors do not really move beyond material motives and aims, and continue to focus on capital and activities, and downplay structural features (De Haan and Zoomers 2005: 33). They still use model-based approaches to livelihoods, giving the impression that analytical distinctions are real-life distinctions that can be put into specific boxes (Hospes and Lont 2004:8–10). They also remain focused on 'livelihoods as being created, negotiated and fought for principally in one locality' (Mazzucato 2004:135). In the following sections, I will attempt to add greater theoretical depth to the livelihoods discussion by elaborating on the ideas of livelihood style, social space and place, geographical place and translocality.

Livelihood Styles: Beyond Agency and Social Structure

Contemporary livelihood studies have not, therefore, changed much in focus over the past two decades and are in principle still centred on the

'active role' that people play in responding to and bringing about change. Through emphasizing people's situated agency, that is, the way in which people 'actively shape their lives in particular contexts through material and non-material assets', analysts have tried to change the image of poor people as mere victims of structural constraints In the light of this desire, it is rather understandable that livelihood practices are often treated as if they are purely individual strategies and thus result of people trying to achieve predefined goals through rationally planned actions (Kaag et al. 2004:53 and 67).

Rather than denying the importance of people's agency in achieving a livelihood, I argue that there is much more involved than the deliberate motives or more conscious strategies of individuals or of groups. The anecdotes in the introductory chapter show that the practices of most Torajans seem intrinsically bounded and determined by the social structures in which they are embedded, even if they are no longer living in Tana Toraja. A view that looks solely on Torajan actions and strategies runs the risk of downplaying the social structures that shape them if not necessarily determining them. Archer (1988:ix, 1995) calls the basic issue in contemporary social theory 'the problem of structure and agency', namely the constant tension between the two influences. According to Miles (2000:19) 'This point [the interface between agency and structure] is acutely evident at an everyday experiential level, where we see that life is actively constituted by the contrary feeling that the individual is both free and yet somehow simultaneously constrained.'

I do not intend to provide a complete account of this dichotomy[6] but rather to bridge the debates on structure and agency by more realistically putting forward an alternative conceptual focus—on 'styles', or more specifically, on 'livelihood styles'. The value of the sociological concept of (life)styles for the analysis of livelihoods 'lies in the way in which it addresses the duality of structure and agency' (Miles 2000:18–9). By employing the concept of style it becomes possible to treat people as agents in the social world. Moreover, styles help to explain what people do, why they do it, and what doing it means to them and others (Chaney 1996:4). In this way, the concept of styles seems also to promise to avoid the rigid 'sectoral approach to livelihood strategies as if resources and resource systems are actually separated from each other and consequently each can be put in a special box' (Hospes and Lont 2004:10). Finally, the

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[6] See for more detailed elaborations, for example, Sztompka 1993; Ritzer and Goodman 2004.

concept of styles helps to analyse people's patterns of livelihood practices, not only as the outcome of strategically planned actions for making a living, but also as the (unconscious as much as conscious) actions to protect existing lifestyles or to pursue new lifestyles and cultural identifications, and to fulfil their social obligations. Besides, it includes practices that are meant to consolidate existing power or to strive for greater political power. As the livelihoods approach has a somewhat non-ideological standpoint, this dimension is rarely touched upon in contemporary livelihood studies.[7]

The concept of style is not completely new within the analysis of livelihoods. Arce and Hebinck (2002) introduced the concept in an unpublished paper as a means to analyze the impact of socio-cultural components within the livelihood framework. They use the notions of lifestyles or 'styles of farming' almost interchangeably as an argument against the concept of livelihood strategies, and build their argument along the lines of the 'styles of farming approach' developed earlier at Wageningen University.[8] By suggesting that style involves a more sophisticated analysis of livelihoods because it goes beyond the level of individual strategies and incorporates the significance of organized practices they contend that a 'style of farming' comprises four interrelated and mutually dependent levels of social analysis: (1) a specific cultural repertoire composed of shared experiences, knowledge, insights, interests, prospects and interpretations of the context; (2) an integrated set of practices and artefacts, such as crop varieties, instruments, cattle and cropping schemes; (3) a specific ordering of the interrelationships between the farming unit and markets, technology and institutions; (4) the way in which local people respond to agrarian policies (Arce and Hebinck 2002:8–9). Arce and Hebinck argue that the analysis of styles of farming has proved to be useful because of 'its clear set of analytical instruments and the way the concept disentangles diversity and differentiation' and therefore it should encompass other lifestyles and move beyond farming.

In a field somewhat related to that of livelihood studies, that of social security, Nooteboom (2003) also applied the concept of style in the analysis of communal institutions that provide social security on the one hand,

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[7] The study of De Haan and Zoomers (2005) is a notable exception; it discusses power relations in the livelihoods approach in order to fully conceptualize access.

[8] For example, by Bolhuis and Van der Ploeg 1985; Hebinck and Van der Ploeg 1997; Van der Ploeg 1999.

and the space for individuals to make use of this security on the other.[9] As with Arce and Hebinck, Nooteboom took the idea of styles loosely from the styles of farming approach developed at Wageningen. On the basis of these studies, Nooteboom (2003:54–5) defines styles (of social security) as 'distinguishable patterns of orientations and actions concerning the variety of means to achieve security; these patterns are structured by an internal logic and conditioned by social, economic, and personal characteristics of the people involved'. Both of these studies consider styles as emic social constructions. In this respect, Nooteboom argues that 'people do not follow a style, but have a style of organizing their social security' and that therefore this differs from strategies designed by individuals.

Although both studies provide some interesting insights into the notion of style, and emphasize its relevance for the integration of socio-cultural components as well as it being a way to move beyond the structure-agency divide, they have left many dimensions of the concept underexposed and without a satisfactory elaboration. In addition to styles, De Haan and Zoomers (2005:41–3) applied the concept of pathways, defined as 'patterns of livelihood activities which arise from a co-ordination process among actors. This co-ordination emerges from individual strategic behaviour embedded both in a historical repertoire and in social differentiation, including power relations and institutional processes, both of which play a role in subsequent decision-making'. The term 'pathways' has become more popular in contemporary livelihood studies[10] and De Haan and Zoomers have been using these studies to build up a definition. Their argumentation and definition provide interesting new insights into the theoretical discussion on livelihoods. For the analysis of the full complexity of Torajan livelihoods, the concept of pathways is particularly useful in stressing the dynamics of livelihoods or, more specifically, the pattern of livelihood practices that 'is generative and develops and changes over time because of the logic of practice' (De Haan and Zoomers 2005:41).

We need to explore the concept of style further to define more precisely what is meant by the term, and to identify its value for livelihood studies as an analytical tool. I will do this on the basis of a deeper analysis of Giddens and Bourdieu's 'distinctive notion on styles' which has been

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[9] Though Nooteboom (2003) does not employ the concept of lifestyle, his discussion of styles is actually based on earlier writings on lifestyles and farming styles, and therefore when he uses the word 'styles', one could also read it as 'lifestyles'.

[10] See, for example, Breusers 2001; Pender et al. 2001; Scoones and Wolmer 2002; De Haan and Zoomers 2005.

instructive in the sociological discussions of styles, or more specifically of lifestyles. De Haan and Zoomers (2005:41) note that the attention to styles in livelihood studies 'can be seen as an attempt to move away from neo-liberal thinking to a more structural approach—from Giddens toward Bourdieu's 'habitus'. I want to make clear once again that I see the value of the concept of styles precisely as a way of bridging the agency-structure divide and, as such, it does include elements of both Giddens and Bourdieu, rather than either one or the other. Both have provided useful tools to sociology and, more specifically, their conception of lifestyles which helps in obtaining a more thorough understanding of the relation-ship between structure and agency (Miles 2000:23). Here I think it is useful to outline some of the fundamental notions of Giddens and of Bourdieu on the study of the agency-structure divide and lifestyles before proceed-ing to a discussion on its usefulness for livelihoods analysis.

Anthony Giddens' structuration theory (1984) is probably one of the best-known and most accomplished attempts to integrate structure and agency (see Ritzer and Goodman 2004:509). This theory emphasizes the 'duality of structure', meaning that action and structure cannot be con-ceived separately as they are in fact two sides of the same coin. On the one side, social structures are created by human agency and, on the other, social structures are the very medium of this constitution (Giddens 1976:121). In this context, Giddens (1984:2) argues that it is 'neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of social totality, but social practices ordered across time and space' that should be taken as the basic domain in the study of the social sciences. Agency and structure are thus inextricably interwoven in ongoing human activity or practice (Ritzer and Goodman 2004:510). Social practices, as the proper units of analysis, are not considered to be discrete actions but rather ongo-ing streams of actions. This continuity of social practices presumes reflex-ivity or consciousness, implying that human actors are not merely self-conscious but are also engaged in the monitoring of the ongoing flow of social life (Giddens 1984:3). As such, 'activities are not produced by con-sciousness, by the social construction of reality, nor are they produced by social structure. Rather, in expressing themselves as actors, people are engaging in practice, and it is through that practice that both conscious-ness and structure are produced' (Ritzer and Goodman 2004:510).

Giddens thus regards human actors (or agents) as the ultimate motor of structuration (Sztompka 1993). In so doing, he accords actors great power, in a sense that they have 'the ability to make a difference in the social world', while at the same time emphasizing that they cannot act in any

meaningful way without drawing upon collective interpretive schemes that enable and constrain their actions (Ritzer and Goodman 2004:511; Calhoun et al. 2002:223). Structure is thus not viewed as a barrier to action, but rather as essentially involved in its production (Giddens 1984:17). As such, Giddens (1984:179) notes that 'there is no such thing as a distinctive type of "structural explanation" in the social sciences; all explanations will involve at least implicit reference both to the purposive, reasoning behaviour of agents and to its intersection with constraining and enabling features of the social and material contexts of that behaviour'.

Against this background, Giddens developed a perception of lifestyles that encompasses most of the central issues touched upon in his theory of structuration. According to Giddens (1991:81–2), a lifestyle involves 'a cluster of habits and orientations, and hence has a certain unity…that connects options in a more or less ordered pattern. …[T]he selection or creation of lifestyles is influenced by group pressures and the visibility of role models, as well as by socioeconomic circumstances'. He defines lifestyles as:

> a more or less integrated set of practices which an individual embraces, not only because such practices fulfil utilitarian needs, but because they give material form to a particular narrative of self-identity. …Lifestyles are [thus] routined practices, the routines incorporated into habits of dress, eating, modes of acting and favoured milieux for encountering others; but the routines followed are reflexively open to change in the light of the mobile nature of self-identity.

In this explanation of lifestyles, Giddens puts the streams, or integrated set of routinized practices of agents, at the centre of lifestyles; while taking into account the influence of social structures in which they are embedded, and acknowledging the reflexivity of agents that enables change in the routines of everyday practices.

While including both structure and agency in his notion of lifestyle, Giddens tends to put the emphasis on the latter and fails to really grasp the social structures that underlie the social world (Craib 1992). Bourdieu, on the other hand, favours a position that is more structuralist, though not losing sight of the agent. Like Giddens, Bourdieu sought to bridge the extremities of structural and interactionist approaches to social life. Although he succeeded to some degree, there is a bias in his work towards structuralism (Ritzer and Goodman 2004:520). Bourdieu (1977, 1990) advanced a 'relational analysis of social tastes and practices' as a means of obtaining an empirical handle on the dynamic relationship between structure and action; or, in his words, by escaping from both subjectivism

and objectivism. His analysis involves the three concepts of 'position', 'dispositions' (or habitus) and 'position-taking' (practices) which have appeared pivotal in most of his work. According to Bourdieu, the complete set of positions make up social space. Each position is occupied by an actor on the basis of their occupation, education or proximity to power. Positions are maintained and expressed to others through a process of position-taking whereby they produce social status for their occupants (Calhoun et al. 2002:260–1). People express their position through a particular style of clothing, leisure activities, consumer patterns and so on. However, there is no hard connection between positions in the social space and the practices related to them; they differ in times and in spaces. Rather than having a permanent connection, structure and practice are linked together by the habitus. By 'habitus' Bourdieu (1989:19) means:

> A system of schemes of perception and appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures which are acquired through the lasting experience of a social position. Habitus is both a system of schemes of production of practices and a system of perception and appreciation of practices. And, in both of these dimensions, its operation expresses the social position in which it was elaborated. Consequently, habitus produces practices and representations which are available for classification, which are objectively differentiated; however, they are immediately perceived as such only by those agents who possess the code, the classificatory schemes necessary to understand their social meaning.

As the habitus (or dispositions) of agents are 'the mental structures through which they apprehend the social world [which] are essentially the product of the internalization of the structures of the world' (Bourdieu 1989:18), they cannot be studied directly since they are only observable through practices. In this respect, habitus both implies a 'sense of one's place' as well as a 'sense of the place of others' or, in other words, provides us with a world with a common sense: a world that seems self-evident. 'It is on the basis of habitus that Bourdieu defines social groups (including social classes), since those who occupy similar positions in the social structure will have the same habitus '(Calhoun et al. 2002:261).

In his work on *Distinction*, Bourdieu (1984) argues that the habitus of a person, or a group of persons that occupy a similar or neighbouring position in social space, is in a way quite systematic. All the elements of a person's behaviour have something in common, 'a kind of affinity of style' (Bourdieu 2002:28). Bourdieu uses the example of handwriting to underpin his argument. Whether a particular person 'writes with instruments as diverse as a pencil, a pen or piece of chalk and on media as different as a

sheet of paper and a blackboard', his or her style of handwriting will be immediately recognizable. He calls this a 'practical systematicity' to denote that it is not necessarily logical. Bourdieu continues his argument, and accepts that there are variances and exceptions but sees the word 'style' as indicative of this practical unity. He acknowledges that an emphasis on this unity is in danger of being regarded as supporting the idea that human behaviour is monolithic—which is sometimes put forward against the notion of habitus—but makes clear that human behaviour is not monolithic. Rather, 'It is very open, very diverse, but within limits, and the idea of lifestyle is suited to express this loose systematicity which characterizes human behaviour'. In line with the above argumentation, Bourdieu (1984:172) defines lifestyles as 'the systematic products of habitus, which perceived in their mutual relations through the schemes of the habitus, become sign systems that are socially qualified (as 'distinguished', 'vulgar, etc.)'.

Bourdieu's contribution to the understanding of lifestyles has proved useful in explaining why contemporary socio-structural distinctions are increasingly articulated through cultural forms (Chaney 1996:65). Lifestyles are about behaving in culturally acceptable ways and depend upon someone's cultural capital. The more cultural capital someone possesses, the more extravagant that person's lifestyle is likely to be (Miles 2000:23). In that sense, certain activities are considered more culturally appropriate than others, and these are hierarchically ordered. As such, lifestyles fulfil an active role in maintaining social hierarchies because some people have more access to cultural (and economic) capital than others. Accepting this argument, and from Bourdieu's point of view, group contexts and influences are of great importance in the construction of people's lifestyles.

Although Bourdieu has provided an interesting theoretical framework for the analysis of lifestyles that is based on some fascinating empirical work, it is not surprising that his work has been criticized as being overly deterministic (see, for example, Chaney 1996). To put it differently, there seems to be no conceptual (or empirical) space for the human agent in Bourdieu's framework, and the use of the term 'reflexitivity' is questionable. As Chaney (1996:66) observes, 'The very prescriptive determinism of his concept of habitus does not allow him to fully appreciate the ways in which actors may and will play with these [lifestyle]choices as ironic commentaries on their own styles of life'. Chaney continues his argument by adopting a quote by Rigby (1991:123 quoted in Chaney 1996:66): 'Bourdieu's view of the role of culture in modern society is not only very pessimistic

but also rather outdated'. With this summation he reflects the processes of modernization and globalization (such as increasing suburbanization, migration, the increasing dominance of retailing in anonymous shopping centres) that seem to have diminished rather than enhanced cultural diversity. According to Chaney (1996:145), these processes have also become 'an inextricable part of the same social and economic changes that have been the context of lifestyle identifications'.

Livelihood Style Defined

In spite of the criticism of both Giddens's and Bourdieu's studies of contemporary lifestyles, I believe that taken together they cover most issues of styles and the factors that shape them and, therefore, provide the fundamentals for coming to grips with the term and discussing its usefulness in the study of livelihoods. Apart from their differences over emphasising either the role of agency or that of structure, they do deliver several analogous aspects in their endeavours to analytically frame the concept of style. They both depart from human practices as the central focus of analysis. As such, they stress the routine nature or systematicity of these practices that are more or less ordered in a pattern and hence show a certain unity. Both authors admit that this pattern follows from the social context (or social space), social differentiation and socioeconomic circumstances (or place) in which it is embedded. Further, they both take the historical, or time dimension, into account, and regard these patterns of practices as a product of time. This reflects the ideas of De Haan and Zoomers (2005:41), who argue that although the results may be the same, the pathways might have been different. In this respect, Giddens and Bourdieu consider styles to be important in expressing one's own, or someone else's, position in society or, in other words, as a means to obtain an identity or social status. However, the main difference lies in the plasticity of styles and the actors' potential to actively bring about change in their style of living.

In Bourdieu's perspective, styles are more or less defined by people's position in the social space. Their various positions and thereby styles are the result of the actors' historical trajectories in arriving at the positions that they now occupy. These trajectories, in turn, correspond largely to a given volume of inherited capital. '[T]he shift from one trajectory to another often depends on collective events—wars, crisis, etc.—or individual events—encounters, affairs, benefactors etc.—which are usually described as fortunate or unfortunate accidents' (Bourdieu 1984:110).

In this sense, Bourdieu largely ignores reflexitivity, the capacity or capability to reflect on one's practices, and change them if desired—which is so important in Giddens' account. Even if the room for manoeuvre is very limited because of the social structure in which an agent is embedded, styles are never completely static according to Giddens. Or, seen from another perspective, in Bourdieu's explanation there is hardly any room for deviant behaviour or styles, whereas in Giddens' reasoning there is. Along the same lines, Bourdieu ascribes a much greater role to culture in defining or determining people's styles than does Giddens.

As I argued above, a satisfactory definition of style for the analysis of livelihoods, or as I prefer to call it 'livelihood style', cannot be based on either Giddens's or Bourdieu's accounts of lifestyle, but must include aspects of both explanations. Accordingly, on the basis of a synthesis-like approach, I define livelihood style as

> A recognizable and coherent pattern of practices that results from an actor's conscious and unconscious objectives in establishing, maintaining, and enhancing a living in interaction (both in a cooperative and conflicting manner) with other actors over time, and within the framework of status systems, cultural ideals and geographical space and place(s).

In this sense, livelihood styles can be perceived as a fairly stable unity of practices that are objectively differentiated; however, the perception of styles by the agents embodied in them (emic view) does not necessarily coincide with the perceptions of the same styles by the ones observing them (etic view). This idea contrasts with the view of Arce and Hebinck and of Nooteboom who consider styles to be specifically an emic notion.

The term 'style' does not imply that daily lives are homogeneous. Rather, the key issue is that people have a great variety of options (in resources, social relations, cultural repertoires, and so on) in a given context to establish a livelihood. Despite these options, particular livelihood styles, or clusters of livelihood styles, emerge as the outcome of the whole gamut of practices that are reflected in the impressive heterogeneity of daily lives (Long and van der Ploeg 1994:70). Although particular livelihood styles might emerge over time, these styles are dynamic and susceptible to change. Changes in styles are both embedded in the style itself, even if this is not observable at first glance, as well as triggered by the context in which styles are embedded. The first aspect of change concerns actors' livelihood trajectories during their life courses, the types of choices they identify and make, and the switches they make between livelihood options (Long 2001:55). The latter form of change is often seen as more important than

the first, especially when it comes to abrupt changes due to particular disasters or crises, but we should be careful not to exaggerate the importance of the contextual factors to which the agent is exposed. As Long and Van der Ploeg argue (1994:77), such factors are not relevant as 'determinants' when self-evident limits exist beyond which action is judged to be inconceivable. 'Rather, [they are relevant] as boundary markers that become targets for negotiation, reconsideration, sabotage and/or change, i.e. as barriers that have to be removed or transformed" (Long 2001:63). Given this 'double way of change', which is inherent to livelihood styles, these styles in fact represent an analysis of the 'work in progress' or, in Bourdieu's words (2002), the *modus operandi.*

Moreover, I argue that livelihood practices are embedded in social differentiation. Or, in other words, in social space, and in the struggles and negotiations that take place within it, since people generally but not necessarily act according to their position within it. Patterns in livelihood practices exist because various people face similar inherited attributes (such as age, gender, ethnicity and descent) and achieved attributes (such as educational credentials and political position) that provide them with similar opportunities and expectations. In Bourdieu's terms, patterns in livelihood practices arise because people from the same social class, gender or caste have similar dispositions[11] and therefore face similar life opportunities and expectations of others (De Haan and Zoomers 2005:41). Agents have some room to manoeuvre within these (dis)positions in order to obtain a living, and are able to change their social positions. Although social structures might not determine people's livelihood styles as rigidly as Bourdieu argues, in any society some ordering principles or boundary markers at least guide people in their perceptions of the social space and their position within it, thereby shaping their life opportunities and their expectations of others in establishing, maintaining or enhancing their wellbeing. As these principles are generally locally bounded, livelihood styles can only be explained with reference to the local context in which they are embedded.

In this perspective, the term livelihood style enables me to analyse the full complexity of Torajan livelihoods by focusing on the patterns of practices that individuals and households employ to compose, maintain

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[11] A disposition is a habit, a preparation, a state of readiness, or a tendency to act in a specified way. In Bourdieu's theory of fields dispositions are the natural tendencies of each individual to take on a certain position in any field. There is no strict determinism through one's dispositions, though in retrospect, a space of possible practices can always be observed.

and enhance wellbeing, without predetermining whether these practices are the result of conscious or unconscious choices. In so doing, it becomes possible to identify the most prominent life objectives (material and non-material) in Tana Toraja, which in turn lead to or correspond to a particular livelihood style that by definition is not designed simply to make a living. If at the same time we take into account the influences of the social space, social differentiation, cultural ideals, place and time in which the actors are embedded, we can see to what extent these goals and the design of a livelihood style are bounded (as markers) by these factors. Moreover, it enables us to consider whether Torajan livelihood styles are location-specific (in both a social and geographical sense) and even, more importantly, whether particular styles are more vulnerable or resilient to changes in context than others. This differs from earlier approaches to livelihoods in that livelihood styles do not explain the vulnerability of people's lives solely by looking at assets, capabilities or the activities of agents, but also encompass people's perspectives or objectives in obtaining a living, and also the more cultural aspects and contexts that shape these aspects. In short, the concept of livelihood styles provides a framework for explaining the way people make a living in Tana Toraja as something which is more than the outcome of economically valuable resources being strategically mobilized for making a living. As such, the concept of livelihood styles seems promising as a way out of the paradox posed in the introduction of this book: how is it possible that while the economic activities in Tana Toraja declined, and the costs for daily life increased, that the exorbitant Torajan expenditures on funeral ceremonies continued or even increased?

Livelihoods and Social Space: Networks, Kinship and Houses

Styles point toward the idea that we should not think of a collection of rational actors but rather of people who have a number of scenarios at their disposal, shaped by context and structural aspects. Further, agency means that people opt for a particular style within this structural room for manoeuvre. Styles could be considered as a kind of patterned behaviour in which the emphasis is on the cultural aspects that shape them. Moreover, styles emphasize that people are not opting for particular practices in a social vacuum but, rather, that they are part of particular groups, or more specifically, networks of social relations. Through social relations, people's styles are positioned in the social world. For example, in the organization of a drama, there are a variety of scenarios possible from which the actors

can choose. However, at the same time, their choice of a particular play or role depends on the people they have at their disposal. Moreover, from the outside, the drama might appear to be a well-orchestrated performance whereas, behind the scenes, people might be competing to get the most popular role. To understand why people choose particular scenarios or styles, and how they come about, it is thus necessary to take account of the social dimension or social space. I am not suggesting that people are completely bounded by social space, but that the risk of being expelled or excluded from particular social relations means that people usually refrain from freeriding.

Thus the practices that make a living are created, maintained, enhanced and adapted in interactions—in both cooperative and conflicting manners—with other actors. This means that people's livelihood styles are, in analytical terms, situated in social spaces with boundaries defined by social networks, relationships and identities. 'These spaces are fluid, constantly changing, and are shaped and constantly re-negotiated by people themselves' (Arce and Hebinck 2002:6–7). Livelihood styles can only be properly understood by mapping the various actors and the networks and social relationships among them. As Granovetter (1992:25) argues, all action (in the sense of economic action) 'is socially situated and cannot be explained by reference to individual motives alone. It is embedded in ongoing networks of personal relationships rather than carried out by atomized actors.' The question then is, what does this space looks like, and in what sense is it constraining or enabling people's behaviour? This boils down to the idea of positive and negative social capital—terms that have become popular in conceptualising the social dimension. In the following sections, I will elaborate on the various aspects that make up the social space in general, and try to obtain some analytical handles for mapping the Torajan social space in particular.

Torajan livelihoods are imbued with social relationships and networks, especially kinship relations. 'Practical' kinship relations, in Bourdieu's words (1977:37), are highly instrumental in Torajans' success at achieving wellbeing. Although kinship may not be the only element in the social space of Torajan society, it certainly appears to be one of the most important factors among the many that make up the basis of the structure of Torajan relationships and networks. As Bourdieu argued (1976:141 in: Schweizer and White 1998:1), kinship and marriage grow out of '…practical and complex strategies. They are part of an entire system of biological, cultural, and social reproduction', and in this sense they are fundamental to the constitution of social relations. In the following

sections, I postulate some theoretical ideas on kinship in general, and more specifically on insular Southeast Asian notions of kinship. As the *tongkonan* in Tana Toraja seems to fulfil a key function in anchoring people in space and linking them in time, I add some perspectives on kinship from the studies on so-called 'house societies'.

Social Relationships and Networks

> A fruitful analysis of any human action…requires us to avoid the atomization implicit in the theoretical extremes of under- and over-socialized views. Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere to a script written for them by the particular intersection of sociocultural categories they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations (Granovetter 1992:31).

I quote Granovetter to emphasize that my purpose is to find a balance between an oversocialized (deterministic, cultural) view of practices, and an under-socialized (individualist, atomized) perspective by focusing on the way in which social relations and networks of relations shape the livelihood practices of human agents for better or for worse. Thus, the stress on social relations goes beyond the particularized individual and also deals with the ambiguous complexities of friction, where relationships exhibit both cooperation and conflict (Schuller and Field 2000). In so doing, I do not aim to account completely for all social network studies— and no-one is quite sure whether a network is a metaphor, a method or a theory (Barnes 1979). Rather, I will establish a conceptual analysis that stems from various social network studies (and to some extent from social capital studies)[12] that will help me to further analyze Torajan social life as an essential element of the available livelihood styles.

Social networks are seen as the set of relations or ties among actors (for example, Mitchell 1973; Wasserman and Faust 1994; Schuller and Field 2000). Actors are regarded here as discrete individual, corporate or collective social units, such as individuals, households, organizations and social groups (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Actors are linked to other actors by social ties. A collection of ties of a specific kind involving a specified set of actors is referred to as social relations. Social relations can be as diverse as kinship, friendship, village or neighbourhood membership, patron-client,

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[12] And to some extent to social capital studies that often adopted key terms from social network studies and then refined them and developed them further.

political party membership and so on. Social relationships can be mapped as a grid of ties that involve both content and form. Mitchell (1973:23–6) extracts three different types of content from the social network literature of that time, which still largely resembles contemporary accounts: communication content; normative content; and exchange or transformation content. The first of these relates to the passage of information between actors. The second concerns the expectations that actors have of other actors because of some social characteristic or social attribute the other may possess. Mitchell (1973: 27) relates these expectations to a 'common sense of meaning' that actors attribute to the relationship. Wasserman and Faust (1994:38) would label these two content types as transfers of non-material resources. The third content can be conceptualized as the links between actors in social networks created by the set of transactions or transfers of material resources. This includes social support such as lending and borrowing items, business transactions (sales or purchases of goods) and the exchange of gifts. To summarize, the relational ties between actors can be seen as channels for the transfer or flow of non-material as well as material resources (Schuller and Field 2000).

Besides content, a tie can also be articulated in form, which concerns the strength of a relation. Relations range from weak to strong. Weak ties can be characterized as links between actors that have infrequent contact and who do not attach great significance to the relationship (Schensul et al. 1999:13). At the other end of the continuum, strong ties imply a great intensity of interaction between actors in relationships that are highly valued. Examples of strong ties that are often given are relations between family or kin, friends and close colleagues. In livelihood studies, strong ties are usually regarded as the most important in maintaining a living because one trusts family and friends, and they are the first ones to call upon (De Haan and Quarles van Ufford 2002:289). Nevertheless, in his seminal work, Granovetter (1973) has shown that, on some occasions, weak ties might also appear to be quite strong. They can function as bridges to other networks that contain information or contacts not available within one's own network. Following Granovetter, several authors—mostly in the field of social capital—have elaborated on bridging and cross-cutting ties as a way to open up different networks and thereby additional resources (see for example Narayan 1999; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 1998).

Knoke and Burt (1983) emphasize that ties between two actors can be either symmetric or asymmetric in the amount and type of resources that flow between them. However, in reality most ties are asymmetric in content and strength because a strict one-to-one correspondence between

what two persons give to one another is rare (Wellman 1988:40–1). Wellman states, 'Although rarely symmetric, ties are usually reciprocated in a generalized way. For example, not only do clients send resources to patrons, but patrons usually send such resources as goods, information, and protection to clients. Further, the power of patrons is partly based on their ties with clients, as the ties themselves are a scarce resource".

Thus, to make a living, people may employ a variety of social relationships that vary in content, strength and direction. These social relationships are rarely differentiated from 'ordinary' social and economic relationships that serve normal life situations (Von Benda Beckmann et al. 1997:109). According to Von Benda-Beckmann et al., the livelihood dimension of these relationships is often just one of many facets 'that are interwoven in complex social relationships' In this respect, relationships can be regarded as multifunctional—as devices for livelihood provisions but also with potentially economic, political and social functions. It should be emphasized that dyadic social relations are generally part of larger social networks and can therefore not be well understood in isolation from the social context in which they are embedded (Granovetter 1992). In Howard Aldrich's words (1982:286), '...transactions within networks are influenced by properties of the field of relations surrounding them'. As such, patron-client relations, for example, should be treated as local manifestations of larger class structures (Bodemann 1988). To push this argument a little further, people are not only embedded in multifunctional relations but also in the multiplex networks of which these relations are part. Multiplexity here refers to overlapping social networks in which the same people are linked together across different speres or dimensions of life (Portes 1998). Boissevain (1974) gives the example of a small town in which the same individuals may simultaneously be kin, neighbours and co-workers and hence be linked to the same network of people through multifunctional relations.

Now, the thorny issue of the boundaries of these networks arises: what are the boundaries of these networks and how are they defined?[13] The most common strategies for boundary specification are based on a distinction between emic approaches that take the subjective perceptions of actors as a starting point and the etic approaches that depart from the observer's point of view (Mitchell 1973; Lauman et al. 1983 quoted in Marsden 1990). In both views several criteria can be chosen to define the

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[13] This parallels the general problem in social science of defining the population to which research results can be generalized (Marsden 1990).

boundaries of networks: (1) actors' attributes that define inclusion or membership criteria for more formal organizations such as schools, church choirs, political parties, but also for less formal domains such as kinship or peergroups. Individual attributes are, for example, age, gender, socioeconomic status, and place of residence, and the like; (2) participation in events, such as funeral ceremonies or gambling parties. 'Events usually occur at discrete points in time, as well as in geographical places' and usually concern attributes of both the actors and of the event (Wasserman and Faust 1994); (3) networks focusing on a particular problem, a resource, an idea or a social condition. Thus, the existence of common aims and interests among a set of people (Mitchell 1973); and finally (4) the relational character of networks, such as the content of ties (particular exchanges for social security for example). It does not need much explication to see that boundary specification becomes more difficult in large-scale and complex societies, where individuals interact with a great number of people on different bases, on different occasions and in different places. Moreover, it is apparent that these boundaries are not static and change. Even the composition of close kinship groups changes over the lifetime of its members. Seen in this way, partial networks or (corporate) groups so bounded are always an abstract construction of either the participants, or the sociologist who is observing them, or both (Mitchell 1973:32). Nevertheless, when it is made clear from the outset whether the networks described are from an 'emic' or an 'etic' perspective, and which principles are used in drawing boundaries, a network analysis provides useful insight into the way in which social space(s) shape people's livelihood practices.

Yet, if we are to accept the finiteness or boundedness of networks of social relations—at least in abstract terms—we need to consider the concept of 'social position' which is in a sense an abstraction from bounded networks or groups. Position can be defined as 'the location of an actor or class of actors in a system of social relationships' (Gross et al. 1958 quoted in Mitchell 1973:30). Whether desirable resources, and information on accessing them, are made available through network connections depends largely on one's position in the network (Smith-Doerr and Powell 2005:391). In this regard, position in a network both empowers and constrains the actions of their incumbents. Through certain network positions actors have greater access to, and potential control over, relevant resources (Krackhardt and Brass 1994:210). Being in these more fortunate positions, actors increase others' dependency upon them and wield more power. Good illustrations of such positions are gatekeepers and brokers.

Gatekeepers, for example, might control access to an organization's leader from which they may gain wealth, flattery, influence, the use of organizational resources and so on. Brokers hold a central position by linking two kinds of network clusters and, as such, might take a share of the resources that pass through their position (Wellman 1988:45–6). In addition to brokers and gatekeepers, we might also think of central positions in political networks, neighbourhood or community networks, kinship networks, and the like. Although people in central positions might increase others' dependence upon them, they also have to increase their dependence on others in order to have access to relevant resources that are not controlled or mediated by those others (Krackhardt and Brass 1994:210).

Long (2001:56) stresses the importance of including a focus on those social networks that are composed of uneven and partial sets of relations, and that strain toward patterns of centralization and hierarchy. He argues that most authors 'depict networks as made up of relatively balanced and dense sets of relations based on principles of reciprocity' but that this is often not the case. Social network studies often fail to address issues of conflict and power and overlook the possibility that networks might also have a dark side. Intense trust and bitter rivalry usually coexist in most densely-knit networks. Competition over access to scarce resources is inherent in social space and leads to collaboration and more-or-less bounded coalitions and factions (Wellman 1988:46). Network analysts in particular, trying to explain the structural basis for political activity, have demonstrated how acts of collective violence (for example food riots or rebellions) are integral parts of broad conflicts over power fought by various interest groups. Interestingly, those engaged in collective violence are not the uprooted, disconnected individuals but rather those more deeply rooted and more densely knit into competing groups. In general, such people appeared to be the most likely to be politically active, whether this activity occurred in violent or non-violent ways.

Although power is usually thought of as a resource that individuals, or clusters of social relations, can possess, accumulate and unproblematically exercise, a more fruitful way of thinking about power flows from feminist or gender studies. These studies (see for example Kabeer 1994) point to the fact that power is much more than how hierarchies and hegemonic control demarcate social positions and opportunities, and restrict access to resources. They do not focus on 'power-over' but stress a 'power-to' view—the capacity to do things, to achieve goals, no matter how small the room for manoeuvre is within particular situations. Villareal (1994) shows in a lively account of women's empowerment that power never

fully belongs to either of the two people involved in a particular interaction. Power is the outcome of complex struggles and negotiations over authority, status, reputation and resources, and it necessitates the acquisition of networks of actors and followers (Long 2001:71). Seeing power in this way, Villareal argues that 'power relations are re-created in interaction and thus constitute a dynamic process of "wielding and yielding". The wants of the power wielder are influenced and shaped by the other in the subordinate position. From this point of view, women are not pure victims, but also have an active role in their subordination' (Villareal 1994 in De Haan and Zoomers 2005:37). If we relate this view to a person's position in a network, it becomes clear that, through the wielding and yielding process, people are continually creating room to improve or protect their position within social space.

Having said this, there is still one issue I need to raise with regard to the analysis of social relations and networks, namely, the ordering principles that are embodied in them. Ordering principles 'should not be seen as fixed institutional frames or normative criteria, but rather as flexible or contestable interpretive modes that give some order to the flux of social life' (Long 2001:56). The scope of these ordering principles varies greatly between societies and criss-crosses different domains of life. Given this situation, I will not continue with an exposition on general or universal ordering principles but instead focus on the specific ordering principles that prevail in South Sulawesi. This will be discussed below but, before getting there, I will first try to get a better analytical grip on the most common social relations and networks in Torajan society—those defined by kinship and houses.

Networks of Kin

The reason for discussing kinship here is well reflected in the words of Kemp and Hüsken (1991:7), '[it] arises not from some specific project to study kinship per se, but rather from the experience, while in the pursuit of other topics, of "discovering" at the local level the importance of kin ties exceeding the boundaries of the family or household.' In the pursuit of discovering Torajan livelihoods, I entered the realm of kinship—its puzzling terminology, meanings and boundaries—as a matter of course. Whereas most scholars in the field of social and cultural studies might have moved away from the study of kinship over recent decades, when considering Torajan society—as with many other both simple and complex societies—kinship is clearly a major dimension of social relations

that cannot be neglected if one wants to understand livelihoods. Therefore, this section is an attempt to 'come to terms' with kinship in island Southeast Asia in general, and in South Sulawesi in particular. It does not present a full account of kinship systems as they have been reported in the specialized literature (mainly in anthropological writings). Rather, the discussion of kinship will centre on the objective of identifying its major characteristics in island Southeast Asia.

Before going into detail on this topic, let me provide a short history of the study of kinship in the region to provide background for the current stance. For a long period, the study of kinship in Southeast Asia was dominated by a concern with lineages and the construction of formal models of kinship terminologies (Kemp and Hüsken 1991; Waterson 1986). Until the 1950s, when kinship studies were still at the heart of the anthropological discipline, the focus was mainly on corporate groups as the main *explanandum* of social structure. This theory of society developed primarily out of fieldwork conducted by British social anthropologists in African countries. However, when social anthropologists entered the rural societies of Southeast Asia, the idea of the corporate group seemed to be of little help because such groups were relatively rare. Shelly Errington (1989:235) put this well:

> In any case, accommodating the cluster of ideas around the *corporate group* (with its usually unstated conceptual baggage of the importance of descent to the formation of groups, the idea that kinship terminology is a distorted reflection of biological reality, etc., etc.) proved to be a strain when it came to Pacific societies, which often trace their 'kinship' relations 'cognatically' or 'bilaterally,' where groupings often have vague or permeable boundaries, where recruitment to groupings is often not strictly along genealogical or descent lines, where indeed, 'kinship' (in the sense of a belief in shared body substance) sometimes does not feature in either the formation of groups or the reference of what we call 'kinship' terminology.

The relative absence of the characteristics of corporate groups in rural settlements of Southeast Asia and the new insights that came with increasing fieldwork in the region, produced a radical switch from an 'official' to a more 'practical' perspective on kinship, to use Bourdieu's terms (1977:37). In the second half of the twentieth century, this understanding developed, and it became generally accepted that the majority of Southeast Asia's population live in cognatic social environments, rather than in genealogically-determined corporate groups (Kemp and Hüsken 1991:1).

'Cognatic' or 'bilateral' are terms used to signify a type of descent that is non-unilineal, meaning that equivalent importance is ascribed to

relations through men as well as through women. In the anthropological literature, cognatic kinship is often extended with a 'kindred' mode of organizing groupings. The concept of the kindred stems mainly from studies of indigenous Borneo societies (most notably, Leach 1950; Murdock 1960; Freeman 1961, 1970) and is, as such, mostly associated with 'simpler' societies (Kemp and Hüsken 1991:5). A kindred was defined as 'that cognatic category which embraces all of an individual's father's kin, and all of his (or her) mother's kin' and that spreads 'upwards and outwards from an individual standing at its centre, or base' (Freeman 1970:67). It is, thus, an ego-focus group of relatives based upon individual knowledge. Hence, depending on the point of view of the ego taken, it varies in constellation. Freeman (1960:71) concludes that:

> Strictly speaking no two individuals have precisely the same kindred. However, if the relationships between themselves are excepted, and assuming they have not produced children of their own, the members of the same sibling group do have the same kindred. Looked in this way, a kindred is seen as radiating out bilaterally from the children of an elementary family to include all those persons to whom relationship can be traced consanguineally through both male and female links.

From this perspective, in many insular Southeast Asian societies, kinship can be understood as consisting of a set of full siblings that form a kindred-centre, a set of allies, or a kind of mini-grouping (Errington 1989:215). This coincides with the way many people of island Southeast Asia themselves often describe their social organization, namely in terms of plants, such as bamboo or coconut trees. Full siblings possess a common 'root' that makes up the 'clump' which is generally hidden from view. Thus, although the various siblings visualized as trunks might seem to be separate trees with their own trunk, the opposite is true; they are all of the same plant with a common shared trunk. Therefore, in South Sulawesi (as in many other societies found among the Southeast Asian archipelagoes) siblings are considered to be a single entity and expected to act accordingly.[14] In this way, '[f]irst-degree siblings (first cousins in our terms) are siblings whose

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[14] In comparing kinship and relation terminology, Shelly Errington (1989:207) distinguishes two regions in island Southeast Asia which comprise comparative kinship characteristics: 'Eastern Indonesia' and the Centrist Archipelago. She refers to the Centrist Archipelago as the region that includes those societies which are located on the swath of islands rimming mainland Southeast Asia, stretching from the Malay peninsula through Borneo, dipping into Java, Sulawesi, the Moluccas, and Mindanao, Luzon, the Visayas, and other Philippine islands. Eastern Indonesia is considered as the region that includes all Indonesian islands east of Bali, including Lombok, Sumba, Sumbawa, Flores, Timor and Ambon.

common source or root is two generational layers removed from them-
selves (i.e. in the grandparental layer); second-degree siblings' common
root is three layers removed' (Errington 1989:215). As full siblings stem
from exactly the same parents in the layer above them, they are consid-
ered as full equivalents in whatever is passed on (noble blood, land, orna-
ments, and the like) from the 'roots' to the descendants. It follows that
many people in these societies consider themselves to be as closely related
to the full siblings of their parents and grandparents as to their own par-
ents and grandparents.

Thus, by embodying forebears in layers rather than in lines, these cog-
natic relationship systems lead quickly to an enormous number of fore-
bears for each individual in them. Not surprisingly, therefore, people trace
themselves 'not *from* forebears but *to* forebears' in these societies
(Errington 1989:216). In doing so, they often trace themselves back to the
most important and highly-valued forebear. This upward-looking is thus
often blurred, or coloured, by 'genealogical amnesia' as the Geertzes
termed it (1975:85). Chabot (1950) had already shown in his study on a
Makassarese and Buginese community in South Sulawesi that genealogi-
cal ties, or better the strategic use of them, are of particular relevance in
understanding the origins and practice of political power. The same is true
of the ritual and religious dimensions. By introducing the concept of 'wor-
ship community' Chabot shows that it is ancestor worship that makes up
one of the most important indigenous concepts in defining social cohe-
sion. In other words, the 'individual choice of genealogy', at least to some
extent, can be seen as an intrinsic feature of such 'loosely structured' social
systems that provides individuals with options when it comes to social
and religious alliance (Rössler and Röttger-Rössler 1996:34).

On the basis of Thai and Malay kinship systems, Jeremy Kemp (1991:93)
argues that genealogical connection is, in practice, just one possible char-
acteristic of 'the relationship between those who speak of and treat one
another as kin'. He uses the term 'affinity' to distinguish those people who
are in fact not kin but are called upon in the name of kinship from those
who are kin through descent. He argues that those related through affinity
should not be placed within the kindred but, insofar as they become
equated with genealogical kin, they can and do form part of what he calls
the 'effective kindred': all those individuals who are called upon in the
name of kinship (Kemp 1991:93). Because of these seemingly fluid and
permeable kinship boundaries and 'loose structuredness' in many South-
east Asian societies, Kemp (1991) maintains that the focus should shift
away from the existence and functions of descent groups. He proposes

repudiation of the observer's externally derived, inherently group-minded formulations of kinship and, instead, study of 'the patterning of dyadic relations and from there move to an examination of the extent to which group formation does or does not take place' (Kemp 1991:95). In this perspective, he sees kinship as an ideology with the institutions that often go by that name. He suggests that kinship should be understood as the value it embodies, meaning 'the axiom of amity', to specify 'the rule of prescriptive altruism' (Fortes 1970 in Kemp 1991:103). 'In kinship we thus have a field of social obligation where the individual actor is supposed to perform according to normative expectations of right and wrong irrespective of whether he or she actually likes the person concerned, or whether fulfilment of these obligations serves perceptions of self-interest' (Kemp 1984:60).

Placing relations within the arena of kinship can thus be an effective means of manipulation. 'Kinship is an ideological discourse at the participants' level where it serves to create, mediate, manipulate, and express social relations' (Kemp 1991:104). Kinship terms give one a social identity and mark a number of qualities; they are a form of coded references to certain qualities that may already exist in a relationship or indicate an attempt to imbue it with them. The resort to kinship terms may not be just an appropriate validation of an existing relationship but part of the tactics used in developing and consolidating close relations. While there is no suggestion that the positive idiom of kinship is always translated into action,[15] in many highly complex societies, kinship remains the dominant idiom for handling close relations.[16] Thus, rather than viewing kinship from a structural or corporatist perspective, kinship terms and more general references to kinship reveal the web of interpersonal relations linking all residents of a village community in many island Southeast Asian societies (Kemp 1991:104; Kemp and Hüsken 1991). We have to place Torajan livelihoods in these types of relationships.

Beyond Kinship: House Societies

An increasing dissatisfaction with the analytical vocabulary of kinship for explaining social organization, together with the concomitant recognition of the heuristic importance of indigenous terms and concepts in the 1970s

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[15] As Kemp (1991) stresses, there are plenty of examples of kin cheating on one another and failing to meet their obligations.

[16] See for example Waterson 1986, 1991; and Waterson 2009 for Tana Toraja.

and 1980s, led to a great interest in the 'house' as an important analytical concept to characterize island Southeast Asian groupings (Gillespie 2000; Waterson 1986, 1991, 2009). The general recognition of the 'house' as much more than a physical structure followed upon the introduction of the notion of house as a type of social structure by Lévi-Strauss (1983, 1987). In some brief sketches in which he compares the house of the Kwakiutl on the northwest coast of North America with that of the noble houses of feudal Europe, while alluding to some other societies in Southeast Asia and Polynesia, Lévi-Strauss (1983:174) defined the house as: 'a corporate body holding an estate made up of both material and immaterial wealth, which perpetuates itself through the transmission of its name, its goods and its titles down a real or imaginary line, considered legitimate as long as this continuity can express itself in the language of kinship or of affinity and, most often, of both'. Lévi-Strauss termed societies in which this idea of houses as the foci of kin or kinship organization predominated 'house societies'.

This idea of houses turned the earlier classificatory assumptions on kinship completely upside down and seemed especially useful for those trying to explain social organizations in Southeast Asia (Gillespie 2000:7). As Waterson (1986) puts it, 'where South-East Asian societies may confuse the outsider by their apparent lack of boundaries, the house as an institution shaping identities and relationships may provide a key to the understanding of these systems.' In fact, from the body of literature on house societies in Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia specifically, it appears that houses fulfil a key function in anchoring people in social space and linking them across time. The temporal dimension points to what Waterson (1991) calls 'the living house': the house as an embodiment of the continuity of a group of kin over several generations. Houses have a 'life history' and a biography that are intertwined with those of their human members and, because of that, anchor their members to a place and connect them through it to their ancestors (Waterson 2000:181–2). Or, as Gillespie (2000:3) phrases it: 'the time depth inherent in the ideology of the house or its valued heirlooms that serves to embody a collective memory about the past, [is] a reference to origins that often forms a salient bond uniting members'.

The function of a house as a spatial locus of a group of people forms the basis for the social dimension. This idea contrasts with the classificatory assumptions of clans and lineages since houses have no singular form of affiliation. This means that '[d]escent and inheritance may flow through either or both parents depending on circumstances; endogamy

and exogamy may coexist; postmarital residence is contingent on a num-
ber of factors; and marriage patterns, exchange relations, co-residence, or
shared labor may be the primary determinants of social relationships,
rather than their outcomes' (Gillespie 2000:7). House membership is very
variable and differs between and sometimes even within societies: in
some societies individuals belong to a single house; in others they might
be considered as members of more than one house; and in others again
they might not be a member of any house at all.

   Hierarchy is often prevalent in house societies, both in the way houses
are positioned to one another and within the members' group of individ-
ual houses. Given the 'plant-branching principle' of kin that prevails in
many parts of Southeast Asia, it is not surprising that status and power are
often concentrated in the older origin-houses of these societies. Someone's
position in house societies is expressed in relation to a particular house
(high- or low-ranking) and, as such, 'it is the language of kinship or of
affinity, or most often, of both that makes the house what it is" (Gillespie
2000:8). Usually, only a few groups are capable of strategically utilizing
relationships (manifested as kin and marital relationships) and sustaining
them over generations. Where most groups are unable to do so, this forms
the foundation for a social hierarchy which is 'experienced as considerable
differences in prestige, wealth, and ritual, and political power, both within
and between houses' (Gillespie 2000:8–9). Waterson (1991:142), therefore,
argues that kinship and ranking systems[17] are closely intertwined with the
house. The completion of prestigious and impressive projects, such as
houses, temporary ritual structures and huge stone tombs or ornaments,
demands the cooperation of a large group of (kin)people associated with
the house, and also the existence of a social ranking system within society
that gives the members of the aristocracy the power and the wealth to
undertake such projects. Houses further offer the aristocracy a clearly vis-
ible means of displaying their wealth, status and power. This can be done
through the design of the house, its size, its distinctive shape and its fine
ornamentation. The construction of such enduring signs of prestige usu-
ally involves expensive ceremonies and, when finished, it becomes the site
of rituals (Waterson 1991:140). In conclusion, a perspective on the house
makes it possible to see all the various and differentiating kinship systems

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[17] Following Hefner (1990:26) class as used throughout this book refers to 'aggregates of
individuals who are similarly situated relative to control of the means of production and
other market resources'. This implies that class is distinguished from social stratification, or
the evaluative system of ranking used by members of society in attributing prestige.

as allowable variants, all of which have the house as an important focus of social organization (Waterson 1991:139).

Moving beyond Local Boundaries

Any sociological analysis of why and how things happen will need to take account of where (and when) they happen.[18]

I have been arguing above that livelihood styles are embedded in a particular locality or place. This does not necessary imply that the deployment of different practices occurs only in one specific locality. Instead, as the stories in the introduction show, some livelihood practices are spread over multiple locations, transcending local, regional as well as national boundaries. Due to their long history of migration, most Torajans possess a large web of social relations spread over a number of places. The Torajan networks that reach out in the wider realm of social space link migrants both to their places of origin and to their kin, co-villagers, co-ethnics or compatriots living in widely dispersed locations all over Indonesia and often beyond. Improved communication and transportation increases opportunities for migrants to maintain ties with network members in other places. These networks of people and places are bound together through 'collective memories' and images of a common place of origin, and possibly of places of migration, and create the sense of a collective identity that differentiates 'us' from 'them' (Long 2000:198).

   The increasing importance of these so-called translocal and/or transnational networks in shaping Torajan livelihood decisions and practices forces me to use an analysis that goes beyond livelihoods as simply being created, negotiated, and fought for principally in one locality (Mazzucato 2004:135). As the earlier conceptions of international migration are simply incapable of capturing the full complexities of multiplicity and translocality, I now turn to some theoretical ideas that stem from the literature on transnationalism.[19] These theories help me avoid looking at livelihoods as sedentary lives and solely as the natural state of society, and to move 'beyond simplistic dichotomies of migrants as either moving for economic or political reasons' (Mazzucato 2004:136). Although it is important to

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[18] Cited by P. Saunders 1989: 218.
[19] Most notably: Glick-Schiller et al. 1992, 1995; Clifford 1994; Appadurai 1995; Marcus 1998; Portes 1995, 1999; Vertovec 1999; Faist 1998, 2000; Mazzucato 2004.

acknowledge 'the open and porous boundaries of places as well as the myriad interlinkages and interdependencies among places',[20] one cannot exclude from any consideration the places themselves that serve as anchoring points of the translocal networks. In fact, translocal networks are largely place-based and place-nourished as Ma (2003:10) emphasizes while referring to the Chinese diaspora. In her study on the habitus of Torajans, Waterson (2002:330) notes that the Torajan traditional religion, with its elaborated ritual life (especially funerals and house ceremonies), is highly interwoven with the local landscape and activities, and is not translated easily to other contexts.

> This is one reason why migrants continue to show a remarkable loyalty to their homeland, often returning long distances to be present at rituals. The fact that some rites continue to be so prominent in Toraja life, even in a Christianized form, gives some indication, too, of the great social signifi-cance of rituals for the maintenance of kin relationships and the building of local political careers. Likewise it is said that an origin-house built in the traditional style would make little sense outside of Toraja itself and could never really become a *tongkonan*. Still, attachment to places and houses of origin remains sufficiently strong that many emigrant Toraja are prepared to make financial contributions to the rebuilding of origin-houses in which they will never reside.

Considering the importance of selected places as anchoring points for translocal Torajan networks, I start this section with an exposition of the concept of place. Or, in other words, with an analysis that pays attention to the 'local' before moving to the 'translocal' to prevent an over-emphasis on either one or the other.

'A Sense of Place'

> *Place is the first of all beings, since everything that exists is in a place and can-not exist without a place.*[21]

The notion of place has a long history and embodies a multiplicity of meanings and connotations that have resulted in a large body of literature on the concept. Place 'can raise an image of one's place in the world, of the reputedly...deep meanings of "a place called home" or, with much greater intimations of mobility and agility, can be used in the context of

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[20] Massey 1997, Perose 1993, and Young 1990 in Johnston et al. 2000:583.
[21] Archytas, as cited by Simplicius, 'Commentary on Aristotle's Categories', in Basso 1996:3.

discussions of positionality' (Massey 1994:1). In the following, I pull out a few threads from the enormous complexity of this field in order to pave the way for a particular way of thinking about place—one that is needed for a better understanding of place or locality in Tana Toraja. The concept of place is frequently used in the social science literature to casually describe settings, but it is rarely defined or problematized (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003:16). In reviewing the large body of social science literature on 'place' or 'locality', one can identify three major ways of looking at it, or giving it meaning.[22]

The first meaning of place is 'as a framing device used "objectively" to bring people into view" (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003:16). In this perspective, locality can be seen as purely descriptive, as the background setting. This view refers to either a geographical or an administrative unit. Although the boundaries may vary, places are considered as bounded sites with a certain unity between the place and the people that embody it. The perspective taken depends on the starting point: 'if an administrative unit is taken as a starting point, its characteristics may not be limited to that region. If however, a regional unit is defined on the basis of common features, like economic structure, population density or landscape and ecological aspects, locality acquires the meaning of territorial uniqueness' (De Haan 1997:159). In both perspectives, locality is perceived as a concrete, place-specific outcome of larger socio-economic, political and cultural processes.

The second way in which the concept of place is used is as a 'socially constructed place', as Rodman (1992) puts it. Or, in other words, place refers to the meaning people attribute to their surroundings. Rodman criticizes the usual anthropological conceptions of place that provide 'taken-for-granted settings' to situate ethnographic descriptions (Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003:15). Rather than using place analytically as a metaphor, or reduced to a locale that imprisons natives, Rodman argues that places should be considered as socially constructed by the people who live in them and know them; they are 'politicized, culturally relative, historically specific, local and multiple constructions' (Rodman in Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003:15). As such, 'Place can have a unique reality for each inhabitant, and while the meanings may be shared with others, the views of place are often likely to be competing, and contested in practice'.

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[22] While not implying that the concepts of 'place' and 'locality' are given identical meanings or connotations by all authors, for the purpose of this study I use them interchangeably.

A socially constructed place, thus refers to the idea that place is a particular articulation of social relations at a particular moment within networks of social relations and understandings (Massey 1994:5). Massey point out that 'the particular mix of social relations which are thus part of what defines the uniqueness of any place is by no means all included within that place itself. Importantly, it includes relations which stretch beyond—the global as part of what constitutes the local, the outside as part of the inside'. In contrast to the first notion of 'bounded' places, this perspective views place as open and porous, and not constructed by placing boundaries around it and defining its identity through counter-position to the other. Rather, places are constructed 'precisely (in part) through the specificity of the mix of links and interconnections to that "beyond"' (Massey 1994:5).

Anthony Giddens (in: Massey 1994:6) argues that this separation of place from social space is a consequence of modernity:

> In premodern societies, space and place largely coincided, since the spatial dimensions of social life are, for most of the population...dominated by 'presence'—by localized activity...Modernity increasingly tears space away from place by fostering relations between 'absent' others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-to-face interaction. In conditions of modernity...locales are thoroughly penetrated by and shaped in terms of social influences quite distant from them.

Although Giddens might be right to argue that space is increasingly distinct from place, the erosion of this supposedly natural connection between people and places is not necessarily modern. Nor has it led to the modernist spectre of global cultural homogenization (see Clifford 1988 in: Gupta and Ferguson 2002:69).

This latter point brings me to the third perspective on place which also developed as a critique on places as a bounded whole, but this time from an anthropological standpoint. Triggered by Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (1983), a field of study emerged that questioned the idea that specific cultural features are tied to a given population inhabiting a particular locality (Mazzucato 2004:140). Gupta and Ferguson (2002:69) state that no matter how persistent 'cultures' and 'peoples' may be,

> they cease to be plausibly identifiable as spots on the map. But the irony (...) is that as actual places and localities become ever more blurred and indeterminate, ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct places become perhaps even more salient. It is here that it becomes most visible how imagined communities (Anderson 1983) come to be attached to imagined places, as displaced peoples cluster around remembered or imagined homelands,

places, or communities in a world that seems increasingly to deny such firm territorialized anchors in their actuality.

Interestingly, Gupta and Ferguson (2002:75) point to the relationship between space and place. Space is:

> Imagined (but not imaginary) as a way to explore the mechanisms through which such conceptual processes of place making meet the changing global economic and political conditions of lived spaces (ibid. 70).

Since the objects of social scientific research can no longer be conceived as automatically and naturally anchored in social space, they suggest paying special attention to the way spaces and places are made, imagined, contested and enforced.

A Conception of Transnationalism

From the introductory chapter it seems that the Torajan social space consists of a continuous flow of people, goods, money and ideas that transgress local and even national borders. Given that the old conceptions of international migration, 'conceiving migration in terms of one or more discrete moves' (Mazzucato 2004:131), are incapable of capturing livelihoods that are being composed in more than one locality, I turn to some theoretical ideas that stem from the literature on transnationalism.[23] The concept of transnationalism made its appearance in the early 1990s as an alternative to the studies of migration. '[A]dvances in information and communication technology, cheaper air travel, and the modern capitalist production relations of the past half century have given rise to new... forms of human mobility which has seemingly connected disparate locations of the globe' (Mazzucato et al. 2006:1047). Against this background scholars of transnationalism[24] point to the idea that new times and new socio-historical circumstances demands a new theoretical paradigm (Kivisto 2001:554). Subsequently, a great body of literature has emerged on transnationalism in which the definitions of the concept reflect the disciplinary backgrounds of the scholars it has attracted (Mazzucato 2004:131).

For the purpose of this study, I will adopt the widely-used conceptualization by Glick-Schiller et al. (1992:7), 'the process by which immigrants forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.' They designate immigrants who build such social fields as 'transmigrants' (Glick-Schiller et al. 1992:1–2) and say,

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[23] For a detailed overview of migration studies, see De Haas (2005).
[24] Most notably Glick-Schiller et al. 1992, 1995; Portes 1998, 1999; Vertovec 1999; Faist 1998, 2000.

'Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations—familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political—that span borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, and feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously'. In this definition, the emphasis is heavily on the dynamic process of building transmigrant 'social fields', labelled transnational social spaces by Faist (2000:210–1). Scholars of transnationalism thus question 'notions of space in which social, economic and cultural phenomena are assumed to overlap perfectly in one geographic area, usually a village, region, agro-ecological zone or nation" (Mazzucato et al. 2006:1047–8). Rather, they emphasize the 'crossing or transcending of boundaries through the flow of ideas, cultural images (Appadurai's (1996) ethno-space, media space, etc.), and people and goods that contribute to the constitution of new spaces' (Mazzucato 2004:133). Moreover, they shift the focus away from 'the economic and political reasons of why migrants leave, to the connections that migrants entertain with their relatives and community members in the homeland and across the diaspora' (Mazzucato 2004:137).

Under the term 'diaspora', another related conceptual framework has surfaced which has generated a vast amount of literature (see for example Clifford 1994; Watson 2004; Tsagarousianou 2004). This other approach has much in common with transnationalism, and the main difference is in the extent to which people's roots are stressed. The word 'diaspora' has been in use for centuries, and in its original meaning 'the diaspora experience was related to traumatic occurrences, forceful dispersal and the not feeling at home of diasporic people in their new places of settlement'.[25] Over the years, the concept has moved increasingly away from the forced character of the movement and has been used so often that it has almost replaced the term 'migration' (Skeldon 2003). For the purpose of this study, it is not useful to elaborate the term 'diaspora' further, but what I would like to stress is that the concept of diaspora is useful for pointing to the transnational migrant community within a transnational social space (that includes non-migrants).

Let me make one final important comment on the concept of transnationalism. Many migrants live in places thousands of kilometres from their home village. Notwithstanding these distances, they still might not have crossed national borders and are, as such, not technically transnational migrants. One can think of large countries such as China, India and

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[25] Horst 2003:35. For a more detailed explanation on the term 'diaspora', see also Horst 2003:35.

Indonesia that have many ethnic groups, each with its own culture, religion, language and so on. Precisely because of the size of these countries and the differentiated nature of societies and contexts, I consider the ideas in the literature on transnationalism appropriate for analyzing networks that do not transgress official established national borders, but only local and provincial borders within these countries. I will call these networks 'translocal', to differentiate them from 'transnational' but, broadly speaking, they have the same theoretical foundation.

Where Do We Go from Here?

In this chapter, I have attempted to construct a theoretical framework for the analysis of the complex reality I encountered during my fieldwork. In so doing, the aim is to find a way out of the paradox that is central to this study as well as to contribute to the theoretical discussions within livelihood studies. After a short explanation of the analytical shortcomings I perceive within the existing livelihoods models in understanding the full complexities of everyday Torajan life, I conclude that the analysis should not focus on either actor or structure, but include both, go beyond a single locality, and include the historical and cultural dimensions as well as the social space in which livelihoods are created, enhanced and secured. Based on either Bourdieu's and Giddens's accounts of lifestyle, I introduce the term 'livelihood style' to arrive at such an analysis. Livelihood style is defined here as a recognizable and coherent pattern of practices that results from an actor's conscious and unconscious objectives in establishing, maintaining, and enhancing a living in interaction (both in a cooperative and conflicting manner) with other actors over time, and within the framework of status systems, cultural ideals and geographical space and place(s). The concept differs from earlier approaches to livelihoods in that livelihood styles do not explain the vulnerability of people's lives solely by looking at assets, capabilities and activities of agents, but also encompasses people's perspectives or objectives in obtaining a living and the more cultural aspects and contexts that shape these aspects.

The term 'style' emphasizes the fact that people do not opt for particular practices in a social vacuum, but rather that they are part of particular groups or, more specifically, networks of social relations. Through social relationships, people's styles are positioned in the social world. To understand why people choose particular scenarios or styles and how they come about, it is thus necessary to take into account the social dimension or social space. Given this, I have elaborated on the various aspects that make

up social space in general and tried to obtain some analytical handles for mapping the Torajan social space in particular. In so doing, I discuss the concept of social relations and networks that make up the general social space, with an emphasis on kinship and houses since these appeared to be the most important factors among the many that form the basis of the structure of Torajan relationships and networks.

Next to the social spaces, livelihood styles are embedded in a particular locality or place. In reality, these places serve as anchoring points for the translocal social world that shape Torajan livelihood decisions and practices. The analysis outlined in this chapter, therefore, pays attention to both the local as well as the translocal. The conceptualization of translocality is mainly inspired by theories on transnationalism.

The theoretical concepts outlined in this chapter will only make sense when we look at concrete cases. In the following chapters, I outline the details of the various structural (political, cultural and economic) layers that make up the Torajan world, and the range of scenarios that people have at their disposal to make a living. Together with the Torajan migrant world (the translocal community) and homeland (place), these layers shape the various livelihood styles that will be outlined in Chapter 8.

THE LARGER TORAJAN WORLD
MIGRANT NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS

In the Introduction we saw that a significant proportion of Torajans live outside the highlands—elsewhere in Indonesia or abroad. Given that people are migrating back and forth, the Torajan world cannot be found at a single location. So what exactly is the Torajan world like, and where can we find it? In this chapter, the focus will be particularly on that part of the Torajan world that exists beyond the borders of Tana Toraja, that is, the migrant community. To come to grips with such a complex and broad phenomenon as the Torajan migrant world, I have divided this chapter into three sections. The first section provides a general overview of the origins of the Torajan migrant community and describes the outcomes of the considerable twentieth-century 'exodus'. More specifically, it provides insights into the direction, characteristics and scale of migration, and the way in which these migrants have created migrant communities at various places of settlement. Although some authors have hinted at the migratory ways of Torajans, a thorough systematic account of the history of Torajan migration is lacking. Therefore, alongside providing a description of the historical making of the Torajan transnational community as an essential element in moving toward an answer to the central research question, this section also aims to contribute to the general historical understanding of Tana Toraja with new perspectives drawn from archival research.

In the second section, the focus is more on the similarities and differences between the various migrant communities or diasporas, the relationships between these communities and their host populations, and the extent to which this whole process has resulted in a large Torajan social space. Along with the overall data, I present several examples of diasporic communities that reflect great internal variations. After having concluded that the Torajan world has become larger and widely spread, and that it includes both the heartland of Tana Toraja and the migrant diaspora, the third section provides a case study of one of these diasporas, namely Makassar. This city is a node in the Torajan world where people maintain both forward and backward relationships. The case study provides a differentiated picture of the ways in which Torajans live and work in an urban

migrant community. Makassar is the home of the largest Torajan community outside of Tana Toraja, one of the oldest urban destinations for Torajan migrants, and fulfils a central role in the translocal Torajan network through its geographical location. Thus it makes the Torajan transmigrant community in Makassar not only an obvious, but also a pivotal case to study.

Torajans on the Move

Among the various Indonesian peoples, migration is certainly not a recent phenomenon. The Minangkabau of West Sumatra are probably best-known for their long history of migration to obtain worldly wisdom, experience and wealth (Volkman 1985:157). The Indonesian word for migration, 'merantau', is even adopted from the Minangkabau word *rantau*, literally meaning coastal- or outer-area (Persoon 1983:215). Also, on the island of Sulawesi, the Bugis inhabiting the southern coastal areas are well-known as great seafarers who sailed and settled as far away as West Malaysia in the sixteenth century.[1] Their highland neighbours on the other hand, the Torajan people, have historically not shown any particular propensity to migrate. In fact, as Volkman (1985:132) argues, the contrary is the case: '[H]ighlanders traditionally shunned unnecessary movement, preferring to stay close to their significant centers: the *tongkonan*, the place of the umbilical cords'.

   Notwithstanding this inward force, the end of the nineteenth century saw the beginning of out-migration that gained momentum in the late 1960s when the majority of Torajan migrants left their homeland. Apart from the much greater numbers of migrants, the direction, objectives and periods of migration have changed significantly since the 1960s. It has become common to speak of 'before *merantau*' to refer to the period before the 1960s, when travelling was often dangerous because of political tensions and brigandage, and 'after *merantau*', which concerns the period since, when peace returned to the region and opportunities for wage labour outside the region increased (Volkman 1984:158). In the following two sections, I discuss the history of Torajan migration in these two broad periods to emphasize the profound changes that have occurred since the 1960s.

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[1] In addition, the Bugis travelled to other places over land. For accounts on Bugis migration within South Sulawesi, see for example Acciaioli 2000, 2004; Lineton 1975.

Before merantau

Although some Torajans would occasionally leave the highlands in the distant past, the first significant flow of albeit forced migration took place when thousands of highlanders were captured as slaves and sold to the Bugis in the lowlands (Bigalke 1981). Historical descriptions by a French missionary that date from 1660 and of two Swiss ethnographers drawn up in 1895 already refer to the transportation of Torajan slaves to Thailand and Malaysia. However, the peak of this slave trade occurred at the end of the nineteenth century (Bigalke 1983). As many as 12,000 Torajans are estimated to have been seized and transported for sale as slaves to the lowlands of South Sulawesi (Bigalke 1981:141). As in other Southeast Asian societies, the enslavement of Torajans was essentially intended to meet the labour shortage in a conquering neighbouring kingdom. However, '[w]hat makes the Torajan case rather unusual in view of the generally accepted interpretation of the underlying purpose of slavery in Southeast Asia is the apparent readiness of so many chiefs to reduce the Torajan population rather than concentrate it for their own political and economic benefits' (Bigalke 1983:352). Probably due to this readiness of their masters to sell them to Bugis traders, as well as to their subsequent integration into lowland life, that only about one-third of the total number of Torajans exported as slaves returned to the highlands after the Dutch colonial government, in 1911, officially abolished slavery in the highlands and allowed Torajans to legally return from the Bugis lowlands (Bigalke 1981:82, 141).

In the subsequent period, some Torajans left their homeland and went to Rongkong to the Northeast of Palopo where they converted uncultivated land into *sawah* (wet rice-fields), worked in the nickel mines of Malili along the Gulf of Bone, or gathered *damar* (resin) in the forests of Malili.[2] Nevertheless, as of 1920, most people still rarely left their villages, and any migration was mainly on a seasonal or short-term basis. In the mid-1920s, all-weather roads to Pare Pare in the south (1923) and Palopo in the east (1927) were finally completed thus connecting Tana Toraja with the 'outside world' (Van Lijf 1952–1953:254). Van der Veen had already witnessed the 'earliest stage of 'modern" out-migration' in 1921, 'when he saw Torajan policemen on the streets of Makassar' (Bigalke 1981:197). The newly-built roads brought the cities of Palopo, Pare Pare and areas further from Makassar effectively much closer to the highlands and signified the real beginning of the 'modern era' of Torajan out-migration.

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[2] Van der End 1985:120; Bigalke 1981:474. For the migration patterns during the 'before *merantau*' period, see Map 3.1.

The introduction of a head tax by the Dutch administration in the mid-1920s led to an increased need for money and forced even more Torajans to leave their homeland. Thousands of people swarmed out of the densely-populated highlands to other places in Sulawesi where they could find employment. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the first Torajan urban communities started to be seen in the ports of Palopo, Makassar and Pare Pare (Van der End 1985:288; Plaisier 1993:92). In 1929, Van der Veen was also reporting the existence of various migrant settlements in the district of Luwu, in both the mountainous regions as well as on the plains. Further, Torajans established communities on the coast of Dongalla, at the large

Map 3.1. Migration routes of Torajans with dates of commencement.
Source: Map by Edwin de Jong.

irrigation projects in Pinrang, and at the asphalt exploitation works on the island of Buton, to the south of Sulawesi.[3]

This flow of migration that had got underway in a little more than a decade received an enormous boost in the late 1930s when the 'Great Depression' hit the highlands. 'By then the bottom had fallen out of the coffee market and people were having to struggle to come up with cash for taxes. The cash crunch got more severe into the late 1930s, stimulating large scale out-migration of youths to highland areas rich in forest products (northern Luwu afdeeling), to lowland public works projects, and to regional cities' (Bigalke 1981:254). Many people felt compelled to leave their villages for a year or more to earn cash to pay their families' taxes. The number of people leaving their villages approached the number of forced 'out-migrants' during the slave trade days. Torajan men generally found employment at Bantaeng, Malili, Kolaka, Pare Pare or elsewhere in Sulawesi, and women mainly worked in factories or for Chinese traders in urban areas such as Pare Pare and Makassar. The account by Pol, a missionary in the southern part of Tana Toraja in 1938, well illustrates the enormous dimension of this migration flow:

> In many places the harvest has failed for several years in a row. By necessity, men are spreading far and wide to earn money to pay their taxes. Regular church attendance is also suffering from this. For weeks at a time they leave home and often return with malaria, through which they are restricted to their homes and not able to visit church. More than half of the population in the parish of Tokesan has moved to the forests of Malili and Kolaka. The people of Batoealoe are joining this move. Some are leaving to Malili and Kolaka but others are settling down on the coastal plains of Ponrang, where it is supposedly easier to make a living. This transmigration is raising unanswered questions for this parish. In Malili and Kolaka these are no Christian communities, which these people might join. In the forests they are very dispersed, or they are temporarily moving in with Mohammedans inhabiting the coastal plains. How to spiritually look after these absent people? I was pleasantly surprised to hear one of these days that, at Malekoe near Malili, a place where hundreds of Torajans are living including several Christians, they were organising a service themselves every Sunday. ...It is impossible for the mission to take care of all the places where Torajans are moving to. (Van den End 1985:427.)

Moreover, Bigalke (1981:257–8) noted that the Torajan migration to the city of Makassar had 'grown somewhere between 3 to 5 times, in the four

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[3] F.J. Ormeling, 'Toradja's', 1948, p. 12, in: KITLV, Collectie F.J. Ormeling, D H 1132; Van der End 1985:288; Plaisier 1993:92.

depressed years after 1935'.[4] Among the female migrants were probably the first Torajan prostitutes to appear in Makassar. Also in this period the first Torajan youth moved to Palopo, Pare Pare, Makassar and some cities in Java for education needed to join the police force or for a position in the 'lower echelons of the colonial service' (Bigalke 1981:267).

During the years of the Japanese occupation, between 1942 and 1945, many Torajans were forced to work on the road from Wotu (at the northern tip of the Gulf of Bone) to Poso. There, and at other infrastructural projects in the lowlands, many died of malnutrition and bad treatment, while thousands of others returned heavily affected by malaria to their highland villages (Van Lijf 1951:259). In the immediate years after the Pacific War, Tana Toraja needed to recover from the problems caused by the Japanese occupation, and an increasing number of migrants left the highlands in search of a living, or to pay off debts caused through gambling, the organization of ceremonial activities, or to arrange an appropriate marriage. The Torajan community in Makassar had already grown to as many as 5,000 (two percent) of the 210,000 Torajans living in Tana Toraja. They were working mostly as domestic servants or entrepreneurs, as officials at government bureaus, or as labourers in the wood-processing and furniture industries and in shoe factories (Van Lijf 1947:62; Heeren 1952). According to Ormeling,[5] most Torajan migrants were doing surprisingly well in the city because of their mutual relations and reciprocal help. Their solidarity was strengthened by the contrasts between Torajans and other ethnic groups, especially the Bugis. The fact that most Torajans were Christian or considered to be non-believers (*pagans*) among a predominantly Islamic population, also set them apart and as a consequence reinforced their mutual ties in the diaspora.

For many Torajans, the city had no enduring attraction, and most of them returned to Tana Toraja once they had earned enough money to buy back their pawned rice fields, paid off debts incurred at past ceremonies or entered into new debt relationships through organizing a ceremony for deceased relatives (Heeren 1952:62). Important reasons, or push factors, for migration were cash shortages, debts and obligations related to death rituals, or gambling, forms of bondage, other conflicts, land shortages and the lack of higher education in the area.

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[4] In 1935, between 500 and 700 Torajans were living in Makassar, a number which had increased to 3000 by 1939 (Roeroek 1939). This figure also includes Torajans from the region of Mamasa, but most Torajans were from the subregion of Makale-Rantepao, the contemporary district of Tana Toraja.

[5] F.J. Ormeling, 'Toradja's', 1948, p. 12, in: KITLV, Collectie F.J. Ormeling, D H 1132.

A number of the migrants were women working as prostitutes. Research by the Department of Social Welfare estimated that the total number of prostitutes in Makassar numbered 800 to 1000, of whom 60 percent were Torajan.[6] According to Wijker,[7] one would be wrong to ascribe the reasons for the high number of Torajan prostitutes in Makassar solely to poor economic conditions in Tana Toraja. Rather, the 'loose character' of Torajans was postulated as the principal rationale for their 'moral straying' by Wijker and his research team.[8] Lobo and Nooy-Palm (1978:ii) came up with a more nuanced reason, which they based on a prostitution report of that time.[9] They wrote that Torajan women worked only temporarily in prostitution to save enough money for their bride wealth, which was needed for their future marriage in Tana Toraja.

Even though this era is marked by increasing migration, the majority of Torajans stayed put in the highlands. Kennedy (1953:178) noted that, as of 1949, most Torajans had hardly ever left their village. By using the example of a settlement about five kilometres from Rantepao, he estimated 'that 80 percent of the women and 20 percent of the men had never visited the capital Makale (less than twenty kilometres away), that less than 5 percent of the villagers had ever left the district, and that far less than 1 percent had ever left the island [of Sulawesi]' (Kennedy 1953 in Volkman 1985:133–4).

Migration at that time became a reality only for people from a small number of villages. Generally, travelling was difficult and Torajans found it hard to establish a new life in a strange and unknown world. Most people only migrated when they already knew some Torajans at the place of destination. When no relatives or acquaintances were around, they were generally taken care of by other Torajan migrants. Thus Torajan migration could be characterized as a form of chain migration, through which well-knit migrant communities gradually came into being. For example, Pa'Pongtiku, who came from a village in the north of Tana Toraja, left for Jakarta in the early 1950s to work as a military official. When he arrived in

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[6] W. Wijker, 'Nota naar aanleiding van een onderzoek naar de prostitutie te Makassar', 1948, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1113.

[7] W. Wijker, 'Nota naar aanleiding van een onderzoek naar de prostitutie te Makassar', 1948, p. 6, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1113.

[8] W. Wijker, 'Nota naar aanleiding van een onderzoek naar de prostitutie te Makassar', 1948, p. 8, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1113.

[9] The origin and title and exact date of the report are not specified.

Jakarta he stayed at the house of Pa'Sarungalo, the first Torajan ever to become a lawyer (after obtaining a degree in the Netherlands). 'Even outside Tana Toraja, Torajans try to keep in touch with one another (with the migrant community)' Pa'Pongtiku said. 'When Torajan people arrived at Tanjung Priok harbour in Jakarta, Pa'Sarungalo picked them up and gave them some money in exchange for information about Tana Toraja. Torajan intellectuals in Jakarta such as Pa'Sarungalo felt responsible for the wellbeing of the Torajan community and offered newcomers assistance upon arrival. Torajans were close to each other in Jakarta, as strangers in an unknown world who sought support among their own. To further stimulate the Torajan network in Jakarta, several notable Torajans established the organization Kekeluargaan Masyarakat Toraja (KMT), whose main purpose was to solve basic problems faced by newcomers: finding a job and a place to stay. Further, it provided assistance to members who lost relatives, even if the forthcoming funeral ceremony was planned far in advance. The KMT also stimulated the establishment of the Kerukunan Keluarga Sulawesi Selatan (KKSS). This organization involves all people from South Sulawesi: Bugis, Mandarese, Makassarese, and Torajans. However, the KKSS only provided assistance in the event of emergencies, and not for forthcoming ceremonies.

Land pressure in Tana Toraja was greater than in most of South Sulawesi and the expansion of agriculture had reached its limits. 'Aggravating this situation was the way in which prominent families maintained their hold on large tracts of land accumulated over generations, which they never sold, and which marrying within the family (as close as first cousins) helped to maintain intact' (Bigalke 1981:399). Aware of the potential social conflict over land, in September 1949 the minister of the regional government, some civil servants from Jakarta and Makassar, local administrators, representatives of the Protestant and Catholic missions and some private individuals, discussed the possibility of transmigrating several tens of thousands of Torajans to sparsely populated regions in and around the highlands (Van Lijf 1952–1953:274). After the collapse of the State of East Indonesia in 1950, however, they were unable to turn these plans into actions.

Nevertheless, the issue of transmigration re-emerged in 1950 under the Emergency Government (Pemerintahan Darurat) of Indonesia, leading to the establishment of a Committee for Local Transmigration (Panitia Locale Transmigrasi Kabupaten Luwu) in 1951.[10] The Committee,

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[10]   ANUP-Tator, in: Arsip Nasional Indonesia Ujung Pandang, 1359.

consisting both of Torajan and Luwu representatives drew up a plan for mass migration of Torajans to the Luwu region—the areas of Walenrang and Masamba to the north of Palopo'. A report of a meeting of this Committee suggested that 20,000 Torajan households—in other words, half of all Torajan households involved in farming—should be moved to the neighbouring area of Luwu.[11] However, again these plans could not be further elaborated because, by 1952, Muslim guerrilla groups from Luwu were starting to attack the southern and eastern peripheries of Tana Toraja. Bigalke (1981:423) noted that at that time '[t]here were numerous abductions, killings, thefts, and incidents where villages [with their traditional *tongkonan* houses] were burnt'.

The guerrilla raids coincided with the Darul Islam rebellion (DI/TII, aiming to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia) that started in 1953 under the leadership of Kahar Muhzakkar and swept through South Sulawesi. The prominence of Kahar Muhzakkar and his guerrilla attacks made travelling throughout South Sulawesi extremely difficult. Pa' Sudenden who had registered at the police academy in Makassar at that time told me that he went to Makassar in a convoy of twenty cars with plenty of people. They had to frequently pause at places where guerrilla attacks from Kahar Muhzakkar could be expected to make sure that everything was safe. The trip took a full week. While contact with the highlands seemed difficult at that time, the 'outside world' nevertheless offered a completely new experience. During subsequent years of rebellion, the small Torajan migrant flow that had got under way came almost to a standstill until 1965 when Suharto's 'New Order' army defeated Kahar Muhzakkar's troops and peace returned to the highlands.

In the early 1960s, the district heads representing Tana Toraja and Luwu reached an agreement about the regulated and controlled migration of a large number of Torajan farmers to Luwu (Roth 2003:82–3): 'Torajan officials were still prominently present in the Luwu government offices and, through their administrative positions, formed a strong power block in favour of local transmigration'. The good educational system in Tana Toraja had enabled many Torajans to find employment in the Luwu offices during the 1950s. 'Tana Toraja possesses the finest educational system in all of rural South Sulawesi. Developed over half a century by missionaries, Toraja Protestant and Catholic schools have produced high caliber high schools and technical school graduates whose skills have been utilized in

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[11] ANUP-Tator, in: Arsip Nasional Indonesia Ujung Pandang, 1361.

government service, the armed forces, and private industry' (Crystal 1989:165).

The volume of transmigration, as well as statements about boundaries and identities, were settled in the so-called Makula agreement, named after a village in Tana Toraja where the meeting was held.[12] 'There was a general feeling that development of Luwu required a higher population density, preferably provided by Toraja farmers..... Their settlement in Luwu, then, was not seen as problematic, but rather as a stimulus for the development of relatively isolated Luwu.' (Roth 2003:83.) The Makula agreement marked the beginning of local transmigration from Tana Toraja to the Luwu plain, which unfolded in two ways: '[O]n the one hand there was the migration and settlement officially recognized and regulated by the Luwu and Toraja administrations. On the other hand, to an increasing extent migration and settlement took place outside of the scope of the formal agreement.' (Roth 2003: 83.) With regard to the formally regulated and controlled migration and settlement, it was initially not easy to find candidates because of the recurrent guerrilla attacks on Torajan settlements in Luwu. Moreover, many Torajans still associated migration with poverty and low social status, and those within the lower social echelons still followed their leaders; leaving without them was out of the question. Although the planned large-scale transmigration did not really take off in this period, hundreds of Torajans did move to Luwu and, today, several settlements in lowland Luwu are still directly or indirectly associated with the Makula agreement (Roth 2003:83).

To summarize, during 60 years of external interference in the highlands, there have been several considerable migration streams. These streams were partly the result of internal measures such as, under the Dutch, when the head tax was introduced, or under the Japanese, when many highlanders were forced to work at specific infrastructure projects in the lowlands. Also the increasing land pressures and food shortages drove Torajans away from the highlands. Migration was also the result of international economic crises, but most importantly it was a reaction to changing needs and opportunities. With the introduction of an educational system, people desired higher education that could only be found beyond the highlands. With the introduction of money, people left the highlands to find better paid jobs. Moreover, the growing and industrializing cities of Pare

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[12] Because the Makula agreement 'is not documented in the archives of the Luwu or Tana Toraja administrations any longer', many details remain unclear (Roth 2003:82).

Pare, Palopo' and Makassar became more attractive, and, most importantly, infrastructure improvements made travelling away from the highlands easier.

After merantau

Although there was an increased displacement of Torajans once the Dutch entered Tana Toraja in the early twentieth century, for most people migration remained a rare phenomenon until the late 1960s when the 'after *merantau*' period started. After the final defeat of the Darul Islam revolt, repair work to demolished bridges and roadways slowly began (Crystal 1974:148–9). Although roads to and from Tana Toraja were still frequently impassable due to mud and rock slides in the late-1960s, this period marked the beginning of an unprecedented migration stream. Increasingly large numbers of farmers now moved to areas in Luwu, such as Batusitanduk and Lamasi, to open up vast new rice lands. As Roth (2003:86) noted,'after the Makula agreement had been mothballed...Luwu was flooded with what was called *transmigrasi gelap* (illicit transmigration), a process that could not be regulated, even less stopped. Increasingly, people came to Luwu on their own initiative. After having sold a parcel of land, buffalo or other possessions in Tana Toraja, they took the proceeds to the Luwu plain and invested in cheap and widely available land.' Interestingly, Torajan migrants established themselves in or close to existing settlements, whereas the national transmigration programme had designated new sites away from local villages for the migrants primarily from Java, Bali, Lombok and Nusa Tenggara Timur (International Crisis Group 2003:8).

Torajan migration to the city of Makassar, already in favour for many decades, albeit with some downturn during the 1952–1965 period, continued at a steady pace, and by 1971 they numbered some 50,000—about ten percent of the city's population (Nooy-Palm et al. 1979b:2). The nickel mining industry at Malili and Soroako in the eastern part of Luwu became another popular destination for Torajan migrants when the Indonesian government granted a contract to International Nickel of Canada (PT Inco) to exploit the nickel deposit in the Luwu region. 'In Saroako for example, Torajan migrants made up about 40 per cent of the unskilled labourers working for PT Inco by 1978' (Robinson 1986:39). Besides these roughly 900 labourers, a few hundred Torajans were working as domestic servants in the mining town. Interestingly, most Torajans were not living in the town itself but in the village of Wawandula, which had become a

predominantly Torajan settlement and is located just south of the mining project. In 1978, the decision by the government's agricultural extension service to nominate Palopo as a cacao production centre set the stage for what is locally called the Torajan (and Bugis) invasion of North Luwu (ICG 2003:8). By the mid-1990s, however, the plain of Luwu had become less attractive for new settlers, and the flow of Torajan migrants moved northwards to Central and North Sulawesi.

While a steady stream of Torajan settlers was spreading out over Sulawesi, the horizons of many Torajans also began to expand. By the late 1960s, President Suharto opened Jakarta's doors to foreign investment on Indonesian soil, and multinational corporations established themselves in Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, Central Sulawesi and elsewhere to exploit the natural resources of the Indonesian archipelago (Volkman 1985:135). 'The underemployed, educated, and highly motivated young Toraja wanted jobs. They rejected subsistence agriculture at home for at least two reasons: it could not support their physical needs; it lacked the enticements of a "modern" life with cash, cities, watches, radios, blue jeans, and Elvis Presley tapes. For former slaves or persons at the bottom of the status hierarchy, migration also offered a chance to acquire previously undreamed of wealth and prestige' (Volkman 1985). Since then, many more Torajan settlers have moved beyond the borders of Sulawesi, and the seeds for the contemporary nationwide and even global Torajan migrant community have been sown. As Volkman (1980:36) phrases it appropriately, 'Toraja cannot be understood in Sulawesian terms alone, for its universe has expanded to include at least Java, Borneo, Bali, and Irian Jaya'.

Initially, Torajans sailed across the Makassar Straits to several places in East Kalimantan (Balikpapan, Nunukan and Samarinda) and West Kalimantan (Pontianak) where they started working in the oilfields and for timber corporations. They undertook all kinds of work, such as 'felling trees, driving tractors, or as mechanics, while women would typically become cooks and housekeepers for foreign or wealthy families' (Volkman 1985:134). From Nunukan, at the northern tip of Kalimantan, they also started to cross the Indonesian border in search of work in the forests of East Malaysia (Sabah). Around 90 percent of them entered Malaysia illegally (*imigrasi gelap*) by sea and arrived at the harbour of Tawau where they were met by family, acquaintances or human traffickers (Mangoting 1997). While many were employed by the logging companies in the nearby forests or at large commercial agricultural enterprises, some moved on to other places in Sabah, such as Sandakan, Kinabalu and Keningau. Later, Torajans advanced to neighbouring Sarawak, the oil state of Brunei, and

the western peninsula of Malaysia. Many Torajan men and women found factory work at the industrial areas that were rapidly developing in the eastern part of Malaysia.

Among these migrants were a great number of Torajan girls and women, some of whom ended up in the sex industry surrounding these industrial areas. As Mangoting (1997) notes, as early as the 1970s and 1980s, Torajan girls and women were lured to Malaysia to work as prostitutes, either under false pretences or by 'choice'. Many Torajan girls and women still end up in the sex business in eastern Malaysia.

Besides Kalimantan and Malaysia, Irian Jaya (today West Papua) became another popular destination when it was opened up for immigration in the early 1970s. Many Torajan economic migrants started to move there and penetrated deep into the jungles to work in the logging and sawmill industries. Moreover, thousands of Torajans, both those with little education and those highly educated, found employment at the Grasberg mine at Freeport, which was the largest gold mine, and third largest copper mine, in the world—or at one of the many other mines that opened up in Irian Jaya. Most Torajans settled along the border between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, near the large towns of Jayapura and Merauke, or in the forestry and mining areas of Sorong and Timika.

Those who did not take the route to Kalimantan, East Malaysia, Sabah and Irian, were often children of Dutch-influenced, more prosperous families (Volkman 1985:134). They went instead to Makassar or one of the major Javanese cities, such as Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung and Surabaya, to obtain higher education. As a consequence, many of the Torajan migrants living in these cities work as businessmen, government officials, teachers or policemen. Thousands of other well-educated Torajans move to places elsewhere in Indonesia (primarily Ambon, East Timor and Bali) to take positions in government service. Since the 1990s, the number of Torajan migrants moving to Australia, North America, Europe and East Asia has also been on the increase. The most common reasons are for higher education, marriage to a foreigner, or simply employment. Hongkong, South Korea and Japan have attracted hundreds of Torajans for jobs in factories or as servants or nannies. These people are usually granted a temporary residence permit for a couple of years only. Batam is a destination within Indonesianthat has recently gained popularity among Torajan youngsters. Unmarried Torajan women between the ages of 15 and 25 can find employment in a large electronics factory.

Today, the number of Torajans leaving their homeland remains high as many of them are well-educated and unable to find suitable employment

locally. Volkman (1985:134) already noted in 1978 through a small sampling of households in one area, that youngsters left the villages *en masse*: '[L]ess than 30% of 150 people between the ages of 15 and 35 remained in their village. Of those who remained, some anticipated leaving when they finished high school; some had previously been to Kalimantan and had plans to return.' Not much seems to have changed since. Today, the Torajan diaspora, estimated at 650,000, exceeds the highland population (458,000) by fifty per cent.[13]

The Torajan Migrant World after 2000

As we have seen from the preceding paragraphs, the contemporary characteristics of the Torajan diaspora have been shaped by local, national and international developments. Until the 1960s, Torajan migration generally was aimed at agricultural activities in the sparsely populated areas of Sulawesi. This process resulted in settlements of farmers, some composed solely of Torajans, others consisting of mixed migrant groups (Torajan, Bugis, resettled locals and Javanese). Although these agricultural communities still make up a considerable share of the total diaspora, the changing nature and direction of migration has added to the variety of Torajan diasporas that have emerged at various places within and beyond Indonesia. Notwithstanding these differences, they share common characteristics, such as ways of organization, places of encounter, and networking characteristics that facilitate the movement of people, capital, goods and information. In what follows, I compare the contemporary diasporas in terms of geographic distribution, population size, composition and social density. Alongside the overall data, I will present several examples of diasporic communities that show great internal diversity.

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[13] The 2000 Indonesian Population Census indicates that there are a total of 750,828 Torajans (that is people from the Tana Toraja district) (Suryadinata et al. 2003:7). This means that around 350,000 Torajans live outside Tana Toraja according to official accounts. In reality, the number will be much higher if we were to include the registered and non-registered migrants and commuters in Indonesia, and the Torajans who live overseas. Aleksander Mangoting, who conducted research among Torajan illegal immigrants in Malaysia, estimated that about 50,000 Torajans reside in Malaysia (Mangoting 1997). The Reformed Ecumenical Council (REC) speaks of about 300,000 Torajans who have gone to Malaysia as migrants, mostly on quasi-legal arrangements (Van Houten 2003). Although the latter figure seems somewhat exaggerated, according to Torajan informants who have returned home from all over the world to attend funeral ceremonies, tens of thousands of Torajans do live in Malaysia, South and Southeast Asia, Europe, Australia and North America.

It is nearly impossible to find accurate figures on the size of the Torajan migrant population because reliable statistics do not exist and not all migrants are permanent settlers but instead commute or move from one place to another. Further, a fair number of migrants are illegal settlers and therefore not registered with the local administration. However, we can approximate the size of the larger diasporas using information from the Torajan church, through migrant organizations (*kerukunan*) and from personal interviews with migrants living at a particular place or who regularly travel around to meet other Torajans for business or other reasons. Since over 90 percent of Torajan migrants live in Southeast Asia, figures are shown for this region only (see Map 3.2).

Outside Southeast Asia there are also Torajan communities in the making, most notably in Hongkong, South Korea, Japan, Australia, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the United States. The sizes of these communities vary from a few hundred to several thousand.

Map 3.2 shows that the communities in Makassar and Luwu are clearly the largest and, in this respect, there has not been much proportional change in the Torajan diaspora 'after *merantau*' in the late 1960s. However, what is new is the mushrooming of Torajan migrant communities outside Sulawesi and Java in the last two decades. Moreover, most, if not all, diaspora display considerable internal differences in composition, settlement

Map 3.2. Distribution of Torajans across Southeast Asia (2003).
Source: Map based on city layout from Forbes (1979:5).

patterns, economic activities and organization. In what follows, I present two contrasting examples of transmigrant communities that differ in all these attributes: one is in east Malaysia and one in Jakarta.

Different Settings, Same Outcome: Two Torajan Diasporas Compared

In Tawau district, the most easterly part of Malaysia (in the province of Sabah), lies Batu Dua, or Hilltop village, where almost all Torajans in Tawau live. Their community adds up to about 1,000 households, nearly all originating from the lowest social class in their homeland (Mangoting 1997:51). The vast majority entered Malaysia by sea and arrived at the harbour of Tawau,after about two days and two nights of travel.[14] Most of those staying here are illegal migrants who live by growing vegetables for market or working on the nearby cocoa plantations. Unlike in most other Torajan communities in Malaysia, none of the women in the community work as prostitutes; several years ago a group of elders successfully fought for a prohibition against participation in the sex industry.[15]

Hilltop Village is a Protestant and Catholic enclave within a predominantly Muslim society with its own Protestant Torajan church. Torajans feel that life for them is harder in Malaysia because of their minority religion. As one of the migrants put it 'the Malaysian government does not want the people of Hilltop Village (mostly Torajans) to stay there because the land is owned by the king and he has plans to return all illegal migrants to Indonesia next year. Bugis people get official documents more easily because they are Muslim, and therefore have a better chance to survive here.' Without official residence permits, these migrants cannot find a permanent job and face being deported or arrested by the police at any moment. They send little money home to their families in Tana Toraja on a regular basis, claiming that incomes are not high enough to make ends meet. Mangoting (1997:65) noted that 95 per cent of the men take part in gambling and cock fighting. However, mutual support is strong; when someone needs money for the funeral ceremony of a deceased relative in Tana Toraja, or when someone gets seriously sick, other Torajans in Hilltop Village will raise money for him or her. They also have a formal organization (the so-called *kerukunan*) that functions as a mutual support system and also as a social framework to keep the migrant community together by

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[14] It takes four hours to get from Tana Toraja to the harbour of Pare Pare by bus, two days and one night by ferry from Pare Pare to Nunukan (located at the northern tip of East Kalimantan), and two more hours by ferry to Tawau, Malaysia.

[15] It is not clear to me whether these elders are Torajans or Malaysians.

organizing special meetings, most notably Christmas celebrations. These *kerukunan* are part of the IKAT (Ikat Keluarga Toraja) Sabah. The literal translation of *ikatan* is 'bundle', but it is better understood as a tie that binds, or even better as a union. *Keluarga* means family, and thus IKAT should be understood as the union of the Torajan family in Eastern Malaysia. The IKAT is an organization that generally operates on an over-arching level. Its leaders try to strengthen the Torajan community in Sabah by organizing social gatherings and also through meetings in which particular problems within the migrant community as well as in Tana Toraja are discussed, and possible plans for action developed.

In Jakarta, the Torajan community has a longer and more sustainable history than the Hilltop Village diaspora. We saw a glimpse of the birth of the Torajan community in Jakarta in the preceding sections. The first Torajans came to Jakarta in the 1950s for higher education or to work as government employees. During this period, the community was still very small, and internal communication was easy. Half a century later, in line with the overall population growth of Jakarta, the Torajan diaspora in and around the city has increased to about 1,800 households, or approximately 9,000 people. Three generations of Torajans already live in Jakarta. The first migrants nearly all consider themselves as Torajan, while some of their children and grandchildren have never been to Tana Toraja and feel more Indonesian than Torajan. However, this does not mean that they have completely broken with their relatives in Tana Toraja. Most travel to the highlands once in a while to attend a funeral ceremony. Unlike the migrants in Hilltop Village, the Torajans in Jakarta are spread all over the city and the neighbouring suburbs. Nowadays those Torajan migrants who live together in Greater Jakarta are either students at one of the many high schools or universities, or are working as government officials, soldiers, businessmen, nurses or doctors at one of the hospitals, or at private companies. Only a handful are skilled labourers or craftsmen. Most of them come from the Torajan upper class and are well-educated. This makes Jakarta the wealthiest and most prestigious of the Torajan diaspora.[16]

Torajans in Greater Jakarta are well organized into entities on three levels: *kerukunan*; church parishes; and an *ikatan*. *Kerukunan* are the most important, for they settle disputes, organize wedding ceremonies and

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[16] *Apa dan Siapa* (*What and Who*), a book written by Torajans for Torajans (Kurapak 2001), describes the fifty most prestigious Torajans in the world. Thirty of them are living in Jabotabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi). While the criteria set for selecting these people might be debatable, the book at least gives some indication of where important members of the Torajan community are located.

death rituals, and raise funds for people in need. They also have a social function by exchanging information about Tana Toraja and about job vacancies in Jakarta, and in bringing people together in a congenial atmosphere. *Kerukunan* are loosely structured, based on kinship, village or region of origin in Tana Toraja. There are fourteen active *kerukunan* in the Jakarta area, including one for Muslim Torajans.[17] In addition to the *kerukunan*, Greater Jakarta has twelve church communities of which nine parishes are part of the Gereja Toraja (established by and for Protestant Torajans), one a Catholic church (Persekutan Umat Katolik Toraja) and two Pentecostal churches. The church as an institution, besides serving people's religious needs, provides Torajan migrants with a support network through funds for education, healthcare and support for the disabled and vulnerable. The church has also taken over some tasks that used to be performed by the *kerukunan* by binding people together at social activities such as sports, feasts and Sunday services. It functions as a major communication channel among the large number of people join congregations. Pa'Wanto, a Torajan migrant in Sejabotabek, said:

> when a Torajan family newly arrives in Jakarta, or when someone is in the hospital, it will be announced in the church. For example, two years ago my son lay in the hospital in Makasssar with cancer. Because he was not getting better, he was transferred to the Cipto general hospital in Jakarta. My cousin went to church and told the minister about it. He then announced it to the church community. Thereupon, two of the wealthiest Torajans in Jakarta visited the hospital: one is the President Director of a shipping company, and the other is a lieutenant colonel in the army. Their wives and my wife were old schoolmates from Rantepao, and they wanted to do something for us. They gave us money for treatment and gave us mental support. Nevertheless, my son did not survive.

The third level on which Torajans are organized in Jakarta is the Ikatan Keluarga Toraja Jakarta (IKAT Jakarta). The association was founded by four notable Torajans in 1958 to strengthen and replace the KMT that had been established in the early 1950s (see discussion above).[18] The IKAT is an officially registered association with a chairman, secretary and other

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[17] The following *kerukunan* can be found in and around Jakarta: Kerukunan Ikat Depok, Kerukunan Tallu Lembangna, Kerukunan Kesu', Kerukuan Buntao' Rantebua, Kerukunan Bassi Sang Tempe'(Bastem), Kerukunan Sa'dan Balusu, Kerukunan Sanda Mamase-Mamasa, Kerukuan Simbuang-Bua Kayu, Kerukunan Denpiku-Paris, Kerukunan Tikala, Kerukunan Saluputti, Kerukunan Muslim Toraya (KMT), Gereja Kibait and Persatuan Umat Katolik Toraja (PUKAT).

[18] Currently, the word 'Jakarta' when used in combination with IKAT has been replaced by Sejabotabek, indicating Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang and Bekasi.

officers. It incorporates ten sub-IKATs that are spread over the various neighbourhoods and one IKAT for students, Ikatan Mahasiswa Toraja (IMT) Jakarta. As with other associations, IKAT Sejabotabek organizes social gatherings at Christmas and Easter. Further, they occasionally organize workshops or seminars when there is a specific issue or problem that involves the Torajan diaspora in the Jakarta area as a whole. These issues can vary from government plans to reorganize the administration in Tana Toraja, to potential attacks on Torajan churches by Muslim extremists in Jakarta on Christmas Eve. Although the main aim of IKAT is a religious one, it also provides some social support. A good example is the case of Toban Sampetoding whose father died in a Jakarta hospital. After the death, Toban, her stepmother and two sisters were in dire straits. The people from IKAT took over the organization and financing of transporting the corpse back to Tana Toraja for a decent funeral.

The Torajan diaspora in Greater Jakarta stands out for its efficient and effective organization. In Jakarta they live in a multicultural, metropolitan environment with people from different ethnic backgrounds and cultures: at work, in their neighbourhood, and also in their families. This contrasts with the people of Hilltop village in Malaysia who most of the time live among fellow Torajans. The Torajan migrant community in Jakarta also has a much longer history than the much younger migrant community in Hilltop village. However, the two diasporas also share some common characteristics. We can draw a comparison of the three similar lines or levels of organization: the *kerukunan*, the church, and the IKAT. The *kerukunan* functions in both communities as a mutual support system and also as a social framework to keep the migrant community together by organizing special meetings. The church as an organization serves people's religious needs, provides social security, cements people together through social events and provides a communication channel. The IKAT also has social binding and social security functions but differs from the other organizations due to its political function. The IKAT in Jakarta is particularly efficient and strong in triggering discussions about particular subjects that touch the migrant community in their locality (such as the Torajan identity within Jakarta), as well as in the heartland (such as the discussion about the large investments in funeral ceremonies). To summarize, both Torajan diasporas are made up of well-organized networks run along similar lines (*kerukunan,* church parishes and IKAT) that aim on the one hand to secure the social and financial wellbeing of their communities and, on the other, to maintain close contacts with those remaining in Tana Toraja.

From this short overview, the picture might be emerging of a harmonious diasporic tradition among Torajans. However, in all the migrant communities there are Torajans who dissociate themselves from their fellow-migrants and some who even purposefully cut their ties with the homeland. Such cases are mainly people from the lowest classes—ones who have failed to succeed in their new environment, accumulated many debts to other Torajans that they are unable to repay, or have lost face in the highlands. However, this is not a common occurrence, and the characteristics discussed above as typical of the Jakarta area and Hilltop Village are shared by all the Torajan diasporas in Southeast Asia, and probably also by others around the world. The idea that 'different settings lead to the same outcome' is typical for the Torajan diaspora and cannot be generalized to all other ethnic associations in the cities of Indonesia. After investigating Toba Batak ethnic associations in the three Indonesian cities of Medan, Bandung and Jakarta, for example, Bruner (1972:227) concluded that 'the three cities provide very different social environments for their Toba Batak migrant communities, and this is reflected in the different ethnic structures that emerged'.

Migrant Networks and Organizations

The Protestant Torajan church is spread across Indonesia (and beyond) and is the 'umbrella' which shelters the majority of the migrant Protestant Torajans (about 75 per cent of Torajans are Protestants). The church is well organized and has its headquarters in Rantepao. Each parish has three groups that cater for specific categories of Torajans:a women's group (Persekutan Wanita Gereja Toraja, PWGT); a youth group (Persekutan Pemuda Gereja Toraja, PPGT); and a Sunday class (Sekolah Minggu Kebaktian Madia, SMKM). There are also various choirs that regularly meet to practice. In this way, the church plays a central part in the social life of many migrants. Some women will meet each other three times a week or more: Sunday at the service, Tuesday for choir rehearsal, and Thursday with the women's group. Catholic Torajans face a different setting as the Catholic Church is not organized along ethnic lines. In general they, therefore, share the church with Catholics from other ethnic groups, most notably from Flores, East Timor, Central Sumatra (Batak), the Moluccas, and the Chinese. Mathias, for example, is working for a mining company in Papua (Jayapura) and is representative of the Torajan Catholics over there. His church community includes people from a variety of ethnic backgrounds, and Torajans make up only a small minority.

However, on religious holidays (particularly Christmas), Catholic and Protestant Torajans come together to celebrate within their *kerukunan*.

The idea of the *kerukunan* actually stems from the Protestant Torajan church, where this organizational model was introduced to prepare for collective Christmas celebrations. Nowadays, *kerukunan* can be found in almost every Torajan diaspora and its original function has broadened. The organization of *kerukunan* is relatively flexible and varies from very strict to loosely structured, and some are more active than others. In Kendari (Southeast Sulawesi), the Lemo Rarukan *kerukunan* (named after a village in Southern Tana Toraja) brings together all the 40 to 50 households that originated from that particular village. This *kerukunan* is active in organizing wedding and funeral ceremonies in the same way as is done in Tana Toraja. This requires a lot of labour and funds. When a member of the *kerukunan* is involved in the organization of such a ceremony, the other members will automatically help in the form of labour, money and material: 'Maringana disingkai' sola uasang' or 'light and heavy work we do it together'. The group has its own chairs, plates and spoons ready for these events.

Ill. 3.1. Toraja church in Makassar (photo by Wim Jakobs).

The Torajan diaspora in Makassar has the largest number of *kerukunan*.[19] It is estimated that there are between 80 and 100 Torajan *kerukunan* in Makassar, but that only 50 to 60 of these are active. *Kerukunan* membership is based on district, village, kinship, religion or university enrolment. Some of the larger (district) *kerukunan* are sub-divided into smaller *kerukunan*. As a consequence, the vast majority of Torajan migrants can be involved in more than one *kerukunan*. A Torajan migrant in Makassar explains:

> I am a member of five *kerukunan*: one of my wife's father's family, a second of my wife's mother's family, another of my father's family, a fourth of my mother's family, and finally the one which is made up of people that originate from the village I grew up. The main purpose of a *kerukunan* in Makassar is to celebrate particular religious events together and to give money or a hand when a relative of one of the members dies. Each member has to contribute some money once in a while. When a relative in the village of origin dies, someone from that village comes to Makassar to collect money for the funeral expenses.

Another Torajan migrant told me that Torajans in Makassar are imbued with organizational life: 'For example, I am the chairman of the Torajan parish RAMA, a member of three *kerukunan* and several savings groups (*arisan*), a singer in the church choir and secretary of the Kombongan Sang Torayan. "*kita bermasyarakat*" (we form one group). We have to be involved into society to be able to live.'

In Makassar there are also various levels of Torajan organization. It is worth analysing the Kombongan Sang Torayan (KST), a group or organization of one Torajan community which can be loosely compared with IKAT in Jakarta. KST is an umbrella organization that includes all the *kerukunan* in Makassar and was established in the mid 1990s when there were several clashes in Makassar between Torajans and Bugis. The governor at that time requested the Torajan migrant community to set up an organization in which all the Makassar-based Torajan *kerukunan* were represented to enable negotiations between the two ethnic groups to take place. Since its establishment, the KST has organized several meetings around topics that concern the whole Torajan community in Makassar. In addition to playing a part in solving ethnic conflicts in Makassar, it became an intermediary between Torajans in Makassar and those in Tana Toraja. For example, after the Indonesian decentralization laws were launched in

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[19] Not all Torajan organizations in Makassar are literally called a *kerukunan*, but *ikatan* and *keluarga* (family) also have, in essence, the same function and objectives.

2001, a large meeting was organized between those in favour and those against dividing the district of Tana Toraja. Along with the board of KST and 60 representatives from the *kerukunan* in Makassar, the meeting was attended by the head of the Tana Toraja district and his entourage. These kinds of meetings are held only once or twice a year, depending on the problems that arise for the Torajan diaspora. The KST thus does not have individual members but rather the *kerukunan*, or better their representatives, chaired by a rich Torajan businessman who also takes care of most expenses involved with the organization of these meetings. As Pa'Salusu explains, 'When a Torajan organization is set up, they look first to the people who are rich enough to pay for the organization of the meetings. In that sense I would call these kinds of organizations an elite system.'

In practice, the IKAT in Jakarta is considered to be much more effective in a social, political and economic sense than the KST in Makassar. Moreover, because of the rapid growth of Torajan diasporas, and the increasing tensions between Torajans and Muslim groups, an increasing number of diasporas nowadays establish their own IKATs in order to unite several *kerukunan*. The IKATs in the Province of Papua (IKAT Propinsi Papua) and in East Kalimantan especially are on the rise and extend their influence to other diasporas. Whereas most issues were formerly only discussed in either Makassar or Jakarta, or between the representatives of both diasporas, some other diasporas have now become powerful enough to demand a role in the protection of Torajan interests in the national arena and/or to claim a voice in discussions about any problems or policy regulations in Tana Toraja. Eventually, in December 2003, representatives from 30 Torajan diasporas within Indonesia (the chairmen of the IKATs) came together in one of the finest hotels in Tana Toraja to discuss the possible establishment of a single national Torajan association. Seven board members were elected during this meeting, but any further steps toward a national Torajan organization were not clearly taken at that time.[20]

Such translocal/national organizations linking many diasporas and often also the home community already exist at a lower level. For example, migrants who originate from the remote village of Baruppu, which is located at the northwestern tip of Tana Toraja, are organized in the Ikatan Sosial Keluarga Baruppu (ISKB). The ISKB consists of several *ikatans* that

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[20] Although not decided upon at that time, several names were suggested for the National Torajan organization: Kombongan Kalua, Masyarakat Toraja Sang Torayaan, Himpunan Keluarga Toraja Indonesia, Kerukunan Keluarga Toraja Nasional, and Ikatan Keluarga Toraja Indonesia (Kareba 2004).

are located in the cities of Indonesia and Malaysia where considerable numbers of people from Baruppu are living. ISKB's central office is located in Makassar. Every five years, all the people from ISKB gather in the village of Baruppu to organize a thanksgiving ceremony. However, here we also find an elite bias; several people have complained that 'ISKB only functions well for the rich people and their relatives. If there are poor people in need the others in ISKB do not care.'

In addition to these kinds of translocal organizations in which money, goods and information are transferred across local and national borders, there are less-formalised interactions between Torajans from the different diasporas. Let us return briefly to the example of Pa'Wanto's son who died in Jakarta from cancer. While the transportation of the corpse from Jakarta to Makassar was arranged by IKAT Jabotabek, the Torajan society in Makassar took over the responsibilities as soon as the corpse arrived at the airport. The *kerukunan* of Tikala financially and emotionally assisted Pa'Wanto in organizing his son's funeral in Makassar. However, after the body was buried, relatives in Tana Toraja indicated that the body should be brought back to the home village for a decent funeral ceremony. After three months, the body finally arrived in Tana Toraja, again with the financial and physical support of the Makassar migrant community.

To summarize: the Torajan community is growing larger and becoming more widely spread. The increasing scale of the Torajan migrant world, and pressures from outside, have led to an all-embracing Torajan organization. Or as Lineton (1975) pointed out for the Bugis migrant society 'homeland and migrant societies form two sections of one social system'. IKAT types of organizations are rapidly emerging in various regions as a mechanism to connect lower-level organizations, such as the *kerukunan* and church parishes, to other migrant communities, and also to an all-embracing Torajan organization.

(*Trans*)*migrants in the City: The Case of Makassar*

Makassar is an important node in the Torajan world, a place where people maintain forward (to other migrant communities) as well as backward (with Tana Toraja) ties. To some extent the city has become an economic extension of Tana Toraja through providing a new field for work and income. Moreover, in Makassar the Torajan world is reproduced and reconstructed (for example through the wall painting at the back of the church discussed in the introduction of this study). New cultural models

are developed of Tana Toraja that come close to what already exists in the homeland, but these models come out differently because Torajan migrants have to cope with the 'modern' urban world and context. Urban elites believe they know better what Tana Toraja needs than the elders and politicians in Tana Toraja itself. When Tana Toraja is recreated in Makassar, the question arises as to how this occurs?

Torajan migrants are of course not living in a social vacuum. The image of Makassar among most Indonesians is that of a 'hot city'; referring both to the climate and to the people inhabiting the city. The two major ethnic groups in the city are from South Sulawesi itself: the Bugis and Makasar.[21] 'Both have a reputation of being short-fused and obsessed with prestige and with honour and shame (*siri'*); other Indonesians see them as "hot" (*panas*) and "emotional" (*banyak emosi*), and the area is perceived as a "hot region" (*daerah panas*)' (Antweiler 1995:3). The Bugis and Makasar share many cultural features and are both adherents to Islam. Torajans, on the other hand, are seen as socially inferior by the Bugis and Makasar and are predominantly Christian. In the following, I will elaborate on the way Torajans make a living in this apparently 'hot' city and the way this affects the world of those remaining in the homeland of Tana Toraja.

Makassar: Microcosm of the Eastern Seas[22]

Makassar has the appearance of a typical Indonesian city; in the centre we find its government offices, Chinese and Indonesian shops and markets, Muslim and Christian places of worship, a mixture of well-to-do and poor neighbourhoods, and a public life conducted in *Bahasa Indonesia*.[23]

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[21] I use 'Makasar' to refer to the ethnic group that is predominantly located along the southern coast of South Sulawesi. The term with one 's' is commonly so used in the literature and helps to avoid confusion with the city 'Makassar', which is written with two s's.

[22] This title is partly derived from Antweiler (2001).

[23] From the beginning of the seventeenth century, Makassar has been a strategic location in Southeast Asia's trading system. At that time, it started to discover its 'commercial vocation as a base for all those seeking to evade the VOC's attempts to monopolize the Moluccan spice trade' (Reid 2000:57). The Portuguese made it their principal Southeast Asian base after the fall of Malacca in 1511. Soon, the city of Makassar became an important base for staple trade, supplying spices to European, Indian and Chinese buyers as well as a typical 'Southeast Asian entrepôt' where popular trading goods, such as porcelain, Mexican silver and Indian cloth, were exchanged Merchants from England, Denmark, Portugal, India and China established warehouses and started to live in the area. According to Reid (2000:58), the city grew quickly from a population of only a few thousand in the 1590s to about 100,000 at its peak in 1640–1660. 'This would have made it one of the six biggest cities in Southeast Asia, and as big as many European capitals'With a population of about 1.4 million today, Makassar remains the largest city in the eastern part of Indonesia, and it is estimated that it will further grow to 2.2 million by the year 2015 (Forbes 1981; JICA 1996).

The town is located next to the sea and has a harbour where impressively stylish wooden Bugis sailing boats lie against a background of large cargo ships. The recently developed harbour facilities, together with a domestic and international airport, help fulfill the modern role of the city as the gateway to Eastern Indonesia and the trigger for economic growth of the region. The rapid economic growth that occurred in Indonesia before the crisis in the 1990s largely excluded the Eastern Indonesian provinces. As Turner (2003:93) noted, 'The regional disparities perpetuated by this polarization have meant that not only is the local economy of Makassar a peripheral one, but also that the local political sphere has been controlled largely by those outside of the island. Not surprisingly, local development has been slow, with a high incidence of poverty and un/underemployment remaining.' Because Makassar was largely bypassed by industrialization, the city had been 'sheltered from many of the direct impacts of the economic crisis that [in the late 1990s] hit Java's modern economic sectors, such as construction, manufacturing, and financial services' (Turner 2000:346). Forrester (1999) concluded that there had not been such high unemployment rates as in Java where they had been a consequence of closing factories and retailers.

Despite, Makassar's status as a 'peripheral economic zone, vis-à-vis the western major islands of Java and Sumatra', the city is nevertheless the most important economic centre in Eastern Indonesia. Moreover, it is a transportation node and critical in providing higher education opportunities for the Eastern Indonesian peoples, such as those from Flores, Timor and the Moluccas (Antweiler 2001). After the national government's decision in the late 1990s to nominate Makassar as one of Indonesia's centres of 'special development',[24] the building sector and economy have flourished.

With people drawn to Makassar to work, pursue education, or set up a business, the city has become a mixture of various ethnic groups, a microcosm of the eastern seas. However, as Antweiler (2001) noted, 'Makassar is not simply a "city of minorities" like for example Medan in Sumatra' but is dominated by the four main ethnic groups of South Sulawesi itself: Bugis, Makasar, Mandar and Torajans. The largest group, the Bugis (52 per cent),[25]

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[24] The others being Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan and Ambon (Antweiler 2001).

[25] This figure is an estimate by Abustam (1988:19). More recent information about the ethnic composition of Makassar's population is not available. However, in an interview with Turner (2003: 84) an official at PUKTI (Centre for the Development of Small Businesses in the Eastern Indonesian Region) 'estimated that in 1997, 30 per cent of the population

are known as seafarers and have a 'reputation of being aggressively competitive, perhaps due to the struggle for political hegemony, rivalry for social status and to avoid *siri*', commonly a loss of honour and dignity, but historically more complex, embodying social solidarity, social identity, prestige and self respect'(Mattulada 1982 in Morrel 1998:161). Although closely related, the Makasar (25 per cent) are often seen as culturally inferior by the Bugis due to their image as poor farmers who have migrated to the city and are willing to undertake low status jobs (Antweiler 1994). Other major groups in Makassar include the Mandar people (13 per cent, also from South Sulawesi) who are culturally linked to the Bugis people, and the Torajan people who make up about 10 per cent of the total population in Makassar. The last group are considered to be of lower descent than the Bugis and Makasar, and are generally referred to as a source of slaves in the past.

Still today, the ethnic categories remain important and there are sharp boundaries between them. Just as Antweiler (1995:4) observed during his fieldwork in a neighbourhood of Makassar, I found that '[p]eople quickly and unambiguously refer to themselves and others as *Bugis*, *Makassar*, *Mandar*, or *Toraja* (the main south Sulawesi groups) and other ones, as for example *Orang Jawa* (Javanese), *Orang Timor* and *Orang Cina* (Chinese Indonesians; officially *Tionghoa*).' Consequently, racial violence is not uncommon, especially between the ethnic groups of the Muslim lowlands and the Christians from the highlands of Tana Toraja. Nevertheless, members of the many different ethnic groups often interact within economic or working relationships through inter-ethnic marriages and/or through residing in the same neighbourhoods. Antweiler (2001) argues that '[d]espite some remaining ethnic names of urban quarters [such as kampung RAMA], many areas are almost unsegregated in ethnic terms today'.

Arriving in the City and Finding Shelter

The wider region of the Makassar municipality (*kotamadya*) comprises 172 km². The inner city is the oldest part, located near the sea and having the highest population density. From here, the city stretches about 20 kilometres inland to the east, where the population density is one fourth lower than in the centre. This is also where the housing estates for the well-to-do

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were Bugis, 40 per cent were Makassar, with the remainder consisting of Mandar (5 per cent), Toraja (5 per cent), Chinese (3 per cent), and 17 per cent "others", among whom were Javanese and those from the Outer Islands.' Except for the total numbers of Bugis and Makasar, these estimations are close to my own impression.

are to be found. Most 'slum' areas are on the fringes of the central part near the sea (JICA 1996). Torajans are scattered all over the city, from the wards of the well-to-do citizens to the slum areas, reflecting their individual social status (Nooy-Palm et al. 1979b:32). There are somewhat higher concentrations of Torajan households in certain areas (see Map 3.3). The older neighbourhoods, those that developed in the 1930s and 1950s, are close to the sea, in the centre of the city (around Jalan Bawakaraeng and kampung Dadi) and in the southern part (around Jalan Cendrawasih and in Tamalate). The other quarters are newer and generally to the east of the centre (Kampung Rama) and further east (Tamalanrea). Kampung RAMA is the only quarter in Makassar that houses virtually only completely Torajan people. It was established in the 1960s by Torajans from Rantepao and Makale (the only two towns in Tana Toraja) and today there are about 400 Torajan households.[26]

As we have observed earlier, Torajans tend not to move to Makassar on their own but through their networks of relatives and friends who originate from the same village or region in the highlands. Upon arrival, these people often provide initial shelter, food, information about the city's 'do's and don'ts', and the networks that help to create the conditions for settling in the city, such as finding employment and shelter. This does not mean that new arrivals automatically leave the welcoming house as soon as they find employment and alternative shelter. Most Torajans have relatives from the highlands staying in their houses, or 'living-ins' as Nooy-Palm (1979b) calls them. I seldom came across Torajan households in Makassar that consisted solely of a nuclear family (parents and their children).

Students and poor, or unemployed, relatives are generally not expected to pay for their expenses but 'take on the functions of "helpers" in their urban relatives' homes in exchange for housing and assistance with tuition' (Adams 2000:171). Rintik, for example, who is a policeman from Rembon living in a boarding house provided by the police department (*Asrama polisi*) in the eastern part of Makassar helps out his relatives.

> Together with his wife, who is a nurse in a Catholic hospital, they are taking care of seven relatives from the highlands plus their own two children. Thus, the tiny, one-floor, official residence with two bedrooms plus a living room and annex kitchen, provides shelter for 11 people. None of these relatives have an income. A 26-year-old niece stopped working in order to take care of her child after her husband died and the other 'living-ins' are still at school.

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[26] In 1992, kampung RAMA consisted of 406 households of which 382 originated from Tana Toraja, 11 from Pare Pare and 13 from elsewhere in Makassar (Hafid 1996–1997:37).

Map 3.3. Concentrations of Torajan households in Makassar.
Source: Map based on city layout from Forbes (1979:5).

> Rintik and his wife are paying all the expenses while the youngsters take care
> of the shopping and food preparation. One year earlier, Rintik was even
> accommodating 20 relatives in his house, but some have since found
> employment and moved out, while others have returned to Tana Toraja.

In addition to visiting relatives, the well-to-do also have Torajan servants
or gardeners living in their houses. These are provided with food, a place
to stay and a small amount of money in return for their services. Usually,
these servants come from lower class families from the same region or vil-
lage in the highlands. In rare cases, people from the highest social class
(*puang*) even bring their former slaves to their urban homes. The *puang*
take care of all the expenses of the slaves and pay some 'pocket money'.
Occasionally relatives of a house-owner will take care of a house while the
owner (and his immediate family) are no longer living there. Makassar is
often a stepping-stone for migration to other places in the archipelago.
Houseowners, often retain their property in Makassar as a base to which
they can always return in case of adversities elsewhere but also because
it is conveniently located on the way to Tana Toraja. It is not uncommon
for the people living in these 'abandoned' houses to have their own
'living-ins'.

Next to these purely Torajan constellations of households, I came across
several mixed-ethnic households. My own estimation is that about five to
ten percent of Torajans in Makassar live in mixed-ethnic households.
Some of these households are a result of inter-ethnic marriages, where the
spouses often had Christian backgrounds and originated from Flores,
Timor or north Sumatra (Batak). Some Torajans had also married a Muslim
with a Bugis or Makasar ethnic background. Others, usually unmarried
Torajans, live in affluent middle-class Chinese or Bugis households. Such
Torajans, often low-ranking, work in these households as servants or as
labourers in an attached business. Rosmina, for instance, stays with her
cousin in a small room above a Chinese grocer's shop.

> Together with her cousin, a Makasar girl, and the Chinese owner and his
> wife, they make up one household. Next to shelter, the Chinese shop owners
> provide food and a small salary (Rp 300,000 per month). Because Rosmina is
> working seven days a week from 6.30 am to 9.30 pm, she relies almost com-
> pletely on the other household members, to whom she has to talk to in the
> Indonesian language. However, to her Torajan colleagues or customers, she
> will immediately switch to the Torajan language.

Torajans who came to the provincial capital some time ago (between the
1930s and the 1970s) generally own a house. Often these people have been
or are still working as policemen, soldiers, teachers, or civil servants at one

of the many government offices in Makassar. Other Torajans have to pay rent, in either money or labour, or depend on the good will of family members to provide accommodation.

Living and Working in Makassar

The neighbourhood in which Torajans live is a reflection of their status. Status, in turn, is often derived to a great extent from someone's occupation. Because Makassar is a widespread city and congested by traffic, most people prefer to live close to their work. Consequently, besides the time period of migrant arrivals, many neighbourhoods represent particular jobs or orientations. The area of Tamalanrea (see map 3.3), for example, is close to Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS), one of the largest and oldest universities in eastern Indonesia. The area also houses a Christian University (UKIP) and various high schools, and most Torajans living in this area are either teaching or studying at one of these institutions. Just as at UKIP, nearly all the students at the Catholic University of Adma Jaya and the Christian School of Theology (STT), which are located in the southern part of Makassar, come from Tana Toraja. Some of these students live in boarding houses in the vicinity of these schools and universities. Others live with their relatives in and around Jalan Cendrawasih, another neighbourhood with a high concentration of Torajans. Kampung Dadi is a less sophisticated area of town that also houses a large number of Torajans. Torajans with a high income do not live in this neighbourhood, but it still provides a more pleasant impression than other Torajan wards in the town where the houses are so close together that their roofs touch each other. Although the streets have become a little busier nowadays, the Dadi neighbourhood still fits the description by Nooy-Palm (1979b) about three decades earlier: 'In Dadi there is much space between the houses, providing room for the children to play their games, whilst adults have built their badminton fields.' Today, most people living in kampung Dadi are employed by the government (including the army, police, primary and secondary schools and those with white collar jobs) and several others are working as carpenters or as servants in one of the hotels in Makassar.

A large number of the Torajans in Makassar have a government position and live in the vicinity of their departments or even in special compounds where houses are provided by the government (especially for the police and army). Others are studying and living in or near their schools and universities. Even more are working in stores, as servants in Chinese, Bugis or Torajan households, in the hotel and catering industry, or as manual

labourers. Others are employed in the shoe, furniture and rattan indus-
tries. Most of these people are living in the more modest or shanty-type of
neighbourhoods 'where the roofs of the houses touch each other'. This is,
for example, true of Lia, who is living with seven other people in a tiny
shack in a slum area in the northern part of Makassar.

> The partly two-storey wooden shack is completely jammed in between other
> houses. Lia is paying Rp 600,000 per year in rent for the small plot of land on
> which the house is built. The house had already been built by her uncle
> when Lia arrived in 1990. Since then, she has patched it up as best as she can.
> The house has a small room of three by three metre which is used both as a
> place to live and one to sleep in. At the back is a kitchen/bath room and toi-
> let and, on the upper floor, another small bedroom. The roof on top of the
> front room is made of zink which heats up when the sun shines and leaks
> when it rains. Lia works in a bar, dancing, earning Rp 300,000 per month. She
> shares the house with her sister Selfi, her first cousins Anni and Eli, and Eli's
> husband from Flores and their two children. Selfi is working at a shoe store,
> Anni is working part-time as a nurse at a Catholic hospital, Eli is unemployed
> and her husband is a waiter at a hotel on the city's boulevard. They all pool
> their incomes to make ends meet. The situation of the other people in the
> neighbourhood is not so very different. Like Lia, most neighbours come from
> the Southern part of Tana Toraja, and are from the lowest social rank, some
> are even slaves. They are working in shops, making furniture and handi-
> crafts, or selling *bakso* (soup with meatballs).

Lia's situation stands in sharp contrast to that of the Torajan businessman
Brent Litha, owner of a bus company (with the same name) that has buses
running throughout South Sulawesi. He also owns a coffee company that
exports coffee from Tana Toraja to markets all over the world. Brent lives
with his family along a busy road near the centre of town. Before reaching
his house one has to pass a large electronically operated gate. His two-
storey house has all the luxuries one can think of. This businessman repre-
sents the Torajan ideal. Although there are very few financially successful
Torajan businessmen in Makassar, together they own part of the city's
major taxi company, some large hotels, companies and shops. In general,
Torajans are not well-known for their business attitudes, and the few busi-
nesses set up by Torajans tend to remain rather small in size. According
to Turner (2005:266), there is some notable occupational demarcation
along ethnic lines in the production of small-scale enterprise goods in
Makassar city. As Turner observes, Torajans continue to dominate the shoe
business as they did in the early days (see also Abustam 1975), while other
businesses are difficult to enter. Given this situation, networks appear
to be pivotal in finding employment. Some people in a Torajan village

complained to me that its inhabitants could not find any work in Makassar simply because there are hardly any other villagers or relatives living in the city. In other words, finding a job in Makassar almost completely depends on 'who you know and not what you know', as Woolcock (1998) phrased it.

Social Relations and Networks

As described above, migration to the city and job searching is generally facilitated by a family member or a fellow villager already in the city, but how do Torajans build up their social relationships and networks afterwards? When it all comes down to 'who you know' in finding a job, shelter or information about forthcoming ceremonies or events, who are these 'who's' and how and where do 'new arrivals' meet them. In other words, what are the typical places and organizations where Torajan city dwellers meet other Torajans, and what sort of people are most likely to be embedded in which Torajan networks?

As we saw earlier, the living situation of Torajans differs widely in the various city neighbourhoods. Some live almost completely among other Torajans, while others live in a neighbourhood dominated by people from other ethnic groups, and a few live in mixed-ethnic households. These different living situations lead to various constellations of social relations and networks in which Torajans become involved. Let me start by introducing the story of Kristina, a 28-year-old woman, who migrated to Makassar in 1994 after she finished high school (SMA) in Tana Toraja.

> In 1994, Kristina came to the city in search of a job and stayed with her aunt, who was still single, in a small house in the southern part of Makassar. After one year, she found employment in a copy shop which was owned by a Chinese. She heard about the job vacancy from the Catholic priest of her church community, of which the Chinese owner was also a member. After two years working at the copy shop, Kristina became an employee at the Catholic university Adma Jaya. This time, she came to know about the job through her uncle who is also working at the administration office of the university. When Kristina left her job at the copy shop, her sister Marianne filled in her position. When Marianne left to go to Surabaya to find better paid employment, the job was again taken over by another sister, Herlina. Herlina dit not get along well with the Chinese owner and quit in 2004, along with a Bugis colleague and friend. At that time, she was finding it hard to find a new job. According to Herlina, there is no possibility of finding a job through the *kerukunan* because there are not many Torajans owning a company.

Kristina now rents a small house not far from the university where she works. She moved to the house in 1996 and shared with her cousin who was already living there. After one year, her cousin moved to Papua, and Kristina's sister Herlina moved in. Kristina is married to a man from Tana Toraja who was searching for employment in Irian Jaya at that time. Together, they have since had a young daughter, Thersa, who is living with Kristina's parents in Tana Toraja. In line with Torajan customs, Kristina gave birth to her child in her parents' house in Tana Toraja. Not uncommonly either, her parents are now taking care of the child because Kristina needs to work and her husband is in Irian Jaya. One week before I visited Kristina, her parents came to Makassar with Thersa to celebrate her first birthday. The party was also attended by a couple of Torajan family members. Besides the ones mentioned above, another daughter, Selviana, came along with her aunt and uncle. Selviana is studying at a secondary school (SMA) in Makassar and lives with her aunt, who works with Kristina at the Catholic university. This aunt is still single and childless and financially supports Selviana's education. They share the house with a disabled uncle of Kristina, who is unable to work. Fitriansa, a cousin of Kristina who lives on the other side of town in a police compound, also attended the birthday party together with his sister. All these family members come from the same village, Palipu', in the southern part of Tana Toraja. These family members are the ones closest to Kristina, and most of her social life is centred around these relations. Often her uncle and colleague visits Kristina and Herlina for a chat and to keep an eye on things. Kristina, frequently visits the other family members on a Sunday afternoon after the Catholic Mass has finished.

Besides her family, she sometimes sees other people from her home village at meetings organized by the Kerukunan Keluarga Besar Kandora (KKBK). KKBK was founded in 1975 as an organization for the people from three villages in Tana Toraja, including Palipu'. According to the chairman of KKBK, the main purpose of this organization is to strengthen the relationships among the people of Kandora and to support its members in times of need. 'If someone from Kandora is sick or dead, the sick person or the family of the deceased receive a certain amount of money to support them. Moreover, the members will physically and financially help with the organization of particular wedding or funeral ceremonies.' The KKBK annually arranges for a large Christmas celebration for all 100 households who are members of the organization. It also has a financial self-help organization, or *arisan*, that meets every month. *Arisans* are not only popular among Torajans but among people from all ethnic groups and layers of Indonesian society. The *arisan* within *kerukunan* Kandora has about 40 or 50 members who each contribute Rp 20,000 per month to the monthly prize or jackpot. Because most meetings are held on the other side of town, Kristina only attends the large Christmas celebration. In spite of its social function, where lots of information is exchanged, the *kerukunan* has not proved very useful to Kristina's sister Herlina in finding work.

> Instead of travelling across town to participate in the KKBK *arisan*, Kristina is a member of an *arisan* at her workplace, which has 20 to 30 members. The members are mostly Torajans who also each pool Rp 20,000 each month. According to Kristina, 'this *arisan* is very helpful in making a living because once in a while you obtain a large amount of money, without the need to return it or pay any interest.'
>
> The house which Kristina rents is located in a typical heterogeneous neighbourhood with Bugis, Javanese, Ambonese, Makasar, and many Torajans. When she returns home from her work, she usually sits outside to chat with her Makasar and Ambonese neighbours. However, besides this gossiping, as she calls it, she does not have much other interaction with her neighbours.

The situation of Kristina represents a typical Torajan network in Makassar; most of those involved are from the same region of origin, and often from the same village and/or shared ancestors. Apart from some relationships with people at work and in the neighbourhood, most interactions of importance occur within this network. *Kerukunan* are usually no more than an extension of these networks and do not directly include people from other regions in Tana Toraja or from other ethnic groups. Religion, on the other hand, or rather its performance, has proved to be a more useful means of establishing new relations outside existing networks. Especially in the Catholic church, where parishes include people from Timor and Flores, and some Chinese, Torajans are more likely to meet people from other ethnic backgrounds. Kristina found employment with the help of her church relationships, at a Chinese-owned copy shop. Often these interactions lead to inter-ethnic marriages. In fact, most of the inter-ethnic marriages in Makassar I came across during my research involved Catholics. Such marriages will often have an impact on the kinds of networks in which the Torajans will participate. This also applies to Maria, who married a man from Flores, who was also a Catholic.

> Maria, a woman in her 40s, came to Makassar ten years ago, following her husband who had found a job as a driver for the Universal Bank. She had met her husband, Hendrikus, in Maros, a city just one hour's drive north of Makassar. Before they married, Maria took care of her sister's household in Maros for over nine years. At the time I interviewed Maria, she was living in the rear part of a house together with her husband, two small children, her brother and her husband's nephew from Flores. For over three years, Hendrikus has now been working as a driver for an Australian oil company, which is run by a Chinese man from Java. He is the only person in the household earning an income (Rp 600,000 a month). The others are still studying in high school or primary school, while Maria is working as a housewife and taking care of her youngest daughter.

Their two-storey dwelling is located in the eastern part of the city in a neighbourhood which is predominantly inhabited by Makasar, but also houses some Bugis, Ambonese, Flores and three Torajan households. The neighbourhood appears quite sad and Maria's dwelling is rather small. Living with so many people on one salary, sometimes makes it hard to make ends meet. Although they get along well with their neighbours, it is difficult to borrow money from them during hard times because they charge over 20 per cent interest. At Hendrikus' workplace it is even harder to ask for help because, as he explains, he has only been working there for three years and has not managed to establish close relations with his colleagues. They have not joined any *arisan*, and the Catholic Kerukunan Flores (KKF) to whom they belong only consists of the Flores and Torajan households in the neighbourhood. The main purpose of this *kerukunan* is the organization of a Christmas celebration rather than the financial support of people in need.

Just like Kristina, Maria also comes from the village of Palipu'. However, as she tells, she rarely meets Torajans from her home area, apart from her sister in Maros. She does not even know the address of her cousin, the policeman who went to the birthday party of Kristina's daughter. Nor is she going to the *kerukunan* Kandora (KKBK). According to her, its members live all over town which will make it difficult to join any meetings. The Catholic church which Maria attends is quite far from her home, but she takes part in a Catholic praying group in the neighbourhood which meets regularly. Her relations with people in Makassar, outside the household, are rather weak. Her sister, on the other hand, has better connections in Maros and explains that, in the event of problems, she often turns to people from the same home area (including Torajans from the neighbouring district of Mamasa). The importance for Torajans of coming from the same region or area is often mentioned by them using the term '*solana*', which literally means 'together'.

The isolation of Maria from other Torajans is neither related to her marriage with someone from another ethnic group, nor to her social background, as was the case with Lia (see former section). Lia came from a slave family, and the only way to escape from this position is to avoid all relations with Torajans in Makassar that come from the same region. This is a rather radical step, and I did not find many Torajans who took it on purpose. The reason for Maria being more-or-less isolated from other Torajans is, in my opinion, somewhat more differentiated. I see it as a combination of financial status, religion and place, along with her inter-ethnic marriage.

Let me start by explaining why financial status can influence a person's participation in Torajan networks. As I explained above, maintaining relations with Torajans takes money, effort, and time. Crisscrossing Makassar to visit other Torajans or joining a *kerukunan* consumes both time and money. Once in a while, Torajans have to contribute money to relatives,

friends and acquaintances for forthcoming ceremonies in Makassar or in Tana Toraja. In fact, the main purposes of a *kerukunan* in Makassar are to celebrate particular religious events and to give money when a relative of one of its members dies, or for a forthcoming wedding. Each member therefore has to contribute some money on occasion, and this makes it impossible for some people to join one let alone several *kerukunan*. The richer people are, the more social relations they can afford, and the more they are involved in Torajan social organizations, often holding leadership positions.

Religion can be another way to cement particular Torajan networks (or to exclude people from them). Makassar has eleven Protestant Torajan churches (Gereja Toraja) in those neighbourhoods with the highest concentrations of Torajans. Each parish has several groups that cater for specific categories of Torajans and various choirs. Through this structure, people meet each other a couple of times a week, and the institution, so to speak, cements the social relations among its members who are predominantly Torajans. In contrast, the Catholic congregations in Makassar are a mix of ethnic groups, and the church rather discourages any direct relation between ethnicity and the church. Thus, instead of encouraging the realization of a large Torajan community or network, it impedes this process by suggesting that this is not necessarily essential. Consequently, the Protestant Torajans I met in Makassar tend to be more closely involved in Torajan networks and organizations than their Catholic equivalents.

Finally, place appears to be another variable that encourages or keeps people from involving themselves in relationships with other Torajans. When the density of Torajan households in a neighbourhood is high, it is more likely that most interactions in the life of these Torajans are undertaken with co-ethnics. This becomes apparent in the story of Lina, who is living in a street just outside kampung RAMA, densely populated with Torajans.

> Lina heads the Makassar department for a Torajan lending and saving cooperative (KSP Balo' Toraja). In the small office at the back of her house she receives her Torajan clients in the mornings. In the afternoons, the 34-year-old woman is usually out visiting Torajan friends or relatives who live nearby for a little chat and some tea. Twice a week she spends the evening with her church choir to practice some hymns for the forthcoming service. On Sundays she goes to the service at the Gereja Toraja in Kampung RAMA, after which she joins some other church members at their homes for some drinks and food. Once in a while, she leaves the neighbourhood to do some shopping in one of the malls in the centre of the city, the only occasions when she meets non-Torajan people.

The life of Lina contrasts strongly with Maria's social life, since she has hardly any Torajans living in the close vicinity. One can conclude that integration into networks and Torajan organizations is more-or-less shaped by the combination of the social and financial status of the migrant, his or her religion and marriage, and the place of the migrant's home. Interestingly, although work seemed to play a part in the way Torajans are integrated into networks and Torajan organizations, in most cases it only played a minor role.

The Torajan social space or field in Makassar thus consists of various localized Torajan networks that are based upon the neighbourhood, family, work, church, *arisan* or *kerukunan*. To some extent, these networks are a reflection or extension of the social structure in the homeland. These networks are 'bonded' and 'bridged', to use Woolcock's terminology (1998), by so-called key players or the urban Torajan elites. Such people usually head these groups and meet each other at various events such as weddings, Christmas celebrations, New Year receptions and more importantly, at ceremonial activities in Tana Toraja. On these occasions, new social relationships are formed and old ties are strengthened. To keep one's relationships strong, it is essential to participate in various such social happenings. Often ceremonies in Tana Toraja provide the best opportunities for people to invest in new and old social capital, because there they have much more time than in Makassar, where they are busy with their work. Given this tight system of social networks, members of the urban Torajan elite, such as Brent Litha and Pa'Salusu, are able to quickly mobilize many Torajans to raise money for funeral ceremonies or Christmas celebrations, in times of elections in Tana Toraja, or when conflicts emerge between Torajans and the Bugis in the city. As such, the Makassar elites exercize great influence over other local Torajans and also over the home region. When local elections are due, Torajan politicians go to Makassar to lobby for support from the Torajan elites over there, and by that they gain the loyalty of associates in Tana Toraja. If they have substantial objection, powerful migrants might even be able to prevent the implementation of particular policy measures in Tana Toraja. Therefore, the district head and his entourage regularly visit Makassar to find support for their plans from among the urban Torajan elites. In return, on their visits to Tana Toraja, these well-educated elites often provide unsolicited advice to the district head on issues such as education, healthcare, employment, tourism and, to a lesser extent, agriculture. These elites owe their important positions not only to their achievements in the city, but also to their financial contributions to funeral and house-inauguration ceremonies in Tana Toraja.

Moving forward in Makassar cannot be achieved without social and financial contributions to the heartland of Tana Toraja.

Communication between the Urban Migrants and the Homeland

From the above it is clear that many Torajan migrants still return regularly to the highlands to participate in funerals, house-building ceremonies and/or weddings. The frequency of such trips depends on the distance between the place of migration and their homeland, the period of migration, the financial capital and employment of the migrant, and the importance of the forthcoming ceremony. However, even if Torajan migrants seldom return home, the vast majority still maintain close relations with the home community. The continuing significance of kinship in the lives of migrants long after they are settled in Makassar, and the growth over time in the type and quantity of transactions which take place between kin located in the two locations deserves further explanation (Basch et al. 1994:165). One cannot automatically assume that the Torajan migrant community in Makassar continues to have many relatives back home to whom it feels obligations. The impetus for keeping close ties with kin in the highlands is highly complex and requires an understanding of Torajan social organization and culture, which will be provided in Chapter 4 and 5. In this section, I simply picture the channels through which information, goods and money are transferred.

The quantity of money and goods sent home to Tana Toraja on a daily basis becomes immediately clear when you enter the office of Litha, which has several buses running to Tana Toraja every day. A large stack of boxes is waiting to be transported to Tana Toraja on the night buses. A price list is hanging on the wall, detailing, the charges for carrying the various sizes of boxes, amounts of money, and letters to Makale or Rantepao.[27] According to Delfi, this system functions very well.

> In addition to money, she sends monthly a box with goods (salt, sugar, sweets, toiletries, etc.) home to her daughter Ritta in Tana Toraja. Ritta is 17 years old and rents a small apartment in the town of Rantepao where she is studying in high school. Delfi works in a café in Makassar and takes care of all Ritta's expenses. When Ritta picks up the box at the Litha office in Rantepao, she usually heads directly to the village of Palipu' where she was brought up by her grandparents (Delfi's parents). Most of the received goods

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[27] It differentiates the following items: letters, money from Rp 50,000 to Rp 1,000,000, small boxes of Indomie (a popular brand of noodles) boxes with salt, computers, monitors, middle-sized boxes, and large boxes.

> will be distributed among them and a brother and sister of Delfi. Often, they
> also receive a little pocket money from Delfi.

Lucie uses another bus company and is also quite positive about this sys-
tem. She often uses the company to send letters home to her village of
Kondo'. The boyfriend of her cousin, who is living in Rantepao, usually
picks up the letters at the local bus office and delivers them to Lucie's par-
ents in the village. Mail headed in the other direction operates in the
same way.

Money and goods are of course not only sent home from Makassar with
the bus companies; these can also be carried by family, friends or acquain-
tances visiting the village or taken personally by the migrants themselves
on a visit home. Another, but less used and less trusted, way involves trans-
fers through the postal service or a bank, although not everyone is allowed
to, or able to, open a bank account. Finally, some money is transferred
through the Torajan lending and saving cooperation (KSP Balo' Toraja)
which has an office in Makassar and several in Tana Toraja. According to
the person heading the local office in Makassar, this channel is used very
irregularly by Torajans and really only when migrants have to contribute
large sums of money for forthcoming ceremonies. In practice, it is more
regularly used for transferring money from parents in Tana Toraja to their
children in Makassar. Forty students receive a combined Rp 20 million
every month. It is not uncommon for parents in Tana Toraja to support
their children during study in Makassar, but most students also receive
support from their wealthier kin in the city. More customary are gifts of
rice, coffee and the Torajan cookies traditionally served at ceremonies.
Often I came across migrants who had brought some rice back from their
visits to the highlands, or obtained some from returning relatives, friends
or neighbours. Thus this transfer is not only a flow of goods and money in
one direction, but it is also not a balanced exchange. Although the amount
of money and goods transferred is hard to measure, virtually all migrants
are sending something home. Beyond making a living in Makassar, most
migrants are trying to save money for their kin in Tana Toraja or for forth-
coming ceremonies.

In the past, information was usually passed from migrants to kin at
home by letters, telegrams or through other Torajans who travelled back
and forth. As a consequence, it could take several months before news
about unexpected events in the home village reached migrants. Since
then, through faster means of transportation and communication, the
transfer of information has become much easier. The first advance was the

introduction of an analogtelephone system in Tana Toraja in 1987 that provided telephone connections for some people, primarily for civil officers and the rich in the towns of Makale and Rantepao. By 1996, there were about 1,300 telephone connections in Makale and 3,100 in Rantepao. Providing exclusive access to telephones only for people in Makale and Rantepao has unintentionally led to a brokering role for some people in the transfer of information. This broker role becomes very clear in the interview with Pong Pedi:

> Because I live in Rantepao and possess a telephone and fax machine in my house, all communications between my family in Makassar, Java and Kalimantan, and my family in the mountain villages pass through my house. I do not have to go to the villages in person to pass on the information because I can give the information to the *pete pete* (minibus) driver who drives up to the villages every day. The driver will convey the news to the villagers, and the other way around it works in the same way. The driver passes on the information without charging any money or expecting anything in return. However, when I want to go to a village, I am more-or-less obliged to go with that particular driver.

In the introduction to this book it was already noted how tante also fulfilled a form of brokers-role in the family house in Makale through informing migrant family members about forthcoming ceremonies and unexpected events while, at the same time, passing information about migrants on to relatives in Tana Toraja. Moreover, we saw that this communication system works quite well, with guests attending ceremonies without official invitations from the organizers, and rarely does anyone miss a ceremony in honor of even the most distant acquaintance.

Although wireless telephones have recently been introduced into the highlands, hand phones can only be used within a radius of twenty kilometres around Rantepao and Makale. In the remote village of Baruppu, which is about a three-hour drive from Rantepao in the dry season, a migrant working for an American company in Balikpapan, Kalimantan, had installed two satellite telephones that connected the inhabitants with the wider world (as far as Malaysia). This was seen as quite an improvement by many people because it was much cheaper than going to Rantepao. Travelling to Rantepao by *petepete* (minibus) costs about Rp 15.000. In addition, passengers generally have to eat and spend the night there before they can return the next day. However, the generator that is needed to get any signal has broken down and the villagers again need to go down to Rantepao.

Students from Baruppu who study in Rantepao also deliver messages. They usually return to Baruppu on the Saturday and go back to Rantepao after Sunday Mass. On other occasions, messages are delivered through *petepete* drivers. Notwithstanding the important role that some people in Makale and Rantepao currently fill in communicating information to migrants and those in the villages, this role is slowly decreasing. People with a cell phone living within reach of the antennas in Makale and Rantepao are already replacing the brokers' role. In the village of Palipu', for example, most communication with migrants now runs through the cell phone of Pa'Marrung. Pa'Marrung is a wealthy man, and his cell phone was sent by his son who is working in South Korea. Whenever Kristina wants to contact her parents, she phones Pa'Marrung. However, she prefers to contact him at his office in Makale because this is much cheaper than through his cell phone.

In Kondo', it is not very different, Lucie can communicate by phone with her younger brother who is working at a highschool in the neighbouring village of Tondon Batuk. After I made an appointment for an interview with Rosmina in Makassar, she contacted her family in Tana Toraja to find out about me. She did this through phoning the neighbours of her family who own a cell phone. As of 2005, Tana Toraja still lacked an internet provider and using any web-based communication was, for the vast majority, still out of the question.[28] However, fax, telephone and road improvements have made communication much quicker, increasing the influence of people in Makassar on household decisions in Tana Toraja, and also vice versa. In particular, migrants of high class families often call home for information about forthcoming ceremonies or to meddle in the organization of important ceremonies. Torajan families in the highlands, conversely, often call their migrant relatives for financial contributions or advice on buying pigs or buffalo for a particular ceremony.

The Homecoming Myth: Metaphor or Reality?

Torajan migrants say that they are longing for their homeland and, even if they have already been living elsewhere for several decades, that their mind is still with their family in Tana Toraja. The majority wish to return to the highlands permanently, even if this is not a realistic option. Thus, the identity of Torajans in Makassar as a group and as individuals is

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[28] It is worth emphasizing that, in contrast to Tana Toraja, communication through the Internet among Torajans in the various diasporas has been rapidly increasing.

inextricably related to their identification with Tana Toraja, and as such Makassar has become a metaphor for Tana Toraja. However, this metaphor seems a little too metaphorical as the homecoming myth does not really appeal to most people. People from the lowest classes are not actually longing to go back to their dependent and outcast position in Tana Toraja, and the poor are not eager to show their disappointing failure to make a fortune in the city to relatives in the homeland. Torajan organizations are generally headed by high-class elders or wealthy people from the middle class. These are the people trying hardest to sustain the Torajan world. However, the Torajan world is not a harmonious whole, and there are some lines of fracture running right through it, especially as it concerns the less fortunate people. Further, for the second- and third- generation Torajan migrants it is not very obvious that they feel Torajan, and there are also people who feel somewhere in between. The latter have mixed feelings about their ethnic identity. This continuing dilemma of feeling in-between was very well illustrated in an interview with Juliet, who is one of 250 students at the Theological College in Makassar. She is 22 years old with a Torajan father and a mother from Manado. When I asked her about her identity, she somewhat confusedly started a monologue about her struggle in living between 'we and them':

> The people in Tana Toraja know me well, but I do not know them. Like last year, when I went to a funeral ceremony, everybody seemed to know me. My relations with Torajans are not very close. Honestly, I feel Makassar, and I am more Makassar than Torajan. I was born in this culture and grew up here. Torajan people are hard. They spend their money on things which are not very useful. For example, on this campus, they usually buy *ballo'*, which is a traditional palm wine from Tana Toraja. They drink it to remember their culture and homeland. The Torajan students impose their ideas upon other students. In a positive sense, Torajan students are very close to each other. Because they are very far from their village, they try to be as one in this place and care a lot about each other, whether they are acting right or wrong. The situation in the dormitory is such that they never meet with people from other ethnic groups such as the Bataks or people from Kupang [Timor]. They use their own language which makes it very difficult for 'outsiders' to join in. They create a gap surrounding 'them and themselves' by using their language. In the night they sleep together like roommates, but in daily life they live separately. It is very difficult to integrate, but the same is true with other ethnic groups who use their own language. Because of the Torajan attitude, the situation is similar at other universities in Makassar; they all stick together to make themselves feel satisfied. When the Torajan students at this campus have a problem, they gather at the house of the 'parents'. This Torajan couple is living and teaching on the Campus. In the Torajan language, they have the phrase *"Misa' kada, potuo pantan kada di pomate"*,

which means that, everywhere you are, you must remember that you are from the same mother. Torajans always use this phrase. When we met at the parents' house, we first started with these words. Yes, we always have to remember this! That is when I think that I am a full Torajan from Makassar. You can call this phrase a binding element for Torajans, because everywhere they go they use it. Not only in Makassar but everywhere they are.

In my family they still have a Torajan attitude, especially my uncle. He is often going to Tana Toraja for funeral ceremonies. We spend a lot of money on funeral ceremonies. My father also spends a lot of money when he is there [in Tana Toraja]. He does not care about money when he is in Tana Toraja but when he is back in Makassar he feels sorry again. Our family always thinks back after he returns to Makassar. We feel very sad about wasting so much money on funerals but we have to. We always think about our debts [through the funeral system]. We have a lot of debts in Tana Toraja and that is why my father often goes up there. It gives me a headache and I am afraid to go to Tana Toraja. When I go there I must face my debts. My father always tells me 'when there is a funeral of relatives which are not too close, please do not attend it or we will get more debts'. I have to say that I am an only child, and this makes the weight of these debts even heavier. My parents have lived in Makassar already for 20–30 years. They made me Makasar. They know all about the good things in Tana Toraja but they warn me about the Torajan attitude. They tell me 'please do not get involved too much in their traditions, especially the funeral ceremonies'.

From this assessment, I would like to draw some insights for further discussion. First, concerning the way in which Torajan students in Makassar use visible ethnic strength to develop group confidence and a sense of security, resulting in 'spaces of difference' as Laguerre (2000:155) calls it. The Torajan language (including phrases), family names, descent and cultural norms (defining status and behaviour) all form elements that keep Torajans together as a group in an alien environment. Moreover, the bargaining position of Torajans in interactions with other Torajans in Makassar is defined by their position in the homeland. In other words, the Torajan transmigrant community in Makassar more-or-less mirrors Torajan society in the highlands. Alongside the binding elements discussed above, the Torajan iconographic system has become a powerful symbol of their identity; declaring that 'the mountain people once considered to be of little consequence are now nationally and internationally recognized' (Morrell 2001:22). The signs on Torajan houses or *tongkonan* pop up everywhere in Makassar. Hotel entrances or even complete buildings are topped with a typical Torajan-style roof. A prominent hotel complex along the boulevard in Makassar consists of buildings that are designed as *tongkonan*. *Tongkonan* elements, and especially the façades'

designs, are attached to Indonesian-style houses, and heaps of miniature *tongkonan*, t-shirts printed with *tongkonan*, and keyrings in the shape of a *tongkonan*, are sold in the souvenir shops of Makassar. Moreover, artefacts or handicrafts with Torajan designs are displayed in the guest rooms of the better-off Torajans, and also of Bugis, Makasar and Mandar alike. Because of international and domestic promotion of tourism by the Indonesian government, 'posters, magazines, newspaper articles and television films publicize the architecture and rituals, creating greater awareness of Torajan identity within, and outside of, Tana Toraja' (Morrell 2001:22). This commodification of ritual and material culture has certainly contributed to the strengthening of the Torajan identity in and beyond Makassar.

The second point I want to pick up on from the interview with Juliet is the issue of being torn between two places, Tana Toraja and Makassar. Often Torajans act as if they were forced to migrate (as part of a diaspora) and, as a result, they are always longing for 'home'. Most of their activities in Makassar are related to objectives in Tana Toraja, such as a future funeral, house-building or eventual retirement in the highlands. Many wealthy Torajans still have a house in Tana Toraja in case they want to return in the future. All the first generation migrants I spoke with indicated they had plans to return to Tana Toraja in the future, when they are retired or when their children finish their education and become financially independent. These people are making a living in Makassar but they are not actually living there.

For the Torajans born in Makassar (second- and third- generation migrants) it is a little more complicated. They usually face problems similar to those of people with mixed-ethnic parents or Torajans within inter-ethnic marriages. This is the third and last issue which I want to draw on. The people within these groups are not so much torn between two places as between two ethnic groups; both with their own cultural repertoire and in terms of accompanying obligations. In the event of inter-ethnic marriages, all the couples that I talked to (both the men and the women) married in Tana Toraja. A Muslim from the city of Manado (in the northern part of Sulawesi) was very impressed by the thousands of people who turned up for his wedding ceremony in a village in Tana Toraja. His Torajan wife, who originates from a high-class family, was quick to add that all visitors were family. After marriage, the man became a Christian, which is also not unusual. Although the Torajan culture is usually a little more dominant in inter-ethnic marriages—probably through the demanding funeral ceremonies and the debt system that comes with it, most Torajans in these relationships are balancing between two cultures. Like children of

a couple with one Torajan parent, their identity depends on the occasion and the place they are at currently. Most second- and third-generation Torajan migrants become increasingly translocal. While they are born in Makassar, they might easily work elsewhere in Indonesia. They still return to the highlands for funeral ceremonies, but they do not always feel Torajan. As Michel, who was born in Makassar but is now living in East-Kalimantan, explained 'I grew up as a migrant and used to move around, I have been living in different places and among various ethnic groups. I have Torajan parents but feel more Indonesian than Torajan.' To summarize, there remains a distinction between Torajan-ness and Indonesian-ness that Torajan migrants have to manage. While the majority have no problems in bridging this distinction, some are living in two worlds, or even opt solely for the Indonesian world, especially those who are third-generation migrants.

Conclusions

In this chapter I gave a more detailed view on the way Tana Toraja changed and in some ways new perspectives on Toraja outmigration by compiling existing literature on this topic and coming up with new data from interviews and archives. This chapter has made clear how the Torajan world has quickly become a transnational social space that includes many places in Indonesia, Malaysia, Hong Kong and elsewhere. Especially 'after *merantau*', many Torajans have left the highlands in search of money or to pursue higher education. Now, the number of Torajans living outside the highlands far exceeds the population in the heartland, and the Torajan world is ever growing. Together with conflicts and decentralization, the increasing scale of the Torajan migrant world has led to the development of an all-embracing Torajan organization. Many types of Torajan networks and organizations are rapidly emerging in regions with high concentrations of Torajan migrants.

   The Torajan world thus includes Torajan migrant networks that cross local boundaries and are in that sense translocal or even transnational. These networks are bound together through collective memories and images (and their exchanges) of a common place of origin. However, unlike many other transnational networks that become detached from any particular place and in that sense can be considered as 'imagined communities', the Torajan transmigrant network stays firmly anchored to the place of origin and is, in that sense, 'imagined, but not imaginary'

(Jenkins 2002). Torajan migrants maintain strong ties with their family and acquaintances in the highlands (especially through participating in ritual performances), including those migrants from the second and third generations who were not born in Tana Toraja. In reality, the wealth, power and status of migrant Torajans in the diaspora is inextricably linked to the heartland and would not even exist without these relations.

Makassar is an important node in the Torajan world, where people maintain both forward as well as backward relations with other Torajans. To some extent it has become a kind of economic extension of Tana Toraja, through providing a new field for work and income. Further, in Makassar, the Torajan world is reconstructed and reproduced, and new cultural models are developed of Tana Toraja that come close to what already exists in the homeland. To some extent, Makassar has become more Torajan than Tana Toraja itself, reflected in the social organization, iconographic system, artefacts, etc. In Makassar, Tana Toraja is often pictured in an ideal romanticized way.

However, even though Makassar is an important center from which elites influence and design politics and policy for Tana Toraja, and where the cultural and symbolic world is (re)invented, the nodes of influence in Tana Toraja itself are still relevant. We need to study particular nodes of the Torajan world in Tana Toraja because the Torajan diaspora in Makassar would not exist without the heartland. Moreover, while the Torajan diaspora in Makassar influences the people and the way they make a living, in Tana Toraja, Torajans remaining in the highlands influence their migrant-relatives in Makassar. The two exemplary cases elaborated in this study depicted the Torajan world from that other perspective, namely, from the heartland.

THE TORAJAN HOMELAND

If you want to understand how Tana Toraja came into being, as both a place and a social space, you need to realize that it is as much about the role of kinship systems and houses as it is about politics. I have divided this chapter into three sections that correspond to the periods in which the rules that shape the historical socio-political process were most radically different: (1) the pre-colonial period; (2) the colonial period; (3) and the post-colonial period.

The first part describes the Torajan social and political space as it existed before the highlands were invaded by the Dutch military at the beginning of the twentieth century. I pay special attention to Torajan kinship, the role and place of houses within this system, and existing forms of power and authority. Such a depiction of pre-colonial Torajan society is needed to better understand contemporary social organization and also to critically examine the continuities and changes between the past and more recent forms of authority and territory. The social and political domains are not dealt with separately because they are only detached from each other in an abstract sense; in reality the two are not independent and have never been completely separate.

Since the Dutch occupied the area in 1906, the highlands of Tana Toraja have seen a long process of power wielding and yielding over territories and government. In the second and third parts, I will elaborate on the general lines and details of history, and also on the system dynamics of the various transitional periods and the local processes that impacted on the socio-political situation in contemporary Tana Toraja. By putting the recent, seemingly 'revolutionary', tendency for local decentralization and autonomy into such a perspective, it becomes possible to obtain a thorough understanding of how the socio-political environment changed after the Indonesian decentralization laws of 1999 were introduced in Tana Toraja. Consequently, the extensive description of the social and political history of Tana Toraja in these two parts focuses on the transitional periods and local processes that had major impacts on the socio-political situation in Tana Toraja. Given that these local transitions did not occur in a vacuum, but are interrelated to power and policy changes on a national and regional level, they are presented in such a context.

Early Sa'dan Toraja Society: Disunity and Diversity

The Indonesian island of Sulawesi is marked by a variety of agro-ecological landscapes, which is matched by the great ethnic, cultural and religious diversity of its people. The various groups inhabiting the highlands of south and central Sulawesi are generally labelled 'Toraja'. The name 'Toraja' was originally a Buginese term used to refer to the 'people from above' or 'highlanders' in contrast to the coastal people from 'below' (Nooy-Palm 1976, 1979a). At the end of the nineteenth century, the Dutch Protestant missionaries Kruijt (also a major ethnographer of the time) and Adriani (also a linguist) adopted the term 'Toraja' to classify the ethnically and linguistically diverse mountain people who inhabited the central and southern highlands of Sulawesi (Schrauwers 1998). Kruijt drew a sharp line between the Islamic lowlanders and 'animistic' highlanders—who he considered could still be converted to Christianity—and named the latter 'Toraja' (Adriani and Kruijt 1914; Kruijt 1938). Others question Kruijt's demarcation and suggest that the religious and political agenda of the mission prevailed over ethnological and linguistic reality (see, for example, Kaudern 1925; Schrauwers 1995). Kruijt subdivided the Toraja 'ethnic' group into three smaller ones: East, West, and South Toraja (see Map 4.1). Adriani preferred to use the term 'Sa'dan' to refer to the south Torajans; the term originated from the name of the river that flows through this region. Partly inspired by these divisions, Dutch officials drew neat administrative boundaries around the valleys of the Sa'dan river and its branches at the beginning of the twentieth century. In so doing, they laid the administrative foundations for the contemporary regency of Tana Toraja—the 'common place of origin' of the Torajans discussed in this study and the focus area of this chapter.

A Society of Houses

By including most of the ingredients put forward by Lévi-Strauss (1983, 1987), it can be concluded that pre-colonial Torajan society was a good example of a house society. According to colonial reports and recent literature, the present area of Tana Toraja once consisted of a number of areas of various sizes that would sometimes unite under external pressure (against the threat of war) but usually led largely independent existences and even fought against each other (Nooy-Palm 1979a:58). Before the area came under Dutch control in 1905 it had never been a unified entity.[1]

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[1] Kis-Jovak et al. 1988. In 1683, Sa'dan communities united against the occupying troops of Bone's Aru Palaka and his vassals but after this defensive act, remembered as

Map 4.1. Kruijt's three-way division of the highlands and the modern district of Tana Toraja.
Source: Map by Edwin de Jong.

Sa'dan Toraja consisted of complex networks of small-scale, localized kin alliances, linked through agricultural, social and ritual activities. These kinship systems are cognatic in the sense that 'descent is traced equally from both mother and father, and all children of both sexes have equal

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'*tulak buntunna Bone*', the Sa'dan alliance dissolved (Adatstaatsrecht Loewoe, 1947, p. 41, in: KITLV, D H 907). Although this was the only occasion on which Sa'dan communities united, it is still used as a motive for Sa'dan Toraja solidarity against other ethnic groups in the region.

rights of inheritance' (Waterson 1991:163). It follows that the smallest single entity is a set of siblings that form a kindred centre. Like most of the peoples of Western Indonesia, this set of allies, or mini-grouping in Errington's words (1989:215), is often compared to the stems of a bamboo plant which have a common mycelium, often hidden from view (see Chapter 2). The larger family group that emerges from multiplication and expansion is literally called a bamboo clump, or *rapu tallang*, by Torajans (Waterson 1995:197, 2009:192).

Torajan kinship is centred on the family houses (*tongkonan*) from which they descend. These *tongkonan* are regarded as 'origin sites' because they were established by the ancestors of a specific group. If a kin group became too large, it split and the severed branch built itself a new *tongkonan*. The descendants that set out however remained conscious of their origin and retained ceremonial responsibilities to the mother *tongkonan* (Bigalke 1981:22). 'Every Torajan traces descent from a number of different origin-houses or *tongkonan*, the birthplaces of their parents, grandparents, and more distant ancestors' (Waterson 1991:163, 165). In that sense, the *tongkonan* represents a person's ties with his or her ancestors and contemporaries and, therefore, literally symbolizes a Torajan's place in society (Volkman 1985:52–3). The word *tongkonan* actually stems from the Torajan term *tongkon* which means 'to sit' or 'to attend' (Waterson 2009). 'In Toraja, as in much of Indonesia, where and how one sits are signs of status' (Volkman 1985:52). A pattern of social stratification of varying significance, form and intensity exists among and between the various Torajan kinship groupings. Such ranking systems are based on hereditary and often comprise three or four classes—the nobility, commoners and slaves.

Not surprisingly, *tongkonan* like their members are not equal in social space and are physical expressions of status differences. Through design, size, distinctive shape, and fine ornamentation, the *tongkonan* of the nobility are conspicuous displays of status, wealth and power. The construction and rebuilding of such enduring signs of prestige usually involve specific rituals.[2] In addition, *tongkonan* of the nobility 'gain prestige from the myths about their founding ancestors, and from the heirloom valuables stored within them (gold and silver ornaments, swords, kerises, old Chinese porcelain, textiles and beadwork)'(Waterson 1991:65). People of high rank are often able to trace genealogical ties with a vast number of *tongkonan* back as far as mythological ancestors, involving up to 30 generations. For people from the lowest class (slave class), this is less

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[2] The Torajan rituals will be described in more detail in Chapter 6.

common, but they are still well aware of their genealogy. Nooy-Palm (1979a:23) asserts that 'The family tree of a person from an eminent family can fill a sheet of paper two metres wide and three metres long.'

Torajans in general distinguish among three pre-eminent lineages to which every person, house and kinship grouping in the Sa'dan highlands can be traced.[3] On the basis of this descent, a person and an individual house can be ranked within the social order. Along these *tongkonan* lines, the first forms of wider socio-political organization began to emerge. To share the burden of comprehensive ceremonial cycles, *tongkonan* started to form federations under the leadership of the mother *tongkonan*.[4] This oldest and most noble tongkonan of a kinship grouping formed the political centre and supplied the ruling chief. Most other *tongkonan* also held titles but less significant ones. Each titleholder had 'a specific area of competence and a concomitant role to perform in ritual (Nooy-Palm 1979a:60). On occasion, these functionaries also met for councils to discuss war and peace and to settle disputes.

In a theoretical sense, Torajans may thus belong to hundreds of different houses. However, in practice most people are only attached to the houses of their parents and grandparents because the obligatory contributions to the expense of rebuilding and rituals discourage membership in too many houses (Waterson 1991:65). A single household typically maintains ties with four *tongkonan*, although this does not imply that members actually have to live in or near all these houses. 'Indeed, it can happen... that a house is left empty and not inhabited at all, and yet is still regarded as the point of origin of its descendants and as the appropriate place for the holding of ceremonies. (Waterson 1991:65).

Considering the above, it can be stated that a *tongkonan* is much more than a material structure or physical place; it is also the group of people who claim descent from it. The synergistic functioning of the *tongkonan* is depicted appropriately by Waterson (2000:177) through the following quote:

> The physical and spiritual components of house value—their heirlooms, bones, and spirits of the dead as well as the placentas of the newly born— anchor people to place and to their ancestral origins. People's identities are thus grounded in the landscape, the physical house functioning as a material sign for the social memories that localize groups to certain places

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[3] For a more extensive account of Torajan genealogy, see Nooy-Palm 1979a.
[4] 'Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, p. 6, in: KITLV, D H 785.

(houses, fields, tombs). Houses create simultaneous spatial and temporal networks for conceptualizing how social groups are linked to one another, because of their references to specific historical memories of descent and affinal relationships that are construed as relationships among houses.

Tongkonan Federations and Constellations

While Torajans share a common mytho-historical origin and cultural heritage with other kinship groupings, that common heritage had undergone diversification because 'people strove to meet the locally variable demands of "place", "time" and "conditions"' (Reuter 2002:117). Throughout the Sa'dan highlands, a variety of distinguished *tongkonan* federations existed in the pre-colonial era. Although the socio-political organizations, and the names for these forms, varied widely, similar levels of organization started to emerge[5] (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for an example). For the purpose of this study, it is only necessary to discuss the most important levels in more detail, namely: (1) *lembang*; (2) *bua'*; (3) *penanian/karopi'*; (4) *borongna/ saroan*. The *borongna* or *saroan* are a form of working group consisting of a few *tongkonan*. The *penanian* or *karopi'* are federations of *tongkonan* that celebrate particular rice ceremonies together. Depending on the area, the *bua'* and *lembang* are the largest genealogical and ceremonial communities that celebrate rituals of superior rank.[6]

Starting with the latter, the *lembang* is an organizational form typically found in the southern Sa'dan highlands. In this area, three of these *lembang*, Sangalla', Ma'kale and Mengkendek, formed a federation called *Tallu Lembangna* (the Three Vessels). The *Tallu Lembangna* are small kingdoms ruled by headmen (*puang*) who have genealogical, political and ritual relationships with each other (Nooy-Palm 1975:64). The unification of the *Tallu Lembangna* in the south of the Sa'dan highlands developed in the late thirteenth century (Liku Ada' 1986:33). In this period, the so-called 'Tomanuruns' and their descendents who came from East Java introduced a three-tiered social stratification based on blood ties in the southern region of Tana Toraja.[7] This status system was the basis of a political

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[5] 'Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, p. 7, in: KITLV, D H 785.

[6] Sometimes *lembang* are called *patang penanian*, an organization of four *penanian* (Nooy-Palm 1975:64).

[7] According to Torajan belief, three Tomanuruns were sent down from heaven. This mythology is shared by the other people in South Sulawesi. Where the Tomanuruns really came from is still uncertain but according to Salombe', they may have come from East Java during the reign of Kertanagara, the last King of Singhasari (Salombe' 1984 in Liku Ada'

organization in which a number of communities cooperated in organizing ceremonies. These communities were ruled by so-called *puangs*, descendants of the *tomanurun* who formed an elevated supra-tier above the three-tiered stratification system. This model of political organization and social stratification took hold only in the southern region of the Sa'dan Toraja. *Puangs* had strong authority because blood ties became the determinant factor of status and mobility between the different classes rarely occurred.

One of the villages in this study, Palipu', was established in this southern region. Palipu' once existed only in a genealogical form. According to mythology, the first inhabitant, named Darra' Matua, came to the region of present-day Palipu' some twenty generations ago. Darra' Matua is believed to have been a descendant of Tamboro Langi', the first Torajan man who arrived on the mountain peak of Kandora after being sent down from heaven. Darra' Matua had three children who each established a *tongkonan* house at the foot of Kandora Mountain. Once the family in these *tongkonan* became too large, some descendants would build a *tongkonan* for themselves in the vicinity of the mother-houses. Gradually a kind of ritual community started to emerge that covered several *tongkonan*. This ritual community, or *penanian*, carried out ritual obligations together and became known as the 'large bamboo rice basket', or Palipu'.[8] Some time later, the *tallu lembangna* absorbed the smaller communities within their territories. Together with eight other *penanians,* Palipu' was incorporated in the statelet, or *lembang*, of Mengkendek, one of the three *tallu lembangna*. Within the *lembang* of Mengkendek, Palipu' constituted the *Tallu Penanianna, sesena Mengkendek* (meaning the three *Penanian*, the half of Mengkendek) along with two other *penanian* (Tengan and Marinding). The three *penanian* were under the authority of *pa'palumbanga,n*[9] who assistedthe *puang* of Mengkendek in maintaining complete control over the whole *lembang*.

1986:28). According to Ramstedt, the direct relationship between the highlands and Majapat is highly speculative. Instead he proposes Bugis Bone as a more direct transmitter of Old-Javanese influence (for more details, see Ramstedt 2004:197).

[8] In Mengkendek, the region that encompasses Palipu', the *penanian* community stages a ritual called *ma'bugi'*. '[T]the *ma'bugi'* functions to purify the traditional community. It removes the pollution which constantly accumulates during the course of everyday life. ... Poor rice harvests, ill domestic animals, sickly children, and such are all external signs that the accumulation of pollutants has become burdensome (Crystal and Yamashita 1987:61).

[9] 'The title, *Pa'palumbangan* can be paraphrased as "The piling up of rice bundles on the *sawah* dike". [T]he title embodies a notion derived from the cultivation of rice. The *Pa'palumbangan* arranged all transactions related to the internal organization of the region, and he also rallied the people in times of war...' (Nooy-Palm 1979a:76).

Ill. 4.1. Mountain Kandora', next to the case study village Palipu' (photo by Wendy de Jong-Jakobs).

Despite Palipu's incorporation into *lembang* Mengkendek, Palipu' largely maintained its autonomy, and its struggles to remain outside the *puangs*' spheres of influence in the subsequent period succeeded. However, since the late nineteenth century, a series of conflicts over land has changed the situation in Palipu'. One of the bitterest issues arose when *puang* Randanan of Mengkendek confiscated almost all of Palipu's wet ricefields. The majority of Palipu's population lost their ricefields and fell to the mercy of the descendants of *puang* Randanan who had founded three *tongkonan* in the settlement. With the arrival of the *puang* family in Palipu', a fourth social class was added to the existing social strata. The *puangs* acquired the highest positions, even above the nobility who also had to hand over many of their ricefields to the puangs. However successful they may have been in politics, the *puang* family never managed to obtain complete control in the ritual community.

Because the total number of *tongkonan* in Palipu' continued to grow, the *penanian* was subdivided into four *borongna*, meaning section or sharing group.[10] It is not clear whether these *borongnas* were already constituted before the large land takeovers at the end of the nineteenth century, but they mainly had a ritual function and facilitated the mobilization of people during conflicts and times of war. When one of the *borongnas* became too large, it was subdivided into six *banua tallu,* meaning 'three houses', and, not surprisingly, these encompass three *tongkonan* and


Figure 4.1. Traditional socio-political divisions in the socio-ritual community Tallu Penanianna: the situation of Palipu'.

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[10] A *borogna* is sometimes also referred to as a *tepona padang*, meaning four pieces of land. However, this type of community does not tally with the *tepona padang* that can be found in the northern areas of Tana Toraja. The four *borongna* in Palipu' are named Babana, Maruang, Pao, and Nabalauma and seem closer to the *saroan* in the North.

their families. This social unit has only a ritual function and remains the smallest subdivision today (see Figure 4.1 for an overview of the social-ritual organization in Palipu').

Descendants of the *puangs* from the South also entered the northern parts of the Torajan highlands. However, these communities appear to have been far less structured in a territorial and organizational sense, and were simply led by family heads. Compared to the more densely populated southern area, where a kind of headed *penanian* and *lembang* had developed to which they could ally themselves through marriage, the conditions in the North were unfavourable for the *puangs* obtaining a firm position.[11] According to Lanting, the lack of *puangs* in the northern regions can be attributed to the formlessness of these regions when the *puangs* arrived. The *puangs* of the south could not establish themselves as the heads of developed communities and instead merged with the existing leaders of the highest class in the North;—the level of the *tomaka*. As a consequence, a fourth tier did not emerge in the north of Tana Toraja.

In this context Kondo', the other research village in this study, came into being. According to Torajan mythodology, Puang ri Kesu', one of the descendants of Tamboro Langi' (the first Torajan man), settled more than 20 generations ago in Angin Angin, in the north of present-day Tana Toraja. This *tongkonan* is considered to be the oldest ancestral house (*tongkonan layuk*) in the northern part of Tana Toraja, and all northern communities have ties to it. One of the descendants of Puang ri Kesu', Polo Padang, founded *tongkonan* Rante Aa, on Mountain Rangri, a few generations later. From this *tongkonan*, descendants spread out in all directions over a radius of about ten kilometres and built their own *tongkonan*.[12] These people are the ancestors of a group of six *bua'* communities that includes Tondon, in which the village of Kondo' is located.[13] A *bua'* community amounts to a territorial area within which the inhabitants celebrate together the *bua' padang* ritual 'which is a kind of agricultural new year celebration with the aim of imploring the higher powers to smile on man, beast and the produce of the fields (in this instance, rice)' (Nooy-Palm 1979a:61). In practice, the people of these various *bua'* communities still

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[11] 'Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, p. 21, in: KITLV, D H 785.

[12] Polo Padang had eight children who built themselves *tongkonan* in Bokin, Bori, Sa'dan, Karua, Nanggal, Seko, Ba'tan and Rangri.

[13] These *bua'* are Buntao, Bokin, Nanggala, Balusu, Talunglipu and Tondon ('Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, p. 22, in: KITLV, D H 785).

maintain close relations with one another through inter-marriages and debt exchanging at funeral ceremonies.

The *bua'* community of Tondon is located just north of Rangri Mountain and was founded by Ne' Malo, one of the descendants from *tongkonan* Rante Aa. The four sons of Ne' Malo spread out over the region of Tondon, and each established their own *tongkonan*. This splintering process eventually led to the emergence of a socio-political organization that consisted of four *tepona padang*, each further divided into three *karopi'*. The *tepona padang* were each headed by three *tongkonan* leaders (to 'parenge') and one ritual leader, or *sokkong bayu*, who were collectively responsible for daily affairs. If they could not reach an agreement, the heads of the six most prominent *tongkonan* in Tondon intervened and took the final decision.[14] At this time, leadership was not set and people had to keep on fighting to defend their positions. It was literally the survival of the fittest. The class system in the north of Tana Toraja was somewhat dynamic, and inhabitants had the chance to acquire status by creating wealth or showing their bravery during wars, which made the northern elite politically vulnerable (Bigalke 1981:20).

The village of Kondo' corresponds with one of the three *karopi'* in the *tepona padang* Mata' allo (see Figure 4.2). Like all twelve *karopi'* in the *bua'* of Tondon, Kondo' was headed by a *to'parenge'*, the chief of the most important *tongkonan* in Kondo'. The *to'parenge'* also sits on the council of the *teponna padang* Mata'allo, representing his *karopi'*. At a large *bua'* feast, encompassing the whole community of Tondon and held at its founder's *tongkonan*, the people of each *tepona padang* were seated along one side of a square ceremonial field. This symbolized the equal status of the four *tepona padang*. Still today, the people of the three *karopi'* that make up one *tepona padang* have stronger ties with each other than with people from other *tepona padang*. Similarly, the people within the *bua'* of Tondon have stronger relations with each other than with people from other communities. They feel closer to the *bua'* communities originating from the *tongkonan* at Rangri Mountain than to those who do not have any relationship with this *tongkonan*. In the past, people from Tondon have allied themselves with various *bua'* communities to resist Bugis attempts to conquer the highlands,[15] and this has strengthened the

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[14] Of these six *tongkonan*, the three most important ones were: Ne' Mala, Ne' Paraba and To' Pajoengi.

[15] One of the most successful defences against invading Bugis armies had been against the attack under the leadership of the Bone raja Arung Palaka in the late seventeenth century. Tondon fought side by side with people from the *bua'* Sa'dan, Balusu and Nanggala.

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              Mesa' Babana Tondon Apa' Tepona Padang (Tondon)

     Tondon      Mata' allo      Langi'       Siba'ta          4 Tepona Padang

  T  B  B    L  K  L    A  S  L    T  S  B
  o  o  a    e  o  a    m  a  e    a  i  u     12 Karopi' (kampung)
  n  r  t    b  n  i    p  l  m    n  b  n
  d  o  u    a  d  y    a  e  b    d  a  t
  o  n  P    n  o  a    n  k  a    u  '  u
  k  g  a    i  '       g  a       n  t  
  B  T  p       L       a          g  a  L
  a  a  a       a       n          t     a
  t  n  n       i       
  u  g          y       

 Sarambu    Pong      Awa'     Bottona   Pangkung   Para'da      6 Saroan
           Tambolang                     Darang

  6 Tn.     3 Tn.    11 Tn.    5 Tn.      4 Tn.      7 Tn.          36
                                                              Tongkonan
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Figure 4.2. Traditional socio-political divisions in the socio-ritual community of Tondon: the situation of Kondo'.

bonds between these *bua'* communities and people from Tondon even further.

The headman, or *to parenge'*, of Kondo' administered the law within the *karopi's* boundaries, and chaired the *karopi'* council which was made up of noble people and village elders. Some of these leaders were also heads of the six indigenous labour institutions in Kondo', the so-called *saroan*.[16] The *saroan* is the most important collective social network above the level of the *tongkonan* and below the *karopi'*. It is difficult to describe the shape of a *saroan* and to distinguish it from a *tongkonan* in terms of membership. Ideally, all members of a *saroan* descend, as do members of a *tongkonan*, from a common ancestor (Volkman 1985:77). A closer look at *saroan*, however, reveals that neither territory nor kinship adequately define their shape. Distant relatives or non-kin living in the neighbourhood of a particular *saroan* may become active members while membership may extend beyond the immediate territorial centre and,

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[16] Although the terms used for referring to this kind of mutual support group differs by territory, *saroan* is the most frequently used term throughout Tana Toraja. In the northern region of the regency its usage can be found most frequently. In the southern research area, the same kind of mutual support group was called a *borongna*. While elaborating on these collective social networks, I use the widely known term *saroan* to prevent any confusion.

conversely, not everyone in that territory is necessarily a member. In this way, the *saroan* is more open than the *tongkonan*, which is impossible for outsiders to join (except through marriage or adoption). Volkman (1985:78) reports that Torajans do not define the *saroan* by what it is (based on territory or kinship), but rather by what it does: '*Saroan* labour is based on a spirit of cooperation, the famous Indonesian *gotong royong*'.[17] S*aroan* were established as communal labour groups to lighten heavy tasks related to agriculture, house building and ceremonial activities. They also functioned to seize prisoners in warfare or in the event of abductions of slaves and theft of buffalo by neighbouring groups. According to a local legend, the *karopi'* community of Kondo' had been seized by people from Awan (western part of the Torajan highlands) about ten generations ago. These people took over control and demanded the best buffalo (*saleko*) that the people of Kondo' possessed and even took the best looking women to become their wives. The people of Kondo' could do nothing but comply with the demands of their conquerors because the rulers from Awan were strong and brave. To find a way out of this precarious situation, the people of Kondo' organized themselves into six groupings or *saroan*. Under the leadership of Ne'Madoi and Ne'Tappi, representing the *tongkonan* of the brave in Kondo', they defeated the tyrants of Awan. Afterwards, the *saroan* remained intact, and were often needed to hold back Bugis intruders or against attempts by neighbouring communities to capture weak inhabitants for the slave trade.[18]

Nowadays, the *saroan* fulfils a vital function, especially in ritual life. It is responsible for erecting all the temporary constructions required at rituals performed by *saroan* members, and it carries out all other labour tasks involved in the preparations, as well as during the ceremonial activities itself. Most importantly, the *saroan* is also the group among which meat is divided, the group that eats together (see also Volkman 1985:79). The *saroan,* or rather its chief (*ambe'*, literally 'father') regulates the distribution of meat, both among its own members and between itself and other *saroan*. The chief of a *saroan* knows each household, its composition, ancestors, wealth and previous meat-cutting record. Membership in a *saroan* is not listed individually but by household. Usually membership is inherited by both male and female children from their parents, but

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[17] *Gotong royong* refers to mutual cooperation.
[18] I have some indications that the people from Kondo' also sold the weak and enslaved to Bugis traders.

upon the establishment of a new household, the newly wed couple chooses the *saroan* they prefer, usually based upon the area in which they live.

Until the Dutch entered the highlands, this system of organization remained largely unchanged through the *karopi'* of Kondo' and larger *bua'* of Tondon. Considerable land seizures, as occurred at the end of the nineteenth century in the southern parts of Tana Toraja, did not take place in this region. While chiefdom was largely determined by bravery displayed during wars, with leadership more fluid in the northern region of the Sa'dan highlands than in the authoritarian south, northerners tended to cling to the original, loosely structured, social organization. Consequently, socio-political organization in the south of Sa'dan Toraja became more developed than in the north. The further you move south, the more complex and sophisticated societies become.[19]

Summing up, early Sa'dan Toraja was subdivided into a number of distinct social units. Each community was internally divided into lineages and segments of kin, which were connected to similar units by a network of collective ties. Torajan society is cognatic, but at the same time consists of a form of linear descent groups (*tongkonan*). These descent groups function more or less like 'quasi lineages' and also have a corporate character. Although names and forms varied widely, the *lembang/bua'*, the *penanian/karopi'*, and the *borongna/saroan* could be seen as on a similar level of social organization. Grounded on mythical common ancestors, the Sa'dan highlands consisted of three larger circles (North, South, and West) which were composed of similar *bua'* units and *lembang* in terms of name, form and socio-political organization. Within each social group, positions of authority were primarily defined by descent and caste. Each group as a whole had a leader or symbolic head, but nonetheless they regulated common affairs collectively. Except for the *Tallu Lembangna*, socio-political organization was not territorial but rather largely genealogical in the Sa'dan highlands.

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[19] The western part of the Sa'dan highlands was also made up of *tongkonan* with long histories that led to another federation of three *lembang* (Adaatstaatsrecht Loewoe 1947:39). However, due to Bugis attacks at the turn of the seventeenth century, this federation disintegrated, and the western region of the Sa'dan highlands became largely subjected to the earlier described *Tallu Lembanga in* its southeast region and the neighbouring region of Mamasa on its west side (Bigalke 1981:25). With regard to social structure, ceremonial activities, house construction and other cultural aspects, people in the west of Sa'dan Toraja are closely related to the Mamasa people, or Toraja-Mamasa (Van der Veen 1929:61).

The Making of a Colonial Toraja

The situation as described in the first part of this chapter changed dramatically in 1906 when the Dutch entered the Sa'dan region. At the beginning of the twentieth century, on the 'outer island' of Sulawesi, the Dutch only ruled the northern region (Minahasa and Gorontalo) and around Makassar in the southern part of the island. As Roth (2004:163) put it 'The highland regions of South and Central Sulawesi remained a white spot on the maps of the colonial administrators until well into the nineteenth century'. In line with the pacification policies of the Dutch government, South Sulawesi was brought entirely under colonial administration between 1905 and 1906 (Plaisier 1993:35). The lowlands of Bone, Sidenreng, Gowa and Luwu were brought under Dutch control with relative ease. After heavy fighting the Sa'dan highlands followed by late-1906 (Morrell 2001:4). In this section, I expand on the first two decades of Dutch administrative engineering in the Sa'dan highlands. During this period, a handful of administrators set out to build a modern government system, as laid down in the Dutch policy for colonial Indonesia, within the boundaries of traditional socio-political organization.

After the monarch of the neighbouring kingdom of Luwu signed a 'Short Declaration' on 19 September 1905, the Sa'dan highlands were incorporated within the colonial administrative structure as two subdivisions (*Onderafdeeling*) in the division (*Afdeeling* or *Zelfbesturend Landschap*) of Luwu. Luwu was placed directly under the authority of the Dutch colonial government.[20] However, unlike the self-government (*Zelfbestuur*) seen in Luwu, the Dutch civil service (*Nederlandsch-Indisch Binnenlandsch Bestuur*) exercized actual power in the Sa'dan subdivisions (Bieshaar 1940:27; Adaatstaatsrecht Loewoe 1947:43). The two subdivisions of Makale and Rantepao were both governed by a Dutch ruler (*controleur*). The subdivision of Makale included the southern *Tallu Lembangna* and the western area of the highlands,[21] while Rantepao comprised the northern and central parts of the Sa'dan lands.

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[20] The Dutch colonial government approved a political contract with Luwu in 1888 in which the 'Sa'dan lands' were considered to be part of Luwu (Van Lijf 1947–1948:530; Adatstaatsrecht Loewoe, 1947, p. 42, in: KITLV, D H 907). The contract was based on the statements of the Governor of the Celebes (South Sulawesi) who obtained his information from informants in Palopo' (Luwu). In 1905, the Dutch government still had no other understanding of the situation, and the Sa'dan highlands became part of the division Luwu. The people of Sa'dan Toraja, however, never accepted their official subordination.

[21] As noted earlier, the western region of the Sa'dan highlands originally belonged for the greater part to the Toraja Mamasa region, at least from a cultural standpoint. However,

Between 1907 and 1910, the Dutch started to create strict boundaries in the Sa'dan highlands—carved into various districts, sub-districts and villages—with a local-level administration (Volkman 1985:30). When subdividing the Sa'dan region, Dutch administrators tried to take both authority structures and shared customs (*adat*) into account.[22] However, the first of these authority structures seemed to prevail, for example by taking the capturing of some Sa'dan *tondok*[23] by other *tondok* during the civil wars of the late nineteenth century for granted.[24] Notwithstanding the efforts of the Dutch to take local factors into account, the delineation of fixed boundaries remained alien to the Torajan way of defining power, which was centred on *tongkonan* rather than bounded by geography.

As of 1910, the Makale subdivision was composed of 14 districts (*landstreken*) and the subdivision of Rantepao of 17 districts.[25] The districts largely matched traditional *lembang*, federations of *bua'*-circles, or single *bua'*-communities, and they were usually headed by traditional Torajan leaders.[26] District heads were officially elected by the adult male population but the Dutch *controleur* retained the right to declare him 'fit' or not (Bigalke 1981:126). The 31 districts varied widely in size (800 to 34,000 inhabitants) and in structure. Accordingly, the number of administrative units below the district level differed throughout the highlands.

In Dutch colonial Indonesia, the *kampung* was the smallest and often the only legal unit of colonial administration below the district level.

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afraid of reprisals from the Dutch military, because their kin-groups in the Mamasa area heavily opposed the pacification acts of the Dutch, they requested incorporation within the subdivision of Makale (Adatstaatsrecht Loewoe, 1947, pp. 42–3, in: KITLV, D H 907).

[22] 'Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, pp. 4–7, in: KITLV, D H 785.

[23] While Torajan social organization slowly moved to a territorially based one, for a long time they had had a concept of territorial organization, implicit in the idea of *tondok* (Bigalke 1981:28). Whereas the *bua'* and *lembang* are social organizations based on ritual cycles that possibly (but not necessarily) develop into territorial organizations, a *tondok* is a territorial unit in its most elementary form. *Tondok* can roughly be translated as 'village', but it comes closer to the Indonesian term of *kampung* (settlement) (Bigalke 1981:28). The *tondok* is composed of a cluster of houses (including *tongkonan*) representing one or more kinship groups with an acknowledged headman for both the religious and political realms.

[24] Adatstaatsrecht Loewoe, 1947, pp. 39–40, in: KITLV, D H 907.

[25] The subdivision of Makale comprised the following districts: (1) Makale; (2) Sangalla; (3) Mengkendek; (4) Taparang; (5) Banga; (6) Malimbong; (7) Taleong; (8) Palesang; (9) Buakayu; (10) Rano; (11) Bau; (12) Mappa; (13) Balepe'; (14) Simbuang. The Subdivision of Rantepao Contained: (15) Tikala; (16) Kesu'; (17) Pangala'; (18) Sa'dan; (19) Balusu; (20) Tondon; (21) Nanggala; (22) Buntao; (23) Rantebua'; (24) Madandan; (25) Piongan; (26) Kurra'; (27) Ulusalu; (28) Seseng; (29) Bittuang; (30) Balla'; (31) Pali ('Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, in: KITLV, D H 785.).

[26] 'Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, in: KITLV, D H 785.

As Sa'dan Torajans were not familiar with this concept, the political reality of the *kampung* had to be created by drawing neat lines around *tongkonan* and *tondok*. Sometimes, one *kampung* would be composed of several *tondok* but with only one *kampung* head, elected by all adult males.[27] As a rule, the *kampung* head had to be a descendent of a high-status family and was usually the titleholder of an important *tongkonan*. A *kampung* council composed of *tondok* leaders assisted the *kampung* head (Kennedy 1953:149). During this period, the Dutch administrators created about 400 *kampung* in the two Subdivisions (Van Lijf 1947:100).

In some districts, especially in the oldest and most complex *Tallu Lembangna*, two administrative levels were set up between the district and *kampung* levels: '*complexes*' and 'sub-districts' (*onderdistrict*). A *complex* usually matched a larger *bua'* community, comprising several *kampung*. A sub-district amounted to a federation of *bua'* circles. However, sub-districts were only established in the district of Makale, one of the *Tallu Lembangna*. In detail, the district of Makale consisted of four sub-districts, four *complexes* and several *kampung*.[28] The head of a *complex* was often also the head of a *kampung*, and a few of them had other *kampung* heads below them. Initially, the Dutch introduced four *complexes* in the subdivision of Rantepao and 24 in the subdivision of Makale but, due to financial reasons, the Dutch systematically deconstructed both *complexes* and sub-districts after 1930.[29] By 1940, only 17 out of 28 *complex* heads were still in office, and all sub-district heads had disappeared, largely because the Dutch were of the opinion that this function lacked any roots in the *adat*.[30]

The situation in Palipu' remained pretty much unaltered. The *puang* family still held political power, and the families that were long rooted in Palipu' occupied most of the important social and cultural (*adat*)

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[27] G.R. Seinstra, 'Memorie van overgave betreffende de onderafdeelingen Makale en Rantepao van den aftredenden Controleur bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur. Bestuursperiode 18 juli 1935–1 januari 1940', 1939, p. 131, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1164.

[28] 'Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, p. 11, in: KITLV, Leiden, D H 785.

[29] Adatstaatsrecht Loewoe, 1947, p. 49, in: KITLV, Leiden, D H 907; Van Lijf 1947:99.

[30] G.R. Seinstra, 'Memorie van overgave betreffende de onderafdeelingen Makale en Rantepao van den aftredenden Controleur bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur. Bestuursperiode 18 juli 1935–1 januari 1940', 1939, pp. 130–1, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1164.

positions. Representatives of the twelve most important *tongkonan* in Palipu' (including that of the *puangs*) were seated in a *kombongan*. This council of elders and chiefs ruled ritual affairs and settled conflicts over issues such as divorce, inheritance and land. Initially the Dutch kept this system largely untouched and turned the *penanian* of Palipu' into an administrative division of a *complex* under the *landstreek* of Mengkendek. This was also the first time that the territory of Palipu' had been clearly delineated by Dutch officials.

Compared to the communities in the southern division of Makale, that were already moving over to territorial units, communities in the northern part of the highlands retained much more of their original shape.[31] For example, the *bua'* of Tondon remained intact and became a district (landstreek) after the Dutch delineated the Torajan highlands.[32] The district was ruled by a head with the title of *to parenge'*, descended from one of the most important *tongkonan* in the *bua'*. The four *tepona padang* were converted into four *kampung*. The heads of these *kampung* assisted the *to parenge'* in governing the district. There were no administrative divisions below the level of the *kampung*, thereby ignoring the *karopi'*.

Despite all these administrative changes, the Dutch wanted to retain the traditional status system (Volkman 1985:30). Nevertheless, the introduction of democratic elections, open to all adult males, had the potential to undermine the existing social order. Giving the lowest status groups, or slaves, a right to vote conflicted with Torajan customs which stated that only particular high-class leaders were entitled to vote.[33] Moreover, Dutch officials observed that slaves adversely influenced elections by voting for the weakest candidates. As a consequence, the general ballot was abolished and political decisions were again made by the high-class elders who joined in traditional committees, or *kombongan*: keeping social-class differentiation alive and probably even reinforcing it.

With the introduction of central government control and an ordered administration, the Dutch created conditions under which education, healthcare, agricultural extension and a cash economy could flourish (Van Lijf 1951:357). Moreover, the door was opened for the Christianization of the highlands. Government officials were concerned that Islam, the dominant religion in South Sulawesi, would further penetrate into the Sa'dan

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[31] 'Nota van H.T. Lanting, Controleur van Makale/Rantepao', 1926, in: KITLV, D H 785.

[32] The delineation of the Torajan highlands is recorded in an official bulletin (Staatsblad, no. 352) in 1916.

[33] Adatstaatsrecht Loewoe, 1947, p. 50, in: KITLV, D H 907.

highlands and encouraged missionary societies to take an interest in the region. In 1913, the government started to lay the foundations for establishing Christianity in the highlands through the Calvinist Missionary Association (GZB)[34] (Bigalke 1984:89). Close cooperation between government and missions was supposed to bring about fundamental changes in the highlands.

The missions introduced education as a way of entering traditional societies without creating the type of resistance that would be engendered by a direct attack on traditional religious values (Bigalke 1984:90). Headmen who refused to cooperate with the GZB were selectively removed and exiled by the Dutch government. Increasing interference by missionaries and government in village affairs, together with the growing fear that the Dutch were trying to destroy indigenous religion, led to mounting opposition among Torajan leaders. The indigenous religion of the Torajan people, which is often called *Aluk to dolo* (Way of the ancestors), refers to the way in which both rituals and daily life are to be conducted; it is an all-embracing way of life. The Tondon elites remained especially hostile to the missionaries and were the first to refuse to provide labour and materials for use in school construction. Tondon 'remained a bitter source of complaints, ostensibly over a misunderstanding between the chief and a guru from the government school in Rantepao' (Bigalke 1981:182). In reality the conflict ran deeper than that, and the missionary Van der Loosdrecht remarked that 'a spirit of quiet rebellion rules in Tondon' (Bigalke 1981:182). The Torajan elites, who saw their position endangered by the mission that attacked the very basis of the social hierarchy, eventually started a small Torajan rebellion in mid-1917 during which the missionary Van de Loosdrecht was murdered (Bigalke 1981:104).

Aware of the fragility of a bureaucracy managed and supported by just a few Dutch officials, the *Controleurs* of Rantepao and Makale issued orders that prevented any further undermining of the traditional elite, as their support seemed to be essential for law and order to prevail in the region (Bigalke 1984:111). Consequently, most village heads continued to maintain authority despite the influence of the Dutch. These changes in government policies resulted in a neat differentiation between the compulsory power of the Dutch government in Makale and Rantepao and the persuasive authority of the mission (Bigalke 1984:112). The mission continued to provide a channel for middle and lower class villagers to oppose the

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[34] Roman Catholic missionaries entered Makale-Rantepao in 1938 after the Dutch government started to allow 'double Missions' (Van Lijf 1951:366).

prevailing social hierarchy, but it had to leave room for the village elite to reject the advances of missionaries and teachers.

    After 20 years of Dutch administration, some of the traditional forms of kin-based socio-political organization had faded away and the transition toward territorial communities had accelerated. Nevertheless, Bigalke (1981:121) wrote that Torajans still praised the accuracy of Dutch administrators in subdividing the Sa'dan highlands into districts. The differences between the northern and southern regions of the Sa'dan highlands were also acknowledged by the Dutch and consequently consolidated into two different administrative divisions. The political authority of traditional Torajan leaders was re-established after temporarily being endangered through the interference of the mission. In practice, the heads of the newly established districts, sub-districts, *complexes* and *kampung* could not be differentiated from *adat* leadership.

    Between the 1920s and the Japanese invasion in 1942, the Dutch regularly considered reducing the large number of administrative territories in the Sa'dan highlands due to financial constraints. However, the arguments in favour of amalgamating administrative units were not very compatible with Torajan *adat,* and large-scale centralization never really succeeded.[35] Although the Dutch did manage to unify the subdivions of Makale and Rantepao under the leadership of one *controleur* in 1927, initially the cultural demarcation between the northern (Rantepao) and southern (Makale) regions remained firm.[36] Later, some of the educated elites started to mix in the newly created towns of Rantepao and Makale, which belonged to no individual kinship group but were a purely Dutch creation. In 1934, the 'modern' elites of Rantepao founded an organization, Perhimpoenan Boenga' Lalan (PBL), with the objective of building a brotherhood among the Torajan people so that they could be united (Bigalke 1981:297). This was the first time that Torajans had openly conceived of themselves as a common group of people from a land (*tanah*) which they called 'Tanah Toradja'.[37]

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[35] G.R. Seinstra, 'Memorie van overgave betreffende de onderafdeelingen Makale en Rantepao van den aftredenden Controleur bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur. Bestuursperiode 18 juli 1935–1 januari 1940', 1939, p. 126, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1164.

[36] The new subdivision of Makale-Rantepao remained part of the Luwu division. The Torajan people, however, rejected the self-government of Luwu, and the Dutch civil service retained the actual political power in the highlands (Van Lijf 1951:370).

[37] During the colonial period, Toraja was written as 'Toradja' and Tana as 'Tanah'. Although I adapt the term according to its usage in a particular government era, they both have the same meaning.

Two years later, a group of young Torajan Christians with various educational backgrounds established the organization Perserikatan Toradja Christen (PTC) in Makale, with the objective of uniting a still-divided Torajan people (Bigalke 1981:298). The real, more covert, intention of the PTC appeared to be separation from, and gaining equal status to, Luwu (Bigalke 1981: 303). The demand for a separation of Tanah Toradja from Luwu was a step toward the ultimate goal of incorporating all highland groups of Central and South Sulawesi into a Greater Toradja, or Toraya Raya (Bigalke 1981:304; Kobong 1989:86–7). The Mission, which initially launched the idea of a Greater Toradja, consisting of all Christianized Torajan mountain peoples of the Sa'dan, Mamasa and Poso areas, in 1932, supported this demand. Anti-Bugis sentiment was growing in the highlands, and the age-old political, social, economic and cultural-ritual relationships between the Protestant Torajan highlands and Islamic lowlands of Luwu were increasingly conceptualized in terms of 'ethnic' identity with religion as the main boundary marker (Roth 2002, 2004). The Dutch government, afraid of running into conflict with the ruling house of Luwu, generally opposed demands for an independent Tanah Toradja. Nevertheless, a political basis for a united Sa'dan highland was established, and the call for an independent Tanah Toradja was growing.

With the Japanese invasion in 1942, 36 years of Dutch rule came to an abrupt end, leaving a political vacuum in the highlands (Bigalke 1981:312). The centralized administration, installed by the Dutch, began to unravel, and some district chiefs tried to claim authority beyond that granted by the Dutch administration. According to Bigalke 'internal rivalries between Rantepao and Makale as well as among their various districts foreshadowed the return to the pre-1906 condition of petty principalities among which the larger districts would play dominant but not unchallenged roles. At this point Luwu intervened to reassert Luwu's authority over Makale-Rantepao and to maintain the integrity of Division (*Afdeeling*) Luwu in the face of purposeful but disorganized attempts to divide it' (Bigalke 1981:317).

Luwu encountered strong resistance from the entire Sa'dan Torajan population among whom desire for separation increased (Van Lijf 1947–1948:533). However, their lack of unity prevented a coordinated effort to assert and maintain the political autonomy of Makale and Rantepao (Bigalke 1981:318). Like the Dutch, Japanese authorities initially adopted an attitude of reconciliation toward both parties and, on the whole, the Japanese administration was not much different from the Dutch. Later the system evolved into a means to supply a war machine, and the Japanese occupation became a 'time of deprivation, primitivity, violence, and the

first unravellings of social order' (Volkman 1985:38). Overall, after 39 years of Dutch and Japanese occupation, Makale and Rantepao still seemed to be a loose collection of stateless societies, despite all those years of 'Dutch administrative engineering' (Bigalke 1981:313). The planned social and political changes of the Dutch colonial government, through government reforms (decentralization), emancipation (*ontvoogding*) of the Indonesian government, educational politics, and so on, never effectively reached the highlands of Sa'dan Toraja (Van Lijf 1951:370).

Torajan Politics under the New Republic

The Emergency of Tana Toraja

After the Japanese surrender, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed Indonesia's independence on 17 August 1945, and a national revolution started against the Dutch, especially in Java and Sumatra (Volkman 1985:40). In these critical months, the self-government of Luwu fell under the influence of the Republican Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia), and its brigands started to raid the neighbouring Sa'dan highlands.[38] Makale-Rantepao managed to resist the raids by the lowland nationalist bands, but highland-lowland tensions heightened once again. Although a small nationalist movement had grown in Torajan towns, most Torajans feared Muslim domination within an independent Indonesia and welcomed the reestablishment of Dutch authority in the highlands at the end of 1945. Dutch military forces crushed the small, localized movement with nationalist inspirations in Makale and Rantepao, and law and order was restored in the highlands by the beginning of 1946.

The four years of Dutch rule that followed again marked a period of rapid administrative transition in which the subdivision of Makale-Rantepao became a highly autonomous division within the Province of South Sulawesi (Residentie Zuid-Celebes). Conscious of the great diversity of regions and of peoples in post-war Indonesia, the Dutch government tried to rapidly form a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis (Legge 1961:4). In a revolutionary period, when a wise application of 'divide and rule' was needed to create a federal Indonesia, the Dutch recognized that further decentralization was inevitable (Bigalke 1981:367). The Dutch rush to implement far-reaching regional autonomy and local self-governance, together with the longstanding Torajan aspirations to

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[38] Adatstaatsrecht Loewoe, 1947, p. 43, in: KITLV, D H 907.

separate from Luwu, led to the realization of the autonomous Self-governing Division (*Zelfbesturend landschap*) of Tana Toraja in October 1946 (Van Lijf 1947:91; Liang Gie 1993:167–75).

One of the major obstacles that had prevented the separation of Tana Toraja before the war had finally been overcome: the lack of harmony among Torajan district heads and a strong 'region-patriotism' (Van Lijf 1947:95). Through a complex procedure, seven out of the 30 Torajan district heads were chosen as representatives in the signing of the Short Declaration that validated Tana Toraja as a self-government area. By mutual agreement, these seven district heads were appointed as members of the executive council of Tana Toraja, *Tongkonan Ada'*[39] (Van Lijf 1947:91). The further development of the self-government of Tana Toraja took place under the leadership of a Dutch *controleur* who had transferred all his authorities to the *Tongkonan Ada'* by 27 July 1947.

By then, Tana Toraja had become 32 autonomous districts (see Map 4.2), or so-called *lembang*, under the leadership of 30 *lembang* heads (2 lembang heads supervized each 2 districts). The *lembang* possessed autonomy in all affairs that did not impinge on the authority and interests of Tana Toraja as a whole. All 30 *lembang* heads sat on the self-governing council, *Kombongan Ada'*. To make Tana Toraja practically governable, ten *lembang* heads (initially seven) formed in the *Tongkonan Ada'* and expected to settle many of the policy matters. Although all *lembang* heads had equal rights to be elected as a member of the *Tongkonan Ada'*, in practice social stratification and descent predominated (Adatstaatrecht Loewoe 1947:47). The chairman and four members of the *Tongkonan Ada'* were responsible for executing daily matters and lived in Makale, the seat of self-government. These five members had to justify themselves to the whole council, which in turn had to justify its actions to the 30 members of the *Kombongan Ada'*. Nevertheless, accountability remained largely ceremonial, and real power belonged to the five *Tongkonan Ada'* members in Makale.

The Dutch were very much aware of the need to find a synthesis between a modern administration and the traditional form of government. Only a leadership rooted in *adat* yielded enough power and prestige to govern the division without massive internal political shocks. Nevertheless, in the four years that the self-governance of Tana Toraja existed, a satisfying synthesis between modern government organization and the

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[39] '*Ada*' 'carries the dual meaning of 'headman who settles small disputes' and 'traditional council' (Bigalke 1981:363).

The districts (*lembang*) of Tana Toraja in 1940:

1.	Kesu'	9.	Pangala'	17.	Pali	25.	Mappa'
2.	Tikala	10.	Dende'	18.	Ratte	26.	Buakayu'
3.	Buntao'	11.	Madandan	19.	Balepe'	27.	Rano
4.	Rantebua'	12.	Piongan	20.	Malimbong	28.	Simbuang
5.	Tondon	13.	Kurra'	21.	Talion	29.	Bau
6.	Nanggala	14.	Ulusalu	22.	Ma'kale	30.	Banga
7.	Balusu	15.	Seseng	23.	Sangalla'	31.	Palesan
8.	Sa'dan	16.	Bittuang	24.	Mengkendek	32.	Tapparan

Map 4.2. The division of Tana Toraja into 32 districts in 1940.
Source: G.R. Seinstra, 'Memorie van overgave betreffende de onderafdeelingen Makale en Rantepao van den aftredenden Controleur bij het Binnenlandsch Bestuur. Bestuursperiode 18 juli 1935–1 januari 1940', 1939, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1164.

traditional form of government was still not achieved, and disputes between Makale and Rantepao continued. Bigalke (1981:362) noted that 'Tana Toraja's unification under a *zelf-bestuur* [self-government] contained a good measure of illusion. Even as the cause which had united

them ceremoniously triumphed, the old north-south rivalry between Makale and Rantepao protruded'. The structural monopolization of the two key administrative positions (chairman and chief civil servant) by headmen from Makale appeared to be unbearable for the Rantepao headmen, and they consequently demanded separation from Tana Toraja. Although this claim was rejected by the Resident of South Sulawesi, the *Tongkonan Ada'* was temporarily dissolved, and by the end of the Dutch era in the highlands, localistic tendencies were still influencing the Torajan political domain (Bigalke 1981: 366).

Transformation of the Torajan Political System: The Feudal Authority Replaced

In Tana Toraja, the struggle between federalism and unitarism was settled in favour of the latter by the end of April 1950 (Van Lijf 1951). Soon afterwards, a phase with rapid shifts started in the political and social worlds. For the fourth time since the Dutch intervention, local governance changed, this time to the disadvantage of traditional *adat* leaders. Tana Toraja again lost its political autonomy to Luwu, and it became largely isolated from the rest of the Indonesian Republic due to regional warfare. In this section, I now proceed to describe the transformation of the political system of Tana Toraja that took place under the Old Order regime of President Sukarno (1950–1965).

Since the proclamation of Indonesian independence in 1945, leading Indonesian politicians had been striving for two objectives: to assume power from the Dutch government; and to replace the feudal authority—for the greater part maintained by the colonial regime—by new government systems based on western democratic understandings.[40] Whereas the first objective had already been accomplished throughout the Indonesian archipelago by 1948,[41] the second objective seemed much more difficult to realize. The self-government of Tana Toraja—made up of *adat* leaders—seized even more power after the Dutch withdrew in 1947. However, support for *adat* leadership started to decline at the end of the 1940s. The general interest in political issues rose after children of the educated Torajan elites, who lived in Makassar, started to infuse Torajan

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[40] A. Ruibing, 'Concept van een beknopte algemene analyse politieke situatie Landschap Tanah Toradja', 1948, p. 1, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Losse Aanwinsten Indische Bestuursambtenaren, 1913–1979, nummer toegang 2.22.09, inventarisnummer 10, stuk 19.
[41] With the exception of New Guinea (Irian Jaya).

intellectuals with republican propaganda.[42] Subsequently, Torajan individuals and groups established political associations and parties that reflected their aspirations.

After Indonesian independence (27 December 1949), the Tongkonan Ada' administration initially continued governing Tana Toraja under the new name of Dewan Pemerintahan Sendiri, or Self-Governing Council (Bigalke 1981:381). However, the council, which was dominated by the old elite, was disbanded a few months later on orders from a battalion of East Javanese troops of Tentara Republik Indonesia (TNI) that arrived in Makale in March 1950 (Bigalke 1981: 384). In line with the instructions of the new governor of South Sulawesi, pro-Republican leaders of local political parties and of society at large formed a local government that consisted of a council called Kommittee Nasional Indonesia (KNI) and a district head (*kepala daerah*). Bigalke noted that 'the day of the politikus (politician) has arrived...' and the tide turned to the benefit of the 'collage of parties and political groups' that had formed coalitions since February 1950.[43] The 21 positions in the KNI were shared among Christian, Muslim and secular parties plus a few Torajan *adat* leaders who strongly favoured a unitary state. The traditional elites had been largely banned from the political domain and 'the spirit of reform was turned against the district and village heads who represented *Jaman Belanda* (the Dutch Era). ... To minimize the problem of finding suitable replacements for the traditional elite, the KNI reduced the number of districts from 32 to 15 and consolidated the number of *kampung* from 410 to 132' (Bigalke 1981:387). In the same year, Tana Toraja once again lost its autonomy to Luwu and became the *daerah pemerintah Negeri* of Makale/Rantepao within the territory of Luwu (*Daerah Swapraja*) (Pakan 1977:29; Legge 1961:70).

Besides the radical transformation of the Torajan political world, independence marked a return to local warfare in the highlands that lasted until 1965. During this period, the people of Sa'dan Toraja were subjected to violent attacks from fundamentalist Muslim guerrilla troops from the Darul Islam (DI/TII) who were attempting to establish an Islamic state

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[42] A. Ruibing, 'Concept van een beknopte algemene analyse politieke situatie Landschap Tanah Toradja', 1948, p. 1, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Losse Aanwinsten Indische Bestuursambtenaren, 1913–1979, nummer toegang 2.22.09, inventarisnummer 10, stuk 22.

[43] Bigalke 1981:383–5. The political coalitions that were established in Tana Toraja between February and April 1950 can be roughly divided into three groups: The Christian Party Parkindo with a strong preference for a unitary state; the Muslim parties PSII and Masyumi; and the secularist parties, of which the socialistically-inclined People's Sovereignty Party (PKR) was the most prominent (Bigalke 1981:383).

(Morrell 2001:4). The real and perceived threat of Islamization induced many Torajans to defensively convert to Christianity. As membership of the Christian church was closely intertwined with that of the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo), it soon became the largest party in Tana Toraja (Crystal 1974:137). Parkindo generally represented the Torajan middle-class (educated Christians of the *to makaka* caste within the nobility). Dissatisfaction among lower-class peasants about the failure to realize land reforms, as promised by the Independence government, led to local acts of violence against the local traditional elites, pushing the latter even further to the margins of politics. The confiscation of thousands of parcels of land in Tana Toraja in the thirty years prior to 1906 had never been resolved by the Dutch. Instead, they had maintained the status quo 'in the interests of practicality and political stability' (Bigalke 1981:396). Especially in the southern part of Tana Toraja, people now started to reclaim the land from which their families had been evicted. 'The claims of this wide layer of lower- and middle- class peasants became gradually organized within the Barizan Tani Indonesia, the ('Peasant Front'), associated with the Indonesian Communist Party' (Donzelli 2002/2003:68). Donzelli had found a police report in the provincial archive taking note of the fact that 'around the end of 1953 and the beginning of 1954 several groups of peasants started occupying and working their landowners' *sawah* (irrigated ricefields) in Palipu' and Marinding' (Donzelli 2002–2003:70). According to oral sources, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) promised the people of Palipu' that the expropriated land would be returned to the original owners or their descendants. Subsequently, during the 1950s, about 80 percent of Palipu's inhabitants became members of the PKI. The descendants of *puang* Randanan had been threatened with being killed by the revolting peasants and sought protection by joining the Darul Islam rebellion (Donzelli 2002–2003:71).

Coupled with political ambitions and an emergent Torajan identity, this agitation led to strong Torajan rejection of political domination by Luwu. In Luwu, the nobility seemed to be torn between those who supported the Darul Islam rebellion and those against it, leaving a political vacuum between the opposing groups (Roth 2004). The resulting power gap was gradually filled by Javanese troops from the national army (in Luwu to establish and expand central control) as well as by Christian Torajans, who started to fill positions in Luwu's regional administrative apparatus due to their educational advantage over their Islamic lowland neighbours. By taking strategic administrative positions and maintaining good relations with representatives of the Luwu nobility

'Toraja leaders had become important actors in the political arena of low-land Luwu' (Roth 2004:171). Supported by the majority of government administrative agencies, political parties and social organizations in Luwu, Torajan leaders officially proposed administrative independence from Luwu to the central government in 1953. In addition, the formation of a 'Greater Toraja' again started to play a role in regional politics.

Regional movements for greater political autonomy from the central government, which has started in Makassar in March 1957 (and known as Permesta), led to intensified violence in the region after Permesta troops joined with the guerrilla army of Darul Islam.[44] According to several respondents, it was in this period that Palipu' came under the control of Andi Sose, the leader of the Darul Islam movement. A dozen *tongkonan* were burned down, and tens of villagers were sold as slaves to the lowland Bugis. It seems that attacks by Andi Sose in the northern region were less severe. In the midst of the turmoil that spread throughout Sulawesi, Tana Toraja was finally granted political autonomy in August 1957. It was administratively separated from Luwu, and both regions became regencies (*Daerah Swatantra*) within the province of Sulawesi.[45] In 1959, Tana Toraja was formally established as an administrative unit referred to as *kabupaten* (district) or *Daerah Istimewa* (special region) (Liang Gie 1993:139). The new government of Tana Toraja was under the effective control of the Protestant party Parkindo that had obtained 15 out of the 20 seats on the Regional People's Representative Council (DPRD) (Crystal 1974:141). Parkindo managed to retain its monopoly on political control in Tana Toraja until the national elections of 1971. Although political independence was achieved, in their struggle for autonomy:

> Torajan leaders took little time to think through the future consequences and see the possible dizadvantages. They headed for a district with a name that reflected their Christian-Toraja identity. It was only later that many leading politicians realized that there were serious dizadvantages to autonomy as well, that something had also been lost. For those envisioning the creation of Toraja Raya, separation from Luwu was considered as an important first step in that direction. Yet, separation was in fact moving away from the very definition of the 'Toraja' basis of the Toraja Raya ideal since part of the population of highland Luwu identified socio-culturally with Tana Toraja rather than with lowland Luwu. (Roth 2004:172.)

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[44] For a more detailed description about Darul Islam and Permesta in South Sulawesi, see Barbara Harvey 1974, 1977.

[45] The separation of Tana Toraja from Luwu was prescribed in the emergency law (*Undang-undang Darurat*), Nr 3/1957, TLN 1138 (Liang Gie 1993:48).

Due to internal mistrust, power struggles and conflicts, the ideal of Toraja Raya was never realized.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Java-based young intellectuals from Tana Toraja and Luwu developed the concept of 'Lutat'[46]—a separate province that consisted of at least the administrative districts of Luwu and Tana Toraja (Roth 2002, 2003, 2004).

> The plans showed both similarities and differences with earlier political lob-bying for Toraja Raya. Lutat was characterized by the same political objec-tive of breaking loose from Bugis-Makassarese South Sulawesi and becoming a province. There was the same awareness of the mutually supportive and complementary resources of Luwu (land) and Tana Toraja (people), of the common socio-cultural and historical ties, and the artificiality of existing administrative boundaries. However, the Jakarta-based group belonged to a younger generation than those who had propagated Toraja Raya, and this group did not like the latter's flavour of colonial missionary politics and Toraja expansionism. (Roth 2003:88.)

Lobbying for this idea in the national political arena was supported by members of the political elites in Luwu and Tana Toraja, leading to the support of President Sukarno by 1963. 'However, like Toraja Raya, Lutat did not materialize because of the fierce resistance from the political elite of lowland South Sulawesi who objected to the plans for separating Luwu and Tana Toraja from the province of South Sulawesi (Roth 2004:177).

In retrospect, the political scene in Tana Toraja seemed to have com-pletely changed in just over a decade. The call for a new administrative unit called 'Greater Toraja' was eventually realized on a much smaller scale in the form of Tana Toraja (Ramstedt 2004:192). The Sukarno regime 'solved' the problem of integrating the traditional government structure into a modern administration by simply ignoring it. Sukarno's desire for a nationwide modernization of government, without any form of tradi-tional authority, apparently bore fruit. A number of districts and *kampung* were merged, resulting in a reduction in the number of districts by more than half, and the reduction of *kampung* to one third of its previous num-ber. Leadership of these newly-formed territories was predestined by young educated nationalists. Politically, the New Order government intro-duced a multi-party system from which the traditional *adat* leaders were excluded. The increasing popularity of the Parkindo party and the mass conversions to Protestantism challenged the power of the traditional

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[46] 'Lutat' is the abbreviation for Luwu and Tator. 'Tator' is the short name for Tana Toraja.

nobility of the Sa'dan-Toraja (Ramstedt 2004:199). After the strategic political elimination of traditional *adat* leaders at the start of the Dutch colonial administration, this was the second time in Tana Toraja's history that *adat* leaders were pushed aside. 'It was now the educated Protestants from the lesser ranks of Toraja society who were setting the trend for where society would have to go, i.e. embracing both modernity and Protestantism … as a "modern" religion' (Ramstedt 2004:199).

Decentralization and Local Autonomy: The Comeback of Traditional adat *Leaders*

In 1965, the rebellion in South Sulawesi was finally brought to an end by West Javanese troops and the region was at peace again. In the same year, the coup led by President Suharto heralded the era of the 'New Order'-regime which was marked by a steady assumption of political power by the military at the expense of traditional political parties. In Tana Toraja, the first phase of the New Order government (1965–1979) saw a far-reaching administrative reorganization. In reality, the New Order government only proceeded along the lines already laid down with the decentralization and local autonomy laws of 1948 and 1957. In the context of this changing political climate, the Torajan nobility, who had never lost their taste for political power, sensed an opening to reassume authority over the regency. With this goal in mind, the nobles started to organize themselves under the flag of the non-religious political party Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia (IPKI) which was closely affiliated with the army (Crystal 1974:141).

The *Desa Gaya Baru* (New Style Village) elections of 1968–1969 provided the first opportunity for Torajan *adat* leaders to make a comeback to the political scene from which they had been absent for almost two decades. With the introduction of the New Style Villages in South Sulawesi, the Suharto regime had intended to reorganize the village structure and reinvent direct elections of village chiefs (Liang Gie 1967; Ardiwilaga 1970). In essence, the objective of the New Style Villages was to stimulate modernization and democratization from the inside out.[47] Further, an aim was to stimulate the freedom of village governments and encourage cooperation with other villages and regencies (inter-regional cooperation). The actual execution of the New Style Villages decree of 1965 (Surat Keputusan 450/xii/1965) was fully delegated to the administrations of the individual

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[47]   Based on Law 22/1948 that prescribed far-reaching village autonomy.

regencies (Crystal 1971:126; Donzelli 2002–2003:30). Locally, the policy was implemented in 1967 after the government of Tana Toraja issued a local decree (Surat Keputusan 152/sp/1967) for the administrative reorganization of the regency (Donzelli 2002/2003:30). Subsequently, local boundaries of Tana Toraja were again redefined, and its 15 districts and 113 *kampung* were reduced in 9 districts (*kecamatan*) and 65 New Style Villages called *lembang*.[48] Palipu' was integrated as a *kampung* within *lembang* Kandora,[49] and Kondo' within *lembang* Tondon. Although the elections for the 65 newly-established *lembang* leaders were formally carried out without declared party affiliations, IPKI-backed individuals managed to win most of the 65 elections. 'The *lembang* elections of 1968–69 had clearly proven that members of the old noble caste could [still] command the loyalty of traditionalist villagers in an open contest for local level political leadership (Crystal 1974:144–5)."

A 1970 Presidential Instruction (Inpres No. 6/1970) that made the participation of all civil servants in the new Golkar party compulsory enabled the nobility to completely bring down the Parkindo hegemony during the national elections of 1971. Golkar enlisted the support of all 'anti-Communist' factions of society (Ramstedt 2004:199). All *lembang* heads, except one, participated in Golkar and, using the same political forces as the *lembang* elections, they led Golkar to an overwhelming victory.[50] Besides removing Parkindo as the controlling power, the majority of the seats in the new legislative (DPRD) and executive bodies (BPH) of Tana Toraja were now filled by the old elites as representatives of the government organ, Golkar.[51]

In a way, the political climate of the 1970s showed many similarities to the early Dutch administration. On a regency level, the nobility assumed political control over Tana Toraja, but it had to comply with the wishes of the central government. Again, the lowest level of the government structure, the *lembang,* remained largely beyond the reach of the Indonesian

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[48]   After Tana Toraja obtained its autonomous status in 1957, the number of *kampung* was reduced from 132 to 113 under the command of its first regent, Mr. Lakitta (Sandarupa 1996).

[49]   *Lembang* Kandora consisted of the *kampung* of Tengan, Kalimbua' and Palipu'.

[50]   In Tana Toraja, 83.4 per cent of all votes went to Golkar (Crystal 1974:144). In total ten parties were involved in the regency elections.

[51]   The Legislative body DPRD (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) was a council consisting of 30 representatives from the regency. The BPH (Badan Pemerintahan Harian) was composed of five members who ran daily affairs. The head of the regency was appointed by the Indonesian government and usually held a high rank in the army (Nooy-Palm 1975:59).

central government on account of its autonomous position. Although many traditional *adat* leaders might have returned to the centre of the political scene, and with a great amount of political autonomy to rule, the New Style Villages did not really coincide with the pre-colonial system and boundaries, as was also the case during the colonial period.

Centralization and Standardization: adat *Depoliticized*

In the 1970s, the central government started to strengthen its power over local communities and standardize regional variations in local government. This resulted in the introduction of a new law on Village Government in 1979. This law forced regional governments to transform the structure of village governments into an idealized Javanese model of the village. By standardizing village government structures throughout Indonesia, those government forms that were grounded in local traditions were completely ignored. In reality, the New Order regime feared regional and ethnic separatism and consequently were aiming to depoliticize *adat*, by reframing it as culture.[52] Since modern government systems were first introduced to Tana Toraja, the system radically changed for the sixth time. The centralization politics of the New Order Government spanned almost two decades, until President Suharto was replaced and the recent era of reformation and decentralization followed, to which I shall turn shortly.

The so-called 'New Order Village' or *desa,* as formulated in Law No 5 of 1979, was implemented in Tana Toraja in 1985 and the only recently established New Style Villages were again fragmented into a larger number of *desas* (see Table 4.1 for a historical overview of the changes in administrative divisions in Tana Toraja over the past century). The administrative boundaries of lembang Kandora, in which Palipu' was integrated did not change, but, it was renamed as *desa* Tengan. The term *lembang* in front of Ma'tallo' was simply changed into *desa*, and this did not have any further consequences for Kondo'. The power of the central and regional governments over the newly formed *desa* was based on intimate personal relations and on patronage. 'Whether lured by privileged access to funds or forced by intimidation, virtually all leaders, local notables and people with prestige and authority inevitably became state clients. 'Village leaders, the loyal state clients, became the axis around which governance, politics and funds circulated. So while heads were powerless in relation to higher

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[52] Culture was mainly expressed in houses, artefacts and clothing, thus excluding social structures and traditional laws and regulations based on tradition.

Table 4.1. Historical overview of the changes in administrative divisions in Tana Toraja.

Period	Administrative Units			
	Large			Small
Before 1906 'Traditional' socio-political organizations	*Tallu Lembangna*	*Lembang*	*Bua'/ penanian*	*Tondok*
1906–1926 Dutch administration	2 subdivisions: Makale and Rantepao	31 districts	4 sub-districts 28 complexes	400 *kampung*
1927–1945 Dutch/ Japanese administration	1 subdivision Makale-Rantepao	32 districts	17 complexes	400 *kampung*
1946–1950 Dutch control	Self-governing Division Tanah Toraja	32 *lembang*		410 *kampung*
1950–1965 Sukarno's Old Order	*Daerah pemerintah Negeri* Makale/ Rantepao; *Daerah Swatantra* (1957); and Kabupaten Tana Toraja (1959)	15 *lembang*		132 *kampung*; 113 *kampung* (1957)
1965–1979 Suharto's New Order (Phase 1)	Kabupaten Tana Toraja	9 *kecamatan*	65 New Style Villages	
1979–1998 Suharto's New Order (Phase 2)	Kabupaten Tana Toraja	15 *kecamatan*	290 *desa/ kelurahan*	900 *dusun/ lingkungan*

authorities, they were, in exchange for their subordination and loyalty, endowed with almost unlimited powers within their community.' (Antlöv 2003:196.)

The former *lembang* committees, which were still grounded on local traditions, were replaced by Village Consultative Assemblies (*Lembaga Musyawarah Desa*, or LMD). The *desa* head automatically became the chair of the LMD and, in consultation with the sub-district government and the Village Guidance Army Officer, he also appointed the other members of the Assembly. Since any mechanism for the local population to hold the *desa* head accountable was lacking, he possessed considerable power within his own territory. However, the *desa* head was at least not 'imported' from outside, and remained part of the community (kinship group) he ruled. Thus, despite his allocated power, he still had to move within the constraints of cultural and social acceptance.

The administrative and social levels that formerly existed below the *lembang* level were abolished and replaced by the *dusun* (hamlet). Both Palipu' and Kondo' became *dusuns* under the new administrative system. The head of a *dusun* was appointed by the *desa* head but was relatively powerless and just an arm of higher-ranked administrators. In the New Order administration, units differed with respect to whether an area was considered 'urban' or 'rural' (Donzelli 2002/2003:30). Tana Toraja regency (*kabupaten*) was considered a predominantly rural area but was endowed with a mixed system. The basic administrative unit throughout the area was therefore the desa, but in and around the two towns of Makale and Rantepao the urban administrative units 'kelurahan' and 'lingkungan' were applied, corresponding to the rural *desa* and *dusun* respectively. In contrast to the *desa* head, who was selected through regular elections, the head of a *kelurahan* (a *lurah*) was appointed by the district head (ibid. 7). While, the total number of administrative units initially differed only slightly from the 9 districts and 65 *lembang* established under the New Style Villages system, by the introduction of the *lembang* in 2002, Tana Toraja had 15 districts, 290 *desa* and *kelurahan* and over 900 *dusun* and *lingkungan*.

During the New Order Period, the borders of *penanians* changed several times, and the *borongna* was basically replaced by the idea of *Rukun Tetangga* (RT). The Suharto government introduced this administrative unit, which is comparable to the *saroan* in the sense that it was launched as a neighbourhood association in which *gotong royong* was promoted. However, the territory of an *RT* is usually artificially marked, cross-cutting *borongna* and *saroan* boundaries.

Conclusions

In the last century, the Torajan world was regularly changing under external pressures and interference. The area was colonized by the Dutch, then occupied by the Japanese, and subsequently came under the control of various successive Indonesian governments. Within the Torajan social space, a continuous struggle took place between various people and parties over the ultimate stakes—power and prestige. Although the stakes in the power game, and the arena in which it is played, have remained largely the same, the rules of the game have been frequently changed by external governments. After a long process of wielding and yielding involving various players, Tana Toraja has become the way it is.

Early Torajan social space consisted of a number of social groupings, or kinship networks, that differed in size and in constellation. The smallest single entity was a set of siblings that formed a kindred centre which was based on ancestral houses or *tongkonan*. These *tongkonan* anchored people to a particular place in contemporary Tana Toraja. In many respects, pre-colonial Torajan society fits the 'house society' image postulated by Lévi-Strauss.[53] Although the early kinship groupings in the highlands were linked to particular places by ancestral houses, they were not territorially based. Early Sa'dan people did not think of their place in terms of a bounded territory until the Dutch arrived. The Dutch laid the foundations for contemporary Tana Toraja by delineating the highlands into districts, sub-districts and villages. What has followed has been a long cycle of power politics with successive power and policy changes on national and regional levels. The history of the transformation of local territories, government systems, and the Torajan *adat* leaders' involvement in them, has been the struggle to come to terms with the ever-changing political realities in a rapidly changing world. Although Torajan traditional government systems initially continued to exist alongside the political administrations of the Dutch and Indonesian states, they were increasingly deconstructed and eliminated under the various regimes, most notably under the government of President Suharto.

The cycles of governmental and territorial changes in Tana Toraja went hand-in-hand with the traditional elite's participation in the political field. The history of Tana Toraja is coloured by struggles between elites from the

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[53]   Lévi-Strauss 1983:174. See Chapters 5 and 6 for more detailed information on the *tongkonan* as the basis of house societies.

noble class concerning authority in the social, political, economic and cultural domains. Most notably, these fights were between the nobilities from the northern and southern regions of Tana Toraja, but they have also taken place between various *adat* community leaders and even *puang* families alike. With the introduction of a 'political field' by the Dutch colonial regime, politics became the central instrument to enhance or at least maintain, power over certain people and available resources. Although the nature of the elites changed due to the introduction of education, money, Christianity and migration, the old nobility and their descendents continued to return to the political stage in Tana Toraja. Members of the old noble caste have been banned from the political scene on no less than three occasions (the inception of Dutch rule, from 1950–1968, and from the late 1970s through 1998) but have several times also proven that they can command the loyalty of the Torajan population in open contests for local-level political leadership. Here it should be added that some rich middle-class people have entered this arena, supported by the central government, or assisted by the ability to buy votes or through increasing their social status, but the majority of the people born in the middle and lower strata of society are still excluded from participation in Tana Toraja's politics.

To conclude, neither the administrative unit of Tana Toraja, nor the total population of the Sa'dan-valley, are self-evident frameworks. What constitutes the place of Tana Toraja is rather the outcome of social and political processes that run more-or-less in parallel with each other. It is constructed as both an administrative unit and as a socially constructed place. In Massey's words, the particular mix of social relations that form part of what defines the uniqueness of Tana Toraja, as a place, are by no means all included within the physical boundaries of the area itself. It includes relationships that stretch beyond. Hence the Torajan social space is much larger than the place itself. What is considered to be Tana Toraja, as a living place or homeland, differs by group and even by individual, and it does not necessarily conform to particular administrative boundaries, or to local kinship groupings or to organizations.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONTESTING POLITICAL POWER

The socio-political landscape outlined in the previous chapter was thoroughly challenged following the recent political and administrative decentralization. The historical struggle over a suitable political and administrative format embraced the traditional elites, the new wealthy middle class, as well as bureaucrats and political leaders, and included both ritual performance and regency development strategies. The investment of resources had increased, but the stakes (political power and control over people, access to resources and prestige) have remained the same. Similarly, the way in which the game is played has not changed much. It remains a struggle between *tongkonan*, or at least individuals shielded by their *tongkonan*, in a display of wealth at funerals and house-inauguration ceremonies.

The political and administrative decentralization policy as launched in Tana Toraja by the Indonesian government in 2001 unfolded as two apparently opposite processes: amalgamation on a village (*lembang*) level, and fragmentation on a regency level (Donzelli 2003:35). These new processes have provided fresh room for manoeuvre in social and political spaces. The question then becomes, who are the people or *tongkonan* who seize power in this 'newly created' space? Which people and parties become involved in this process of wielding and yielding, and what are the rules and the prizes at stake? And did the recent political transition affect regional social differentiation in Tana Toraja by altering the rules for inclusion and exclusion from social networks?

In the following discussion, the origin and rationales behind the amalgamation and fragmentation processes, the extent to which they were modified in the concrete implementation measures, and the implications for the contemporary social and political environment of Tana Toraja will be described. Whereas the previous chapter highlighted the arena in which the social and political game took place, this chapter gives an insight into the game itself or, as Bourdieu (1992) puts it, it provides 'a sense of the social and political game'. It describes the players that took part in the game, their positions in it, the investments made in the game, the prizes or stakes to play for, and the rules and possible strategies when aiming for sustaining the game.

Decentralization and Regional Autonomy in Indonesia:
The Revival of adat

The New Order politics of centralized power for the ethnically diverse and geographically dispersed nation was nearing an end with the downfall of Suharto in 1998. A mounting call for decentralization and local autonomy, by national and international institutions on the one hand and regional movements on the other, led to the introduction of two major laws in May 1999 by the 'new' Indonesian government, which promised a radically decentralized form of government. Law No. 22 on Regional Government and Law No. 25 on Fiscal Balance both devolve a great amount of administrative and financial autonomy to the district (*kabupaten*) and municipality (*kota*) levels, largely bypassing the provincial level.[1] Introducing regional autonomy legislation seemed a solution to the separatist movements and the communal acts of violence that were sweeping through Indonesia. To speed up the decentralization and democratization process, the new legislation allowed for the creation of new regions (sub-districts, districts, municipalities and provinces) by dividing or merging existing administrative units.[2]

At the local level, the 1999 Regional Government Law also ascribed an extensive amount of autonomy and rights to villages (the *desa* as defined in the 1979 Village Government Law). Moreover, it was stated that village units no longer had to correspond to the form of the *desa*. According to article 93 (1) of Law No. 22/1999, villages could be formed, disbanded or combined with other units as long as this was in accordance with socio-cultural conditions and approved by the head of the regency and the regency's parliament. In line with the ability to form new administrative units, their names may also be changed—again with the provision that these names should be analogous to traditional ethnic or regional

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[1] Endeavours to devolve authority and responsibility to regional governments in Indonesia had been undertaken on six previous occasions. Beginning, under colonial rule, with the Laws of 1903 and 1922 and followed by the Indonesian government through various national laws, namely Basic Law No. 22 of 1948, Basic Law No. 1 of 1957, Basic Law No. 18 of 1965 and Basic Law No. 5 of 1974.

[2] ICG 2003:4. The procedures that allow the dividing or merging of existing administrative units are set out in Regulation 129/2000. 'Under the terms of Regulation 129, advocates of a new district must demonstrate that it is a viable entity, in terms of economic resources, regional potential, population size, geographical area, and political and cultural conditions. They must also gain approval of both the district from which it wishes to separate and the relevant provincial government, as well as the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Indonesian Parliament.' (ICG 2003:4.)

concepts (article 1 of Law No. 22/1999). In addition to reforming administrative units, the new law 'affords the villages their own set of rights and responsibilities, the same as a corporation or individual …, and to make their own rules and regulations' (Simarmata 2002). Thus, in theory at least, villages had the opportunity to govern according to local customs.

Along with the regional calls for administrative decentralization, a resurgence of *adat* (local customs and tradition) was evident.[3] The penetration of centralized state power in Indonesia in recent decades gradually eroded the position of customary laws (*hukum adat*) and customary communal land rights (*hak tanah ulayat*) so as not to conflict with the 'public interest', while a variety of indigenous governance systems were replaced by a national unitary village system (Sakai 2002:245). The renewed emphasis on *adat* was '[M]arked by explicit criticism of the New Order's cultural and economic policy and to its rhetoric of development ('politik pembangunan'), which entailed an ideological devaluation of 'adat communities' (Donzelli 2003:25). Many critics suggested that the empowerment of traditional local government systems contained the remedy to the darkest methods and abuses of the New Order regime, such as corruption, collusion and nepotism (Donzelli 2003:18).

The Kongres Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (KMAN, Congress of the Alliance of Indonesian Adat Communities) held in Jakarta in March 1999 added an even greater impetus to the drive to revitalize *adat*. As Acciaioli (2002:217) puts it 'This congress, three years in the planning, marked a milestone in the mobilization of various "traditional" societies throughout the archipelago to demand recognition of their rights and achievements from the national government.' The delegates were pushed toward 'eliminating negative stereotypes of their societies and present an appropriate image that reflected their claims to local sovereignty' (Acciaioli 2002: 2017–8). They directed a number of demands at the national government, such as recognition of the customary *adat* council, eradication of the village deliberations institute, and withdrawal of all laws, presidential decisions, regulations and letters of explanation that cause loss to or weaken the rights of customary societies. Moreover, by enlarging the scale of cooperation and action through the establishment of the Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN, Alliance of Indonesian Adat Communities) they constituted a new stage in identity politics. AMAN is a Non-Governmental

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[3] *Adat* was often equated with 'tradition' but, because of its usage in different and sometimes opposing discourses, it has obtained multiple meanings (Donzelli 2003:16).

Organization made up of traditional *adat* leaders from most of the ethnic groups throughout the country which has been promoting the value of *adat* at all political levels.[4] Interestingly, AMAN finds its origin in Tana Toraja at a workshop of the Network for the Defence of Customary Societies (Jaringan Pembelaan Hak-Hak Masyarakat Adat) held in the highlands of Tana Toraja in 1993 (Acciaioli 2002). Here, the foundation was laid for the definition of '*adat* communities' (*masyarakat adat* or MA) and the first ideas about an alliance of Indonesian ethnic groups was put forward.

Not clear is whether it was the enthusiasm of AMAN that spilled over into Indonesian society at large, or whether the enthusiasm resulted from the general grievances about the New Order inheritance. Whatever the case, a climate of opinion that supported a resurgence of *adat* soon prevailed.

Return to the lembang *Movement*

The introduction of the so-called 'Big Bang' approach to devolution of government authority, together with the call for the return of *adat* to local politics, formed the national political and ideological background against which recent administrative unification and fragmentation processes in Tana Toraja have taken place. In the following sections, I will further elaborate on the implementation and implications of both processes, starting with the unification of administrative units at the village level.

Shortly after passage of the regional autonomy laws of 1999, subsequent national regulations began to undermine the potential autonomy of villages. The new regulations started to again delimit and re-standardize village government in Indonesia.[5] However, in Tana Toraja the spirit of 'the return to a government structure grounded on local tradition' had already been released from the bottle and had imbued Torajan society.

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[4] In 2004, AMAN had 927 registered communities, 777 of which were verified members. 18 indigenous organisations at the local level and 11 at the regional level were also allied with AMAN (Moniaga 2004).

[5] 'Minister of Internal Affairs Decree No. 64 of 1999 on General Guidelines for Village Government—later superseded by Government Decree No. 76 of 2001—set in motion the process of delimiting and standardizing village government in Indonesia, an abrupt reversal of the letter and spirit of the 1999 Regional Government Law. The new regulation stipulated a) the particular elements that comprise village government; b) procedures for electing and appointing village officials; c) specific duties and responsibilities of village governments; and d) the requirement that villages are to produce Village Regulations.' (Simarmata 2002).

Moreover, the Torajan *adat* leaders—who had been marginalized since the introduction of the uniform local administrative structures across Indonesia in the 1970s—sensed new opportunities after Law No. 22/1999 was launched and pleaded for an important role for the traditional institutions.[6] The election of a Torajan woman as the head of AMAN added an even greater impetus to the drive to revitalize Torajan *adat* in the life of the region and its people (Fauzi and Zakaria 2002). Less than six months after the establishment of AMAN, a local branch was founded in Tana Toraja 6 August 1999 and named AMAT.[7] Interestingly, the first AMAT conference was attended by representatives of 32 *adat* regions (*wilayah adat*), the same number of regions that existed under the Dutch colonial administration between 1925 and 1949. Enthusiasm for restoring traditional roles and forms of local government started to dominate the political debates about decentralization and local autonomy.

With the support of local and national NGOs, this public sentiment led eventually to a new regulation on village government. Just three months after Law 22/1999 became effective on 1 January 2001, the DPRD of Tana Toraja passed the 'return to the *lembang*' regulation into law (No. 2 of 2001).[8] The new regulation prescribed the reorganization of territories and government structures on the village (*desa*) level with the reformed territories being renamed *lembang*. A *lembang* symbolizes the geographical area of a group of people that have ancestral origins going back generations and having a shared socio-cultural set of laws and values as well as a 'traditional' form of government organization. In this respect, the *lembang* officially appear to be autonomous territories with their own institutions based on customs and tradition. The term *dusun*—the administrative level below the *desa*—was to be changed to *kampung*, a name

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[6] It should be noted that Torajan *adat* leaders do not nowadays necessarily adhere to the traditional *aluk to dolo* religion and may be Christian or Muslim. In contemporary Tana Toraja, *aluk to dolo* has become a religion rather than an all-embracing way of life. Instead, *adat* has now become the popular term to refer to all local customs and traditions that have ancestral origins, just as on the national level *adat* has become a popular buzzword in Indonesian public discourse (Donzelli 2003:16–7). For this reason, when talking about leaders who derived their authority through descent from the old nobility, or as members of the highest ranking *tongkonan*, I refer to *adat* leaders (*tokoh adat or pemangku adat*), no matter whether they are adherents of *aluk to dolo*, Christianity or Islam.

[7] Donzelli 2003:28. AMAT stands for *Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Toraja*.

[8] For examples of the reinstitutionalization of older forms of village governance elsewhere in Indonesia see Acciaioli (2001, 2002), who describes the return to the *ngata Toro* in some parts of Kulawali in Central Sulawesi, and Sakai (2002), who elaborates on the *ngari* in West Sumatra.

first introduced by the Dutch colonial administration, and *kampung* were to fall under the administration of the *lembang*.

Although the 'return to the *lembang*' idea included the return to government forms grounded on local customs, the *lembang* regulation of April 2001 actually dictated rather detailed guidelines for the establishment of *lembang* governments, leaving little room for deviation.[9] The government of a *lembang* should consist of an elected head (*kepala lembang*) and a *lembang* committee, including a secretary, heads of affairs (such as for the economy and development), and the leaders of the *kampung* that make up the *lembang*. The *lembang* community directly elects the head of a *lembang*. In line with the *adat*, the only ones eligible to stand as *lembang* head are, by definition, those from the highest social strata. *Kampung* leaders are generally appointed by the head of the *lembang,* but subject to his approval they can be elected by the *kampung's* population.

One of the major differences of the *lembang* government approach, compared to earlier government systems, was the introduction of a Badan Perwakilan Lembang (BPL, Lembang Representative Council). This council must communicate the interests and aspirations of the community it represents to the *lembang* executive committee, as well as controlling its daily practices. Members of the '*lembang* parliament' should be descendants of traditional *lembang* leaders and are elected directly by the inhabitants of the *lembang*. The number of members on the council depends on the total population of the *lembang*.[10]

Failure of the lembang Movement

In theory, the 'return to the *lembang*' seemed to be a promising way to enhance local autonomy and democratization in accordance with local customs and tradition. In reality, it marked a synthesis of the administrative authority with that of *adat*: dualism between government (bureaucracy) and *adat* leaders (St. Majo Basa 2001:2 in Malamassam 2004:20). However, the new regulation ran into problems once the process entered the implementation phase (Simarmata 2002). Stiff resistance began to emerge from *desa* and sub-district heads (*kecamatan*) who stood to lose their power and privileges under the *lembang* system (Fauzi and Zakaria

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[9] This regulation is formulated in Lembaran Daerah Kabupaten Tana Toraja No. 2/2001.
[10] With 2500 people living in a *lembang* (the minimum allowed), the Council will consist of seven members. The maximum number of members of a *lembang* Representative Council is thirteen (article 21 of *lembang* law no. 2/2001).

2002). Further, Torajan elites started to argue over the *lembang*' boundaries, names, customary law and available government positions. Influential Torajan migrants (descendants of traditional noble families) also interfered in the creation of the new *lembang* and influenced the *lembang* elections, openly or behind the scenes. Some migrants returned to Tana Toraja to campaign for particular candidates in the elections for choosing *lembang* heads, and others even ran for the position of *lembang* head themselves. In practice, many of the newly elected *lembang* heads were former migrants living elsewhere in Tana Toraja or the Indonesian archipelago.

Interestingly, the candidates' identification with a particular *tongkonan* seemed an important factor within the electoral contests. Candidates for *lembang* head strategically identified themselves with their father's or mother's *tongkonan*, or even re-established lost genealogical lines that went back many generations. Ne'Angke, a *lembang* head in the south of Tana Toraja, explained that he used his mother's *tongkonan* (in his family name and as a place to live) in the elections because this side of the family traditionally had had good relations with the lowest class, which included the majority of the voters in this *lembang*. However, a candidate's identification with a particular *tongkonan* means that there is much more to win or lose than a single government position. The honour and shame of whole families is at stake. Old elites, seeking the re-establishment of their role as traditional leaders in society, put forward a representative of the family for the *lembang* head elections.

Especially in the oldest *adat* communities of southern Tana Toraja there was a lot of competition for *lembang* head positions. Interference by family members living outside Tana Toraja, or working for the regional government in Makale, sometimes delayed the final establishment of a *lembang* and its government for more than a year, and in some cases even prevented the formation of a new *lembang*. In the southern *adat* community of Marinding,[11] for example, descendants from several *puang* families struggled over the boundaries, name and leadership of the yet to be formed, *lembang* for over three years. This was a typical case in which the honour of several *puang* families and their *tongkonan* were at stake. These local struggles over new territories and political positions reflect the historically continuous attempts by *puang* families to increase their authority at the expense of other *puang* families. These local administrative units have become the arena in which the representatives of *puang* families

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[11] Marinding is one of the eight *penanian* (*bua'*) in the area of Mengkendek which is in turn one of the three *lembang* (*Tallu Lembangna*) in southern Tana Toraja.

fight over political authority, which is directly associated with their authority in their past and, thus, touches upon their current socio-cultural position in society. The extent to which the territories of the newly established *lembang* and *kampung* coincide with traditional socio-political organizations with roots in pre-colonial times differs from area to area in Tana Toraja. Unlike the various problem cases, some *lembang* were established with relative ease and without any resistance.

Under the new *lembang* regulation covering Tana Toraja, a *lembang* can include as many as four *desa* but, on average, they consist of two or three *desa*. Out of the 116 *lembang* established by early 2004, 19 *lembang* had the same geographical unit as the previous *desa*. In general, the geographical territory of a *lembang* is larger than the *desa* of the New Order regime but much smaller than the 31, and later 32, *adat* communities detected by the Dutch at the beginning of the twentieth century. In some areas, the new *lembang* match traditional *bua'* units or *penanian* of the pre-colonial era, but they are usually smaller and in no sense match the former *lembang* that existed before the Sa'dan highlands were delineated by Dutch administrators. Below the *lembang* level are usually three to four *kampung* (sometimes matching the New Order *dusun* but not necessarily), although some *lembang* comprise as many as ten *kampung*.

The current area of Palipu' is divided into two *lembang*. One *lembang* comprises the *penanian* of Tengan and of Kandora and is called Lembang Kandora. The other *lembang* corresponds with the boundaries of the *penanian* Marinding but still does not have a formal name or *lembang* head as explained above. The return to the *lembang* concept in neighbouring Kandora was smoother; the former *desa* head of Tengan, which included the *penanian* of Palipu' and Tengan, became the head of Lembang Kandora after a small election with five candidates. Three of these candidates came from the area of Tengan and two from Palipu', including the winner of the election, Pak Sello. The other candidate, who represented Palipu', Benyamin Tandea, was living in Makassar at the time of the elections and had left Palipu' as far back as 1958. Despite his long absence, Tandea was still eager to campaign for the position of *lembang* head in Palipu' and wanted to return to the highlands to economically develop the village. In his view, 'Palipu' had good agricultural resources but gambling was preventing economic improvements. Ironically, the organizers of these gambling events are the *adat* and religious leaders: those who are preaching in front of the church.' Tandea wanted to curtail and eventually abolish gambling events and encourage investment in handicraft production to encourage tourism. However, his good intentions were not shared by the

local voters, who preferred the less radical Pak Sello. As one villager said about Pak Sello, he was 'someone who is easy going, not so formal, and not bureaucratic. But, more importantly, he is not feudal because he is not from the highest social echelons like Benyamin, who is related to the most important *puang* family in the village.' Since the people in Tengan were very much divided, the other three candidates did not have a realistic chance against the popular former *desa* head who obtained the majority of the votes from the people in Palipu'. The *lembang* committee and representative council seem to function fairly democratically with regular meetings and information days for the villagers.

After the decentralization laws were implemented, the *adat* community of Tondon remained part of the *kecamatan* of Tondon-Nangalla. Nangalla is another *adat* community and has had close relations with Tondon. Each *tepona padang* became a *lembang*, and each *karopi* became a *kampung*. The *rukun tetangga* (neighbourhoods) were never really accepted, and the *saroan* are, thus, still the lowest level of organization. Currently, it seems that the *adat* committees are flourishing and the original social structure remains untouched. Even the people that are elected to the Representative Committee of the *lembang* hardly differ from the traditional *adat* committee members.

The only major change was the replacement of the *desa* head by a *lembang* head (*kepala lembang*). In Tondon, the positions of all four *lembang* heads are filled by members of one family. Two brothers control the most important *lembang* including Mata'allo, which includes the village of Kondo'. An uncle rules another *lembang*, and an aunt of the two brothers heads the least powerful *lembang* in Tondon. She has only the official status and does not perform any real duties. All the males as well as the son of the female *lembang* head had been famous hoodlums (*preman*) who were quite notorious in the region for their bravery and their influence on the organization of Tana Toraja's illegal gambling. This case seems to demonstrate that the return to the *lembang* modified the authority of the old nobility in the modern political system.

The election of the four *lembang* heads had been orchestrated by Bello Salurante, a migrant living in Mangkutana, in the area of Luwu. Bello Salurante is the father of the two brothers and also closely related to the other two *lembang* heads. He had been the leader of the region of Tondon until he was jailed in 1972 on suspicion of murder. At that time, Suharto's *desa* system was being introduced in Tana Toraja, and a Torajan bureaucrat from Makale took over his position. However, as Bello Salurante is related to all the influential *tongkonan* in the area of Tondon, and also in

other regions in northern Tana Toraja, he retained much of his power. This became very clear in the subsequent *lembang* elections, and with the support of his money, status and influence, Bello Salurante's family regained formal power after having remained behind the scenes for over three decades. Pa' Ratte, the current *lembang* head of Mata'allo previously lived in Rantepao. He is related to one of the most important *tongkonan* in Kondo' and in the *lembang*. With the support of some powerful and influential villagers, the victory in the *lembang* elections was effectively guaranteed. Nowadays, Pa' Ratte is one of the largest investors in funeral and house-inauguration ceremonies in Tondon, probably in order to retain his status and with that his position.

If we weigh the situation following the return to the *lembang* in the Tondon area, we can draw several conclusions. The whole *adat* community fell into the hands of one family clan. Although everybody in Tondon shares the same ancestors, this 'newly emerged' clan is from a very small family circle and has claimed a disproportionate amount of power. Although the functioning of the *kombongans* (*adat* committees) seems quite democratic, those in charge are only from the highest class and make decisions that are largely in the interests of this class. As the *Lembang* Representative body includes the same people as the *adat* committee, it is unlikely to function well as a controlling committee. Interests are too intermingled, and the power of the *kepala lembang* is such that it would be foolish to offend him.

Although under the new *lembang* regulation of 2001 the *lembang* became autonomous, the administration of the *kelurahan* remained under the direct control of the district head's office. Moreover, the head of a *kelurahan* is not democratically elected but appointed directly by the *bupati* (head of district) of Tana Toraja and receives a civil service salary. All the 27 *kelurahans* are close to the two towns in Tana Toraja—Rantepao and Makale. The former *kelurahans* in the other sub-districts (*kecamatan*) were completely removed after the implementation of the 'return to the *lembang*'. Considering the direct lines between the head of the district and the *kelurahan* head, and the latter's dependency on the good will of the former, the district head still exercizes great power over the economic and political domains of Tana Toraja, which are centred on Rantepao and Makale respectively. In this chapter, I do not elaborate further on the *kelurahan* but focus on the *lembang*.

In contrast to the heads of *kelurahan*, *lembang* heads receive no salary from the district government. According to article 67 of the *lembang* regulation No. 1/2001, *lembang* heads are supposed to receive a salary of

500,000 *rupiah* per month from the regional government, but as of January 2005 they had not received any salary. Surprisingly, in the whole of Tana Toraja, this has not caused candidates to withdraw from the *lembang* head elections. On the contrary, the position of *lembang* head has become one of the most desirable positions in Tana Toraja. The *lembang* head of Mata'allo, which includes Kondo', explained, 'due to the relative autonomy of a *lembang*, *kepala lembang* (*lembang* heads) have become *raja kecil* (small kings).' One opportunity for *lembang* heads to obtain money is through tax collection on land and on the slaughtering of pigs and buffalo at funerals or house-building ceremonies.[12] This official added, 'In this *lembang* they slaughter most of the animals in Tana Toraja, so I do not have to worry about money. This year the inhabitants of this *lembang* paid 50 million *rupiah* in slaughtering tax, which is more than enough for my salary.

The real situation might be a little more differentiated, as many people with their own demands and requirements try to obtain a share of the potential benefits of the new decentralization laws. Further, a large proportion of the taxes levied has to be transferred to the district office.[13] A *lembang* head explained that he could refuse to transfer the slaughtering tax on animals (*pajak potong hewan*) to the district head.

> The district head has no legislation to kick me out as I am not officially employed, because I do not get salary. However, getting projects from the *kantor daerah* (district office) for the *lembang* depends on personal relations with the *bupati*. I have a close relation with the *bupati* (regency head), thus money for projects comes frequently. But,to get the project money for the *lembang*, I have to pay tax first.

To summarize, it can be said that if a *lembang* head manages to strike a balance between the needs and desires of his constituents and the requirements and prerogatives of the local bureaucracy, the opportunities to increase his social and material status are considerable.

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[12] Generally, the land and slaughtering tax passes through the hands of the *lembang* head before being transferred to the sub-district and subsequently to the office of the district head.

[13] Of the slaughtering tax, the *lembang* head is obliged to hand over 65 per cent of the collected tax to the district office, while the remaining 35 per cent is meant to be used to develop the *lembang*. The *kampung* head or his secretary collects the land tax and retains two per cent of the total amount levied. He transfers the money to the *lembang* head who gets four per cent. The money is passed on again to the head of the *kecamatan* (sub-district) who keeps ten per cent of the money. The remaining money is eventually transferred to the head of the *kabupaten* (district) via the bank, which probably charges some commission as well.

The lembang *Revised and Re-divided*

Three years after implementation of the *lembang* law of 2001 started, dissatisfaction with its limitations and deficiencies began to become apparent. Several *lembang* were still not formed; others still lacked a *lembang* head because communities refused to elect one, or the elected heads were not acknowledged by the government of the regency. Moreover, the dissatisfaction of various *adat* communities about their forced inclusion in neighbouring *lembang* was on the rise. The *lembang* law lacked any precise description about the territorial demarcation of communities, and this made the creation of new *lembang* difficult. Further, the condition that at least 2,500 inhabitants or 500 households were necessary to form one *lembang* forced smaller *adat* communities to merge with others under the umbrella of a single *lembang*, creating tensions between different systems of traditional authority.

In addition to the conflicts and deficiencies over territorial boundaries and *lembang* head elections, *lembang* heads still did not receive any salary from the regional government. In their struggle for appreciation by the government of Tana Toraja—both moral and financial—they bundled their power iton a *lembang* head association. the *Forum Kepala-Kepala Lembang*, FKKL. This organization started to put pressure on the government to revise the *lembang* law of 2001 and deliver the promised salaries. The same problem applied to the *lembang* secretary, who was supposed to receive a minimum salary of 300,000 *rupiah* monthly but who had received nothing. With regard to the *lembang* secretary an additional problem arose: his or her tasks were not well-defined in the 2001 *lembang* law, leading to the non-fulfilment or insufficient implementation of many secretarial tasks.

The last major problem concerned the functioning of the *lembang* representative council. In addition to granting local authority, the *lembang* law aimed to control the executive powers through a *lembang* council. However, rather than checking the execution of daily affairs, the council members were usually involved in executive tasks. Further, even if council members did try to check on or restrain unauthorized activities of the *lembang* executives, an appropriate mechanism to report complaints to the regional level was lacking, leaving the executives' authority relatively untouchable.[14]

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[14] One should note that not all *lembang* leaders abuse their power, and that a great number of *lembang* governments apply their authority for the benefit of the community they are heading.

The general dissatisfaction of Torajan society with the results and constraints of the original *lembang* law finally resulted in a revision in June 2004 (No. 5/2004). One of the major changes in the revised law was the reduction in the minimum number of people in one *lembang* to 1,500, or 300 households. In addition, the revised law stated that any changes in *lembang* boundaries should not lead to disruption in the community life of the various *lembang* included in the re-division. Further, the majority of a *lembang's* inhabitants, the regional parliament and the head of the district all have to agree to the transformation of the *lembang*. By the end of that year, the number of *lembang* had increased by 54 (to 170 in total).[15]

The regulation concerning the minimum salary of the *lembang* executive was removed in the 2004 law. A new regulation (article 68 of Law 5/2004) states that the salaries of the executives have to be reviewed every year and should depend on the prosperity of the *lembang's* economy, and that the controlling role of the local parliament has to be reinforced. Although the revised law seemingly provides some solutions to the problems created by the earlier *lembang* law, it is too early to determine whether the outcome will be satisfactory. In some cases, the problems that kept administrative units from forming a *lembang* or electing a *lembang* head are still not resolved. The proposed synthesis between the administrative and the *adat* authorities seemed to be more difficult than expected. Some people who were involved in the initial phase of the 'return of the *lembang*' activities are quite disappointed about the reality and point out that the new administrative system has only brought back feudalism rather than increased democracy. Recently, some politically influential Torajans have even started to discuss the 'return of the *desa*'. Predictions regarding whether the *lembang* system will survive are difficult, but the amalgamation and fragmentation process at the village level seems to continue.

In line with the new decentralization laws of 1999, the 40 members of the local parliament elected the head of Tana Toraja in March 2000. However, both the process and the results of the two-step elections[16] provoked great opposition from the Torajan communities in Tana Toraja, and also from the diasporas of Jakarta and Makassar. Before the elections

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[15] Law No. 5/2004 also dictated the transformation of *lembang* into *kelurahan* in the capital towns of sub-districts (*kecamatan*), and it allowed the formation or fragmentation of earlier *kelurahan* in Rantepao and Makale, resulting in a total of 67 *kelurahan* by the end of 2004, compared to 27 in January of the same year. The newly formed *kelurahan* in the sub-districts remained effective in the same way as under the *lembang* system.

[16] The 40 DPRD members chose five people out of fifteen candidates during the first round. In the second round the regency head was elected from the five candidates left.

started, well-educated Torajans from the highest social strata living in
Jakarta and Makassar (see Chapter 3) set the criteria for candidates. In this
way, all the members of the Torajan parliament—who were used to get-
ting their instructions from Torajans in Jakarta and Makassar—knew
which candidate they should choose as the new head of the district.
Nevertheless, through bribery involving several members of the regional
parliament, the result of the elections was a total surprise.[17] With thirteen
votes, Johannis Amping Situru, an ordinary court clerk in south Jakarta,
was chosen as the new district head of Tana Toraja (*Kompas* 7 Augustus
2000). The Torajan elites in Makassar and Jakarta, to whom the newly-
elected regency head was completely unknown, objected immediately.
Together with the rumours that Amping Situru planned to abolish the
social stratification system, as well as the traditionally popular cockfights
and gambling,[18] this dissatisfaction led to mass demonstrations in front of
the local parliament house in Makale. Consequently, it took five months
before the Governor of South Sulawesi managed to inaugurate Amping
Situru as the new regency head. This was only after both the Elite Police
(Ge-gana) and the Police (Brimobda) from Pare Pare intervened, and after
Amping Situru promised that he would not abolish gambling. This case
shows that the elite's power does not always control political outcomes
and that money and wealth can be as important as status and the support
of the right *tongkonan*.

A 'Greater' or a Fragmented Toraja?

As noted earlier, regional autonomy in Tana Toraja involved both an amal-
gamation process at the village level and a fragmentation (*pemekaran*)
process at the level of the regency. The discussion pertaining to the subdi-
vision of Tana Toraja into several smaller regencies started soon after the
'return to the *lembang*' idea was initiated. Although the Tana Toraja region

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[17] According to many reliable sources, the new regent of Tana Toraja openly used
'money politics' to get elected. On several occasions he invited DPRD members to the high-
class hotels of Makassar, offering them 100 million rupiah each for their votes. Further he
bribed influential people from the Gereja Toraja (Toraja Protestant Church) and the
Theological Seminar in Rantepao (STT) as well as Torajan leaders in and outside Tana
Toraja to promote his campaign.
[18] Although cock-fighting is illegal under Indonesian law, the local government has
never managed to ban the extremely popular form of gambling completely. In the immedi-
ate post-Suharto period, cock-fighting saw a resurgence in Tana Toraja due to bureaucratic
disarray and inattention (see Morrell 2001:12).

still remained under a single administrative umbrella at the beginning of 2005, attempts at fragmentation were pushed from within and beyond the highlands, and speculation about the future of Tana Toraja remained intense. Would fragmentation lead to a 'Greater Toraja', or would neighbouring regions integrate new, smaller regencies into their province? Before turning to the ongoing attempts to split Tana Toraja, I need to elaborate on the regional conditions and conflicting interests in which the process is embedded.

Pemekaran formed an integral part of the process of decentralization and regional autonomy that started after 1999. *Pemekaran* created new opportunities for political actors in provinces, districts, sub-districts and municipalities (Roth 2007:121). After the regional autonomy legislation was launched, 17 out of the 24 regencies (districts) and municipalities of South Sulawesi announced their desire to separate from the province, forming as many as five independent provinces (Morrell 2002:34). Tana Toraja was included in the plans of the neighbouring regencies on its eastern border, 'Luwu' and 'North Luwu', to form a province of 'Greater Luwu' (Luwu Raya).[19] Along the opposite coastline and hinterland, on the west side of Tana Toraja, three neighbouring regencies (Mamuju, Majene and Polewali-Mamasa) proposed forming the province of West Sulawesi (Sulawesi Barat).[20] Two other regions in South Sulawesi followed these movements and announced their intention to form a separate province as well (Eastern Sulawesi and the Pare Pare region). Particularly the regions most distant from the administrative and commercial capital of Makassar were the most eager to separate. 'In demanding self-determination, residents in the areas covered by the proposed provinces of West Sulawesi and Greater Luwu were expressing dissatisfaction with centralist governance at the provincial level' (Morrell 2002:35).

Tana Toraja, located between the proposed provinces of West Sulawesi and Greater Luwu, found itself in a somewhat ambivalent situation in 2001. Some Luwu *adat* leaders started to argue for Tana Toraja's exclusion from the Greater Luwu province by pointing out that the former Dutch administration did not include the Torajan highlands. Advocates of Tana Toraja's inclusion highlighted the close historic connections that predated colonialism. On the other side of the regency, in Mamasa, Torajans from Tana Toraja and the neighbouring regency of Polmas discussed the

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[19] For an elaboration on the process of *pemekaran* in Luwu, see Roth 2007.
[20] For more information on the *pemekaran* process in West Sulawesi, see Morrell 2002; Natan 2004.

potential integration of the regency into the proposed province of West Sulawesi but also failed to come to an agreement.

While the discussions about Tana Toraja's inclusion or not in the Greater Luwu or West Sulawesi provinces continued, Tana Torajans themselves submitted proposals to the Regency's office for separate northern and western regencies.[21] Again, the applications were supported by references to cultural and *adat* specificities and supposedly pre-colonial conditions. In fact, the proposed northern regency consisted of the same districts that were included in the Division of Rantepao, established by the Dutch in the early colonial era and including seven sub-districts. The proposed West Toraja regency was included in the Division of Makale after the Dutch entered the Torajan highlands. The committees that submitted the proposal for a West and a North Toraja claimed that the proposed districts consisted of a history, culture and tradition that differed from other parts of Tana Toraja. Initially, the proposals for fragmentation only involved the split of Tana Toraja into three smaller regencies (North, West and South Toraja) but later the idea of a Greater Tana Toraja resurfaced. Just as in the 1930s and 1950s, a Greater Toraja was supposed to include all the Toraja regions of South Sulawesi, and so also parts of the proposed Western and Luwu provinces. As any new province in Indonesia required a minimum of three regencies at that time (today five regencies are needed), the proposed fragmentation of Tana Toraja became even more important.

Clearly several competing attempts at fragmentation and confederation were going on in Tana Toraja. These efforts were not limited to actions by the local population but included heavy lobbying by Torajan migrants (mostly intellectuals and businessmen) in Luwu, Makassar and Java (predominantly businessmen in Jakarta). The various groups involved can be differentiated as follows. First are those who wanted to establish separate Northern and Western Torajan regencies. These people were generally based in the concerned regions and led by descendants of the traditional nobility of the various *adat* communities. Secondly, the Southern Torajans' highest ranking nobility (*puang*)—and most notably the Torajan elite in Jakarta, which comprises a large part of the southern nobility anyway— were generally against the splitting of Tana Toraja. Together with the Torajan elites (businessmen, government officials and intellectuals) in Makassar and Luwu these people were striving for the incorporation of

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[21] Before a region can be established as independent regency, the proposal for separation has to be approved by various institutions at the regency, provincial and national levels.

Ill. 5.1. Toraja newspaper with a picture symbolizing the possible separation of Tana Toraja (photo by Edwin de Jong).

Tana Toraja into either a Greater Luwu or a West Sulawesi province. Third, in contrast to the Java-based elites, the Torajan elites in Luwu and Makassar were not fundamentally opposed to the establishment of a Western and a Northern Toraja. Fourthly and finally, some people within and beyond Tana Toraja started to push for the creation of a Greater Toraja province once again. However, this was usually seen as a second step after Tana Toraja had been subdivided into several regencies or after a confederation has taken place with the neighbouring regencies of Luwu and/or Polewali-Mamasa. These people had usually been involved in the earlier attempts to create a Greater Toraja in the 1950s and 1960s, and were just revitalizing old political agendas.

The general fragmentation fever that prevailed among the inhabitants of Tana Toraja—on regency, *lembang* and, later, also sub-district levels[22]—drew attention away from political processes on a higher level than the regency. In September 2004, the Indonesian parliament approved the creation of a West Sulawesi province. Due to miscommunication and insufficient lobbying by the Torajan government, Tana Toraja was left out the newly established province. The inclusion of Tana Toraja in a Greater Luwu also seemed more distant than before. Polls that had been conducted in all the Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD, village councils) of Luwu showed that 95 per cent of the citizens would vote in favour of a future Luwu province excluding Tana Toraja (Nathan 2004).

As of January 2005, the Regional Autonomy Office of South Sulawesi (Biro Otoda Propinsi Sulsel) had only approved the proposal for North Toraja and had rejected the proposal for a West Toraja regency. Torajan elites that stem from the most influential *tongkonan* in the north of the regency, together with some of the newly affluent, were confident that their proposal would also be accepted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Jakarta and so becomes reality. However, Torajan migrants (especially the rich Java-based elites) cast doubts on the actual approval of North Toraja and were promoting the inclusion of Tana Toraja as a still united regency, in a new Greater Luwu province. There has been a concerted effort since 2000 to introduce Sharia law in the whole of the province of South Sulawesi and, according to the Java-based Torajan elites, inclusion in Luwu is the only option left to prevent political, economic and thus also religious

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[22] Based on the modified regulation on sub-districts (*kecamatan*) No. 2/2004, the 15 sub-districts of Tana Toraja were further subdivided into 26 in January 2005, and a few more proposals were still waiting for approval by the Tana Toraja parliament.

domination by the Bugis-Makassarese lowlanders of South Sulawesi. Their fear is that their Muslim neighbours on the southern borders would soon overrun a fragmented Tana Toraja.

It seemed that, after a long history of struggles over political power between the northern and southern elites of Tana Toraja, administrative separation of the two regions was now closer than ever. In 2008 the district North Toraja (Toraja Utara) was approved by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Jakarta and the region separated from Tana Toraja. The proposed Western Toraja regency was initially rejected at the provincial level, was reviewed after its northern neighbour obtained final approval from Jakarta, but has been rejected again. On a regional level, the Torajan elites' struggle for Tana Toraja's inclusion in the proposed Greater Luwu province seems unlikely to be successful. History shows that the political scenarios in the region are extremely flexible and shifting. The current attempts to unify Tana Toraja and Luwu even show many similarities with demands for a Greater Toraja and Luwu in the 1950s and 1960s. While the majority of the population in Luwu might be against the involvement of Tana Toraja in a Greater Luwu province, discussions continue between the nobilities from both regions who emphasize historically close social, cultural, political and economic relationships. Thus, although the borders of Tana Toraja currently remain unchanged, a period of further regional fragmentation and/or amalgamation—possibly leading to a Greater Luwu province— should not be ruled out.

Conclusions

The recent decentralization moves in Tana Toraja are the third (after 1948 and 1968/69) in a series of attempts that involve the desire for a government structure that is grounded on local tradition in Tana Toraja. At the local level, continuous efforts to find a synthesis between the traditional form of government and a modern administration resulted in the introduction of 'the return to the *lembang*' regulation. On a regional level, it manifested itself through the proposed fragmentation of Tana Toraja into three regencies and the efforts to create a Greater Toraja or Luwu.

The newly launched *lembang* system had to be built on a local administration that is the result of six historical cycles of decentralization and centralization. In other words, the return to the *lembang* is an attempt to reinvent a traditional socio-political government system and its boundaries that supposedly existed before it had been deconstructed, adjusted,

fragmented and combined, all in the course of one century. Although traditional government systems initially continued to exist in parallel with the national political administrations of the Dutch colonialists and Indonesians, it was increasingly deconstructed and eliminated by successive regimes, most notably under the government of President Suharto. One can thus reasonably argue that the extent to which the traditional socio-political systems continued to function, in parallel with the successive political systems of the central government, determined the feasibility of creating a new *lembang* unit. Nevertheless, as this chapter has shown, there is much at stake in the implementation process of the *lembang*. Some regions have become arenas in which the Torajan traditional elites (living within and beyond Tana Toraja) struggle over boundaries, names and political authority. Tradition acquires multiple meanings and is applied strategically to achieve personal and *tongkonan* objectives. In short, the introduction of the *lembang* seems to have run into the same problems as earlier attempts to decentralize the highlands of Tana Toraja.

Giving common people a say in a traditionally hierarchical and socially stratified society appears to be rather difficult. This chapter shows that the decentralization of the local government system and greater political autonomy do not automatically lead to democratic elections and/or a democratic way of governance. Elections are influenced by patron-client and blood relationships, social stratification and money-politics. Lembang Representative Councils are generally made up of *adat* leaders from the highest social strata, and their interests seem to be very much intermingled with the executives, paralyzing the controlling function of the legislative committee.

Just as on the local level demands for separate Northern and Western Toraja regencies, and movements for the creation of a Greater Toraja or Lutat province show many similarities with earlier efforts. Although the three proposed regions of Tana Toraja are socially and economically more integrated (through inter-marriage, migration and trade) than ever before, in the political domain tensions between the nobilities of the three regions are still very much alive, and the separation of at least the Northern region from Tana Toraja as a whole proved to be more effective than earlier attempts in the 1940s. Just as in the 1930s, 50s and 60s, the creation of a Greater Toraja or Lutat seems to be a more complex political process than it first appeared. Again, the great range of actors (with regard to ethnicity, religion, and other factors) with differing interests (such as economic gain and increasing political power) prevents Tana Toraja from withdrawing from South Sulawesi province.

In conclusion, after the downfall of the Suharto regime the rules have changed and become more flexible. The power game seems open once again for the old nobility. The contest over power and prestige at both the *lembang* and the district levels now embraces the new wealthy middle class, bureaucrats, political leaders, as well as the traditional elites, and includes both local Torajans and migrants. With the support of their *tongkonan*, these people struggle over political power, resources and prestige. Although some middle-class people (mostly businessmen) are now able to join the struggle for power, it remains very much a fight among the traditional elites and their *tongkonan*, and the majority of the population of Tana Toraja are excluded from important positions on the political stage. To some extent, political competition over power is similar to the struggles over status and prestige. Certainly, the investment of resources has increased, but the stakes are the same. Similarly, the way in which the game is played has not changed much. It remains a struggle between *tongkonan*, or at least individuals shielded by their *tongkonan*, in a display of wealth at funerals and house-inauguration ceremonies. These public displays will be elaborated upon further in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX

SOCIAL DISTINCTION AND RITUAL PERFORMANCE

Being a Torajan means that you always have to honour an invitation; wherever you are and whatever you do you must go to the ceremony—that is, if you can find the money.

Interview with Pong Cindy (4 September 2002)

Due to his thorough knowledge of the complicated rules that frame local rituals, Pong Cindy is a well-respected person in Kondo'. Whenever there is a ritual, he is invited to be the master of ceremonies, despite the fact that he suffers from poor health. When I met him, he was already orchestrating his third ceremony in less than a month. Given such commitments, Pong Cindy hardly finds the time to do his job as a village secretary or to cultivate his ten hectares of rice. Before this series of ceremonies commenced, Pong Cindy and some fellow villagers went to the northern forests of Tana Toraja to cut down trees to renovate a *tongkonan*. The *to'parenge* (the ritual headman of the village) had decided to rebuild the old *tongkonan* of his lineage, of which Pong Cindy is a member. All family members are expected to contribute money and labour for its maintenance and related ceremonies. Although, the *to'parenge's* children, who had migrated to Merauke (Irian Jaya) had already donated one-fifth of the total cost of Rp 100 million Pong Cindy, as a high status member of the family, is still expected to contribute Rp 15 million—which for him is an enormous sum.

In such times, several households eat only one meal per day, wear old clothes and withdraw their children from primary school because they can no longer pay the expenses. Nevertheless, they spend a fortune on pigs and buffalo to be slaughtered at ceremonies—sums that can be as much as the total school fees for a child through to university. This spending behaviour does not go uncontested: colonial missionaries and officials have already condemned the 'irrational' behaviour of the Torajans, and many present-day government officials and some well-educated Torajans continue to argue against irresponsible expenditure on ceremonies. Some frankly state that Torajan funeral ceremonies are a waste of time and money which could be better spent on the development of the area. However, the vast majority of the Torajan population object to such criticism as, in their view, large funeral ceremonies are not only a way of showing respect to ancestors, but also keep the Torajan economy running;

and they are a way to maintain close contacts with relatives and friends. As someone said, 'If you see funeral ceremonies as destroying capital, you miss the point. To a Torajan it is not a matter of destroying capital but a way of maintaining social relations. If you lose your relatives and friends you lose everything; if you lose your money you can try to recover it.' Whether the protagonists or antagonists are right or wrong is not the issue here; what counts is that ceremonies remain pivotal to the way Torajans live.

As we saw with Pong Cindy, funerals are not the only Torajan ceremonies that absorb large amounts of capital, but also the *tongkonan*. Rebuilding one could easily cost the price of a luxurious villa in one of the fancy suburbs of Makassar (see illustration 6.1. for an example of a recently renovated *tongkonan*). The *tongkonan* is a pivotal institution in Tana Toraja as is well reflected in the Torajan expression 'the *tongkonan* is like a mother'. A remark by Pa' Kondo of Malau who was interviewed by Waterson (2003:43) states this very clearly: 'The house is the mother (starting-point or origin) of our search for a livelihood and of the birth of children.' The question is, why are Torajans so obsessed with *tongkonan* and funeral ceremonies? What is their interest in these houses and rituals, and how much money is involved?

In Chapter 2, I argued out that the pattern of practices that people employ to make a living has to be studied within the framework of status systems and cultural ideals/objectives. In other words, to understand livelihood practices and the logic behind these practices, we need to take into account the cultural and religious dimensions that produce and reproduce social stratification and define those activities that are more appropriate and valued than others. In this chapter, I portray the *tongkonan* and the funeral ceremony in the Geertzian sense as being the basic 'vehicles of meaning' in any Torajan life. Moreover, I pay particular attention to the conceptions of honour, shame and prestige that form the major rationale behind 'taking a ride on these vehicles', or attaching oneself to a particular *tongkonan* and entering the arena and partaking in 'the game over meat'.

Torajan Order and Status

As in many other Southeast Asian societies, the Torajan world is highly structured and carefully ordered.[1] All objects, land, people and activities

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[1] See, for example, Errington (1989) who describes comparable concerns for structure and order by the Bugis of Luwu, and Bateson and Mead (1942) and Belo (1970) for Balinese society (Hollan and Wellenkamp 1994:43).

Ill. 6.1. A recently renovated tongkonan (photo by Wim Jakobs).

are classified, in both space and time. 'Some of the Toraja concern with temporal and spatial arrangements…is related to notions of hierarchy and to a desire to distinguish between different levels, including levels of social status and or ritual' (Hollan and Wellenkamp 1994:44). The traditional religion (*aluk to dolo*) of Torajans refers to the way in which both rituals and daily life are to be conducted. '*Aluk* was the wisdom of the ancestors,

brought by the great *to minaa* Suloara [ritual priest]; it was the multitude
of spirits who inhabited mountain peaks, or streams, or house rafters; it
was the speech of the priests, or *to mebalun*; the number of buffalo slaugh-
tered; the countless (or 7,777) prohibitions that informed daily life; the
proper performance of everyday prayer and ceremony' (Volkman 1985:33).
Dutch missionaries who tried to introduce Christianity to the highlands
met fierce resistance because of the Torajan fondness for funeral ceremo-
nies and gambling and so formally separated custom [*adat*] from religion
[*aluk*], as two complementary but distinct domains, as a way of harmoni-
ously blending Torajan ritual with Christianity.

After the mission divided *aluk to dolo* into a religious (*aluk*) and a cus-
tomary world (*adat*), *aluk to dolo* faded as an all-embracing framework for
life. However, as an idea, it has revived; a richly elaborated set of rituals
profoundly linked to agricultural cycles and to death and rebirth remains
the centre of Torajan life.[2]

The Torajan concern with proper placement is omnipresent in the
ordering of rituals. The primary division in rituals, one that permeates all
aspects of life and death, is between the rituals of the east (smoke-rising or
rambu tuka') and west (smoke-descending or *rambu solo'*). The east is
associated with the rising sun and refers to rituals of birth, life and pros-
perity. Among this large array of potential rituals, marriage and ceremo-
nies centred upon the rebuilding or renovation of the *tongkonan* are
presently most elaborated and practiced.[3] Ceremonies of the west are
connected with the setting sun and signify death and decay, and Torajan
death rituals are their major manifestations. Although there is a certain
order of precedence applied to all festivals, the two ritual spheres (east
and west) should be strictly separated in both place and time.

In most Torajan rituals of both types, the *tongkonan* forms the focus or
centre of events. 'In cosmic orientation every house is equal; the simplest
bamboo shack and the most statuesque *tongkonan* face directly north,
toward the river's source, ensuring that the right side of the house faces
east (toward life) and the left side faces west (toward death)' (Volkman
1985:52). Hence the *tongkonan* represents both life and death, a person's

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[2] The motives for, and implications of, the division of *aluk to dolo* into religious and
customary worlds will be discussed in more detail in the fifth section of this chapter.

[3] Although wedding ceremonies are also becoming increasingly popular in Tana Toraja,
and some wealthy and high-class Torajans spend considerable amounts of money on these
events, they remain far behind *tongkonan* inauguration and funeral ceremonies, both in
size and cost. Not many migrants will return for a wedding ceremony to Tana Toraja. For
these reasons, I do not elaborate further on wedding ceremonies in this study.

ties with his contemporaries and his ancestors, and stands, therefore, as an embodiment of the continuity of a group of people (Waterson 2000:181). When a child is born, the father buries the placenta on the east side of the house, the side associated with life. In time, 'the house becomes a place where "many placentas are buried", and thus should never be moved' (Waterson 2003:42).

The rice barn and the house are complementary and make up a kind of unit, in which the barn is a sort of smaller reproduction of the *tongkonan* and stands opposite the house. Here the Torajan penchant for order and completeness, as Volkman (1985:14) describes it, becomes apparent again. Houses have to be linked to other structures to become *tongkonan*. Next to rice barns, '[i]mportant origin houses also have their own family tombs (*liang*) cut out of solid rock and used over generations; the house and the *liang* are described as pair (*sipasang*)' (Waterson 2000:183). Upon the death of a person whose placenta is buried next to the *tongkonan*, the corpse is brought back to the house before it is buried in the family tomb, thus completing the circle of life and death. *Tongkonan* of rank are also expected to possess ricefields, coconut and bamboo groves, and other heirloom valuables such as gold and silver ornaments, daggers (*keris*), textiles, and old Chinese porcelain and beadwork, together making up the inert wealth or *mana'* (heirlooms) of a *tongkonan*.

> Ownership of *mana'* and even caring for *mana'* confers prestige and power on the possessors or caretakers. In the theoretical terms of Bourdieu (1984) *mana'* comprise objects of distinction in Toraja. In the power plays involving the distribution of *mana',* the aim of the game is to amass *mana'* for one's self and hence for one's own *tongkonan* and preferably at the expense of another. ... Once acquired and considered *tongkonan* property, *mana'* should be inert, never given away although still able to be circulated in exchange by being lent, shared or inherited (Robinson 2000:44)

The *tongkonan* itself is built according to a general architectural master plan, in which most parts have a particular function and place. According to Schefold (1988:233), who carefully documented traditional house constructions with reference to both form and meaning, '*tongkonan* are among the most impressive forms of vernacular architecture in the world. With their curved, jutting roofs over towering gables, luxuriantly ornamented and in their upper part slanting outward, they bear witness to the pride of their builders.' The high *tongkonan* gables are supported by poles, to which dozens or even hundreds of buffalo horns are attached, indicating the slaughtering (ritual) history and, by that, the wealth of a family. The wall panels are decorated with painted engravings.

The geometrically designed carvings have individual meanings and names. In theory, all the details of construction and decoration correspond to the status of the *tongkonan*, or rather to the descendants who claim to be its members (Volkman 1985:53). Thus, although all *tongkonan* might be equal in cosmic orientation, in social and ritual space they are not. In social space, the *tongkonan* can be considered a status symbol *par excellence*. It constitutes the centre within a web of strong and emotionally articulated bonds that are woven between people and their graves, land and ancestors, 'all of which combine to create a particular sense of place' (Waterson 2000:183). No two *tongkonan* occupy exactly the same position in the social space of the village or wider territories. Each *tongkonan* has its own name, heirlooms, ritual privileges and material property, which distinguish it from others. Through its physical appearance, the *tongkonan* displays status, wealth and power and, by that, its place and that of its members in the social ranking system. Since the close identification of people with their houses describes the social ranking system in the two research villages, I can best start by positioning the *tongkonan* in Palipu' and Kondo'.

In both villages, *tongkonan* derive their status from age and lineage, ritual history and the heroic deeds of its ancestors during past battles or wars. In Palipu', all this becomes clear when we unravel the positions of twelve *tongkonan* that are considered to be the most important or central. The twelve nobles (*potoktengan*) that together make up the traditional village council ritual titles that express their individual links with one of these *tongkonan* (see Table 6.1 for an overview of these ritual titles). More precisely, a titleholder is a descendant of the founders of one of the twelve houses who has been nominated by the other members of the *tongkonan*. As Nooy-Palm (1975:70) noted 'The titleholder of a *tongkonan* will often be in the possession of worldly goods and appreciated virtues as he precedes the big rituals. Being honoured in this culture is a matter of ascribed and achieved status. Only people of rank can organize a feast of merit or some other costly ritual. Therefore, being rich is the necessary condition for giving those feasts.'

When a titleholder dies, another member of the *tongkonan* will replace him. Because descendants of these twelve *tongkonan* regularly intermarry, most members within this circle have ties to several of these *tongkonan*. Intermarriage among these twelve *tongkonan* also implies an almost complete closure of the 'family circle' to people from other houses, thus securing the resources (most importantly, labour, rice fields and status) of the group.

Ill. 6.2. The front of a *tongkonan*. The buffalo horns symbolize the number of buffalo slaughtered at past ceremonies (photo by Edwin de Jong).

Table 6.1. Ritual titles in Palipu' and Kondo' in hierarchical order.

Ritual titles in Palipu'	English translation	Ritual titles in Kondo'	English translation
Massu'buk Panta'nakan	Ritual leader	*To parenge'*	Ritual leader
To Mangrara/ Ma'gandang	Noble	*To makaka*	Noble
Masserek	Noble (representative)	*Baliara'*	Noble (representative)
Ma'sanduk	Rich man	*Pa' bantuan sugi'*	Rich man
Mangkaro bubun lan biang	Eloquent	*Lolok didi*	Eloquent
Panglaa Padang	Ritual specialist	*Pandioran*	Ritual specialist
Ambe borongna	Head of *borongna*	*Ambe saroan*	Head of *saroan*

All direct descendants of these twelve *tongkonan* are considered to belong to the two upper classes. People of the highest class are direct descendants of *puang* Randanan, the *puang* who gained control over large areas of land in Mengkendek at the end of the nineteenth century, including most of the best rice fields in Palipu'. His relatives settled in Palipu' and built three *tongkonan*.[4] Although, these *tongkonan* all have a representative on the village council, they do not have a particular ritual function. The remaining nine important *tongkonan* were founded by the children of Darra Matua (the first man sent down from heaven) and his descendants, and also by intruders who won battles over Mountain Kandora and with that power over the people of Palipu'. To summarize, in Palipu', we can detect four circles of *tongkonan*. One circle of tongkonan consists of descendants of Puang Randanan; another circle originates from the three children of

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[4] Puang Randanan built *tongkonan* Tiroali, and Puang Buntu Liong built *tongkonan* Buntu Liong, which are both on a hill and served to defend the area. The daughter of Puang Buntu Liong and the son of Puang Randanan gave birth to a daughter, Puang Ine'(who now lives in Makale). Puang Buntu Randanan captured *tongkonan* Lebani. The son of Puang Buntu Liong is Puang Kembong. The son of Puang Kembong is the head of the *kampung* Marinding.

Darra Matua; and two circles of *tongkonan* stem from ancestors who entered Palipu' through battle and strategic marriage.

When visualizing these circles of *tongkonan* and their descendants, one should not use the image of a pyramid but more of a cone, or a banyan tree, as this is how most Southeast Asians would depict the shape of their societies. At the top of the banyan tree stands the oldest *tongkonan*. The descendants of this house build their own *tongkonan* which can be visualized as the foremost top layer. The layer directly below makes up the *tongkonan* that spring from the houses in the second layer, and so forth. The central or vertical line that flows from the top of the banyan tree to the bottom represents the direct descendants of the oldest *tongkonan*. *Tongkonan* within the layers around this central line stand in more-or-less a horizontal position relative to each other. *Tongkonan* relations are, thus, either 'vertical' between higher and lower layers or 'lateral' between *tongkonan* within the same layer. Errington (1989:140) would call the people from these latter *tongkonan* 'status-peers' rather than status equals, arguing that there is no ideological space for equals in a hierarchical society, not even of people within the same layer.[5]

Taking the image of the banyan tree a little further, we can thus discern four major banyan trees of different sizes (representing age and importance) in Palipu'. The trees stand so close to each other that the branches touch, and from a distance it seems that these trees make up a single canopy. However, on closer inspection, it becomes possible to distinguish various branches (lineages) that all lead to one of the four trunks. On these branches are leaves (people) hanging in different positions, but trees are constantly in motion and the leaves change position with changing wind directions. Branches and sometimes complete trunks break off (in storms and typhoons), and so on. Idealistically, society in Palipu' can be depicted as a clump of banyan trees.[6]

In addition to these important houses, another twelve *tongkonan* are recognised as the houses of the village elders' or the *banua matua ulu*, and are therefore highly regarded. The representatives of these *tongkonan* also participate in village meetings, and like the other members they come from the second and third social classes. All the *tongkonan* in the village

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[5] This system is not the same as the idea of precedence as described by Fox (1994) and later Reuter (2002) for Balinese society.

[6] Reality is a little more complicated when one takes into consideration people who are so-called 'freeriders'—those who do not obey the rules for outsiders who are not fully included in the system.

except two are related to the four circles of the most important *tongkonan*. The two non-related *tongkonan* sprout from separate circles, or minor banyan trees, consisting of only one or a few *tongkonan*.

As noted in Chapter 2, many Southeast Asian societies do not trace themselves *from* forebears but *to* forebears, and Torajans adopt this approach, making *tongkonan* membership more flexible. In practice, only a few groups of siblings are able to trace themselves back to the most important and highly honoured forebears; through battle, marriage, or by strategically utilizing relationships over time. As a result, social hierarchy does not only exist between *tongkonan* but also within *tongkonan*. Here we return to the importance of full siblings (placed at the centre of the kindred) in unravelling Torajan society. While siblings are more-or-less equal in status ('status peers'), the few sets of full siblings that claim membership in a particular *tongkonan*, stand to some extent in a hierarchical order relative to each other. Each of these full sibling groups again stands in a hierarchical position relative to sibling groups from other *tongkonan*. The idea that full sibling groups and *tongkonan* are the most fundamental factors in someone's social place in society will be elaborated upon further in the following sections on *tongkonan-* and funeral ceremonies. For now it will suffice to note that the majority of the villagers in Palipu' are not considered members of one of the important *tongkonan* and are placed in the third social class (39 per cent of the population). A similar number of people are positioned in the fourth or slave class (39 per cent). These families, or some of their members, often originate from outside Palipu' and have usually been, or still are, clients of the *puang* families. The first class makes up 7 per cent of the households, and the second class 15 per cent.

Sketching the positions of *tongkonan* in Kondo' society is a little easier than in Palipu' because it has been less afflicted by invasions and internal fighting. To repeat the comparison of society with banyan trees, Kondo' society can be visualised as two major banyan trees. Starting with the largest, oldest and most important tree, the top of one tree is a *tongkonan* built by Ne' Malo, the founder of *Tondon teponna padang* (four quarters). The four sons of Ne' Malo spread out over the region of Tondon, and each established his own *tongkonan*. One of these sons, Mamata, moved to Kondo' where he built *tongkonan* Sarambu eleven generations ago. His descendants built themselves another three *tongkonan* in Kondo' (Pong Tambolang, Tombanglia, and Ne'Malana). Not long afterwards, some eight generations ago, a person named Kongle founded a fifth *tongkonan* (*To'Sapuko*) in the area of Kondo'. It is not clear whether Kongle, whose

mother originated from the neighbouring area of Rangri and his father from Makale (Tondon Makale), established himself in Kondo' with the approval of the other four *tongkonan*. Whether peaceful or not, Kongle laid the foundation for a second family line in Kondo' that comprised several *tongkonan*. From among these *tongkonan*, a daughter established the sixth origin-*tongkonan* Pangkung Darang. Over the years, descendants of the six origin-houses have founded their own *tongkonan*, bringing the total number of *tongkonan* in Kondo' to 36.

As in Palipu', the congruence between ranking in the organization of *tongkonan* and social stratification is evident in Kondo'. As one respondent argued, 'the way we know that someone belongs to a certain class is by asking which *tongkonan* or family name they come from. Ne'Malo' is the forefather and former ruler over Tondon. All his direct descendants are from the highest class, as you can see from their *tongkonan*.' In fact, if we take a closer look at the ritual titleholders in Kondo' they all stem directly from the first five origin-*tongkonan*. These kin groups are the only ones considered to be from the highest social class (7 percent). The ritual leader, or *to parenge'*, is a direct descendant of *tongkonan* Sarambu, the first house built in Kondo'. The people who hold titles of *to makaka* (noble), *pa'buntuan sugi'* (rich man), and *lolok didi* (eloquent or spokesman) all stem from the three *tongkonan* build by the descendants of Mamata. The ritual specialist in Kondo' (*paindoran*) is a direct descendant of *tongkonan* To'Sapuko which was founded by Kongle. People in the second class (16 per cent) originate from *tongkonan* that stand close to the five origin-*tongkonan*. Some of these people are charged with the less influential ritual functions. The majority of Kondo's households, though, are placed in the third (44 per cent) and fourth (33 per cent) social classes. People from the fourth, or slave class, live in the same area and are mostly connected to the *tongkonan* of the *lolok didi*. For this reason, the *lolok didi* is seen as the 'king of slaves'.

In addition to the identification with a house, a person's social class is also revealed at certain ceremonies. As one Torajan said, 'To know from which social class someone comes from might also appear from the way they sit under the *alang* (rice barn) during ceremonies'. People from the third and fourth classes always have to carry pigs and do work at the ceremonies, such as slaughtering the animals. During a ceremony, low class people can only sit on the ground, while the highest strata sit under the rice barn. In a depiction of the rice barn, the highest class of people sit on the right side, the second-class sit on the left side, and the other classes sit behind the rice barn (see Figure 6.1 for an example).

front of rice barn

to parenge' ——————→   ←—————— pa'buntuan sugi'

to makaka ——————→   ←—————— lolok didi

relatives ——————→   ←—————— relatives

(to parenge'/to makaka)   (pa'buntuan sugi'/lolok didi)

Figure 6.1. Positions of upper-class people under the rice barn at a ceremony, with only one available rice barn.

> Class has nothing to do with money. Even if you return from Malaysia and have become very rich, you retain your low status. The third class of commoners slaughter as many buffalo as they can afford just to show off, to demonstrate that they have money. They can never achieve a higher position though. People from the fourth class are theoretically not allowed to hold a ceremony in their own right, but they can pay people from the first social strata for permission to do so.

In the third section of this chapter, the close link between funeral ceremonies and social stratification will be further elaborated. For now, it is enough to understand that kinship groups cannot be dissociated from particular *tongkonan* and accordingly from status and power. *Tongkonan* and family names reflect people's social position in society. Most villagers argue that social differentiation is fading, but when one recites certain names and asks their opinion they are very well aware of the status of these family names. People with highly respected family names still seem to have greater access to resources than others. Having discussed this topic with various people, it seems that the contemporary concept of class and status is slowly changing and is interpreted differently from early times. Nevertheless, it remains omnipresent in house inaugurations and funeral ceremonies, and also to a substantial degree in daily life.

The Making and Re-making of a tongkonan

I have already mentioned in the Introduction and in Chapter 3 of this study that one has to be very self absorbed not to notice the traditional Torajan houses when arriving in Makassar. However, whereas a careless eye could have missed the signs of *tongkonan* in Makassar, one would have

to be blind not to see any *tongkonan* or parts thereof in Tana Toraja. The '*tongkonan* is simply everywhere' starting at the entrance gate to the district, which is topped with a miniature *tongkonan*, in the architecture (roofs, walls and entrances) of most hotels and government buildings, as monuments, as grave-markers, as roadside shelters, as the shape of ceremonial pig-carriers, as emblems for government propaganda, and so on. The most striking are the enormous *tongkonan*-shape offices of the Torajan Protestant church in Rantepao, and the newly-built office of the district's council (DPRD) in Makale with its huge Torajan-style roof. It is no accident that both church and political entities feature *tongkonan* in or on their central buildings. The *tongkonan* 'was and continues to be a densely meaningful sign—a palpable, indeed, a live-in and walk-through sign— that ties together cosmos, kinship, the relations between the sexes, hierarchy, and the inscription of directions on the body and in social geography (such as up/down, right/left, and center/periphery)' (Errington: 1998:203). Why should it not be an appropriate way to tie Torajan Protestants or the whole Torajan community together? Seeing it in these terms, the *tongkonan* can be considered as an ethnic symbol *par excellence*, as Schefold (1988:238) described it.

The reasons for a house being a *tongkonan* or not are sometimes difficult to unravel, as they differ between regions. It is commonly assumed that houses gain power over time; the older they are the more they become associated with ancestors 'who protect their descendants' (Waterson 2003:45). Moreover, in general, *tongkonan* have to undergo a continuous cycle of renewal to obtain and maintain the title of an 'origin-house'. In villages, a lot of construction and renovation work is clearly going on. The rebuilding of houses does not only serve to re-establish the house structurally; it also reasserts its role as the focus of a kinship group (Morrell 2001:7). Most *tongkonan* are actually renewed before they become dilapidated. A *tongkonan* destroyed by fire does not necessarily lose its function and can be rebuilt at any time by descendants, even after many generations. In Palipu' many *tongkonan* have been set on fire in various attacks from outside the village, such as by Puang Randanan and his followers, the Bugis rebels of Andi Sosé, or Torajans from neighbouring settlements. Although ten of the forty *tongkonan* are still not rebuilt after being burnt down, they are not forgotten. People remember their names and hold onto the titles connected with them.

The renewal or re-roofing of existing *tongkonan* or the building of completely new *tongkonan* involves specific ceremonies. Membership of a *tongkonan* implies a willingness to invest in the rebuilding of houses and

also in the rituals that come with this. As Waterson (2000:183–4) noted: 'The willingness to invest in the rebuilding of houses is still a striking feature of life in Tana Toraja, for it secures prestige and social approval'. However, the expense of contributing to the rebuilding of houses and participating in ceremonies prevent people from becoming members of too many houses. In practice, most people only maintain ties with houses of their parents and grandparents, and of their spouse's parents and grandparents. One woman respondent drew a family tree of eight generations, traced through her mother. She named five *tongkonan* in different settlements that were connected to this genealogy and still of importance to her. Nevertheless, she indicated the house of her grandmother, who had died ten years earlier, as the closest. This *tongkonan* is already 200 years old and needed repairing. Before the repair work started, the members of the *tongkonan* gathered to plan and to collect money. She calls this the 'climax of social relations'. 'Because after such a meeting each member knows, this is my family. Even if you have known each other for a long time but did not know they were kin, after the *tongkonan* ceremony you know that this is my family. Each *tongkonan* member feels a responsibility to bring something'. An explanation offered by another informant adds to this understanding:

> Everybody has many *tongkonan*, depending on the number of marriages of their ancestors with people from outside their family. I do not know all my *tongkonan* but, if a *tongkonan* has to be rebuilt, its caretakers know that I belong to that *tongkonan*. I will be invited to attend the ceremony and of course I have to contribute money then. When a *tongkonan* has to be restored, it is unacceptable for people who are relatives from the same *tongkonan* to not be invited.

As Morrell (2001:7) writes 'The importance of the *tongkonan*, as a symbol of one's personal heritage, is such that few people avoid this responsibility, and expatriate family members still maintain their *tongkonan* affiliations, returning to the region to participate in events related to their house of origin'. In Palipu' and Kondo' it is, in practice, these expatriates or migrants who take care of most of the expenses in rebuilding a *tongkonan* and the rituals associated with it.

In the past, *tongkonan* had a double function. They served as residences or 'places where people lived and around which daily life took place' as well as a symbolic centres of a descent group (Schefold 1988:238). A few decades ago, the former role faded, and presently *tongkonan* are increasingly uninhabited. Schefold (1988:238) notes that 'The Toraja are moving out of their ancestral seats, the rooms of which are too high up, and too

cramped, and are building next to them stabler, more comfortable accommodations for themselves, as an environment for a modern way of life'. The diminishing role of the *tongkonan* as a residence is, however, not only the consequence of a modern lifestyle. It is as much the result of the Torajan desire for prestige of which the *tongkonan* is the physical expression. The modest shape and simple structure of old *tongkonan*, designed as a domicile, have changed into an architecturally sophisticated construction that appears less suitable for living. The refinement of the building, both in structure and in specific details of construction techniques, has led to a spectacular enhancement of the visual effect (Schefold (1988:235). '[T]he towering modern houses with their tremendously curved roofs are most appropriate to the tasks that the tourist brochures ascribe to them, as if they were primarily intended for show'. As Schefold argues, taking into account the complex system of classes and ranks, the striving for recognition and prestige is certainly not a new phenomenon in Torajan society. Rather, the 'new wealth' of migrating family members fuels the construction of expensive modern *tongkonan*.

During my time in Kondo', several villagers went off for a couple of days to fell timber in the northern tip of Tana Toraja. The people from Kondo' bought a licence from the government in Makale to chop down several square metres of trees. The wood was needed for the renovation of one of the oldest *tongkonan* in Kondo'. The *to'parenge* (headman) had decided to renew this *tongkonan* as it was one of the important houses in his family line. Before the rebuilding of the *tongkonan* started, its most important members and prominent fellow villagers met to discuss the financial arrangements and ritual procedures. Although much of the work would be done for free, the lumberjacks who cut the trees, and later the carpenters who would build the house, had to be supplied with food, coffee, cigarettes and palm wine, all of which demanded considerable sums of money. Further, every stage of house building would be accompanied by rituals; from the first felling of timber in the forest, to the final roofing with corrugated iron. Thus, besides labour, hundreds of people considered to be members of the *tongkonan* had to donate money for the construction of the house and the rituals involved. Most of the contributors I spoke to commented that they had called upon their migrant members for financial support. Because of the old age of the house, the circle of people that feel attached to it stretches far beyond Kondo'. Even a government official in Makale mentioned that she had contributed some money and a pig to the renovation of this *tongkonan* because her husband appeared to have some connections to it through distant relatives.

The inauguration of a *tongkonan* is a much smaller event than a funeral ceremony in terms of offerings made and the number of participants. Nevertheless, depending on the social rank and age of the house, it can be still considerable. The largest aristocratic inaugural house ceremonies, in which hundreds of pigs, chickens and dogs are sacrificed, might last three days and involve several hundreds or even thousands of people. Unlike at funeral ceremonies, it is not common to slaughter buffalo on these occasions. A huge house ceremony was held in Kondo' in December 2002 for a *tongkonan*. The renovation work took a little over three months, and many families could trace a link to this *tongkonan*. The work at the *tongkonan* had already been completed for over a year, but family members needed time to collect enough money for the ceremony. Because of the considerable costs of a ceremony, some house inaugurations are delayed for more than 10 years.

On the first day of the 2002 ceremony, I arrived with Pa Ratte, the head of *lembang* Tondon Matallo who had invited me. Together with his entourage of followers (family and friends) we entered the ceremonial field and walked straight to the rice barn facing the renewed *tongkonan*. Like all rice barns in Tana Toraja, it had a raised floor supported by six round poles (see Photograph 6.2 for an example of a traditional Torajan rice barn). Between the poles and underneath the storehouse was a lower floor or platform. In everyday life this space provides shelter against the heat of the day. During ceremonies (inaugurations, funerals and the like) it is a place where important, upperclass people may sit. Their position is determined by rank and ritual function. Often there are several barns, enabling the close kin of the society's leaders to join in. The other guests are seated under temporary shelters. The height of the floors in these guesthouses indicates the social status of the guests. Low class people usually sit on the ground. Pa Ratte seated himself on the floor underneath the rice granary against the front pole on the right side. Once seated, his movements, speech and eyes changed immediately, becoming appropriate for a man with his prestige and status.

Small trucks drove to and from the ceremonial field bringing enormous pigs from all the family members who claimed to descend from this *tongkonan*. The pigs at house ceremonies are much larger and fatter than those at funeral ceremonies. The largest pigs, costing as much as a small buffalo, were so fattened that they were unable to walk and had to be carried on a bamboo chair. Family members who did not bring or send any pigs to the ceremony lost their membership of the *tongkonan* and with that the rights (status, access to land, and so on) that comes with it. According to Waterson (1995:200), true descendants of a *tongkonan* are not only the

ones obliged to bring a pig to the house ceremony; they are also the ones that have the undisputed right to bring in a pig.

> If, however, one brings one's pig as a sign of one's descent from the house in question, one must be prepared to recite one's genealogy if questioned. If one cannot thus prove one's descent, the pig will be refused. If it is accepted, then one's membership is also an accepted fact; at a later date one might cite this as proof of it (Waterson 1995:200).

Meanwhile, hundreds of members of the *tongkonan* and other villagers arrived, mostly in groups. The visitors had been arriving from near and from places as far as Kalimantan, Malaysia and Irian Jaya to demonstrate and confirm their membership. The space between the rebuilt *tongkonan* and its four rice barns was soon packed with people and pigs. A dozen pigs were slaughtered on the first afternoon, but most were sacrificed on the third and most important day. This was a day of celebrations, graced with dance performances. The meat from the pigs was shared among those present, according to social rank. In retrospect, house inauguration feasts can be seen as expensive shows of wealth, status and class membership, only surpassed by funeral ceremonies. These ceremonies are excellent places to meet other people, to maintain one's social ties, and to define or question people's position in society. While the physical and social tongkonan were quite similar in the past, today the circle of the social tongkonan is ever increasing and becoming translocal or transnational. With its members sometimes spread all over the world, but showing a centripetal tendency, I will term these houses 'global *tongkonan*'—tongkonan that have become a kind of mythological temples to which people can always return.

Siri' Makes the World Go Round

The importance of belonging to a particular *tongkonan*, and the efforts that Torajans put into demonstrating this to others, cannot solely be explained from the perspective of striving for wealth, status and power. In reality a less observable explanation for this attitude and orientation is called *siri'*, a concept shared by the people of Tana Toraja and South Sulawesi in general, and unique to the region. In ethnographic literature,[7] *siri'* has been translated variously as 'shame', 'embarrassment' and

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[7] For example Chabot 1950; Volkman 1985; Errington 1989; Hollan and Wellenkamp 1994.

Ill. 6.3. Traditional Torajan rice barns on a family compound (photo by Wim Jakobs).

'shyness', or more positively as 'prestige', 'honour' or 'reputation'. However, as Errington (1989:145) correctly remarks, 'Perhaps like all words, but especially like words that stand at the juncture of emotions, processes, reactions, contexts and understandings, *siri'* cannot be satisfactory translated'. At the very least, any translation would need two words that reflected the double nature of *siri'*—its shame and honour sides. A person who possesses *siri'* is sensitive to, and hence vulnerable to, other people and has the capacity to feel both embarrassment/shame and respect/honour (Errington 1989:145).

Both honour and shame make a person human and define their *siri'*. According to Volkman (1985:73–4) 'This is not a matter of inner subjectivity but of knowing one's "place" the recognition of self in relation to others: to those with whom one shares ancestors or *tongkonan*, to those of loftier or lesser status'. In this way, *siri'* always surfaces in interactions, and it orients one to his or her position in the social hierarchy. 'If persons are accorded the deference and respect due to their place in society, they feel honoured/respected (*dikasiri'*). But if their position is challenged in some way, they are likely to feel embarrassment/shame/humiliation' (Holland

and Wellenkamp 1994:51). As Volkman (1985:74) indicates, when people have reached adulthood, they are supposed to have an understanding of 'social roles and hierarchies, linguistic codes, kinship relations, and avoidance patterns'. Or as she puts it '[t]o be without *siri'* at all is to be scarcely alive'. Yet, when people do not comply with these roles or norms, they are condemned for not knowing *siri'* or being *ma'siri* (ashamed). *Siri'* is, thus, not an inner control in the same way as we imagine conscience but, rather, represents 'the capacity and sensibility required to adjust one's behaviour to a situation without force or the threat of force' (Errington 1989:146). Children are not born with *siri'* but 'they have to be installed with it'. To some extent, *siri'* can be compared to what one could call 'decent' or 'civilized'. Although there is no definition of a civilized person, adults know how to behave in a civilized way.

Siri' is so closely linked to social relations that all relations are conceptualized in terms of shared *siri'*, or of us and them. Some people have one *siri'* in common or 'share one's *siri'*; they protect and guard it' and there are 'those who do not share one's *siri'* but attack it, thus dividing the world 'into two sorts of people; "us" and "them"' (Errington 1989:144). In theory, everyone from the same household, kindred, *tongkonan* or, in other words, kin who trace relations to the same source or ancestors, are of one *siri'*. However, in practice, kinspeople can become 'strangers' to each other by offending one another. As we saw in the previous section, people do their utmost to stay a member of a particular *tongkonan*; they invest in it, both in material and social senses. However, their membership can be questioned at any time, and gifts might be refused by other members of the *tongkonan*, implying the denial of someone's relationship to the kin group. On the other hand, strangers (such as adopted children or in-laws) can sometimes become joined in *siri'* through association and habit. In fact, what Errington (1989:147–9) found for the Bugis, applies just as much to Torajan society: 'When people are thrown together into association, they either develop a single *siri'* or else they become enemies' because 'There is no neutral ground, and there are no alternatives.'

This understanding of *siri'* explains partly (in addition to other factors discussed in Chapter 3) why Torajan migrants stick together in Makassar and other migrant centres. Far away from home, surrounded by strangers, Torajans have a heightened awareness of the oneness of *siri'* with their people from Tana Toraja. In explaining what makes a person Torajan, someone gave an example that exactly reflects this heightened awareness.

> When there is a meeting in a neutral place in Makassar together with Bugis people, the Torajans will be less expressive and sit at the back. This is not because they are afraid to say something but because they are so concerned about what other people think about them that they are afraid to say the wrong things. They even have a word for such behaviour *longko'*, meaning not shy but afraid to offend other people.

This shows the sensitivity of being both protective of one's own *siri'* (by sitting at the back) and afraid to offend someone else's *siri'* (by using the wrong words). Sharing one's *siri'* provides Torajans with a feeling of security, both through knowing their place in the wider social world and through belonging to a particular group of people that care for each other. Shared *siri'* has, thus, many advantages but can also be very constraining. This is well illustrated by the explanation of *siri'* by the lembang head from Tondon.

> Even when people from the upper class become poor they will always receive support from others because if they become poor they will bring shame (*ma'siri'*) to their family or *tongkonan*. Other high-status family members feel *longko'* (shame/afraid to offend others) and they will help this person not to lose face (and also their own) and provide him or her with the money and materials needed. For example, if I see poor family members, I will help them to maintain their status. This means that when they need to pay off a debt by bringing a pig or buffalo to a funeral ceremony, I will provide them with the necessary money. So, you can imagine, that you have to be rich when you are a district head, because you cannot lose face and become *ma'siri'*. You always have to help people who can claim to be kin and share a *siri'*.

The boundaries between those fused in *siri'* and those opposed in *siri'* constantly shift with place. When someone is living in Makassar, for example, his or her *siri'* group might extend to other Torajans not even living in close vicinity or being related in Tana Toraja. When they live outside Sulawesi with few other Torajans, they usually share a *siri'* with the other peoples of South Sulawesi. Within these places, *siri'* again differs by occasion and social interaction. For example,[8] the people in one village might work together in the organization of a ceremony because they are all servants of the same high-noble feast-givers, and in that sense they are joined in support of another's *siri'*, not each other's. When the ceremony is over or when the high noble returns to Makassar, these followers might offend each other and become strangers, or people who do not share the same *siri'*.

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8 I borrowed this example from Errington (1989:150), who described a similar event in Bugis society.

Although *siri'* is expressed in various social interactions, in daily life contexts it is generally related to the way in which food is shared or eaten. Sharing food is important in social relations, and when such sharing is not well conducted this could shame the hosts. Conversely, when the food is served well, people will be honoured. When people approach someone's house (even if they are just passing by), they usually greet the occupant with the words 'O grandmother, is the rice cooked yet? (*O nene', manasu moraka?*). The usual reply then will be 'Yes, it's cooked' (*manasumo*). People will be ashamed, or *ma'siri'*, if people do enter their house while the rice has all been eaten. On the other hand, the hosts will be offended if a visitor does not eat before leaving (unless he or she is a very frequent visitor such as a neighbour). At meals guests are often encouraged to take more rice by saying 'please take some more rice. Do not feel ashamed (*ma'siri'*)' and rules for eating together are very strict, everyone being afraid to start or stop eating before the others. Moreover, close social ties are often translated by referring to the fact that people eat from the same pot. The explanation by Rimba of the importance of food makes this clear:

> I was brought up by my grandparents in Tana Toraja, while my parents and three younger brothers were living in Irian Jaya. When my grandfather died, we decided to offer 16 buffalo at the funeral ceremony. My younger brothers did not agree with this large number of buffalo and did not want to come over to Tana Toraja. My father and I insisted on their participation in the ceremony and finally they showed up. As the eldest of the family, and one who had always eaten with this society, I thought the time had come to pay off my debt and provide them all with food. For that reason, I thought the funeral ceremony was important and a large number of buffalo were needed. Moreover, my grandfather had been living here and always took part in the feasts of others and ate from the same pot, so now I need to give them food in return to protect our *siri'*.

Though food and the way of sharing and eating are important in Torajan life, there are many other social contexts in which *siri'* surfaces, or is used to refer to people's motivation for action. Many Torajans have the impression that Tondon (which includes Kondo') is a closed community in which people are willing to forego their *siri'* outside Tana Toraja in order to earn money and increase their *gengsi* or prestige back home. The Tondon area is regarded as the source of many of the women working as prostitutes in the larger industrial areas of Malaysia. According to sources both within and beyond the village, Tondon men are often involved in illegal activities (illegal gambling, running brothels and the like) in the same areas. When one respondent in the South of Tana Toraja explained *siri'*, he used the example of Tondon migrants: 'Torajan people are always concerned about

their names and reputation, but when they migrate they do whatever they like. They gamble and work in prostitution. Actually, there is nobody left in Tondon who has *siri'* any longer'.

Siri' is a powerful motivation in everyday life and also at rituals. Funeral ceremonies are excellent occasions for revealing or challenging one's *siri'*. As we already saw in the example of Rimba, large-scale food sharing is important in expressing one's *siri'* at these events. However, according to one's position, the organizers (mostly children or close family of the deceased) have to conform to a whole framework of norms and rules to prevent themselves from becoming *ma'siri'*. Next to the quantity and quality of the food served, the orchestration, size and duration of the rituals, the number of buffalo and pigs offered, family wealth (*mana'*) displayed, and the number and status of guests, together define whether the organizers should be shamed or honoured by the living and the dead (spirits and ancestors). Through the funeral, children fulfil their responsibilities toward their parents and thereby display their own *siri'*, their place and honour in society. Because of this responsibility, as well as the great opportunity to protect or increase the *siri'* of oneself and the ones who share the same *siri'* (including the dead), the funeral ceremony and the slaughtering of buffalo at these events is, for many Torajans, their ultimate goal in life. Although people often claim that noone is forced to contribute a buffalo to a ceremony, as we saw above in the case of Rimba, people are often pressured to do so. Pressure comes from people feeling ashamed or *ma'siri'* if they do not give, so they are continuously preoccupied with finding a way to make at least a small contribution to a relative's ritual celebration (Hollan and Wellenkamp 1994:85).

Not only is the *siri'* of the organizers at stake at funeral ceremonies, but also that of the guests and servants. Under the watchful eye of the crowd, the principal participants walk in large processions, displaying their offerings, such as buffalo, pigs, rice and palm wine. Their names and gifts (including money) are announced through loudspeakers. For people of high rank, it is important not to show up alone or unshielded at these ceremonies, but rather with a large entourage of people, including porters bearing the offerings. The most public display in which everyone's *siri'* is at stake is at the meat division (*lelang*).[9] While the meat is tossed from the centre of the ritual field, or at larger ceremonies hurled down from a five- or six- metre-high bamboo platform, the meat receiver's name is loudly

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[9] See Volkman (1985:96–103) for a more elaborate description on this meat distribution and the consequences of it.

announced through the speakers. During this activity, the atmosphere in the ritual arena is tense, as Volkman nicely depicted it (1985:75–6) 'Everyone observes the calling order, the cut of meat, and its size. In what appears to be a bewildering rush of name-calling, meat-flinging, and animated conservation, everyone attunes himself to the subtleties of what is being tossed, when, and to whom.[10] One hears frequent whispers of *ma'siri'*, for someone inevitably is being shamed.' The part of the slaughtered animal and the size of the portion defines the receiver's social status and, with it, secures or challenges the *siri'* of this person and his *siri'* group. As the criteria for defining who gets what are generally ambiguous, it is not hard to imagine that often some people feel that their *siri'* has been challenged, leading sometimes to emotional scenes and even fights. *Siri'* is thus not only about holding steady, but also about attack and defence (Errington 1989:154). Moreover, *siri'* is the Torajan explanation for 'why the system works at all: why they cut animals for their relatives, repay debts, and, at present, feel themselves caught in an endless slaughter cycle' (Volkman 1985:73).

Tournaments of Value

Throughout this chapter, life and death have appeared to be inextricably entwined with each other, and pinpointed in the *tongkonan*. Upon birth, the placenta is buried next to the *tongkonan;* at death, the corpse of the person whose placenta was buried next to the *tongkonan* is brought back to the house before it is buried in the family tomb, thus, completing the cycle of life and death. In the Torajan view of the world, all humans, rocks, trees, houses and artefacts contain an invisible animating energy that makes items effective and potent (Errington 1989:44). This life-energy, or *sumanga'* as they call it, is in everything or pervades everything, but to varying degrees.[11] Thus, every form of life in the Torajan universe is at once a part of *sumanga'* and a container for it, which makes the cosmos continuous, reversible and open (Tsintjilonis 1999:640). In other words,

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[10] These are parts of freshly cut meat that are thrown at the earth ground, to be taken home to the recipient's household.

[11] Errington 1989:122. The idea that a kind of constantly creative energy permeates and animates the universe is not unique to the Torajans but is shared by many other Southeast Asian societies. Whereas the Bugis and Makasar call it *sumange'* (see Errington 1983, 1989), the terms given to this energy are close cognates of the Malay *semangat*. For a more elaborate explanation of the Torajan idea of *sumanga'*, see Tsintjinolis 1999; Errington 1983, 1989.

all 'activity and life is part of a single continuum, a single unfolding (Tsintjilonis 1999:622). The objective for Torajans is, then, to embody *sumanga'* in such a way that it is arranged in a specific fashion: from right to left or from left to right and around a source of power or navel. This explains the Torajan concern with order and proper placement and the strict division between rituals of the East and West that were discussed in the section above. *Tongkonan* are a perfect example of sources of power or nodes at which the energy collects, albeit in differing degrees of concentration. In an open cosmos of energy, the house has a definite existence that

> possesses a navel that should be seen both as the centre and origin point of the family group. In addition, although the succession of houses functions as a process of spatial inscription and differentiation, it does not amount to a permanent separation or irreversible fragmentation, but to a multiplication of points at which the creative energy associated with the cosmos can be tapped and utilized in a continuous process of expansion. Within this expansion a *tongkonan* is much more than a house. It is not a spatial sign of life, it is the very place where life is 'planted' and 'grown'. ...[I]t is the process of life itself. (Tsintjilonis 1999:631)

Considering that death is coincident with the transformation of a life-spirit into a 'black shadow', the most important purpose of the traditional rites in the funeral ceremony is to initiate a process of transition through which one's 'black shadow' is eventually 'converted back into *sumanga'*, which is concentrated at the *tongkonan*. For this reason, the *tongkonan* plays a special role in the funeral ceremony, as we will see later in this section.

The arrangement of right to left or left to right has to do with the movement between life (East or ascent) and death (West or descent) or, as Tsintjilonis (1999:638) phrases it, 'the transformation of a "black shadow" into *sumanga'* may be seen as embodying an overall practice of exchange in relation to which the rites of the "ascending smoke" [life] are both opposed and completed by the rites of the "descending smoke" [death].' The overall practice of exchange that is achieved through sacrifice at ancestral rites is thus a way to proceed in the right direction. As a sacrifice is 'an act of giving that is necessarily reciprocated' according to Mauss (1990:16) 'life and death may be seen as integral parts of this reciprocity— that is, the overall exchange between gods, ancestors and humans, on which the cosmos depends' (Tsintjilonis 1999:638).

We do not need to go too deeply into the concept of *sumanga'* to understand the underlying principle of 'excessive' offerings of money and

animals at funeral ceremonies in Tana Toraja. This is a much more complex subject than can be explained solely through wealth, status, prestige or *siri';* it is as much *sumanga'* that determines the 'actual pattern of life'. It is a belief in things that we cannot see, hear, smell or feel, unlike the funeral ceremony, which is only an expression of it. In the following paragraphs, I will describe many aspects of the funeral ceremony in a less abstract way since it is important for the argumentation in this book. I therefore present a brief outline of the funeral of Ne'Sukku', a person of high rank in the village of Kondo' in northern Tana Toraja that I was invited to attend.

After someone dies, it is important that the relatives of the deceased (and preferably their children) organize some kind of ritual that secures the transformation of the soul into *sumanga'*. This generally amounts to 'some form of sacrifice which is, whenever possible, shared and eaten' (Volkman 1985:84). The scale and sequence of the rituals as well as the size, type and number of animals to be sacrificed are all defined by local customary rules and are inextricably connected to the status and wealth of the deceased. A complex system of rituals exists for people from all classes and rankings and differing in size, duration and the type of offerings expected. For poor people, a simple ritual and a symbolic small sacrifice, such as a chicken egg or small pig, will do. However, the spirits will be angry at those who can afford more than they sacrifice. Traditionally, the wealthiest people are expected to sacrifice twenty-four buffalo and a number of pigs, and to organize a funeral ceremony that lasts for several days. However, nowadays, people of this rank slaughter up to 150 buffalo and hundreds of pigs. In the southern village of Palipu', the *puang* families especially are expected to hold such large ceremonies in order to retain their high status and not lose their *siri'*. Just after I left Palipu' in January 2005, an important *puang* died, and preparations for a large funeral ceremony were taking place. In the preceding period, I only attended a few small ceremonies of 'lower class people' in which no more than four buffalo were slaughtered. In the northern village of Kondo', on the other hand, funeral ceremonies appeared to be much larger in size and cost, regardless of people's social status. I attended several extraordinarily large funeral ceremonies and heard stories about several others. Although a symbolic sacrifice might have satisfied the spirits, and once was common for slaves and the poor, a socially acceptable funeral in Kondo' today demands a genuine animal sacrifice.

In accordance with their belief in *sumanga'*, among Torajans 'death is treated as a gradual process rather than an abrupt event' (Hollan and

Wellenkamp 1994:13). Often a long delay occurs, sometimes up to several years, between a person's physical demise and the performance of his or her funeral. Torajan customary rules do not set limitations on the period between death and burial. In fact, in reality 'the greater the eventual funeral the longer the hiatus between expiration of the deceased and the commencement of ritual activities culminating in burial' (Crystal 1974:126). The hiatus is due to several factors, such as the need to save money and make preparations for the funeral, and waiting for an auspicious date. In the meantime, the body of the deceased is bathed, injected with formalin and wrapped in cloth. The corpse is often sat in a chair, either in the southernmost room or in the main room, as if it is still a member of the household. The presence of a dead person in a house is often signalled through hanging a white cloth in front of the house.

Eleven months after Ne'Sukku died the community of Kondo' staged her great funeral ceremony. Family members and village cultural leaders had been urging her seven children to organize an extraordinary ceremonial display that corresponded to their high social status, and more importantly would further increase the family's prestige. However, the children's resources were limited, and it was not easy for them to meet the cultural expectations of the community within the limits of their financial capacity. Of Ne'Sukku's seven children, only two daughters had remained in the

Ill. 6.4. Men constructing a ceremonial field in front of rice barns (photo by Wendy de Jong-Jakobs).

village. The others were living in Luwu in Southeast Sulawesi and Sabah in Malaysia. The daughters living in Tana Toraja (or rather their husbands) coordinated preparations for the funeral ceremony while consulting with migrant siblings by cellular phone. Generally, migrant members will be notified about the necessary expenditures and, in line with financial capacity, the total costs will be divided among the various family members. In practice, migrants end up paying the largest shares. Ten months after Ne'Sukku passed away, the children gathered and decided to slaughter 100 to 105 buffalo at the ceremony. The ceremony was planned to last up to ten days before the corpse would eventually be taken to the family grave. The whole ceremony was orchestrated by Pong Cindy, a cousin of Ne'Sukku and well-respected in the village because of his fine knowledge about rituals (*ambe' kasiuluran*). The ritual cycle was more-or-less divided into three stages, which I will outline below.

> The first phase is what I will call 'honouring the ancestral *tongkonan*'. During Ne'Sukku's life, she felt close to three ancestral *tongkonan* located in a radius of a few kilometres. Over seven days, the corpse was carried in a nicely decorated wooden coffin, accompanied by a loudly screaming crowd, from one of these *tongkonan* to another. The ceremonies in front of these houses were attended by various *tongkonan* members who ate, drank, talked and danced in honour of the dead. At each *tongkonan*, several buffalo were slaughtered and distributed to those present, who sometimes numbered up to several hundred.
>
> On the eighth day, the corpse was brought into the *rante* on the outskirts of the village: ushering in the second phase and climax of the ceremonial cycle. The *rante* is a ceremonial field that consists of a circle of standing stones that represent important ancestors. On this occasion, a large rectangular field (30 by 40 metres) with lines of temporary bamboo shelters erected to protect the hundreds of guests around the *rante* from sun and rain. In the farthest corner of the field, a two-storey, graceful bamboo structure (*lakian*) with saddle-shaped roof was erected to house the corpse. This structure was decorated with red and gold-cloth and a golden keris and displayed the heirlooms of the family.[12] 150 villagers had been working on the construction of the ritual arena for more than two weeks. The work was carried out on a cooperative (*gotong royong*) basis, free of charge. However, the family had to provide the workers with meals, coffee, cigarettes, palm wine, and cakes every day. The bamboo needed for the construction was chopped down in the village, but the nipah (type of palm) used for the roofs had to be imported from the harbour city of Palopo.

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[12] Only upperclass families are allowed to possess a *keris*, an expensive arched sword decorated with precious stones.

Over the next two days, thousands of relatives, friends and acquaintances arrived from far and near in Tana Toraja to pay their last respects to the deceased. In addition, many Torajan migrants—living all over Indonesia and beyond—returned to the highlands of Tana Toraja to attend. Torajan customs forbid the distribution of invitations to a funeral ceremony, making it remarkable that so many people turned up. The organizers are only permitted to inform people about their intention to hold a funeral, and on what date. These days are called *allona*, the days to receive guests, or as it is often ironically called, 'to receive debts'. In fact, it is an event that 'spells either glory or shame for both the sponsors of the ritual and their guests' (Volkman 1985:91). Hundreds of trucks, jeeps, minibuses and motor taxis come and go transporting all the visitors and their gifts to the ceremonial arena, sometimes lining up several hundred metres outside the ceremonial field as far back as the main road to Rantepao. Rows of vendors, mostly older women, are seated around the entrance to the ritual field, welcoming all new visitors while showing their merchandise: chips, sweets, cigarettes, beer, and so on. The sound of a gong announces the arrival of a new group of guests at the ceremonial field. In the middle of the field, traditionally dressed women are nimbly beating wooden sticks on a large trunk that produces a distinctive drum beat and announces the arrival of important guests. The visitors walk slowly around the ritual field in a formal procession, or *rombongan*, leading water buffalo, and carrying pigs, vats of palm wine and rice baskets. The sound of dozens of screaming pigs, hanging upside down with their feet tied to a bamboo pole carried by two people, fills the field. Volkman (1985:91) noted that '[t]he number of *rombongan* and their participants depend on the extent of the deceased's connections: a "small person" may have just one or two short processions at his or her funeral; a "big person" may have dozens.' At the funeral of Ne'Sukku, tens of *rombongan* entered the ritual arena. The order of the people in these *rombongan* was hierarchical, on the basis of age, kinship and status, and after everyone had found his or her proper place, a display of wealth and prosperity began. One of Ne'Sukku's family members carefully wrote down all the gifts that were brought—hundreds of buffalo and pigs, dozens of sacks with rice and vats of palm wine and millions of *rupiah*. The gifts, name and current abode of the givers are announced through loudspeakers to the guests already seated in the shelters around the field. It is like being at an Indonesian airport; you hear the names of Jakarta, Makassar, Surabaya, Balikpapan, Irian Jaya, Singapore, and so on. After a ceremonial greeting, and betel and cigarette offering to the leaders of the processions, the guests retire to the shelters where they are offered drinks and food which is prepared in a dozen instant kitchens at the back of the ceremonial field.

Between the bustling of the ceremony, a film crew, hired by the family, competes with some Torajan migrants to get the best shot of about thirty male dancers who circle slowly, chanting songs in honour of the dead. These laments for the deceased, or *ma'badong*, have a mystic sound and often continue deep into the night. A very well-dressed 20 year-old girl equipped with

a digital camera tries to get a shot of the dancers. For this girl, Mery, the Torajan funeral ceremony is a completely new experience. Mery was born in Malaysia and this is her first visit to the highlands of Tana Toraja – sadly, to take leave of her grandmother. Her mother Marisha is one of the dead person's daughters and migrated to Malaysia 32 years ago where she found work as a cook in a lumber camp. Mery had arrived in Tana Toraja two weeks before the ceremony began. Upon arrival, she went with her mother to the market to do some shopping. Each child has their own shelter at the ceremonial field, in which they receive their guests. An eighth shelter has been prepared for general guests that come for all seven children, including the village leaders, civil officers, policemen and army officials. Mery's mother is responsible for her own shelter and guests. She has bought mats for people to sit on, biscuits, tea, sugar, coffee, palm wine and so on. As food is so important in Torajan society, much of the success of the ceremony and prestige is defined by the food served. A complex system is set up behind the scenes to smoothly serve the hundreds of guests with food and drinks. While every shelter has an attached kitchen, a complex water system is installed to provide all eight kitchens with running water, which is not an easy task high up the mountain. Tens of women are cooking hundreds of kilograms of rice and a dozen pigs each day. The kitchen attached to the general shelter is operated by women from the village who are part of the women's group or PKK (Perempuan Kelompok). Mery's mother is assisted by some family members, friends and former slaves.

Besides preparing food for the guests, the children of the deceased person have to offer a number of buffalo and pigs for distribution through a public auction (*lelang*) among those present. Mery's mother and her uncle, Pong Abbi, provided most of the buffalo, 20 each, some costing up to Rp 40 million. The other five children each brought another six buffalo, bringing the total to 70. The remaining buffalo were offered by other family members (first and second cousins only). The number of pigs offered neared five hundred. Each animal brought in by a visitor represents a debt, and therefore a social tie. Some animals serve to pay off a previously incurred debt, while others created a new debt. Some animals were given to the entire family (all the siblings) and others to an individual child of Ne'Sukku. Some were given by whole families and some by individuals. As Crystal (1974:133) stated, 'It is true that the more pigs and buffalo [that] are accepted the greater the amount of meat for subsequent distribution and the higher the esteem the family of the deceased will garner in the eyes of village folk. But one must consider also the years and decades to come.' It is expected that a similar animal (in size, weight and price) will be returned to the giver at a future ceremony.

Every few hours, Mery's mobile phone rings with her father calling from Malaysia. Her father is a Filipino logger who stayed behind in Malaysia to take care of Mery's two sisters. While accepting the cultural background of his wife, he is concerned about any newly incurred debts. Or, in other words, the number of buffalo that have been brought into the ritual arena explicitly in the name of his wife. Before Mery arrived in the highlands she did not

have any idea what Torajan culture was like because her mother had never talked about it. However, what she did know was about the *paniuran*, or the obligation to contribute. Her mother was continually mentioning the *paniuran* in Tana Toraja, and Mery knew exactly the market prices for buffalo, the names used for particular types of buffalo (depending on the pattern of colors), and the debts of the family. Like most Torajan households, Mery's mother kept an accurate account of the date, occasion, parties involved (givers and receivers), and the size, quality and value of the gifts that have been exchanged, such as buffalo, pigs, palm wine, rice, coffee, tea, sugar, biscuits and money. Mery added that she was often angry when family members from Tana Toraja called her mother in Malaysia to say, "Hello, we have a *paniuran* here". However, now I have been in Toraja for two weeks I have changed my mind, and I will soon come back. Maybe for the funeral of my grandfather.' In fact, during the ceremony, Mery was given a small buffalo by her aunt, drawing her more directly into the debt system. However, debts of this kind are inheritable, and it is not necessary to repay the debt in one's present life.

A couple of hours later, the whole ritual field was covered with blood, bones and meat from the tens of buffaloes slaughtered. Palm wine was flowing freely, while the sound of talking and singing guests was accompanied by the noise of villagers hacking the buffalo meat into smaller pieces to be distributed. The distribution of the meat took place from a five-metre-high platform (*lelang*) that stood in the middle of the field. As Pong Cindy announced the names of various people, two men threw down buffalo and pig meat from the platform. Various sizes and cuts of meat were tossed down to the field, which had already turned into mud after the afternoon rain. The meat was picked up by the children or helpers of the ones named. Volkman (1985:100) had already noted in 1985 that the meat division is difficult to understand because of 'the complex, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory bases for determining the distribution of meat.' Nevertheless, it is obvious that this 'politics of meat' (*politik daging*), as Torajans call it, could wound or confirm people's *siri'*. Some people became really angry following the division and started scolding satirical ballads while others were encouraged by cheering to pick up their meat.

These days of feasting and ritual are in fact excellent opportunities for meeting old and new friends, getting to know relatives, or extending business networks in Makassar. While the children of Ne'Sukku had lengthy discussions that lasted long into the night about the procedure, size and costs of the ritual performances for the next day, the guests were drinking palm wine, chatting, dancing and singing. Just as Volkman (1985:87) had observed at another ceremony, 'Young men and women become especially rowdy, enjoying the social opportunities afforded by the ritual gathering.' Most relatives stay overnight in one of the temporary shelters. My companion Mery is having a hard time. She is unaccustomed to sleeping on hard mats, having difficulties finding clean water to take a bath and brush her teeth, and not liking the Torajan food.

After these intensive days of 'blood, bones, and meat', the third phase of the funeral begins—the actual burial. Usually, only a few days pass between

the death feast and the burial. These days are often filled with cockfighting, and large funeral ceremonies are not complete without cock fights. Torajans believe that these cockfights create a form of power that conveys the *sumanga'* of the deceased to the afterlife. However, over time, these events have become large illegal gambling events in which a lot of money and resources are at stake. Van Lijf (1948) had already noted these events in 1906 and the attempts of the Dutch government to curtail their size and frequency. Yet today these cockfights flourish and are even organized outside funeral ceremonies. Although the cockfights were reasonably well controlled under President Suharto, 'the immediate post-Suharto period saw a resurgence of cockfighting and gambling in Tana Toraja, as advantage was taken of bureaucratic disarray and inattention' (Morrel 2001:12). At Ne'Sukku's ceremony, the burial was delayed by about two months because of a difference of opinion between Ne'Sukku's children and others about the meaning of cockfighting. The *to'parenge* or ritual leader of Kondo' believed that the Torajan term for cockfighting *saung* was derived from *adat* (customs) and not from *aluk to dolo*, the original religion.[13] If that was true, it had

Ill. 6.5. Men cutting the offered buffalo in pieces on the ceremonial field (photo by Wendy de Jong-Jakobs).

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[13] The distinction between *adat* and *aluk to dolo* will be further discussed in the next section.

nothing to do with the ceremony and had to be left out of the cycles of ritu-
als. Moreover, the government and police did not allow the setting up of a
large gambling den. Eventually, the family, the to'parenge (ritual leader) and
the police agreed upon two days of cockfighting before the corpse was
brought to the family grave, located somewhere in the rocks halfway up the
mountain just outside Kondo'.

As Volkman (1985:104) states, 'By the end of the funeral the children of the
deceased have established new reputations, positions, new degrees of *siri'*,
new cutting histories, and new debts.' The total costs for the construction
and decoration of the ceremonial buildings, traditional costumes, drinks
and food for the thousands of guests, the expenses of a cameraman, the
purchase of buffalo and pigs plus the animal slaughter tax were estimated
at nearly two billion *rupiah* (170,000 Euros). As with many other ceremo-
nies in the northern area of Tana Toraja, this funeral ceremony was rather
large relative to the resources owned by the people involved. In reality, the
old nobility is challenged by rich men from the lower classes to demon-
strate their wealth during a ceremony through sharing the slaughtered
buffalo meat with the community of ritual participants. It now happens
more often that lower class people who have made so-called 'new money'
in Jakarta, Irian Jaya or Malaysia, organize exorbitant funeral ceremonies
that do not comport with their social status. According to one of my
respondents in the north, 'funeral ceremonies become bigger because tra-
ditional rules are no longer adhered to. People are more concerned now
with *gengsi* (prestige) than with the customs. For example, according to
the traditional religion, 24 buffalo is the highest number allowed to be
slaughtered at a funeral ceremony. Slaughtering more is thus far "over the
top", or *gengsi.*' To me, it seems that it is the honour or prestige side of siri'
that is driving the increase in size and cost of ceremonies. When I first
arrived in Tana Toraja, many people complained about the ever growing
size of funeral ceremonies. They often linked this growth to *gengsi*. As one
informant put it, 'For the low-class people, *gengsi* means showing that
they are able to do many things, but for the high-class people it means
maintaining their position.' This struggle between the low and rich classes
of people has eventually led to an increasing competition between
ascribed status and achieved wealth that surfaces in a battle between
blood ties and money on the ceremonial field (Volkman 1980:8).

The competitive element within the funeral ceremony is further stimu-
lated by the inheritance system in Tana Toraja. Children receive an inheri-
tance (usually wet-rice fields) by paying a symbolic price in the form of
buffalo they promise to sacrifice at their parents' death ritual. This means

that a child who sacrifices more will get more than his or her siblings. 'This led to an ever greater competition between siblings, unless they were more or less willing to equalize their shares' (Liku Ada' 1986:229). The northern region seemed to be more conservative in applying the old inheritance system than was the south, probably because almost every household in the north is able to own land, while most wet-rice fields (*sawahs*) in the south are in the possession of the *puangs* and their descendants, avoiding the need for intensive competition either in or outside a symbolic arena.

Tongkonan, *Funerals and Christianity*

A strong status competition that is fought out through *tongkonan* at ceremonies appears to have developed in Tana Toraja. These struggles are valuable for the highest social classes in maintaining their status, and they may be even more important for the middle class in its attempts to gain prestige. However, while the ceremonial competition provides opportunities for some, for others it is a burden. Consequently, a large group of people have been searching for a way to escape the status competition. In this chapter, I may have given the impression that all Torajans are joining in the competition for status and prestige, but the reality is, of course, more differentiated. As in Makassar, some people free themselves from the Torajan heartland or even the Torajan world through migration and then isolation from contact with other Torajans. However, in the highlands, people have discovered a less extreme way to escape ritual obligations through the Pentecostal church. Pentecostalism provides another route to individual enrichment, something that has been quite difficult in a society where most accumulated wealth serves to benefit the *tongkonan*.

The reason why funeral ceremonies are the way they are today has a long history and has much to do with infusions of wealth by migrant kin. Christian religion, or more specifically the 'Mission', has also played a major role in these events. The Mission saw funeral ceremonies as capital-wasting events that increased inequality, and it has constantly attempted to abolish funeral ceremonies. However, the Mission's attacks on death rituals touched a vital nerve and led to several years of Torajan rebellion, resulting in the death of the missionary, Van de Loosdrecht, in 1917. When the Mission saw that their position was endangered, they moderated their approach and stopped their frontal assault on rituals. 'The outcome was the development of a simple but decisive strategy: the formal separation

of custom [*adat*] from religion [*aluk*], as two complementary but distinct domains' (Volkman 1985:36). This decision marked the start of large-scale Christianization in Tana Toraja because converted people no longer had to abandon their beloved rituals, now considered to be mere customs. Moreover, with this division of *aluk* as an all-embracing framework for life into custom and religion, the foundations were laid for the possible expansion of ritual practices because the beliefs that once constrained them waned. Torajans now had the opportunity to go to church and attend other Christian activities and still 'share in their traditionalist relatives' sacrificial meat' (Volkman 1985:36). Further, the increasing egalitarianism propagated by the Christians led to an increase in participation by low-status people in these rituals, something that was previously forbidden by the rigid rules of *aluk to dolo*. The division between customs and religion have in practice forced Torajans to schizophrenically adopt two different ways of life: the way of their ancestors and that of their Christian god (Ngelow 2004:5). This has even led to the integration of New Testament readings and sermons into today's Torajan funeral rites.

When the Dutch began to allow 'double missions' in 1938, Catholic missionaries also entered the Torajan highlands. The Catholic mission especially attracted followers from the lower classes by providing them with education and healthcare. The competition between the Catholic and the Protestant churches that emerged did not, however, result in mass conversion of the population over the following years. By 1950, only eight percent of the Torajan population had converted to Christianity (Van Lijf 1951:367). However, the real and perceived threat of Darul Islam in the 1950s and 1960s convinced many Torajans to convert to Christianity (see Chapter 4). In the same period, some Torajans in the south of Tana Toraja converted to Islam, but the number has remained small compared to the Christian majority. As of 2003, 87 percent of the population was affiliated with Christianity (68 percent Protestant[14] and 19 percent Catholic). Eight percent considered themselves Muslim, and 5 percent remained *aluk to dolo* believers (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2003).

Until the 1970s, most attempts by the Protestant and Catholic churches to reach the poor and the people from the slave class had failed. In reality, the Protestant Torajan church preserved the class system, whether

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[14] The Indonesian government figures do not differentiate between the various sects within Protestantism, such as Pentecostals and Seventh Day Adventists. The majority of the Christians in Tana Toraja are Protestants associated with the Gereja Toraja (Toraja Church).

deliberately or not, and the only way to escape the system was through migration. The introduction of the Pentecostal church in the 1970s, in contrast, represented a major step away from the established, somewhat more upper-class Protestant Torajan church. Because of its vegetarian beliefs and absolute ban on offerings at rituals, thereby rejecting the consumption of ritually slaughtered animals, the Pentecostal church is becoming increasingly popular with two kinds of people in Tana Toraja. First and foremost, by the poor and lower-class people who want to escape from the burdens of mandatory reciprocal exchange; and second by richer people whose accumulation of wealth is challenged by the extravagantly expensive funeral ceremonies.

By providing an alternative religious and social centre to the *tongkonan*, rather than trying to integrate both organizations, Pentecostalism has been more successful in counteracting the *tongkonan* than the Torajan Church. Coming to grips with the *tongkonan*, and the traditional balancing of power that came with it, had always been a problem for the Christian church. As we saw above, the *tongkonan* is metaphorically the heart of Torajan society and influences most people's actions and behaviour because the wealth and survival of the *tongkonan* and its members is paramount. I found several reports of meetings held in the 1960s by members of the Torajan Church who lived all over Tana Toraja that mentioned the difficulty of acquiring a basic understanding of the *tongkonan*. The Protestant Torajan church that had managed to control many social practices and events that influenced the life of Torajans still had difficulty grasping the genealogically limited relationships and the feudal value system within the *tongkonan*. Christian priests were trained to deal with local leadership and, through that, to establish some control over society, but this influence always remained outside the domain of the *tongkonan*. One priest from the Torajan Church explained to me the difficulties between church and *tongkonan*:

> The Torajan Church adopted Christianity and its practices from the Dutch, and these stand largely in contradiction to the ideas of the *tongkonan*. Ideally, there is no contradiction between the church community and the *tongkonan* but, in practice, the *tongkonan* is highly hierarchical while Christianity advocates equality. We are still trying to integrate the ideas of the *tongkonan* into the Torajan church. The Sinode office of the Torajan Church in Rantepao is a good example of bringing in the symbol of the *tongkonan*. It is now the largest *Tongkonan* in Tana Toraja, and the name of the building, Sangulli, means 'the *tongkonan* of all people'. It symbolizes the integration of the *tongkonan* into the church community by creating it as their *tongkonan*.

Some Torajan priests (most notably Kobong 2001) continue to argue in favour of the possibility of completely absorbing the *tongkonan* into the Torajan Church. However, they acknowledge that the 'structure of the *tongkonan*-cracy' will make this a long process.

Not surprisingly, Pentecostalism has gained most followers in the south of Tana Toraja, where the social system is more rigid and the land less equally divided.[15] In Palipu' alone, there are seven churches of which five are Pentecostal, some admittedly comprising only ten households.[16] Overall, adherents of Pentecostalism are rapidly increasing in this region and Pentecostals (30 per cent) already outnumber Catholics (23 per cent) and Muslims (4 per cent) combined. Nevertheless, the majority of the village still follows the Protestant Torajan Church (45 per cent). The few Muslims in Palipu' have to go to the next village to attend Friday mosque. The picture in Kondo' is completely different. This northern village has only a small Torajan Church that has to house 96 per cent of the village population, and an unfinished Catholic church that serves the other 4 per cent of the people. As of 2005, Islam and Pentecostalism had yet to penetrate the village.

As in other parts of Tana Toraja, in the villages of Palipu' and Kondo' most people in the highest social classes are members of the Protestant Torajan Church. They are more conservative about honouring the old rules and customs than people belonging to other religions. One sees that the Catholics were generally the first people from the lower classes to try to escape the social system. Later, people from these classes turned to Pentecostalism.

Although religion criss-crosses *tongkonan* in the sense that a *tongkonan* often has members of various religions, household members usually adhere to a single religion. People within a marriage can come from different religious backgrounds, but often one or the other then converts to the religion of his or her spouse. Pong Evi, for example, was a Muslim when he married his Christian wife. They agreed that the sex of the first-born child would determine the religion of the family. If the child was a girl, Pong Evi would convert to Christianity, but if it was a boy, his wife would become a Muslim. The child turned out to be a girl, and Pong Evi became a follower

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[15] With its large increase in Pentecostal followers, the town of Rantepao is an exception in the northern area of Tana Toraja.

[16] These seven churches are the GPDI (Gereja Penta Kosta Di Indonesia), GKI (Gereja Kema Inyil), GPSDI (Gereja Penta Kosta Serikat Di Indonesia), KIBAID (Kerapatan Inyil Bangsa Indonesia), GPT (Gereja Penta Kosta Tabernakel), GT (Gereja Toraja) and GK (Gereja Katolik).

of the Torajan Church like his wife. The importance of the church in the social life of Palipu', and to a lesser extent in Kondo', can be seen in the emergence of a new type of community alongside the *tongkonan*.

Conclusions

This chapter has shown how the social order in Tana Toraja is pervaded by the *tongkonan*. Social stratification largely coincides with the stratification of the *tongkonan*. The distinction between various *tongkonan* in turn is based on differences in *siri'*. The social order is not a stable or fixed hierarchy but continuously needs to be re-established through displays of wealth, status and power. Or, in other words, 'distinction needs to be maintained through displays'. This competition takes place between *tongkonan* rather than on an individual level. Although leaving some room to manoeuvre for the middle classes, especially in the north of Tana Toraja, for the lowest and slave classes the system provides hardly any means for an individual to break through class barriers.

Social stratification is important for the way people make a living. Hierarchy leads to distinctions in Bourdieu's sense of the word, and this again leads to displays of conspicuous consumption. People are either born into a particular *tongkonan*, or they have specific relationships with a *tongkonan* through ancestors or marriage. While the *tongkonan* is the only vehicle through which people are able to advance upward in this hierarchy, the main objective of Torajans is to distinguish themselves, and their *tongkonan*, above others and so increase their *siri'*. It is important to exclude as many people as possible from membership in one's high-status *tongkonan* and for the individual to make sure that he or she becomes successful within that *tongkonan*.

To summarize, enhancing the *siri'* of individuals and *tongkonan* is the ultimate goal of many Torajans and is more important than food or drink. However, when one achieves the *siri'* desired, the food and drink will come automatically. People are clearly investing enormous sums of money in ceremonies, and there must be a reason for this—namely, the creation of siri' and networks through which they can accumulate even more wealth and in turn *siri'*. This constitutes a kind of vicious circle: through *siri'* Torajans obtain more wealth and power, and through increased wealth and power they obtain more *siri'*.

Although this circular relationship between *siri'* and prestige on the one hand and power and wealth on the other has led to an enormous increase

in extravagant ceremonies, not every Torajan is able or willing to join in. Often such abstainers from the custom avoid any further involvement through migration and give up most of their contacts with the heartland. Others have turned to Pentecostalism as an alternative way of life, one that does not allow participation in certain traditional funeral rituals, such as the slaughtering of animals at ceremonies.

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE PATTERNS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY

At the crack of dawn everything is already in full swing in the village of Kondo'. Today is market day in Rantepao, and the villagers are preparing themselves for the short ride to the commercial centre of Tana Toraja to sell their fresh products, to run some errands and to hear the latest news, including that about upcoming ceremonies. Pasar Bolu, as it is called, is located a few kilometres north of the town on the banks of the Sa'dan river, and it is the largest market in the highlands. The market space is a loose arrangement of various covered sections of vendor stalls which extend into the surrounding streets.

Small minibuses (*bemos*) loaded with pigs, vegetables, maize, sacks of coffee beans and rice arrive in the market streets. A couple of young Torajan men return by motorcycle from the harbour of Palopo where they have bought fish, now in two large bamboo baskets hanging on each side of the saddle, ready for sale. Hundreds of *becak* drivers (pedicabs), *bemo* chauffeurs and *ojeks* (motorcycle taxis) move haphazardly dropping off their passengers. In the midst of this chaotic traffic, women carrying large baskets of vegetables and fruit on their backs, plod forward in search of a spot to put down their merchandise. Men are loaded with bundles of colourful bags, hand carvings and hand-forged knives, or lug fresh palm wine in plastic jerrycans. While the stationary traders spread out their food, household items, hardware or clothes on a mat or in a basket, food vendors are pushing small stalls along, ready to serve those who did not have breakfast before leaving home. Some villagers are attempting to lead their buffalo through the crowd to the livestock section, the largest market of its kind in Tana Toraja. Hundreds of buffalo are offered to prospective buyers, but ordinary market visitors also try to get a glimpse of these prestigeous animals. In March 2003, the most expensive bull ever sold for Rp 90 million. From the neighbouring section comes the penetrating sound of screaming pigs that lie on their sides, trussed up on bamboo stretchers in neatly arranged rows. The pig department is bustling with vendors, buyers and porters that carry the pigs to and from the *bemos*. The smaller pigs are carried in wheelbarrows and the larger pigs hang from stout bamboo poles. Before noon, many visitors are already returning home, and in a couple of hours the market space is quiet again.

This lively and picturesque scene, in which I was involved for several times, can be observed weekly on market days and does not seem to have suffered from Indonesia's economic crisis. Although Pasar Bolu is at the

heart of a large network of markets spread all over the highlands, it is not very exceptional, and at most markets there is no obvious sign of diminishing economic activity. However, to interpret the Torajans' economic situation solely in terms of trade and markets would produce a simplified portrayal of a predominantly agricultural economy and thereby reproduce popular dichotomies of a traditional versus modern dualism that 'shares the problem of stereotyping, and underestimates the diversity, complexity and productivity of upland farming systems' (Murray Li 1999:28). In order to show the breadth of the Torajan economy, we have to bring the various economic spheres—production, distribution and consumption—within a single field of vision. In so doing one has to take into account the historical processes that have informed both the differences and the similarities in the economic life of Torajan villagers. Consequently, the first section of this chapter provides a broad historical overview of the regional Torajan economy.

Against this background, I consider the various economic spheres of the research villages in the subsequent section. The discussion about production and distribution follows Murray Li's analysis that pays equal attention: (1) to the 'significant middle ground' of rural economies, namely

Ill. 7.1. Pasar Bolu the buffalo market in Tana Toraja (photo by Wim Jakobs).

'*tegal*, dryland, tree grove/swidden combinations, commercial crops on smallholdings or in fallows, and farming strategies which include both upland and *sawah* components'; (2) to seasonal combinations that include fishing or waged labour and 'many other livelihood options that upland people have identified and pursued'; (3) and to combinations of farm and non-farm components that can include migrants and their remittances. By taking into account the whole plethora of income activities that Torajan villagers have at their disposal, an attempt is made to show diversity, complexity and productivity. Even covering these income activities will not explain much without an understanding of the expenditure patterns of households; these will be outlined in the penultimate section.

I began this study with the assumption that an apparent paradox existed between the sizes and costs of ceremonial activities, that have increased while the value of money fell and living costs that have increased because of the national economic crisis. The question that then arose is, 'What are the real effects of the economic crisis on people's living standard, and how do Torajans still find the money in 'times of crisis' to contribute to the extravagant ceremonies?' To overcome the problem of time limitations that prevent me from completing a pre- and post-crisis study of people's incomes and expenditures, which would help in analyzing the actual effects on people's livelihoods, I base the last section on case studies and oral histories that provide insights into the dynamics of people's economic activities.

Economic Development in Tana Toraja: Booms and Busts

Before turning to the village economies of Palipu' and Kondo', I begin with the historical conditions under which the economy developed in Tana Toraja as a whole. As in many other regions of Indonesia,[1] the penetration of the market into the Torajan village economy was neither an 'abrupt development brought about by the modern agricultural technologies of the 1970s nor a linear progressive' trend that took off following the early years of colonial interference (Hüsken 1989:303). Rather, agricultural commercialization, proletarianization and migration of the Torajan population, and cultural commodification, entered Tana Toraja cyclically; the course and pace were determined by nationally and internationally

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[1] On Indonesian upland societies, see for example the contributions of White and Hüsken on rural Java in Hart et al. 1989; Murray Li 1999:5.

changing conditions and the way in which local agents responded to these changes. The manner in which the recent economic crisis is experienced locally and the way this works out in the context of everyday lives and practices, can only be understood if it is seen as a product of these complex historical economic cycles.[2] As in Chapter 4, this section develops chronologically and is divided into the same four historical periods that have been prominent in Tana Toraja previously noted: pre-colonial; colonial; post-colonial; and post-1998 (or the economic crisis period). Since the history of migration has already been extensively discussed in Chapter 3, that topic will be largely omitted from this historical overview.

Early Economy of the Highlands

For generations, as with all spheres of life in the Sa'dan highlands, the economy was organized around the *tongkonan*. These '*tongkonan* economies' were not only designed to assure the survival of its members but also production of a surplus needed for the performance of a complex cycle of rituals. In principle, the land and other resources that surround a *tongkonan* were communally owned. Members that wanted to establish their own *tongkonan* were pushed into uninhabited areas where they had to open up new agricultural land. Through this practice, Torajans moved out from the major fertile valleys to the smaller and drier knolls and steeper hillsides. In this early pre-colonial time, Torajans lived from the cultivation of rice, maize, cassava and other tubers. Rice played a major role in rituals and was mainly consumed during ceremonial activities and for daily consumption only by people from the highest social class. Rice was grown on irrigated fields laid out in the flat bottoms of the valleys and on some terraced mountain slopes. The diet of the less well-off mainly consisted of maize and cassava that were widely grown on upland dry lands (Kis-Jovak et al. 1988:14). The leaves of the cassava plant were 'cooked and used for pig vegetables' (Bigalke 1981:11). Animal husbandry of pigs, buffalo and chickens constituted another important livelihood activity. Buffalo and pigs were the most popular animal stocks as they were status symbols to be sacrificed in large numbers at ceremonies. For this reason, buffalo were rarely used to perform agricultural work.

Although there is some basis for suggesting that coffee had already been introduced into the Sa'dan highlands around the seventh or eighteenth century, it was not until the 1870s that substantial production

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[2] This chapter is partly based on an earlier article on Torajan livelihoods and resource allocations (De Jong, 2008b).

started.[3] At this time, world market prices for coffee quadrupled, and the increasing demand from lowland traders encouraged various Torajans to cultivate coffee in the upland regions (Nooy-Palm 2003:87). It is not clear whether a market system existed as an economic institution before this trading stimulus. However, by the late nineteenth century, the Torajan market system was 'in keeping with the new demands for collection and distribution of goods' (Bigalke 1981:39). In this period, a large network of interlocking circles that each comprised six markets had developed in the highlands. In practice, this meant that markets returned to the same place every seventh day. In an account of his visit to the Sa'dan highlands in 1902, Van Rijn reported that markets were well attended by Torajans, many of whom walked for two hours or more to get there. Lowlanders came to these markets to trade coffee in return for cotton (cloth). According to Van Rijn, coffee brought some prosperity to the population of the Sa'dan highlands. He also argued that the slave trade went on freely, given the fact that children were offered for sale each market day. 'They showed me a young boy for whom the owner, also Torajan, asked 10 Rijksdaalders [25 guilders or about 13 US dollars]; the child clearly had not been fed for many days and looked so miserable and weakened that death would have brought liberation within a few days' (Van Rijn 1902:7). Children around the age of six were especially popular among Bugis traders because they did not try to run away as did their elders.

As noted in Chapters 3 and 4, slavery had existed in the highlands for centuries. However, the growing networks of trade that linked the highlands and lowlands in the nineteenth century 'largely in response to the world rise in coffee prices and the proliferation of coffee bushes in the highlands' made highland slaving easier (Bigalke 1981:64). In 1885, the highlands of Tana Toraja became the scene of a struggle between rival groups from neighbouring lowland regions who tried to control the valuable coffee exports. This struggle went on alongside plundering and slave raids by combative expansionist Torajan headmen (Van Lijf 1951:357). When the Dutch came on the scene in 1905, they found a region debilitated through intervening neighbouring rulers and civil wars that had afflicted Tana Toraja for two decades (Van Lijf 1948:534).

The Torajan Economy Under Colonial Rule

The Dutch occupied the region under the pretext of introducing a *Pax Neerlandica*. They ended the wars and slave trading and created

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[3] For a plausible argument that coffee found its way into the highlands well before the nineteenth century, see Bigalke 1981:30–1.

conditions for the introduction of education, health care, Christianity, a centrally organized administration, and a structured import and export trade. Although cash entered the region in the first few years after the Dutch arrival in the highlands, the livelihoods of most Torajans remained largely unchanged.[4] The latter half of the 1910s marked the beginning of a long period of economic booms and busts. A lingering drought was followed by a series of poor rice crops in 1916, 1917 and 1918, while the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918 and 1919 killed 10 per cent of the population in the divisions of Makale and Rantepao (Bigalke 1981:254). 'Normal conditions' returned in Tana Toraja at the end of the 1910s, and in 1920 and 1921 the Torajans were blessed with exceptional rice harvests (Alle den Volcke 1923a:89). However, in 1922 the economy took a turn for the worse for the second time within less than four years. Some villages lost their entire crop to the rice pest *pasian*, a rice mould that prevents the formation of the grain. Together with a plague of mice that devoured more of the crop, Tana Toraja faced a serious rice shortage that year. A cattle disease that was possibly even more disastrous devastated the most valued of the Torajan possessions, the buffalo, in the same year. Exporting the buffalo hides helped those who had lost their animals to minimize, to some extent, their financial losses (Alle den Volcke 1923b:31). In the following year, drought once again caused great damage to the rice crop (Alle den Volcke 1923c:102). These disasters made people look for causes, and they usually attributed them to individual and corporate violations of taboos.

Relative prosperity returned in 1925 and persisted until the Great Depression affected Tana Toraja in the mid-1930s. Food such as rice, maize, cassava, leaf vegetables, bananas, coconuts and peanuts were amply available, and a large proportion of the rice harvest was even exchanged for money on the local market. A considerable volume of potatoes was grown for export to neighbouring regions but not for home consumption (Lafeber 1925:7).[5] In 1928, coffee prices were high and centres of coffee production were booming. 'Hundreds of persons owned horses…and expenditures on gambling, cock-fights, and death feasts were reportedly lavish' (Bigalke 1981:254). However, sacrificial feasts, which devoured large quantities of buffalo, pigs, chicken and rice, the custom of maintaining a large number of followers, and the passion for gambling prevented the formation of

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[4] The coffee trade was mostly based on an exchange of Torajan coffee for weapons, necessities, or gadgets; cash was rarely used in this pre-colonial exchange network.

[5] A.C. Lafeber, Militaire memorie van het landschap Makelé, 1925, p. 7, in: Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Ministerie van Koloniën: Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39 inventarisnummer 294.

sizeable capital holdings (Nobele 1926:96). As most land was controlled by large landowners from the highest class, common people and slaves had no opportunity to share in the benefits of the boom years in the late-1920s and early 30s, and many Torajans left the relatively densely populated highlands to places all over Sulawesi to find employment (Van den End 1985:288). The Dutch encouraged the extension and intensification of the growing of rice and cash crops in Tana Toraja, but sizable plantations like those in Java or Sumatra never developed. The Dutch administration introduced head taxes and laid claim to labour service for large public works. Ne'Bado, an elderly woman from Palipu' recalled:

> When the Dutch were in Toraja, every person had to pay a tax called 'Sima Ulu'...each year, even the ones married had to pay an individual sum. During this time, little money was circulating, only coins. To pay the tax sometimes we had to sell chickens or we even gave chickens as barter. The tax collector was from Palipu' and if we couldn't pay the tax one year we had to pay the double amount next year.

The increased need for cash made many Torajans, who had formerly worked unpaid or as slaves, leave their homeland. As the Great Depression settled over Tana Toraja, the bottom dropped out of the coffee market, and the cash crunch became even more severe in the late 1930s (Bigalke 1981:254). With coffee prices low, Torajans struggled to come up with cash to pay taxes. The reliance on an economy increasingly dependent on exports had made Torajans more vulnerable to fluctuations in world demand. Further, in most villages, rice harvests failed for several years in a row, and people started to migrate on a large scale (see Chapter 3).

Even though coffee plantations were largely abandoned during the Depression, 5.2 million coffee trees were back in production in the years leading up to the Japanese intrusion into the highlands in 1942.[6] During the years of Japanese occupation, coffee bushes were once again neglected and, by 1946, approximately half of the trees had died, and only one-third of the remaining trees were in production. The Japanese did not drink coffee, and exports were frozen completely. In the period between 1942 and 1945, Torajans had to cope with many difficulties: the Japanese took cattle to feed their troops and prevented the import of buffalo from other areas into Sulawesi; rice became scarce and the stock of pigs shrank quickly; many Torajans were forced to work in the lowlands and died of

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[6] A. Dirks, Memorie van Overgave van de afdeling Loewoe, 1938, p. 24, in: Nationaal Archief, Ministerie van Koloniën, Memories van Overgave, 1852–1962, nummer toegang 2.10.39, inventarisnummer 1162; Van Lijf 1947:67.

malnutrition and bad treatment. Thousands of others returned to their highland villages infected with malaria (Van Lijf 1951:259). 'The most difficult thing I remember', a villager from Palipu' remarked, 'was to find clothes. In that time we started to weave with threads made of pineapple leaves.' Ne'Payung, now in her nineties and living in Kondo', recalled the Japanese occupation:

> During that time, there was a food shortage and it was very difficult to buy food. Nothing was like in the Dutch period. Many villagers only ate cassava and were hungry all the time. We didn't have any clothes, and everything was too expensive to buy. Compulsory work for the Japanese was much harder than under the Dutch regime. Some villagers had to build houses for the Japanese, work on roads, and so on. Because life was so difficult, the Torajan word for difficulty or hardship, *maparri'*, became synonymous with food and clothes.

In the early years of Indonesian independence, the Torajan economy needed time to recover from the problems created during the Japanese occupation. The local market was suffering from shortages of rice, salt and textiles, which pushed prices up (Bigalke 1981:356). Meat and palm oil were also too expensive for most Torajans, and they had to live on only cassava and maize, leaving many of them malnourished. The '[e]conomic problems were accentuated by the collapse of coffee production' (Bigalke 1981:357) and Tana Toraja found itself again in a crisis situation.

By the middle of the twentieth century, little had really changed in the way that Torajans supported themselves (except for a small number of civil servants, church officials and school teachers). The rotating weekly markets continued in much the same way. The two Torajan villages of Rantepao and Makale had developed into typical Indonesian towns.[7] Rantepao had even become a significant marketplace but most of the trade was controlled by outsiders, such as the Chinese and Bugis (Van Lijf 1953:254). Only a minority of the Torajans managed to set up little shops or make use of a truck, bus or taxi.

Economic Transition: Steady Growth and Commercialization

Given the political turmoil in South Sulawesi, the Torajan economy became fairly isolated until 1965 when Suharto's 'New Order' army defeated both Kahar Muhzakkar's troops and the Torajan Communists. The onset

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[7] A typical Indonesian town includes some government offices, schools, mosques and churches, shops and a central market place.

of the 'New Order' period (1966–1998) marked a rapid transition in the highlands. 'The coming of the Dutch, the Japanese occupation, the call for Indonesian independence and the subsequent political unrest all had their effect, and the population has had to live through all these within three-quarters of a century' (Kis-Jovak et al. 1988). It was, however, the enormous increase in out-migration and the consequent remittances from the migrants, the proletarianization of the population, the introduction of tourism into the highlands, and the introduction of several high-yielding cash crops that really touched upon all aspects of Torajan life. Since the 1970s, village economies have started to open up. Many economic activities that still largely revolved around subsistence and barter now became cash-based activities.

Nooy-Palm (1979a:12) had already observed in 1970 that tourism in Tana Toraja was burgeoning. Thus, only a few years after the Indonesian government had issued its second Five-Year Plan in 1974, which stimulated the development of tourism in 'Outer Island' destinations, the tourist industry in the Torajan highlands was already booming. 'Whether it was the tourism promotion by the Indonesian government or a BBC television documentary in 1972, showing a Torajan funeral ritual, that led to the tourist boom is uncertain but the documentary certainly helped to lure foreign visitors to the Torajan highlands' (Adams 1998:81). The unique character and beauty of the landscape, the colourful and dramatic ceremonies of the Torajans, together with a pleasant temperature all year round, hold much appeal for tourists. Since then, the number of tourists in Tana Toraja has been growing steadily. Hotel registration figures show that in 1996 over 58,000 international and 218,000 domestic tourists visited Tana Toraja.[8] Next to migration, tourism offered Torajan people another non-agricultural alternative to the narrow range of available government and commercial positions (Morrell 2001). It has provided opportunities for some Torajans to invest in hotels or restaurants. Others found employment as drivers, guides, servants or cooks. Moreover, some farmers benefited from the sale of vegetables, eggs, poultry, handicrafts and even entrance tickets for tourist attractions located in their village.

Regardless of the benefits that tourism has brought to some people of Tana Toraja, most Torajans believe that the bulk of profits derived from

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[8] BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 1996. This official number is probably a bit on the high side because it also includes Indonesian guests, such as traders, politicians and NGO members attending conferences and workshops, as well as occasional Torajan migrants with their families who may prefer to stay in hotels while taking part in ritual activities.

tourism goes to non-Torajan tour companies based in Jakarta, Bali and Makassar who have their agents and facilities in the capital of South Sulawesi (Crystal 1989:159). Despite the non-Torajan domination of the tourist market, some people, especially in and around the town of Rantepao, have a sizeable stake in this industry. Although reliable studies on the influence of tourism on the Torajan livelihood are lacking, it is argued that tourism has had little impact on most of the 75 per cent of the Torajan population who subsist as village farmers. According to Crystal, only those villagers involved in the production of handicrafts for sale in Rantepao and Makale have profited from the explosion of tourist arrivals. Further, these handicrafts are largely produced in one village, La'bo.

While little had changed in the Torajan agriculture since the nineteenth century, in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s the agricultural world was shaken up.[9] Rice was still the preferred Torajan staple but, except for a few large landholders, most people did not own enough land to provide themselves with rice all year round, and they had to buy some rice and supplement their diet with other crops grown in their garden. Contrary to what the lush green landscape and rice-field-covered mountains might suggest, most of the soil in the region was infertile or poorly suited to cultivation (Nooy-Palm 1979a:13). In the 1970s, national policymakers introduced agricultural programmes and economic policies aimed at making Indonesia self-sufficient in rice. The introduction of 'high yield variety' seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, technical assistance and improvements to irrigation systems by the Indonesian government in the 1970s increased the yearly production of rice. Many Torajan farmers reaped the benefits of these policies, and by the late 1970s some even started to harvest a second rice crop each year. Although it was formerly forbidden to plant rice on dry fields, this 'ban' had gradually been relaxed. With some exceptions, the development of irrigation works lagged behind, so that the success or failure of the harvest (or double cropping) for the majority of the rice farmers still depended on the amount of annual rainfall (Nooy-Palm 1979a:19).

In the late 1970s, the government introduced the cultivation of cloves to the highlands of Tana Toraja as a second cash crop alongside coffee. At that time, Torajan farmers also started to pay greater attention to the cultivation of fruit and vegetables because of an increased demand from the growing number of tourists and people working at the mining centres in

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[9] In the 1970s, 90 per cent of the population in Tana Toraja was still involved in agriculture (Nooy-Palm 1979b:12). The remainder were civil servants, teachers or church officials.

the neighbouring district of Luwu (Nooy-Palm 1979b:22). In the 1980s, pepper was launched by government officials as a third cash crop, but it was never grown on a large scale. By the end of that decade, cocoa appeared much more promising in the Torajan highlands and even partly displaced coffee and traditional rice farming (Potter 2000:249). Although government extension or support was lacking, the rumours of large profits induced people to plant cocoa. While cocoa trees did not yield as high an output as coffee, and prices per kilogram were lower, cocoa cultivation was much easier. In the mid-1990s, vanilla was privately brought into the highlands and became another popular cash crop, but it is grown on a much smaller scale than cocoa. Based on the information from local vanilla planters, the vanilla plant yields pods after two or three years, but it usually dies after three harvesting years. Further, the plants are quite vulnerable to pests and disease and need constant care. As of 1996, coffee was still, by far, the most widely cultivated crop.[10]

Developments in the New Order period thus dramatically altered the foundations of the regional economy. A new rice variety was introduced in the 1970s that enabled double cropping. Mechanization made it possible to prepare larger plots of land in a shorter time, while the use of pesticides with the improved varieties greatly reduced losses and fluctuations in harvests.[11] On the other hand, these new techniques required larger investments, which acted as constraints on the lower-income earners (if they possessed rice fields at all). Together with the increasing popularity of wage labour, this turned the traditional farming system upside down. Former farmer groups, based on reciprocity, largely dissolved, and patron-client relations loosened or strengthened. The introduction of cloves, pepper, cocoa and vanilla made some farmers less vulnerable to fluctuations in coffee prices on the world market. The introduction of new cash crops also provided poor farmers and former slaves who owned no *sawah* the possibility of obtaining some cash from farming, thereby making them less dependent on patrons. However, most of these lacked the land or capital to farm on a large scale. For this group, livestock raising, petty trade, or migration (or remittances from other family members) seemed to be a better option.

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[10] In 1996 13,033 hectares were planted with coffee yielding 5,078 tons of coffee; 3,037 ha with cloves (110 tons); 904 ha with cocoa (733 tons); 277 ha with vanilla (57 ton); and 33 ha with pepper (8 tons) (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 1996).
[11] In 1970 the rice harvest yielded 40,000 tons (Nooy-Palm 1979a:12), while the rice harvested by 1996 amounted 133,559 tons (BPS 1996), which is more than a threefold increase.

In addition to agriculture, animal husbandry and tourism, by 1996 some 10 per cent of the population found jobs as civil servants, school teachers, church officials and businessmen. Similar to the tourist industry, local shops and the supply industry were still largely dominated by the Chinese and lowlanders (primarily Bugis). Local industry and manufacturing had remained fairly small-scale and only contributed in limited ways to the wealth of the area. Some small home industries (for instance the production of handicrafts in mountain villages) existed in Tana Toraja, but in general the only medium-scale industry in the region was to be found in Rantepao and Makale. The narrow range of jobs outside agriculture, a shortage of agricultural land, limited opportunities for higher education, a constraining social class system, and expensive funeral and house-building ceremonies encouraged the mass migration of Torajans to other regions in Indonesia and beyond (see Chapter 3). As a consequence, the flow of remittances into Tana Toraja became the largest source of income for the region.

Economic Fluctuations in Tana Toraja 1997–2003

After more than three decades of steady growth under the Suharto regime, Tana Toraja entered a rapid transitional period in the late 1990s. Regional economic conditions had been affected by the national economic crisis and, in 1998, the growth rate of the Gross Regional Product (GRP) had dropped dramatically from 9.12 per cent in 1996 to minus 3.38 per cent (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2000b:12). By 1999, Tana Toraja was recovering from the economic downturn, and the growth rate of the regency rose slightly again, reaching 4 per cent in 2001 (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2004a). However, in 2003 it slipped back once more to 2.29 per cent and to date the high growth rates of the early and mid-1990s have not been repeated.

Tana Toraja's large involvement in cash crop cultivation meant that its economy was not hit as hard as were other areas of Indonesia.[12] Owing to higher world market prices and a lower *rupiah*, resulting from the Indonesian economic and financial crisis, the *rupiah* prices of coffee (Robusta and Arabica), cocoa and cloves had skyrocketed by July 1997. By mid-1998 the prices of these crops in Tana Toraja had more than tripled

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[12] Indonesia's Gross Domestic Product shrank in 1998 by 14 per cent (Gérard and Ruf 2001:3).

since January 1997.[13] Since 1999, prices of coffee Robusta and cloves, however, dropped almost back to pre-crisis levels by the end of 2000. Thanks to its high quality, the price of Arabica (at least the Torajan variety) appeared to be more stable and less prone to fluctuations than the Robusta variety. As of 2002, the price of one kilogram of Arabica was still worth twice what it was before the impressive price increases of 1997. The price of cocoa also remained fairly stable until the beginning of 2003, when it collapsed completely. After the hefty price fluctuations of coffee, cocoa and cloves came more or less to a standstill, vanilla prices started to rise dramatically in 2002. In 2003, one kilogram of wet vanilla yielded as much as Rp 250 thousand at the local market in Tana Toraja.

Alongside the price increases for cash crops in the initial phase of the Indonesian crisis, inflation of the *rupiah* pushed up the costs of daily necessities such as food, toiletries, electricity, fuel, medicines and education. Imported products such as pesticides, fertilizers, machines and luxury goods became even more expensive. Following the national trend, the inflation rate in South Sulawesi province reached 80 per cent in 1998, compared to just 4.56 per cent in 1996 (BPS Propinsi Sulawesi Selatan 2000). The inflation ceased in 1999 and has more or less stabilized in the years thereafter.

In addition to fluctuating profits for cash crops and costs of daily necessities, the once-thriving tourist industry in Tana Toraja collapsed completely. When violent conflicts spread throughout Indonesia in 1998 and 1999, tourists began to stay away, and the number of people visiting the area dropped from a peak of 280,000 a year to about 25,000 in 2001. In 2002 it seemed that tourists were regaining confidence in Indonesia and starting to return to Tana Toraja. However, the bomb blast in Bali in October 2002 was a deathblow for Tana Toraja's already crumbling tourist industry.

Meanwhile, thousands of Torajans were returning from conflict areas such as Poso, East-Timor, the Moluccas, Aceh and Kalimantan (Sambas) to the relatively safe haven of Tana Toraja.[14] In 2002, many migrants also returned from Malaysia after the Malaysian government introduced stiff

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[13]   The contribution of cash crops to the General Regional Product (GRP) of Tana Toraja more than doubled from 9.95 per cent in 1996 to 19.73 per cent in 1998 (BPS Tana Toraja 2000b). The increase in the contribution of agriculture to the RBP of Tana Toraja (52.46 per cent in 1996 to 62.23 per cent in 1998) seemed to be entirely due to the increasing production of cash crops and the rising market prices for these crops.

[14]   By 2002, as many as 7,588 Torajans had registered themselves as return migrants (Dinas Kependudukan dan Tenaga Kerja Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2001/2002).

measures to stem the flow of illegal immigrants. According to local records, only 391 migrants returned as a result of the Malaysian crackdown, but in reality the numbers are much higher.[15] As one Torajan official explained, 'It is difficult to get accurate data on the number of migrants who returned to Tana Toraja. Torajan people always feel embarrassed if they return to Tana Toraja after failing to succeed where they had migrated to. They do not want to register because they do not want other people to know about their failure.'

Village Economies in the Early Twenty-First Century

After this outline of the regional historical processes, I will now sharpen the focus somewhat and look at the way in which these processes have constituted both differences and similarities in the economic lives of Torajans in the villages. Identifying and interpreting the plethora of income activities, costs of living, consumption patterns, resource allocation and distribution, and the way in which all these aspects are managed within the household, creates a basis for determining the way in which the recent economic crisis is experienced locally. These experiences, and the way these developed in the context of everyday lives and practices, are discussed in the next section.

Gross Village Cash Incomes

The data from Palipu' and Kondo' show that almost all households (99 per cent) were involved in the agricultural cycle in some way or another (see Table 7.1). Likewise, livestock breeding was also found to be prevalent. Crop and livestock production feature alongside several non-agricultural contributions to a household's wellbeing. Whereas diversification of local activities and income sources has become the norm, about half of the households have even spread their activities over two or more locations through migration. In this section, specific attention is paid to local productive livelihood practices; in other words, all that household members undertake to earn an income or create outputs that can be used directly by the household (Ashley et al. 2003), as opposed to reproductive (domestic)

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[15] I came across dozens of migrants who returned from Malaysia and told me that they did not register at the office of Population and Labour out of shame, or just because they did not expect the government to help them.

practices. Although certain income activities are typically gender related, in most households both sexes generate incomes in cash or in kind.

Apart from market days, church services, feasts and ceremonies, everyday life in Palipu' and Kondo' is generally governed by the seasons. Because of the seasonal and fluctuating character of most income activities, it is difficult to obtain exact data on incomes. Nevertheless, most villagers were able to give a broad indication of their household's income over the past year, sufficient to provide a picture of income divisions and differences.[16] The data in Figure 7.1 show the contribution (in percentages) of each local income activity toward the total cash earned in Palipu' and Kondo'. Noteworthy is the fact that the figures for the two villages differ on almost every activity, with the exception of general farm activities (proceeds from growing vegetables, fruit, sweet potatoes or corn, or paid labour on neighbouring farms).

Considering these figures, we can conclude that cash crop cultivation and government employment make up the largest income share in Palipu', whereas Kondo' can be characterized as a livestock-breeding village where rice growing and non-farm activities, such as carpentry and small-scale

Figure 7.1. Total income composites for Palipu' and Kondo'.
Source: Survey conducted in Palipu' and Kondo' in 2003.

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[16] The data from the survey have been cross-checked with information derived from general observations and in-depth interviews.

trading, are equally important. The total annual income earned from local activities in Palipu' is about Rp 290 million and in Kondo' about Rp 385 million. When we take into account the fact that the number of households in Palipu' (181) is much higher than in Kondo' (148), we see that households in the northern village earn far more than households in Palipu'. The average yearly income per household (Rp 1.6 million) in Palipu' is only two-thirds of that in Kondo' (Rp 2.6 million). When we exclude the large amount of money earned by the very few civil officers (10 in Palipu' and 2 in Kondo'), the picture becomes even more disadvantageous for the households in Palipu'. With that calculation, households in Palipu' earn only a little more than a third (Rp 800,000) of households in Kondo' (Rp 2.2 million).

Local Household Income Activities

The rice cultivation process runs through the life of most villagers like a continuous thread and, as a consequence, most livelihood activities are adjusted to it (see Figure 7.2 for the number of households involved in this activity). As rice is currently the main staple in both villages in the case study and important during ceremonial activities, it is generally planted for subsistence purposes. Only when households have a surplus will rice be sold on the markets of Rantepao or Makale. Notwithstanding this important role of rice (culturally and economically), the rocky soil in Palipu' and in Kondo' hinders large-scale rice cultivation and, especially in Palipu', it contributes little to overall income.

The valley floor of Palipu' is covered with 59 hectares of rice fields, which is about 11.4 percent of the total land area (517 ha). Considering that one hectare of wetland in Tana Toraja produces an average of 4,000 kilograms of rice per year (BPS Kabupaten Tana Toraja 2001), each individual would have 260 kilograms of rice at his or her disposal if the harvest were shared equally.[17] Ellis (1990:46) noted that in the late 1980s average rice consumption in Indonesia was 145 kilograms per person. Thus, theoretically, each person in Palipu' would have a surplus of 115 kilograms. In practice, however, the situation appears to be very different. All the major rice fields are owned by a small number of families that make up the highest social stratum of Palipu' society. Further, the rice fields in Palipu' are dependent on rainfall, which makes production unpredictable and

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[17] Theoretically, 59 hectares of wetland yields 236,000 kilograms of rice. Dividing by a population of 905 gives an average of 260 kilograms per person in the village.

Figure 7.2. Number of households involved in specific income-earning activities.
Source: Survey conducted in Palipu' and Kondo' in 2003.

prevents the cultivation of a third or often even a second rice crop in a year. In practice, only 16 per cent of households produce a surplus of rice for sale; the majority have just enough or need to borrow rice from other villagers or buy it at the market.

There is a considerable variation between the quality and size of rice fields. The lowest ones in the valley are the most fertile, often fairly large in size, and all owned by families of the highest social strata. The upland rice plots are much smaller in size, strewn with large rocks and less fertile. These fields are accessible to some families from the lower social echelons of Palipu'. Irrigation of the rice fields comes about through an ingenious and complex system of small canals that runs between the rice fields. Many rice field owners depend upon the responsible water management of other landowners. There is no formal regulation of the irrigation system, yet quarrels appear to be infrequent. One farmer interviewed noted that 'formal regulation for irrigating the fields is lacking, but each landowner, or caretaker, of rice fields understands how to regulate the water in the irrigation canals'.

In spite of the unequal distribution of rice fields, both in quantity and in quality, 44 percent of the households in Palipu' have direct access to these fields through shared tenancy arrangements. In general, three kinds

of shared tenancy arrangements exist in Palipu': (1) the lenders take care of the rice fields and pay for all investments, and 30 to 50 percent of the harvest is transferred to the landowner; (2) both the investments and the harvest is shared equally by the landowner and land user; or (3) the rice field is worked by several people who receive 30 to 50 percent of the harvest, and the landowner is responsible for the necessary investments. Additionally, the pawning of rice fields, in return for their value in buffalo, is a common manoeuvre often undertaken in the event of an upcoming ceremony, or to meet the expenses of their children's education or to secure a position at a government office.

> For instance, Pong Fitri pawned a piece of his rice fields to some rich villagers. The land is worth a certain number of buffalo and the market price for buffalo is what he received. If he wants the rice field back, he needs to return the same number of buffalo (or their future market value) to the mortgagers. He pawned the land because he needed the money to pay the school fees for his son in Makassar. Pong Fitri believes that he will be able to repay his mortgage soon after his son graduates from the police academy and starts to work.

Further, most households in Palipu' have at least access to a share in the rice harvest through different forms of labour arrangements. The rice cultivation process takes about 100 days and involves a series of practices that are quite labour-intensive. The cycle starts with the sowing of the rice seed in small nursery beds. A few days later, the rice fields are cleared of weeds, the dykes and irrigation system are reconditioned, and the fields are filled with water. After a month, the water will be drained out and the fields ploughed. Dykes are cleared of weeds, and the bottom of the field is flattened. The fields are re-flooded and are then ready for planting. It takes a couple of weeks more before the small lush green rice seedlings from the nursery beds are transplanted to the rice fields. This is the first activity in which women are heavily involved, or more precisely is only carried out by women. After another two months, the rice (*padi*) is fully grown and harvested by both men and women.

   The planting and harvesting periods require a large number of labourers, although the ploughing of the fields also requires considerable labour. A quarter-hectare rice field requires about 30 to 40 people for two days in both the planting and harvesting seasons. Throughout Tana Toraja, rice field labour is still largely paid for by a share in the harvest. What does differ by region, or even by village, is the percentage of this payment.

> Papi Legi owns a couple of rice fields that are considerably larger than the average in the village of Palipu'. In a good year, he has a rice harvest of six to

Ill. 7.2. Torajans planting rice (photo by Wim Jakobs).

Ill. 7.3. Taking a break from rice planting (photo by Wim Jakobs).

eight sacks (*karung*), which equals about 600 to 800 litres of rice. His family uses about two litres of rice per day; therefore the harvest is hardly enough to meet household consumption needs. Papa Legi calls in the help of some neighbours and friends for ploughing, planting, and harvesting. The fields are ploughed by hand, because the terraces are too small for a mechanical tractor. He pays the labourers at harvest time according to the general regulations in Palipu'. For ploughing, labourers obtain 7 to 8 litres of rice per day, for planting 4 to 5 litres, and for harvesting 2 litres out of every 10 litres harvested. He further has to provide one meal, cigarettes, coffee and palm wine to the labourers each working day. Papa Legi himself works on other people's rice fields, where he receives the same kind of payment. He generally works for around ten days per rice cycle on the fields of others, and, if they have a good year, there might even be two rice harvests.

Given that this household, which owns a fair amount of land by Palipu' standards, has problems meeting its consumption needs, it is not hard to understand that it must be difficult for landless villagers to make ends meet, even if they receive rice as wages-in-kind. Therefore, many households in Palipu' grow cassava (48 per cent), maize (12 per cent), and/or sweet potatoes (45 per cent) to supplement their rice diet. Most also grow vegetables, fruits and chillies for home consumption. Some vegetables, such as tomatoes and onions, are sold on the market (by 12 per cent of households). In contrast to rice fields, which are symbolically important and inextricably linked to *tongkonan*, dry land (*tegal*) is less valuable and every household in Palipu' has access to some *tegal* through direct ownership or on loan from their patron.

   Some pieces of dry land are very small and located near to the house or carved out on steep slopes, while others are rather large and often used for cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, vanilla or cloves. Robusta coffee is the most popular crop grown on *tegal*. Whereas in the 1960s only a few coffee trees could be found in the village, now 71 per cent of households in Palipu' cultivate coffee. However, the crop is generally used for subsistence purposes, and only 6 per cent of households earn money from the sale of it.[18] More lucrative is the cultivation of vanilla and cocoa. When vanilla prices rocketed (following world market prices) in 2001, vanilla soon became a desirable crop in Palipu'. Some households in Palipu' earned as much as Rp 5 million at the market for their vanilla harvest in 2002. Triggered by these promising profits, 59 per cent of Palipu's households started to grow vanilla. However, vanilla vines need special care, and not everyone has the

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[18]   The average income from coffee is Rp 114,000, ranging from Rp 5,000 to 500,000.

knowledge or skills to grow them successfully. Only 22 per cent of the vanilla growers actually netted a profit out of this activity in 2002. Cocoa is a different story. Cocoa has been grown in Palipu' since the early 1990s, and currently 67 per cent of households are growing it. Unfortunately, since 2001 Palipu' has been hit by an epidemic that has affected most of the cocoa trees in the village. Although the fruits look healthy from the outside, the cocoa beans inside are rotten, and because of this only 19 per cent of the households in Palipu' managed to earn any income from this activity. Along with dry land and rice fields, several households also possess some groves with various kinds of trees and bamboo. Some of these groves are close to the houses and consist of just a few trees, while others are much further away and much larger. About eight households in Palipu' possess some Palmyra palm trees from which they extract palm wine.

Although agriculture is by far the most important source of income in Palipu', livestock breeding and poultry add significantly to household income and constitute a fallback position in times of distress (see Table 7.1 for the number of livestock owned in the villages). Every household in Palipu' raises at least some livestock, such as pigs (92 per cent of households), chickens (85 per cent) and buffalo (9 per cent).

In addition to providing income and security, livestock constitutes a future investment for gifts for funerals, *tongkonan* and wedding ceremonies. Some people rear cocks for fighting contests (gambling). Since many farmers lack the resources to cover the large initial investments in buffalo and pigs, a sharing arrangement with a livestock owner or trader is not uncommon. Apart from some large landowners who breed fish between the rice cycles in the rice fields, fish breeding is quite rare in Palipu'.

Table 7.1. Number of livestock.

Livestock	Number of animals		Average number of specific animals owned in households	
	Palipu'	Kondo'	Palipu'	Kondo'
Buffalo	14	49	1.1	1.9
Pigs	429	286	3.2	2.9
Chicken	981	1153	7.8	11.5
Goats	22	1	3.7	1.0

Source: Survey conducted in Palipu' and Kondo' in 2003.

Along with agriculture and livestock breeding, Palipu's inhabitants employ several other activities to diversify the household's income. About 17 per cent of the households have at least one member who, on a part-time basis, works as a carpenter, bricklayer, or handicraft producer; depending on the labour demand in or near Palipu'. Four per cent of the households are involved in small-scale trading of livestock and cash crops. A few households (5 per cent) are more fortunate and have a stable monthly income through government employment, and others through government pensions. Surprisingly, these few households bring in about half of the village's total income. On average, these households receive more than Rp 10 million annually from the government.

In retrospect, one can confidently state that most households in Palipu' obtain a living through raising pigs or chickens in combination with the cultivation of one or more cash crops, such as coffee (Robusta), cocoa, vanilla and cloves. Less than half of them are involved in rice growing and/or in the cultivation of cassava. Some households have a regular income through government employment, or an irregular income through business, carpentry, craftwork, and so on, which is often on a part-time basis.

Ill. 7.4. Getting back from the land (photo by Wim Jakobs).

In contrast to Palipu', Kondo' is predominantly focussed on rice-growing. While the total area of rice fields (36 ha) is less than that in Palipu', and rice fields only cover 12.4 per cent of the total land area (290 ha), the quality of the soil is much better. The best rice fields, owned by households from the highest social strata, are even irrigated by the Rangri river. These rice fields nowadays generally yield two, and sometimes even three, harvests a year. However, the majority of Kondo's population have to rely on rain fed rice fields, and they are consequently more dependent on the amount of rainfall each year. As in Palipu', the distribution of rice fields, both in quality and quantity, is highly skewed. However, 73 per cent of the village's households are involved in the rice-growing process through share-cropping arrangements; which is far more than in Palipu' (44 per cent). These arrangements are usually based on an equal division of the harvest. Most people in Kondo' do not think about the size of their land and instead think in terms of the number of plots they own or work on. Most villagers retain their land even if they migrate. In return for a share of the harvest or cash, others are usually allowed to work such plots. Rice fields are rarely individually owned but remain the possession of the *tongkonan*. Land division in Kondo' (as in most of Tana Toraja) is highly complicated. Most plots, especially rice fields, are divided at funeral ceremonies among consanguineous relatives of the deceased person. The size of the land they inherit (usage rights) usually depends on the number and value of the buffalo they sacrifice at the ceremony. Because of the many divisions and re-divisions of land, many households possess several small rice plots of different quality at various locations. Each rice plot has a name that usually corresponds to an ancestor's name from an important *tongkonan*. The rice fields usually remain the property or common wealth of the *tongkonan* and are therefore seldom sold. In the past, all rice fields belonged to people from the highest class. A comprehensive land division has never taken place, thus denying most lower status households (usually from the poorer strata) access to rice fields.

Although the most important reasons for growing rice are to meet household consumption needs and supply funeral and house-building ceremonies, 51 per cent of the households in Kondo' make some money out of it. On average, they earn a little over one million *rupiah* (ranging from Rp 50 to Rp 10 million). As in Palipu', the majority of the villagers have access to the rice fields by contributing their labour during the ploughing, planting or harvesting seasons in return for a share of the harvest. However, it is no longer uncommon to pay labourers in cash, especially the ones ploughing the field. These labourers cost around Rp 25,000 a day, plus the

Ill. 7.5.   Cutting sweet potato leafs for the pigs (photo by Wim Jakobs).

food, palm wine and cigarettes that have to be provided by the landowner each working day. The planters (women) earn 3 to 4 litres of rice per day, and those who harvest the rice receive one-third of the total harvest, which has to be shared among them.

While the soil in Kondo' is suited to rice growing, it is less suitable for dry-land farming. Most households grow some cassava (35 per cent), maize (19 per cent), vegetables (46 per cent), fruits (25 per cent) and/or sweet potatoes (95 per cent), but only on a small scale and usually not for the market. The majority grow sweet potatoes to feed to their pigs. With regard to cash crops, the story is not much different; 27 per cent of households own a few coffee, cocoa or clove trees or vanilla vines that produce small quantities of marketable crops. The cultivation of bamboo trees is quite popular (52 per cent of households). One of the major reasons for the large bamboo groves that can be found in Palipu' is its usefulness for constructing the ceremonial fields. There are six households involved in the extraction of palm wine from local trees.

As in Palipu', livestock breeding is a popular enterprise undertaken to raise additional income and savings for times of distress in Kondo', and it is also important for providing gifts for ritual activities. Virtually all the

households in Kondo' raise chickens (98 per cent) and pigs (91 per cent), and a relatively large number also buffalo (24 per cent). Most young men breed cocks, which they train to fight at ceremonies, in gambling dens or at semi-formal gatherings with friends or fellow villagers. The number of households earning an income through livestock raising is similar to that in Palipu'. What differs significantly is the amount of money earned from raising livestock. Whereas households in Palipu' make on average Rp 445,000 through selling livestock, Kondo's households earn on average Rp 2,400,000 per year through breeding livestock. As in Palipu', fish breeding is an uncommon activity and very small-scale.

Fifteen per cent of Kondo's households have a member who contributes to their income through part-time work as a carpenter, bricklayer or handicraft worker, usually in the slack season. One man, for example, earns an additional Rp 100,000 per year by making mortar, another earns a little less through weaving bamboo baskets. Seven per cent of the households are involved in the small-scale trading of livestock. Following the reorganization of the village administration, the village headman and his assistant no longer receive a salary from the government and now rely upon a percentage of the taxes levied at ceremonial activities for the

Ill. 7.6. Making mortars (photo by Wim Jakobs).

Ill. 7.7. Old man making baskets (photo by Wim Jakobs).

slaughtering of buffalo and pigs. Only two households receive some income from government pensions, which is again a rather large proportion of the total village income.

In conclusion, most households in Kondo' are involved in raising chickens or pigs in combination with cultivating rice. Only one-quarter of the

households grow cash crops (mostly cocoa and coffee) and then only on a small scale. Unlike in Palipu', vanilla has hardly entered the farming agenda. A small number of households earn some income through part-time work such as in construction and small-scale business activities.

Spreading Activities beyond the Village Borders

As local employment outside of agriculture is rare in Tana Toraja, and higher education facilities are limited, those in need of a supplementary income or wanting a higher education have little choice than to leave the highlands. Consequently, 30 per cent of the population of Palipu' and 33 per cent of the people of Kondo' have migrated at least semi-permanently to other places in Indonesia or abroad.

Migration in Palipu' started in the 1950s, when some villagers (mostly men) moved to Berau', in the northern part of South Sulawesi, and later to Napu', in Central Sulawesi, to work in the forests for logging companies. Some years later, more and more people (men and women) started to leave for the larger cities of Indonesia, especially to Makassar where they found employment at one of the government offices, as teachers or nurses, in the military or police, at a shop, or to continue their education. Pa'Wanti, who left for Makassar in 1958 following his uncle, mentioned that at that time—

> It took one week to get to Makassar and we drove in a convoy of 40 cars under the guidance of the army against any guerrilla attacks. Especially the first part of the trip from Tana Toraja to Pare Pare was difficult because the road was very bad. It took until the mid-1990s before this road was asphalted. The latter part of the journey, from Pare Pare to Makassar, was already an all-weather road at that time.

In line with the regional trend, in the 1960s and 1970s many villagers followed and spread out all over Indonesia. Today, 35 per cent of migrants have left the island of Sulawesi and are living elsewhere in Indonesia or abroad (2 per cent). The others remain in South Sulawesi, usually in the cities of Makassar and Palopo, or in some transmigrant villages in Luwu. The migrant population left Palipu' for several reasons: 32 per cent left in search of work, 10 per cent to follow higher education, to join their family (29 per cent), to get married (21 per cent), to live independently (5 per cent), or for other reasons (3 per cent). While 14 per cent of the migrants are attending school and 18 per cent are unemployed but looking for work, the vast majority are working as farmers (24 per cent), as housekeepers (10 per cent), as civil officers (8 per cent), or involved in various other jobs, ranging from priest to driver.

The migrant population from Palipu' come from 67 per cent of the households in the village. Of these households, 55 per cent claim to receive remittances at least annually (in the form of goods, cash or both). Money and goods are sent home by post or bank transfer, through family, friends or acquaintances visiting the village, or carried personally by the migrants on a visit home.[19] In particular, those migrants who are living and working outside of Tana Toraja (such as in Luwu, Makassar, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya) send money home to support their household members: for day-to-day existence (71 per cent), for funeral and other ceremonies (16 per cent), or house-building activities (10 per cent). Migrants living in Tana Toraja support their home-households by returning and supplying labour for agricultural and ceremonial activities, or by bringing some food or small amounts of money with them when they return, although these transactions are usually not seen as remittances. Apart from a few extremes, the amounts of the remittances generally range from Rp 500,000 to several millions a year. With an average value of Rp 1.6 million, these contributions are considerable.

In Kondo', the picture is somewhat different from that in Palipu'. People in this northern village are strong supporters of funeral and *tongkonan*-building ceremonies, and their livelihoods are essentially centred on these extraordinary happenings. Given the huge costs of funeral ceremonies, and the few job opportunities in or near the village, 81 per cent of the households in Kondo' have one or more members who have migrated to places beyond Tana Toraja. Of the total migrant population, 47 per cent left the highlands in search of employment. The remainder migrated to pursue higher education (12 per cent), to get married (15 per cent), to follow other family members (13 per cent), to become independent (2 per cent), or for other reasons.

The largest group (34 per cent) have moved to Malaysia (Sabah and Sarawak) and some to other countries such as Singapore and Japan. The Tondon area (including Kondo') is regarded by other Torajans as the source of many of the women working as prostitutes in the larger industrial areas of Malaysia. According to sources both within and beyond the village, Tondon men are often involved in illegal activities (illegal gambling, running brothels, and the like) in the same areas. In other words, the image of Tondon is that of a closed community in which people are willing to forgo

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[19] Migrants regularly visit their homes during holidays (particularly Christmas) and to attend funeral, house-building and wedding ceremonies.

their *siri'* once they leave Tana Toraja in order to earn money and increase their socio-cultural status and *siri'* back home. While the figures from the questionnaires do not really say much about the migrant's 'real' jobs, they do show that many girls left at the age of 12 or 13 to go to Malaysia,[20] and the in-depth interviews with parents and other villagers partly confirm the image of Tondon, or at least the village of Kondo', as an area where girls leave to work in the sex industry of Malaysia.[21]

Some of the girls working in the sex industry left for Malaysia because they are impressed by the wealth obtained by other villagers or family members working in that sector, which they see displayed during funeral ceremonies. When these workers return to Malaysia, other village girls will join them voluntarily, or coerced by their parents who hope their daughter will be able to earn a lot of cash for future necessities, such as a funeral or rebuilding a house. In other cases, girls are recruited by Torajan middle-men under false pretences. These girls are promised a factory job and sometimes even sign a contract, but, upon arrival in Malaysia, they end up in one of the many brothels. According to an informant who explained how this works, 'their documents appear to be incomplete or useless and they have a culture shock because they have come straight from the *kampung* (village). Most of them have rarely left Tana Toraja before, and are used to speaking the Torajan language and having familiar people around them. At least in the initial stage, all these factors give them little other option than to cooperate'. Some of these girls are sent to Kuala Lumpur or Penang in West Malaysia to learn English. Afterwards, they continue on to Singapore, Hongkong or Taiwan. In general, these Torajan girls are from the poorer families and have had little education.

Other villagers have migrated to Kalimantan and Irian Jaya (28 per cent), or stayed closer to home by moving to Luwu or Makassar (6 per cent) or to locations within Tana Toraja itself (28 per cent). As in Palipu', migration became more popular in the 1960s when people migrated to the city of Makassar to continue their education or to the area of Palopo to open up new farmland. Since the 1980s, villagers have started to move to other areas in Indonesia and Malaysia due to the TKI (Tenaga Kerja Indonesia) programme of the Indonesian government, which promoted

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[20] In Palipu', all migrants were over 18 when they left the village.
[21] Although this reputation might have some truth in it, one should be careful about generalizations as I came across many young migrants from Tondon who migrate to continue their education at high schools or university, or who are working in legal and highly respectable businesses.

international migration. Today, most migrants to Malaysia leave in the same way as do the girls that end up in the sex industry. They either join a family member or are recruited by middlemen to work in a factory or mining company, but they will never go without any 'guarantee' of work or knowing someone at the place of migration. Due to the stricter immigration regulations imposed by the Malaysian government, nowadays most villagers migrate illegally to Malaysia.

Seventy-nine per cent of all households with migrant members in Kondo' reported receiving remittances on a more or less regular basis. Most migrants who send money home do this to support their family in buying the daily necessities (77 per cent), for funeral and other ceremonies (65 per cent) and for house building and repairs (16 per cent). The vast majority of the remittance money is for specific ceremonial activities. Accordingly, the amounts of money sent home are generally much higher than in Palipu' but also less frequent. It is not uncommon for households in Kondo' with Malaysian migrants to receive Rp 10 to 15 million at a time. Migrants working in Indonesia usually send less, but they still send considerable sums of money, ranging from Rp 500,000 to several million a year. The importance of migration in raising the economic standards of many households in Kondo' is made clear by a man who told me 'there are people in the village who are so poor that they can hardly pay the school fees and have to take their children out of school. However, after these uneducated children migrated, they send lots of money home that benefits their families and helps them to survive.' Just as in Palipu', family migrants still living in Tana Toraja support their home household by contributing labour, food or small sums of money.

Livelihood Sources of Various Wealth Groups in Palipu' and Kondo'

From the above description of the livelihood activities open to households in the case study villages, and the extent to which households employ them, it remains unclear whether certain activities are related to a household's wealth or not. However, to determine whether the effects of and responses to the economic crisis are typical of the village as a whole, or relate only to households within a particular wealth group, we need to obtain insights into the livelihood activities that are predominant within each wealth group. Below, therefore, we compare households belonging to different wealth groups, and the way in which they make a living.

Palipu's inhabitants identify four wealth classes among themselves (very rich, rich, moderate and poor) which closely correspond to the

prevailing social categorization. The first two categories, the very rich (3 per cent) and the rich (8 per cent), make up less than one-eighth of Palipu's population. The group identified as moderate households includes 33 per cent of the total population. The families in the remaining and largest group of households (56 per cent) are considered poor. Large landowners were usually identified as very rich as these are the only villagers who own considerable areas of rice fields. The very rich households produce 20 to 40 *karung* of rice per harvest, while the rich produce 5 to 8 *karung* per harvest. Moderate and poor households depend on access to the fields of the richer people and obtain less than 5 *karung*. Other determinative criteria for wealth class are: the size and state of the house in which the household lives; the *tongkonan* of one's ancestor; the educational level of one's children; the current employment of family members and the size of the related remittances they send home; and the physical assets of a household such as motorcycles, hand tractors and rice-milling machines.

The pattern of activities that make up the livelihood composites of the various wealth groups is shown in Figure 7.3. As a result of their dominant role in rice farming, very rich households never need to buy rice. Wealthy households sometimes buy rice to supplement their own harvest, and all the households in the moderate and poor categories have to buy rice to feed the family. As a result, the latter two groups of households are most vulnerable to fluctuations in the market price of rice.

In terms of the cultivation of cash crops and the breeding of livestock, the only significant difference among the various wealth groups is that whereas nearly all the upper-class households are involved in all the possible activities, poorer people are only involved in one or two activities. Although involvement in these activities might therefore not seem to be a significant marker, the extent of participation in these activities does have significance. The scale of the production of cash crops by the rich is much larger than by the poor because they have more arable land and the resources needed to plant and look after the trees (fertilizer, pesticides, labour, and other inputs). The same holds true for the number of livestock kept. The poorer households can be characterized by the smaller scope of the activities they undertake. The poor households rely for the most part on the breeding of pigs and chickens, while they try to find some additional income through growing small quantities of sweet potatoes or vegetables that are sold at the market.[22]

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[22] In Tana Toraja sweet potatoes are usually boiled and added to a mixture of rice and bran to feed pigs.

Linked to the qualitative information on wealth rankings, it seems that salaried jobs are equated with wealth. People in the village see government jobs (or rather the regular salary they bring in) as a means of obtaining wealth, or at least of securing an acceptable living standard. The salary makes it possible to invest in agricultural activities, and it can also serve as collateral for obtaining bank loans for larger investments or to buy desirable consumer goods.

Finally, in the comparison, relatively rich households receive greater financial and material support from migrant family members than their poorer neighbours. Nevertheless, despite the smaller amounts involved, for most of the middle- and lower-class households, remittances are a vital source of income in making a living or in coping with crisis or distress. The families from the highest social strata, on the other hand, generally use their remittances for ceremonies that maintain or increase their status rather than for satisfying daily needs.

As in Palipu', Kondo's dwellers distinguish four wealth classes using the same descriptions: very rich (*paling kaya*), rich (*kaya*), moderate (*sedang*) and poor (*miskin*). However, in Kondo' wealth is even more closely associated with social stratification. The names of certain social positions in the society directly refer to the economic status of a person. *Pa'buntuan sugi'*, for example, means 'rich man', and anyone having this status (and the *tongkonan* he represents) is automatically ranked in the highest level of society. As a consequence of these closely interwoven social and economic

Figure 7.3. Percentage of Palipu' households involved in the various livelihood activities by wealth group.
Source: Surveys and wealth-ranking sessions conducted in Palipu' and Kondo' in 2003.

dimensions, wealth is measured through the number and value of pigs that a household has slaughtered at previous funeral or *tongkonan*-building ceremonies, as well as through the state of the *tongkonan* of the forebears from whom the household acknowledges descent. The number of migrants and the amount of remittances they send home for ceremonial activities is another important criterion used by Kondo's dwellers to distinguish the poor from the richer households. Finally, as in Palipu', physical assets such as rice fields, houses, motorcycles, hand tractors and rice millers are an important component in wealth mapping. In Kondo', the distribution of households over the four wealth classes is a little more equal than in Palipu'. The very rich (11 per cent) and rich (12 per cent) layers make up 23 per cent of all households in the village. Twenty-nine per cent of households were placed in the moderate category, leaving almost half of Kondo's households (48 per cent) categorized as poor.

The activities that make up the livelihood composites of the various wealth groups are shown in Figure 7.4. As noted earlier, virtually all households in the top two categories own rice fields, with most of the very rich having fields reliably irrigated by the Rangri River. A lot of households in the moderate category grow rice in the fields of large landowners in return for a share of the yield. People from poor households generally work on the land of those who own or have hired land and are paid in rice or money. It should be noted that there are some exceptions—situations in which poor people own rice fields and rich people lack rice fields.

Figure 7.4. Percentage of Kondo' households involved in the various livelihood activities by wealth group.
Source: Surveys and wealth-ranking sessions conducted in Palipu' and Kondo' in 2003.

Across all wealth groups, cash crops are grown only on a small scale. Since they are by far the largest group, most households (in absolute terms) in the poor category are involved in the cultivation of cash crops, especially coffee and cocoa. At first glance, there seems to be no significant difference between the four wealth groups with regard to breeding livestock. However, the number of buffalo, pigs and chickens that a household owns mirrors the wealth of the categories.

A fairly high number of labour migrants are to be found in all wealth groups, although the very rich and rich households have proportionally more migrant members than the poorer sections of society. Also the destinations of the migrants differ significantly across wealth categories. Most migrants from the poor households leave South Sulawesi and travel to Malaysia or other parts of Indonesia, such as Irian Jaya and Kalimantan, where they are able to make more money with their limited education.[23]

Migrants who stay within Tana Toraja usually live in the Tondon region or in the nearby town of Rantepao, the location of the main market (*pasar Bolu*). A few of the very rich and rich households have second houses in Rantepao from which family members run a small shop or food stall. Virtually all households in the very rich category receive some remittances, as do over half of those placed in the moderate and poor categories. Thus, the majority of households receive remittances, and the amount of money received is considerable, especially in the event of a funeral ceremony.

Expenditure Patterns

The differential income opportunities and income levels are reflected in expenditure patterns. However, because expenditures within households fluctuate tremendously, depending on seasonality and unexpected events or contingencies, it is difficult to give some general figures on average expenditures in the villages. Nevertheless, I will try to give some indication of expenses of poor and rich households by dividing expenditures into four categories: monthly expenses, annual expenses, one-time purchases, and emergencies.

The monthly costs in both research villages are quite similar. The most important expenditures are on food, toiletries, fodder, electricity or kerosene, transport and church attendance. Typically, the expenditure on

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[23] Migrants from the poor and moderate wealth groups generally have a lower education level than their richer fellow villagers and, accordingly, find different types of employment.

food varies from about Rp 30,000-Rp 300,000 per month. The poor only buy some rice, salt and cooking oil; they obtain most products such as cassava, vegetables, fruits and chillies from their own gardens. The rich, in contrast, add sugar, coffee, tea, sweets, cookies and so on to their diet. With toiletries it is much the same story. The poor usually spend about Rp 5,000–10,000 a month on toothpaste and bathing and washing soap, while the richer households spend Rp 40,000–50,000 a month on these products. Because most households own pigs, they need fodder to feed them. In general they feed pigs the leaves of sweet potatoes grown in the garden around the house. However, this is not sufficient to really fatten them, and the people who can afford to mix the leaves with rice bran bought in the village or at the market for about Rp 60,000–70,000 per month. Electricity costs vary between Rp 5,000 and 30,000 a month. The poor only use electricity to light a lamp in the evening, but richer households usually have a television, sewing machine and radio. In Kondo', only a third of the households, those living closest to Rantepao, are connected to the electrical grid. The other two-thirds of the household use kerosene or gas for cooking and lighting which costs Rp 5,000–10,000 per month. Because the market is popular in Tana Toraja as a social event as well as the place where one buys daily necessities, most villagers go to the markets in Makale or Rantepao on a weekly basis, or at least once a month. For these market visits, people use public transport or motor taxis which costs them about Rp 5,000–15,000 a month. Together with the weekly church collections, which cost villagers several hundreds to a thousand rupiah a time, poor households therefore need about Rp 45,000 per month to pay for these daily necessities. To cover expenditures of around Rp 500,000 a month, the richer households need ten times as much income as the poorer ones.

In addition to these monthly costs, most households have additional expenses that recur annually: agricultural inputs, educational costs, clothes and land tax. Labourers who help the household with the preparation of rice fields, rice planting and harvesting are usually paid in rice and not in money. However, most landowners who cultivate rice usually spend some money on fertilizer, some on renting a hand tractor for ploughing, and some on buying seeds and/or pesticides. Naturally, all these costs depend on the size of the rice fields but, in general, landowners apply at least one sack of fertilizer that costs about Rp 80,000 each. For the cultivation of cash crops not much money is needed because most plants are acquired through family and neighbours, while the farmers use natural fertilizer.

Educational costs are burdensome for most households in the research villages. The school fees for the primary school (SD) are Rp 60,000 a year in addition to the cost of the school uniforms and writing materials that schoolchildren need. When children continue to the lower secondary school (SMP) or even further to the higher secondary school (SMA), enrolment fees run from Rp 120,000 to Rp 300,000 a year. Higher education in Makassar costs from one to several million *rupiah* a year, which is beyond what most households can afford. Considering that typical households have at least three children, education costs them a minimum of several hundred thousand *rupiah* a year. Clothes are generally purchased only once a year during special events or before Christmas. Wealthier households often spend more on clothes (Rp 500,000 to Rp 1 million) and buy them more frequently, while the very poor rarely purchase clothes but receive the cast-offs from their richer neighbours.

Each household in Tana Toraja is obliged to pay land tax to the government annually. The amount of the tax depends upon the quality and size of their land. People with small plots that hold only their house and a small garden pay around Rp 5,000, while large landowners with a lot of good quality rice fields have to pay more than Rp 100,000 a year. However, because of the complexity and opaqueness of landownership, which often involves several owners who are no longer living in the village, the system is not really fixed, and large landowners often manage to reduce their annual contributions to Rp 20,000 or Rp 30,000. Overall, these yearly expenses are thus very variable, and while some people spend almost nothing on agriculture, education, clothes or land tax, others spend millions of *rupiah*.

In addition to these monthly and annually recurring expenditures, some people also spend money on luxury goods such as radios, televisions and motorcycles, or on their houses. However, these expenditures are only made once or a few times in a lifetime. The poor usually spend very little on their houses and use materials that are available in the surrounding area such as wood and bamboo, while the richer people build houses that cost Rp 10–30 million. While these expenditures may take a large part of the household budget, emergency costs are, in most cases, a larger burden on the household because they are generally unexpected. Besides the death of livestock, most sudden costs are linked to human health problems. Officially, poor households should have a health card that provides basic healthcare free of charge at the government hospitals and local first-aid posts (Puskesmas). However, in Palipu', most of the poor households have yet to obtain a healthcard, while in Kondo', the card distribution

system seems to be influenced by family networks, which do not always benefit the poor. When households do not have the money to pay for healthcare, they usually turn to traditional doctors, who are much cheaper than the modern doctors and hospitals. The richer households, on the other hand, opt for private healthcare, which is expensive but more reliable and better trained than that provided by the government.

The last category, and for some households the greatest burden, are the expenditures on funeral and/or *tongkonan* ceremonies. Though death is usually sudden, funeral ceremonies are well-planned, sometimes years in advance, and therefore not as unexpected as health problems. *Tongkonan* building—and the ceremonies that go with it—could be put into a different category but are sudden in a sense that the *tongkonan* leader usually determines at what moment it will be rebuilt and at what cost. While most household expenditure is broadly similar in both villages, the expenditure on ceremonies is very different (see Figures 7.5 and 7.6). Typically, in Palipu' 38 per cent of the households spend less than Rp 100,000 a year on ceremonies, whereas in Kondo, there are hardly any households that spend less than Rp 100,000 on these events. While in Palipu' more than half of the households (57 per cent) spend less than Rp 500,000 on ceremonies, in Kondo' only a quarter do so (24 per cent). In Palipu', only 21 per cent of the households spend more than Rp 1 million annually on ceremonies, compared to 64 per cent in Kondo'. Finally, while there are hardly any households in Palipu' that spend more than RP 5 million a year on ceremonies, in Kondo' 34 per cent of households do so.

Kondo'

Figure 7.5. Yearly ceremonial expenditures in Kondo'.
Source: Surveys and wealth-ranking sessions conducted in Palipu' and Kondo' in 2003.

Palipu'

Figure 7.6. Yearly ceremonial expenditures in Palipu'.
Source: Surveys and wealth-ranking sessions conducted in Palipu' and Kondo' in 2003.

In conclusion, the amount of money spent on funeral and *tongkonan* ceremonies is out of all proportion to other household expenditures as well as in terms of household incomes. When we consider that the average annual incomes from local activities in Palipu' and Kondo' are Rp 1.6 and Rp 2.6 million respectively, there is a significant gap between income and expenditure for a large number of households, especially in Kondo'. This gap is bridged by migrant remittances, as we saw in the previous section, and highlights the importance of such supplements to household income. In the following section, I turn to the effects of the economic crisis on the income and expenditure patterns just described.

The Economic Crisis as Experienced in the Two Villages

Palipu' during the Economic Crisis: Crisis or Godsend?

Across all the wealth categories, only a few households saw an increase in their income over the five-year period starting in 1998. The major reason for the income growth for the lucky few was the huge increase in the prices they obtained for vanilla, and to a lesser extent for cocoa, on the local and national markets. Others mentioned that remittances in local currency from family members in Malaysia, South Korea or Japan had increased substantially due to favourable exchange rate changes. Given that the wealthier classes grow larger quantities of vanilla than the poorer ones, it is not surprising that the wealthiest category of households gained most

from the increased returns. As a villager from the rich class commented 'thanks to the price rises for vanilla in 2001, our income has increased enormously and we were able to build a new house.' However, overall, very few households were profiting from the high vanilla prices.

The exorbitant prices being obtained for vanilla brought about a new problem. Since vanilla prices were so high, it quickly became a desirable crop in Tana Toraja. In Palipu', around 40 per cent of the moderate and poor households and 25 per cent of the very rich and rich categories, started to grow this crop. Throughout Tana Toraja, vanilla seeds have become scarce and the theft of plants has become a new phenomenon in the Torajan highlands. Even within village boundaries, suspicions and accusations of vanilla theft have become more frequent, leading to social distrust and sometimes to conflict. Moreover, the high vanilla yields have led to jealousy among people who are still growing cocoa or coffee, or whose vanilla crop has failed. Vanilla vines need special care and not everyone has the knowledge or skills needed to grow them successfully. Not coincidentally the richest households in Palipu' are especially plagued by theft because most of them grow vanilla in considerable quantities and had started to cultivate the crop before its price rose rapidly on the market. Two-thirds of the vanilla farmers from poor and moderate households have only recently planted the crop and are still awaiting their first significant harvest.

Notwithstanding the rising prices for some cash crops, the vast majority of households faced a drop in income, especially in the three lowest wealth categories. In the moderate and poor groups, around 75 per cent of all households were affected by the long droughts of 1999 and 2002. Because of these droughts, the villagers had to delay rice planting for several months, which made it impossible to grow a second crop, and the eventual harvest was also lower than normal. The coffee, cocoa and often also the vanilla harvests of these households were also disappointing, or even failed, as a consequence of the droughts. In addition to the problems caused by the lengthy dry season, the incomes of households within these three wealth groups appeared to be negatively affected by plant and animal diseases. Because of local beliefs, ignorance, or simply a lack of money, most villagers do not vaccinate their livestock and, every year, a fair number of buffalo, pigs and chickens become ill or die.[24] Crop diseases are also

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[24] A few years ago, one farmer in Palipu' did decide to vaccinate his pigs. Shortly after, they all died. Since then, it is difficult to convince people of the benefits of expensive injections.

quite common in Palipu', and again it is especially the poorer households, who lack the money to invest in pesticides or the knowledge to use them properly, who suffer from crop problems. Since 2001, Palipu' has suffered from a problem that has affected most of the cocoa trees in the village, and although the fruits look healthy from the outside, the cocoa beans inside are rotten.

Thus it is not only the economic crisis that has created hardships for some of the farmers, and sometimes it is difficult to differentiate the effects of the crisis from other influences. This is well illustrated by the case of Yannis Buku's household, from the poorest category.

> Yannis and his wife had been cultivating coffee and cocoa for many years. In 1997, this appeared very lucrative as local prices for these crops had increased six-fold due to higher world market prices and the falling *rupiah*. However, this windfall lasted less than two years before the prices of coffee and cocoa fell back. In 2002, the household cut down most of their coffee and cocoa trees to create additional space for vanilla plants. This decision did not yield the expected results as most of the newly planted vanilla died. Although they had been growing a little vanilla for more than ten years they had paid it little attention until 2001 when they saw that prices were on the rise. They planted some more vanilla, which they bought from some Torajans in a neighbouring village. 'Two years earlier I had obtained vanilla plants for free from some neighbours but now it has become hard to find free vanilla plants', Yannis complained. 'Also the costs of maintenance have increased'. Fertilizer and pesticides had become expensive, and since they could not afford these, they could not benefit from the high vanilla prices at the time.
>
> The household had also been unlucky with other food crops they grew. After the long drought in 1999, they brought home hardly any rice from the two fields they hired from a rich family in Palipu' in exchange for half the harvest. In the good years before the drought, the household had purchased some pigs with the money they had made from the sale of coffee and cocoa. They raised the pigs for funeral and house-construction ceremonies, and also as a form of insurance for difficult times. Unfortunately, most of their pigs died of disease in 1999 when they most needed the money: to pay off the costs of agricultural inputs to the rice field owner; to buy additional rice for household consumption; and to buy daily necessities such as toiletries, soap and electricity, all of which had increased in price. As a consequence, Yannis's wife had to ask the children in Makassar for money. The household had another disappointing harvest in 2002. They had hardly anything left to sell and again called upon their children in Makassar who are themselves struggling to make ends meet. Now all their hopes for a better life rest on the newly planted vanilla.

Yannis's close neighbours, who are a slightly better off, experienced similar contingencies but faced an even more serious crisis: they had been

obliged to adopt three nieces whose parents had died in the clash between Christians and Muslims in the Buginese city of Palopo in 1999. The head of household told me:

> We adopted the three children who are now going to school in Palipu'. We face huge problems in feeding the children and paying their school fees. We would like to grow some vanilla but do not have enough land. Most of the land in Palipu' belongs to the rich, and the poor can only work on the land in exchange for a share of the harvest, making it hard to earn much money. Another family we know who fled from Palopo had a lot of land over there but their house was burnt down and they had to abandon their land. Nowadays they live in Palipu' without any land and are having to start rebuilding their life all over again.

The return of family members from the conflict areas of Poso, East Timor and Ambon in 1998 and 1999 has been another cause of declining household incomes in the moderate and poor classes. These households face a double burden because, first, the remittances abruptly stopped, and second, they also have to care for the returning migrants.

Furthermore, some of the poorest households complained about the loss of the additional income that used to come from construction work, because many of the rich people had been refraining from building or renovating their houses in the last couple of years. As one respondent explained in the spring of 2003:

> Because of the rising prices of daily necessities such as salt, cooking oil, fertilizer and school fees, we all need more money, and so more and more people are looking for some construction work. However, the number of people building a house has decreased since everything became more expensive in Tana Toraja, and some people get less money from their migrant relatives.

While one rich household did mention the shrinking remittances from Kalimantan as a reason for its declining income, there is no indication that this is a general trend among the rich in Palipu'. Rather, most people pointed to remittances as a resource that steadily enables new investments, or that improves the fallback position of the household. A final reason given for falling incomes was the sickness or death of a family member and thus a reduction in the potential labour force, and this was mentioned by households in all but the 'very rich' category. These stochastic risks obviously do not have any connection with the crisis.

Interestingly, in response to a question concerning whether the household had faced serious problems or 'crises' during the period 1998–2003, the sickness or death of a family member ranked only third behind

droughts and crop and animal diseases.[25] In general, the serious problems or crises that households pointed out coincided with the wider reasons for declining incomes and were not necessarily related to the income of their own household. In addition, another problem that often cropped up during the interviews was the high unemployment rate and the bleak prospects for youngsters with a decent education. With the establishment of a 'decentralised Torajan government' the entry fee for government jobs has increased enormously (up to Rp 20 million), and there are few other jobs for educated people in Tana Toraja. A similar trend toward increasing admission fees for civil service positions can be observed elsewhere in Indonesia. This has made it much harder for Torajan people to obtain government jobs than in the past. Moreover, some private companies have also started to demand entrance fees for new employees, limiting job opportunities for young graduates from poor families even further. This problem seems to be of particular concern to households in the lowest two classes. The rich and the very rich households who have land to use as collateral are still able to raise the necessary 'entrance fee'.

The number of households registering positive events in recent times is considerably lower than the number of households confronted with the negative aspects of the crisis. Across all wealth classes, households reported receiving increasing amounts of money for their vanilla, cocoa or coffee crops as positive experiences.

The question remains as to what extent these positive and negative events affected the situation of these households. Compared to the households in the very rich and rich categories, very few poor and moderate households had seen any improvement in their situation. In general, any improvement or deterioration in the household situation resulted from a combination of the reasons outlined above. Households from the moderate and poor classes also emphasized their ever-growing expenditures on daily essentials such as food, kerosene, toiletries, local transport, their children's education and medicines. A dozen children in Palipu' dropped out of primary school between 1999 and 2003 due to the increase in school fees. In the same period, it also became increasingly difficult to find cheap medicines, stocks at the local health centre (Puskesmas) were running out, and what was still available was past its expiry date. Medicines at the

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[25] Sickness here means serious illness for which hospitalisation is needed or which has resulted in permanent disability. When an able-bodied person dies, it not only implies a reduction in available labour but also brings huge costs for a funeral ceremony, even if the rituals are relatively modest.

private pharmacies are fresher, but their quality also declined while prices have more than tripled. For some, the rising costs of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, have had a dramatic impact on the household budget. Despite all these sometimes large fluctuations in many aspects that affect households in Tana Toraja in the period between 1998 and 2003, the bulk of the households in Palipu' did not experience any significant change in their situation at all.

Kondo' during the Economic Crisis: Flourishing Ceremonies

In contrast to Palipu', the increase in income experienced by Kondo' households between 1998 and 2003 had nothing to do with increasing returns on cash crops. Rather, the rises in income were a result of larger remittances being received from household members working in Malaysia (and due largely to improved exchange rates of the Malaysian ringgit), or because of higher rice yields through increasing use of fertilizer.

Households in which incomes fell in this period tended to mention the prolonged dry seasons of 1999 and 2002 as a major cause. Households from the upper classes complained about disappointing rice harvests, and households from the lower categories pointed to the shrinking labour market. Several households from across all wealth groups commented that their rice crops had been affected by infestations of mice and caterpillars in 2002.

As in Palipu', the majority of the households in Kondo' had not experienced any sizeable change in income level. Although relatively less dependent on cash crop prices, incomes in Kondo' are never completely stable and vary from year to year. Incomes are dependent on the amount of rainfall, the health of plants and animals, available family labour, market prices and the continuity of the remittances they receive from migrant family members.

Droughts, animal and plant diseases, and sickness or death of household members are as much crises for households across all wealth groups in Kondo' as they are in Palipu'. Animal diseases had spread through Kondo' in late 2002 killing many chickens and pigs although, surprisingly, few households gave this as a reason for their decreasing incomes. On a more individual basis, one very rich household saw their vanilla garden destroyed by a plant disease, and the land of one household in the moderate wealth group was flooded in 2001. Besides these rather individual crises, there was another factor that negatively affected some families: an increase in gambling. Since the central government in Jakarta loosened its

control over Tana Toraja in the late 1990s, the frequency and scale of gambling activities has been growing rapidly. Although cockfights are allowed at funeral ceremonies as part of the ritual activities, gambling remains illegal. However, according to Morell, 'the immediate post-Suharto period saw a resurgence of cockfighting and gambling in Tana Toraja, as advantage was taken of bureaucratic disarray and inattention' (Morrell 2001:12). One villager from the very rich class remarked:

> Since the crisis there are not so many problems here in the village because cockfights are being organized and this brings in lots of money from outside through the gambling. Many Chinese, Buginese and Makassarese, as well as Torajan migrants, come here to gamble and, of course, for the ceremonies. They bring in money from outside Tana Toraja to try their luck in the highlands.

However, in contrast to this somewhat recreational gambling, quite a few of the less well-off Torajans gamble heavily in the hope of boosting their income or paying off debts, but they usually return home worse off, causing trouble and conflicts within the household. Thus, while gambling might provide a new source of income for the few winners and those involved in organizing such events, it also leads to financial and social problems. One respondent from the poorest wealth class mentioned that, from the day that her husband had given up gambling, she had seen a positive effect on the household's income.

Just as in Palipu', quite a few people pointed to the high unemployment rate among *pemuda* (youngsters) as a real problem. Given the large number of unemployed, local wages for agricultural activities and construction work have fallen, further tempting youngsters to try their luck at gambling. Further, the male youth from Kondo' had been involved in gang fights in the town of Rantepao. In the clashes, which carried on for several months toward the end of 2002, a few Kondo' youngsters suffered knife or gunshot wounds. Some people believe that the clashes were a local struggle for power among the assorted gangs. Others, however, assert that—as occurred elsewhere in Indonesia—the conflict in Rantepao was purposely instigated by Golkar politicians to distract attention from regional political scandals. Once initiated, these fights become difficult to stop. Whatever the cause, the local police, despite the extra power they had obtained during the decentralization politics of the late 1990s, appeared unable to put an end to the fights. Eventually, the central authorities had to intervene, and the national army based in Pare Pare brought the conflict under control.

In Kondo', about half a dozen youngsters have become *tukang ojek* (motorcycle taxi drivers) in the town of Rantepao and in their own village. Within a couple of years, most villages have seen the arrival of five to ten motorcycle taxis, all of them driven by young men between 18 and 30 years old. Several of them are former tourist guides who used to accompany tourists to funeral ceremonies, places of interest, or on walking treks through the mountains of Tana Toraja but who, since the Bali bombing, can no longer make a living in tourism. Other guides have returned to their villages to work in the rice fields or find temporary employment during the coffee, cocoa, vanilla and clove harvesting seasons. Some, however, have taken the opportunity to sell goods (chips, sweets, cigarettes, beer, and the like) at the increasing number of ceremonies and illegal gambling sites throughout Tana Toraja.

The positive experiences and events that have taken place between 1998 and 2003, and that were reported by respondents, once again indicate the importance of migration and remittances for livelihoods in Kondo'. The majority of households see the graduation of their children from high school, leading to employment and the sending home of remittances, as positive events. During the recent turbulent years, their children have been successful (*berhasil*), which has given them the opportunity to invest in funeral ceremonies to show off their enhanced wealth and increase their social status. The success of children in obtaining well-paid jobs is a major cause of improvements in household wellbeing.

In 2003, only a small minority of households claimed to feel worse off than five years earlier. Those who had experienced a worsening situation in their household blamed the increases in prices for cooking oil, petrol, food, transport and fertilizer. Although most households in Kondo' acknowledged the increased prices for food and goods as important, most of them commented 'there is no crisis in Tana Toraja because the funeral ceremonies are still flourishing.'

Concluding Remarks

According to Bourdieu (1989:18), the 'social reality' that objectivists speak about is an matter of perception and so can be a crisis: 'Social science must take as its object both this reality and the perception of this reality, the perspectives, the points of view that, by virtue of their position in objective social space, agents have on this reality'. The reality of crisis and the interrelated livelihood changes, and people's perception of this reality,

have been documented in this chapter. A detailed picture of people's incomes and expenditures, and their perceptions of the series of events that have affected Tana Toraja since the late 1990s, reveal some interesting insights.

In Palipu', the southern research village, households from the poor and moderate categories were the worst affected by the events that took place during the period 1997–2003. In general, because they were unable to profit from the higher prices for cash crops such as coffee, cocoa and vanilla, they experienced relatively large problems in coping with the higher prices for daily necessities and agricultural inputs. The level of dependency on cash played an important role; the more dependent on cash, the greater the hardship. Exceptions to this 'rule' were the rich and those who, by luck, had grown vanilla. Quite a few households in the rich and very rich categories saw their situations improve, mainly due to increasing incomes as a result of the rising prices for their cash crops and the growing amount of money they received as remittances. Socioeconomic class, and the associated land and other income opportunities that come with it, appeared to be an important factor in how people experienced events. Overall, the level of remittances received by the households in Palipu' determined their resilience to shocks and, with this, their perception of events (a more passive stance was adopted by those with higher remittances).

In Kondo', where the social structure is more flexible, and the opportunities for social climbing across all wealth classes are much greater through organizing extraordinary ceremonies, a different picture emerges from that of Palipu'. The large flow of remittances into the village, especially from Malaysia, completely neutralized the negative effects of the crisis. In fact, a number of households, even moderate and poor ones, experienced an improvement in their household situation because of increased remittances from family members in Malaysia. Although there are some differences between perceptions of the crisis among households in the various wealth classes, most people in Kondo' did not admit to experiencing any negative effects of the economic crisis. This has a lot to do with the specific constitution of the major objectives in their lives. Alongside social position in society and past experiences, someone's present reality (and thus their experiences and responses to changing conditions) is shaped by future objectives. In Kondo', people's objectives in life are generally not oriented toward their daily wellbeing but rather toward their participation in the funeral ceremonies of family, friends and acquaintances, and the organization of an honourable ceremony for deceased parents. This is

demonstrated by the enormous expenditures on these ceremonies. Thus, as long as these ceremonies continue to flourish, they do not experience any real problem or crisis.

Interestingly, in general, people had less money available to invest in ceremonies in the aftermath of the economic crisis. The costs of ceremonies were however then covered at the expense of other items such as clothes, food and luxury goods. This does not mean that there is a different economic rationality in Tana Toraja, but rather that people have priorities in their expenditure patterns that are not purely aimed at satisfying basic needs, as they are usually defined in Western literature. Nevertheless, as we saw in Chapter 6, social mobility is not possible for everyone, and some people do refrain from participating in ceremonies. Because the use of averages masks a lot of detail in this chapter, it is still not clear which people or households invest vast amounts of money in ceremonies and which do not. Not everyone in the same wealth class acts in the same way. Given this we need to include the less tangible variables than money or income, and this will be the purpose of the next chapter.

TORAJAN LIVELIHOOD STYLES

Through tracing the socio-political, cultural and economic structures and layers of daily life in Tana Toraja in the previous chapters, I have shown the great variety of options open for making a living. The changing political and economic landscape (from colonialism to commercialization and migration) has opened up more possibilities in the past century. In the room or space that Torajans have to make a living, they strive for both material goals, such as securing land, money and heirlooms, and immaterial ones, such as prestige, status, *siri'* and power. The way people are oriented toward these different goals and the range of actions they undertake to achieve them is to a great extent shaped by the structures and context in which they are embedded. From the comparison between Palipu' and Kondo', it appears that structure and context are important boundary markers for people's actions. People in Palipu' are less oriented toward the organization of large ceremonies than those in Kondo' because of their different historical and social structural setting. Social mobility in Palipu' seems to be far more difficult than in Kondo', and spending vast amounts of money on ceremonies helps little in climbing the social ladder in Palipu'. Moreover, a long history of education and Christianization, especially Pentecostalism, have provided people in Palipu' with alternative possibilities and life orientations. In Kondo', where the building of an educational system was boycotted from the beginning of its introduction, and Christianity has far less penetrated into society, ceremonies continue to dominate all aspects of life. Consequently, people in Kondo' migrate to different destinations and for other purposes than people in Palipu'; namely to make as much money as quickly as possible rather than pursuing higher education to build a basis for a more sustainable or stable living. Finally, we saw a difference in orientation with regard to agricultural activities that is essentially due to both the economic structure and environmental conditions but possibly also to social and cultural regulations. People in Palipu' are much more oriented toward cash crop cultivation than are villagers in Kondo', who are almost solely involved in rice growing. In short, there are a variety of structural and contextual explanations as to why people behave and think differently in the two villages.

However, as we also saw in the previous chapters, within these structural and contextual boundaries, people still have some room for manoeuvre. Within villages but also, for example, in the same wealth class, people act very differently and have different goals in life. Both in Palipu' and Kondo' we have seen people that spend much more on ceremonies than others, people with and without translocal livelihood activities, people involved in the cultivation of cash crops or rice or both, and so on. Thus, even though we know in which context and under what conditions people are more likely to spend a lot of money on ceremonies, we do not know exactly who these people are and what they have in common, both in practice and in orientation. Therefore, alongside the framework of status systems, cultural ideals and geographical space and place, and the changes that take place within them, we have to look at the patterns of practices that households employ in making a living. Or, in other words, to take a closer look at the livelihood styles that have emerged in both villages as outcomes of the whole gamut of practices that reflect the impressive heterogeneity of daily lives. Only then will we be able to explain which people are spending a lot of money on ceremonies in times of economic crisis and political turmoil, and why.

In this chapter, I take a closer look at the livelihood styles of Torajan households in the two villages. First, I will identify the most typical livelihood styles that can be found in each village and their distribution among the populations. Second, I present a number of cases from both villages that illustrate these styles within the complexities of everyday life. Third, I reflect upon these livelihood styles by referring to the theoretical notions on the idea of style as outlined in Chapter 2.

Identifying Livelihood Styles in Palipu' and Kondo'

To uncover particular patterns of coherence between various livelihood practices within the framework of status systems ('social class'), cultural ideals ('expenditures on funeral ceremonies' and 'religion'), geographical space ('migration', 'destination of migrants' and 'remittances') and place (Palipu' compared with Kondo'), I have used a cluster analysis (See Appendix 1–4). This procedure resulted in four dominant patterns or styles for each village. When placing these styles in a table (see Table 8.1), three opposing poles of orientation are distinguishable that are important factors in differentiating the styles from each other: local versus translocal or even transnational; conservative versus dynamic or enterprising; and

Table 8.1. Livelihood styles in Palipu' and Kondo'.

CONTEXTS/PLACE	Livelihood styles in Palipu'				Livelihood styles in Kondo'			
	Local	Translocal			Local	Translocal	Transnational	
ORIENTATION	Conservative[1]	Enterprising		Small spenders	Conservative		Enterprising	Conservative
	Small spenders	Big spenders			Small spenders	Big spenders		
STYLES	Style 1 Outcasts	Style 2 Established locals	Style 3 Translocals	Style 4 Entrepreneurs	Style 1 Locals	Style 2 *Siri'* protectors	Style 3 *Gengsi* seekers	Style 4 Transnationals
Number of households (percentage)	17	21	41	21	28	26	27	19
Column in Appendix	3	2	1	4	2	1	3	4
Income activities								
Cash crops	–	+	+	+	–	–	+	–
Side activities					–/+	–	–/+	–/+
Framework of status systems								
Social class	3–4	1–2	1–3	4	2–4	1–3	2–3	4
Possess rice fields/land	–	+	+	–	–/+	+	+	–/+
Cultural ideals								
Expenses on ceremonies	–	++	+	–	–/+	+	++	+
Religion	Pentec	Prot/Cat	Prot/Cat	Pentec	Prot	Prot	Prot	Prot

(*Continued*)

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[1] The term 'conservative' here refers to households that undertake few income producing activities, whether or not they are able or willing to. From this point of view, it is the opposite of enterprising people and does not imply traditional or inward-looking (though this might sometimes be the case).

Table 8.1. (*Cont.*)

CONTEXTS/PLACE	Livelihood styles in Palipu'				Livelihood styles in Kondo'			
	Local		Translocal		Local		Translocal	Transnational
ORIENTATION	Conservative[1]	Enterprising			Conservative		Enterprising	Conservative
	Small spenders	Big spenders		Small spenders	Small spenders	Big spenders		
STYLES	Style 1 Outcasts	Style 2 Established locals	Style 3 Translocals	Style 4 Entrepreneurs	Style 1 Locals	Style 2 *Sir'* protectors	Style 3 *Gengsi* seekers	Style 4 Transnationals
Geographical space								
Migration	–	–	+	+	–	+	+	+
Destination	n/a	n/a	Sulsel/ Indon	Indon/ Tator	n/a	Indon	Abroad	Abroad
Remittances	n/a	n/a	+	+	n/a	+	++	+

Note abbreviations:
religions: Pentec = Pentecostal; Prot = Protestant; Cat = Catholic
destination of migration: Sulsel = South Sulawesi; Indon = other places in Indonesia; Tator = Tana Toraja
+ = yes; - = no

minor against major contributors to ceremonies. From an analytical point of view, these three opposing poles of orientation appear to be the central axes of potential differences on which the various livelihood styles in the villages can be placed. What makes these styles distinct from each other is not only their differing positions on at least one of these axes, but more importantly their different positional combinations on all three axes. In Palipu' for example, we can distinguish two livelihood styles that are both based on translocal practices and considered to be enterprising in their outlook. However, while both styles are similar with regard to these two opposite poles of orientation, they differ completely in their orientation toward expenditure at ceremonies and consist of people that stem from different social classes and religious backgrounds. It is exactly because of this that we cannot simply take wealth, social class, locality or any other

variable as the single explanation of people's behaviour but must look at the patterning of practices, or better, livelihood style, instead.

When we take a closer look at the various styles detected through the cluster analysis, we see that the largest group of households in Palipu' (41 per cent) have a translocal style. That is, all these households have migrant members living elsewhere in South Sulawesi or beyond (57 per cent), in the cities of Java, the mining and logging centres of Irian Jaya, or industrial or forestry areas of Kalimantan. About 60 per cent of these households receive income from remittances from their migrant members, and probably even more derive financial assistance if we were to take into account the ad hoc financial contributions for unexpected events, such as sickness or death of family members in the village. They are also relatively enterprising in a sense that they have spread their agricultural risks by growing several cash crops (diversification). They come from all but the lowest social class, but the majority of these households (68.3 per cent) are in the third class. They are Protestant or Catholic and spend a considerable amount of money on ceremonies—more than half of them over Rp 500,000 per year.

The ones closest to the translocals are the 'entrepreneurs' in the sense that they generally also extend their activities beyond the village borders and have a broad spectrum of economic activities in which they are involved. However, in contrast translocals their expenditure on ceremonies is rather low. Quite a number of households identified with this style are Pentecostals. The cluster of people that were identified with a style which I labelled 'established locals' is of similar size (21 per cent) to the entrepreneurs but, in contrast, is locally oriented and includes some large contributors to ceremonial activities. I named this style 'established locals' because most of the households within this cluster are fairly secure in their relatively high social position.

Probably most different to the established locals are the households in style 1, which I named the 'outcasts', referring to people who have almost no chance for undertaking remunerative labour, or to climb the social ladder. For them, income from remittances is negligible, as is any other side activity. The majority of the outcasts in Palipu' come from the lowest social class and own few or no rice fields or farmland on which to cultivate subsistence or cash crops. Since they have few income opportunities, and hardly any chance of social mobility, their financial contributions to ceremonial activities are rather low. Most such households have turned to the various Pentecostal churches in Palipu' to escape from poverty, slavery, or

the obligations inherent to the gift-giving system that prevails in Tana Toraja.

The picture in Kondo' is somewhat different in the sense that there is not really a dominant livelihood style, and all four clusters of households appear to be more or less of equal size. Almost all households are involved in livestock and poultry raising, making this, as in Palipu', a non-discriminatory variable. In contrast to Palipu', however, the variable of religion is not significant in Kondo' because all but five households are Protestant. Although the analysis generated four new and distinct livelihood styles, the 'locals' in Kondo' are not dissimilar to the outcasts in Palipu'. They have few migrant family members, and the ones who have left Kondo' live in neighbouring villages or in the nearby town of Rantepao. Consequently, remittances are not a source of income for the bulk of the households in this cluster. They are involved in only a few income activities, and this cluster contains most of the households that spend relatively little on ceremonies. Nevertheless, such expenditures still far exceed the investment in ceremonies by most households in Palipu'.

All the other three styles in Kondo' include households that can be considered to be 'big spenders' at ceremonies. The most extreme ones are the

Ill. 8.1.   Toraja woman (photo by Wim Jakobs).

'*gengsi* seekers'. The households which are identified with this style have spread their activities across national borders (in other words are transnational). All the households have one or more migrants abroad (generally in Malaysia), or at least outside Sulawesi Island (7 per cent) and 98 per cent of these households receive remittances from their migrant members. In striving for a higher status, members of these households leave (voluntarily or under pressure) the Torajan highlands to find the cash needed for the organization of large ceremonies. No fewer than 62 per cent of these households had spent more than Rp five million on ceremonies and another 28 per cent somewhere between Rp one and Rp five million. Not surprisingly, most of these households are from the second and third classes and have some room to manoeuvre in climbing the social ladder. The majority are involved in a kaleidoscope of activities, and their involvement in cash crop cultivation is disproportionably high compared to the households within the other styles.

The people in the third livelihood style are protecting their position, or *siri'*, by making considerable contributions to ceremonies. This style includes the highest number of households from the first social class, and 60 per cent invest more than Rp 1 million per year in ceremonies and almost one-third more than Rp 5 million. All the households contain migrants working in other places in Indonesia, beyond the island of Sulawesi. Given their large investments in ceremonies to guard their honour or *siri'*, I labelled this cluster of households the '*siri'* protectors'.

The 'transnationals' fill a somewhat odd position; they have no real basis for protecting a high *siri'* or for seeking *gengsi'*, because almost all of them are from the lowest social class. However, a remarkably high number of households spend between Rp one and Rp five million annually on funeral ceremonies. While these households have a transnational outlook, in the sense that they have spread their activities beyond the borders of Indonesia (as the *gengsi'* seekers), their involvement in local income generating activities is rather restricted.

The cluster analyses of households in both Kondo' and Palipu' reveal some more or less neatly defined patterns of coherence between various aspects of livelihood which provide insights into characteristics of the households that are most willing to spend money on ceremonies. In Palipu', households that are identifiable as established locals show similarities with translocals who invest considerable sums of money in ceremonies. Both lifestyles are made up of enterprising higher class people. In Kondo', most households spend huge sums on ceremonies, but for diverse reasons: some are protecting their *siri'*, while others are trying to

increase it. These people are not necessarily the wealthiest ones, but they are the ones who have extended their income-generating activities beyond local and national borders.

Although it reveals interesting insights, cluster analysis yields a rather static picture of livelihood styles and provides only a glimpse of what these styles actually look like. It fails to illuminate many features that typically go along with these styles. The ways in which the households of the various styles interact with other households, for example, remain unclear. Mmore importantly, it does not show the extent to which these styles are affected by changes in conditions triggered by the Indonesian economic crisis. In the following sections, I provide a more detailed and dynamic picture of the various livelihood styles by presenting four cases of households for each village.

Livelihood Styles in Palipu'

Translocals: The Household of Rannu and Lucia Lomo'

> Rannu and his wife Lucia Lomo' are already in their mid-fifties and have seven children, only three of whom still live at home. Home is a modern single storey wooden house that stands on squared poles and is roofed with corrugated zinc. Opposite the house stands a nicely carved and colourfully painted rice barn, which has recently been built according to traditional principles mixed with some modern elements. The rice barn represents the high status of the family. As both Rannu and his wife originate from the old *tongkonan* Biang, their status is just below that of the second class or *puang* family. They are both farmers and raise some livestock. Around the house they have about a quarter of a hectare of dry land on which they grow coffee, cacao and some vegetables. The coffee trees do not provide enough beans for household consumption all year round, and the cacao fruits have been rotten for some years. Their vanilla trees died last year after yielding harvests for three years in a row. The household grows rice on the fields of Rannu's mother, who lives next door with his sister, and the harvest has to be shared with these relatives. After distribution, about 200 kilograms of rice remains for household consumption, and this is not enough for the whole year. To eat rice all year around, Lucia Lomo needs to buy rice at the market over several months. When they are on a tight budget, Lucia mixes the rice with home-grown cassava. Both Rannu and Lucia also work on the rice fields of other villagers to earn some additional rice. Lucia takes care of their ten chickens and two pigs. Interestingly, one of the pigs was bought at an auction held at the Catholic church in Palipu' where they are members. The chickens and pigs serve as a form of saving that they can immediately exchange for cash if something unexpected happens. They can also serve as gifts for house-building or funeral ceremonies.

The household spends, on average, around Rp three million yearly on ceremonial activities, but sometimes these figures are far exceeded. Because of the high cost of one year's ceremonies, Rannu borrowed Rp eight million from a local Torajan bank, Ballo' Toraya.[2] Part of this loan was also intended to cover the school fees of their daughter who is studying nursing at a school in Makale and of two other children who attend a secondary school in a neighbouring village. Because the income from agriculture is low and insecure, Rannu regularly receives money from his brother and sister who live in Makassar. Rannu and Lucia's daughters Kristina and Marlina also contribute substantially to the household budget (see the case of Kristina in Chapter 3). Kristina regularly sends money, goods and sweets to her parents in the village, which is transported by friends or relatives returning to the village or collected by Rannu, who sometimes travels to Makassar to visit his daughters and siblings for several days. Further, the migrant family members regularly return to Palipu' to give a hand in the harvest season or to attend specific funeral ceremonies. However, although this extra labour is welcomed by Rannu, it is especially because of the migrant remittances that this household does not have huge problems in making a living or reacting to unexpected adversities or crises. As Rannu said, 'The money from my family in Makassar is a continuous source of income, whether it is a crisis or not'.

The household of Rannu is a typical example of the translocal livelihood style. Important activities by family members at two locations, in Palipu' and Makassar, are usually undertaken in consultation with each other, while there is an exchange of goods, people and information in both directions. Rannu's family in Palipu' takes care of Kristina's child and sometimes sends rice or goods to their family in Makassar. Kristina and Marlina, on the other hand, provide labour, money and goods to the household in Palipu' when needed. They are united in keeping the household running. Without the migrant family, Rannu would never have received a loan from the bank and could not fulfil his daily needs or meet his cultural obligations. Kristina in Makassar, on the other hand, could not work and earn an income if she had to take care of her baby. Typically, both the migrant members and Rannu and his wife are embedded in wider networks that provide them with the assistance needed in times of contingencies, or in case of upcoming ceremonies. Their daughters, and Rannu's siblings, are able to make use of their kin, colleagues, church members and participants in *kerukunan* Kandora (migrant association) in Makassar, while Rannu and his wife are part of an important and extensive family that owns a considerable amount of land and family wealth (*mana'*), and includes some fairly wealthy members who are always ready to give a

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[2] See Chapter 3 for a more elaborate explanation of this bank.

hand, whether as an act of kindness or to protect the *siri'* of the family. In general, these households are not poor, but they are not rich either, and they have an average standard of living according to Torajan criteria.

Entrepreneurs: The Household of Ne'Angke'

> Ne'Angke' lives with his wife, two children and a grandchild in a long wooden house that is built on poles. The house stands on the outskirts of the village, at the bottom of the hill on which the *tongkonan* of the deceased *puang* looks out over Palipu's largest rice fields, or *uma'*. Ne'Angke' and his wife are both from the lowest social class in Palipu', and most of their relatives live in the neighbouring area of Rarukang, which used to be a part of Palipu'. The family of Ne'Angke' has a relatively high and stable income through diversification of income activities, both within and beyond the borders of Palipu'. Household members are growing rice on two pieces of land owned by the *puang* in return for a share of the harvest. They also cultivate coffee, cocoa and vanilla, and they have about 20 pigs and one buffalo, which is raised by the son of a neighbour. Andarias, a son of Ne'Angke', sometimes earns some additional income through working as a bricklayer in and around the village. Because income from these activities is still unstable (depending upon rainfall and the regional economic situation) and employment is difficult to find, the other three children of Ne'Angke' have migrated to Kendari (in southeast Sulawesi) or Makassar. A son in Kendari teaches at a primary school and regularly sends money and goods home. Two daughters, Delfi and Nona, work in a local bar and shoe store in Makassar (for the story of Delfi see Chapter 3) and also contribute to the income of the household. The remittances are mainly used for daily necessities in the household and to pay for the studies of Ritta, the Delfi's daughter who lives in Makassar. If the household desperately needs money, they sell one of their pigs. If the situation is more dire, they will either call upon Ne'Angke's brother who lives in Rantepao and works for the Protestant Torajan church, or the brothers and sisters of Ne'Angke's wife who have a small shop in Kendari. In general, the household gets by through its considerable array of potential income sources. When the cost of living increased in Tana Toraja, following the economic crisis, they put more effort into growing cash crops such as vanilla and cocoa. When both the rice and the cash crop harvests were disappointing because of the drought, they asked for more money and goods from their migrant relatives and sold some pigs, and Andarias sought more construction work.

This household is a typical example of what can be categorized as an entrepreneurial livelihood style. This style is generally adopted by households from the lowest class who own few rice fields. In contrast to the 'outcasts', these households are very enterprising and are always searching for additional income possibilities. They have a diverse assortment of income activities shared among the various household members and locations that offer resistance to the threats in their vulnerable surroundings.

Because of their low social position, their networks are relatively small and do not reach people in the higher levels of society, except for a few patrons such as the *puangs*. However, even though their networks are small, social relations remain crucial for undertaking various activities, and the social relationships within their small network are relatively close and intense.

Households with an entrepreneurial livelihood style are not strongly oriented toward *gengsi* and generally use remittances for everyday expenses (such as food, housing, healthcare and education) and investing in agricultural activities rather than for lavish ceremonies. Although the majority of such households are Protestant, quite a number are Pentecostals. Pentecostalism further stimulates such entrepreneurial spirit as it accepts individual profit making. Moreover, it provides its adherents with the opportunity to establish new networks and free themselves from the chains of upperclass patrons who expect their free or low-paid labour for working their fields or at funeral ceremonies. Although most Pentecostals do still participate in the ceremonies of others, they do not organize large ceremonies themselves or take large gifts to ceremonies. Probably because the Pentecostals do largely exclude themselves from the existing socio-cultural system, through refraining from gift-giving, the church network is quite important in their lives. These networks are generally small, consisting of only a dozen households, but they are tight and helpful in cushioning many material and emotional needs in times of contingencies. Much of the money that went to ceremonies in the past now goes instead to the Pentecostal church for building and maintenance.

Established Locals: The Household of Ne'Kedeng

Next to the primary school, a two-storey wooden house looks over the valley of Palipu'. The house is surrounded by a green and colourful garden separated from the road by a hedge. On the ground floor is a little shop where sweets and cakes are sold to the schoolchildren, cigarettes to the men, and rice, salt, sugar and other daily needs to the women. On the floor above the shop lives Ne'Kedeng, who has a seat on the traditional village council, and his family. Ne'Kedeng who, according to local customs, is named after his first grandchild Kedeng comes from an important *tongkonan* in the village. His wife, Naomi, originates from an even more important *tongkonan* in Palipu', and her uncle is the ritual leader of Palipu'. Both Ne'Kedeng and his wife are considered by other villagers to be upperclass citizens and fairly rich. Like most upperclass villagers in Palipu', they are adherents of the Protestant Torajan church. Although the family has five children, none of them has left the highlands. Three children are still in school, and two

daughters are helping Naomi in and around the house and in the shop. One of the daughters is married to another villager who commutes to Makale each day to work as a mechanic in a garage.

Although the house is not particularly large, it fulfils a central role in the social life of several villagers. Almost every night, people gather in the back-yard to have a chat and drink some palm wine until late into the night. These late-night gatherings, sometimes lasting until two or three in the morning, are obviously detrimental to Naomi's health, because she always wakes up at five to feed their livestock and prepare breakfast. Naomi is raising 3 pigs, 2 goats and 15 chickens for future contingencies and upcoming ceremonies. Ne'Kedeng is raising a cock for gambling purposes. In the late afternoon, some men in Palipu' usually come together to pool Rp 50,000–100,000 on a battle between two cocks who have sharp razor blades tied to their feet. Generally, this bloody spectacle ends when one of the cocks gives up. Ne'Kedeng is not particularly lucky and often loses money through gam-bling. However, as he put it, 'Gambling is not about the money but concerns a social element'. Besides these afternoon and late night gatherings in and around the house, the area underneath the first floor is a popular spot for villagers to socialize informally.

The household possesses a quarter of a hectare of rice fields and another plot for cash crop cultivation, including vanilla, cocoa and coffee robusta. On another plot, they grow some cassava and coffee for subsistence use. The house is encircled with fruit trees and coconut palms. Most of the food consumed by the household comes from their own gardens. Although the quantity of their land has declined a little in recent years because of redivi-sions among the *tongkonan* members during funeral ceremonies, the house-hold has not faced any notable change in their income. Interestingly, Naomi remarked that 'the situation in our family has not changed in the past five years (1998 to January 2003) because we have nothing to do with the government'.

The household spends a substantial amount of money on luxury goods and possesses all the items you can find in the village: a radio, a CD player, a DVD player, a television and satellite dish, a sewing machine and a motor-cycle. Although the cash crops in good years yield considerable profits, most of the money comes from the wealthier family members in Palipu', or from their son-in-law who works in Makale. The same is true when it comes to ceremonies. Even though funeral ceremonies in Palipu' are relatively small, and only three or four buffalo and several pigs are slaughtered (with the exception of the *puang* family who slaughter tens or even hundreds of ani-mals), they still spend millions of *rupiah* each year on ceremonies, mostly also borrowed from, or given by, their richer siblings.

The case of Ne'Kedeng is a good example of a household with an estab-lished local livelihood style. Both Ne'Kedeng and Naomi are of a high social class through their kinship ties and well-established in this social position. They cannot rise to a higher position, and therefore it is pointless

to push for upward social mobility. Conversely, their social embeddedness in society prevents them from descending the social ladder. They are highly respected and adored by a large group of people (neighbours, friends and kin alike) in Palipu', and can always count on assistance in the organization of and participation in ceremonies. This does not mean, however, that they can refrain from gift-giving at ceremonies. Because they are from the higher social classes, just below the *puang*, they have to uphold this status by spending a considerable amount of money on ceremonies. This means that they need people who are able to lend or give them money. Since they are very locally oriented, and lack any direct relations with migrants, they have to maintain some relationships with translocal households and, through them, their migrant members and their money. As households with both translocal and established local livelihood styles are often members of the same *tongkonan* and thus share the same *siri'*, migrant money often trickles down in the form of money or cattle loans (not always expected to be repaid in this life). Further, in the event of future necessities, they always have some land they could use for collateral. Often such families are also involved in a variety of activities, such as rice cultivation, cash crop cultivation and other ancillary activities. The high number of households (83.3 per cent) involved in the cultivation of the fairly new cash crop, vanilla, is striking. As among the translocals, there are hardly any Pentecostals in this cluster.

Outcasts: The Case of Sande's Household

Sande' is a landless person who lives in a small house on the edge of the village, close to Ne'Mone. The house stands on a hillock that is officially owned by the village headman. Because it is not very fertile, it has already been lent for several years to Sande's parents, who live further up the hill. Sande' shares the house with his wife Elisabeth and their seven children. Elisabeth is Sande's third cousin, and they both come from an area of Palipu' that is known as 'the home of slaves'. Because they do not own land, Sande's family works on other people's rice fields in return for a share of the harvested rice. Sande' and his son plough, and his wife and daughter are involved in planting and harvesting. Usually these activities each take 3 to 5 days per season and yield about five litres of rice per labourer per day. In addition, Sande' grows some coffee on his parents' land (provided by the village headman) for both consumption in the household and for sale. On average, they harvest 4 to 5 kilograms of coffee during the harvest months which yields Rp 5,000 per litre. The children planted some vanilla plants that were given by a neighbour for free. They used some long grass as fertilizer because they lacked the money to buy synthetic fertilizer.

Besides farming, Sande's son Julian takes care of Ne'Angke's buffalo, which was bought at the market for Rp 6.7 million. Julian, who is 12 years old, dropped out of school and goes daily to the fields with the buffalo to graze. In about another year, the buffalo will be sold and the profit will be shared between the owner and Sande'. In addition to the buffalo, the household is raising two adult pigs and seven piglets at the same time of the study. The household received the mature pigs from the PKK (women's group) in the *borongna* of Babana through a form of rotation system. When the pigs give birth, Sande's wife has to give three piglets to another household. Elisabeth feeds the pigs sweet potato leaves which are grown around the house and rice bran which she purchases at the market. The money for purchasing the rice bran comes from the sale of one of their ten chickens.

To feed the household members, they need about one litre of rice per day. However, because they are often short of rice, they mix it with cassava, which is also grown on their parents' land. They usually do not buy any food. The only expenses they have is for the education of their children, soap and clothing. Because of their lack of money, only two out of their seven children attend school, each costing Rp 5,000 per month. They buy clothes only once a year. Sometimes they receive some garments from migrant family members (cousins) returning for a ceremony. However, in return Elisabeth has to prepare food and wash the dishes at these ceremonies.

The household does not spend any money on ceremonies because they are Pentecostals. They seldom go to funeral ceremonies and, if they do go, they do not take any gifts, because this is strictly forbidden by their religion. In fact, all but two of Sande's brothers and sisters became Pentacostals when they were young. The other two have remained members of the Protestant Torajan church and work for the *puang* family. For years, his sister Lomo has been working as a servant for the *puang* in Palipu'. After the *puang* died, Lomo stayed in his house to take care of the body until the actual funeral a year later. Another sister of Sande' joined a *puang* member in Makassar, where she works as a servant in the house in exchange for payment of her expenses. It seems that the only way to escape commitments toward the puang family is to change religion and become Pentecostals, as Sande' has done.

Sande's household clearly shows a livelihood style in which the objectives are not so much to fulfil the cultural expectations of society, in the sense of gift-giving at ceremonies, but rather to make ends meet. Or, in other words, to find enough food and money to survive. Because he converted to Pentecostalism, Sande' broke the link with the *puang* family; in so doing, he excluded himself and his household from any help from that quarter. The small group of people belonging to his parish of the Pentecostal church have not completely taken over this role, but they do provide labour in case of need. The household is able to borrow small amounts of money (up to say Rp 30,000) from neighbours and family members, but in

Ill. 8.2. Buffalo boy (photo by Wim Jakobs).

general these people are in the same situation. Escaping this situation is not easy because the household lacks relatives that would 'bridge' them to a wealthier (higher class) group of people, and they do not have the money to provide further education for their children, nor land or investments to grow profitable cash crops or rice on a large scale. For them, the economic crisis did not make much difference, because they were already trapped in a marginal subsistence situation.

Livelihood Styles in Kondo'

Locals: Pong Fitri's Household

At the far eastern end of the village of Kondo' stands a small wooden house on a mountainous plateau. The house is occupied by Pong Fitri, his wife and four children. The couple earn an income through planting some rice on other's people's fields in another village, about three kilometres to the south. Pong Fitri makes additional money by cutting mortars out of stone. Recently, the couple planted some coffee and cocoa trees near their house. However, because this piece of land is on the top of a rocky plateau, it is difficult to retain rainwater in the soil, and the trees grow only slowly. Pong Fitri

and his wife are doing their utmost to make ends meet. The rice they obtain from the fields they work on is not sufficient to provide them with food all year around, and they grow some cassava to mix with the rice or to replace it during shortages. They also grow some sweet potatoes to feed their pig which they keep for future necessities—perhaps as a gift at a ceremony. They raise two chickens and two dogs that are also predestined for consumption at ceremonies. Around the house they grow some banana trees and chillies.

The appearance of this small house on a dry plot of land on the outskirts of the village suggests a pitiful life. Their low status and very limited sources of income do not help make life any easier. However, on closer observation, the household appears to be firmly embedded in village society and to receive much assistance from relatives, neighbours and other villagers. Often Pong Fitri's wife praised society in Kondo' for being helpful during hard times. As she put it, 'We feel secure living here, because the people in Kondo' are very close to each other. They are helpful and show their kindness when it is needed most'. At the time of my interview, the household owed Rp 1.5 million to a rich villager who had lent them the money so that they could participate in a large funeral ceremony during the previous year. Although they pay interest of five per cent each month (Rp 75,000), the sense that there are always people in the village willing to lend them large sums of money gave the household a sense of security. They often borrow rice from some of the large landowners in the village, again at an interest of five per cent. Next to these helpful financial contributions, they also receive significant day-to-day assistance from their close relatives, neighbours and members of the same *saroan*. These people frequently exchange small amounts of money and food when it is needed. Further, they often give each other a hand in cultivating the rice fields and cash crops, or in renovating or building a new house, as occurred with Pong Fitri the previous year. Interestingly, even though Pong Fitri is from the lowest social class, he feels very attached to his *tongkonan*, to which he annually gives about Rp 100,000 in *paniuran* (ritual debt).

The case of Pong Fitri is typical of a household with a local livelihood style. It is of the lowest social class, financially poor, has relatively few income possibilities and lacks any migrant members and remittances. However, I would not term them impoverished or outcasts, like some people in Palipu'. The people in this category are still firmly embedded in local society. In this way they manage to acquire the most important basic needs such as food, housing and healthcare, and, probably more importantly, to fulfil their cultural duties at ceremonial events.

Gengsi *Seekers: Pong Pading's Household*

Pong Pading is married to a daughter of Ne'Sukku (see the account of a funeral in Chapter 6), and as they were still living in the village he took care

of most of the organizational work for the funeral ceremony. In everyday life, Pong Pading cultivates rice, cocoa, vegetables and some passion fruit, but the organization of the funeral ceremony demanded all of his time for a whole month. He even had to postpone ploughing the rice fields until the ceremonial activities were finished. Pong Pading's household also cultivates the rice fields of his brothers- and sisters-in-law who are living in Luwu and in Malaysia. In exchange, they are allowed to keep two-thirds of the rice harvest in good seasons and all of it in slack times. However, the plots are small and provide barely enough rice for the household's consumption. For the third season in a row, disease has struck his cocoa trees.

Notwithstanding these disappointing agricultural results, Pong Pading's household has no difficulties in maintaining a reasonable standard of living. They raise ten pigs and some chickens which can be sold during difficult times but, more importantly, they have two children working in Malaysia, plus one in Kalimantan and another in Luwu who support the household financially on a regular basis. At the funeral of Pong Pading's mother-in-law, Ne Sukku', all ten pigs were eaten by the 150 villagers who assisted with the preparations for the ceremony and by the hundreds of guests at the actual rituals. Pong Pading's children contributed the remainder of his entire share (Rp 150 million) to pay for 15 buffalo and other necessities. Unlike his wife, who is without question from the highest social class, one of Pong Pading's parents is from the second class, making his status somewhat questionable. Because of this, he is always focussed on increasing his prestige through slaughtering lots of expensive buffalo at funeral ceremonies or taking large fat pigs to house inauguration ceremonies. Further, by filling a central role in his wife's family, possible because almost all of her family live outside Tana Toraja and so are not always in a position to attend funeral ceremonies, he is continuously seeking ways to increase his prestige or *gengsi*. His opportunities to achieve this goal have increased in the last four years because, during this period, almost all of his children have migrated and are now able to contribute to the family's striving for honour.

The case of Pong Pading illustrates a typical household that has ordered most of its practices in such a way that they lead to an increase in *gengsi*. When entering Pong Pading's house, there is no obvious sign of wealth, but everyone in Kondo' considers him to be a wealthy man because he offers so many buffalo and pigs at funeral ceremonies. It seems that the pursuit of *gengsi* in Kondo' is still accelerating, demanding ever greater contributions of pigs and buffalo. Many people from the higher social classes are involved, and the competition for prestige seems to be unaffected by the recent economic crisis. This is to an extent because much of the necessary money comes from outside Indonesia (mainly Malaysia) where markets were less affected by the Southeast Asian economic crisis. More importantly, the competition continues because contributing money to ceremonies and thus upholding or increasing the family's

prestige is the number one priority for most villagers, even if this must be accomplished at the expense of their own living conditions and comfort.

This style involves mainly people from the second and third social classes, who still have some room for upward mobility. Although most of the money of the *gengsi* seekers comes from outside Tana Toraja, most of them also engage in a range of agricultural activities in Tana Toraja, such as cash crop and rice cultivation. To fulfil their major objective in life, quite a number of households also raise buffalo. In addition to conspicuous gift giving at ceremonies, status and prestige also depend on one's social contribution to village society. For this reason, most of these households are quite active in various social, cultural or economic events. They fulfil duties in a church, on the village council, in public projects, and so on.

Siri' Protectors: The Household of Ne'Rombe

Ne'Rombe and his wife live together with their 22-year-old daughter in a large *tongkonan*. In front of the *tongkonan* are four beautifully carved and decorated rice barns (*lumbung*) that symbolize the wealth of the family. Since the mid-1970s, Ne'Rombe has held the position of *pa'buntuan sugi'* which means 'rich man'. Given his wealth, this title has certainly been given with good reason. He owns a second house in Burika' and owns about 10 hectares of rainfed, but also irrigated, rice fields. Notwithstanding, a more important criterion is his impressive record of contributions of slaughtered animals at funerals and the large number of animals he takes to other people's ceremonies. Ne'Rombe is quite a figure in Kondo'. He is the leader of two *tongkonan*, the headman (*Ambe'*) of *saroan* Bottona in the southern part of the village, and is known as 'the king of slaves'. Although it is never expressed openly, most people living in the area of *saroan* Bottona are considered to be former slaves or people from the lowest class. One consequence is that Ne'Rombe has no difficulty mobilizing people to help him at funeral ceremonies, or to work on one of his twelve plots of rice. However, unlike in the past, today he has to provide food, cigarettes and palm wine, or give his labourers a share of the harvest in exchange for their services.

To protect his status and power over the people in Bottona, he has to display his wealth at all important ceremonies and slaughter animals in vast numbers at all of them. Fortunately, he has six children who are now living in Jakarta, Irian Jaya, Kalimantan and Malaysia and who take care of most of the expenses. Working as a businessman, a civil officer, at a bank, and as a general labourer, they manage to save tens of millions of *rupiah* each year to send to their home family in Kondo'. Another son, living in Rantepao, takes care of this great amount of money that regularly flows into the local bank. Because this son has a telephone in his house, he is able to facilitate contact between the migrants and his parents in Kondo'. All the migrants return home at least once a year to attend one of the ceremonies, keeping ties within the family close.

In line with his extravagant expenditure at ceremonies, Ne'Rombe spends far more on daily life than the average villager in Kondo'. Typically, his household needs about Rp 700,000 each month for food, clothes, toiletries, animal feed, healthcare, church donations, electricity, land tax and transportation to the market and to ceremonies. In addition, it costs them about Rp 1 million annually to farm their rice fields (mostly for renting a hand tractor for ploughing). It is also these rice fields that deliver most of their locally earned income. The fields are cultivated by other people on a sharecropping basis, and they typically yield over 500 litres of rice (worth Rp 10 million at the time of this research), after deducting the share for the workers. However, the rice is never sold on the market but is utilized in the household for everyday meals and for ceremonial activities.

Although the case of Ne'Rombe might seem a little extreme, it presents clearly all the aspects that make up the livelihood style of the *siri'* protectors in Kondo'. Ne'Rombe (and his other household members) is well-respected by his *tongkonan* and *saroan* members, and also in the Protestant Torajan church where he holds a seat on the elders council. In order to maintain this respect of Kondo' society, or in other words to consolidate his position, he has to display his wealth at ceremonies. To obtain the necessary wealth, the household has spread their economic activities over multiple locations and various disciplines. Although Ne'Rombe functions as the representative of the household, all its members have a part to play in the maintenance of its wealth and power. In addition to money, it has never been a problem for Ne'Rombe to find labour for the organization of extraordinarily large ceremonies because he has so many followers. As one Torajan told me, 'It is only possible to organize large ceremonies if you are from the highest class. For ceremonies of size you need to mobilize a lot of people, and this is only possible when you are very rich or when you are from the highest class and have a lot of people below you who feel obliged to help'. In conclusion, it is fair to say that this livelihood style is thus suited to people from the highest social echelons who have migrant money and followers. As with the status seekers, their concern in life is not so much about having enough food on the table or being healthy, but rather to be able to slaughter livestock at all times and at all ceremonies. Over 60 per cent of such households invest more than Rp 1 million per year in ceremonies, and almost one-third of the households spend over Rp 5 million for such purposes.

Transnationals: The Household of Marthen Bai

Marthen lives with his wife and a school-age child in a newly-built wooden house in the southern part of the village, known as the 'slave area'. The house,

which cost Rp 8 million to build was completed just before I arrived for a first interview. The house was paid for by his other three children, who are all working in a supermarket in the city of Sandakan, in the eastern part of Malaysia. The small cottage they used to live in before they moved into the new house now serves as the kitchen. Marthen is cultivating some rice fields that are far from the village and owned by a distant relative. The yield is not enough for the household's own needs, and each year the household needs to buy rice over several months. He also has some fruit and coffee trees in front of his house for subsistent use and, whenever possible, he makes some money from carpentry. His wife is raising a pig and some chickens and earns some additional rice by working in other people's rice fields during the harvest season.

Because the income generated by Marthen and his wife is insufficient to buy food and other daily necessities, let alone luxury consumer goods, they depend on the regular remittances sent by their children. As Marthen phrases it, 'money is the key to everything' (*uang adalah kunci segala segalanya*). To prevent myself from feeling ashamed toward other relatives if there is a funeral ceremony and I cannot join, I hope that my children will never refrain from sending money. I need to offer pigs and sometimes even buffalo at ceremonies whether I want to or not'. Last year, Marthen's household spent about Rp 8.5 million on gifts for ceremonies. He explains that the reasons for sending money home are ranked as follows: for funerals and other ceremonies; for house building; and then for expenses in daily life. For Marthen's household, life has become much easier recently because their minimal income has been supplemented by the remittances of their children who have been migrating over the past decade. The migrant family members regularly return home to attend ceremonies or to spend their holidays, and Marthen and his wife have already been twice to Malaysia to visit their children and grandchildren.

Marthen's situation is a good example of a household that has become completely dependent upon remittances. Compared to the other livelihood styles, the translocal contains more households that lack any land rights and that are less involved in the cultivation of coffee, cocoa or vanilla. Consequently, remittances play a significant role in the income portfolio of these households, especially when we consider their relatively large expenditures on ceremonies. Typically, they have established a solid network around them, one which usually includes relatives, neighbours and *saroan* members. However, they do not fulfil any very public or notable role in society, as do the *gengsi* seekers and *siri'* protectors, and they do not rely on their networks when it comes to money. The transnationals have to fulfil certain duties to retain their honour and to prevent themselves from being shamed, but this is far easier (and cheaper) than fulfilling the duties of the *siri'* protectors, who have to uphold their high status.

In this sense, the orientation of the people with this style is more of a balance between fulfilling duties at ceremonies and obtaining a basic standard of living in terms of food, healthcare, housing, religious devotion, etc.

Some Concluding Remarks on Livelihood Styles in Tana Toraja

The typical cases above demonstrate that people within similar contexts opt for different approaches and practices in earning a living. A closer look shows that neither structure nor agency is the sole determinant of these choices and actions. Households within the same social class might behave differently, and households with similar characteristics do not automatically act in the same way. People's actions are, rather, the result of both structural aspects, such as social class and income possibilities, and the capabilities they have to undertake particular practices. Although there is a wide range of possible practices from which people can choose (consciously or unconsciously), both the cluster analysis and the observations during the field research highlighted certain dominant patterns of practices in Tana Toraja, which are well reflected in the livelihood styles described above. As styles are not neatly bounded or static, an investigation into livelihood styles in other villages, or a follow-up study, would probably lead to slightly different results. However, apart from styles that reflect deviant behaviour (such as those involving illegal practices), the styles in Palipu' and Kondo' are fairly typical of contemporary southern and northern villages in Tana Toraja. In this respect, they are helpful in answering the questions that stand at the heart of this study: which households in Tana Toraja are spending a lot of money on ceremonies, and why, and how are these households able to find the necessary money and resources while Indonesia is struggling with an economic crisis.

The livelihood styles in Palipu', tend to contradict somewhat the view that funeral ceremonies in Tana Toraja are becoming larger and more extravagant spectacles. Apart from the *puang* families, the majority of the households are not oriented toward the organization of ceremonies of great size and cost. Social mobility is difficult in this region, and people are more oriented toward the education of their children and the making of a sustainable living. Participation in ceremonial activities remains important for most households in order to maintain their status or to fulfil their ritual obligations toward their ancestors or relatives, but most of these ritual activities remain modest and involve the slaughtering of only

a few buffalo and pigs. The largest cluster of households in the village, the translocals, spend money on ceremonies, most of which is derived from migrant members who are living in South Sulawesi (mostly in Makassar) or elsewhere in Indonesia. The style cluster called 'established locals' contains about half the number of households in the translocal cluster. These households are all of a relatively high status and spend larger sums of money on ceremonies, mostly generated through local activities. Both these two clusters of households are dominated by Protestants or Catholics and are relatively wealthy compared to the other villagers.

In contrast to households with these livelihood styles, the outcasts and the entrepreneurs spend little or no money on ceremonies. Instead they focus on obtaining enough money for food, healthcare, education and other daily necessities. All households in these two style clusters come from the lower social echelons of society. The outcasts have difficulty making ends meet, and most of them have turned to Pentecostalism to free themselves from pressing ritual obligations. They make up quite an isolated group in society and struggle much of the time to satisfy their basic needs. Through employing a wide variety of income activities and spreading beyond local borders, the entrepreneurs have succeeded in making a much more sustainable living. During the economic crisis, they profited from the increasing prices for cash crops, and their migrant family members helped to cushion the impact of disappointing agricultural harvests. Some members of this cluster have also turned to Pentecostalism to either escape ritual obligations or to free themselves from the suffocating grasp of the *puangs*.

Unlike the livelihood styles in the south of Tana Toraja, the livelihood styles in the northern exemplary village of Kondo' seem to better the paradox that I put forward in the introduction to this chapter and also to this book. The style analysis makes it clear that it is particularly households from the upper two social classes that spend enormous amounts of money on ceremonies, albeit for different reasons. The expenditure on ceremonies by households from the highest class are needed to uphold their high status and *siri'*. These *siri'* protectors generally generate money from rice cultivation and, more importantly, through migrant members with relatively well-paid jobs throughout Indonesia. Because protecting the family's *siri'* is seen as so important for these households, the money flow from migrants has not been affected by the economic crisis. The *gengsi* seekers, who are generally from the second and third classes, are driving up the size and cost of funeral ceremonies. With the help of 'new' money from migrant household members in Malaysia, which was not hit as hard by the

Southeast Asian economic crisis as Indonesia, they are now in a position to organize exorbitant ceremonies themselves or to buy the most beautiful and expensive buffalo for the ceremonies of other *siri'* protectors, taking on new debts that have to be paid back, preferably through an even larger gift at a future ceremony.

The growth in ceremonies is fuelled by the contributions of lower social class households who are trying to fulfil their perceived duties in both financial and physical (contributing labour) senses, to guard their own, and their *tongkonan*'s, honour. Although they do not organize large ceremonies themselves, these transnational households are significant contributors of migrant money to the ceremonial activities of others. Households identified as having the style of 'locals' are the only ones not really spending much on ceremonies. They do not receive remittances and have very limited income generating options. They are not oriented toward prestige but just do what is expected of them, investing a modest amount of money in gifts for ceremonies but, more importantly, providing labour to help make the organization of the enormous ceremonies of *siri'* protectors and *gengsi* seekers possible.

In conclusion, the livelihood styles concept has helped me to examine the households and add to the picture that I had of Tana Toraja at the start of my research. My research shows that it is primarily the *gengsi* seekers and the *siri'* protectors in the northern area of Tana Toraja that are involved in a continuous battle over power and prestige. In the south, it is primarily the *puang* who organize extravagant ceremonial activities, while the majority of the villagers refrain from holding large slaughtering events. In this southern region, there is even a growing number of people who escape the gift-giving system by turning to Pentecostalism. Further, the styles concept helped in reaching an understanding of these households that went beyond income activities. It provided ideas about households' structural constraints, their value orientations and their social networks and relations that can be called upon in times of crisis or contingencies.

Livelihood styles are not static, and they vary from the standard patterns in the sense that change is inherent in a style. Along with internal changes, these styles are the way they are because of changes in the context in which they are embedded. As we saw in both villages, the introduction of education, Christianity, a cash market and migration have all created new opportunities and value orientations. However, these changes, triggered by outsiders, did not occur evenly or at the same time in all parts of Tana Toraja. Moreover, the way people reacted to these changes differed and depended on various other factors such as structural constraints,

existing value orientations, and the local and/or translocal social networks in which they took place.

   People could potentially switch to other practices or even adopt other styles, but in general this appeared to be complicated by structural constraints. As we saw in the two village studies, people feel more or less obliged to participate in ceremonies, to protect their own and their family's *siri'* and to show their respect to their ancestors. Refraining from these socio-cultural duties would mean a break with their family, their *tongkonan* and even society. Although there are some so-called free-riders (generally in the towns of Rantepao and Makale) and people who sever most or all of their social relations by leaving the village and severing contact, the majority fulfil their duties. In Palipu', the 'outcasts' turned to Pentecostalism to escape their socio-cultural obligations, something which was not possible several decades ago. This provided a way out of the gift-giving system without becoming totally excluded from existing social relationships. The orientation of people with the other styles is still based on participation in ceremonial activities, not only to pay their respect to ancestors, or to protect the honour of the family, but e to obtain, power, prestige and wealth as well. In that sense, participation in ceremonies, and the high expenditure that comes with it, are as rational as seeking food, shelter and a healthy life. And the way to match the ever-increasing sizes and costs of the ceremonies of the *siri'* protectors, and so obtain more power, prestige and wealth within the highlands, is through migration to places beyond Tana Toraja.

CHAPTER NINE

LIVING WITH THE DEAD

When I first arrived in Tana Toraja in 2001, and again in 2002, to map out the way in which people make a living in the aftermath of the Indonesian economic crisis, I was confronted by an obsession with death. Torajans literally live with the dead, and there seemed to be 'no life without the dead'. Everyday life is complicated by the incidence of various public events, of which funerals are the most important. The ceremonies in which I participated were not unique but represented only few of over a thousand similar funeral ceremonies that continue to be organized each year. The paradox of a people that continue or even increase their participation in the organization of extravagant and very expensive ceremonies while the value of their currency has dropped and the cost of living increased was behind the central question of this study: 'What is the practice of everyday life in the highlands of Tana Toraja' (taking into account the cultural, socio-political and economic realm, and translocal networks)'?

I assumed that there must be a logic behind the way Torajans make a living that is different from perspectives based solely on income, employment, consumption criteria or basic needs that are central in most livelihood studies. Although such studies have advanced the analysis of livelihoods by paying greater attention to individual agency, their formulation remains based on economics, while political, social and cultural aspects are treated as context. However, in Torajan lives (perhaps as in most people's lives) there is much more at stake than economic rationality—something that lies, as Hefner phrases it, 'outside the sphere of rational choice, somewhere in the "irrational" world' (Hefner 1990:235). Many decisions are a matter of satisfying what is socially and culturally valued and crucial. Human agents are embedded in various political, cultural and social structures, as much as economic ones, and all of these factors influence their practices.

For my investigation of the effects of the economic crisis at the local level, I first needed to find out exactly what 'the local' meant in Tana Toraja and which locality would be suitable for my research. However, I found that a conventional, single-site and 'representative' location, with an

independently bounded set of relationships and activities, simply did not exist in the highlands. The empirical facts showed much variation between villages in the highlands with regard to socio-political organization and stratification, cultural ideals and expressions, the natural environment, land tenure and economic organization. The differences were most clear-cut between villages in the northern and southern parts of Tana Toraja.

Further, the increasing mobility of Torajans, especially in the latter half of the twentieth century, has led to a large number of dispersed and/or fragmented networks that span multiple localities and cut across political boundaries. The contemporary Torajan social field is much larger than Tana Toraja. It consists of networks scattered all over the world, with the largest density in Indonesia and its major foci in Tana Toraja and Makassar, the main city of South Sulawesi. The ancestral house, or *tongkonan*, has expanded and now crosses regional and national borders as its members have left the Torajan highlands in search of employment elsewhere. Despite living and working outside Tana Toraja, these people remain surprisingly connected to their homeland and, in fact, they have often left the highlands with the purpose of expanding the family's wealth. In that sense, the Torajan world does not stop at the borders of the highlands. Consequently, while research into the ways Torajans make a living could have easily been executed at the community level a century ago, today such research cannot avoid adopting a translocal or transnational perspective. Thus, the research localities need to sample from the overarching Torajan social field, or clustering of networks, and should include at least one village in the northern and one in the southern part of Tana Toraja, as well as a typical migrant community.

These initial research findings made what had seemed a practical and comprehensible research question rather complex, and they required both analytical accommodation and reconceptualization that had several implications for the way the data had to be gathered. I needed to develop an analysis that would enable me to better come to terms with Torajan livelihoods. The analysis had to provide a more complete picture than perspectives based solely on income, employment, consumption criteria or basic needs. It should focus on both actor and structure, go beyond a single locality, include the historical and cultural dimensions, and take into consideration the social space in which livelihoods are created, enhanced and secured. Methodologically, this meant that I had to move away from a conventional single-site approach to a research design encompassing multiple sites. This involved not only extending the description of the particular from a detailed to a more holistic approach, and shifting from an

ethnographic study of a single community to a method involving inter-local comparison, but it also required following the people, following the thing, and following the story, as Marcus (1995) puts it, from Torajan villages to migrant communities.

By approaching the conceptual apparatus of livelihoods differently and studying the ways in which Torajans make a living at various locations in the Torajan world, while taking into account the social interactions between these localities, this study differs from previous livelihood studies. Further, this study differs from other livelihood studies in the way it deals with history. It provides a rather extensive socio-political, cultural and economic historical background to develop a better understanding of the dynamics of people's livelihoods and to put the recent economic crisis in perspective. People's livelihood practices, and the ideals or objectives on which they are based, do not come from nowhere but are part of a long life trajectory and can only be understood as such. Overall, this study aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion on livelihoods and transnationalism, to the methodological debate on doing research at multiple sites, and also to the advancement of the ethnography of highland Tana Toraja.

Moving toward a Global Tongkonan

The Torajan world has become larger and more widely spread in recent years, and includes both the heartland of Tana Toraja as well as a migrant diaspora. Especially since the 1960s, in the so-called 'after *merantau*' period, large-scale migration has been set in motion. Torajan people started to establish migrant communities all over Indonesia, and later also abroad, particularly in certain Southeast Asian nations but also in some European countries, the United States and Australia. The number of Torajans living outside the highlands now far exceeds the population of Tana Toraja itself. The various Torajan migrant communities, or diasporas as I prefer to call them, have been shaped by various local, national and international developments, but whether they are in Sulawesi, Kalimantan, Java or Malaysia, they share some similarities in the way they are organized, the places they encounter, as well as the networks that facilitate the movement of people, capital, goods and information.

In a period of potential conflict with other ethnic groups and religious backgrounds, but also in a time of decentralization, the various diasporas seem to merge into a transnational social world, or space, as I called it in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2). An IKAT type of organization is

rapidly emerging in various regions with high concentrations of Torajan migrants as a mechanism to connect the lower levels of organization, such as the *kerukunan* and the church parish, with other migrant communities and even to an all-embracing Torajan organization. Through forging and sustaining multi-stranded social relations that link their societies of origin and of settlement, most Torajan migrants meet the definition of Schiller et al. (1992) used to identify people as transmigrants. As we saw in Chapter 3, Torajan transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations—familial, economic, social, organizational, religious and political—that span borders. They take actions, make decisions, feel concerns and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously. The social spaces that are created by these transmigrants do not perfectly overlap in a single geographical area; rather they transcend boundaries and have together merged into a new Torajan transnational social space or world. In this sense, the Torajan social world fits into existing ideas about transnationalism and resembles other studies on this topic. However, it also differs from many other transnational networks in which the diasporas become detached from particular places and are eventually considered 'imagined communities'. In contrast, the Torajan transmigrant networks stay firmly anchored in their place of origin and are in that sense 'imagined but not imaginary' in the words of Jenkins (2002). In the case of Makassar, we saw that the Torajan elites living in this city influence and design politics and policy in Tana Toraja and that it is a place where the cultural and symbolic world is reinvented. However, it also became clear that the Torajan diaspora in Makassar would not exist without the heartland. The wealth, power and status of migrant Torajans in the diaspora is inextricably linked to the heartland, and Torajans remaining in the highlands are as much influencing the livelihoods of their migrant relatives in Makassar as the other way around.

   This exceptional and long-standing attachment and interdependency of Torajan migrants to the highlands is reinforced through the *tongkonan*. The *tongkonan* is, as it were, the navel of Torajan lives. It is the place where the umbilical cords of people are buried and where people return after death. It is the place that houses the family's energy, or *sumanga'*, and the symbol of people's wealth, power and status. Through the design of the house, its size, distinctive shape and fine ornamentation, the *tongkonan* provides a clearly visible display of people's wealth, status and power. Moreover, the construction of such an enduring sign of prestige usually involves expensive ceremonies and, when finished, it becomes the site of rituals such as funeral ceremonies. As such, it gives Torajans their identity

and, therefore, few Torajans can live without the shield of a *tongkonan*. Thus, it is understandable that even though Torajans might physically have left the highlands, their minds stay with the *tongkonan* of their origin in Tana Toraja, and most of their actions in the place of migration serve to benefit their *tongkonan* at some stage. Torajan migration has thus literally broadened the *tongkonan*. Whereas the physical and social *tongkonan* were quite similar in the past, today, the circle of the social *tongkonan* is ever increasing and becoming translocal or even transnational. Because these transnational migrant members of a *tongkonan,* living all over the world, continue to show a centripetal tendency, I term these houses 'global *tongkonan*'—a kind of mythological temple to which people can, and should, return.

The Homeland: Social Space and Place

Clearly the Torajan migrant world is not detached from any place but is firmly anchored in the *tongkonan* located in the Torajan homeland. The seemingly open and porous translocal or transnational Torajan networks are thus largely place-based and place-nourished. But what exactly is the Torajan homeland, and how did it come into being as a social space and place? How does the Torajan social space, or the networks in Tana Toraja, tally with the administrative units in the district? And how are these spaces and places imagined, contested and enforced?

Neither the administrative unit of Tana Toraja nor the total population of the Sa'dan Valley are self-evident frameworks. What constitutes the place of Tana Toraja is rather the outcome of social and political processes that run more or less in parallel to each other. Before the Dutch arrived in 1906, Sa'dan people did not even think of their place in terms of a bounded territory. In many aspects, pre-colonial Torajan society fitted the 'house society' image postulated by Lévi-Strauss (1983:174). It consisted of a number of social groupings, or kinship networks that were linked to particular places by ancestral houses, but which were not territorially based. In the following century, this Torajan world changed rather quickly due to external pressures and interference. The area was colonized by the Dutch, ruled by the Japanese, and came subsequently under the control of various successive Indonesian governments. Within the Torajan social space, a continuous struggle took place between various people and parties over the ultimate stakes—power and prestige. Although the stakes in the power game, and the arena in which it was played, remained largely the same,

the rules of the game were frequently changed by external governments. This history of power politics with successive power and policy changes on national and regional levels has turned Tana Toraja into both an administrative unit and a socially constructed place. After a long process of wielding and yielding by various players, Tana Toraja has settled into its present geographic identity.

In Massey's words (1994), the particular mix of social relations, which are part of what defines the uniqueness of Tana Toraja as a place, are by no means all included within the place itself. It includes relationships that stretch beyond and, as such, the Torajan social space is much larger than the place itself. What is precisely considered Tana Toraja, as a living place or homeland, differs by group or even by individual, and it does not necessarily coincide with particular administrative boundaries, nor with local kinship groupings or organizations.

A Layered Society

Chapters 5 through 7 outlined the details of the various structural layers or dimensions that make up the Torajan world, starting with the socio-political aspects. This socio-political layer makes clear that following the downfall of the Suharto regime the rules have changed and become more flexible. The power game has opened up again for the old nobility. The contest over power and prestige at both the *lembang* and the district level now embraces the new wealthy middle class, bureaucrats and political leaders, as well as the traditional elites, and includes both local Torajans and migrants. With the support of their *tongkonan*, these people struggle over political power, resources and prestige. Although some middle-class people (mostly businessmen) are now able to join the struggle for power, it largely remains a fight among the traditional elite and their *tongkonan*; the majority of the population in Tana Toraja are excluded from any important position on the political stage. To some extent, political competition over power is similar to struggles over status and prestige and not very different from the fights over political room that emerged after earlier decentralization measures. Certainly, the investment of resources has increased, but the stakes are the same. Similarly, the way in which the game is played has not changed much. It remains a struggle between *tongkonan*, or at least individuals shielded by their *tongkonan*, in a display of wealth at funerals and house-inauguration ceremonies.

The cultural layer shows that distinction is an important objective in Torajan lives. Distinction needs to be maintained, or gained, through

displays. The competition through displays takes place between *tongkonan*, not between individuals. Although leaving some room for manoeuvre by the secondary classes, especially in northern Tana Toraja, for the lower and 'slave' classes the system offers virtually no way to break through the class barriers. This social stratification is important for the way people can make a living. Hierarchy leads to distinction, which again leads to displays. People are either born in a particular *tongkonan*, or have a particular relationship to a *tongkonan* through ancestors or marriage. While the *tongkonan* is the only vehicle through which people are able to move up the hierarchy, the main purpose of Torajans is to distinguish themselves and their *tongkonan* from others, to increase their *siri'*. Their most important ambition is to exclude as many people as possible from membership in one's high-status *tongkonan*, and to ensure that one becomes successful within that *tongkonan*. Enhancing the *siri'* of individuals and *tongkonan* is thus the ultimate goal of many Torajans and is more important than food or drink.

Since funeral ceremonies are 'events par excellence' of creating or increasing ones *siri'*, people invest enormous amounts of money in them. As Vickers (2005:47) puts it, 'Rituals were regarded as the defining moments of local culture, the real "work" of life, and people dated the important events of their lives around them'. In Geertz's terms, these rituals, in particular funeral ceremonies, are the main vehicles of meaning in Torajan society. Through the creation of *siri'*, people can accumulate more wealth, which in turn leads to more *siri'*. Although this form of 'rat race to the top' has led to the enormous growth in ceremonies, not every Torajan is willing or able to compete. Often such people have avoided any further involvement in ceremonies through migration and at the same time have given up most of their contacts with the homeland. Others have turned to Pentecostalism as an alternative way of life since that does not allow participation in certain traditional funeral rituals, such as the slaughtering of animals.

The layer of the economy shows another side of Torajan lives. It reveals that there are many differences in the ways in which people earn a living and spend their money. Accordingly, the way in which people's income and expenditure patterns have been affected by the economic crisis, and people's perceptions of the crisis, are also highly disparate.

If the data from the two sample cases are compared, various conclusions about the Torajan experience of the Indonesian 'total crisis' can be drawn. First of all, location matters. Although the two villages are both located in the same district and, as the crow flies, no more than

30 kilometres apart, their social systems and resource bases differ considerably and, accordingly, people's life objectives, expectations and involvement in livelihood activities are different. Each livelihood activity is affected differently (some positively, some negatively) by the crisis, and so the overall effect on people largely depends on the balance of their involvements in these various activities. Second, wealth class is another indicative marker of the way in which people experienced the Indonesian financial and economic crisis in Tana Toraja. Usually, and to an extent determined by location, wealth and status largely define people's life objectives and access to resources, and so influence their responses to, and experiences of, changes in their life conditions.

Third, for most people in both Torajan villages, the Indonesian total crisis only meant a minor disturbance to the lifecycle of agricultural production, migration and rituals. Although, depending on their specific constitution, some saw their income clearly deteriorating while others were able to gain, the majority of households did not experience any noteworthy change at all. Fourth, it was demonstrated that local livelihoods are always open to risks, threats and emerging opportunities even without the influence of external shocks. Rural people live in vulnerable environments and are regularly faced with crop and livestock diseases, droughts, floods, forest fires, and the like. Important and additional crisis-related hardships, affecting both wealthy and poor villagers, resulted from the fluctuating market prices and changes in the socio-political realm. Fifth, most Torajan people do not live in isolation but are part of local and translocal networks of social relationships (kin, fellow villagers and friends) which can help them to cope with unexpected setbacks or to take advantage of new opportunities. The existence of large networks, diversified by wealth and location, are a crucial determinant in understanding the resilience of the villagers to shocks and stresses such as those caused by the Indonesian crisis.

To conclude, the comparison of people's livelihoods and their resilience in times of crisis between two villages shows a clear relationship between people's perceptions of reality and the social-cultural context in which they are embedded. As a consequence, the effects, responses and experiences of a crisis, or any other macro-change, cannot be studied only on the macro level but need to include the local dimension plus the transnational relations and the networks that link them. In other words, different contexts produce different livelihood combinations, which in turn lead to different perceptions. Moreover, these perceptions do not become homogeneous by a blending of the various contexts and possible combinations

that have been affected by the crisis. However, in general, people did have less money to invest in ceremonies after the crisis than before. The extremely high costs of ceremonies, which are out of proportion to other local expenses, were covered with the help of migrant household members but also at the expense of other demands such as for clothes, food and luxury goods. This does not mean that there is another economic rationality in Tana Toraja, but rather that people have priorities in their allocations of resources other than satisfying the basic needs as defined in most Western countries.

Torajan Livelihood Styles

Whereas the various layers provide insights into the structural aspects that shape the room that people have to make a living, they do not explain what kind of people or households are investing disproportionate amounts of money in ceremonies. Not everyone in the same socio-political organization, social class, *tongkonan* or wealth class acts in the same way. Thinking solely in terms of categories is therefore not an effective way of explaining people's behaviour. Through focussing on income or wealth class, most livelihood and poverty studies consequently provide an incomplete or, even worse, inaccurate picture of reality. Wealth class alone is too limited, and to get a differentiated and reliable picture of the way in which people make a living, what is needed is to cut across the various social, political, cultural and economic categories.

To explain the way people make a living in Tana Toraja as something more than the outcome of economically valuable resources being strategically mobilized, and to 'escape the various boxes', I introduced the concept of style. Styles are defined here as a recognizable and coherent pattern of practices that result from an actor's conscious and unconscious objectives in establishing, maintaining and enhancing a living in interaction (both in cooperative and conflicting manners) with other actors over time, and within the framework of status systems, cultural ideals and geographical space and place(s). Styles point to the idea that we should not be thinking of a collection of rational actors but rather of people who have a number of scenarios at their disposal that are shaped by context and structural factors. With some licence, the analysis of livelihood styles can be compared with the popular computer program 'Adobe Photoshop' with which one can edit digital photographs. To change or refine particular details in a photo, it is necessary to separate the photo into various layers so as not to

lose any important information. The adjustments are, thus, not made to the photo itself, but to the various layers underneath the photograph. Although each layer provides some information, or parts of the picture, the layers are useless on their own; only together do they make up the picture. When we compare a particular style to a photo, or at least to the end result of a series of actions made with the help of the computer program, the layers can be seen as the various socio-political, cultural and economic structures that lie behind the style. Each layer provides a lot of information about people's behaviour and thinking, but only when they are put together do they yield insight into the style. Thus, although we have to outline each layer or structure separately, they remain only single layers, or individual parts of the whole picture which only become valuable in combination with the others. Missing only one layer leads to an incomplete picture or false representation of livelihood styles.

After an elaboration of the Torajan migrant world and homeland in Chapters 3 and 4, and the various layers of Torajan society in Chapters 5–7, I brought everything together in Chapter 8 to identify particular livelihood styles. Although there is a wide array of practices possible, from which people in Tana Toraja can choose (consciously or unconsciously), both the cluster analysis and the observations during the field research indicated particular dominant patterns of practices. As styles are not neatly bounded or static, an investigation of livelihood styles in other villages, or a follow-up study, would probably lead to slightly different results. However, apart from styles that reflect deviant behaviour (such as those involving illegal practices), the four styles in Palipu' and the four in Kondo' are fairly typical of contemporary life in southern and northern villages in Tana Toraja.

The style analysis reveals that it is especially the *gengsi* seekers and the *siri'* protectors in the northern area of Tana Toraja who are involved in a continuous battle over power and prestige. In the south, it is primarily the *puang* who organize extravagant ceremonial activities, and the majority of villagers refrain from large slaughtering events. In this region, there is even a growing number of people escaping the gift-giving system altogether through turning to Pentecostalism. The styles concept has helped me to understand these households far better than by simply considering income activities. It has also provided ideas about a household's structural constraints, value orientation and translocal/national social networks and relations that can be of help in times of crises or contingencies.

Livelihood styles are not static, and they differ from the normal patterns in the sense that change is incorporated into a style. Alongside internal changes, these styles developed because of changes in the context in

which they are embedded. As we saw in both villages, the introductions of education, Christianity, a cash market and migration have created new opportunities and value orientations. However, these changes, triggered by outsiders, did not apply evenly, or at the same time, in all parts of Tana Toraja. Further, the way people reacted to these changes differed and depended on various other factors such as structural constraints, existing value orientations, and the local and/or translocal social networks in which they were embedded.

While people might switch to other practices, or even other styles, in general this appeared to be complicated by structural constraints. As we saw in the two village studies, people feel more or less obliged to participate in ceremonies in order to protect their own and their family's *siri'* and to show their respect to their ancestors. Opting out of these socio-cultural duties means a break with family, *tongkonan* and even society. Although there are some so-called freeriders (generally in the towns of Rantepao and Makale) and people who break off most or all of their social relations through leaving the village and avoiding any contact, the majority meet their obligations. In Palipu' the 'outcasts' had turned to Pentecostalism to escape their socio-cultural obligations—something which was not possible until relatively recently. This provided them with a route out of the gift-giving system without being totally excluded from their social relationships. The orientation of people in the other styles is still very much based on participation in ceremonial activities, not only to pay respect to their ancestors, or to protect the honour of the family, but as much to obtain power, prestige and wealth. In this sense, participation in ceremonies and the high costs that come with it are as rational as looking for food, shelter and a healthy life. The route to follow to meet the ever increasing size and cost of the ceremonies of the *siri'* protectors, and through that obtain more power, prestige and wealth inside the highlands, has become migration beyond Tana Toraja.

Life and Death: A Double Helix

I began this book by highlighting the paradox that people continue or even increase their participation in the organization of extravagant and expensive ceremonies while the value of money has decreased and the costs of living increased. After having broadened the livelihoods approach and given it greater theoretical depth while also looking beyond purely economic activities in the elaboration of this approach, I conclude that

the Torajan practice of everyday life is not only to be found in life but also in death. Death in Tana Toraja is a public happening, and the meaning of life is a good death. Funeral ceremonies are central in the life of most Torajans and are the answer to death. A better death leads to more prestige and a better position. Death is, as it were, the last opportunity to make something of your life. World religions, education and migration have not ended the large funeral ceremonies in Tana Toraja. Instead, these factors have made possible the growth both in size and cost of funeral and house-building ceremonies. Death is more than an abstract concept; ancestors are, for example, still living on in wooden statues (*tau tau*) or even present in the house, waiting to be buried. If you give the dead a good funeral, this will be repaid in daily life through a good harvest or good health, for example. It is a different way of life, another rationality. Or as Hefner (1990:237) phrases it, 'It is not that actors are less rational'; rather the 'social system that governs economic life depends upon a more tightly controlled circulation of goods, rights, and authority. It is the social structure, not individual rationality per se, that differs'.

In a society which is highly stratified, an extravagant ceremony brings prestige, something which cannot always be translated into financial terms. People with prestige are not always the ones with the most money. Real status cannot be bought by people born in the lower social classes. People with money are seen as upstarts, *nouveau riches*. You might have an expensive house in Rantepao but, if you organize a moderate funeral for your parents, that house means nothing. These upstarts or the middle-class, as well as youths who have migrated since the mid-1960s, are the cause of the ever larger investments in ceremonies. Through migrant money, the number of potential competitors at ceremonies has increased. Meeting one's social obligations and expectations at these ceremonies has also become more costly; the gifts exchanged should preferably be more expensive than those at previous ceremonies. While the stakes (prestige, wealth, power, social approval) have remained the same, the cost has escalated greatly. While you may have had to pawn a rice field in the past to get enough money for a ceremony, today you need the value of a fancy house in Makassar. Moreover, in the past you could move forward through earning money elsewhere, but nowadays you can only advance by spending money in Tana Toraja itself. If it is difficult or financially impossible to join in rituals, ceremonies can acquire another meaning in life, both in a relative and in an absolute sense. For some people, Pentecostalism has, in recent decades, become an alternative means to achieve *siri'*.

The fact that the economic crisis had only a relatively small influence on Torajan livelihoods, shows that economic objectives or needs do not have to dominate. Decentralization has effectively strengthened the various forms of ritualization, most prominently the funeral ceremony. The battle for political power and influence on the *lembang* and district levels is fought out in the arena of ceremonies. When Suharto was still in power, these ceremonies mostly served to gain cultural capital, to increase one's personal, or the *tongkonan's*, prestige. Nowadays, this prestige and honour, which can only be increased at ceremonies, has become a necessary asset if one wants to increase ones political power and influence. This has led to more ritual, more movement of people, and more cosmopolitanism.

Thus, only if you dissociate yourself from a purely economic perspective on the way people practice everyday life can you understand Torajan livelihoods. In line with Hefner's conclusions (1990) on the account on the political economy of mountain Java, 'In the end, there need be no such opposition between economic and cultural analysis'. The emphasis on economic matters should rather be seen as a helix which closely or rather inseparably interacts with the helix of cultural issues such as social stratification, *siri'* and prestige. They are both essential parts of the way up, and people move from one helix to the other (not always consciously). Cultural matters need to be more central in livelihood studies simply because people are trying to make a living within this 'double helix'. It is as much to do with *siri'*, status and prestige as it is with wealth. All the things that are important in Torajan life can only be achieved through a combination of economic activities and death ceremonies and rituals: 'there is no life without the dead, and the meaning of life is a good death'.

CLUSTER ANALYSIS

The variables examined in the cluster analysis consisted of involvement in specific economic activities, such as those outlined in Chapter 7. (Appendix 2 gives an overview of the variables). Further, status systems were reflected in the variable 'social class', and cultural ideals in the variables 'expenditure on ceremonies' and 'religion' (which came to the fore in Chapters 4 and 5 and 6). The variables 'destination of migrants' and 'receiving remittances' represent the household's involvement in the translocal field.

Since the number of clusters was unknown in advance, I first started with a hierarchical cluster analysis in line with Ward on the basis of a 'squared Euclidean distance' method. This method considers both internal homogeneity (objects that show similarities end up in the same cluster) and external diversity (objects that show no similarities fall into different clusters). The measurement of similarity is established in the method used with the number of different characteristics calculated for each pair of objects. This so-called Ward-cluster method, starts by placing each household in a separate cluster. Subsequently, all households that score the same for a variable are put together and the two clusters that show the most similarities are combined. Because this method does not determine the number of clusters, I chose, on the basis of observed differences, to have four clusters in each village.[1] A recognized disadvantage of hierarchical cluster analysis is the fact that once objects are combined they stay together for the whole analysis. Statistical literature strongly recommends using a so-called 'relocative method' to follow the hierarchical cluster analysis. In this method, each object is added, in an iterative manner, to the cluster to which it has most similarities. In the case of Palipu', for example (see Appendix 3), Cluster 1 contained 68 households after the hierarchical cluster analysis but, in the relocation phase, eight of these

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[1] Although the number of clusters could have been increased, in both villages, four clusters could clearly be distinguished from each other. Increasing the number of clusters leads to more variation in the size of the clusters, and the proposed clusters could be considered as sub-clusters of one of the four dominant clusters. Reducing the number of clusters harms the analysis because it misses the nuances.

households were moved to other clusters. Eventually, after the relocation analysis, the 147 sample households in Palipu' were divided into four clusters of 60, 31, 25 and 31; and the 107 households in Kondo' into four clusters of 28, 30, 29 and 21 households.

More important than the actual size of the clusters are the characteristics/variables that make these clusters distinctive. These are identified by computing the average of all combined variables for each cluster (see Appendix 4). The tables also display the number of households (n) that share a particular characteristic and the factor (Sig) that indicates the probability that the four averages are similar to each other. When the probability is lower than 0.05, it is safe to conclude that there is a significant difference between the clusters. This method enables one to consider the specificity of a cluster for each characteristic/variable.

VARIABLES IN THE CLUSTER ANALYSIS FOR PALIPU' AND KONDO'

Variables in the cluster analysis of Palipu'

Variables	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Level of measurement
Religion of the household	147	1	12	3.41	3.643	Nominal
Location of migrants (*1 = abroad, 2 = Indonesia-Sulawesi, 3 = Sulawesi-Tana Toraja, 4 = Tana Toraja*)	145	1	5	3.34	1.391	Nominal
Ceremonial expenditures	141	1	4	2.26	1.181	1 = low 4 = high
Receiving remittances	142	1	3	1.97	0.842	1 = yes 2 = no
Owning ricefields	143	1	2	1.55	0.499	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in coffee cultivation	145	1	2	1.28	0.448	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in cacao cultivation	144	1	2	1.32	0.468	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in vanilla cultivation	144	1	2	1.39	0.489	1 = yes 2 = no
Monthly income of the household	147	1	2	1.95	0.214	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in side activities	146	1	2	1.80	0.400	1 = yes 2 = no
Raising buffalo	145	1	2	1.91	0.287	1 = yes 2 = no
Raising pigs	145	1	2	1.07	0.254	1 = yes 2 = no
Raising livestock other than buffalo and pigs	145	1	2	1.14	0.346	1 = yes 2 = no
Social strata	145	1	4	3.12	0.873	Ordinal

Variables in the cluster analysis of Kondo'

Variables	N	Min	Max	Mean	Std. Dev.	Level of measurement
Number of households for which all variables are known	124					
Religion of the household	108	1	3	1.09	.422	Nominal
Location of migrants (1 = abroad, 2 = Indonesia-Sulawesi, 3 = Sulawesi-Tana Toraja, 4 = Tana Toraja)	105	1	5	2.33	1.567	Nominal
Ceremonial expenditures	104	1	4	2.76	1.162	1 = low 4 = high
Receiving remittances	101	1	3	1.58	0.816	1 = yes 2 = no
Owning ricefields	103	1	2	1.17	0.382	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in coffee cultivation	103	1	2	1.81	0.397	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in cacao cultivation	103	1	2	1.81	0.397	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in vanilla cultivation	103	1	2	1.96	0.194	1 = yes 2 = no
Involvement in side activities	108	1	2	1.79	0.411	1 = yes 2 = no
Raising buffalo	107	1	2	1.76	0.431	1 = yes 2 = no
Raising pigs	107	1	2	1.08	0.279	1 = yes 2 = no
Raising livestock other than buffalo and pigs	107	1	2	1.01	0.097	1 = yes 2 = no
Social strata	108	1	4	3.05	0.869	Ordinal
Number of households for which all variables are known	89					

The variable 'location of migrants' needs further explanation as one household may have more than one migrant at different locations. For statistical purposes this variable has been created more or less arbitrarily by looking at the migrant living farthest away from home. Thus, for example, if a household has four migrants, one in Malaysia, two in Java and one in Sulawesi, the item for the variable 'location of migration' for this household is 'Abroad'. The hierarchical ranking applied here is: (1) Abroad; (2) Indonesia but outside Sulawesi; (3) Sulawesi but outside Tana Toraja; and (4) Tana Toraja. In general, this order reflects the amounts of money contributed to the household, which tend to be greatest from migrants abroad. It should also be noted, however, that most households have migrants that cluster together as family members seem to follow each other.

The variables 'religion', 'location of migration' and 'social stratification' are converted into as many dummy variables as there are categories. The other variables are converted using no = 0 and yes = 1, for example, whether the household is involved in buffalo raising or not. As is clear from the first column (N) there are only few missing values. In the analysis, any missing values of the variables 'religion', 'location of migration' and 'social strata' have been indicated by placing all dummies on 0 (no). By replacing the missing values in the yes-no questions with the average of the concerned variable, their influence on the results is minimised.

CLUSTERS OF HOUSEHOLDS AFTER RELOCATION PROCEDURE

Clusters of households after relocation procedure: The case of Palipu'

		Ward Method (Clusters)				Total
		1	2	3	4	households
Cluster number of case	1	60	0	0	0	60
	2	6	23	1	1	31
	3	1	1	20	3	25
	4	1	0	3	27	31
Total		68	24	24	31	147

Clusters of households after relocation procedure: the case of Kondo'

		Ward Method (Clusters)				Total
		1	2	3	4	households
Cluster number of case	1	26	2	0	0	28
	2	1	28	1	0	30
	3	0	1	28	0	29
	4	0	2	0	19	21
Total		27	33	29	19	108

CLUSTER ANALYSES OF PALIPU' AND KONDO'

Cluster analysis of Palipu'

Variables	Result cluster analysis						
	1	2	3	4	Total	n	Sig
	N = 60	N = 31	N = 25	N = 31	N = 147		
Protestant	.5500	.5161	.2800	.4194	.4694	69	.126
Pentecostal	.0167	.0000	.3600	.0645	.0816	12	.000
Catholic	.3000	.3548	.0400	.0968	.2245	33	.005
Islam	.0333	.0645	.0000	.0000	.0272	4	.356
Aluk to dolo (animist religion)	.0500	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0204	3	.221
Gereja Kema Inyil (GKI)	.0333	.0323	.0800	.0000	.0340	5	.446
Gereja Penta Kosta Serikat Di Indonesia (GPSDI)	.0167	.0000	.0400	.0000	.0136	2	.540
Kerapatan Inyil Bangsa Indonesia (KIBAID	.0000	.0323	.0800	.0968	.0408	6	.109
Gereja Pentecostal Toraja (GPT)	.0000	.0000	.1200	.2903	.0816	12	.000
Location of migrants: abroad	.0667	.0000	.1200	.0000	.0476	7	.091
Location of migrants: Indonesia not South Sulawesi	.5667	.0000	.1200	.5484	.3673	54	.000
Location migrants: South Sulawesi	.1667	.0000	.0400	.1290	.1020	15	.056
Location migrants: Tana Toraja	.2000	.0000	.0800	.2258	.1429	21	.024

(*Continued*)

Variables	Result cluster analysis						
	1	2	3	4	Total	n	Sig
	N = 60	N = 31	N = 25	N = 31	N = 147		
No migrants	.0000	1.0000	.6000	.0645	.3265	48	.000
Expenditure on ceremonies: 0–100*	.2167	.0968	.8000	.5806	.3673	54	.000
Expenditure on ceremonies: 100–500*	.2000	.2903	.0800	.0968	.1769	26	.116
Expenditure on ceremonies: 500–1,000*	.3167	.1290	.1200	.1613	.2109	31	.072
Expenditure on ceremonies: >1,000*	.2167	.3871	.0000	.1613	.2041	30	.004
Highest (1st) social class	.0833	.0968	.0000	.0000	.0544	8	.155
2nd social class	.2167	.3226	.0000	.0000	.1565	23	.000
3rd social class	.6833	.4516	.0800	.0000	.3878	57	.000
Lowest (4th) social class	.0000	.0968	.9200	1.0000	.3878	57	.000
Receive remittances	.5957	.0000	.0400	.5519	.3663	54	.000
Possess rice fields	.5575	.6452	.2000	.2371	.4476	66	.000
Cultivate coffee	.7953	.7742	.2400	.9265	.7241	106	.000
Cultivate cocoa	.7393	.6774	.2400	.9252	.6805	100	.000
Cultivate vanilla	.6203	.8387	.1600	.7294	.6111	90	.000
Receive a regular monthly income	.0833	.0645	.0000	.0000	.0476	7	.200
Involved in side activities	.1367	.3548	.0400	.2903	.1986	29	.007
Raising buffalo	.1030	.0323	.2400	.0000	.0897	13	.008
Raising pigs	.9143	.9677	.8800	.9677	.9310	137	.462
Raising other livestock	.8453	.8387	.7600	1.0000	.8620	127	.056

* The amount of money invested in ceremonies yearly is given in Indonesian rupiah x 1,000.

Cluster analysis Kondo'

Variables	Result cluster analysis						
	1	2	3	4	Total	n	Sig
	N = 28	N = 30	N = 29	N = 21	N = 108		
Protestant	1.0000	.9000	.9310	1.0000	.9537	103	.201
Catholic	.000	.1000	.0690	.000	.0463	5	.201
Location migrants: abroad	.0000	.0000	.9310	.8571	.4167	45	.000
Location migrants: Indonesia not South Sulawesi	1.0000	.0000	.0690	.0000	.2778	30	.000
Location migrants: South Sulawesi	.0000	.0333	.0000	.0000	.0093	1	.463
Location migrants: Tana Toraja	.0000	.2000	.0000	.0952	.0741	8	.008
No migrants	.0000	.7000	.0000	.0000	.1944	21	.000
Expenditure on ceremonies: 0–500*	.1786	.4333	.0345	.2381	.2222	24	.002
Expenditure on ceremonies: 500–1,000*	.1786	.1000	.0690	.1429	.1204	13	.616
Expenditure on ceremonies: 1,000–5,000*	.3214	.1667	.2759	.4286	.2870	31	.230
Expenditure on ceremonies: >5,000*	.2857	.2667	.6207	.0952	.3333	36	.000
Highest (1st) social class	.1429	.0000	.0690	.0476	.0648	7	.175
2nd social class	.1786	.2000	.2069	.0000	.1574	17	.178
3rd social class	.6071	.4000	.6552	.0000	.4444	48	.000
Lowest (4th) social class	.0714	.4000	.0690	.9524	.3333	36	.000
Receive remittances	.7593	.0280	.9800	.7343	.6106	63	.000
Possess rice fields	.9521	.7610	.8848	.6667	.8255	85	.031

(*Continued*)

Variables	Result cluster analysis						
	1	2	3	4	Total	n	Sig
	N = 28	N = 30	N = 29	N = 21	N = 108		
Cultivate coffee	.1207	.1397	.4614	.0000	.1940	20	.000
Cultivate cocoa	.0136	.1397	.4959	.0952	.1940	20	.000
Cultivate vanilla	.0386	.0013	.1062	.0000	.0389	4	.125
Receive a regular monthly income	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	0	.149
Involved in side activities	.0714	.3000	.2069	.2857	.2130	23	.255
Raising buffalo	.1786	.2080	.3793	.1905	.2430	26	.858
Raising pigs	.8929	.9307	.8966	.9524	.9159	98	.422
Raising other livestock	.9643	.9997	1.0000	1.0000	.9906	106	.201

* The amount of money invested yearly in ceremonies is given in Indonesian rupiah x 1,000.

GLOSSARY OF INDONESIAN AND DUTCH TERMS

Adat	Tradition, customary law
Afdeeling	Dutch colonial administrative division
Alang	Rice barn
Aluk	Ritual, symbolic action, religion; also defines animist in contrast to Christian or Muslim
Ambe'	Father; village or group head
Arisan	Rotating savings and credit funds
Badan	Body or committee
*Bahasa Indone*sia	Indonesian language
Ballo'	Palm wine
Banua	House
Bua'	A ritual community that celebrates together a kind of agricultural new year with the aim of imploring the higher powers to smile on man, beast and the pro-duce of the fields
Borongna	Section or sharing group
Bupati	District head
Camat	Head of the *kecamatan*; subdistrict head
Complex	Dutch colonial administrative subdistrict
Controleur	Dutch administrator on a district level
Damar	Resin
Dapo'	Kitchen, hearth
Desa	Village
Dusun	Hamlet
Gengsi	Prestige
*Gotong Royon*g	Mutual cooperation
Ikatan (*Ind.*)	Literally a bundle, but it is better understood as a tie that binds, or even better as a union
Indo'	Mother
Jaman Belanda	Dutch Era
Kabupaten	District
Kampung	Hamlet
Karopi'	Federations of *tongkonan* that celebrate particular rice ceremonies together
Kaunan	Slave

Kebun	Garden (usually for the cultivation of perennials like coffee, cocoa, etc.)
Kecamatan	Subdistrict
Keluarga	Family
Kepala	Head
kepala daerah	district head
Kerukunan	Association
Kombongan	Committee; meeting
Kotamadya	Municipality
Landstreek	Colonial Dutch administrative subdistrict
Layuk	Old (in combination with *tongkonan* referring to the oldest)
Lelang	Meat division
Lembang	Literally vessel; district; *adat* community
Liang	Family tomb
Lingkungan	Urban administrative unit
Ma'bua	Highest smoke-rising ritual
Mana'	Heirlooms
Maro	Smoke-rising ritual; literally crazy
Ma'siri'	Ashamed
Merantau	To go abroad
Ne'	Respectful title
Nene'	Grandparent; ancestor
Onderafdeling	Dutch colonial administrative subdivision
Oom	Uncle
Padang	Land
Padi	Rice, paddy
Paniuran	Obligation to contribute; ritual debt
Penanian	Federations of *tongkonan* that celebrate particular rice ceremonies together
Pete pete	Minibus
Potoktengan	Twelve nobles
Puang	Owner; master (of a slave); highest-ranking nobility in southern Toraja
Rantau	Literally; coast or outer area
Rante	Ceremonial field
Rambu tuka'	Smoke-rising
Rambu solo'	Smoke-descending
Rapu	Family

Rarabuku	Family; literally 'blood bones'
Reformasi	Political reform
Rombongan	Formal guest procession at a funeral
Rupiah (*Rp*)	Indonesian currency unit. Between 2001 and 2005 the rupiah rate of exchange with the US dollar fluctuated between 10 and 12,000
Saroan	Meat-sharing and labour group
Saung	Cockfighting
Sawah	Wet ricefield
Sipasang	Pair
Siri'	Honour/shame
Sugi'`	Rich
Sumanga'	Life-energy
Tallu	Three
Tana'	Hereditary status, a tethering stake
Tante	Aunt
Tau tau	Effigy of the deceased
Tegal	Dry land
Tepona	Four
To	Person
To'makaka	High noble
To minaa	Ritual specialist, priest of the right; literally 'the one who knows'
To'Parenge	A rank of important people used in north Toraja, often associated with ritual leader of a karopi' (village)
To'	Place; clustered strands
Tondok	Community, settlement
Tongkonan	Ancestral house
Tuak	Palm wine

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INDEX