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
THE COLONIZATION AND SCHOOLING OF THE TO PAMONA
OF CENTRAL SULAWESI, 1894 TO 1924

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STATEMENT

This thesis contains no material which has been submitted for examination in any other course or accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person except when due reference is made in the text.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'J. P. Cote', written in a cursive style.

Joost J. P. Cote

ABSTRACT

In the last decade of the nineteenth century, a significant shift in colonial policy is discernable in the former Dutch East Indies. In part, it represented a reaction to the failure of the orthodox Liberal policies which had arisen from the ruins of an earlier policy of economic exploitation by government monopoly. The new imperialism at the turn of the century represented a more total and committed attitude towards annexation of the colony through moral and economic "association". The new colonialism was fired by the vitality and moral indignation of the European middle class and brought an effective Dutch colonial presence to the Outer Islands for the first time.

Amongst the regions which felt the effects of Governor-General van Heutz's imposition of Pax Nederlandia was Central Sulawesi. Here, as in other areas, the colonial government with the aid of the mission sought to bring order, morality and economic progress to what was generally regarded as a backward community of head-hunting animists. As part of its non-military pacification program, the Batavian government encouraged the Christian mission to "civilize" the Sulawesi heartland and save it from the "threat" of Islam.

The official link between government and mission was the financial support provided to mission schools. Within a decade of the introduction of the van Heutz-model village school in Java, this financial link was being exploited in an attempt to absorb the government-aided mission school into a unified system of universal indigenous elementary schools designed to bring to the archipelago a modicum of European civilization. This process was formalized in 1924 with the adoption of the Algemene Subsidie Regeling (general subsidy regulation).

The three decades of mission activity in Central Sulawesi preceding the adoption of that regulation witnessed a radical change to the external features of the traditional To Pamona society. Initially, government and mission representatives worked together harmoniously to reorder the

indigenous society by means of a program of village re-settlement, agricultural innovations, taxation and schooling. Gradually, with the strengthening of centralized bureaucracy, the increasingly secular liberal orientation of government officials posted to Poso, together with at least a quantitative expansion of mission influence, basic conflicts in aims emerged which led to a series of confrontations between local government officials and Poso missionaries.

Within the mission itself, expansion and external criticism revealed conflicting interpretations of the mission's role in assisting a traditional society to adapt to the imposed changes. Financial limitations acted as the catalyst for these conflicts within the mission and between it and the regional government. To justify its stand, each party argued that it was acting in the best interests of the indigenous society.

Throughout, the village mission school provided the illumination for the goals, conflicts and, in the final analysis, the power struggle amongst the self-appointed "guardians" of the people. The result of the power struggle was not declared in 1924 but the terms of the mission's surrender were already being drafted.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the assistance received from the Rev. and Mrs. J. Visser whose hospitality, willingness to play host and interpreter and whose valuable correspondence made possible and profitable the initial excursion to Tentena, Kabupaten Poso. This initial experience has proved invaluable as a continuing source of inspiration over the years required to complete this thesis while engaged in full-time employment.

The help of Mrs. Muskens, formerly librarian-in-charge of the Southeast Asian collection at Monash University library, in providing initial bibliographical advice and guidance is gratefully acknowledged.

I wish also specifically to thank Rev. I.H. Enklaar, whose initial approval of my application to use the Oegstgeest archives and whose subsequent assistance made this period of research a profitable one. I must also include in this acknowledgement the hospitality shown to myself and my family by the staff and residents of the "Zendingshuis" which made our three month sojourn there so enjoyable.

I would like to record here formally my appreciation of the assistance, advice and support given by my supervisor, Ms. Ailsa Zainu'ddin and, during her study leave, that of Mr. (Dr.) Martin Sullivan and Dr. Barbara Harvey as well as that of Mr. Abe Kelabora.

I officially acknowledge my debt to the Centre of Southeast Asian Studies for its contribution to my travelling expenses in 1977 and to the Council of Burwood State College for allowing me two periods of paid leave and a travel grant.

Finally, I wish to record my warmest appreciation for the support and inspiration provided by my wife who also undertook to correct the drafts and for the many months of work ungrudgingly undertaken by Mrs. Annette van der Hock who typed both the draft and final versions of this thesis.

INTRODUCTION

In referring to the inhabitants of Central Sulawesi as To Pamona, this thesis, for the first time in European literature, formally ascribes to the people of this region a name which they have used themselves since at least 1958. It is a name that originates from their own cultural heritage whose record lies buried under a plethora of missionary and colonialist literature, and that distinguishes these people from their neighbours, the To Mori in the east, the Toraja in the south-west and the To Napu, To Besoa and To Bada to the west. Its use in this thesis is dedicated to the hope that the cultural identity of that people will be allowed to re-assert itself both in academic literature and more importantly, in the plurality of contemporary Indonesian culture.

Pamona (meaning literally, "the beginning"), is the legendary mother village of the tribes of north central Sulawesi whose location is recorded to this day in the site and name of the present village on the north-west shore of Lake Poso.¹ From this site, the seven founding tribes dispersed to settle the valleys of the Sulawesi heartland, leaving behind them as a record of their historic decision the "seven stones of separation", three of which still stand outside the present Pamona village church of the Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah.

The name To Pamona came to be used locally during the 1957-60 civil war in Sulawesi. In March, 1957, a popular movement, the Perjuangan semesta, more usually contracted to Permesta, (Total Struggle), was established in Ujung Pandang. The movement's objective was to defend Sulawesi's economic and political independence from Javanese domination. Initially, the movement had Sukarno's approval and resources generated by Sulawesi trade, particularly from copra export, funded various Sulawesi development projects. By the end of 1957, Minahassan

1. See infra, Chapter Two.

interests began to control the movement, attracting resentment from the inhabitants of the Poso region. It was believed that their national identity was being threatened by Minahassan domination. Local resentment expressed itself in the formation of the Geraken Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah, (Youth Movement of Central Sulawesi). This group, employing guerrilla tactics, besieged the town of Poso, the Minahassan stronghold in the region. The town was finally taken by the G.P.S.T. in July, 1958. By 1960, central government had reasserted control in the area as Indonesia prepared to confront its former colonial master in the struggle to gain possession of West Irian. In the ferment of the local independence struggle, national identity was crystalized. The name Pamona became the symbol of this new identity, within which traditional tribal distinctions continued to be recognized.²

The anthropological and ethnographical data which forms the basis of current knowledge of Pamona culture in the western world is derived almost exclusively from the studies undertaken by Dr. Albert C. Kruyt, Dr. Nicolaus Adriani, Rev. Jan Kruyt and to a lesser extent, from their missionary colleagues of the colonial period. This is partly because the changes initiated by the Dutch colonial government and promoted by the Dutch Protestant mission were such that, according to the professional Swedish ethnologist, Kaudern, by the 1920's it was no longer possible to identify the external features of traditional Pamona society.³ Since Independence, geographic isolation

2. A brief description of these events is provided by W.J.L. Dake, Het Medische Werk van de Zending in Nederlands Indie, vol. 1, (Kok and Kampen, 1972). The origin of the use of the name To Pamona has been provided by Rev. J. Visser in a letter of 11 August, 1978. Rev. Visser has worked as a theologian attached to the theological school in Tentena since about 1969. The term "Toraja" was emphatically rejected during interviews conducted by this writer in Tentena in August, 1975.
3. W. Kaudern, Ethnological Studies in Celebes: Results of the author's expedition to Celebes, 1917-1920, (Elanders Boktryckeri Aktenbolog, Gotenborg, 1925), vol. 1, pp. 29-30.

and political sensitivities have apparently discouraged European research in the area. An extensive literature search has uncovered no post-war literature which purports to re-interpret substantially the existing mission literature. A major monograph on the region was published in 1970 by Rev. Jan Kruyt, son and spiritual successor of Albert Kruyt.⁴ In as far as it represents a review of primary and published sources covering over sixty years of mission activity, it is a useful addition to the extant literature but essentially this book, largely a first hand account of Jan Kruyt's own work, provides a contemporary restatement of the mission perspective.

This thesis attempts the first re-assessment of the mission role in the colonization and schooling of the indigenous population of Central Sulawesi. More broadly, it attempts to place the endeavours of the representatives of the Netherlands Missionary Society in Central Sulawesi in the context of contemporary colonial politics in the former Dutch East Indies and specifically in terms of the then current colonial education debate.

The Netherlands Missionary Society was the oldest missionary organization in the colony and possibly the oldest organization of this type in Europe.⁵ It was founded in Rotterdam in 1797 and Albert Kruyt was the one hundred and fifth missionary it had sent out in a little less than ninety years.⁶ Like the other large missionary corporations, the Utrechtse Zendingsvereniging and the Nederlandse Zendingsvereniging, the Nederlands Zendelinggenootschap was linked to the Nederlands Hervormde Kerk. These leading mission organizations took steps to merge in 1901, a process which developed increasing momentum in the period before World War Two and led to the

4. J. Kruyt, Het Zendingsveld Poso, (Kok, Kampen, 1970).

5. E.F. Kruijf, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zendelinggenootschap, (Wolters, Groningen, 1894), p. 5.

6. ibid, p. 678, Appendix.

formation of the Hervormde Zendingraad in 1942.⁷ This body was reconstituted in 1951 to become the Raad voor de Zending van der Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk whose headquarters today is located in the Hendrik Kraemer Instituut in Oegstgeest near Leiden.

Around the turn of the twentieth century, colonial politics in the Dutch East Indies underwent a significant shift in emphasis as a result of an economically induced change of climate in western capitalist nations. This change in colonial policies manifested itself in a renewed interest in the welfare of the "little man" of the Indonesian kampong. The espoused policies, the promotion of indigenous welfare, agriculture and education, have been generally subsumed under the title of the ethische politiek. Like the "little man" of the metropolises of the European imperialist nations, who experienced the effects of similar policies at home, the non-European beneficiaries of the new style of colonialism were to discover that the opportunities for progress were only available to those who were prepared to identify themselves with the aspirations of their masters.

Central to this shift in both the internal and colonial policies was the role allocated to education in its formal and informal manifestations. The extension of educational opportunities at home, and particularly the curriculum reform broadly endorsed throughout the west, together with the popularization of the political model of democracy, found its pale reflection in the colonies in the form of a dramatic expansion in the provision of education and in the notion of supervised self-administration. In the colony, the ruler became the guardian whose task it was to help his wards realize that their best interests were served by association with their guardian's

7. Dr. K. Brouwer, "Onstaan en groei van de samenwerking der Zendingcorporaties", (Origins and growth of the co-operative mission corporations), 5 pages attached to Rev. S. Slump, "Inleiding op het oude Zending archief", (Introduction to the old mission archive), (unpublished - available at the Hendrik Kraemer Instituut).

objectives.⁸ In the home country the major instrument for "association" was the "educational ladder" and its apparently objective criteria for identifying a meritocratic hierarchy in which each received his just deserts.⁹ In the colony association was more difficult to achieve but the key instrument remained education, as provided formally through schools and in a variety of agricultural, credit and hygiene programs.

In Indonesia, the colonialists of the ethical period found that the greatest obstacle to promoting native welfare was the absence of a "work ethic":

The natives are not lazy but they are careless and thoughtless about the future. The main reason for this is that they do not use their brains because they have not been taught to do so In our own society, carelessness is often found in uneducated people who live from day to day¹⁰

Association meant fundamentally the transformation of the culture of both the colonized non-European and the working class European at home.¹¹ In contemporary literature, this same concept is referred to as "socialization".¹²

In the colonization and schooling of the To Pamona of Central Sulawesi, despite incessant bickering, mission and government were fundamentally at one in desiring to implant in the non-literate society with which they were confronted a triumvirate of western values; individuality, rationality and acquisitiveness. These values were implicitly regarded as the basis of the ill-defined notion

8. See specifically, Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam, (Brill, Leiden, 1911).
9. See, for instance, M. Young, The Rise of the Meritocracy, (Thames & Hudson, London, 1961).
10. J. Habbema, "Onderwijs politiek en economisch belang van onderwijs aan de bevolking van Nederlandsch-Indie", (Educational policy and the economic importance of education for the population of the Netherlands Indies), in Indische Gids, vol. 22, 1904, p. 997.
11. See R. Johnson, "Notes on the schooling of the English working class", in Dale et al, Schooling and Capitalism (Open University Set Book, R.K.P., London, 1976.)
12. As described for instance by R. Dreeben, "The contribution of schooling to the learning of norms", in Harvard Educational Review, vol. 37, No. 2, Spring 1967, pp. 211-237.

of progress held by the European overlords. In the achievement of this objective, the school was only one of the means by which government and mission attempted to break up the traditional patterns of communication. The introduction of taxation, the payment of school fees and new methods of farming were all introduced and justified as educative. They were of educational value because they were designed to force the To Pamona to relinquish their dependence on others, to break down the shared consciousness of a communalistic society and to force individuals to make good the financial commitments imposed on them separately. In this process the school was of vital importance, albeit that its influence would only be perceivable in the longer term. The role of the school in eventually producing a literate society was paramount in breaking down the individual's dependence on the group culture. In a non-literate culture, the individual's choice lies between identification with the dominant cultural tradition or isolation.¹³ The mission school attempted to initiate its clients via a series of solitary activities into the Euro-Christian literate culture whose basic tenets are individuality and rationality and whose very foreignness was likely to isolate the initiated from the traditional indigenous culture. To facilitate this initiation Kruyt attempted to ensure mission monopoly, not simply over the school system, but also over the entire spectrum of social change in the villages of Central Sulawesi; to create as it were, a new and distinct Christian Pamona society with its own adat serviced by school and church under the care and encouragement of the mission. This goal inevitably brought the mission into conflict with the rival pretensions of local government officials, although a fundamental political allegiance was maintained between the mission and the Batavian government.

Kruyt maintained he did "not desire a radical

13. J. Goody and I. Watt, "The Consequences of Literacy", in J. Goody (Ed.), *Literacy in traditional societies*, (Cambridge University Press, 1968).

transformation of Pamona society: he wished only to "modify traditional culture to the point where the acceptance of Christianity and European ethics would not be inhibited." In this aim Kruyt confirmed his allegiance to the Batavian colonial government which wanted nothing more in Central Sulawesi than to establish a level of indigenous production sufficient to finance the regional administration and the establishment of a political climate which would prevent the territorial expansion of Islam.

In Central Sulawesi, as in many areas of the outer Indonesian islands, Dutch colonial interest finally managed to attain some measure of authority after a three hundred year presence in the archipelago. It lost the power again in less than half a century. What independence has meant for the people whose recent history has been partially set down here, and how the colonial experience has been integrated into their culture are questions which hopefully in the not too distant future, will engage this author in further study.

Sources

In August, 1975 a visit was undertaken to the region on which this thesis focuses. The visit, while brief, made possible a first hand acquaintance with the geography of the area and contact with a number of educational, church and community leaders. The full impact of the region's isolation could also be experienced by undertaking the complicated air, sea and land journey necessary to reach the inland headquarters of the former mission network, now the location of the synod of the Church of Central Sulawesi. Thereafter, by traversing the Central Sulawesi mountain ranges in a blistering two day march southwards to the last stop of the Palopo-Malaku bus service, something of the difficulties of the pioneering days of the central figure of this thesis could be experienced.

The major source of material for this thesis was the mission archives of the Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk in Oegstgeest, North Holland. In a basement of the Hendrik Kraemer Instituut building, which dates from 1917, is located an extensive collection of archival material dating

back to 1797 which is in the process of being catalogued. This institution which today incorporates a training school for missionaries and Third World workers, residential facilities and a select library, houses what must be one of the most important single collections relevant to colonial Indonesian history outside the Rijksarchief in the Hague and the Jakarta National Archives.

While facilities for examining such documents are limited, the researcher should find the atmosphere congenial and assistance freely offered.

The additional quarry for material on colonial Indonesia generally, was the Southeast Asian collection at Monash University which has been gathered together under the supervision of Mrs. Bob Muskens. Included in this collection is most of the published work of Albert C. Kruyt, to be found in journals such as Mededelingen, Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Aardrijkgundig Genootschap, Koloniaal Tijdschrift as well as in independent publications.

Terms and Spelling

The central focus of this thesis is the region largely included in the present-day Kabupaten Poso, Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah, which in colonial days formed the Onderafdeling Poso of the Assistent Residentie van Centraal (Midden) Celebes. The official boundaries of this region changed from time to time and the use of the terms "Central Sulawesi", "the Poso area" and "the Poso basin", or simply "Poso", are non-precise geographically, indicating the region roughly north of Lake Poso, and between imaginary lines drawn south from the mouth of the Puna and Malei Rivers. This area is perhaps best described as the Poso basin after the river of that name and the major tributaries which drain it. Where specifically indicated, the area of concern has been broadened to include the inhabitants of the mountainous region to the west, the entire region included in the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes (broadly congruent with the Propinsi Sulawesi Tengah), or the total mission field of the Netherlands Missionary Society in the Sulawesi mainland which included parts of north and east Sulawesi Selatan.

The spelling of the name Poso, varies in the literature. The spelling in this thesis is the contemporary one which appears to have been officially adopted in 1924. Prior to that date it was usual to spell the name with double "s". As far as possible, all names of places have been Indonesianized and modern spelling has been employed throughout except where specific Dutch, politically defined regions or centres of colonial power are mentioned.

A significant feature of the Poso mission was the work undertaken by the guru who, prior to 1916, were exclusively from north Sulawesi. The office of guru was a dual one. In the first place he was employed as a teacher of the elementary school, but for the mission his more important role was that of village pastor. This essentially dual role makes an English translation of the term cumbersome and has thus been retained unitalicized in that sense, in the same way as it was used in Dutch language sources. Other Indonesian terms employed in Dutch primary sources have also been retained but italicized. Most Dutch administrative titles have been Anglicized although, because of the frequent occurrence and specific connotation of the term controleur, this has been retained untranslated and unitalicized.

The term Toraja has been avoided in the text where it formerly applied to the To Pamona but retained in its modern form in quotations. The term Bare'e referring to the language of these people has been retained in preference to the substitute Bahasa Pamona, for its descriptive convenience although its use does not represent a preference based on linguistic research. Indeed, there is a great need for the linguistic work of Adriani and Kruyt to be subjected to a thorough re-examination.

A number of Dutch names used throughout this thesis have been rendered in modern Dutch spelling. The older form of the surname Kruyt (Kruijt) has been avoided and where names originally contained a double vowel followed by a single consonant and vowel, the modern spelling has been substituted.

Finally, the bulk of the material used in the

preparation of this thesis, both primary and secondary sources is in the Dutch language. This author takes full responsibility for all translations appearing in the text as direct or indirect quotations. In so far as very little has been written about Central Sulawesi other than in the Dutch language, the works of Kaudern and the thesis by R.E. Downs being the major exceptions,¹⁴ it has been one of the aims of this thesis to provide the English reader with the first English language interpretation of the history of the European presence in the region. In terms of educational history it is hoped that it may be read in conjunction with the innovative work of H. Kroeskamp whose book, Early schoolmasters in a developing country provides a detailed description of nineteenth century mission education in the Outer Islands of the Dutch East Indies.

14. R.E. Downs, The religion of the Bare'e-speaking Toraja of Central Celebes. (Doctral dissertation, Leiden University) Excelsior 'sGravenhage, 1956.

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CHAPTER ONE

COLONIZATION BY TREATY: ESTABLISHING A DUTCH PRESENCE IN THE TOMINI GULF 1600-1890

In October, 1865, Jhr. J.C.W.D.A. van der Wyck, a Controleur attached to the office of the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, sailed a two-masted cruiser to the mouth of the Poso River situated at the southern extremity of the Gulf of Tomini. Here he had disembarked and was preparing for an expedition to explore the upper reaches of that river when his ship was sighted by his superior, the Resident of Menado who was at the time commanding a naval exercise against piracy in the Gulf. Annoyed that a junior official should be attempting to venture into unknown regions without his knowledge or approval, altercations ensued. Van der Wyck nonetheless persisted in his objective and became the first European to set eyes on Lake Poso.¹

The immediate stimulus for van der Wyck's expedition was a note delivered to the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo at Poso four months previously while he was also hunting "pirates". The note was signed by someone claiming to be the chief of Poso and it begged the representative of the colonial government "if it pleases the honourable gentleman, that he has sympathy for us and helps us by preventing ... the outrages perpetrated by members of the Koelawi, Besoa, Linoe, Pipikoro, Paloe, Sigi and Dolo tribes". These tribes "constantly come to steal everything they can get their hands on". The note concluded, "furthermore, I request that the government takes us into its care and grant us a good administration."²

1. The accounts of the expeditions of 1865 and 1869 were published in the Indische Gids of 1913 by Dr. Adriani: "Verhaal der ondekkingsreis van Jhr. J.C.W.D.A. van der Wyck naar het Posso Meer, 16-22 October, 1865". (Story of the voyage of discovery of J. van Wijk to Poso Lake) Indische Gids, vol. 35, 1913, pp. 843-862. "De reis van de Heer W.J.M. Michelsen naar het Posso Meer, 12-17 Juli, 1869." (The journey of Mr. W. Michelsen to the Poso Lake). Indische Gids, vol. 35, 1913, pp. 1612-1618.

2. Adriani, "Verhaal ... van der Wyck", in op. cit. p. 855.

The nature of this note suggests that its author, rather than being an indigenous chief, was a trader, possibly a Chinese representative of the Gorontalo-based firm of Sie Boen Tiang Brothers which had been trading in the Gulf since 1857. The note was designed to attract maximum attention from a colonial administration already perturbed at the extent of what was officially described as piracy in this potentially rich area. Moreover, by offering the colonial government sovereignty over the region, its author hoped to appeal to the imperialist urge of the Europeans.

The report prepared by van der Wyck as a result of his explorations was suppressed by his superiors as was a similar report written by his successor who visited the area four years later. Van der Wyck's report was not uncovered until after the death of his former superior, J.G.F. Riedel in December, 1911 when it was found amongst his personal papers. Apart from the political aspects of this censorship, it had important ramifications for scientific circles. The vast inland water, stretching southwards for thirty-four kilometers and twelve kilometers at its widest point,³ was of such geological significance in this Darwinian era that the suspicion that the report containing news of the Lake's discovery had been suppressed, shook the scientific world. In 1895, the Utrecht professor, Arthur Wichman, publicly accused the amateur ethnographer and erstwhile Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, J.G.F. Riedel of perpetrating a crime against science.⁴

3. A.C. Kruyt and N. Adriani, De Bare'e-Sprekende Toradja's van Midden Celebes, 3 volumes. (Government Printer, Batavia, 1912), Vol. 1, p. 13. For the first scientific description of the lake see P. & F. Sarasin, Reisen in Celebes, 2 volumes, (Wiesbaden, 1905), also E.C. Abendanon, "Onderzoek van Centraal Celebes", Tijdschrift Kon. Ned. Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, vol. 28, 1910. Passim, especially pp. 979-1001.
4. A. Wichman, "De Heer J.G.F. Riedel en de meeren van noord en Centraal Celebes", (Mr. J.G.F. Riedel and the lakes of north and central Celebes), in Indische Gids, vol. 18, 1896, pp. 1410-1427.

The report itself, published by Adriani in 1913, was written as though it were a statement on a prospective colony. Van der Wyck appears to have regarded his expedition very seriously and even involved himself in a tribal dispute on the basis of the June note. He claimed that the warring parties accepted his role as a colonial government representative which confirmed the Controleur's belief in the authenticity of the appeal.

In this first exercise of power in Central Sulawesi, van der Wyck gained a strong impression of the value an imposition of colonial rule would have in such a "primitive" region. He supported this impression with an optimistic picture of the economic potential of the area: iron-ore existed in large quantities, the inhabitants were conversant with iron smelting and black-smithing techniques while he noted that an abundant supply of rice and wax existed. More importantly, the "raja of Rano" promised van der Wyck that his people would plant all the coffee trees they were capable of and would sell the beans to the government at a fixed price. With an estimated population of 200,000, the cultuurstelsel (compulsory plantation-cultivation system) would flourish in this new colony without any undue pressure and extra expense. Moreover, the colony would be easy to govern. All raja acknowledged the overlordship of the suppliant Ta Aroea and the village chiefs controlled all trade and commerce. Thus, with the allegiance of Ta Aroea ensured, the colonial government, represented by an official who dealt as honestly with the people as van der Wyck had done, could control a very profitable area.⁵

The "chief of Poso" was not the only suppliant in this region for the paternal protection of European colonialism. In 1863, the rulers of four Gorontalo states, Limbotto, Bone, Attingala and Boalemo had jointly appealed to the colonial representative in the area to intervene on their behalf to stamp out "the enslavement of many Gorontaloese by pirates" and to "return these people to

5. Adriani, "Verhaal ... van der Wyck" in op. cit., p. 861.

their birth place".⁶ The following year the appeal was repeated and, like the Poso note, the princes requested that their states be brought under direct colonial rule.⁷ The Menado residency responded by increasing its presence in the Gulf, a measure which had led directly to closer contact being made with the Poso area. In 1865, the series of flag-waving exercises in the Gulf climaxed in a co-ordinated operation against piracy and slave trading in the Tomini Gulf.⁸

Simultaneously, consideration was being given to improving the situation within the Gorontalo states themselves where exploitation, poverty and general mal-administration by the colonial government's contractual allies were becoming a matter of concern. By 1866

serious consideration was given by the Indies government to put an end to this sad situation by the introduction of direct rule in the various states of Gorontalo which, till now, has been left to the chiefs to rule, and by revoking the contracts with these chiefs.⁹

This attitude was reiterated in the following year¹⁰ but nevertheless, annexation plans were shelved and a modest "experiment" was substituted "to place a European adviser with each of the four rulers".¹¹ In 1870, annexation plans were again postponed, this time due to "the financial situation".¹² Direct rule in Gorontalo was not instituted until 1889, immediately after a radical change in colonial

6. Koloniaal Verslag, 1863, p. 23. An investigation of this situation appears to have been made by a Dutch official, C.H.B. Rosenberg, ibid, p. 120.
7. Koloniaal Verslag, 1864, p. 22.
8. Koloniaal Verslag, 1865, p. 20.
9. Koloniaal Verslag, 1866, p. 24.
10. Koloniaal Verslag, 1867, p. 15.
11. Koloniaal Verslag, 1870, p. 46.
12. loc. cit..

policy.^{13.}

A third appeal for colonial intervention from a Tomini Gulf state was received from Parigi in 1873.^{14.}

Internal instability caused by the activities of pirates and the infiltration and interference from its powerful neighbours, Sigi and Palu in the political intrigues within the state motivated the request by Parigi rulers for Dutch protection. Parigi was described in the 1890's as a "seedbed of intrigue", a state "characterized by internal divisions and constant warfare with the states of the west coast",^{15.} It was the base for much of the pirate activity in the Gulf and was consequently regarded as the festering sore of the area. Yet, the request was rejected "in order not to create an expansion of our territorial claims"^{16.} even though "the state of Parigi and its dependencies have, since the year 1751, as the result of victory, been subjected to Dutch sovereignty".^{17.}

13. The argument which was used to support the case for direct rule was that such outlay as might be incurred would soon be recouped by increased taxation derived from increased income which would result from the better ordering of native society. The administrative change was provided for in the Netherlands Indies estimates for 1889. The question is discussed in "De Begrooting voor Nederlands Indie voor 1889", in Tijdschrift van Nederlandsch Indie, 1888, pp. 296-311.
14. Nota over Parigi door de Generale Staf: Historische Overzicht van Parigi, December, 1895. (Memorandum on Parigi by the General Staff: Historical Review of Parigi), (hereinafter referred to as Parigi Memorandum, 1895).
15. A.J.N. Engelenberg, "Opmerkingen naar aanleiding de Lezing van officiele bescheiden en Tijdschriften Betreffende den Toestand ter west en zuid kust van de Tomini Bocht". (Remarks in consequence of reading official reports and periodical articles concerning the situation on the west and south coast of the Tomini Gulf). (Buitenzorg, 4 July, 1901), p. 87.
16. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.
17. Introduction to the Parigi contract renewed in 1863.

The unrest and mal-administration in the Tomini Gulf which the Menado administration deplored but did little to rectify was in part a symptom of a renewed struggle between major indigenous powers in the area for supremacy. This struggle was a consequence of the colonial government's earlier diplomatic interventions which had disturbed the existing balance of power that in turn had created a power vacuum the Dutch themselves were unable to fill. The insignificance of colonial rule in the Tomini Gulf at the end of the nineteenth century reflected three centuries of unsuccessful and often half-hearted attempts to retain a European presence in the region. Throughout this period, the Dutch colonialists were just one of a number of powers involved in a struggle for supremacy in the Tomini Gulf. Only in the last fifty years of their presence in the archipelago did they manage to attain a pseudo-legal sovereignty in the region.

A tenuous European presence had existed in the Gulf of Tomini since the Spaniards extended their activities to that region in the latter part of the sixteenth century. When the Dutch forced the Spanish out of eastern Ternate in 1607, the latter withdrew to the neighbouring Sulawesi peninsula.¹⁸ There they consolidated their commercial activities by the establishment of several factories along the inland coast of the Gulf¹⁹ under a treaty with Gorontalo which had attained undisputed control in the area by the turn of the century.²⁰

By 1630, Gorontalo's authority was being threatened

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18. D.G.E. Hall, A History of South-East Asia, 3rd Edition, (MacMillan, London, 1970), p. 294.
 19. Parigi Memorandum, 1895. One of the factories (or trading posts) was established in Parigi.
 20. Nota van Toelichting, Contract met Moeton, 1891 (Explanatory memorandum to the contract with Muton) by the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, Baron van Hoevell. According to Gorontalese chronicles, the kingdom of Gorontalo had established its hegemony in the Gulf of Tomini in the fourteenth century. By the sixteenth century, it was appointing rulers in the various states and settlements scattered around the Gulf. These Gorontalo appointees were, according to Dutch sources, "constantly enriching themselves by thieving and plundering at the expense of the population."

by the expansionist tendencies of the west Sulawesi state of Mandar, a vassal of the King of Gowa.²¹ In the face of imminent defeat, Gorontalo appealed for aid to the Sultan of Ternate who subsequently exacted as a price for Ternate protection, Gorontalo's submission to Ternate's sovereignty.²² In 1644, Ternate extended its authority in northern Sulawesi with the connivance of its Dutch allies by driving the Spanish from Manado. The following decade, despite the Freedom of Munster treaty of 1651, the Dutch took possession of Manado through a treaty with the Sultan of Ternate under Spanish protest. From their base in Manado, the Dutch were able to strangle Spanish trade between the Tomini Gulf and Manila, thus finally forcing the Spanish to leave the Indonesian archipelago altogether in 1663.²³

With the defeat of the Spanish, the alliance with Ternate confirmed by the Treaty of 1667, and General Spelman's victories at Buton (1667) and Makassar (1669), the Dutch appeared to have secured their control in the Tomini Gulf.²⁴ This appearance was confirmed when, after the revolt of Ternate in 1680, the Treaty of Banggai, which had granted the former Gorontalo territories in the Tomini Gulf to Ternate, was revoked and the new treaty, drawn up in 1683, limited the rights of the Sultan to these territories.²⁵ The former kingdoms of Gorontalo and Limbotto were expressly excepted from the new treaty in which the Dutch claimed direct jurisdiction over "the Christians in the Gulf or on the north coast who may be found now or later".²⁶ An attempt was then made to consolidate Dutch sovereignty throughout this part of the archipelago based on the right of conquest.

21. loc. cit...

22. Nota behorende bij de Missive van den Eerste Gouvernements Secretaris van 8 Augustus, 1888, No. 1452 (Memorandum attached to the letter of the first Government Secretary, 8 August, 1888), (Hereinafter referred to as 1888 Memorandum).

23. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.

24. 1888 Memorandum.

25. loc. cit...

26. loc. cit...

The impact of Dutch involvement in the region had been to counteract the expansion of both Ternate and Makassar in the Tomini Gulf. The removal of these two overlords left a power vacuum amongst this collection of petty states which the V.O.C. could not fill. In the following century, it exercised no tangible influence and preferred to claim a nominal sovereignty on the basis of treaties signed.²⁷ Real power in the Gulf shifted to Mandar which attempted to consolidate its authority by establishing sizable settlements of Mandar colonialists along the coast, although this authority was disputed by Bone, particularly in Parigi and along the southern shores.²⁸

In 1730, the V.O.C. was forced to recognize that the rulers of Gorontalo and Limbotto "cannot guarantee the adequate supply of tortoise shell due to the fact that Buginese and Mandarese act the boss in the Gulf of Tomini",²⁹ while efforts had also to be made "to prevent gold from the mines of Lambunu, Tuladengi and other places from falling into the hands of the Bugies (sic.) and Mandarese".³⁰

In 1759, on Mandar initiative, the Dutch fort at Lambunu was over-run.³¹ The Dutch responded by encouraging its Gorontalo allies to reassert their claims in the Gulf, a tactic which did little to curtail the activities of Mandar and Bone.³² Fourteen years later, a new fortress was built, this time on soil of the anti-Mandar state, Parigi.³³

The persistence of the Europeans in attempting to maintain a toe-hold in the Gulf reflected their interest in the area's commercial potential. As well as gold and tortoise shell, the area provided a wide range of forest

27. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.

28. 1888 Memorandum. 29. loc. cit..

30. E.J. Jellesma, De Minahassa en eenige andere streken der Residentie Menado, (The Minahassa and several other regions of the Residency of Menado). (de Bussy, Amsterdam 1903), p. 221.

31. loc. cit.. 32. 1888 Memorandum.

33. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.

products. Inland from the southern shoreline of the Gulf, it was believed that large deposits of iron-ore existed.^{34.}

With the demise of the Dutch East Indies Trading Company, the Dutch withdrew from the Gulf retaining contact only with the Minahassa peninsula and Gorontalo. Mandar-dominated states, federated with the foremost of these, Muton, controlled the western and neighbouring northern shores while Bone claimed the southern coast^{35.} with Parigi maintaining a delicate independence. In the rest of the archipelago, the new colonial government established its authority over a few key areas which had been the major centres of influence of the former V.O.C.. After the 1814 Treaty of London returned the archipelago to the Dutch, small outposts representing colonial power existed in Padang and Palembang, (Sumatra) Banjarmasin, Pontianak and Sambas (Kalimantan), Makassar and Menado (Sulawesi) and parts of Maluku.^{36.} Even in Java the principalities of Madiun, Kediri, Banjumas Bagelen, Preanger and Madura were virtually independent areas.^{37.}

34. A. Kruyt "Het Ijzer in Midden Celebes", (Iron in Central Celebes), in Bijdragen Tot Het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, vol. 53, 1901, pp. 148-160.
35. 1888 Memorandum. In 1809, a Dutch official in the area reported that the Buginese had "conquered the whole area and have established a ruler in Tojo who from here, rules all the islands".
36. Of Sumatra, Colijn writes: "On the island of Sumatra, three times greater than Java, our entire possession consisted of the city of Padang and its immediate surroundings and several insignificant, dilapidated posts along the coast, as well as a district in the capital Palembang. Otherwise nothing!" H. Colijn, "Onze staatkunde ten aanzien van de Buiten Bezittingen", (Government policy toward the Outer Island possessions), in Colijn (ed.), Nederlands Indie, vol. 2, (Elsevier, 1913), p. 4.
37. E.B. Kielstra, "Uitbreiding van ons gezag sinds 1816" (Extension of our rule since 1816), in Colijn, op. cit. p. 35. The Preanger Lands did not come into an "orthodox" relationship with Batavia until 1871.

Externally, while the Netherlands government was regarded as the de facto government of the archipelago (subject to several limitations imposed by England), there was no need to defend the far-flung boundaries of its possessions against the claims of other colonial powers. It had nevertheless, to defend strenuously, its continuing presence in the few areas where outposts were established in the period between 1815 and 1830,³⁸ while the 1825-27 Java war appeared to threaten the very seat of Dutch power. With such a tenuous grip on its colonial possessions, the Batavian government was content to continue the policy of the V.O.C.: colonization by treaty.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, colonization was equated with exploitation on the basis of the system of forced cultivation employed in Java, parts of southern Sumatra and the Minahassa, the so-called cultuurstelsel. The colonial government had neither the manpower nor financial resources to expand such a system of commercial administration beyond these "pacified" areas. Moreover, the demand of the home government for an annual surplus in the Indies (the "batigslot" policy) to finance the national debt,³⁹ enforced a non-intervention policy (onthoudingspolitiek) in the rest of the archipelago. Economically, the Outer Islands remained a financial burden, running up a cumulative debt of about f.40 million

38. Major uprisings occurred in Maluku (1817), Saparua and surrounding islands and Palembang area (1819), West coast Sumatra (1821), Ceram (1823), South Sulawesi (1824) and South-west Kalimantan (1825); Colijn in Colijn, op. cit., p. 6.
39. Minister of Colonies, Baud, wanted the East Indies contributions to home government finances to be increased from an average of f.12.75m p.a. (which had been achieved between 1841 and 1846) to f.22,612,000 p.a. to cover interest repayments of f.9,800,000, f.5m over nine years to pay off the f.30m debt to the Netherlands Handelsmaatschappij, and the remainder to contribute to the building up of rail services in the Netherlands and to cover shortages in the West Indies and Guinea Coast treasuries. Kielstra, in Colijn, op. cit., p. 17.

by 1862.⁴⁰ Politically, they could be ignored while foreign colonial powers continued to respect this Dutch sphere of influence. Old commercial treaties gave Dutch authority an aura of legality. As long as the isolated Dutch outposts were not endangered by internal revolt there was no need for the Outer Islands to impinge upon the predominant economic preoccupations.

Militarily, the Dutch could not effectively police their far-flung territorial claims since the systematic subjugation of the independant states was beyond the capabilities of the colonial military and naval forces. The key to Dutch policy regarding its relations with indigenous rulers in the Outer Islands therefore, was to avoid any situation which might provoke confrontation. Even had such areas been pacified, the lack of a sufficiently educated and experienced administrative corps, and the lack of knowledge of those regions lying outside the immediate sphere of Dutch influence would have militated against successful colonization.⁴¹

These circumstances ensured the effective continuation of an onthoudings politiek throughout most of the nineteenth century, a policy which also governed Dutch activities in the Gulf of Tomini, although its proximity to Dutch-occupied north Sulawesi ensured that the states along this inland sea continued to receive some attention from the colonial government.

In the 1830's, attempts were being made to formalize the status quo in the Gulf of Tomini by the signing of a treaty with the ruler of Muton, the major power in the

40. The figure was arrived at by the author of an article, "De financiële resultaten van het bestuur der Buitengewesten 1839-1862", (The financial results of the administration of the Outer Islands, 1839-1862), in the Indische Gids, 1890, pp. 1336-1339. Colijn states that the Outer Island possessions achieved an overall surplus of f.3m between 1835 and 1840, while over the period 1835-1850 income from these areas exceeded expenditure by f.1½m. Colijn in Colijn, op. cit., p. 17.

41. Kielstra in Colijn, op. cit., p. 48.

region while a Dutch outpost was established further west to represent colonial interests there.⁴² After 1841 when this post had to be vacated as a result of an epidemic, Dutch presence in the Gulf was limited to occasional visits by warships.⁴³

By mid-century, there was a relaxation in the colonial government's anti-expansionist policy. The activities of the English adventurer, James Brook had convinced Minister of Colonies, Baud, of the threat of English colonial expansion and the danger of relying on treaties as a basis for territorial claims. The establishment of the government of Borneo represented, not only a reaffirmation of Dutch sovereignty in the area, but was also justified economically on the grounds that the island was a rich source of coal and gold deposits.⁴⁴

The effects of this official policy change was also felt in the Tomini Gulf region. In 1846, approval was given for the establishment of a new Dutch administrative post in the Gulf.⁴⁵ In 1850, a concerted diplomatic thrust was instituted, aimed at breaking up the intricate pattern of alliances amongst the Sulawesi rulers in order to consolidate formal Dutch authority and to remove what the colonial government considered to be the main cause of unrest. These activities represented a policy of cautious colonial expansion which nevertheless sought to avoid military engagements and a commitment of hard-pressed human and financial resources.⁴⁶

42. Mutton contract, explanatory memorandum, 1891.

43. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.

44. Colijn in Colijn, op. cit., p. 11.

45. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.

46. J.M. Somer, De Korte Verklaring, (Crona, 1934) argues that four stages can be identified in the development of colonial policy towards the Outer Islands in the middle of the nineteenth century:

1. 1840-1845: a period where official policy is against military expansion in the Outer Islands.
2. 1846-1851: where expansion of territory is approved of if military action is avoided wherever possible.
3. 1852-1860: while official policy (home government) disapproves, territorial expansion continues with Batavia's concurrence.
4. 1861-1870: a return to the principles of the first period.

The justification for this change in policy was expressed in the instructions to the Governor-General in 1855 which demanded that this official ensured that indigenous rulers "promote the welfare of their people", "prevent slavery and piracy" and "protect industry, commerce and shipping" and that obstruction to the realization of these rulers' duties be removed.^{47.}

The diplomatic campaign in the Tomini Gulf was waged on three fronts with Bone, Muton and Parigi. In 1850, the Civiel Gezaghebber of Gorontalo renegotiated the 1831 treaty with the ruler of Muton^{48.} using a new style of contract, seen as the most effective weapon in this period of diplomatic expansion.^{49.} It specified the ruler's duties to promote native economy, particularly rice cultivation, to rule wisely and to prevent the exploitation of children. The ruler had also to promise to have no relations with other foreign (ie. European) governments. In return, the colonial government promised "as indication of its paternal interest in the improvement of the welfare of its loyal subjects" to retract the articles of the earlier contract demanding the compulsory payment of government-designated produce. The effect of this renewal of the alliance was to consolidate further, Muton's power (as yet undefined territorially) and to strengthen its independence from Mandar.^{50.} For the Dutch, strengthening

47. Somer, op. cit., p. 83. Article 46 however, stated: "the weakness of rulers may not be made use of to extend Dutch rule". It is clear therefore, the change was not to be interpreted as a signal for wholesale expansion.

48. Muton contract, explanatory memorandum, 1891.

49. According to Somer, the first "long contract" (lange contract) was used in 1857 with the Sultan of Pontianak. It appears fairly certain however, that the 1851 Muton contract is of this type and therefore precedes what Somer regarded as the first such contract by six years. See also Encyclopedia van Nederlands Indie, vol. 1, p. 385.

50. Muton contract, explanatory memorandum, 1891. The Muton rulers were traditionally linked by family ties to Mandar.

the local ruler within the Gulf meant the clarification of the source of power and responsibility. The colonialists were attempting to tidy up the foundations of their authority.

The policy of strengthening the position of Muton was also designed to confine the pretensions of the ruler of Bone and to limit the unsettling influences of Bone and Mandar representatives on trade and political stability in the economic hinterland of the Dutch possessions along the Menado peninsula. The basis for removing the claims of Bone in the Gulf was prepared in the same year. In October, 1850, the Dutch administration in Makassar obtained a clarification from the ruler of Bone as to the nature of his claims in the north of the island.⁵¹ At the same time the other recognized power in the Gulf of Tomini, Parigi, was forced to sign a treaty recognizing Dutch supremacy. This treaty was intended formally to break any residual ties between Bone and Parigi. It was also aimed at ending the Buginese trade monopoly in the area⁵² but it became apparent that a formal treaty of this kind with Parigi had little effect as long as Bone continued to enforce its traditional claims.

Bone influence manifested itself in the continued humiliation of senior colonial officials who visited Parigi in 1852, 1854 and 1856.⁵³ A confidential resolution of February, 1851 had suggested the necessity of continuing to recognize Bone claims in the interests of "preventing further developments".⁵⁴ While this solution was being considered, the ruler of Bone was preparing to reassert Bone claims in Parigi, an act which "became one of the motives for the war with Bone".⁵⁵

The situation in the Gulf area was a matter of such

51. 1888 Memorandum.

52. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.

53. loc. cit...

54. loc. cit...

55. loc. cit...

concern that the government in the Netherlands included in its recommendation to the King that a Dutch post be re-established in the Tomini Gulf.⁵⁶ This recommendation was not approved, but an expedition to avenge Dutch honour sailed to Parigi in 1857, bombarding the coastal village to induce Parigi submission. The expedition was only partially successful. While a formal reaffirmation of the recognition of Dutch sovereignty was obtained, the "raja" refused to bend the knee physically to the representative of his Dutch overlord. Faced with this defiance but not wishing to force the issue for fear of the heavily armed forces gathered out of range of the two warships, the Resident decided to retire to Menado with two hostages.⁵⁷ To risk a confrontation which might engage the government in an expensive campaign was counter to Batavia's policy. The Resident of Menado "thought it advisable to avoid further contact [with Parigi] while the Bone problem was not yet settled."⁵⁸ The "Bone problem" was solved by a war and the subsequent treaty of 1860 by which Bone

waived its claimed rights on lands outside the coastline of its territory in the Gulf of Bone, or on any islands situated outside the Gulf or on any supremacy over other rulers and allies of the Netherlands Indies government.⁵⁹

This left the colonial government formally the supreme power in the Gulf although its supremacy was based on very slender foundations consisting of treaties with Muton, Parigi and Tojo.⁶⁰ There remained an area of residual Mandar influence beyond Muton's western border. Here the tradition of chiefs appointed by a Mandar ruler

56. loc. cit..

57. Engelenberg, op. cit. p. 84.


58. Parigi Memorandum, 1895. The contract was reaffirmed in 1863.

59. 1888 Memorandum. Article 5 of that treaty.

60. The relations with Tojo were governed by the contract of 1765 between the colonial government and Gorontalo which recognized Gorontalo's claims over Tojo. (1888 Memorandum.)

MAP 1

THE GULF OF TOMINI STATES AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY



was continued, a practice which the Dutch were apparently prepared to condone for the time being.^{61.}

This brief flurry of diplomatic activity, which had resulted in Batavia holding a sheaf of paper contracts, brought to an end this period of colonial expansion. After 1860, Parigi was "all but left to its own resources"^{62.} Piracy, slavery and internal warfare were allowed to continue unchecked, wrote the concerned officials of the later imperialist era at the end of the century.^{63.} Parigi and Tojo extended their influence beyond their eastern and western borders respectively amongst the "ruler-less" peoples of the Poso basin.^{64.} The welfare of Muton vacillated under successive rulers.^{65.}

The return to inactivity on the part of the colonial government in the Tomini Gulf, reflected the new policy announced by the in-coming Minister of Colonies, Loudon, in 1861:

I regard any expansion of our rule in the Indies Archipelago as a step closer to our doom and this especially since we already in this regard have grown beyond our capability ... if necessary, issue directions to the heads of local administration in the Outer Islands in general ... to

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61. The explanatory memorandum to the Muton contract states that renunciation by Mandar of its claims in the area had not been demanded by the colonial government either through oversight or "changed priorities". It is likely that the pacification of Mandar on the mid-west coast was lower down on the list of priorities than Bone which figured prominently in the history of Dutch attempts to pacify the strategic south-west of Sulawesi.
62. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.
63. loc. cit..
64. Kruyt states that at this time, the To Kadombuku tribe living on the east bank of the Poso river became vassals of both Parigi and Tojo, while in 1891, a new Parigi settlement had been formed at the mouth of the Poso river. The settlement of Mapane was also a Parigi settlement which, in the 1890's was in its turn, attempting to establish its independence from Parigi. There is also some evidence of Mandar penetration of the Poso basin earlier in the century. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 138-140.
65. Muton contract, explanatory memorandum, 1891.

anything whereby they may give us cause to increase our direct control or make annexation unavoidable.⁶⁶

Loudon's expression of the home government's position toward expansion in the Outer Islands nullified the principle enunciated in 1855 upon which Dutch interference in the affairs of the Tomini Gulf states was justified. In the Indies the embargo created serious tensions expressed for instance in the following summary report on the Menado residency in the Colonial Report of 1867:

The small states along the north coast of Celebes were in a continuous state of misery, poverty and extortion as a result of the minimal influence which the authorities were able to exercise there due to the lack of regular communication.⁶⁷

It is against this background that the failure of the Menado administration to exploit the opportunities to expand colonial rule which presented themselves in the 1860's must be evaluated. Four years after van der Wyck's expedition in 1865, his successor, W.J.M. Michelsen, retraced his steps and subsequently issued his own report on his observations.⁶⁸ This report has been lost to posterity, but an accompanying diary survives whose sentiment reflects a new era of colonial concern. Significantly absent from Michelsen's diary is the emphasis on political and economic imperialism. Instead, he is concerned to describe religious ceremonies and customs, the conditions of villages and the nature of government. The tenor of Michelsen's 1869 diary reflects the growing humanitarian concern for the "quality of life" of the "native", a concern which, in the face of an official embargo on the expansion of colonial rule, was exploited nevertheless, to justify "creeping colonialism" in areas where an absolute "hands off" policy would jeopardize commercial interests or colonial honour.

66. Somer, op. cit., p. 94.

67. Koloniaal Verslag, 1867, p. 15.

68. Adriani, "De reis van de heer W.J.M. Michelsen naar het Poso meer, 12-17 Juli, 1869", loc. cit..

In this respect, the Tomini Gulf failed to generate sufficient political and economic interest in the 1860's to warrant annexation unlike regions in Sumatra in the same period. Conditions in areas bordering the directly ruled region of Palembang were, according to the Colonial Report of 1864, similar to those in northern Sulawesi but in Sumatra, annexation of the states of Senindo, Kesani, Makakau and Blalau did proceed:

This annexation which in no way had the consequence of increasing expenditure, occurred on the basis of an appeal by both chiefs and the people and was in every aspect regarded as desirable as the only means to end the piracy and murder ... which [was perpetrated by inhabitants] from the above districts in adjoining government territory.⁶⁹.

Again, the annexation of the Pasumah lands was made to check piracy while the appeal by chiefs for the intervention of the Assistant Resident of Siak led to a government expedition in north-east coast Sumatra and, via the intervention of a government-directed indigenous missionary, the establishment of direct control by the colonial government over part of Labuhan Batu. A controleur was then posted. This brought to an end the long-standing conflict between Panei, Bila and Kota Pinang.⁷⁰ While the situations in the Tomini Gulf and Sumatra were similar, the difference was that annexed lands in Sumatra were neighbouring important government lands whose economic and political position had to be maintained to defend Dutch honour. Dutch commercial interests in the Tomini Gulf on the other hand, are of later origin and colonization there occurred when growing Dutch commercial interests had to be protected in the context of an entirely revised colonial policy.

The initial interest expressed in the Poso basin region thus was not re-activated until two decades later when a new program of contract-signing was commenced by the colonial government. The formal instrument used in this period was significantly different from the model

69. Koloniaal Verslag, 1864.

70. Koloniaal Verslag, 1867.

contract employed in the middle of the century. The new "short contract" (korte verklaring) reflected the greater determination of the colonial government to assert its supremacy. This change in policy was influenced by the experience of the Aceh war. In 1875, a secret decision was taken in the context of that war to develop a uniformly applicable model contract as an instrument for legalizing Dutch intervention in the indigenous states. This was eventually to form the basis for the consolidation of Dutch authority throughout the Islands.⁷¹ The "long contract" (lange contract) in operation since the 1850's, which had been designed to replace the older V.O.C. style commercial treaty, was too cumbersome for this new era of colonization. The "long contract" had to specify each and every right of the respective partners in what Somer describes as a "subordinate alliance".

Somer argues:

The effective exercise of our [Dutch] authority carried with it that this authority had to be imposed unilaterally; the moral character of our administration had to lead to the intervention in the internal affairs of the self-ruler.⁷²

As such, the "short contract" was a reassertion of the theme enunciated in 1855: the Dutch restatement of the white man's burden.

The "effective exercise of Dutch authority" was motivated by more than humanitarian considerations as the Colonial Report of 1892-93 makes clear. In accordance with Somer's interpretation, it stated:

In as far as the available administrative resources will allow, attempts are being made to step up our contacts with these areas of indirect rule ... with a view to making chiefs and population gradually accustomed to our authority and aware of their mutual relations and rights, [in order] to increase our influence over them with a view to bringing more order into native rule.

The report then continues to clarify the objective of this

71. Somer, op. cit., p. 128ff..

72. loc. cit..

73. Koloniaal Verslag, 1892-3, p. 22.

moral intervention:

Through this means it will become clear whether it would be advisable to establish permanent administrative supervision and whether, through the placing of one or more officials to smooth the way for the exploitation of those districts by private enterprise, the admission of which is now impossible, given the condition of disorder prevailing at present.⁷⁴

The inter-related development of firm political relations and the promotion of conditions favourable to Dutch private enterprise dominated colonial policy in the Outer Islands in this period. Dutch capital demanded of the government the establishment of a political infrastructure supportive of its operations. This needed to include basic safety for its personnel and official protection from non-Dutch competitors, both European and indigenous. In the potentially rich but uncontrolled Tomini Gulf, the perceived threat of European politico-economic rivalry to Dutch interests became a matter of great concern in the penultimate decade of the nineteenth century. In 1882, a British ship, the "Pym", entered the waters of the Sangi and Talaud Islands group. It was believed that British officers had attempted to gain the allegiance of the raja of Beo to the English crown and had offered him weapons. The colonial government responded promptly by posting a controleur in the area.⁷⁵ With equal haste, relations were established with Wajo. The explanatory note to the contract signed in 1888 stated:

... not long ago, a couple of foreign adventurers with an authority from a foreign power had unsuccessfully attempted to contract a political agreement with the aforementioned state.⁷⁶

74. loc. cit.. The Report continues: "In relation to the fact that recently certain districts of Celebes, namely, those in or near the Tomini Gulf are attracting the attention of private entrepreneurs, the Indies government has been concerned to investigate in which way our contractual relations with the relevant states need to be improved to better meet these needs."

75. ibid., p. 18.

76. Koloniaal Verslag, 1889, p. 18.

The possibility that the independent states might indiscriminantly grant mining leases to a growing number of "foreign adventurers" resulted in a series of visits by the administrators of Menado and Gorontalo to the Tomini Gulf states. In 1891, a trip by the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo to various Tomini states had as its object the conclusion of specific agreements regarding mining leases.⁷⁷ In Poso, Parigi, Sausu and Muton, the Dutch official handed over contracts, the signing of which would guarantee Dutch monopoly over mineral exploitation. In Muton, the official managed "with difficulty" to obtain an interview on this subject with the raja who was at the time engaged in celebrating the recent recovery of his daughter from a serious illness. In Parigi and Sausu, signing of the contract was avoided by these rulers on the grounds that they needed "to discuss [the matter] with their statesmen first". In Poso, "after a lengthy explanation of the issue (it demanded not a little effort to explain and make clear to these simple primitive people, what was required), they indicated that they were not adverse to the matter".⁷⁸ It was on such foundations that Dutch authority rested.

Belief in the existence of iron-ore deposits in the Poso area date from the days of the V.O.C. and various unfounded reports of mineral deposits in the area continued

77. Koloniaal Verslag, 1892-3, p. 25. "Use was made of this opportunity (a trip into Tomini Gulf) to gain written approval from the raja and nobles of Tojo, for the government sponsored exploration of mineral wealth of that territory whereby a guarantee was sought that the personnel involved would have their safety guaranteed against malevolent interference."
78. "Reisrapport van de Heer Baron van Hoevell over de Bocht van Tomini 10 Maart tot 21 Maart, 1891 - Todjo, Posso, Saesoe en Moeton", (Travel report of Baron van Hoevell concerning the Gulf of Tomini, 10-21 March, 1891 - Tojo, Poso, Sausu and Muton), (Hereinafter referred to as: van Hoevell report).

to be reported in publications in the latter quarter of the century.⁷⁹ Not till 1887 did the Batavian government act on these reports. In that year, a plan was conceived for "a mineral exploration of the northern peninsula of Celebes".⁸⁰ This project was suspended through lack of personnel, but was resurrected in 1895. The Colonial Report of that year indicated that the original scope of the project would be widened and "included in the area of investigation of the engineer appointed, shall be the territories of the Tomini Gulf."⁸¹

Mineral exploitation in self-rule areas, whether on government or private initiative, demanded the establishment of formal relations and specific agreements with indigenous rulers. A major and direct influence on the creation of contractual ties between the colonial government and the rulers of the Tomini states was, then, the need to guarantee the safety of government and private enterprise personnel involved in mineral exploration to promote the eventual exploitation by Dutch capital of mineral deposits.

The colonial administration argued that to be able to supervise and profit from the mining boom, "one was forced to involve oneself with these states again, if one wished that the issuing of such leases here remained in the hands of the government".⁸²

79. Some knowledge of Central Sulawesi during the V.O.C. period is indicated by Valentijn. Kruyt (Kruyt, "Het Ijzer...") quotes a passage from Valentijn which suggests that Poso had been visited at that time and that an impression of a dense population and rich iron-ore deposits was gained. The similarity of that reference with the statements of van der Wyck ("Verhaal der Ondekkingsreis"), J.G.F. Riedel ("De Topantunusau of oorspronkelijke volksstammen van Central Selebés") and van Hoëvell ("Todjo, Posso en Saesoe") all subsequently shown to be largely incorrect, may suggest that the latter were influenced by a knowledge of Valentijn. Kruyt's article on the presence of iron-ore in Central Sulawesi was written largely to show the incorrectness of this belief.

80. Koloniaal Verslag, 1887, p. 196. Some mineral exploration had been undertaken in 1886 mainly to search for gold deposits in Gorontalo. (Koloniaal Verslag, 1894-5, p. 246).

81. Koloniaal Verslag, 1894-5, p. 20.

82. Parigi Memorandum, 1895.

The Colonial Report of 1894 declared that, on the basis of the experience in Borneo, the economic contracts being handed to the rulers of the Tomini Gulf states since 1891 would place "the distribution of mining leases within self-rule native states, together with the payment of moneys to lease-holders, in the hands of the [colonial] government".⁸³ The Tomini Gulf model contract differed from those used in Borneo in that it was "being expanded to cover agricultural leases".⁸⁴

From the point of view of agricultural products, the Tomini Gulf was also an attractive area. In 1885, the value of forest products exported from Gorontalo was f.1,359,667.⁸⁵ Gorontalo had become the centre of this trade which originated in "Banggai, in the states bordering the Tomini Gulf and the Gorontalo districts of Paguat, Boalemo and Bone".⁸⁶ This trade was organized by the trading houses in the residency's capital, Menado. Agents of these trading houses were stationed in Gorontalo buying from local traders along the coast. The goods were then brought by schooner to Gorontalo for sale and transshipping to Europe.⁸⁷ The Dutch shipping line, K.P.M. opened a new shipping route in 1893 which linked Makassar with Gorontalo by a fourteen day voyage, thus enabling it to cash in on this growing export market.⁸⁸ In 1893 export from Gorontalo included timber products valued at f.13,580 from the Tomini Gulf.⁸⁹

As these figures indicate, this trade was carefully supervised by the Dutch government which was profiting from the export duties imposed. Since personnel were not available at the loading points in the Tomini Gulf itself, the threat of foreign shipping loading at source and

83. Koloniaal Verslag, 1894-5, p. 27.

84. loc. cit..

85. Koloniaal Verslag, 1889-90.

86. Koloniaal Verslag, 1893-4, p. 224.

87. loc. cit..

88. loc. cit..

89. Koloniaal Verslag, 1894-5, p. 247.

avoiding customs, represented a significant economic loss. Norwegian and German ships with those of other nationalities had been seen buying up rattan and resin at Mapane.⁹⁰ Political interference followed closely on the heels of this foreign economic interest and so, in the Tomini Gulf where Dutch authority was hardly recognized,⁹¹ "an attempt had to be made to close it off from foreigners" since "the great wealth in forest products had attracted the attention of trade".⁹²

An awareness of the economic potential of the Tomini Gulf brought with it a concern for the depressing effect of internal disorder, piracy, ignorance and the exploitation of states by their rulers or by other states. The economy of Muton was reported to have declined alarmingly in the 1880's as a result of the anarchy following the long illness and subsequent death of its ruler.⁹³ In Tuladenggi, the potential copra and hard wood production was left unexploited due to "the commercial ignorance" of the population although some trade existed with Gorontalo in rattan. Sugar, copra and forest products in the state of Tomini, already the basis of a thriving inland trade in the Tomini Gulf area, could according to the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo in 1891, be better developed and organized, as could the lucrative trade there in horses, cattle and tobacco.⁹⁴ Tobacco production in Tinombu had already made this settlement "the largest trading centre in Muton" but the Dutch report implied it could be better organized if it came under Dutch control.⁹⁵ The Dutch official who carried out this survey of the economic potential of the region, Baron van Hoevell, concluded that the indigenous economy would prosper under European influence and could contribute to the overall

90. Er Sjlenberg, op. cit., p. 31.

91. ibid, p. 30.

92. ibid, p. 33.

93. Muton contract, explanatory memorandum, 1891. The inter-regnum period of 1887-1891 had a particularly depressing effect on the state of Muton's economy.

94. loc. cit..

95. loc. cit..

economic advancement of the people if it was accompanied by improvements in the standard of living and in agricultural methods which could be brought about by the imposition of a Pax Nederlandia. In the less settled conditions in the south-west corner of the Gulf, the exaction of tributes, the imposition of fines and constant inter-tribal warfare prevented the establishment of conditions conducive to indigenous economic development or the establishment of Dutch industries.^{96.}

The ordering of native society was nevertheless a second priority in the light of the threats represented by the appearance of foreign European powers in the waters of the Tomini Gulf. In the words of the future Assistant Resident of Central Celebes:

The Netherlands Indies government had no authority in the area of the Tomini Gulf when, in order to establish its position as the dominant power in the Indian archipelago, and as a result of the pressure of European agricultural and mining industry interests, it had to provide itself with a secure position in the area.^{97.}

In response to these two pressures, at least seven contracts were signed with rulers of the petty coastal states in the Tomini Gulf in the second half of the 1880's.^{98.} These contracts all followed a model being developed for the self-rule territories in the residency of Manado "lying on the north coast of Celebes and in the Tomini Gulf".^{99.} Amongst these was the contract with Poso. It was signed in 1888 and the accompanying note explained that the absence of formal relations with the colonial government "has now been rectified by the signing of simple contracts which gain their importance from the fact that

96. Parigi Memorandum.

97. Engelenberg, op. cit., p. 30.

98. Encyclopedie van Nederlandsch Indie, vol. 1, "Contracten".

99. Koloniaal Verslag, 1892-3, p. 27.

Dutch sovereignty ... is thereby formally recognized."¹⁰⁰.

The three point contract bound the signatories to recognize Dutch sovereignty, not to enter into communication with any other foreign government or their representatives and defined the extent of their territory.¹⁰¹.

In its haste to formalize its relations with Poso in 1888, "the Dutch government took measures which were insufficiently prepared by a thorough investigation of the [political] situation and relations in the Poso area."¹⁰².

As it was discovered in the following decade, the signatories to the Poso contract were not rulers. Even had they been such, they would not have been in a position to comprehend the nature of such a contract; nor could they have enforced its conditions, both because of the nature of traditional society and because of the prior claims of Luwu, Tojo, Parigi and Sigi.¹⁰³.

A further threat to Dutch hegemony in the area which also had its economic ramifications, was the activity of Muslim traders in the Gulf. While it was not possible to eradicate the Muslim influence in the area, the entire coastal region being inhabited by Muslims of Mandar, Bone, Parigi and Gorontalo extraction, it was thought to be in the interests of Dutch authority to limit the extension of this influence. The dominant attitude in regard to Islam in Dutch circles placed Muslims, particularly "fanatical" Muslims in the same category as "foreign adventurers".

Islam was thought of as a tightly organized religion, similar in many respects to Roman Catholicism, with a hierarchical clergy owing allegiance to the Turkish Caliph and wielding great powers over Indonesian rulers and their subjects, Muslims whose lives were believed to be regulated by Islamic law. Both in its international ramifications - including dangers of Indonesian appeals to Muslim rulers

100. Quoted in Indische Gids, 1890, pp. 1326-27. The Nota van Toelichting admits: "Netherlands' authority at that time (1889), had not yet been regulated on a firm footing".

101. loc. cit..

102. Engelenberg, op. cit., p. 30.

103. ibid, pp. 47-8.

abroad - and in its hold over native life, Islam then appeared as a formidable enemy.¹⁰⁴

The Aceh war, continuing in spasms since 1872, provided empirical "evidence" of the worst excesses of Muslim "fanaticism" and recent history in southern Sulawesi, confirmed Dutch policy makers in their attitude.

The first official expression of concern regarding the growth of Islamic influence in the Tomini Gulf appears in the Colonial Report of 1870 which pointed out that:

In the regions bordering the Tomini Gulf, especially in the area of Poso, Mohammedan traders have attempted in recent times to make propaganda amongst the Alfurs of the To Lage tribe.¹⁰⁵

Later reports continue to plot the course of Muslim penetration and Dutch concern.¹⁰⁶ Two years prior to the signing of the Poso contract, the Resident of Menado was privately advocating the need for missionaries in the Poso area to "help" the "threatened heathen" tribes.¹⁰⁷

The resident Muslims of the Gulf were not considered a serious threat. Largely the product of marriages between conquering outsiders and original "Alfur" animist inhabitants, they were not considered "fanatical" as they paid "little attention to the Koran". They had also adopted many "Alfur superstitions and usages".¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, Controleur Engelenberg listed the "support for the stationing of a [Christian] mission in Poso" as one of the ways in which the colonial government "tried to gain authority" in the Poso region in addition to the signing of a contract and the establishment of an administrative post.¹⁰⁹

104. H.J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, (van Hoeve, 1958), p. 19.

105. Koloniaal Verslag, 1870, p. 19.

106. Koloniaal Verslag, 1883, p. 18, Koloniaal Verslag, 1885-6, p. 20, Koloniaal Verslag, 1886-7, p. 22, Koloniaal Verslag, 1893-4, p. 26.

107. N. Adriani, Posso, (Den Haag, 1919), p. 25.

108. Van Hoeverell Report, see infra, ch. 2.

109. Engelenberg, op. cit., p. 29.

Unlike the earlier period of Dutch diplomatic activity in the Gulf, the expansion of Dutch private enterprise by the end of the nineteenth century made it mandatory upon the colonial government to effect real intervention in the region. According to Gallois, member of the Council of the Netherlands Indies who had been sent to investigate the problems of the area, this meant the stationing of European personnel there:

The stationing of a controleur in the Gulf of Tomini can hardly be postponed any longer, given the forceful demand making itself felt to open the area up for European agricultural and mining industries. The stream of people who for some time have been paying attention to the area, requesting lease-holds, cannot be held back much longer, not even by appealing to the fact that our administration there is not sufficiently established to provide the supervision essential to guarantee safety.^{110.}

The experience in Poso had shown that the signing of a contract was not enough: a physical presence was necessary. In 1890, two years after the signing of the contract, Australian gold hunters had arrived at the mouth of the Poso river in a vessel belonging to the Sultan of Pahang "to offer English flags and British protection".^{111.} A little over one year later, the first Dutch missionary was escorted to the mouth of the same river by the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo to begin his "civilizing" work among the "heathen" population.^{112.}

Ineluctably, the demands of Dutch capital and the threat of foreign political and economic competition, led the colonial government to involve itself in the detailed administration of the Outer Islands. As an indication that the Outer Islands were now to receive greater official

110. *ibid*, p. 31.

111. *ibid*, p. 30.

112. Baron van Hoevell as Assistant Resident of Gorontalo had taken Kruyt to Poso in 1891 to help him select a site for his house. In the same year, as he was encouraging Kruyt in his attempt to start a mission in Poso which he thought "could do some good" (Adriani, *op. cit.*, p. 26.), an article written by van Hoevell, ("Todjo, Posso, Saesoe") which made much of his discovery of coal deposits in the Poso river was published in the Journal of the Bataviaasche Genootschap, (vol. 35, pp. 1-47.)

recognition, the appointment of a director for the Outer Possessions and the feasibility of the decentralization of the administration in these areas were warmly discussed.¹¹³ Greater contact brought in its train greater awareness of the levels of disorganization and injustice in the indigenous states¹¹⁴, which could not be countenanced by a European power which had sent representatives to the Congress of Berlin in 1885 and the Brussels Conference in 1889.¹¹⁵ Colonization, as the Dutch finally learnt, meant the commitment of resources and personnel: contracts alone would not achieve the long term aim of facilitating economic exploitation and promoting human welfare.

Characterizing this evolving policy as the "ethical policy" has been unfortunate since it forced its interpreters to interpose between the two inter-dependent aims a false dichotomy which was then used as a vehicle to condemn Dutch colonial practice as hypocritical. It was true that individual personalities and groups in the Netherlands and in the Indies tended to emphasize one or the other goal at any time, that there was conflict between the proponents concerned to promote one aim rather than the other, but in practice, there was no such dichotomy. The so-called "ethical policy" represented a humanitarian solution by the generally conscientious Dutch administration to a number of interlocking problems which had haunted nineteenth century colonial policy-makers.

113. See for instance, the debate on the 1889 Estimates quoted in Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch Indie, 1888, pp. 379-87. Even at this stage, however, lack of personnel was still being used as a argument against expansion of Dutch rule.
114. The lengthy reports on the history of the various states in the Tomini Gulf and the number of expeditions to these areas in the early part of the last decade were all symptomatic of this greater concern. They also represented the attempts then being made to disentangle the traditional relations between the various states themselves and individually with the colonial government in Batavia's attempt to develop legal foundations for its authority.
115. De Kat Angelino, Colonial Policy, (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1931), p. 24.

The turn-of-the-century policy shift was in essence, a recognition that Western economic aims were to be achieved, not in spite of, but through the welfare of native society.¹¹⁶ One aspect of this recognition was that the European Christian Church, along with other instruments for propagating European culture and ethics - in particular the school - could play an important role in achieving this dual aim.

116. This interpretation recognizes of course, the point made by Kahin(Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia) that the outcome of the westerization of native economy was the introduction to it of a money economy which by 1915, led to the continuing decline in money terms of native welfare in Java. (Kahin, p.21). See also infra, Ch. 6.

CHAPTER TWO

.COLONIAL GOVERNMENT, MISSION AND PAMONA SOCIETY

At the beginning of the last decade of the 19th century, government and mission were poised to advance on the Poso basin to bring order and civilization to its inhabitants. In June, 1890 the Resident of Menado proposed in a confidential memorandum that the government approve the stationing of a controleur at Poso.¹ In the same year and the same month the Netherlands Missionary Society selected one of its trainees, Albertus Christiaan Kruyt, to pioneer a new mission field which it had decided to open in 1889.² To accompany Kruyt, the Netherlands Bible Society decided it would send to Poso, Nicolas Adriani, at that time reading Indonesian languages at Leiden University.³

The then Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, Baron van Hoevell, under whose administration the Gulf of Tomini lay, had advised both government and mission to establish a presence in the area.⁴ Poso, according to that official, was an area of great potential to the colonial state and the Dutch church. In an article in the journal of the Royal Batavian Society,⁵ van Hoevell wrote of a densely populated area of 100,000 people who were as yet "uncontaminated by Mohammedanism". It bordered an "extensive territory with a fertile soil and a population of at least 90,000", namely Tojo. With its belief in animism, ancestors, spirits and gods, Baron van Hoevell's description of this society fired the humanitarian and missionary spirit

1. Resident of Menado, 12 June, 1890. No. 1290.
2. Minutes N.M.S., 30th June, 1890.
3. The N.B.S. indicated in the beginning of 1889 that it would send a language expert to accompany Kruyt believing that the existence of a large population justified undertaking a translation of the bible in the local language. (Minutes N.M.S., 26 March, 1889. See also K.J. Brouwer, Dr. A.C. Kruyt: Dienaar der Toradjas (J.N. Voorhoeve, Den Haag 1951)). p. 7ff.
4. N.M.S. to Albert Kruyt, 29 October, 1891 and 11 December, 1891.
5. G.W.W.C. Baron van Hoevell "Todjo, Posso en Saesoe" Tijdschrift van het Bataviaasche Genootschap, vol. 35, 1891. pp. 1-47.

of the day. Besides, the writer was able to assure his readers that coal and iron-ore were to be found in the area thus ensuring the interest of the more practically-minded. Specifically, Baron van Hoevell directed attention to the Lage tribe with whom the government had signed a contract in 1888. This he stated, was the largest single group in the Poso region, numbering almost 30,000 people who were "particularly friendly" and were accustomed to being ruled by a tribal chief. These people, van Hoevell wrote, had regrettably been neglected by the government because the Lage people had been always "lumped together" with the "savage and ferocious head-hunters" who lived west of the Poso river and in the vicinity of the Poso lake.

Largely as a result of the prompting of the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, both government and mission developed policies in the 1890's to bring what they regarded as a primitive and heathen people under the beneficial influence of European civilization. Acting separately and with distinct philosophies, church and state were to work together in this initial period to achieve broadly similar goals. In the process, the Pamona society was to undergo extensive but superficial transformation which, by the 1920's had left very little of the external features of original culture unaffected.⁶

In August, 1888, formal relations were established between the Dutch colonial power and three of the tribes who inhabited the area between Tojo and the Poso river.⁷ Unlike their neighbours in the Gulf of Tomini, the inhabitants of the Poso river basin did not form the political entity that Baron van Hoevell had suggested and, through the prior claims of other Sulawesi potentates, did not have the right independently to form alliances with other powers. The Dutch signed the 1888 contract in complete

6. W. Kaudern: Ethnological Studies in Celebes, vol. 1, p. 29 (Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, Gotenborg, 1925)

7. Encyclopaedia van Nederlandsch Indie, vol. 1, "Contracten" pp. 384-392. The complete contract is reproduced in Indische Gids 1890, pt. 2, pp. 1326-1329. The region with whose representatives a contract was drawn up was a narrow area between the Poso and Tongke Rivers. The contract was officially approved on July 10, 1889. See Map 6.

ignorance of the area's internal government and external relations.⁸ Negotiations were conducted through a Gorontaloese interpreter who was "old and toothless so that he was hard to understand".⁹

Kruyt believed that the four indigenous signatories to the contract had even less understanding of the colonialist's designs and were motivated by the attractiveness of the presents offered; namely a coat, a pair of trousers and the decorative contract itself.¹⁰ A consideration of the identities of the four suggests a more substantial and political motive. In 1888, three of the oldest and most politically advanced of the Poso tribes were represented; the coastal section of the Lage tribe by the kabosenya Garuda; the small but influential Kadombuku tribe by the kabosenya Bunga and Uli and the most important tribe, the Onda'e by the kabosenya Bengke.¹¹ The coastal To Lage and the To Kadombuku had in the last thirty years, been forced to pay tribute to the Tomini Gulf state of Parigi amounting to 200 to 400 'bushes' of rice annually.¹² As yet, these two tribes were the only ones thus imposed upon but Parigi authority in the area was steadily growing with its colonization of the entire coastal strip between the village of Mapane and the Malei river. The To Onda'e, inhabiting territories south and east of these two tribes were involved in protracted wars with the To Napu, a notoriously warlike tribe from the mountainous regions west of the Mapane river.¹³ Baron van

8. Adatrechtbundels, vol. 9, p. 177.

9. Memorandum of Governor of Celebes and Resident of Manado, 23 October, 1899.

10. Kruyt and Adriani, De Bare'e Sprekende Toradja's van Midden Celebes, (Government Printer, Batavia, 1912) vol. 1, p. 142.

11. Indische Gids 1890, p. 1227. The contract lists three "Rajas of the Poso Lands".

12. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 138.

13. Kruyt states that Onda'e owed Napu seven slaves as a result of earlier hostilities and Onda'e's failure to fulfill this demand led to the 1892-1902 war. The chief of Onda'e was related to the Magau of Parigi via the marriage of his brother with the Magau's sister. ibid, p. 223.

Hoevell indicated an awareness of this background in a report to his superior in 1891 when he stated that:

the tribal chiefs who lived closer to the Poso lake made it known at the time that they were favourably disposed to recognizing the Dutch government on condition that the government permanently establish itself in Poso and protected them against attacks from the warlike tribes located west of the Poso river.¹⁴

Neither of the two contracting parties however, were aware of the full implications of the contract which had been signed. It was only in the last decade of the 19th century that the colonial government found it necessary to begin the task of untangling and clearly defining the relations between its various contractual allies in order to assert its authority effectively. Not till the military campaigns of 1905-08 did it complete the process of isolating each contractual ally from outside influence and subordinating these "states" directly to itself, and it was not till then that the Poso tribes came to comprehend fully the meaning of colonization. The early colonial policy in Central Sulawesi was complicated by the fact that all the major external influences in the affairs of the Tomini Gulf states originated outside the administrative region of residency of Menado. The states of Palu (involved in Parigi and Sausu), Mandar (involved in Muton, Sigi, Ampibobo and Toribulu), Sigi (involved in Napu, Parigi, Sausu, Mapane and Poso), and Luwu (which laid claim to most of the Poso area) were situated within the administrative region of the government of Celebes and Dependencies whose administrative capital was Makassar, at the extreme south-western end of the island. Thus, effective imposition of Dutch rule was hampered by the existence of its own colonial structures.

The Poso region, of all the Tomini Gulf states, posed the greatest administrative problem since it possessed no

14. Baron van Hoevell, "Explanatory memorandum regarding the advisability of issuing mining licences in the Gulf of Tomini". The "warlike tribes west of the river", the Napu, Besoa and Pebato, were described as being "renowned as savage and ruthless head-hunters".

indigenous political hierarchy which the Dutch considered as a viable basis for colonial rule. The original contract assumed the existence of a political entity which, by the middle of the following decade, proved to be an illusion. Yet politically, the area was potentially the most attractive since it opened up the heart of the island to Dutch influence. To bring Poso tribes into a satisfactory formal relationship with the colonial government, the Dutch administration had three options. Firstly, it could endorse the subjugation of the various tribes under the rule of their traditional overlord, the Datu of Luwu who, as a contractual ally of the Dutch, could administer the area under the supervision of European officials. Secondly, nascent traditional administrative structures within these tribes could be strengthened under Dutch supervision so that the region could be administered as separate self-rule areas or as a federation of self-governing tribes.¹⁵ Thirdly, the colonial government could take over the administration of the entire region or parts thereof, as an area of direct rule.¹⁶ In the course of the two decades following the signing of the first contract in 1888, all three options were seriously considered.

The first administrative solution was swiftly rejected by the Menado government. In 1896, Resident Jellesma, himself son of a missionary,¹⁷ stated that the claims of

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15. This is the argument of the Engelenberg Memorandum "Comments apropos a review of official reports and journal articles regarding the situation on the west and south coast of the Gulf of Tomini, 5 October, 1901".
16. The latter two alternatives represent theoretical legal distinctions perpetuated by the colonial government which differed little in practice. See J.H. Heslinga, Het inlandsch Bestuur en zijn reorganisatie in Nederlandsch Indie, (s'Gravenhage 1920).
17. N.M.S. to Kruyt, 29 October, 1891. Jellesma was described as "the only son of our late and highly regarded missionary". His father was in fact the predecessor of Kruyt's own father in the mission in East Java. Much hope was pinned on Jellesma by the N.M.S., both for his support of the Poso mission (N.M.S. to Kruyt, 9 March, 1892) and of the Minahassa (Dr. E.E. Kruijf, Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsch Zendinggenootschap (Wolters, Groningen 1894, p. 439). In responding to the N.M.S. letter of congratulations on his appointment as Resident, Jellesma promised the Society he would do his best to help Kruyt (Minutes 1892, 22 April, 1892).

Luwu over the Poso tribes should not be encouraged since he did not believe that "the expansion of the influence of Luwu would be in the best interests of the Poso Alfurs". This influence, he stated, was hindering the work of missionaries in the area and:

... in various ways, attempts are being made to introduce the Mohammedan religion, which from a political point of view can surely only have an adverse effect. It is my firm conviction that, from a political point of view, the influence of Luwu must sooner be bridled than expanded.¹⁸

The Assistant Resident of Gorontalo and Controleur Liebert of Poso¹⁹. confirmed this assessment, the former stating as his view that "this influence of Luwu on the Poso Alfurs is pernicious".²⁰ Assistant Resident Westra went on to suggest that the informed opinion of the missionaries Adriani and Kruyt be sought in this matter. Prior to tendering their official advice, these officials had held private discussions with Kruyt, who in 1896 was on his way via Gorontalo and Menado to Java for "spiritual refreshment". He had discussed with these men "the opposition of the Raja of Luwu" which he had experienced in attempts to begin a school in Buyu mBayu.²¹ The support of Kruyt's work expressed by these officials, represented not simply their concern to promote the expansion of Christian influence in Central Sulawesi; equally significant was the rivalry that existed between the administrations of Menado and Makassar.

18. Resident Jellesma to Director of Internal Affairs, Menado, 17 May, 1896.

19. Memorandum concerning Luwu and Poso, 16 September, 1896

20. Confidential memo of Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, H.A. Westra, Gorontalo, 30 September, 1896. Both Liebert and Westra wrote at the request of the Resident in response to the Director for Internal Affairs' negative reaction (Batavia, 30 July, 1896) to Jellesma's letter of 17 May, 1896 in which he had also asked for a commission to be established to investigate Luwu claims.

21. Minutes N.M.S., 26 October, 1896. Letter, Kruyt to N.M.S., Java 16 September, 1896. Westra's memo was accompanied by a sketch map provided by Kruyt and his memo suggested that the views of Kruyt and Adriani be sought on this issue. The fact that these administrators sought the missionaries' opinion was in part, the result of the relative ineffectiveness of the government's administration.

A support of Luwu claims would mean the annexation of the Poso region by the Government of Celebes. This political fact was not lost on the Governor of Celebes, Braam Morris to whom Kruyt spoke later during the same trip. It was the Governor's opinion that:

from the beginning, out of ignorance, the evangelizing work was incorrectly tackled because that territory comes under the Governor of Makassar and not under the Resident of Menado.²².

Partly to meet the political ramifications of this issue, a commission of four was appointed by Batavia²³. to investigate the extent of Luwu claims in the Poso region. The commission included a representative from both administrations. Its report was inconclusive from the point of view of the administrative rivalry but it did conclude that many To Pamona north of Lake Poso recognized the Datu of Luwu as their traditional overlord.²⁴ It further recommended that the colonial government discourage Tojo and Sigi from exercising their claims over tribes in the Poso area²⁵. and noted that Parigi pretensions in the region had been curtailed by the To Pamona themselves.²⁶.

Menado's concern to retain administrative control over the area was consistent with the policy it had followed in the previous decade. The administration saw the Poso region as a potential bulwark against the rising tide of Islamic expansion. This formed a further reason for making certain that the area remained within the Menado residency. It would clearly not be possible for the government of Makassar, administering the area through Luwu, to prevent the Islamization of the region, and this eventually would lead to the complete isolation of the Christianized Menado peninsula.

22. ibid.

23. Government Resolution, 3 July, 1897, No. 21. The Commission was largely appointed as a result of the urging of the Resident of Menado, Jellesma.

24. "The Territory of Poso", Report of the Commission, quoted in Engelenberg Memorandum, p. 12ff.

25. ibid., p. 59.

26. ibid., p. 25.

Fortunately for Menado, its policy fitted well with that espoused in The Hague.

Throughout the 1880's, Menado had emphasised the seriousness of the threat of Islam. In late 1886, the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, Baron van Hoevell, had encouraged the Protestant minister of Menado to take a professional interest in the "heathen Alfurs" in the Poso area.²⁷ He himself actively pursued an anti-Muslim policy which included "imprisonment of Islamic priests",²⁸. Greatly impressed by the activity of Muslims in the area, Rev. Wieland persuaded the Netherlands Missionary Society to establish a new mission field there.²⁹ Despite economic difficulties³⁰, the Society was encouraged in this decision by the maiden policy decision of the new Minister of Colonies, Keuchenius, who in May, 1888 had called for mission co-operation "to counteract the increasing influence of Islam amongst the heathens of the Indies archipelago".³¹ The Society had commenced a strong lobby to ease what it saw as restrictions on mission work, preventing it from responding to this appeal. It called for the relaxation of aspects of Article 123 of the Constitution in order to place the Christian mission on a more equal footing with Islamic evangelization, greater financial support for mission schools and a restriction on the number of foreign missionaries permitted in the colony with whose methods the Society

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27. N.M.S. to Kruyt, 29 October, 1891 and 11 December, 1891 "It was especially because of the appeals of Mr. van Hoevell that we decided to establish a post there; however, our sights were set on Limbotto". (11 December, 1891).
28. Minutes N.M.S., 30 December, 1889. Rev. Roggs to N.M.S., 24 September, 1889.
29. Rev. Wieland to N.M.S., 15 November, 1888. "I understand from the Assistant Resident that in recent years Mohammedanism was expanding strongly in that area and that only if action was taken quickly by a sturdy missionary, could many still be won for Christianity." A lengthy report from Rev. Graafland in the same year (Minutes N.M.S., 25 February, 1889) provided further evidence for the need of a mission in Poso.
30. N.M.S. to Kruyt, 9 March, 1892.
31. Minutes N.M.S., Minister of Colonies, Keuchenius to N.M.S., 8 May, 1888, also discussed in Indische Gids 1889, pt. 2, p. 1570 and 1790.

disagreed.^{32.}

Coincidentally, the Missionary Society's Menado representatives were themselves expressing a desire to expand their activities.^{33.} Specifically, the Menado mission wanted permission to expand beyond the Minahassa to counteract the growing activity of the Roman Catholic Church. Baron van Hoevell had threatened in his letter to the Society that "if the Protestant side could not fulfill this need for a mission in Poso he would invite the Catholics to do so".^{34.} The Menado mission looked to Boloang Mongondau,^{35.} Gorontalo and Poso as new areas of expansion in the Residency. Already conflict was apparent in Menado in 1889 where "R.C. propaganda was causing friction",^{36.} while in 1891 it had spread to Gorontalo with the admission there of a Roman Catholic priest,^{37.} at a time when the protestant mission there was undergoing difficulties.

32. Minutes N.M.S., 30 May, 1888. N.M.S. to Minister of Colonies, 28 May, 1888. The Society was also granted an audience with the Minister on May 25, 1888.
33. Minutes N.M.S., 27 October, 1890 reports that the parishes of Menado and the Minahassa had raised f.3000 for a mission in Poso and Gorontalo and the Minutes for 30 June, 1890 states that out of concern for the spread of Islam, f.141 was raised in Menado for the extension of the Menado mission. Administratively, the Poso mission was serviced from Menado in its formative years.
34. K.J. Bouwer, op. cit., p. 8.
35. Boloang Mongondau was opened up to the mission in 1889; Graafland stressed the need for the Society to accept a responsibility for this area. (See note 29). Kruyt and his brother-in-law, Moulijn, were appointed to Gorontalo in 1889 (Minutes N.M.S., 25 April, 1889). Kruyt was selected for Poso in 1890 (Minutes N.M.S., 19 June, 1890).
36. Minutes N.M.S., 30 December, 1889. Rev. Roggs to N.M.S., 24 September, 1889.
37. Minutes N.M.S., 30 May, 1892. N.M.S. to Kruyt, 11 December, 1891. The arrival of Roman Catholic priests in Limbotto in 1891 and the earlier activity of this church in the Kendari Bay, East Celebes between 1885 and 1887 (See Indische Gids, 1889, p. 550) as well as the Minahassa situation, appears to have strongly motivated the N.M.S. in extending its activities. For an account of the contemporary attitude of the N.M.S., see Kruijf, op. cit., pp. 407-415.

The two interests thus merged when in 1891, the future Resident, Jellesma, conducted missionary Kruyt to Poso and officially installed him with all the imprimatur surrounding the installation of a Controleur. Upon landing, the Assistant Resident told the assembled tribesmen: "The help you give this man, you give me."³⁸ Subsequently, the results of Kruyt's work were reported in the Colonial Reports as if he were a pioneering government official. Indeed, Kruyt had more "success" than the first government officials stationed in Poso.³⁹

By the end of the century, the colonial government had firmly rejected any notion of officially recognizing Luwu claims over the Poso tribes and was set to implement the second administrative solution. It had been suggested that as a result of the evangelizing work of Dutch missionaries, Central Sulawesi could become an area of direct rule; a Dutch Christian outpost in mainland Sulawesi.⁴⁰

38. J. Kruyt, Het Zendingsveld Poso, (Kok and Kampen, Amsterdam, 1970), p. 68.

39. The Colonial Report of 1893-94 states:

"With regard to the work of the missionary who has recently established himself in Poso (in the Gulf of Tomini), little of significance appears in the regional report but it does appear that he has already succeeded in establishing the trust of some influential chiefs there At Poso and Mapane, these Alfur chiefs of the inland waited upon the Resident which can be regarded as a result of their contact with the abovementioned missionary."

Koloniaal Verslag, 1893-94, p. 24.

This can be contrasted with the following comment:

"Significant results have not yet been achieved by the placement of a Controleur in the Gulf of Tomini While his contacts with the inland areas of Poso are of little significance, probably because of his lack of confidence in the use of the local language ..."

First Government Secretary to Resident of Manado, 23 March, 1897.


40. Engelenberg Memorandum, 5 October, 1901.

Until missionary Kruyt commenced his flood of geographical, linguistic and anthropological studies in 1892, nothing factual was known about the To Pamona of Central Sulawesi.⁴¹ Riedel's article of 1886 purported to be an authoritative account of the inhabitants of the Poso area but his map of the region indicates that, while there is some correspondence in nomenclature, geographical positioning is largely incorrect.⁴² Again Baron van Hoevell's apparently scholarly piece, written in 1891, added little accurate information.⁴³ Despite later government and scientific expeditions, the ethnological information available in the first two decades of the colonial presence in the area was based on the information gathered by Albert Kruyt and to a lesser extent, Nicolaus Adriani. The information provided by these pioneers was limited to Central Sulawesi and since, according to the Swedish ethnologist, Kaudern there was very little left of the original culture by the 1920's, Kruyt and Adriani perforce remain the authorities on the traditional culture of the inhabitants of this area.⁴⁴ In contrast, the less hospitable mountainous regions of N.W. Central Celebes and the more articulated Torajan society in the south, retained their cultural traditions more or less intact for a longer

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41. See R. Kennedy, Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures, (Yale U.P., 1945), "Toradja Group", pp. 112-115, also Brouwer, op. cit., bibliography. Prior to 1892, Dr. J.G.F. Riedel had published: "Bijdragen tot de kennis der talen en dialecten op de eilanden Luzon, Panai, of Ilong Ilong alsmede op Noord en Midden Celebes", (Verhandelingen van het Bataviasch Genootschap, 1868) and "De Topantunuasu of oorspronkelijke volksstammen van Centraal Celebes", (Bijdragen tot het Koninklijk Instituut, vol. 5, 1886). Both these articles Kruyt dismisses as largely inaccurate. Van Hoevell's article of 1891, Kruyt states, does contain some substance, although again, gross inaccuracies exist.
42. J.G.F. Riedel, op. cit., 1886. See map 2.
43. G.W.W.C., Baron van Hoevell, "Todjo, Posso en Saesoc", 1891.
44. W. Kaudern, Ethnological Studies in Celebes: Results of the Author's expedition to Celebes, 1917-1920, six volumes, (Elanders Boktryckeri Aktenbolag, Gotenborg 1925).

EUROPEAN ETHNOGRAPHIC AND GEOGRAPHICAL KNOWLEDGE OF CENTRAL SULAWESI PRIOR TO 1890

From: J.G.F. Riedel, 1886.



period. These areas were and are consequently studied by a wider range of people.^{45.}

The problem with Kruyt's work for anthropological study is that he was a biased amateur. The American, Richard E. Downs, in the introduction to his thesis The Religion of the Bare'e Speaking Toraja of Central Celebes writes that:

the mass of ethnographic data contained in Kruyt's monograph is poorly organized and full of unexplained inconsistencies ... All of Kruyt's writing was marred by a preoccupation with a succession of dubious theories that was no doubt due to his lack of anthropological training. On the other hand, his enthusiasm and enormous capacity for work, enabled him to collect a mass of ethnographic data which, stripped of his interpretations, is unquestionably of great value."^{46.}

Kruyt was the first to apply the term "Toraja", generally to the tribes of north-central Sulawesi in 1897.^{47.} Prior to that year, Kruyt, in common with his European contemporaries, referred to the inhabitants of this area as "Alfurs", a term previously applied to the inhabitants of the northern peninsula of the island. The extension of the application of this term represents a linguistic signpost indicating the direction from which colonial interest in Central Sulawesi originated.

The change in nomenclature introduced by Kruyt in 1897 was the result of his visit to Palopo in January of that

45. ibid, pp. 29-32 and Kruyt, De West Toradjas op Midden Celebes, vol. 1, pp. 1-5.

46. R.E. Downs, The Religion of the Bare'e Speaking Toradja of Central Celebes, (Leiden, 1956). Preface.

47. The term does not appear to have been used in any of the literature prior to 1897. In studying Kruyt's annual reports, published in the mission journal of the N.M.S., Mededelingen, one finds Kruyt in 1895 constantly using the term "Alfur", "Pebato Alfur" etc.. In 1896, the term "Alfur" is used once and usually the people are referred to by their tribal name, eg. "To Pebato", "Pebato tribe" or, when Kruyt is making a general reference, he used the term "Poso'er". In the 1897 report, that is after his trip to Luwu in January, 1897, Kruyt for the first time, uses the term "Toraja" and occasionally reverts to "Poso'er" but he makes no more use of the word "Alfur".

year. This southern Sulawesi town was the residence of the Datu of Luwu, claimant to sovereignty over most of the north-central tribes. Here, Kruyt was introduced to the term "Toraja", employed widely in the south to refer to the non-Muslim population of the inland. The name, generally adopted by Europeans, was a contraction of "to", meaning "people" and "raja", derived from the Buginese, "aja" meaning "above" in the sense of "up country"; thus, the people of the inland. Kruyt's adoption of the name in preference to the equally indiscriminate term "Alfur", had no scientific basis, as Kruyt himself admitted:

the term had become so widely known in the European world that we did not hesitate to extend its application to all the inland tribes, if only to avoid the name Alfur or Alifur which gave occasion for much misunderstanding.⁴⁸

By 1912, when the first edition of Kruyt and Adriani's monograph, De Bare'e Sprekende Toradjas van Centraal Celebes was published, the use of the generic term "Toraja" had become widely accepted as a result of Kruyt's steady stream of published articles on the area and its people. Yet, while Kruyt and Adriani had gathered extensive ethnographic and anthropological material on the inhabitants of Central Sulawesi, they knew little of the surrounding populations under whose classification the To Pamona were subsumed. Nor were Kruyt and Adriani themselves able to agree on the geographical spread of this ethnic group. Initially, Kruyt attempted to distinguish them from their southern and north-western neighbours on a linguistic basis. Thus, he referred to them as "Bare'e-speaking Torajans" in accordance with local practice of referring to an ethnic group by its form of negation, (bare'e = no).⁵⁰

48. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 2.

49. Volumes one and two of the 1912 edition are the work of Kruyt, while volume three is the work of Adriani. The 1950 edition was extensively reworked by Kruyt.

50. Kruyt, De West Toradjas (1938), vol. 1, pp. 6-7. The root form of the negation used in this part of Sulawesi was the word "bare'e", with its derivatives "are'e", "ae'e", "iba" and "aunde'e".

He also referred to them on a geographic basis as "Poso Torajans".

This linguistic classification, as Kaudern later pointed out, had forced Adriani to conclude that the originally identified Toraja group did not speak a Torajan language.⁵¹ The Swedish ethnologist considered the generic term "Toraja" too entrenched in scientific literature to warrant its change, even though he criticized Kruyt's unfounded use of it. Kruyt set aside his initial nomenclature as a result of Kaudern's criticisms and in his second major monograph, The West Torajans of Central Celebes, resorted to the classifications employed by Kaudern and Adriani, namely "Southern", "Eastern" and "Western Torajans". In the later work, Kruyt admitted that, while there was linguistic and ethnological evidence to distinguish "Southern Torajans" from their northern neighbours, it remained difficult to separate the eastern and western branches clearly.⁵²

Ultimately, Kruyt sought an explanation for the differences amongst the "Torajans" of Central Sulawesi in a theory of separate foreign cultural influences and migration patterns. He concluded that the Western and Southern Torajans were primarily influenced by stone-using migrants who brought with them, bronze implements, while the Eastern Torajans were influenced by a dominant migrant group which used pottery. The island of Sulawesi was in part invaded from the north, by a people originating from the islands of Japan, via Formosa and the Philippines through northern Sulawesi and via Lore and Sadang to East Java. This migration was followed by an invasion of potters who moved through Central Sulawesi from the south via Luwu and Malili, spreading north via the Poso basin to Kulawi and further to the north. These potters had come under the influence of Hindu-Javanese civilization, introducing to Central Sulawesi, the concept and function of chief, novel methods of warfare and agriculture and "a higher plane of spiritual life".⁵³ Differences between tribal groups in

51. Kaudern, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 2.


52. Kruyt, De West Toradjas, vol. 1, pp. 6-13.

53. ibid, vol. 1, p. 497.

MAP 3


COMPARISON OF THE ETHNOGRAPHIC CLASSIFICATION OF
CENTRAL SULAWESI INHABITANTS BY KAUDERN, KRUYT AND ADRIANI

A. KAUDERN




From: Kaudern, Ethnographic Studies, Vol. 2.

B. KRUYT



C. ADRIANI



each area, Kruyt explained by saying that not all tribes were influenced by these migrants to the same extent while others were influenced by both migrant cultures. Western "Torajans", furthermore, had also in more recent history, been influenced by Buginese, Makassarese and Mandarese cultures which had penetrated via the Palu valley.⁵⁴

There is no indication in the literature that the tribes of the Poso, Laa and Kodina river valleys referred to themselves by a collective name, although the inhabitants of adjacent regions identified them generally as To Lage, the name of the largest and possibly oldest of the Pamona tribes. Each of the tribes named itself after a founding village which, in many cases, only existed as a revered landmark. The tribes were nonetheless linked by a shared mythology which referred to their common legendary origin in the village of Pamona. The legend recalled how a large population once lived under its datu until their leader was captured by Wotu warriors, a state later conquered by its neighbour Luwu. With the removal of their datu, the elders of the Pamona people decided to disperse and erected the seven "stones of separation" to mark this turning point in their history. The seven stones represented six major Pamona tribes, each led by one of six brothers, while the seventh stone represented their sister who led the To Napu, who today are nevertheless regarded as ethnically different.⁵⁵ It was to this legendary ancestry that the people of Central Sulawesi resorted when in 1958, they decided to assert their sense of national identity.

The unfounded application of the term "Toraja" and the vain efforts to fit this classification to a geographic and demographic reality was not simply an indication of Kruyt's lack of scientific training. More significantly, it represented the European's need to establish order in the face of apparent chaos. The colonization of the To Pamona can thus be said to begin in the pages of the

54. ibid, vol. 1, pp. 1-13, Ch. 2, pp. 469-499.

55. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., p. 5.

ILLUSTRATION I

THE STONES OF SEPARATION AT PAMONA



Photo by Mrs. J. Visser, Tentena

learned journals where they were classified according to the European wisdom of the day.


While missionary Kruyt acted as the resident anthropologist for Central Sulawesi, he was in the first place a missionary. The data collected by him in the cause of his evangelizing work was limited by his objective of finding in the culture of the To Pamona, "weaknesses" and/or points of contact on which he could graft his Christian message.⁵⁶ Kruyt's interest in Pamona religion was similar to Snouck Hurgronje's interest in Islam: the aim of both was to find the basis for a program of "spiritual annexation".⁵⁷ There is a further point of comparison between the two writers. Snouck's work showed that broadly speaking, Muslims in the Dutch East Indies were not 'real' Muslims. They could therefore, be bought off with enlightened policies. The extensive works of Kruyt similarly indicated that the Pamona villager's allegiance to his religious beliefs was equally feeble that for the most part his religion consisted of "conservatism turned into a religion" aimed at maintaining the family's links with its ancestors.⁵⁸ The ordinary To Pamona, he attempted to show, had little real knowledge of the galaxy of gods and spirits but was forced through fear to participate in a daily and annual cycle of ritual. Pamona religion, as Kruyt perceived it, was the preserve of the priestess who alone could preside over a variety of rituals designed to secure an individual's spiritual wellbeing.⁵⁹

The religious beliefs of the ordinary Pamona manifested themselves largely in ritual related to everyday

56. This interpretation of Albert Kruyt's aim is supported by J. Kruyt, Het Zendingveld Poso, pp. 56-61.
57. J.C. Kielstra, Het Koloniale Vraagstuk van Dezentijd (De Eruen F. Bohn, Haarlem, 1928), p. 34ff.
58. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., p. 361ff.
59. ibid, p. 376.

ILLUSTRATION II

PEBATO MEN IN CEREMONIAL DRESS, CIRCA 1900



From: Kruyt and Adriani, De Bare'e-Sprekende Toradja's van Midden Celebes, 1912, Folio.

life in the construction of houses, treating illness, death and particularly in agriculture.⁶⁰ As a missionary, Kruyt was later most supportive of those regulations of the government which altered the conservative pattern of everyday life. Such changes, it was hoped, would force the villager to lose contact with the ways of the ancestors, thus striking at the foundations of "paganism". This ideally would leave the population powerless to oppose Kruyt's message. With the traditional life disappearing, the collective wisdom of the past would no longer hold the answers to present and future problems. The missionary who interposed between government directive and village response would thus begin to replace the ancestors.

The Pamona villager believed in a cosmos of which he, as a member of the living generation, formed an integral part. Not simply passive recipients, the living generation was in two-way communication with a spirit world peopled by gods, spirits and ancestors. The tribal lands themselves, together with the upper and under world, formed the habitat for many of the spirits. The living, the dead and the immortal acted and reacted on each other in ordered if not always in predictable ways. The known world was reflected in the unseen upper and under worlds. Geographical, celestial, animal and plant life also formed part of a living, interacting whole in which the Pamona tribesman was but one element. The Pamona cosmos existed to the exclusion of everyone else's, a conceit which was perhaps permissible in the pre-colonial period. Each family, village and tribe was united in this extended existence through their land, ancestors and their common origin in the great manufactory of souls in the ninth level of the upper world. Foreigners had a different cosmos, it was believed, peopled by their own ancestors, gods and spirits which could not impinge upon the Pamona cosmos.

Kruyt concluded from his study of Pamona religion, that a real distinction existed in the theology of most primitive societies in the Indies which reflected separate

60. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, Ch. 10 and vol. 2, Ch.s 17, 18 and 23. A summary of these religious practices and beliefs is given by Downs, op. cit..

stages of religious development. In 1906 he wrote:

By studying the religious concepts of Indonesians, we see therefore, two threads: that of the actual Animism, of the soul substance which entirely fills the natural world which, together with its personification, also continues to retain its impersonal character; and that of Spiritism, of the independent immortal soul in the after life, which is feared and therefore honoured.⁶¹

In a more primitive society characterized by a communalistic social structure and an undeveloped perception of self, the concept of a personalized soul remains confused and ill-considered. The impact of Christianity and Islam, according to Kruyt, tended to alter this balance in favour of sharpening the perception of a personal immortal soul and suppressing the original animist concept of an impersonal soul substance whose dynamism animated the whole of nature.⁶²

In the context of To Pamona religion, these two concepts were expressed in the two generic terms "raoa" and "lamo".⁶³ These terms were used to refer to separate aspects of the supernatural. Raoa included "the air and the spirits living in it, everything which surrounds man, the environment ... and to man himself where it means his spirit, feelings, inner consciousness". Lamo was the general term for "gods, spirits and ancestors, for a person's spirit feelings, inner consciousness, for things consecrated to the gods ... for wild pigs and fowl (they belonged to the spirits of the forest), for things one did not want to mention by name ... and often for things which one was afraid of".⁶⁴

The best known gods were Pue mpoloburu and Ndara. The former was the supplier of the Pamona's tanoana (a man's soul) and the punisher of crimes against the social order. The latter was a goddess of the underworld and was

61. Kruyt, Het Animisme in den Indischen Archipel (Martinus Nijhoff, s'Gravenhage, 1906), p. 4.

62. ibid, p. 5.

63. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 248.

64. Downs, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

generally associated with the earth and agriculture. Several lesser gods supplemented the activities of these two and were communicated with by the village chief or priestesses.⁶⁵ Downs comments that

it is not surprising that there should be some confusion as to the identity of these gods and there is no point in speculating as to whether or not, two or even all of them were the same they were certainly held to be individual figures, though their membership in a group of powers was more important than their distinctive personalities."⁶⁶

Several of these gods were specifically involved with agriculture, while each family and village had its own favourite god. According to Adriani, these gods were not recognized as omnipresent.

These gods were not regarded as being constantly engaged in the administration of the world; they only stepped in to help, or not, those who come under their jurisdiction in the isolated occasions when action on their part was needed.⁶⁷

The spirits were different from the gods and were thought by some to have once been human. They affected the villagers' daily life by their human-like virtues and vices. Chief among the spirits were the wurake, who in the first place, served the priestesses, and were generally well-disposed toward humans. Other groups of spirits which were associated with ill-health and misfortune were majsu, dimalele, sobugu, weapu and the wawo jangi with whom the wurake were said to be often at war. Only one other group of spirits, the longga, were thought to be constantly well-disposed towards the Pamona.

On earth, spirits who generally took on human form, inhabited trees, stones or earth. They were given the general name of bela, or forest spirits and were believed to control forest animals. If angered, they made people sick or otherwise possessed them. They were of particular concern to hunters and gatherers of forest products. Every spot of earth also had its spirit inhabitator or tampu ntana,

65. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 268-9.

66. Downs, op. cit., p. 15.

67. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 428.

which, if properly honoured during cultivation, was the cause of a good harvest. Other spirits inhabited lakes and rivers. A further group was connected with newly harvested rice. The lamoa ri pabetea provided satisfaction after eating while other spirits could cause people to remain constantly hungry or even make the rice disappear from the rice sheds. Others again, could either promote or ruin a rice crop, depending on how they were honoured. In turn, each village had its special spirit of the rice fields (lamoa nawu), to whom appeals were made to guarantee the year's rice crop.^{68.}

Apart from gods and spirits, the supernatural world was populated by the dead, differentiated as the recently dead, angga, and the revered ancestors, angga ntau tu'a. The former tended to be mischievous and haunted the familiar places of their former life, indistinguishable in their pranks from spirits. Every effort was therefore made by the priestesses to conduct the angga to their homes in the underworld during the rituals of the second funeral, but ancestors were continually called upon to aid the living in the struggle of life.^{69.}

The living generation communicated with this ethereal population by direct appeal through their priestess or via their souls or tanoana. A person's tanoana was thought to be able to leave a person's body at will, particularly during sleep and was said to be absent during sickness when evil spirits were said to have lured the soul from the body. Apart from people, rice, buffaloes and dogs were also believed to have souls.

Each person knew something of the spirit world and in his daily life, fulfilled the required ritual to placate its inhabitants. For major events, the Pamona called upon the services of the priestess. Her main task was to tend the soul, whether during sickness, in which case she had to retrieve it, or after death when she had to conduct it to the underworld, or directly after birth when she was called

68. Downs, op. cit. pp. 20-27. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit. vol. 1, Ch. 10, 12, 13 and vol. 2, Ch. 23.

69. Downs, op. cit., pp. 28-31, Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit. vol. 2, Ch. 17.

upon to tie the soul firmly to the newly-born or on the return of a weary traveller, when she had to recall the soul which had stayed behind. Moreover, the priestess carried out precautionary rituals in the inauguration of houses and the ritualistic preparation for head-hunting expeditions. The women who fulfilled this task did not form a separate caste but lived as ordinary citizens, stepping in to carry out their priestly function when called upon. All girls were initiated into the rites of priestesses although the majority did not continue to practise this art.⁷⁰ Occasionally, young men apprenticed themselves. They were generally regarded as effeminate and subsequent to their apprenticeship, wore female attire and were referred to as 'mother' or 'aunt'.⁷¹ The mystical role of the priestess was shared by less specialized individuals referred to as sando, who performed essential rituals related to the treatment of superficial diseases, producing rain or keeping rain away.⁷² Others performed vital ceremonies during the agricultural cycle, while yet others interceded with ancestors to ensure the success of head-hunters.

Most daily activities took account of the vagaries of the spirits but there were a number of ritualistic experiences in which the villager was obliged to participate to ensure the prosperity of the village. One such ritual was the taking of heads. The significance of head-hunting lay in its function of ensuring the health of the village and the success of the crops, since the

70. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 31.

71. ibid, pp. 47-52. NB. Downs refers to "shamans" although Kruyt specifically avoids this term when referring to the "Bare'e speaking Torajans". He makes the point in his 1938 monograph that the distinction between the N.W. Celebes shaman and the Poso priestess is one of the criteria on the basis of which a distinction can be made between the "East and West Torajans". See also Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, Ch. 12 and Kruyt, Het Animisme, pp. 443-460.

72. For a detailed discussion of this practice, see Kruyt "Regen lokken en regen verdrijven bij de Toradjas van Midden Celebes", (Rain-making and rain-diverting in Central Celebes), Tijdschrift voor Land, Taal en Volkenkunde, vol. 64, 1901, pp. 1-11.

failure to gain a scalp would anger the ancestors.⁷³ Scalps were also taken to honour those who had recently died and to save the tanoana of the mourners. Each youth was obliged to participate in a head-hunting expedition to attain his manhood.⁷⁴

During a funeral, the population came closest to communing with the ancestors, for here they helped the dead in their transition to the underworld. The funeral, a protracted two-stage ceremony, formed the central religious experience of the To Pamona. Death was the final departure from the limited world of the living to the supernatural world of the revered ancestors, a journey re-enacted symbolically in initiation ceremonies, head-hunting ceremonies⁷⁵ and indeed, in the ritual related to the growing cycle of the staple crop - rice:

Seen as a whole, the growing of rice was a sacrificial ritual. The rice, which came from the upperworld, was cared for as a human being as it developed and was finally killed and given a funeral at the harvest feast. All this was done with the aid of practically all the gods, spirits and ancestors of the upper and under worlds.⁷⁶

Religion was in this way inextricably intertwined in the whole fabric of Pamona life. Death hardly formed a boundary between the living and the departed generations as the past spilled over into the present and death was re-enacted in the rituals of the living. Human ancestors participated with spirits and to a lesser extent, with gods in the life of the living and the living joined with the inanimate in the existence of those beyond the shroud. The formal and visible link between the two worlds was the village temple or lobo which within Pamona village society was simultaneously the focal point of Pamona spiritual, communal and cultural life.

73. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., Ch. 9, pp. 238-241. Kruyt, "Het koppensnellen der Torajas van Midden Celebes en zijn beteekenis", (The meaning of head-hunting as practised by the Torajans of Central Celebes), Verhandelingen en Mededelingen v/w het Kon. Academie van Wetenschappen, vol. 3, 1899, pp. 147-229.

74. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 31.

75. Downs, op. cit., p. 91.

76. ibid, p. 100.

The political structure of the village was similarly indeterminate. The priestess did not form a separate caste⁷⁷. nor did the village head rise above the other kabosenya. Villages co-existed in a fraternal association of independent entities, held together by recognized family ties which extended to a recognition of a distant common origin as a base for tribal identification.⁷⁸ Amongst village chiefs of one tribe, one or two were generally recognized as having personal qualities which destined them to act as tribal spokesman and as arbitrators in disputes. The respect these men were accorded related to their ability to divine the wishes of the ancestors, their persuasiveness, their success in interpreting omens. But beside this respect, they held no inherited power and depended on their charisma to obtain consensus.⁷⁹

The fraternal intervillage structure was not disturbed by recognition of an overlord, which for most of the tribes was the Datu of Luwu. This ruler, geographically distant, was regarded as a lamoa, whose place in society was no more and no less than that of other lamoa who had to be appeased and whose designs had to be taken cognizance of in conducting one's life. The Datu of Luwu consequently did not rule the To Pamona in a literal sense. His wishes had to be taken notice of to prevent ill-health and poor harvests. Tributes to the Datu took on a sacrificial appearance.⁸⁰ Relations with the Jena of Tojo and the Magau of Sigi were of a more recent date and hence had not yet been accorded supernatural qualities.⁸¹

The total number of tribes which shared this religio-cultural heritage and a common legendary origin amounted to twenty-seven.⁸² In size, they ranged from

77. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 364.

78. ibid, pp. 120-124.

79. ibid, pp. 124-127. Nevertheless, slave-owning tribes which were simultaneously the oldest, tended to have a more formal structure. See below, page 25.


80. ibid, pp. 130-132.

81. ibid, pp. 136-140.

82. ibid, Ch. 2-5.

MAP 4

THE PAMONA TRIBES OF CENTRAL SULAWESI CIRCA 1900



Based on Kruyt and Adriani, De Bare'e-Sprekende Toradja's van Midden Celebes, 1912, Vol. 1, Chapters 1-4.

the largest, the To Wingke mPoso, consisting of twenty-five villages at the time of Kruyt's arrival⁸³. to the smallest To Ba'u, which after the government implemented its resettlement program, formed part of one village.⁸⁴ The earliest government census of what became the administrative district of Poso, was undertaken in 1907 for taxation purposes. It indicated a total population of 22,977 people, made up of 11,302 males of whom 6,079 were deemed liable for taxation, and 11,675 females.⁸⁵ Kruyt estimated a population density of fourteen and three-quarter persons per square kilometer on the basis of an estimated 1,560 square kilometer area.⁸⁶ The population figure determined in 1907 contrasted sharply with the official estimation of the population in 1889 when the figure of 100,000 was used to motivate mission and government interest in the area.⁸⁷

83. ibid, p. 34.

84. ibid, p. 73.

85. The system of taxation introduced amounted to a tax on earning potential of an able-bodied adult male. Estimating adulthood did represent a difficulty. The tax system consciously ignored the matriarchal and communalistic nature of society which mission and government were concerned to dismantle.

86. ibid, p. 88. See also Kruyt, "Gegevens voor het bevolkings vraagstuk van een gedeelte van Midden Celebes", (Evidence for the population question in part of Central Celebes). Tijdschrift van het Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundige Genootschap, vol. 20, 1903, pp. 190-205.

Since there were some Bare'e speaking tribes outside the administrative district of Poso, this figure does not coincide with the total Bare'e speaking population.

87. Minutes N.M.S., February, 1889. According to Rev. Graafland of Menado: "The population of Poso is estimated at about 100,000". This is the figure presumably derived from government sources and which were also used by van Hoevell (op. cit., 1891). Van Hoevell quoted from the Memorie van Overgave of Gov. Padtbrugge (1682) which stated that: "the territory is believed to be so densely populated that in many places, there is believed to be a shortage of firewood so that dried manure has to be used instead". Van Hoevell recognized that this was an exaggeration but "nevertheless, it is a fact that Poso has a dense population".

An unknown proportion of this population were slaves whom the census did not identify. Slaves were of two categories; those who formed an hereditary caste and those who were obtained from time to time as prisoners of war, as payment in settlement of disputes or who were directly purchased. The former were integrated into the tribe but the non-hereditary slave was used as peace offering, as payment of tribute and for sacrifice. Such practices apart, however, there was no indication that there had ever been a regular slave trade. Hereditary slaves were to be found only among the oldest tribes, the To Onda'e and To Lage and their off-shoots: To Palande and To Pada. Non-hereditary slaves were found in each tribe, although not in large numbers.^{88.}

Kruyt placed great significance on the impact of the possession of a slave caste, explaining the major social difference between slave-owning tribes and non-slave-owning tribes as being due to this factor. Unlike the To Pebato and To Wingke mPoso, the hereditary slave-owning tribes such as the To Lage, had more formalized religious and government institutions. The To Lage and To Onda'e village chief tended to be more authoritative; consultative leadership being less apparent than in Pebato villages. To Lage free men and women, kabosenya were on the whole, better dressed and housed than their To Pebato counterparts, while the latter were a better fed community. This, Kruyt believed, resulted from the fact that the To Lage left their slaves to tend to the fields, which resulted in smaller harvests, while at the same time, the latter used their slaves to gather more forest products which could be exchanged at the coast for such luxury items as foreign clothing, guns and plates. Lage and Onda'e kabosenya in this way, emphasized their higher status in the tribe. The hierarchical differentiation in these tribes also expressed itself, according to Kruyt, in their religious observances which were conducted more ceremoniously but less intensely than was the case in Pebato area.^{89.}

88. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 156-165.

89. ibid, p. 165. Kruyt found no racial or linguistic differences to account for the existence of a slave caste.

The major activity in Pamona life was the cultivation and harvesting of rice, which also formed the central focus for religious ceremonies. In the Poso basin, rice was grown exclusively on dry fields prepared on hill-sides on the "slash and burn" principle.⁹⁰ Land was owned communally by the tribe and the sparseness of the population insured against over-cultivation of such fields. For much of the rice-growing cycle, a significant proportion of the village population lived in temporary huts in the fields and in consequence, most of the non-agricultural activities of the village occurred after the rice harvest, when villagers returned to their hill-top dwellings. Besides rice, other grain foods were grown including maize, sorghum and Turkish wheat and these crops were supplemented by the growing of vegetables, condiments such as onions and ginger, fruit including bananas and pawpaw, together with small quantities of sugar-cane and tobacco.⁹¹

A brisk trade in iron implements, copper ornaments, earthen-ware utensils, salt, shells, various types of vines and grasses for weaving, buffalo, goats and dogs existed between tribes specializing in one or other of these barter items. A universally accepted currency prior to the introduction of money by the Dutch, was cotton pieces which had a standard value, estimated in the first decade of the twentieth century at two Dutch guilders each.⁹² Coins from the period of English rule were also still in circulation on the coast. As an alternative to this currency, standard bartering equivalents also existed: a set of copper arm or leg bands was equivalent to one buffalo or 500 bushels of rice or two 75cm. long blocks of salt, the thickness of a man.⁹³ Such items were exchanged by individuals of one

90. The mountain tribes in the west had been introduced to wet rice cultivation prior to the coming of colonial rule in Central Sulawesi. ibid, vol. 2, p. 231.

91. ibid, vol. 2, p. 301.

92. ibid, vol. 2, Ch. 24. See also Kruyt, "Lapjes geld op Celebes", (Cloth money in Celebes), Tijdschrift voor Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, vol. 73, 1933, pp. 172-183.

93. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 301.

tribe who usually transported them to a village of another tribe with the specific intention of exchanging his product for a needed item which he knew the other village possessed. Markets as such did not exist and intra-tribal trade rarely took place, as needed articles were generally borrowed or given within the extended family net-work.

A different matter however, was the trade with foreign merchants who operated in coastal settlements such as Tojo and Mapane. These had become important trade centres where strong rulers existed to maintain a degree of law and order. Both centres had, by the last quarter of the 19th century, attracted permanent settlements of Mandar, Boni, Ternate and Gorontalo traders who acted as middlemen between inland tribesmen and visiting merchants. The rulers of Tojo and Mapane had, by the end of the century, instituted a system of duties or taxes on both the seller and the purchaser.⁹⁴ Thus for resin, the most important export item, the middleman was obliged to pay twenty-five cents per picul, while the trader had to pay a further fifty cents. After spending weeks in the jungle collecting resin and transporting his load for several days to the coast, the tribesman earned f.3.75 worth of over-valued cloth.⁹⁵ The export of resin collected in this manner at the port of Tojo averaged 3,200 picul per annum prior to 1900.⁹⁶ In a similar fashion, rattan, copra, wax, buffalo and deer hides, deer horns, a little ebony wood and rice were traded at the coast by the inland tribes. The function of this foreign trade was to enable the To Pamona to purchase valued imported articles which were saved to form a

94. ibid, p. 304. Increasingly, trade came into the hands of Chinese traders after 1870, probably as a result of greater Dutch activity in the Gulf in the latter part of the century, particularly against pirates. See also Kruyt and Adriani, "De economische toestanden, de handel en nijverheid der Torajas op Celebes", (The economic situation, trade and industry amongst the Torajans of Celebes), Tijdschrift voor Economische Geographie, vol. 4, 1913, pp. 403-411.

95. ibid, p. 307.

96. ibid, p. 308.

family's inheritable wealth. Such articles as copper plates, expensive clothing and cotton material were then used from time to time for festive occasions, to pay fines or to place in the coffin of the deceased. In contrast, inter-tribal trade had the aim of obtaining necessary or valued items for everyday use which could not otherwise be obtained in the tribe.^{97.}

In most villages, small home industries had been established. These varied according to the materials available in the area but included such items as the production and decoration of bark cloth, basket and mat weaving and the manufacture of earthen-ware containers. Other than bark cloth, which till the latter part of the 19th Century was sold for export, articles were not made to be sold, only surplus production found its way into the inter-tribal barter trade. In Kruyt's early years, baskets fetched a price of between three and ten cents (or one to three chickens)^{98.} and pots, two to thirty cents depending on size.^{99.} The manufacture of sugar wine and iron implements was also carried out in those areas where the raw material was available,^{100.} while all tribes sent representatives to the coast to obtain salt. Copper articles were made in Mori and Kulawi, the raw materials, however, being the supply of copper plates, goblets and similar items owned by most villages. Unlike iron, copper itself was not manufactured in Central Sulawesi.

Much of the economic activity of the To Pamona was motivated by and centred on, their cultural life. It was after the annual harvest that time was available for head-hunting expeditions in preparation for the large death feasts. This was the occasion when the To Pamona literary

97. ibid, vol. 2, p. 311.

98. ibid, p. 332.

99. ibid, p. 338.

100. Iron-ore was found east of Matano Lake, along the upper reaches of the Kodina and Kalaena Rivers, in Rampi near the Takalekaju pass near Bada in Onda'e, Salu Kaia, Wawo nDoda, Palande and Lamusa, (ibid, p. 343). See also Kruyt, "Het ijzer in Midden Celebes" ("Iron in Central Celebes"), Bijdragen Kon. Bat. Gen., vol. 53, 1901, pp. 148-166.

culture, both secular and sacred, found its greatest expression¹⁰¹. against the background of a rich display of treasures collected over many years through trade with foreigners on the coast. At these large tribal gatherings the accumulated village wealth of buffalo and agricultural produce was generously offered and consumed from the utensils produced by hours of skilled labour. The gatherings of the To Pamona in honour of the dead were occasions for bartering, for initiating the young into adulthood, for handing on and consolidating the cultural tradition and for communing with others, both the living distant relations and the revered ancestors. These ceremonies represented the climax of all facets of Pamona life in which they ultimately found their meaning.

It was after the harvest, with the year's food supply safely gathered and stored and the agricultural spirits farewelled, that the circumstances were auspicious and the time was available to indulge in the To Pamona love of language in a formal way.¹⁰². The ordinary villager enjoyed repartee, metaphoric allusion and a wealth of imagery in his daily language. A good speaker, one who had mastered the art of manipulating the subtleties of his language, was much admired, not only for his ability to entertain, but also for his ability to win verbal battles against an opponent in the Pamona form of legal litigation. Mastery of the use of language was a quality usually sought in a village chief but every villager was required to master the art of circumlocution necessitated by his

101. To my knowledge since the work of Kruyt and Adriani, no further efforts have been made to study this oral tradition. Since independence, use of Bahasa Pamona (Bare'e) as a regional language had been discouraged so that, apart from its use by the older generation and within the village family context and transitionally in the first grades of the primary school, the lively literary tradition which Kruyt and Adriani witnessed is in danger of extinction. The library of the Synod of the Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah had itself, no copies of Adriani's collected stories.

102. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 356. Adriani notes: "It is only the indifferent or mentally deficient who know nothing of their literature or who have made no attempt to enrich it".

religious belief.

As an expression of the inner man, the tanoana, language impinged upon the omnipotent, invisible world. Particularly the more stylized literary forms such as poems, epic stories and even riddles had to be restricted to specific periods when the enjoyment of them would no longer interfere with the serious task of placating the spirits who influenced the success of the harvest.¹⁰³ Literary rendition also demanded an audience so that it was during the occasions when the tribes gathered for their important ceremonies, the harvest feasts and death ceremonies, that this art was practised. The literary season opened cautiously with riddle-telling as villagers collected on their ladangs to tend the ripening rice. The riddle had a serious, religious aspect for the act of solving the problem was seen as analogical to the filling of the rice ears with grain.¹⁰⁴ After the harvest came the epic stories, recounted at the larger inter-village gatherings. These had three express purposes: for entertainment, to provide explanations of events or phenomena and to provide a vehicle for religious expression in religious ceremonies. Epic stories were usually sung and were designed to appeal by their rhyming lines. Adriani, whose linguistic research forms the basis of the knowledge of Pamona literature, identified over three hundred separate stock stories.¹⁰⁵ In addition, he discovered at least fifteen types of poetic styles.¹⁰⁶

Although the oral tradition was a vital one, it was exceedingly fragile. Only the literary form was passed on from generation to generation; the content was improvised and the mark of the good raconteur was this ability to improvise. In the longer prose stories, some content was handed down in the form of rhyming verse which made up its

103. ibid, vol. 3, p. 357. For nine months of the year, story or poem reciting was prohibited.

104. ibid, vol. 3, p. 271.

105. ibid, vol. 3, p. 355.

106. ibid, vol. 3, p. 463.

conversational elements.¹⁰⁷ The form of poetry on the other hand, was strictly observed. Poems conformed to a sense of balance which Adriani termed, parallelism. This device reinforced rhythm and provided scope for poets to show their vocabulary range, their mastery of the art of punning and the full range of their abilities as poets. Rhyme was not an essential feature of poetry.¹⁰⁸

One literary form that demanded careful instruction and memorization, was the litany of the priestess. These litanies which enabled her to communicate with the spirit world, consisted of about 1,200 lines of verse conforming to an iambic or trocheeic rhythm pattern. However, the language of this litany was largely a collection of "garbled words (largest category), alternate words, old forms, circumlocutions and some foreign words taken from neighbouring languages".¹⁰⁹ Ordinary villagers did not understand these litanies, nor often did the priestess, so that this literary form falls outside the actual literary tradition of Pamona culture.

It was into this world that Albertus Christiaan Kruyt first set foot in 1891 to introduce its inhabitants to Christianity in the firm belief that:

The Poso people must be made to entertain the Christian message because they do not yet understand their own happiness. The means of pressuring them must be gentle and yet strong. ... we believe that God will round out the incompleteness of our work through his leadership.¹¹⁰

The son of Johannes Kruyt, patriarch of a long line of missionaries, Albert was born on his father's mission field at Mojowarno in East Java in 1871. His education took place entirely in the Netherlands where he was sent on his own, at the age of eight. From his eighth to his twentieth year, he was nurtured in the bosom of the Netherlands Missionary Society. After a period of private tutoring from an ex-missionary, Kruyt underwent higher elementary education (M.U.L.O.) at a superior Christian school in

107. *ibid*, vol. 3, p. 355. 108. *ibid*, vol. 3, pp. 462-3

109. Downs, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

110. Kruyt, "Verslag van de Zending to Poso over 1896" (Report of the mission in Poso in 1896), *Mededelingen*, 1898, p. 183.

Rotterdam. This was followed by seven years of study in the Society's own training institution in Rotterdam. The education at this institution consisted of three more years of general schooling followed by what could be termed as four years of professional studies. Here he studied theology, mission history, Indonesian language, culture and religion. He also undertook some basic medical training and, after he had been called for the Poso mission in 1890, Buginese language classes which he attended with Nicolaus Adriani, who had been selected by the Netherlands Bible Society to join Kruyt in Poso.^{111.}

The Poso mission bore the deep imprint of Kruyt, its forceful pioneer. He was a man whose thunderous voice and dominant personality his former pupils and mission teachers can still remember.^{112.} To his colleagues, Brother Kruyt appeared to have been either an inspiration or an obstacle to progress.^{113.} To the ordinary villager, the pandita was a person of abnormal endurance and perseverance. His son and colleague, Jan Kruyt described him honestly as

... impulsive by nature, which manifested itself clearly in his decisions and attitudes. Considered superficially, he could therefore be regarded as inconsequential Against this is the fact that he worked very methodically so that a strict order existed in his division of time and labour.^{114.}

Saturated with missionary idealism throughout his formative years, Kruyt chose his own interpretation of his role based on his perception of Pamona society. His practice showed him not to be a creature of his father's philosophies. During his education, Kruyt came into contact with a broad spectrum of theological perspectives.

111. See Brouwer, op. cit., Ch. 1, passim.

112. Based on interviews conducted in Tentena, Central Sulawesi in August, 1975.

113. This was particularly apparent in the debates regarding mission involvement in medical care and commercial enterprise. See for instance, W.J.L. Dake, Het medische werk van de Zending in Nederlands Indie, (Kok and Kampen, Amsterdam, 1973), pt. 3.

114. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 61.

He left the Netherlands at the age of twenty under the influence of Christian socialism and the modern theological interpretations of the Groningen or Modern school as well as the ideas espoused in theological circles of Utrecht University.¹¹⁵ Academically, his education continued part-time in the field, as the bibliography of 167 authors quoted in his first major work, Animism in the Indies Archipelago, 1906, indicates. In the area of anthropology of religion, he took an anti-rationalist, anti-Tylor position although he appears to have been influenced by the then current cultural evolutionary ideology, which has been called "unilinear evolutionism".¹¹⁶ The publication of two major ethnological monographs, a number of shorter essays and over fifty non-mission articles further attests to his intellectual growth during his forty years as a missionary.¹¹⁷

During his long tour of duty in Central Sulawesi, Kruyt's principles of action were little modified from that hinted at in a letter to his father in 1902:

Everything that Christian Socialists desire is present in Central Celebes: no capitalism,

115. Brouwer, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Kruyt's biographer fails to define Kruyt's theological position. It does appear, however, that Kruyt came into contact with a wider range of theological perspectives than would have been typical for mission candidates at this time.

116. Kruyt, diary copy, letter to Adriani, Poso, 2 February, 1902. Speaking of the Moninklijke Akademie, Kruyt wrote: "Most of my theories found much opposition from several ethnologists who held steadfastly to Tylor." In 1906, he wrote in the introduction to his first major work, "For me, who has come to know a primitive society in its daily life, it remains a puzzle, how it could have been suggested that Christianity has evolved out of this primitive religion." Downs wrote that, by 1918, Kruyt had come under the influence of van Ossenbruggen's dynamistic theories, (op. cit., p. 35). For a summary of the cultural evolutionary position, see M. Harris, The Rise of Anthropological Theory (Crowell, New York, 1968).

117. See Brouwer, op. cit., (Bibliography) and R. Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 112-115.

not the power of money etc.. Only the principle upon which this society is based is wrong The social circumstances of the To Pamona, the patriarchal administration, free of all force ... absence of striving for self-enrichment, more respect for other's rights than is apparent in Europe - all these circumstances are undeniably better in which to lead a Godly and pleasant life than the conditions which would be brought about if the government exercised power here.¹¹⁸

His aim throughout his career, and the basis of his prolonged conflict with the representatives of the colonial administration, was to transform the principles upon which the society was based, with the minimum possible change to its basic structure. This policy led him to attempt to isolate the Pamona community from external influence. In practice, this meant a paternalistic policy in which only the missionary had the authority and the competence to judge what changes were 'good' for the people.

Kruyt's concept of necessary change was rooted in his belief in a form of cultural evolutionism which he clarified in a series of articles written at the end of his career.¹¹⁹ For Kruyt, the Christian consciousness marked the last stage in the evolutionary process because Christianity made demands on and demanded the development of the individual's awareness of self and his relations with his Creator. The evolution of this essential sense of individuality was marked in traditional societies by an increasing independence from the natural forces in the perceived environment. This was to a large extent, dependent upon man's ability to extend control over his means of livelihood. Secondly, it was characterized by an increasing specialization within the community, initially to be found in the appearance of a political hierarchy and a division of labour and later, exemplified by the individual's sense of his own responsibility for

118. Kruyt to J. Kruyt (sn.), 9 February, 1902.

119. Kruyt, "Zending en Volkskracht", Mededelingen, vol. 79-80, 1935-36.

his actions. Ultimately, it was the individual's concordat with the 'supreme power' which expressed the achievement of the final stage towards recognition of individual responsibility.

In his study of the evolution of Pamona society, Kruyt was able to show how "its inhabitants are led, steadily higher, step by step, toward Him". By means of the introduction of technical know-how and religious practices, brought to the Poso basin by successive waves of migration, "God led them a step closer towards Himself". Kruyt's role in this evolutionary process was clear: it was to save the 'pagans' from the conservative web of their 'heathen' rituals and to develop the potential of their humanity.

Even though Kruyt wrote that "colonization goes more and more against my grain,"¹²⁰ he recognized the need, after twelve years of unfruitful labour, for a sharp knock to be given to the otherwise unshakable foundations of that conservative society. Recognizing that the political situation of Central Sulawesi needed the intervention of a more potent force than he could muster, Kruyt cautiously welcomed government intervention in Central Sulawesi and continued to do so as long as he was able to influence government policy.

In an important address given to the Indies Society in 1906,¹²¹ Kruyt outlined his terms for the co-operation of church and state in the Poso region, a position which formed the basis of his relations with the colonial government during his working life. In the address entitled "The native state and the Christian Mission", Kruyt argued, in the context of Dutch colonialism in 'heathen' areas, that a beneficial expansion of colonial rule was only possible in such areas if it was immediately followed or preceded by a Christian missionary presence.

120. Kruyt to J. Kruyt (sn.), 9 February, 1902.

121. This address was given to the general meeting of the Indische Genootschap, 23 October, 1906 and reproduced in Verhandelingen van de Indisch Genootschap, 1907, pp. 79-109.

The "heathen" state in its political structures, in its economic activity, in every aspect of daily and ritualistic life, was kept together by "spiritism", the inseparable bond between ancestor, animate forces of inanimate life and the present generation of people. Any penetration into this conservative and communalistic society, argued Kruyt, must bring in its wake change, and such change to any one feature of this entity would bring irreparable destruction to the whole.

Given the right of a colonial power to penetrate such traditional societies, (and Kruyt and his ethical contemporaries did not regard this as a matter for debate) destruction of the status quo was unavoidable. But, since in such societies, political state and religion are necessarily inter-related, the political arm of the colonizing country alone could not restore a new church-state unity to give indigenous life meaning and purpose. A new religious force must also be introduced and in the Indies, the choice lay between Islam and Christianity.

But, argued Kruyt, Islam represented a church-state unity which was anti-Dutch and pro-Mecca; it was indeed a false religion and clearly, Muslims could not be regarded as the best citizens in a Dutch (Christian) colony. Consequently, stated Kruyt, when a European colonial power penetrated a traditional society, to effect social improvement, it had to be aided in this task by representatives of the Christian church who could provide the people with a new religion which would restore to them, in the new political situation, that essential unity and meaning of life. The Christian colonizer, in other words, had to be seen to be Christian and had to introduce the totality of its culture to its subjects.

Implicit in Kruyt's 1906 address is his realization that only through a quite radical and externally initiated change to the Pamona way of life, would it be possible for Kruyt to break into the web which joined the villager to the ways of his ancestors. This was a realization born from twelve years of fruitless labour during which he had operated on a policy of gradual familiarization. Kruyt's annual reports over the first years indicate that he worked

to a basic plan in which time hardly mattered.^{122.}

The first stage of his plan was the cultivation of personal contacts to enable him to gain free access into the village community. He achieved this by studying the language and culture of the people, by providing medicines, by developing personal contacts with village chiefs, by offering gifts and by contributing to the expenses of village festivities. In the second stage, he confirmed and cemented such contacts by placing demands on these relationships by requesting overnight accommodation, by requesting permission for the erection of a house for a guru, by asking villagers to listen to and comment on simple sermons and by asking parents to send their children to school. Thirdly, when sufficient mutual trust had been established, Kruyt would begin seriously to preach the Christian message. This step, which of course, was constantly repeated, also took on a set pattern. The Christian message had to be couched in terms which would make clear to the individual villager that the European religion was relevant to him. Thus, Kruyt would typically begin by showing that the Dutch and the To Pamona were originally the same people. This in Pamona terms, meant that Europeans and To Pamona shared common ancestors. Consequently, they should revere the same God. The final stage was for Kruyt to introduce the concept of personal responsibility and the concept of sin. By linking this to the Pamona idea of the existence of the soul after death, he would sketch the Christian concept of salvation of the personal soul through belief in Jesus Christ.

Such a gradual and indirect approach needed time. Kruyt had to contend with competing forces which proved beyond his capacities to surmount. The inaccessibility of the small, widely scattered villages made it difficult for him to develop those vital, intimate relations. Travelling took much of his time and energy. He commented to his wife in 1892 that the lack of a substantial

122. From 1895 unofficial Annual Reports on the mission in Poso were published in Mededelingen van wege het Nederlandsch Zending Genootschap.

village in his vicinity hampered his work.¹²³ Another major obstacle to the success of Kruyt's procedure was the para-religious fear which the To Pamona had towards their overlord, the Datu of Luwu, and to a lesser extent, the Jena of Tojo. The village chiefs feared that these rulers would not approve their acceptance of Kruyt's proposals. Kruyt attempted to meet and remove these fears by travelling personally to Palopo and Tojo in 1897 to seek the approval of these rulers but representatives of both ruling houses continued to provoke unrest in the Poso basin. Furthermore, the constant state of unrest, due to wars and rumours of wars, did not make the situation conducive to the spreading of a message of peace and good will. Finally, Kruyt was hampered by a lack of European personnel which prevented him from contacting the entire tribe and overcoming the conservative influences brought to bear by elements of a tribe living too far inland for Kruyt to visit on a regular basis.

It can thus be fairly argued in Kruyt's own terms that the immediate, if not the ultimate success of the Poso mission, was dependent upon the intensification of colonial rule in the Poso region. Kruyt was forced to depend on the colonial government, not simply to improve the external conditions within which he had to operate, but also to break open the "web of conservatism", the bond between the living and the dead, in order to reach the individual.

123. Kruyt to Mrs. Kruyt - Moulajn, 11 May, 1892. The frustration felt by Kruyt was no doubt heightened by the fact that he and the Society were led to believe that a dense population existed in the region.

CHAPTER THREE

LAYING THE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATIONS 1894 to 1904

The history of mission education in Central Sulawesi is a history of its role in transforming Pamona society and of its struggle to maintain a separate identity in the face of government pressure to centralize its control over all indigenous education.

In assessing the role of the mission school as facilitator of change, the absence of indigenous sources and attention to documented external manifestations produce a tendency to over-estimate the school's impact. Warning his fellow missionaries of the same danger, Jan Kruyt, son of Albert Kruyt and education director of the Central Sulawesi mission, stated in 1931:

The school is still foreign, is still not part of the people, still does not play a role and still does not possess an indigenous character. We are still standing at the threshold of a difficult development.¹

At this time, eighty mission schools were in existence.

At a more general level, it is necessary to proceed cautiously in assessing the impact of Westernization. After thirty years of colonization and independence from Luwu overlordship, the representative of the Poso people, To Lasa, waited for Luwu direction before accepting the return of Dutch administration supported by Australian forces, after the capitulation of Japan.² Quite simply, the Dutch remained colonizers; the mission school, despite missionary attempts to relate it to the indigenous society, remained foreign. Even though a large number of To Pamona accepted Christian baptism, they remained To Pamona above all.

The precise role of the mission school in the evangelization work of the mission had become problematic

1. J. Kruyt, "De plaats van de volksschool in de samenleving op Midden Celebes", (The role of the village school in the Central Celebes society). Mededelingen, vol. 75, 1931, p. 241.
2. J. Kruyt, Het Zendingsveld Poso, p. 100.

in the early twentieth century. Mission writers who contributed to the debate on indigenous education in the second and third decades of this century, were content to take as their starting point, the fact that mission schools played a major role in the provision of "native education". They were mainly preoccupied with defining and defending the place of the mission school in the system of indigenous education,³ particularly after mission schools were absorbed into the general system of government sponsored indigenous elementary schools.

Dr. Adriani, in an address to an anniversary meeting of the Netherlands Missionary Society in 1907 declared:

For the mission in Central Celebes, the schools have always been a great support. Imagine a man like Brother Kruyt thirteen years ago, still with great expectations, enthusiastic to bring the Gospel to the people but realizing that most of his efforts would be unsuccessful due to the unwillingness of the Torajan people to receive the Gospel, due to the economic situation of the population which could not be improved by our meagre means, due to the amount of time and effort necessarily wasted by the amount of travel needed to do the work; then what a comforting thought it must have been for him in those first years: at least I have my schools.⁴

This "confession" by Adriani points to one significant aspect of the function of mission schools, that is, the extent to which schools and school attendance statistics helped the missionary to bolster the quantitative results of his work. Particularly in the formative period of a

3. See for instance, the report commissioned by the Nederlandsche Zendingraad (Netherlands Mission Council) "Het volksonderwijs der Zending in de Buitangewesten" (Popular education provided by the Protestant mission in the Outer Islands), c. 1932, and Dr. C.W.K. Baron van Boetzelaer van Dubbeldam (Mission Consul in the Netherlands Indies), "De Zendingsscholen en het volksonderwijs", (Mission schools and popular education). (Pamphlet, Batavia 1917, Paper given at the mission conference at Banduug, 20-27 August, 1916).
4. The address was entitled "De Ontwikkeling der Zendingsscholen op Midden Celebes", (The Development of Mission schools in Central Celebes), published in Mededelingen, vol. 51, 1907.

mission, which in Central Sulawesi lasted almost eighteen years,⁵ school attendance figures were an encouragement in the absence of converts. This provided the supporting public, mission administration and missionary alike, with a sense of achievement which may well have been illusory.⁶

There were two main views regarding the place of the school in the Protestant mission. The more traditional view, to which Kruyt subscribed, regarded the establishment of schools as subordinate to the actual mission task, the preaching of the Gospel with the view of making conversions. For Kruyt, the mission school was a means of establishing contact with parents as well as developing certain skills and attitudes in children who would later form the adult church congregation. The other view, promoted by the Director of the Mission Society, Gunning, saw the school more as a social service. From this perspective, the mission school took on a more worldly function designed to meet perceived needs as defined by the nature of the indigenous community.⁷ The effect of both views was similar since both promoted Western oriented education in a non-Western culture. Supporters of both shared the belief expressed at the 1902 annual conference of the N.M.S.: "Efforts have to be made to

5. The first To Pamona conversions to Christianity were not till 1909. See Kruyt, "Papa i Wunte", Mededelingen, vol. 54, 1910.

6. Kruyt, like all other Society missionaries, was required to correspond and report regularly, but for at least a decade, his reports had nothing substantial to communicate. Kruyt prepared an annual account intended for general public consumption in Mededelingen, together with more informal reports, regularly reproduced for limited circulation in Maandberichten, (Monthly News of the N.M.S.) and "Brieven van de Zending Albert C. Kruyt en zijn Echtgenote aan hunne Vrienden", (Letters of the missionary A.C. Kruyt and his spouse to their friends). While the published reports were not falsified, they were generally optimistic and made much of small events. Such "public relations" exercises were an essential element in promoting the voluntary contributions upon which the society depended.

7. See "Het volksschool onderwijs der Zending in de Buitengewesten". (Anon. n.d.), pp. 1-4.

train the native to exercise greater initiative so that he can learn to be more independent".⁸ In practice, the school helped to separate the pupil from his traditional life-view and thereby helped to facilitate the acceptance of Western/Christian values.

In the period 1894-1904, seven schools were established by the Poso mission, of which one, located at Kuku, did not become operational till 1906. Of the remaining six, three were exclusively schools for To Pamona children who numbered eighteen out of a total enrolment in the six schools of approximately seventy.

By 1896, Kruyt had concluded that the two major obstacles to school attendance were the opposition to schools by the region's overlords and the negative influence of Muslim neighbours. This conclusion had led him to arrange a series of audiences with these rulers and to establish schools for Muslim children in Mapane and Tojo. The latter schools soon became relatively successful but no dramatic increase in attendance resulted in the inland schools after Kruyt had obtained the formal approval of the Luwu, Sigi and Tojo rulers.

It thus became apparent to Kruyt that other factors motivated the antipathy towards the schools. A year previously he had announced to mission circles in the Netherlands that he was forming the suspicion that the To Pamona parent refused to send his children to school because he "was becoming conscious that these children would thereby become Christian".

The matter of the school therefore, goes further than we thought. We are therefore, no longer confronted by objections which can be removed by humans. When one sends one's children to school, this can also be regarded as an approach to Christianity.⁹

In 1895, Kruyt was still groping blindly in his attempts to interpret the sensibilities of the indigenous mind. By 1899 however, he was coming closer to an understanding of the real attitude to schooling.

8. Minutes N.M.S., 8 July, 1902.

9. Annual report, 1895. Mededelingen, vol. 40, 1896, p. 192.

TABLE 1

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE IN THE
PCSO REGION 1894-1904

LOCATION	YEAR OF ESTABLISHMENT	ATTENDANCE								
		1894	1895	1896	1897	1888	1899	1900	1901	1904
Poso*	March, 1894	0	6	20	16	16				16
Panta†	July, 1894	2	3(15)	(8)‡	3(8)	3	5	6	6	6
Tomasa	October, 1894	0	3	0	1	5	3	1	2	2
Buyu mBayau	November, 1895		0	0		4	4	3	10	10
Tojo*	May, 1897				7	5	5	3	18	18
Mapane*+	(mid) 1897				4(10)		4	7	17	17
Kuku	1904						3		0	0

1. Information extracted from annual general reports as printed in Mededelingen. Except for the figures for 1904, statistics refer to regular attendance, not to official enrolment.

* Malay language schools

+ School held three times per week

‡ Figures in brackets indicate maximums recorded

C.F. A table published by Kruyt in Mededelingen in 1900 with statistics for 1899

No. Schools	Total Registered Attendance	
	No. Pupils	Total Ave. Attendance
6	21	24(?)
	<u>Christian*</u>	<u>Muslim</u>
	21	23
		24

* Includes all non-Muslim Pupils

What I had never heard earlier, people are now beginning to express: by means of the school, the children will become the superiors of their parents.¹⁰

Opposition to schooling, as Kruyt was now beginning to realize, was rooted in the heritage of ancestor reverence - it was the responsibility of each generation to maintain the lore of the ancestors. The social ideal was the maintenance of the delicate equilibrium of existence. The acceptance of Christianity or the achievement of scholastic abilities were thus equally unacceptable. Kruyt realized that he had to wait for God and the colonial government.

One must go to the sensitive writings of the linguist, Dr. Nicolaus Adriani, to find an explanation of the To Pamona perception of the school and a satisfactory understanding of their rejection of it. Though a colleague of Kruyt, Adriani was not a missionary.¹¹ He was a representative of the Netherlands Bible Society, sent to Poso with the task of preparing a Bare'e language version of the Bible when it was still thought that the population of Central Sulawesi was sufficiently large to justify this. While he involved himself from time to time in the routine work of the Poso mission, he remained primarily a student of language.¹² He came, not to impose, but to learn. A convinced Christian, a believer in the need to educate the indigenous population and a firm supporter of the

10. Annual report, 1899. Mededelingen, vol. 44, 1900, p. 348. See also J. Kruyt, "De plaats van de volksschool ...", in op. cit., pp. 243 ff..
11. For a biography of Adriani, see H. Kraemer and A.E. Adriani, Dr. N. Adriani, (Paris, Amsterdam, 1934) 2nd Edition, E.C. Snouck Hurgranje (ed.) Verzamelde Geschriften van Dr. N. Adriani, vol. 1, (Haarlem, 1932), A.C. Kruyt, "Nicolaus Adriani" in Mededelingen, 1926. pp. 193-209.
12. Adriani had four lengthy absences from Poso. Kruyt wrote to Gunning, Adriani's uncle, in 1910:
 "Adriani takes no part in the work of missionaries and has never taken part ... from the point of view of the mission, Adriani is purely a theoretician."
 (J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 21).

government's policy to curb the expansion of Islam,¹³ he was in disagreement with the harsh effects of Controleur Engelenberg's colonization policy.¹⁴ There was a noticeable cooling in relations between Kruyt and Adriani as the mission developed.¹⁵ Adriani was a member of Kartini's circle of correspondents,¹⁶ loved by the people where Kruyt was respected;¹⁷ he was a student of Indonesian life, not an imperialist.¹⁸

In a perceptive article in the Koloniaal Tijdschrift of 1919,¹⁹ he attempted to view education, medical

13. Adriani to Mrs. Gardner, Church Missionary Society representative, Cairo, Egypt, n.d. 1910 (Archive N.B.S.).
14. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 26 April, 1907:
 ... I noticed some time ago that Dr. Adriani was not on my side. It certainly was a surprise to discover that his position was a long way from mine and that he did not give me moral support.
15. Kruyt's attitude toward Adriani had become ambiguous and the oft-quoted close friendship probably cooled down after the effective subjugation of Poso. In a letter to Adriani's wife, in which Kruyt refuses her request to hand over Adriani's correspondence, Kruyt recalls that the happiest days of the partnership was the period 1895-1908 (Netherlands Bible Society Archives, Haarlem - Adriani's Archive letter, 11 May, 1927). Kruyt's changed attitude is apparent even in the obituary he wrote for publication in Mededelingen 1926. As Kruyt admitted in the letter to Adriani's wife: "I have noticed that Nico Adriani is regarded differently in Holland and Java (therefore outside Poso) than we regarded him here. Hereby I don't mean to say that for instance, we regard him less favourably than those who have only met Nico elsewhere; not at all - only different." This ambiguous attitude is also reflected in J. Kruyt's book published in 1970.
16. Raden Adjeng Kartini, Letters of a Javanese Princess, (Norton & Co., New York, 1964). See Appendix No. 1.
17. Kruyt, "Nicolaus Adriani" in op. cit., pp. 197-200.
18. The difference of approach of the two men can be exemplified in a comparison of Kruyt's and Adriani's attitude to the religious anti-government movement, Mejapi. See "De Godsdienstige politieke beweging 'Mejapi' op Celebes", (The religio-political movement, 'mejapi', on Celebes) in Bijdragen, Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, (vol. 67, 1913), pp. 135-151.
19. N. Adriani, "Onderwijs, Geneeskunde, Bestuur en Godsdienst-prediking onder een animistische volk in Nederlandsch-Indie" (Education, Medicine, Administration and Preaching the Gospel amongst an animist people in N.I.), reproduced in Verzamelde Geschriften, vol. 2, pp. 365-386.

treatment, government administration and evangelization from "the point of view of an animist society" on the basis of his knowledge of the inhabitants of the Poso area. The role of education in its broadest sense in such a society, argued Adriani, was the transfer of information "of all that which is relevant to maintain it in an unaltered form from generation to generation". The function of education was to conserve what was already known regarding the inter-dependence of the living and the phenomena of the natural and spirit world. The applicable principle was a form of pragmatism: that which had worked well in the past must be maintained.

The rules of social organization, justice, warfare, religion, medical care, funeral rites, the feeding, clothing and raising of children, the building of houses, everything is already known.²⁰

If this concept of education is a largely informal one, a formal aspect also existed. The rules which governed the inter-relationship between man and nature, were designed to steer the individual through the myriad of dangers which were thought to beset his life. The knowledge needed to overcome the magical powers of the natural and spirit world and so secure one's protection against them, was not incorporated in a body of lore. This was the kinetic element which an individual might learn to use to his own account.

Adriani concluded that the concept of formal instruction, in as far as it was known in Pamona society, was equated with secretiveness and individualism and was thus anti-social. The teacher of magic practised a clandestine art. The student of magic gave himself up to his teacher, separated himself from his village and paid handsomely for the privilege of possessing secret powers of which his fellow villagers were hopefully ignorant.²¹

20. ibid, p. 367.

21. loc. cit.,

The objections Kruyt received prior to 1905 reflect these attitudes. The sending of children to school was regarded as either useless or dangerous.²² On the other hand, with the establishment of a colonial administration after 1905 and the resultant change to the external aspects of life, Kruyt found it almost impossible to meet the requests for schools.

There were, nonetheless, three inland schools in existence by 1904 with approximately eighteen children frequently attending, one year prior to the establishment of colonial control and five years prior to the first conversions to Christianity. An explanation for this fact must similarly be found within Pamona culture. Three factors contributed to their establishment: the personality of the village chiefs involved, Kruyt's own personality and its impact on his Pamona audience and the nature of Pamona childhood.

A foreigner had no influence in this society unless he could establish his relevance by accruing a certain amount of prestige.²³

A person who was not able to command prestige was not listened to by a Torajan. There had to be a pronounced element of respect which can come dangerously close to fear but which nevertheless, clearly differs from it.²⁴

Kruyt was initially perceived of as the bringer of no apparent advantage and, not being engaged in trade, with no apparent purpose, since the To Pamona could not understand the relevance of Kruyt's religion to their society. Jan Kruyt argues plausibly that his father established for himself a place in Pamona society through his forceful personality, physical build and endurance and spirited involvement in intertribal affairs.²⁵

After 1891, Kruyt rapidly developed his relations with northern To Pamona villagers from a bribery level of

23. See Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, Ch. 6 and 7.

24. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 61.

25. loc. cit.

contact,^{26.} to being able to speak as an equal with village chiefs. As his command of the language and its idiomatic patterns and expressions and his understanding of Pamona conventions developed, he was able to master and manipulate the complex and tortuous litigious processes traditionally part of village negotiations.^{27.}

Moreover, as he became a familiar figure in the village, he appeared, after all, to provide some advantages. He supplied medicines and medical treatment unknown in Poso previously. He lent money. He often made gifts of edible delicacies. He was undoubtedly an interesting novelty, an item of news value, that broke into the routine of traditional life. He had shown himself an enemy of their enemy, specifically the To Parigi.^{28.} He made contributions to ceremonial feasts. Kruyt asked for nothing more in return than that people attend his meetings where he spoke of another God.

Having gained recognition of the right to be heard, Kruyt exploited this position to persuade the more influential chiefs with whom he was acquainted to accept a guru (teacher) into their village. In attempting to impose his will on these chiefs, Kruyt revealed himself as a firm advocate of zachte dwang (gentle coercion). In this initial period the object of his zachte dwang was the

26. "Coffee and gambir were served after Sunday meetings." Requests were often made on Mondays after attendance at Sunday meetings, "at which time some said straight out that the requested item was meant as a reward for the Sunday attendance", (Brouwer, op. cit., p. 67). In the period around 1894, Brouwer describes Kruyt enticing village children to school with "little boxes containing a mirror ... with which he had filled his pockets in anticipation". (Brouwer, op. cit., p. 44.)
27. See Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, Ch. 8.
28. The Parigi expedition into the Poso area in March, 1894 at the instigation of Sigi, was designed to punish the To Kadombuku and the Mapane - Pebato area as well as to drive Kruyt from Poso, or kill him. Kruyt frightened a troop of "several hundred" warriors away, causing the departure of the entire expedition from Poso. This episode is described in J. Kruyt, op. cit., pp. 62-3.

school which Kruyt described as "a great enemy of conservatism upon which therefore, our hope is based".²⁹. The mission school thus appeared as a physical product of missionary endeavour which, without necessarily affecting the more gradual preparation towards religious conversion, at least extracted from the To Pamona an expression of their acceptance of Kruyt's presence.³⁰

It had, however, limited significance as a measure of their attitude towards Christianity, the actual goal of Kruyt's striving. Rather, it was an expression of this society's conventions of social intercourse. In the face of direct pressure the To Pamona characteristically sought a compromise. Having gained a respected place in several northern villages, Kruyt was able to claim attention for his argument. The villagers, having accepted Kruyt's credentials to be heard, felt constrained to meet at least some of his demands. It was primarily on these grounds that the three village schools maintained their meagre existence in those first ten years. In his 1899 report, Kruyt wrote:

Even though the schools this year again had to cope with many hindrances, they still all remained in existence. It seems moreover, that they are maintained by the fearfulness of the To Pamona, who do not readily act against someone's wishes. In this situation, they prefer to find a means of evasion; this they did with the matter of the school but when we had cut off all possible evasatory tactics, they had to hand over some children.³¹

29. Annual report, 1899 in op. cit., p. 348.

30. Kruyt admitted this when he wrote:

With the attempts to establish schools, we experienced ... suspicion and the only result of years of trying was that several Poso friends offered a few children to receive instruction, and this, only to do us a personal favour.

A.C. Kruyt, "Zending en Volkskracht" (Protestant Mission and National Character), pt. 1 in Nededeelingen vol. 79, 1935, p. 36.

31. Annual report, 1899, in op. cit. p. 348. However, there were at least two other villages, Malei and Pelato which Kruyt regularly visited, that continued to evade Kruyt's persistent request for a school.

Nevertheless, Papa i Wunte and Papa i Melempo, the chiefs in whose villages, schools were established, appeared to have been able to look beyond the horizons of the traditional conceptualizations of the isolated To Pamona world and were able to appreciate the broader political significance of Kruyt's presence. They did not, as Kruyt suggests, simply follow social convention.


Apart from the school established in 1904 at Kuku in the midst of impending military action, no inland schools were established after the controleur of the Tomini Gulf had become effectively established in Poso. The only attempt recorded by Kruyt, the proposed Malei school, failed. The first two schools, those of Panta and Tomasa, were established in areas where, in contrast to the rest of the region, active interference was being experienced from outside powers. The coastal section of the To Pebato were suffering constant harassment from the warlike To Napu tribe in conjunction with Sigi claims over the area. The To Kadombuku, apart from the established claims of Tojo, were also experiencing interference from Parigi. It is therefore reasonable to hypothesize that, in both cases, Kruyt's presence was perceived as offering a certain (magical) advantage which could be usefully employed in the Pebato and Kadombuku attempts to safeguard their independence. The price of this presence was the acceptance of a foreigner in their midst and a quota of children to attend school.

After 1896, however, when the government began to play a more overt role in Central Sulawesi Kruyt was equated in the minds of many with a new external threat, so that the advantage he may have been seen to have, disappeared.^{32.}

32. Jan Kruyt states: "Only after 1897 did the very small schools in these places Panta, Tomasa, Buyu mBayau start to develop". (J. Kruyt, *op. cit.*, p. 72.) This reflects the fact that from 1897, there was a very small but reasonably stable average attendance at each school. However, the numbers involved remained minimal and there was no question of expansion. Indeed, Albert Kruyt's letters of 1901-1902 speak of the difficulty of keeping the schools open. To the Tomasa guru he wrote that he must, at all costs, not allow the school to close. At the time there was only one pupil attending the school. At Buyu mBayau, the guru was similarly struggling to record an attendance.

MAP 5

EXTENT OF MISSIONARY INFLUENCE IN THE POSO REGION CIRCA 1895



Based on a sketch map by A. Kruyt, 1895.

At the same time, lack of support, both missionary and Minahassan, prevented Kruyt from being able to expand his area of influence. After 1905, when all tribes of Central Sulawesi had to accept the permanent presence of the colonial government, the school once again offered some advantage in that its guru could explain to the village the incomprehensible demands of their new European masters.³³

If, as Adriani states, education held a magical significance for the To Pamona, the above hypothesis, which lack of indigenous sources makes difficult to verify, can be reasonably posited to explain the motives of those villages which accepted Kruyt and his school.

Such motivation did not apply to schools in the three coastal villages of Mapane, Poso and Tojo. The first school to be established, the Poso school of 1894, while initially designed for To Pamona children, was in this respect, a complete failure. Only after the posting there of the controleur and his staff in March, 1895, were regular classes held. The school was then attended by six children, four from the controleur's staff of Minahassan police, one a brother of the Minahassan guru and one a member of Kruyt's household, a Pamona child whose freedom Kruyt had purchased.³⁴ There had been one potential pupil in 1894, the son of the chief of Saiwose, but he had been withdrawn when his father had come under pressure from local Muslim leaders.

In 1896, the enrolment at this school increased as a result of the enlargement of the indigenous constabulary attached to the office of the controleur. These officers were Christians who, like the five Minahassan families whose children attended school in 1895, were themselves

33. A. Kruyt, "Zending en Volkskracht", pt. 1, in op. cit., p. 39. Kruyt writes that the requests for teachers after 1906 were not "because they had plans of becoming Christian, but because they hoped that through the school, they would become more quickly habituated to the new circumstances, forced upon them by the western administration."

34. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 64.

products of mission education. Other pupils were the children of Gorontaloese (Muslim) sailors who manned the Tomini Gulf Government steamer.³⁵

By the end of 1896, twenty children were enrolled at the Poso school, which proved almost as great a problem as the non-attendance at other schools.

Several children knew no Malay and most knew no Poso (sic.). Instruction had therefore, to be given in two languages. In addition, this group of children could not be divided into less than five classes under one teacher.³⁶

The majority of parents whose children attended school at Poso were previously acquainted with the idea of formal education, having themselves attended mission schools. For the Muslim parents in Poso, Mapane and Tojo, other considerations motivated their interest in education. Of the Mapane school, Kruyt wrote:

The Mohammedans who live here have seen more of the world and know very well what a school means and this knowledge has led them to try to instil in the To Pamona, an aversion to the school. If the To Pamona were to become smarter and more independent, then it would mean the end of shameless trade practices carried out on the coast by Mohammedans with the To Pamona by means of which, the former were able to lead a lazy and carefree life.³⁷

Attendance at the two Muslim schools was significantly better, primarily because most parents, according to Kruyt, recognized the instrumental value of schooling. For these parents, regardless of the rest of the curriculum which included biblical history, learning to read and write Malay was "one of the main reasons for sending their children to school".³⁸ This specific goal was apparent in the communities' attitude to the Christian presence of

35. N. Adriani, Posso, (Den Haag, 1919), p. 162.

36. Annual report, 1897, in Mededelingen, vol. 42, 1898, p. 270.

37. ibid, p. 266.

38. N. Adriani, op. cit., p. 164.

the Minahassan teacher:

To the children, it was stressed that the Mohammedan leader from whom they learnt to recite the Koran, was their real teacher and that the school teacher had absolutely no power over them.³⁹

In establishing the schools at Mapane and Tojo, Kruyt did not have in mind prozelytizing amongst the Muslim population. His concern was firstly to deflect anti-school propaganda emanating from these communities and secondly, to maintain a presence in these trading centres where people from the inland regularly came to sell their products and to obtain salt and other commodities. Such a presence, Kruyt hoped, would provide these villagers with a haven when away from their home while the guru could also counteract Muslim prozelytization amongst them. In Mapane, Kruyt organized the school on a half-time basis as a result of a teacher shortage, rather than allow Muslim children from Mapane to attend the Panta school. His reason, characteristic of his central principle of isolating Pamona society from other than mission influence, was that he did not think "it desirable that Poso children be brought into constant contact with Mohammedan children already under bad influence."⁴⁰

In contrast to the Muslim and Minahassan groups, the school was an unknown concept in inland Central Sulawesi and its acceptance in a few isolated cases was the result of a combination of the impact of Kruyt as a person in the context of social conventions and an expression of To Pamona belief in the powers of "magic" to deal with phenomena beyond the ken of their ancestors.

Even then, interest centred on the person rather than on the institution. Negotiations focussed on the issue of accepting a Minahassan family within the village structure. The decision that had to be made was whether or not there was some advantage to be gained from the presence in their midst of a person possessing the skills,

39. loc. cit.

40. Annual report, 1896, in Mededelingen, vol. 42, 1898 p. 179.

material benefits and something of the character of Kruyt whom they had come to accept over the last three years.

Adriani describes this process as it occurred in the establishment of the school in Tomasa:

Through regular friendly association with the people, and by regularly speaking about the school, he [Kruyt] finally achieved that a meeting of village heads was called to discuss the matter. This indicated that the question of the school was agreed to in principle. Kruyt easily defeated the fears which were expressed and had merely to evidence his own conduct and approach, which the people had been able to observe over three years, to placate any suggestions which sprang from distrust. Agreement was finally reached that there would be no opposition to the settling of a teacher in the district of Tomasa.⁴¹

Because indigenous "teachers" were distrusted, much depended not only on Kruyt's conduct, but specifically on that of the Minahassan, in the process of gaining acceptance of the schools.⁴² The acceptance of a teacher in the village also involved, for Kruyt, an obligation for parents to send their children to school. A token number of children was consequently sent from time to time.

If formal instruction was a foreign concept in adult society, except as a secretive and individual induction into magical rites, the concept of education in a less formal sense was also foreign to the relations between parents and their children. Pamona children received no direction from their parents and were inducted into the intricacies of their culture only upon initiation into adult society.⁴³ What the child knew and understood derived, not from parents but was learnt incidentally from the peer group or older siblings.⁴⁴

41. N. Adriani, op. cit., p. 143.

42. See note 30.

43. See Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 2, Ch. 16, especially pp. 74-77.

44. N. Adriani, "Onderwijs ..." in op. cit. p. 370.

So long as an infant needed the care of its mother it was conscientiously tended, but once able to walk and look after itself to some extent it was no longer paid much attention. Brothers or sisters, little older or more intelligent than the child, were appointed to look after it. The result of this was frequent accidents as everyone who knows the Torajan style of house construction understands: such houses are badly built on poles two meters high ...⁴⁵.

Growing up in a household of two to six families, the child was socialized into an acceptance of a communalistic style of life in which "an individual was nothing and the family all important", but specific training was absent in To Pamona childhood.

Children do exactly as they like. The personal virtues and weaknesses of adults and children are of no concern; they are regarded as personal characteristics ... The children show their parents little obedience and simply do as they wish.⁴⁶

The child thus had the freedom to do and develop as it pleased, within the limitations imposed by the communal household. As an adult, it would retain this freedom, subject only to the dictates of the ancestral lore which, together with the conventions of social intercourse imposed the restraints necessary for the existence of Pamona society.

Not only was the concept of schooling foreign (indeed, the word education was non-existent in the Pamona vocabulary)⁴⁷. the concept of regular and consistent training, the discipline of concentrated thinking and the contemplation of abstract notions were also alien to the Pamona child. Indeed, the entire paraphernalia of the school, as Kruyt perceived it, lacked any point of contact with indigenous life. Hence, regardless of whether the parent

45. N. Adriani, "Maatschappelijke, speciaal economische verandering der bevolking van Midden-Celebes, sedert de invoering van het Nederlandsch gezag aldaar", (Social and especially economic changes amongst the people of Central Celebes since the establishment there of Dutch government), in Verzamelde Geschriften, vol. 2, p.3.

46. Adriani, op. cit., p. 50.

47. Adriani, "Onderwijs ...", in op. cit., p. 369.

was willing to send the child to the teacher for a few hours of instruction, it was an open question whether the child would in fact attend, or once attending, whether it would continue to undergo instruction.

Kruyt's European preconceptions regarding schooling are richly highlighted in his biographer's account of the (attempted) opening of the first school at Poso. Supplied with a blackboard and school desks, shipped from Gorontalo at government expense, the school was ready to open in March, 1894.

Everywhere we went, we discussed the value of the school, while as a bribe, small prizes were promised in the form of shirts and trousers sent by several ladies from Holland or made by Mrs. Kruyt. On the specified day, two strokes were given on the bell, the pre-determined signal for the children to come, but ... no-one came.⁴⁸

The abstract notion of "the value of the school" and the material value of shirts and trousers had clearly not convinced his audiences. Not until 1898 did Kruyt reluctantly give up his demand that European attire be worn in school; he came to realize that this made children attending school the objects of ridicule. Consequently, "in order not to completely drive them away from school, we had to let them wear their national costume, ie. loin cloths".⁴⁹

If children were to attend instruction, the paraphernalia of the European school (adopted also in the Minahassa and throughout the Dutch government indigenous school system) had to be discarded. In this respect, the initial approach by guru Kolondam at Panta at the end of 1894 was more promising, although still unsuccessful.

He had a school age child and he invited children of the village to come and play with her. The number sometimes climbed to fifteen. They were quite keen to weave mats and some remembered well the letters taught them through games. The term "school" was carefully avoided but the word still came to be used by the population relatively soon and the number of pupils dropped to three or four

48. Brouwer, op. cit., p. 79.

49. Annual report, 1898, in Mededelingen, vol. 43, 1899, p. 226.

who, furthermore, came very infrequently."⁵⁰.

There were several other factors affecting school attendance besides the suspicion as to their purpose and the children's reluctance to undergo sustained instruction. Tribes which owned few slaves, specifically the To Pebato, depended in small but significant ways on their children's labour and hence, regular attendance would have been inconvenient. Traditional activities for school age children included minding siblings, fetching water, stamping rice and tending buffaloes in season. In contrast, children of slave-owning tribes, in particular, the To Kadombuku and To Lage, were not required to perform these tasks which were undertaken by slave children. However, the latter group tended to have less children and refused to allow slave children to attend school.⁵¹

Agricultural methods also made for irregular attendance. While the actual village was traditionally located on hill-tops, the rice fields and other food gardens were usually situated some distance from the village. These fields were re-located every few years as a consequence of the "slash and burn" farming method. Temporary shelters were constructed in these fields so that the weary march between garden and village would not have to be undertaken each day during the important growing season. Constant supervision of crops was also required to protect them from birds and wild animals.⁵² Consequently,

The rule is that most Torajans live spread out in their garden shelters. Only for feasts and meetings do they gather together for several days in the mother village ... For the mission, this mode of living is a hindrance. Villages are difficult to reach. The meetings on Sundays held in the mother village are attended by few villagers. Attendance at school by the children is made difficult by the distance.⁵³

50. Adriani, op. cit., p. 130.

51. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 2 July, 1903.

52. See Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 2, Ch. 23.

53. Annual report, 1906, in Mededelingen, vol. 51, 1907, p. 336.

Children could not be left behind and thus, depending on the distance of the rice field from the village (where the school was located) and the season in the agricultural calendar, children who may have attended school in the months when their parents resided in the village would have been removed.

The location and size of the traditional village represented another significant obstacle to the expansion of Kruyt's mission prior to 1905. In a letter to his wife during one of his visits to Poso before his permanent settlement there, Kruyt complained, "You know the main thing I am lacking? A really big kampong [village] around me."⁵⁴ Most villages were small, varying between two and ten houses. The largest village Kruyt encountered consisted of thirteen houses and a total population of around two hundred. Thus, a school would have a small potential enrolment even if all children attended. Also, since villages could be as far as six hours walking distance apart, it was rarely possible for one school to cater for more than one village.⁵⁵

The new village of Panta, established in 1894, represented the model of the ideal Pamona village as Kruyt perceived it from his perspective as a missionary. Kruyt, during his second visit to Poso in 1892, had proposed to the chief of Wayo Makuni, Papa i Wunte, that his village and its neighbours should move from their fortress-like positions on hill-tops to the valley below. There each of the twenty-five families of the above-mentioned village would, together with the other villagers, build their own house. In this way, the new village of Panta would consist of fifty houses with a population of about two hundred.⁵⁶ Kruyt himself offered to "help with the chiselling, sawing and hammering".⁵⁷ The To Pebato,

54. Quoted in J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 73.

55. Annual report, 1906, in op. cit., p. 336.

56. Brouwer, op. cit., p. 60.

57. Adriani, op. cit., p. 136.

unlike the neighbouring To Lage, were unacquainted with these carpentary skills and, like all To Pamona, were unacquainted with the use of nails.⁵⁸

Kruyt offered a vision of a model village while the To Pebato perceived in Kruyt an insurance against harassment by To Napu raiders.⁵⁹ Kruyt's motives in encouraging the establishment of a new village were, in the first place, practical - the time and effort needed to visit each of these small communities located in almost inaccessible positions hampered the expansion of his area of influence. His proposal was also an expression of European disgust at the moral and hygienic implications of such a life style. The essence of this disgust was a reaction to the manifestations of communal living which denied individual identity and, in consequence, individual responsibility. Moreover, Kruyt recognized that a large village was more efficient in its demand on the missionary's resources. While Panta did not prove the success he had anticipated, it did provide the model for new villages after 1905.

A further factor which limited the success and expansion of early mission schools was the quantity and quality of its teachers. Until 1916, almost all teachers were Minahassans, with a few originating from Menado, Ambon and the Sangi and Talaud Islands. While Kruyt was

58. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 148ff..

59. Brouwer (op. cit., p. 64) implies that Kruyt was perceived as a representative of the colonial government although J. Kruyt argues that the people gradually came to distinguish between mission and government, citing Sigi's attitude in 1894 in evidence (pp. 66-67) which does not deny the basis of the argument. Jan Kruyt also states: "Papa i Wunte declared in July, 1898 that when he had accepted the school, he had considered school attendance as a means to escape from the heavy burden of the rapacious To Napu." (op. cit., p. 71). This point is not elaborated upon and does not appear elsewhere in Kruyt's (snr) writing. In this chapter however, it is argued that this is the central motivation for accepting schools. One further consideration which J. Kruyt notes in passing is the suggestion that Kruyt was perceived as being an incarnation of a spirit (op. cit., p. 67). Kruyt senior recorded this comment in his diary on 3 July, 1894.

in principle opposed to the introduction of any foreign elements into Pamona society, he was obliged to make an exception while it remained impossible to recruit teachers from the ranks of his school graduates. The first indigenous teachers were appointed in 1917 after graduating from the Pendolo teacher training institution which was not established until 1913.

The Minahassan guru upon whose personal qualities the success of the mission at the village level had to depend was, to Kruyt's mind, of limited value:

As teachers, the gurus are satisfactory; only most of them are not suitable as pioneer missionaries. They themselves exist at too low a religious level to develop much energy and influence. They are indifferent to heathenism because they have only learned that Christianity is against it without yet understood its evil and the differences between heathenism and Christianity.⁶⁰

As a teacher, the guru had a clearly defined task with which he could cope and for which he could be specifically trained. Once established in the village it was, however, his personal qualities which determined his success or otherwise:

The Minahassan, knowing that his good conduct was his only protection, would apply himself to gaining a good name amongst the older generation and establishing friendship with the younger generation. The positive movement towards education had to come from the children; all that had to be obtained from the parents was that they would not oppose this.⁶¹

Yet for Kruyt, the teaching role of the guru was secondary to his function as his representative qua missionary. As such, the guru held Bible-discussion meetings and informal sermons, attended the sick and generally involved himself in village affairs when he could. For the To Pamona, the presence of the guru in the village as

60. Annual report, 1899, in op. cit. p. 350. Privately, however, Kruyt was saying in 1901: "none of my gurus except the one in Tojo, has any idea of how to develop the children. The highest class in the Poso school now knows as much as the guru. While this man receives instruction from me, it is all dead capital [since] he is unable to integrate [this new material]". Kruyt's diary, 3 November, 1901.

61. N. Adriani, "Onderwijs ..." in op. cit., p. 370.

a teacher was legitimated by his role as locum tenens for Kruyt.

The guru had another function in the village which, with his other non-evangelizing activities, formed an important part of the mission's indirect attack on traditional values. This function was to acquaint the village, through example, with an alternative way of life. His domestic arrangements, his hygiene provisions, diet, dress, budgeting and most significantly, his farming methods, were all intended to function as object lessons in the Christian way of life. Rice growing by the gurus, introduced as a conscious educational method in 1896, was intended by Kruyt as an attack on traditional rice growing methods which were inextricably bound up with the entire spectrum of religious observances. As Kruyt accurately perceived, "the heathenism of the Poso people is actually concentrated in their rice cultivation".⁶² Thus, by growing rice without resorting to such religious practices, opportunities could frequently be found to initiate discussions about Christianity.

If so much depended on these Minahassans it was essential that they were of the best personal quality but, due to the shortage of trained graduates and the general Minahassan reluctance to work in such a "primitive" area, Kruyt was forced to accept any services which were offered. Adriani described the early teachers as being:

not especially chosen personnel, but Minahassans who, as assistant teachers, were not earning very much in their own country and who were prepared to work in a "foreign country" for more money. They also realized that they would be separated from a society so much more civilized and orderly than that which they could expect to find in Poso. Their salary was not much higher than that which they received in the Minahassa: it was a humble sum of f.15 per month.⁶³

62. Annual report, 1896, in op. cit. p. 174.

63. N. Adriani, op. cit., p. 157.

The employment history of Kruyt's teachers was not an encouraging one. The employment of his first two teachers was approved in September, 1892.⁶⁴ This number was raised to four in 1894 since, he argued, even if no more schools were likely for some time, it was important to launch the mission from a number of locations at once.⁶⁵ By 1895, his staff was becoming dissatisfied. All four demanded a rise in their allowance⁶⁶ and, upon Kruyt's refusal, one returned to the Minahassa.⁶⁷ In the meantime, Kruyt was preparing two of his murid, probably the Christian Talaud Islanders he had brought with him as coolies in 1893, as teachers.⁶⁸ Four months later he was forced to sack them as they proved unsuitable.⁶⁹

In 1896, in order to retain his three remaining gurus, he offered them a f.5 per month increase, using the money which had been allocated for the fourth guru.⁷⁰ Two years later he granted an entitlement of three months leave after each three years of service with return fares paid to the Minahassa.⁷¹ This decision was approved by the Society's administration despite its growing financial problems.⁷²

64. Minutes N.M.S., Meeting, 26 September, 1892.
65. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 5 July, 1894.
66. Minutes N.M.S., Meeting, 10 October, 1895.
67. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 3 January, 1896.
68. Annual report, 1895, in op. cit., p. 183. These murid who lived with Kruyt as "houseboys" and general handi-men worked under Kruyt's supervision as pupil-teachers at the Poso school. The term "murid" was used by Kruyt to refer to non-Pamona personnel who were being prepared as teachers.
69. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 20 May, 1896.
70. loc. cit..
71. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 12 January, 1898.
72. In 1898, all the Society's missionaries were warned of the need to reduce their budgets by 10% and were encouraged to apply for government subsidies as a further means of reducing the Society's financial burdens. Minutes N.M.S., Meeting, 28 June, 1897.

By 1898, Kruyt was employing six gurus of whom the two most recent arrivals were described as "not amongst the best",⁷³ while in 1900, he lost one of his more experienced teachers through illness.⁷⁴ In 1901, during a prolonged stay in the Minahassa, Kruyt discovered his colleagues there were themselves suffering from a lack of trained personnel.⁷⁵ Even the availability of good trainees was uncertain.⁷⁶ Kruyt was consequently forced to advertise as a result of which he received two applications. Both applicants were at the time in unsubsidized mission schools at f.6 and f.7 per month.⁷⁷ The attraction of Poso, where Kruyt was offering f.15 with rises to f.20 plus farming land and leave every three years with all fares paid, clearly outweighed the prospect of living in an isolated uncivilized area without government protection.

Typical of the better teachers Kruyt was able to engage, was Guru Kolondam, of whom Kruyt supplied this thumb-nail sketch in an official report in 1894:

He is a Minahassan by birth and was, in his own country, already employed in a mission school at Tondano. He did not receive his training at the mission's teacher training school at Tomohon, but, after several years of training as a pupil-teacher, was appointed as a teacher ... The missionary who supervises him [ie. Kruyt] is satisfied with his conduct and diligence. He had learnt the local language and is diligently improving his command of it by all means available. On Sundays ... he acts as trainee minister.⁷⁸

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73. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 31 March, 1898. In 1899, Kruyt appointed a pupil-teacher to assist the guru of Tojo. (Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 10 August, 1899). It seems that this appointee was one of the two "gurus" who arrived in 1898, since Kruyt's accounts for 1899 refer to four gurus and one pupil-teacher. The sixth Minahassan appears to have continued under Kruyt's tuition in Poso and since he was not yet earning his keep, remained unpaid.
74. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 19 May, 1900. The account for 1900 makes reference to six teachers and six unpaid "helpers".
75. Kruyt to Adriani, Kumelembuai, 15 August, 1901.
76. loc. cit..
77. Kruyt to Adriani, Tomohon, 24 September, 1901.
78. Report on the Native Protestant Mission School at Panta (Mapane), 1894.

The best of the Minahassan teachers Kruyt managed to obtain at this time were those who had qualified as assistant teachers at a teachers' training institute such as the one at Tondano. Here they attended a four year course after having completed their elementary education at a government second-class school or at an equivalent mission school. The course included more advanced instruction in Malay language, handwriting, arithmetic, geography, natural science, some pedagogical theory and teaching practice as well as Biblical studies.^{79.}

Descriptions of early Poso schools also indicate that attention was given to Froebelian educational principles, particularly the use of craft work as introduced in the Minahassa by Graafland in the 1880's.^{80.}

On arrival at Poso, the teachers received training from Kruyt in the Bare'e language for up to six months before placement in a village. Supervision subsequently exercised by Kruyt over these isolated teachers was strict. Apart from his inspection of their work during regular visits - some places were visited by Kruyt up to twenty times per year^{81.} - teachers had to maintain diaries which were presented to Kruyt regularly for inspection. Kruyt also instituted half-yearly conferences with his staff in 1895, an idea he had taken over from his father who used this method of supervision effectively in Mojowarno.^{82.}

79. H. Kroeskamp, Early Schoolmasters in a Developing Country, Van Gorcum and Co., Assen, 1973, Chapter 4.

80. loc. cit.. In the 1894 report on Panta, Kruyt writes: "Also abundant use is made of Froebel work and manual work. The former is most acceptable to the children; of the latter, no results are yet available."

At least two other text books written by Graafland were used in Kruyt's schools according to the inventory of school equipment 1901.

81. Annual report, 1895, in op. cit., pp.193-197. Panta was visited twenty times and Tomasa ten times in 1895.

82. ibid., p. 191, in op. cit., p. 176. In 1901 Kruyt wrote to his father:

"I believe that these conferences are the first steps to independence of communities and ministers. I instituted these conferences with the express aim of giving the guru a sense of responsibility for their work." See Appendix No. 2.

The religious festivities at Christmas formed the occasion for one of these gatherings of the Minahassans at Kruyt's house.⁸³

The primary function of these occasions was to further their religious training. Kruyt organized the first such occasion around an agenda of discussions on the Minahassan's own translations of the Malay language Bible in Bare'e.⁸⁴ For Kruyt, the main role of the guru remained that of evangelization. The Minahassan teacher had to represent Kruyt in the isolated villages. As the only missionary in the area prior to 1904 (apart from the temporary services of Adriani), Kruyt had to depend on their limited abilities.

In as far as it is possible to call the irregularly attended gatherings of children in the houses of the Minahassans schools, some attempt needs to be made to describe the curriculum of this embryonic system.⁸⁵

The six schools were supplied with pre-fabricated school benches, consisting of sloping top and attached bench seats and seating between six to eight pupils.⁸⁶ Attendance at the three inland schools was very irregular and of the children in the Panta school, Kruyt wrote in 1894:

The number of girls exceeds that of boys. Generally speaking, the pupils are all children of the nobility [free class] The children of slaves do not come, or come rarely, partly because they have to work and partly because school attendance is not considered necessary for them. The age of the children varies between seven and twelve years.⁸⁷

The language medium of these three schools was Bare'e.

83. Annual report, 1897, in op. cit. p. 272.

84. Annual report, 1896, in op. cit. p. 176.

85. Apart from the Poso school, all schools were originally held on the verandah of the guru's house which at other times also functioned as the place of worship.

86. 1894 report (Panta). In 1901, the Poso school was furnished with seven such tables and benches and two blackboards. (Inventory of school equipment, 1901).

87. 1894 report (Panta).

The principle of using the local language, unlike the use of Malay in the Indies Church schools in the Minahassa, accorded with sound educational practice. For Kruyt, this policy grew out of his whole approach to the mission in Central Sulawesi. He had discovered very early that, in order to establish a point of contact with the people, in order to enter their mental world, communication had to occur via the medium of their own language.⁸⁸ This applied equally to individual conversations, to Sunday sermons or to Bible expositions and to school instruction. For Kruyt, the school had to be woven into the very fabric of village life, although this was, he recognized, of necessity, a slow process. As his son in a later period expressed it, the mission school is more

than what syllabus and curriculum prescribed. ... [The functioning school] has to be encountered in the entirety of village life; ... To do this, one has to understand the role and function of the guru in that life. To do this, one has to witness how the school building is the central point of the community as the Lobo [temple] was in former times; the place for Sunday and other church services, the building in which all feasts are held. To do this finally, attention has to be given to the significance of the school for the practice of the mother tongue at this stage of community development.⁸⁹

This aim, which was consciously formulated and largely achieved in later decades, was the goal which underpinned Kruyt senior's practice in the formative period.

Kruyt's extensive ethnological research was entirely motivated by the realization that in order to graft Christianity successfully on to Pamona society, the missionary had to understand the mental and cultural world which the indigenous people inhabited. By sharing a common language medium, and intellectually sharing their

88. Kruyt, "Zending en Volkskracht", pt. 1, in op. cit., p. 36. Kruyt was already convinced of the principle of using the local language as the medium of instruction when he commenced his mission work in Gorontalo in 1891. (See Brouwer, op. cit., pp. 135ff.).

89. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 197.

cultural heritage, the missionary or teacher would be able to pursue the tribesman through the layers of shared experience to flush out the individual in order to engage "the mind". In justifying the curriculum of the school, Kruyt wrote in 1894:

An attempt is made to develop the mental capacities by the use of short stories ... about everyday subjects, through which every opportunity is given the children to force them to reflect in as pleasant a way as possible.⁹⁰

Similarly, adults during a home visit or sermon questioned about their religion, were forced,

to think over an issue for a moment and they do this with some interest because it pertains to their own life. And because their thinking has been stimulated, they will the sooner listen to the remarks we make on that subject and the preaching of the Gospel we connect to these remarks.⁹¹

The shared language medium was to be the vehicle to colonize the Pamona mind by the logic of Euro-Christian rhetoric in the best interests of the indigenous population.⁹²

Apart from its formal educational function, the school also had a religious and social role. The difficulty of the task of the school in the formative period of the mission was to manufacture the relevance of these aspects, both for the pupil and the graduate. The

90. 1894 report on the Panta school.

91. Annual report, 1900, in Mededelingen, vol. 44, 1900, p. 147.

92. Cf. J. Kruyt, op. cit., pp. 196-199. Retrospectively, Jan Kruyt recognized that "In reality, the school remained didactically and in terms of content, oriented towards Western-European norms". Neither the To Pamona community nor the Minahassan teachers were involved (and in Kruyt's opinion, could have been involved) in this central education debate. As the years went by, Jan Kruyt claimed, it was the government regulations which prevented the mission from restructuring its education to meet indigenous needs more effectively. When the mission was finally given an opportunity to experiment in 1933, circumstances were inauspicious.

problem lay in the fact that the norms inherent in formal European schooling were the product of another culture; the "hidden curriculum" of the mission school attempted to socialize Pamona children for a society which had yet to evolve.

The communities of these villages lived socially and economically largely according to the old handed-down patterns. This meant that the [socio-economic] structure was still largely undifferentiated so that it offered little material upon which the education system could base itself. The school was, due to its method of work, in advance of society: through what the children read in the reader, through learning to finish a required task in a specified time period, through the various aspects of the curriculum and formal requirements which were obviously part of the school.⁹³.

Establishing the relevance of the European school to the indigenous community depended largely on the willingness of the latter to change and to that extent the mission school could only evolve into an effective institution within the context of the success of the over-all mission activity. In turn, as Jan Kruyt suggests, the entire activity was dependent on the socio-economic level of the indigenous society being altered to one more equating that of European society.

At the same time, the experience of the Minahassa had shown Kruyt the importance of not changing the essential agricultural basis of society.

The scholastic character of education in the Minahassa had inculcated in student and teacher a dislike for agriculture which is consequently left more and more to the women because the man looks for a position which immediately accords him a title with which he is usually addressed, no matter how lowly his function is.⁹⁴.

Kruyt attempted to solve this educational dilemma by drawing on the progressive education theory introduced into this part of the archipelago by the pioneering work of

93. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 198.

94. N. Adriani, op. cit., p. 166.

missionary and educationalist, Graafland, in the Minahassa in the early 1880's,⁹⁵ and simultaneously in Java through the work of Kruyt's father at Mojowarno.⁹⁶ Early in the history of schooling in the Poso region, some attempt was already being made to relate school to everyday life, as much for the very practical reasons of ensuring the acceptance of the early school, as from pedagogic and mission goals. This in turn formed the principle justification developed by the Protestant mission for the continuation of mission schools in the face of rapid expansion in the government initiated education sector, particularly of the so-called volksschool. Despite the financial burdens, the Missionary Society's 1902 annual conference called for the continuation of mission involvement with education because:

The education provided by the state is based on the Western model and is not suitable for the population. Missionaries can assess better than government officials the criteria of [good] education for natives.⁹⁷

That the mission was better able to assess educational needs, Kruyt never doubted. Whether or not the mission provided an education which was less occidental and more suitable is problematic. What is certain is that the mission made available more schools and provided more supervision than the government would have done.

Subjects attempted in the early mission schools consisted of learning the alphabet and spelling, reading, biblical history (bible stories), singing and arithmetic. In 1894, Kruyt was already using a Bare'e reading book which he had written, using stories from the rich oral tradition of the area.⁹⁸ Froebelian methods were also employed to teach the children their letters through

95. H. Kroeskamp, op. cit., Ch. 4.

96. See for instance, the description of Johannes Kruyt's work in S. Coolsma, De Zendingeeuw voor Nederlandsch Indie, (The century of Protestant Mission in the Netherlands Indies). (Breijer, Utrecht, 1901).

97. Minutes N.M.S., 8 July, 1902.

98. 1894 Report, Panta school.

games and there was a strong emphasis from the beginning on craft work which appears to have been effective in attracting pupils. Besides, more serious sequential teaching would have been almost impossible.

Adriani, as linguist, was given the responsibility of developing a number of school books in the Bare'e language. A spelling and reading book was printed and in use by 1900. This consisted largely of a collection of folk-tales which "are known to the Torajan people and enjoy a great popularity". The contents of these stories were not of a high literary standard but "they are often amusing, also sometimes fantastic and horrifying, generally lucid and picturesquely told but without background or moral."⁹⁹ Adriani emphasized that eventually,

Other reading material would have to be provided for the children, but it was essential to encourage a desire for reading and to make them see that their folk-tales were not cast aside by us and that the art of reading and writing could be entirely applicable to their own language.¹⁰⁰

By 1903, a Bare'e language New Testament story book was completed and an Old Testament Reader was available for use in schools (and church services), in 1907.¹⁰¹ For Adriani, the linguist, it was a delight to be a spectator of the process whereby a pre-literate people began to enter a literate culture:

The language, which for them had been till now, exclusively aural now became visual. The idea that a word consists of sounds and syllables, that one word is derived from another and that everything in a language is based on fixed rules, was also a great pleasure to them.¹⁰²

Kruyt, as he admitted himself, was no "school master" and, on a visit to Tomohon in 1901, declared himself unable to appraise the work of the training institution for that reason, although "the topics treated there ... satisfied me."¹⁰³ He did claim some expertise in psychology as an extension of his ethnographical interest. In 1912, he

99. N. Adriani, op. cit., p. 170. 100. ibid.

101. ibid., p. 171, See Appendix 3. 102. ibid., p. 169.

103. Kruyt to Adriani, Tomohon, 24 September, 1901.

enumerated the mental attributes of the To Pamona on the basis of empirical "evidence". The To Pamona he claimed, lacked understanding of one-to-one correspondence, lacked the ability to think abstractly and reached a peak in mental agility with the onset of puberty.¹⁰⁴ Kruyt considered women to be the more intelligent sex. Their role in the matrilineal society, the almost exclusive initiation of women into the priestly rites, their flexible attitude to fertility control and/or infanticide, and their role as the guardians of the language, reflected this. Their role as guardians of Pamona culture meant, for Kruyt, that they were more conservative, that is, less willing to accept the new ways.¹⁰⁵

Kruyt did believe in the quality of basic common sense (goed verstand) of the To Pamona and saw in it a valuable raw material for education. The pedagogical aim of the school was to develop the child's interest in matters lying outside his present consciousness and to bring him to understand such phenomena.

The greatest difficulty for the Torajan child is this; to maintain his attention span, in other words, to concentrate. Reading and writing are quickly learned but arithmetic is for him, a big stumbling block ... The speed [of the child in learning to read and write] has to be explained partly by the good memory of the Torajan. It is remarkable how quickly the children learn [ie. memorize] a lesson and memorize a story which has been told to them.¹⁰⁶

The greatest success of the school therefore, must have been achieved in the area of rote learning.

Arithmetic, Kruyt admitted, was less successful. The difficulty here was aggravated by the fact that there were no arithmetic books and consequently, little guidance for the teacher. Arithmetic lessons mainly took the form of mental arithmetic or the teacher would write sums on the blackboard or dictate them¹⁰⁷. in the manner of the 19th

104. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 103.

105. ibid, pp. 103-4. 106. ibid, p. 103.

107. N. Adriani, "De Ontwikkeling der Zendingsscholen op Midden Celebes." in op. cit., p. 364.

ILLUSTRATION III

PEBATO WOMEN IN CEREMONIAL DRESS, CIRCA 1900



From: Kruyt and Adriani, De Bare'e-Sprekende
Toradja's van Midden Celebes, 1912, Folio.

century monitorial schools of England.

Arithmetic, despite the difficulties experienced in teaching it, was considered by Kruyt as having both pedagogical and practical significance. Pedagogically, its importance lay in training the mind to think abstractly. Practically, its significance lay in assisting the villager in carrying out trade and in implementing the traditional system of justice. Of constant concern to Kruyt was the way To Pamona tribesmen were exploited by Muslim traders and their acceptance of fines whose magnitude they were unable to comprehend until it was too late:

In trading, they have recourse to all sorts of aids [in reckoning] such as pieces of wood or a length of cotton on which marks are made. When a fine is being discussed, the Torajan appears to have no notion of its size except when he is presented with a representation of each buffalo by a leaf, a piece of wood etc., which is nothing else but a consequence of his being unaccustomed to thinking abstractly.¹⁰⁸

The teaching of geography was similarly important. Director Gunning, during his visit to Poso in 1901, remarked on that schools' geography classes, "because [Kruyt's] method is to make the children think about geographical phenomena".¹⁰⁹

Kruyt's emphasis on the significance of the ability to think abstractly resulted from his hope that this skill would enable the To Pamona to recognize the logical superiority of Christianity and the irrationality of traditional beliefs, and more broadly, to realize the advantages of the changes to be introduced with colonial rule.

Apart from this academic education, quite a deal of time was taken up with activities such as singing, music and craft work. It is not clear what singing was practised but most likely, children were taught Christian hymns from the Minahassa, translated into Bare'e. The Minahassan gurus also introduced flute playing, a pastime very

108. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 103.

109. Kruyt to his father, 10 March, 1901.

popular back in their home-land. The children were taught how to make the Minahassan flutes from bamboo which were then decorated. Children's flute groups played later at Sunday church services.^{110.}

For craft work, boys and girls were required to make everyday articles such as mats and baskets. While grass and cane weaving was traditional amongst most tribes, whether or not traditional methods and artifacts were promoted exclusively is not clear. In any case, craft work gained an added significance in the mission school because it involved an attack on an aspect of traditional culture which specified different tasks for men and women. Thus, males and females produced different objects needed for their respective functions. By carrying out a female task it was believed that the male would be contaminated by female characteristics which would make him unsuitable as a warrior since, "A man who performs women's work becomes timid". In schools, no account was taken of these attitudes and Kruyt hoped that this would "no doubt encourage their disappearance".^{111.}

Besides formal instruction and craft work, attempts at inculcating European concepts of hygiene and other European values also formed part of the Minahassan school-teachers task. The teachers, for instance, took the children bathing and taught them how to look after their hair" but such things still depend on gentle coercion (zachte dwang)."^{112.}

The primary role of the mission school in this period, like that of the elementary school in Western society, was one of inculcating "acceptable values". In the context of Pamona society, this amounted largely to separating the individual child from the communal consciousness of traditional society and developing in it, the beginnings of a self-consciousness as a basis for individual conversion. Facets of school life such as

110. Adriani, op. cit., p. 167.

111. ibid.

112. Annual report, 1898 in op. cit., p. 226.

regular attendance, perserverance at routine tasks lacking immediate and perceivable rewards were in this sense, as important in the "civilizing" process as the actual content of the education provided.

In the formative years of mission education, a financial infra-structure normal for a school system, had not yet been established. Apart from government subsidies first received in 1902 for two full-time Malay language schools, the entire burden of financing the schools was borne by the Netherlands Missionary Society with some ad hoc support from the Menado and Gorontalo government offices. The Society's expenditure on the Poso mission, including the missionary's salary, which in 1894 totalled f.4517, had almost doubled by 1904.

In 1902, the schools at Poso and Tojo received a subsidy even though the number of students did not reach the required number of twenty-five.¹¹³ Under the terms of the 1895 subsidy arrangements, "subsidies could be paid to private indigenous schools which provided elementary education". Government assistance consisted of an initial establishment grant of f.200, a subsidy of f.100 per annum for twenty-five pupils or more to meet recurrent expenses and an annual capital grant of f.20 for a school of this size. Also under these regulations a basic three hour daily teaching program was to be provided and the curriculum was to be equivalent to that of a second-class Government Native school. Its teachers were to be eligible for appointment at such government schools. Religious education could be given provided that this instruction was in addition to the three hours of

113. Director of Education, Religion and Industry to the Resident of Menado, 12 July, 1901.

"I have no objection to the principle of making subsidies available to private native schools in Poso and Taliboi, [Tojo] even if it has to be proposed that the government waives several conditions for eligibility for granting subsidies described in the regulations of Government Gazette 1895, No. 146."

For 1902, Kruyt received f.600. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 29 January, 1902. See Appendix No. 4.

secular instruction. Finally, such subsidized schools had to admit children of all denominations.¹¹⁴ The schools of Poso and Tojo fulfilled all these requirements except what was presumably the most significant one, that of pupil numbers. The receipt of subsidies by the two schools which failed to fulfill the letter of the subsidy regulations is a manifestation of the sympathy expressed at the residency level and by the central government for this endeavour.

Indirect subsidy from the Manado administration was also enjoyed by Kruyt in the form of free transport of materials and personnel,¹¹⁵ while the colonial treasury financed the printing of the first non-religious school books, the spelling and reading books, printed in Manado in 1900.¹¹⁶ No financial aid was forthcoming for the payment of teachers at the inland schools, nor for the erection of the guru house-cum-school-cum-church. Since school attendance in this period was entirely free, the financing of the mission schools depended entirely on the voluntary contributions collected by the Missionary Society in the Netherlands.

Wood, roofing materials, flooring, walls; everything had either to be provided by us or purchased from the inhabitants. The gurus themselves helped in the construction of their own houses.¹¹⁷

As the guru house was at the same time, a school and church meeting-place, a wide verandah served that purpose, keeping building costs to a minimum. The guru's initial salary of f.15 per month was, after 1896, supplemented with the produce from the land granted him by the villagers.¹¹⁸

114. See J. Hoekman, De Voornaamste Voorschriften Betreffende het Inlandsch Onderwijs. (The principle regulations relating to Native education). (Batavia, 1915)

115. Annual report, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1897, 1898.

116. N. Adriani, "Ontwikkeling", in op. cit., p. 364. Also Kruyt to Director of Education, August, 1902 in which he asks the government to print his reader on Celebes geography.

117. N. Adriani, "Ontwikkeling", in op. cit., p. 355

118. Annual report, 1896, in op. cit., p. 174

This gesture on the part of the village was hardly a sacrifice since there was land aplenty, but it did represent the acceptance of the guru as a fellow villager.

The initial lack of success of the Poso mission, which depended entirely upon the finance of the parent mission body, placed Kruyt in a rather precarious position and brought his methods under close scrutiny. Coolsma, in a turn-of-the-century publication, had strongly attacked Kruyt's methods as being the root cause of the lack of success in Poso.¹¹⁹ Even though Coolsma later retracted his criticisms, it seems fairly clear that there was dissatisfaction with Kruyt's handling of his work.¹²⁰ In the year of publication of Coolsma's book, a period when the Missionary Society was in financial difficulties, there was some pressure to close down this unsuccessful mission.¹²¹ This attempt from some quarters, while it in

119. S. Coolsma, op. cit., pp. 613-620. Coolsma was the director of the Mission House (Zendingshuis) of the Netherlands Mission Association (Nederlandsch Zendingvereeniging).

120. Brouwer writes:

"This [criticism], in the then current situation where the [mission] corporations were not yet working in co-operation and also diverged philosophically, was not insignificant criticism. Fortunately, they were not left unattested. Kruyt's friend, Dr. A. van der Flier wrote so strongly against them in the Nederlandsche Kerkbode [Netherlands Church Messenger] and showed with evidence from Kruyt's reports ... so convincingly their unsubstantiability, that Mr. Coolsma retracted in the following edition of the paper, the whole rather long passage of his book and declared that he wished to regard them as unwritten." (Brouwer, op. cit., pp. 91-92). This does not however, detract from the basic proposition that his contemporaries were more than a little concerned with what they understood to be Kruyt's methods.

121. Brouwer, op. cit., p. 93 and Minutes N.M.S., 1902. Kruyt to N.M.S., 24 December, 1901.

fact failed, no doubt placed extra pressure on Kruyt to "come up with results".^{122.}

The financial limitations imposed on the Poso mission hampered its initial development. Most significantly, the provision of another missionary to replace Kruyt's 'silent partner' (Adriani) would have enabled Kruyt to mount a simultaneous attack on what he saw as the greatest brake on his mission work, village and tribal inter-dependence. A second missionary, however, would have only increased the financial resources necessary to finance the increased missionary activity. The Missionary Society was only just coping with Kruyt's limited field of operations.^{123.}

While the financial situation can be pointed to as a limiting factor, greater financial support would not necessarily have brought about the quite spectacular

122. Kruyt, however, had the full support of the Society's director:

"By the unique method of work of the brothers [in Poso] the natives are acquainted with the Gospel better than elsewhere. If, at a particular time, there should be a mass conversion, which elsewhere, not unjustifiably, is not completely trusted, here those converted to Christianity will know better what they are doing than elsewhere."

Minutes N.M.S., 1903. Meeting, 7 July, 1903.

Despite Gunning's faith in Kruyt's methods, there is nevertheless an emphasis on results.

123. Missionary Hofman had been selected for the Poso mission for which he was ordained in July, 1903 and two further trainees, P. ten Kate and P. Schuyt had also been nominated for Poso on completion of their training. (Minutes N.M.S., 1903, Meeting, 7 & 8 July, 1903). These preparations were being made in anticipation of the effects of serious government intervention in Central Sulawesi. Director Gunning told a meeting of the Society in July, 1903:

"Through the coincidence of a number of circumstances, there is likely to be a great change for the better for the mission [in Poso]".

Minutes N.M.S., 1903, Meeting, 7 July, 1903.

Previously, Kruyt had written,

"Much will depend on the decisions which the government will have to make in the new year, as to whether or not it wishes to co-operate energetically in the development of this important region."

(Minutes N.M.S., 1903. Kruyt to N.M.S., 20 December, 1902).

results following the military strikes of 1905-1906 and the subsequent intensification of Dutch colonial rule. It was only after that time that the principle of self-help, first introduced in the provision of a new school in Panta in 1894, could be developed. After 1906, the increasing demand for schools (or at least, for teachers) as well as the implicit threat from the military administrators placed Kruyt and his colleagues in a better bargaining position to extract local financing from the village concerned for the required school, thus considerably alleviating the burden of capital expenses born hitherto by the Society.

CHAPTER FOUR

LAYING THE COLONIAL FOUNDATIONS

1893 to 1904

The renewed vigour with which the Dutch were attempting to establish themselves as masters of the Gulf of Tomini at the end of the nineteenth century sparked off a struggle for supremacy amongst indigenous powers in the region. The immediate prize for both European and indigenous imperialists was control over the tribes of the Central Sulawesi interior. The non-availability of military forces and sheer ignorance of the geographic, demographic and political nature of the region hindered the European thrust into the area, providing both the stimulus and the occasion for Sulawesi potentates to jostle for power.

Keen as the colonial administration was to promote private enterprise and to exploit the Outer Islands to the advantage of the colonial treasury, it was still forced to adopt a cautious policy. It was a policy which attempted to curb the worst excesses of indigenous rulers while with a token presence, accustoming them to Dutch authority. Central Sulawesi had to await the availability of military forces freed from the pacification of more important areas before decisive Dutch intervention in the area could occur.¹

The retiring Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, Baron van Hoeffell, whilst a major influence in directing Dutch attention to the area, nevertheless warned Batavia that the "stream of entrepreneurs" then being attracted to the

1. This was particularly due to the continuing Aceh war and the "pacification" of Lombok. The final solution came in 1905. J. Kruyt, op. cit., pp. 96-97, writing of the period 1903-4 states:

"Aceh as well as Jambi demanded greater military concentration than had been thought necessary. The uprising in Borneo still demanded attention. All available warships were still needed to guard the neutrality in the Russo-Japanese war. And together with all this was the fact that the Governor-General was not prepared to begin an extensive military action in Celebes just before the end of his term of office".

Gulf area would involve the government in "difficulties with independent rulers which would necessarily result in [military] expeditions". The Gulf of Tomini did possess a surplus of wealth, he believed, and "could become a rich field of endeavour for European capital and industry and become profitable for the colonial treasury" but only if the government pursued a policy of gradual intensification of Dutch authority. This gradual strengthening of the administration would be financed by the resultant increase in government revenue effected. Eventually this would bring about, "an entirely different situation ... in which agricultural enterprise and mineral exploitation will be possible". This in turn would "develop and raise the welfare of the community".²

This recommendation was accepted and, as a first stage in its implementation, a position of controleur for the Gulf of Tomini was created by government resolution in June, 1893.³ The position was justified on the grounds that: "the native rulers there could no longer be bereft of European guidance given the state of disorder, lack of administration and poverty".⁴

The decision to place the representative of colonial power in the south-west corner of the Gulf was influenced by a very practical consideration: the need for a refueling station in the Gulf. The distance between this furthest part of the Gulf and Gorontalo proved too great for the capacity of the on-board coal supplies of

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2. Baron van Hoevell to Resident of Menado, Gorontalo, 22 March, 1891, "Memorandum regarding the desirability or otherwise of the issuing of mining leases in the Gulf of Tomini".
 3. Government Resolution, 13 June, 1893, No. 15 quoted in Engelenberg, op. cit., p. 32. In a confidential letter to Batavia dated 12 June, 1890, No. 1290, the Resident of Menado had asked for two controleurs to be placed in Poso and Tambu.
 4. Letter of the Governor-General to Minister of Colonies, 13 June, 1893, No. 1347^b/15, (Engelenberg, loc. cit.)

the steam ships the Dutch were using at the time. Baron van Hoevell's report in 1891 stated that he had not visited Poso during his last official tours of the Gulf partly through lack of coal.⁵ The nature of indigenous administration further strained this limited coal supply because it was necessary for the Dutch official to "steam up and down the coast to collect [the various representatives of the native ruler] for a conference at a central point".⁶

Related to this problem was the fact that a number of foreign vessels and most recently a vessel containing Australians sailing under a British flag, had been trading in this area and making political overtures.⁷ Naval supervision originating from Gorontalo, to counteract foreign European penetration, was obviously hampered by the lack of a refuelling station in the Gulf.

The controleur for the Tomini Gulf was initially stationed in Mapane on 5 September, 1894.⁸ From the point of view of controlling trade and preventing political interference by foreign European powers, the choice was a correct one. The port of Mapane was good although, climatically, the settlement was not conducive to the good health of Europeans.⁹ The political structure appeared non-threatening. According to the 1888 contract, the Mapane settlement formed part of the territory of Sausu, an insignificant state of approximately 1000 inhabitants.¹⁰

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5. Baron van Hoevell, "Report on an official trip through the Gulf of Tomini," 10-21 March, 1891.
 6. Baron van Hoevell, Memorandum 1891.
 7. Memorandum of the government General Secretary, 19 February, 1897.
 8. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 67.
 9. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 49-50. Mapane was established by Sigi as a trading port in the 1860's. Politically, its role was to extend the influence of the inland state of Sigi along the Gulf coast. By the 1880's, it had become an international trading centre.
 10. Like the contract with Poso, the 1888 contract with Sausu was drawn up in ignorance of the political realities. The explanatory memorandum accompanying the contract stated that the population of Sausu was 1050 and its eastern boundary lay close to the mouth of the Poso River.

However, control of Mapane, partly because of its economic significance, was being disputed by Sigi and Parigi. The inhabitants of the town, in attempting to assert their own independence, were playing the claimants off, one against the other. An effective Dutch presence in Mapane would have diminished the influence of the inland state of Sigi and strengthened that of the Dutch contractual ally, Parigi. Three months after the arrival of the Controleur, the Magau of Sigi made it known that he would not tolerate the presence of a representative of the "Company" in Mapane. Consequently, in March, 1895, the post was transferred to Poso.¹¹

Since the initial placement of the Controleur in Mapane indicated the colonial government's primary economic concern, Tojo, another important port, would seem to have been the next logical choice, had not certain political considerations intervened. The State of Tojo had a well developed (Buginese) administration which recognized Boni overlordship and was strongly Muslim.¹² Unlike Mapane/Sausu, Tojo was not regarded as a potential direct-rule area, and Baron van Hoeffell's advice in 1891 had been pessimistic as to the likely success of European enterprise in the state.¹³ Furthermore, if the Controleur were stationed here, he would then be too far removed from Mapane and other west coast ports.

Despite the negative factors related to it, the choice of the Poso site was determined in response to the threat of hostile indigenous states and the ineffectualness of Dutch authority. Poso was chosen "because it was regarded as sufficiently safe for the Controleur."¹⁴

11. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 67.

12. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 75. The title of the ruler of Tojo, "Jena" was a local modification of the Buginese "Jenang". Other statesmen of Tojo held positions which, according to Kruyt, corresponded to the ruling hierarchy of Boni. More significantly, Tojo regarded itself as subject to Boni.

13. Baron van Hoeffell, Memorandum 1891.

14. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 67.

As a result of this decision, Poso became the focus of government attention in the Tomini Gulf. Yet the location of Poso as the seat of Dutch authority in the region was far from suitable in many ways. As a port, "it did not have a good name in shipping circles".¹⁵ Drinking water had to be carried in daily.¹⁶ Economically, it was insignificant and was overshadowed by neighbouring Tojo, Mapane and several other western Tomini Gulf ports.¹⁷ Politically, it was also insignificant. The bulk of the indigenous population lived a day's march inland and beyond. At the river's mouth lay only a small Parigi settlement and some isolated Pamona villages.¹⁸ A language barrier further isolated the Controleur from the inland population.

But Poso, with whose friendly "rajas" the government had contracted in 1888, presented no perceivable military or political threat. A Parigi colony situated at the mouth of the Poso river had withdrawn in March, 1894.¹⁹ Further, it had been assumed that Poso would become a direct-rule region which it was believed would become economically important.²⁰ Lying between Mapane and Tojo, its Controleur

15. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 50.

16. ibid, p. 49.

17. loc. cit.. Also van Hoëvell, Muton Contract, Explanatory memorandum, 1891. Other important Gulf ports were Tomini and Tinamba.

18. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 138.

19. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 159. The Parigi colony which had been established at the mouth of the Poso river during the 1880's was designed to consolidate the Parigi claim over the To Kadombuku and to extend its influence in Poso generally. As a result of its disastrous military expedition in March, 1894 in which the northern Pamona tribes joined to expel a Parigi troop of 800 men, the Parigi colony also departed.


20. The explanatory memorandum attached to the 1888 contract states:

"Although the agreements differ in form and content from the contracts which would have been signed with states which were to retain the right of self-government, the Indies government thought that, given the aim in view, the existing arrangements would suffice for the time being."

The only aim which is mentioned is the desire to establish a formal relationship with the area to prevent a foreign government from doing this first.

MAP 6

THE INDIGENOUS STATES OF CENTRAL SULAWESI CIRCA 1900



*Shaded area represents
land covered by the
1888 Poso Contract.

could exercise surveillance on both ports while counteracting any attempt by another European or indigenous Muslim power to extend its influence over its inhabitants. Most importantly, according to the 1888 contract, no Sulawesi power exercised an influence over the "rajas of Poso".

One further important consideration influenced the choice of Mapane/Poso over Tojo or other coastal Gulf ports: the presence of missionary Kruyt. The Missionary Society whose influence on the pro-mission Minister of Colonies and the Menado administration was considerable, had, a year prior to the government resolution, expressed its wish that a controleur be placed in Poso.²¹ The government was responsible for the colony's European citizens and primarily for this reason, required missionaries under Article 123 of the Constitution to apply for work permits.²² Resident Jellesma, coming from a missionary background himself but also because he was an astute policy-maker, was concerned to ensure Kruyt's safety and had initially warned Kruyt not to venture too far inland.²³ Concern for his safety was no empty fear since Kruyt's life had been threatened in early 1894 when his house was surrounded by a large contingent of Parigi

21. In reply to Kruyt (8 July, 1892), the Missionary Society wrote (29 September, 1892):

"It is hoped that a controleur will be stationed in Poso and as well that the choice falls on a man who is sympathetic to the mission".

In a letter of 29 December, 1895 it wrote in response to the announcement of Controleur Liebert: "We mourn the fact that the Controleur just had to be an indifferent Catholic."

22. According to Article 123 of the Constitution, a missionary had to apply for a government permit to carry out missionary activities in a specific area. See P.M. Franken van Driel Regeering en Zending in Nederlandsch-Indie, especially Ch. 3, (H.J. Paris, Amsterdam, 1923). Approval to work in Gorontalo had been obtained by Kruyt personally in Batavia in 1891. Several days after his arrival in Gorontalo, Kruyt applied for a permit for Poso approval for which automatically cancelled his previous permit. (Brouwer, op. cit., pp. 29-35).

23. Minutes N.M.S., 29 May, 1893. Kruyt to N.M.S., 29 March, 1893.

warriors with orders to remove him from Poso.²⁴ Such concern also had important political overtones. Should Kruyt be murdered, or should his activities incite hostilities, this would have to be taken as a direct challenge to Dutch colonial authority.

While Jellesma may have seen the location of a Dutch outpost as guaranteeing the missionary's safety, for Kruyt, the presence of the Controleur living "just down the road" was a hindrance.²⁵ Any help the Controleur could have given him could also have been undertaken had the latter been stationed elsewhere, Kruyt argued, and in 1897 in an official advice to the government, he recommended that the Controleur should be relocated in Tojo.²⁶ Here the Controleur would be in a position to curb the anti-mission influence of the Tojo ruler. Kruyt's rejection of the Menado government's political involvement in the achievement of the mission's objectives was characteristic of his strategy. In suggesting that the Controleur would be more useful to the mission if located in Tojo, Kruyt implicitly relegated the government to a secondary role in the "advancement" of this traditional society.

For different reasons, Batavia also queried the wisdom of stationing the Gulf's only colonial representative in Poso. More concerned with broader political issues, the central colonial government questioned the political acumen of Jellesma's decision. Responding to the Resident's reiteration of his request for the appointment of a second Controleur in the region,²⁷ the first

24. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 62.

25. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 50: "At the end of the road [where the house of the civilian commander stands] is the school and the teacher's house."

26. An undated rough copy of Kruyt's reply to a request from the First Government Secretary (Buitenzorg, 22 March, 1897) to Resident of Menado. The Secretary's letter is marked: "Copy for A.C. Kruyt with request for consideration and advice." See infra pp. 120-121.

27. Resident of Menado to Governor-General, 22 May, 1896, No. 1734.

Government Secretary, on behalf of the Governor-General wondered whether it "would not be more desirable if the Controleur currently stationed in Poso be, from now on, stationed in Parigi". The letter continued by pointing out that Poso was so peaceful that this post appeared to be superfluous: "the missionary Kruyt has already gained much influence amongst the Alfurs and his relations with them leave nothing to be desired". The Controleur on the other hand, because of the language barrier, could have minimum impact here, whereas in Parigi, where Malay was spoken, "it is the opinion of His Excellency that the Controleur would perform useful work in the interests of the establishment and expansion of our authority."²⁸.

Resident Jellesma persevered with his policy and it was because the Controleur remained in Poso where he was unable to communicate directly with the inhabitants (other than those foreigners living on the coast), that Kruyt was able to exercise an inordinate influence on the design and implementation of government policy in the area. Since the activity of the government official was limited in the Poso inland, it was Kruyt's policies which, in the early years, determined the objectives of government action. In his relations with Pamona village headmen, Kruyt proved himself to be an effective politician and it was this same diplomatic skill in his relations with the European authorities which enabled him to pursue so effectively his religious and cultural aims.

The primary objective of the government in Poso in the 1890's was the removal of outside influence in the affairs of the Pamona population. This objective was laid down by Jellesma in 1895²⁹. and was initially directed against Parigi and Tojo. Since it was not the government but the mission which was working in the inland where such

28. First Government Secretary to Resident of Manado.
22 March, 1897.

29. While a document outlining this policy could not be found in the Kruyt archive, the memoranda of Assistant Resident, A.H. Westra (30 September, 1896) and Controleur Liebert (16 September, 1896) make it clear that such a policy had been formulated and implemented for some time.

external influence manifested themselves, it was the mission which was the beneficiary of this policy in the short term. Only when the promotion of the mission is seen as being in the long term interests of the government, can it be argued that the government was pursuing its own interests.

It was the change which Kruyt was attempting to introduce in Pamona society - essentially the establishment of schools - which revealed the extent of control exercised in Poso by powers lying outside the area. The development of government policy in the period up to 1898 can be seen as being linked to the implementation of Kruyt's school policy.

Outside the coastal settlement where Kruyt had his house, his first two schools, Panta (July, 1894) and Tomasa (October, 1894), were located in those central areas which he had initially selected as influential. In the period 1891-1893, prior to his permanent settlement in Poso, he had purposefully cultivated friendships with influential chiefs.³⁰ These relationships formed the basis of his missionary activity. The focus of his attention was the village chief of Tonipa, Papa i Wunte, opinion leader of the coastal Pebato tribe,³¹ and Papa i Melemo of Tomasa, "who was the most important of all kabosenya in the whole district, especially because he was uncle to at least twenty chiefs of the surrounding villages."³²

In fact, in as far as such a role existed in Pamona society, the latter could be regarded as tribal chief of the To Kadombuku. Relations with these two chiefs appear to have been facilitated by the fact that both suffered

30. N. Adriani, op. cit., pp. 127-141. Including a brief visit to the area in the company of the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, Kruyt's visits to Poso prior to his permanent settlement were: June, 1891, February to July, 1892, August, 1892 to January, 1893 and April to September, 1893. He finally arrived to settle permanently with his wife on 31 December, 1893.

31. Adriani, op. cit., p. 135.

32. Brouwer, op. cit., p. 49.

most directly from external interference³³. and, located closest to the coast, both were more familiar with the existence of the "Company",³⁴. Furthermore, two To Kadombuku chiefs had contracted with the colonial government in 1888.³⁵

The third inland school, established in name only in 1895, lay south of the other two, forming the point of a triangular thrust into the heart of Central Sulawesi. The acceptance of a guru in the village of Buyu mBayau, chosen because it was the largest village of the area,³⁶ was dependent upon the exploitation of Kruyt's friendship with the coastal Pebato chief of Tonipa. Two Malay language schools for Muslim children in Tojo and Mapane in 1897 were established for reasons not directly related to Kruyt's evangelizing work.

Far more than his ineffectual evangelization, it was the establishment of schools which represented a threat to the traditional status quo, and which attracted the interference of the rulers of Tojo and Sigi. It appeared that Kruyt's success in bringing the benefits of European

33. The To Kadombuku were simultaneously subject to Tojo and Parigi according to Kruyt (Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 138 and 140). They had also come under Mandar influence in the early part of the nineteenth century and had been converted to Islam. (ibid, p. 42). J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 71 states:

"Papa i Wunte had declared ... that when he had accepted the school [in Panta] he had seen school attendance by the youth as a means to escape from the heavy burden of the rapacious To Napu: [thus a means to] renewal by becoming spiritually superior, something which the ways of the ancestors offered no opportunity for."

34. In all references to conversations with local people, Kruyt uses this term indicating that the To Pamona had been aware of the existence of the V.O.C. and/or equated the present colonial government with its commercial predecessor.

35. These were, Uli, chief of Taliboi and Bunga-sawa, both brothers (nephews?) of the chief of Tomasa. Kruyt, "Het Stroomgebied van de Tomasa Rivier", (The Tomasa River valley). Tijdschrift van het Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, vol. 16, 1899, p. 615.

36. Buyu mBayau lay close to Kruyt's footpath between Panta and Tomasa. It also represented the first of the inland Pebato villages separated from the coastal villages by a largely uninhabited terrain.

civilization to the Pamona people on behalf of the colonial government, was being frustrated by their negative influence. The government therefore introduced its policy of combatting such interference. In attempting to restrict the traditional rights of Tojo in the Poso area and by itself imposing a new authority which was of questionable legitimacy, the actions of the colonial government led to Luwu involvement in the area. The limits of the traditional rights of this state in the Poso area had not been determined at that time.³⁷

According to Controleur Liebert, Jellesma's policy of prohibiting Tojo and Parigi from involvement in "Alfur" affairs had automatically led to the strengthening of Luwu influence.³⁸ Such influence became manifest, if only because of government inaction, in its opposition to Kruyt. Kruyt exploited this situation to involve the government in implementing policy favourable to the mission.

Two examples of the inter-relation of Kruyt's school policy and government policy reveal this. In October, 1894, Kruyt had managed to gain approval from a conference of To Kadombuku village chiefs for the location in Tomasa of a Minahassan guru but he was unable to record a regular attendance of children at this makeshift school.³⁹ In 1895, his attempt to place a guru in the coastal town of Malei, a To Lage colony "threatened" by a surrounding Muslim population, failed entirely.⁴⁰ In both cases the

37. General consensus was that Luwu exercised no direct influence beyond a line drawn north of the Lake and that it had never entered north Central Sulawesi until several representatives accompanied the German scientists, Fritz and Paul Sarassin in 1894. In 1903, Kruyt called these men "success hunters", although he dedicated his 1938 monograph to them.

38. Controleur Liebert, Memorandum concerning Luwu and Poso, 16 September, 1896.

39. Kruyt, Maandberichten, 1895, No. 1.

40. Kruyt's interest in Malei was related to the fact that this To Lage settlement lay within Tojo territory and was very susceptible to Muslim takeover. Kruyt's concern was that, through close tribal relations, Malei could "infect" the rest of the To Lage tribe.

cause of failure was primarily the opposition from the Jena of Tojo.⁴¹

In response to this rebuff, Kruyt succeeded in gaining Jellesma's order prohibiting Tojo interference. For his part, he attempted to persuade the Tojo ruler to accept a school in his village but, although the man expressed interest at first, by the end of 1895, he had rejected Kruyt's proposal.⁴² Kruyt had hoped that the establishment of a school in Tojo would remove the ruler's opposition to the commencement of schools amongst his subjects in Tomasa and Malei.

Throughout 1896, Kruyt persisted in his attempts to begin schools in Tomasa and Malei⁴³ as well as to counter Luwu opposition to the school in Buyu mBayau.⁴⁴ In February, 1897, the only Tomasa pupil, the son of the village chief, was withdrawn from the school and the chief of Malei refused to establish a school unless one was first established in Tojo.⁴⁵ During the next few months, Kruyt embarked on a diplomatic mission to gain more effective government support. In a letter to Controleur Liebert in March, 1897⁴⁶ regarding a situation which he described as involving "mission and politics", Kruyt claimed that the schools were being hindered by the presence of a Tojo prince who had been living in Poso for the past year and a half. In his three-page letter Kruyt emphasized the political, social and economic dangers involved in the continuing presence of this person who was

41. Annual Report, 1895, in op. cit., p. 200.

42. Minutes N.M.S., 18 May, 1896. Kruyt to N.M.S., 3 January, 1896.

43. Annual Report, 1896, in op. cit., pp. 177-191.

44. Minutes N.M.S., 10 October, 1895. Kruyt to N.M.S., September, 1895. Kruyt reports that Luwu had forbidden the Buyu mBayau chief to allow children to be sent to school. Kruyt had asked the Controleur to intervene (Minutes N.M.S., 24 February, 1896) and the latter had held an unsuccessful meeting with the Luwu Prince Ambenaa.

45. Annual Report, 1897 in op. cit., pp. 268-9.

46. Kruyt to Controleur Liebert, 9 March, 1897.

attempting to establish himself as the de facto ruler of Poso. The Prince was corrupting the morals of the indigenous population by the introduction of drink and gambling and was also undertaking Muslim prozelytization under the disguise of carrying out trade.

Since my interests in this regard correspond so closely with those of the government, I want to ... beg you urgently to take steps if possible, to remove this Tojo Prince betimes from Poso.⁴⁷.

On the same day, in a separate letter to the Assistant Resident,⁴⁸ Kruyt persuaded this official to furnish him with a letter indicating the government's desire that a school be established in Tojo and that further opposition to school attendance in Tomasa be ended. Prior to this, Kruyt had applied for permission to extend his mission beyond the territory of Poso, approval for which he received in April.

Kruyt was presented with an opportunity to develop his diplomatic activity further when he received a request from the First Government Secretary in April, 1897 to advise the government on the desirability of relocating the Controleur for the Tomini Gulf.⁴⁹ Since it came while he was trying to convince the Menado administration to isolate Tojo influence, Kruyt advised the stationing of the Controleur in Tojo. The benefits of this transfer, Kruyt believed, were that it would remove from Poso the foreign influence attracted there by the presence of the Dutch administrative centre. It would enable the Controleur to exercise a more effective restraint on the Tojo ruling house, thereby curbing the negative influence of Tojo on the mission schools in the

47. loc. cit..

48. Kruyt to Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, 9 March, 1897. A copy of the requested letter dated, Gorontalo, 21 April, 1897 in Kruyt's archive contains the note in Kruyt's handwriting: "Copy of a letter of the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, A.H. Westra written at my request to the Raja of Tojo regarding the erection of a school in Tojo." (The letter does not employ Roman script).

49. First Government Secretary to the Resident of Menado, 22 March, 1897. Copy to Kruyt from the Controleur's office dated Poso, 19 April, 1897.

Poso area. Politically, Kruyt argued, the nature of Pamona social structure meant that the government could only exercise its influence by acting through a recognized ruler viz., the Jena of Tojo who "currently exercises the most influence".

Since this advice was contrary to that which Kruyt gave in regard to Luwu, it reinforces the view that Kruyt was attempting to manipulate the government for his own ends. In the final analysis, Kruyt believed only the mission was able to exert a progressive influence on the Pamona villagers. Only when

the mission has exerted its influence on the Torajans for a longer period of time will their hearts ... become susceptible to act according to the ordering and regulating spirit of the government.⁵⁰

Finally in May, 1897, Kruyt was able to establish a mission school in Tojo but only after convincing Jellesma at the last moment not to establish a government school there.⁵¹ A neutral government school would have been politically and morally more just but would have hampered Kruyt's aim of exerting influence in Tojo in the interests of his Poso mission and his desire "to come into contact with the Alfur tribes in the interior [of Tojo] and so open a new door".⁵²

Kruyt feared that the establishment of a government school would have given the impression that the government did not support the Christian mission, thus facilitating Muslim "propaganda". The correctness of Jellesma's proposal was evidenced by the initial Muslim reaction to the opening of Kruyt's school,⁵³ although eagerness for Malay language tuition appeared to have rapidly overcome any theological scruples and the school remained successful until its replacement by a government school in 1907.

The Buyu mBayau school played an even more central role in determining government policy. The opposition

50. An undated draft of Kruyt's response to this request.

51. Minutes N.M.S., 27 September, 1897. Kruyt to N.M.S., 24 June, 1897.

52. Minutes N.M.S., 18 May, 1896. Kruyt to N.M.S., 3 January, 1896.

53. Annual Report, 1898 in op. cit., p. 233.

Kruyt experienced from Luwu in establishing this school led to a spate of memoranda from the Resident, Assistant Resident and Tomini Controleur decrying Luwu influence in Poso which was "encouraging the Alfurs not to send their children to school".⁵⁴ This in turn led to the establishment in 1897 of an investigatory Commission that Kruyt accompanied.⁵⁵ The report of this Commission revealed the extent of the government's ignorance of the Central Sulawesi power structure.⁵⁶ The need to extricate the inland tribes from Luwu influence became the principal policy question for the Menado administration in the late 1890's and was a major factor in the military exercise of 1904-5. It was, however, as a result of Kruyt's personal efforts that Luwu approval was obtained for its Pamona subjects to send children to school.⁵⁷

In both cases Kruyt's activities in endeavouring to establish mission schools resulted in a negative reaction from the To Pamona overlord. The opposition to Kruyt's schools initially expressed by Tojo and Luwu were manifestations of the authority exerted by these rulers over the colonial government's contractual allies, an authority of

54. Jellesma to Director of the Department of the Interior, 17 May, 1896.

55. Minutes N.M.S., 25 April, 1898. Kruyt to N.M.S., 12 January, 1898. Kruyt's conclusion regarding the work of the Commission was that it was of no significance to the mission (it produced no information of which Kruyt was not already aware), but that it did show that Luwu influence north of the Poso Lake was less than that in the south.

56. As quoted in Engelenberg, *op. cit.*, passim. The report concluded that "all tribes including the To Pebato recognized the overlordship of Luwu", op. cit., p. 12.

57. Minutes N.M.S., 28 June, 1897. Kruyt to N.M.S., 27 February, 1897, "The Minister [the Datu's representative] was afraid that the Torajans would no longer heed the orders of their ruler if they went to school the impression [of this meeting] on the Poso people is great and ... they will no longer lightly use the Datu to hide behind in order to avoid a matter which is not desired by them".

which the government was not aware in 1888. In supporting Kruyt, the Menado government was provided with an issue which justified its interference in the internal affairs of Central Sulawesi. Such interference would have occurred in the course of time but in as far as the Dutch government's interest was first and foremost economic, its primary concern would otherwise have been restricted to coastal trade.

From the perspective of the mission, Kruyt's interest was related directly to the establishment of guru posts or centres for eventual evangelization and schooling. Kruyt believed, as he announced publicly in 1906, that he was playing a major role in the work of the European colonialist in bringing civilization to the "heathen natives". For political and humanitarian reasons, Europe was obliged to bring Christian civilization to the East, that is, church and state had to work as partners. In practice, Kruyt acted as though only the church, with its closer contact with the "man in the village", knew what was good for "the native" and as though the role of the secular authority was to implement those changes of which the church approved. In the 1890's, sheer ignorance of conditions, a personal and official sympathy with the mission's task of evangelization⁵⁸, and the non-specificity of government objectives created a situation in which Kruyt was able to exert significant influence. This influence was all the more effective since Kruyt proved himself to be an astute politician and kept himself sufficiently abreast of contemporary political thinking and policy to couch his advice in terms most likely to be acceptable. By the latter end of the 1890's, the government was beginning to define policies which were to facilitate mission activities. This support was motivated

58. This is clear from the nature of the correspondence between Kruyt and various government officials. At a higher level, good relations existed between the Missionary Society administration and the Dutch government. The centenary dinner of the N.M.S. for instance, was attended by the Minister of Colonies (Minutes N.M.S., 14 July, 1897).

by the government's desire to establish a Dutch presence in the area in the face of anti-Dutch economic and political competition and of pressure from Dutch capital to open up the archipelago for exploitation by private enterprise. Intertwined with this concern was a growing recognition of a humanitarian responsibility, given fresh impetus by the change of government in 1888 in the Hague.

A significant aspect of the new policy was the recognition of the "civilizing" work of missionaries and specifically, support for the provision of popular education. This latter policy was introduced in a series of education laws between 1892 and 1895 in which the principle of popular education and the sharing of the responsibility for education by church and state was re-established.⁵⁹ This new mood was echoed within the Christian churches with the upsurge of evangelistic theology which had grown out of the doctrinal debates of the 1850's.⁶⁰

Specifically in Central Sulawesi, the government's long term aim was to establish Dutch authority in the region. As yet, not having the power to subdue the indigenous rulers directly, it could only attempt to impose its rule where opposition was minimal. In the meantime, the government sought to gain control over indigenous trade in order to channel this into the colonial economic structure and thereby to finance the expansion of colonial administration needed to develop political dominance. Related to this was the recognition of the eventual need to develop the village administration and economy as a means to improving the community's standard of living.

In practice, these goals overlapped. In 1899, the Controleur in Poso argued that the Luwu involvement in

59. See infra, Chapter 6.

60. In 1888, it was estimated that there were ninety-three missionaries in the Indies of which seventy had arrived since 1879. Minutes N.M.S., 30 May, 1888.

his administrative district depressed the resin trade by exacting heavy duties.⁶¹ This, he intimated, affected the Dutch controlled export trade and the welfare of the people. In a similar way, Luwu interference in mission schools in Poso hindered the "civilizing" work of the schools and, ultimately, the achievement of colonial authority and the material and spiritual advancement of the indigenous people.

In similar fashion, the interference of the Magau of Sigi in north-west Central Sulawesi in the affairs of Mapane and the northern Pebato people hindered both the success of the mission school of Panta and the development of trade centering on the port of Mapane. The 1888 contract with Sausu had assumed that Mapane formed part of this state but it became apparent in the next decade that the contract had legitimized the extension of the Sigi sphere of influence.⁶² In a series of agreements in 1898 and 1899, the government managed to untangle the causes of unrest in the south-west corner of the Gulf, thus freeing Mapane and northern Pebato from the depressing effect of Sigi intrigue.

As in the case of Tomasa and Buyu mBayau, Kruyt was prepared to confront the source of opposition to his school in Panta personally. All accounts indicate that Kruyt was on very close terms with the northern Pebato leader, Papa i Wunte. In 1894, this chief had encouraged his neighbouring villagers to resettle and establish a combined village on the foothills below their former hill-top strongholds.⁶³ Opposition to the school was therefore external, and after Kruyt's successful excursion to Palopo and his partial diplomatic success in Tojo, he arranged to visit Bora, the seat of the Magau of Sigi, to obtain

61. Controleur's diary, October, 1899 in Engelenberg, op. cit., p. 135. By 1899, groups of Luwu representatives were openly travelling through north Central Sulawesi exhorting people to oppose the government. A Luwu Prince had settled in Poso and "out of fear ... no-one came to barter rice and vegetables with the Controleur." (Kruyt to Adriani, 20 October, 1901).

62. Explanatory Memorandum to the Sausu contract, 20 February, 1899. (Engelenberg, op. cit., p. 79.)

63. Panta was formed from an amalgamation of Wayo Makumi and Tampongadi which combination produced a combined population of 200. Brouwer, op. cit., p. 60.

formal permission to establish schools in Panta and Mapane,⁶⁴ (the latter school being designed, as was the Tojo school, to deflect Muslim opposition to Pamona schooling). The effect of Kruyt's visit was an immediate increase in school attendance in Panta from an irregular one or two children to a regular attendance of eight.⁶⁵ While evidence is lacking, it is likely that once Kruyt had convinced the Resident to retract his plan to establish a neutral school in Tojo, the government also condoned the establishment of a mission school in Muslim Mapane.

To what extent Sigi approval of mission schools in Mapane and Panta was due to fear of the Dutch presence in Poso is not clear but it must have been apparent to its ruler that the mission came under government protection.⁶⁶ In 1898, the new Controleur, Dumas, with the mediation of Kruyt, was able to arrange peace between the hard-pressed Parigi and To Pebato. Sigi suffered a further defeat in February, 1899 with the signing of a new contract with Sausu which excluded Mapane.⁶⁷ Mapane thus came into a

64. Minutes N.M.S., 28 June, 1897. Kruyt to N.M.S., 7 April, 1897.

65. Annual Report, 1898 in op. cit., p. 228.

66. Kruyt's success in his dealings with the Magau of Sigi, as in the case of the Datu of Luwu, did not mean these rulers accepted the colonial government. In general, while they appeared to "go along" with the Dutch, they did not take the colonial government very seriously while it refused to deploy its military forces in a sustained operation. Engelenberg argued in 1901 that Kruyt's success was due to the ruler appreciating Kruyt's recognition of his authority. Kruyt himself believed that Sigi's co-operation in the matter of schools and in giving up its claim in Pebato was due to its fear of the colonial presence in neighbouring Poso. J. Kruyt states that the inhabitants of Central Sulawesi quickly recognized the difference between mission and government and that therefore, approval could be given for schools without this implying acceptance of the government. In practice, however, the To Pamona appeared to be well aware of the facts.

67. Sausu contract, 20 February, 1899. Sigi had forced Sausu to refuse to sign the contract in December, 1898 because it aimed to redraw the Sausu south-east boundary excluding Mapane. The 1888 boundaries had been dictated by Sigi. Agreement to the contract was given in February, 1899 despite continuing Sigi opposition.

special relationship with the government which bought off Sigi claims over it with an annual payment of f.250.⁶⁸ According to the Colonial Report of 1900, this agreement also officially freed the To Pebato from any allegiance to the Magau of Sigi.⁶⁹ Concurrently, the government purchased the right of imposing duties in the port of Mapane with the payment of another f.250 to the chief.⁷⁰

The same policy was adopted in Tojo. In 1899 a cash settlement of f.3,000 per annum was paid to the Jena for taxing rights⁷¹ and a government regulation gazetted in the same year established a custom port in Tojo and Poso.⁷² In 1900, the government ordered the To Kadombuku to cease its recognition of the authority of Tojo.⁷³ Tojo hesitated to accept this colonial imposition and the Jena travelled to his overlord, the ruler of Boni, to seek permission to come to terms with the government.⁷⁴ With the induction of the new ruler in 1902, traditional claims over the Pamona tribe were officially ended.⁷⁵

At the opening of the new century, a clear policy had thus evolved. Initially reacting to mission needs, the government had succeeded in removing the northern Poso

68. Controleur Dumas, 8 August, 1899, No. 201/1 quoted in Engelenberg, op. cit., p. 61. Kruyt Diary, 26 October, 1901 states that Sigi had voluntarily given up its claims.

69. Koloniaal Verslag, 1900. p. 38. Kruyt Diary, 25 January, 1901 states that Sigi sent Dumas a letter in which it gave up its rights over Mapane and Pebato. At the same time Sigi was thought to have ordered the To Napu to harass the To Pebato.

70. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 305.

71. loc. cit.. Taxation rights in Poso were purchased for f.100 (Kruyt Diary, 26 October, 1901).

72. Government Gazette, 1899, No. 169. This was expanded by Government Gazette, 1901, No. 2 and 3, 10 January, 1901.

73. Kruyt to Adriani, 17 January, 1900.

74. Kruyt to Adriani, 6 February, 1900.

75. Kruyt Diary, 18 April, 1902.

tribes from external controls, thus facilitating the work of Kruyt while taking to itself control over the export trade from the ports of Tojo and Mapane. In doing so, it was preparing this region of Central Sulawesi as an area of direct rule, a goal it had had under consideration at the time of signing the contract of 1888.

However, Dutch success in 1899 was only partial. Again it was Kruyt's experience in developing his mission work which made it apparent that only the complete isolation of the entire Pamona tribal network would make an effective Dutch influence possible. In 1897, Kruyt explained the lack of success of his evangelization in the following terms:

The Pebato kabosenyas closer to the coast know us and have gradually come to trust us. The Pebato land however, is too large to work simultaneously so that the kabosenyas in the upland districts, while knowing us, have been too little under our influence to feel any sympathy for our task. I have indicated earlier that members of one Torajan tribe cling together like lice. One is not keen to do something which is resisted by other kabosenyas and so it happens that kabosenyas who no longer see any wrong in the school, do not wish to become involved [with a school] in order not to raise the ire of their colleagues.⁷⁶

By 1900, Kruyt had only been able to establish schools in those inland villages where Dutch authority was a visible alternative to foreign indigenous power. The southern sections of these tribes which had remained unaffected by such developments, remained committed to a spiritual bond with Luwu. Tribes further south, such as Onda'e and Lamusa, accepted a Luwu-imposed Karaya as the physical embodiment of this bond. The social and spiritual framework of Pamona life, which depended on the conservation of the ways of the ancestors, dictated their opposition to the new ideas and innovations of the white man.⁷⁷

76. Annual Report, 1897, in op. cit., pp. 263-266.

77. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 130-131. The Datu of Luwu was considered to be a god. Looking at him would cause death. Opposition to him would mean defeat by a swarm of wasps and the destruction of rice supplies which would turn into worms.

Geographical separation kept them removed from his persuasive tongue. Even the northern tribesmen who traded acceptance of a Minahassan guru for the doubtful political benefit of a Dutch alliance did not thereby indicate acceptance of European culture. Change meant social disintegration and it was widely believed that eventually the educated child would be taken away by the government as slave or soldier.⁷⁸

From a political point of view, the key to Dutch authority in the Poso region was the removal of Luwu. For the mission the removal of Luwu would crack the spiritual foundation of Pamona society. The policy of removing Luwu was inaugurated by the appointment of Controleur A.J.M. Engelenberg in June, 1901.

In a revealing letter to his friend Adriani, Kruyt, commenting on discussion he had held in Gorontalo, wrote:

The Assistant Resident of Gorontalo began immediately to discuss the newly appointed Controleur of Poso. I of course pretended ignorance and did not let it appear that we were behind it. The people in Gorontalo think that this special appointment was made in relation to the plans for Luwu.⁷⁹

The circumstances surrounding the appointment of this Controleur are obscure but it is clear that his selection for the post coincided with a government desire to implement a new decisive program for the colonization of the Poso region. Colijn, in the introduction to an official report on the administration of the new Assistant Residency of Central Celebes, confirms the fact that the Poso missionaries "were behind" Engelenberg's appointment.⁸⁰ In a cryptic sentence he notes that "Mr. Adriani was able to secure the interest of General Secretary Nederburgh in Central Celebes" and that this bureaucrat arranged for Engelenberg's transfer to Poso.

Circumstantial evidence suggests that the winning ways of Adriani were re-enforced by the political muscle

78. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 71.

79. Kruyt to Adriani, Amurang, 21 July, 1901.

80. H. Colijn, "Organizatie van het bestuur enz. in de afdeeling Midden Celebes." (The organization of the administration etc. of the administrative region of Central Celebes), 22 April, 1906, p. 2.

wielded by the Director of the Netherlands Missionary Society. Director Gunning was touring the mission fields in the Dutch East Indies at this time accompanied by his nephew, Adriani. As part of this inspection tour, Gunning arrived in Poso in February, 1901,⁸¹ and took this opportunity to discuss with Kruyt a broad range of mission policy decisions. Subjects discussed included school curricula, medical provision and possible mission contributions to the economic development of the region. As well, Gunning strongly advised Kruyt to

send in two requests to the Director of Education, Religion and Industry for subsidies for the schools at Poso and Tojo ... [indicating] in the request that the Tojo school is of great importance to the government.⁸²

Batavia's current concern regarding "what can be done to increase the number of native schools"⁸³ provided the Society with a significant degree of political leverage at this time, leverage it was not adverse to exploiting in order to help solve the serious financial difficulties it was experiencing as its annual expenditure was f.95,000 and its guaranteed income no more than f.35,000 per annum.⁸⁴ In convincing Kruyt he should apply for government subsidies, Gunning clearly had one eye on the Society's deficit. The other, less introverted, was focussed on "the great social importance of the mission". The Society was firmly convinced it had a right to government support as the Christian mission

was of great significance to the development of our colonies since it is working in many areas where the government cannot achieve its goal without the support of the mission.⁸⁵

81. Kruyt to his father, 10 March, 1901.

82. loc. cit.

83. Minutes N.M.S., 24 September, 1902. Summary of a circular from the Director of Education, Religion and Industry, dated 12 July, 1901. In 1901 the Director had written to the Resident of Menado that subsidies would be made available even if all the requirements could not be met. This allowed Kruyt to apply for subsidies even though there was not a minimum of twenty-five pupils in Tojo and Poso. Again there appears to be a connection here with the Gunning visit.

84. Minutes N.M.S., 8 July, 1902.

85. loc. cit.

One such area was Poso which, because the Society was in such desperate financial circumstances, was in danger of having to be closed down after ten years of unsuccessful operation.⁸⁶ To avoid this eventuality, the Society's administration was lobbying strongly for government support.

The likelihood that Batavia would heed this appeal was increased by the widespread belief that England continued to have designs on northern Sulawesi. According to Kruyt, Controleur Dumas believed that English gold mining firms "purposely did not want to find gold in Celebes [but] first wanted to get their hands on the place and then exploit the mines".⁸⁷ Kruyt was told of one rumour indicating that letters had been intercepted from Cecil Rhodes to English engineers in Sulawesi. In Manado, preparations were being made in 1901 to train commando units to defend the high plateau area of Tondano, to which area the administration of Manado would be evacuated in case the "foreign enemy" should invade.⁸⁸

In these circumstances, the pressures that Gunning or Adriani applied to obtain the appointment of a controleur capable of inaugurating a forceful policy of colonial expansion in the interests of facilitating the success of the Christian mission and ultimately of strengthening Dutch authority were likely to receive a favourable response.

Engelenberg's appointment dates from June, 1901 but it is clear that he was approached by the General Secretary during the previous year, prior to his furlough in Holland.⁸⁹ One month after the official decision regarding his appointment, Engelenberg presented the authorities in

86. Minutes N.M.S., Annual Conference, N.M.S., 1901.

87. Kruyt to Adriani, 21 July, 1901. Kruyt to Adriani, 7 September, 1901.

88. loc. cit..

89. Engelenberg was appointed by Government Resolution, No. 15, 8 May, 1901. Colijn, op. cit., notes that Engelenberg was in Holland on furlough in 1900 to 1901. He arrived in Gorontalo in October, 1901.

Batavia with a report outlining a policy for the effective colonization of Central Sulawesi.⁹⁰ This remarkably incisive report, submitted soon after his appointment about an area he had never visited, could hardly have been completed without prior knowledge of his appointment or without detailed advice. There is every reason to believe that this promising junior official, selected by a senior government bureaucrat who had been made conscious of the importance of a special appointment for the Poso region, was carefully tutored by Adriani in Java.

The appointment of Controleur Engelenberg brought to the administration of the Tomini Gulf an official with more than twelve years experience.⁹¹ Engelenberg came to the Tomini Gulf after a successful involvement in the "pacification of Lombok"⁹² where "all his proposals ... had been accepted" by the government.⁹³ His appointment ushered in a period of close association between government and mission in the planning and implementation of policies which can be described as "ethical" but, while the mission played an influential role in obtaining the appointment of an official of his calibre, Engelenberg was not a creature of the mission.

Kruyt described Engelenberg as a Tolstoyan.⁹⁴ Not a strict Christian,⁹⁵ "Phillip" was nevertheless a "serious

90. The report, "Opmerkingen naar aanleiding van de lezing van officiële bescheiden en tydschrift artikelen betreffende den toestand ter west en zuidkust van de Tomini Bocht", is dated Buitenzorg, 4 July, 1901.

91. Indische Gids 1904, p. 1721. Report on the Indische Genootschap address by Engelenberg to a packed audience in October, 1904.

92. Editor's note, Het Vaderland, Friday, 5 August, 1904 to the front page article by Engelenberg, "Ons bestuurs beleid in Nederlandsch-Indie", (Our Colonial Policy in the Netherlands Indies).

93. The Editor's note to Engelenberg's article reads in part: "It seems to us that these suggestions demand the attention of all those who wish the best for the Indies. All the more so since they are being expressed by as an authoritative voice as that of Mr. Engelenberg who, after the Cilegon rebellion, has exercised great influence in the pacification of Lombok and now in the Gulf of Tomini."

94. Kruyt Diary, 26 October, 1901.

95. loc. cit.

person", not an officious bureaucratic.⁹⁶ If he had been a serious disciple of Tolstoy, he would have been imbued by that author's romantic view of life which emphasized "the importance of the individual's free human spirit nourished by God and directed by interest, emotion and desire" and the necessity of "freeing the individual for creative improvisation through understanding". Engelenberg would have been imbued by Tolstoy's notion of culture as

a vast heterogeneous reservoir of values that are held together loosely by their ability to meet the present needs of a people and to nourish the quest for new and better modes of behaviour.⁹⁷

Such notions may well have lain behind his plans for Poso which he outlined to the Pamona chiefs in early 1902. Engelenberg described his mission as aiming to remove those obstacles which lay in the way of their welfare, not to disturb their lives unnecessarily. The government had come in the villagers' best interest to abolish practices such as head-hunting and human sacrifices, in order to help them "become greater in number and stronger in limb":

We can see that it is possible to bring the people a period of prosperity, of wealthy settlements and of physical strength.

If the To Pamona did not wish to accept his plan, on the basis of which the government claimed the right to interfere in their affairs, then Engelenberg would be "necessitated to

96. loc. cit... In his first letter to Kruyt, Engelenberg wrote:

"I accepted this position when it was offered to me in Buitenzorg because I noticed that here I would not be a Controleur in the usual sense of the word. Only as a person will I represent something here. This position will, I noticed, be a training school to me. I, ruined by the [illegible] will perhaps, under the influence of the Torajans, return to the right track of being nothing but a person I thank you for your advice, for your preparedness to support me. I have need of this support".

97. R.D. Archambault, introduction to L. Wiener (trans), Tolstoy on Education, (U.C.P., Chicago, 1972), p. ix.

wage war against them."⁹⁸.

It is apparent from Engelenberg's speech to the chiefs that he shared Kruyt's belief in the detrimental effects of the conservative and conserving nature of the socio-religious culture of the To Pamona. While Kruyt believed that Christianity offered them an opportunity to grow to spiritual maturity, Engelenberg, in a wider sense, assumed that European culture, of which Christianity formed an integral part, would provide these people with freedom "for creative improvisation" and "a reservoir of values" which would enable them "to meet [their] present needs ... and to nourish the quest for new and better modes of behaviour".

His immediate political solution for the region was set out in his 1901 report. Poso, he argued, had to be purchased from Luwu, not as in the case of Sigi, by an annual premium, but by a once only payment which was later set at f.20,000.⁹⁹ Until this was done the government could claim no legal right to colonize the area and could not accuse Luwu of illegal interference. Unless the legal basis of Dutch authority was clarified and Central Sulawesi completely isolated as a separate political entity, a humanitarian program designed to raise the standard of living of the To Pamona could not be implemented.

Engelenberg's choice of a financial rather than a military solution to the problem of Luwu interference in the affairs of the Pamona tribes was both politically realistic and sensitive to the objectives of the Poso mission. Politically, there was little likelihood of Batavia authorizing a large scale military operation in an area of no immediate significance. Throughout the Indies, military forces were engaged in defending the

98. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 20 June, 1902. In this letter, Engelenberg outlines the speech he is preparing for a meeting with the Pamona chiefs. Kruyt provided the Controleur with "good Bare'e sentences" and "wise advice" in response to this letter. (Engelenberg to Kruyt, 22 June, 1902).

99. Kruyt to his father, 26 October, 1901.

neutrality of the Indies for the duration of the Russo-Japanese war.¹⁰⁰ To wait for a military solution would therefore have further delayed the introduction of effective European administration in the area.

A military campaign moreover would have been contrary to the objectives of the mission. The supernatural character of authority of the Datu of Luwu could not be demolished by military force alone. What would be needed would be the symbolic transfer of Luwu overlordship to the European colonial government. This could conceivably be achieved if Luwu co-operation could be purchased by a sufficiently large sum of money.

Kruyt had implicitly argued in 1897 that To Pamona allegiance to semi-divine overlords made it impossible for the government to exercise any immediate influence on these people. Since the nature of their allegiance was religious, it had to be undermined by similar means. In advising the central government that the Controleur be transferred to Tojo, Kruyt reasoned that, until the mission had effectively educated the indigenous population, there was little the government could do other than to attempt to influence the policies of their overlords. Engelenberg was in effect, recommending that Kruyt's policy be short-circuited by transferring To Pamona allegiance directly to the colonial government. In so doing, he appeared to have accepted Kruyt's caricature of Pamona tribes and villages as having no effective administration.

Kruyt at this time expressed his reservations regarding direct rule and the prospect of intimate government interference in the lives of "his people". He was sufficiently a realist nonetheless, to recognize that the success of his mission depended upon the removal of Luwu influence, which could only be achieved by more direct involvement by the government. The solution suggested by Engelenberg was preferable to a military-backed annexation and, given the references with which Engelenberg arrived in Poso, Kruyt was prepared to co-operate in the venture.

100. See Note 1.

The isolation of Central Sulawesi from Luwu influence and the recognition that more effective Dutch influence depended on more effective administration, necessitated the establishment of a new administrative region foreshadowed in Engelenberg's report. Its realization depended upon Batavia's willingness to allow increased government involvement and on the co-operation of the Datu of Luwu. While Batavia accepted Engelenberg's proposal in principle,¹⁰¹ the Controleur soon discovered that Luwu was unwilling to co-operate in giving up its claims over Poso. Engelenberg, convinced that the policy outlined in his report should succeed and concerned that Luwu's tardiness would endanger his credibility in Batavia, found a strong ally in Kruyt. In 1902, after repeated audiences with the Datu of Luwu, Engelenberg conspired with the missionary to put the most positive construction on his negotiations.

I had no success in Palopo [Luwu]. But I won't admit that. On the contrary, I will say that the separation of the Poso area will not be long in coming ... but if you are asked about the results of my trip, then you could say - without lying - that they give cause for hope, open up prospects for the separation from Luwu.¹⁰²

Several months later, Kruyt helped the Controleur to gain the support of the Governor of Celebes, Baron van Hoeffell, for his plan.¹⁰³ In a letter subsequent to this meeting, Kruyt wrote to Baron van Hoeffell on Engelenberg's behalf appealing to this senior official, "as a friend of the mission", to "bring this matter of the separation to a conclusion as soon as possible". Outlining his view of the essential inter-relatedness of the government and mission objectives, Kruyt revealed his essentially Machiavellian approach to his co-operation with Engelenberg.

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101. The new Assistant Residency of Central Celebes was created by an executive decision of 19 June, 1903, No. 32. The new area included Tojo.
102. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 10 May, 1902. On 24 April, Engelenberg wrote to Kruyt: "The trip to Luwu has only proved that firm action has to be taken. Don't mention it at the moment."
103. Kruyt to Governor of Makassar, Baron van Hoeffell, 6 July, 1902. Baron van Hoeffell had formerly encouraged missionary endeavour as Assistant Resident of Gorontalo. See Supra, Ch. 2, pp. 31-2.

Their chief objection has always been that, by becoming Christian, they would come under the authority of the "Kumpania", although actually, their lord is the raja of Luwu. Now I believe that you know me sufficiently well to know that I would not want to use the government to advance Christendom, but, where mission and government are both working in the interests of a people which does not understand its own needs, I will gratefully accept help from the government.¹⁰⁴.

Again in October, in an official letter to Engelenberg, Kruyt furnished the Controleur with evidence for the desirability of the removal of Luwu claims.¹⁰⁵ This letter was designed to provide Engelenberg with material for his negotiations with Batavia. Broadly, the letter contained a repetition of the views Kruyt had expressed to the Governor of Makassar. He need not have written Engelenberg this official letter, since the issue had been discussed in private letters and conversations many times before¹⁰⁶. and was essentially, the view Engelenberg had adopted himself in 1901. There was no disagreement between the two men on the view that, unless government interference was legitimized in the eyes of the To Pamona by the removal of Luwu overlordship, neither government nor mission would gain any real influence. Evidence of Kruyt's support for this view was necessary for Engelenberg, however, since the missionary's opinion was highly regarded in Batavia.

While the Datu of Luwu was playing a cat and mouse game with the Controleur of Poso, Engelenberg was also furthering his predecessor's policy of limiting Tojo authority over the Poso tribes, again with the co-operation of Kruyt. Early in 1902, Engelenberg was drawing up precise boundaries between Tojo and the To Lage and

104. loc. cit..

105. Kruyt to the Controleur of Poso, 10 October, 1902. Unlike his other letters, Kruyt addressed this formally to "the Controleur of Poso".

106. Kruyt to his father, 26 October, 1901. This letter contains a report of a discussion with Engelenberg regarding the latter's right to interfere in the To Onda'e - To Napu war.

To Kadombuku tribal areas. Kruyt was asked to arrange meetings of the tribal chiefs with the Controleur¹⁰⁷ and to test the feeling of the To Kadombuku chiefs regarding the proposed new Tojo ruler.¹⁰⁸ Depending on their attitude, Engelenberg was prepared to refuse to recognize the new Jena of Tojo and replace him with one more prepared to accept Dutch authority. Kruyt commented to Adriani:

Between you and me I sometimes think that the Controleur is taking too much of a risk but if he is allowed to carry out his plan to bring this area under his direct influence, then this will certainly be to the benefit of the mission.¹⁰⁹

In anticipation of the likelihood of closer regulation of Tojo affairs by the colonial government, Kruyt was determined to maintain the mission school in Tojo despite its drain on mission resources

Engelenberg achieved a significant measure of success in the case of Tojo because its subjects were prepared to renounce their allegiance. This had also happened in the case of Sigi. Both these overlords were too recent to have attained a place in the ancestral lore and, unlike Luwu, interfered too directly in the daily affairs of the To Pamona. As it suited them to be relieved of this burden, they co-operated with the Dutch. In the case of Luwu however, tradition and religion demanded the continuation of Luwu overlordship which furthermore rarely interfered with the conduct of their life. Therefore, only if Luwu renounced its rights would the To Pamona accept their "freedom". Added to this was the fact that, in accepting colonial rule, they realized they would be exchanging a distant, non-interfering Sulawesi overlord for the intimate daily interference of a European administration which threatened to change their way of life. This attitude was carefully exploited by Luwu to maintain and extend its authority in north Central Sulawesi.

107. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 6 April, 1902.

108. Kruyt to Adriani, 18 April, 1902.

109. loc. cit.

By January, 1903, Kruyt was able to report to Adriani that "the plans of the Controleur are gradually beginning to ripen". In the course of 1902, Kruyt's own position had also been defined. Having reluctantly accepted the necessity of active government involvement to ensure the success of his mission, Kruyt was nevertheless still troubled by the likely interference he would experience after the introduction of direct rule. His letters, written from the Minahassa in 1901, expressed his disgust at what he regarded as the dependent and soulless society produced by direct colonial rule there. As a result of the combined labours of Church and State, that society was now suffering from "the reaction of a generation which had not made its own choice [for Christianity]",¹¹⁰ while at a socio-economic level, the Minahassa was having to cope with a mentality which had resulted from "the slavish way the Minahassans had been trained by the government".¹¹¹

Against this background, Kruyt had agonized about the results of colonization in Poso. In a letter to his father in February, 1902 he wrote:

It is sad that the situation is like this but I believe the government cannot achieve a significant influence until it has fought with one or another people, ... [the basis of society] must be Christian love and the government helps [to develop] at least the external recognition of this love, by, amongst other ways, prohibiting and preventing the barbaric consequences of the egoistic principle [of Pamona society].¹¹²

His solution to the dilemma was to encourage government action in the political and economic arena, including action against Luwu, Sigi and Tojo, to use its force to prevent the continuation of "barbaric" practices¹¹³ and

110. Kruyt to Adriani, Amurang, 21 October, 1901.

111. loc. cit... In a letter to Adriani from Tomohon, 17 September, 1901, Kruyt writes: "The situation in the Minahassa is designed to turn the people into a type of slave class."

112. Kruyt to his father, 9 February, 1902.

113. Kruyt Diary, 24 November, 1901: "The head-hunting practice is one of the bulwarks of heathenism and if an opening can be made by the force of the government then the state of heathenism is immediately weakened".

eventually, to use its expertise to raise the material standard of living. By limiting government action to the external phenomena of Pamona society, Kruyt hoped to create a situation whereby the mission would have a monopoly in the nurturing task. In administrative terms, Kruyt appeared to be wanting the development of a system of self-government under the guidance of the mission and with the help of paternal government administration.

By 1904, Kruyt had succeeded in convincing Engelenberg to adopt the notion of self-government in Central Sulawesi. By then, however, the political and economic reality in the colony had also changed, making a change of policy on Engelenberg's part a matter of political necessity.

In 1902, Engelenberg had drawn up his first development budget of f.81,000 which included f.6,000 for road construction and finance to cover increases in paramilitary and administrative personnel. This budget was to finance the implementation of his policy of direct rule for Central Sulawesi.¹¹⁴

Following the partial success of his discussions in Batavia in early 1903 to gain support for his programs¹¹⁵ and the strong possibility of his promotion to Assistant Resident of his proposed new administrative region, Engelenberg proceeded to develop his direct-rule policy. In a confidential memorandum to the new Resident of Manado and former Lombok colleague,¹¹⁵ he called for a massive financial support by the government of the mission in Central Sulawesi. Arguing on the basis of the political advantages which would accrue, he emphasized that support of these "apostles of civilization" in Central Sulawesi

114. Kruyt to his father, 9 March, 1902.

115. Engelenberg had written to Kruyt from Sukabumi, (30 April, 1903):

"In general I found a sympathetic ear. Not everything was, however, agreed to due to the lack of necessary funds I have also spoken about the mission. We will try to tackle the matter of the mission more forcefully and for this cause, try to get together some money".

would not lead to friction with other religions since "the whole of Central Celebes was inhabited by heathens".

The political advantage accruing to the state if the entire Central Celebes could be added to the pro-government areas of the archipelago because of its religious belief, cannot be over-estimated.

Engelenberg asked for complete government financing of four extra missionaries in Poso at an average annual salary of f.2,400 each, together with allowances for six gurus per missionary at f.240 each.¹¹⁷ The total of f.16,000 per annum would have brought his 1903 budget estimate to around f.100,000. With little likelihood of Central Sulawesi itself being able to contribute much to its own expenses, Engelenberg's plans for direct rule were forcing him to make unrealistic demands on a hard-pressed colonial treasury.¹¹⁸ At the same time, regardless of the financial problems of the Missionary Society, there was no possibility of Kruyt being prepared to become a government employee, as was the case of missionaries in the Minahassa.

As a result of the economic impossibility of his proposal and Kruyt's opposition to it in principle, Engelenberg in 1904 modified his plan for Central Sulawesi. In a visit to the Netherlands with the aim of negotiating directly with the opinion leaders in The Hague, he canvassed

117. Engelenberg to the Resident of Menado, Tomasa, 27 September, 1903, Confidential, No. 720/6.

118. Snouck Hurgronje with whom Engelenberg stayed during his visit to Java, wrote to Kruyt (1 May, 1903):

"The government is far from being unwilling to adopt his [Engelenberg's] proposals regarding the Gulf but ... from all corners of the archipelago, requests are being received in constantly increasing volumes and some already endlessly repeated, of which each one appears more urgent than the other ... and the receipts from which all this has to be paid are becoming less rather than more. The person who thinks rationally thus must have patience and not demand the impossible. People are trying to implement Engelenberg's proposals partially but because of the very understandable pressure from Holland to economize, there is not even certainty about the partially accepted plans being included in the budget. Of the goodwill of the government, Mr. Engelenberg must certainly feel assured."

a modified colonial policy based on the principle of self-rule which formed an extension of van Deventer's "debt of honour" argument.

Despite its moral implications, the van Deventer position was essentially an economic one. This statesman was offering a solution to the colony's crippling debt problem which he saw as the major obstacle to economic development. Most of this colonial debt was the result of the compulsory repayments for loans made available by the mother country since 1883. In 1889, the accumulated debt had reached f.120 million. This persistent deficit prevented capital investment necessary to establish an infra-structure for economic development. Van Deventer had argued that the Netherlands absorb this debt by crediting it against the forced payments made by the colony since 1867 and that the balance of f.67 million be repaid as a debt of honour in annual instalments of f.7½ million per annum.^{119.}

Engelenberg was in fact proposing a plan for the expenditure of this sum in developing areas such as Central Sulawesi. Interwoven with a humanitarian idealism, he was essentially putting forward a blueprint for economic development in the colony. "Our vocation", he believed, "is to give the natives an opportunity to [achieve] a higher standard of living".^{120.} Even without a lengthy investigation into causes of economic decline in Java, it was clear, he stated in the Dutch capital's daily paper, Het Vaderland, that it was the state of immaturity in which the Javanese was kept which, "made him unsuitable for a dogged perseverance in the difficult struggle which life always imposes". The key, argued Engelenberg, is to train the indigenous population to be economically and politically self-sufficient:

119. The van Deventer article appeared in the Gids in August, 1899. It was reviewed in the Indische Gids in 1899, pp. 1085-1089.

120. Engelenberg's article "Our colonial policy in Netherlands Indies" appeared in Het Vaderland, 5 and 6 August, 1904.

Only when each part of the country, each state, each region, desires the competence to be enabled to provide for its own needs, and to be allowed to make its own decisions in this matter; only in this situation can one expect there to be life in the various parts of the large organism and only then will the whole be able to prosper.

Engelenberg supported Snouck Hurgronje's concept of "association" which he said could be achieved through training for economic and political independence whereby the indigenous population would be brought closer to the phase of development already reached by the Dutch.

On this basis, direct-rule should be avoided and he proposed for Poso a federation of self-governing states. This federation would initially receive European financial support but would simultaneously bear the burden of the general expenses of the colony. It would be encouraged to implement Western economic principles in the exploitation of minerals and the establishment of commercial agriculture and ensure an adequate provision of education.

Referring to the role of the Christian mission, Engelenberg was not prepared publicly to advocate harnessing it to government administration. However, he did emphasize its importance once again:

Christianity . . . ensures in an intellectual and moral sense, a great future for this people; while the government will have to recognize the political significance of the conquest by a religion which brings the natives closer to us and ties them to us.

Repeating these same ideas in the forum of the Indische Genootschap (Indies Society) two months later,¹²¹ Engelenberg's views were described as too idealistic and naive by Mr. van Deventer himself. The meeting questioned Engelenberg's implicit faith in missionaries and his trust in the ability of the native to be trained for independence. His former superior, responding in print to Engelenberg's address, shared the opinion of van Deventer and the Editor of the Indische Gids:

121. . . . eviewed in the Indische Gids, 1904, pp. 1411-1413.

... given the present conditions in the Tomini Gulf states, it will still take years before it can be considered desirable that the native rulers there be given more independence; these [rulers] are still too uneducated and moreover, lack almost all sense of duty in promoting the interests of their subjects, while the people themselves are as yet at too low a level of civilization Indeed, Mr. Engelenberg is too optimistic and regards the situation in the states of the Tomini Gulf with their primitive population, through rose coloured glasses."¹²².

The reality as perceived by the experienced colonial administrator confirmed him in his belief in colonization. The humanitarianism of the ethical policy thus had many interpretations. The paternalism of the missionary suited the climate of the times far more than the idealism of the secular reformer. However, by the first decade of the century, all parties shared some sense of a mission in Central Sulawesi.

122. E.J. Jellesma, "The Gulf of Tomini", Indische Gids, 1904, pp. 1663-1666. Director Gunning who expressed great interest in Engelenberg's plans arranged meetings for him with E.B. Kielstra, J. T. Kreemer, C.W. Janssen and van Deventer. These leading politicians all expressed interest but "because he appeared unable to develop a plan based on precise information, they were all necessitated to maintain a reserved stance". (J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 247.)

CHAPTER FIVE

IMPOSING AN ETHICAL POLICY

In 1901 the Dutch Queen committed her government to a new colonial policy inspired by Christian and humanitarian principles:

As a Christian nation, the Netherlands have a duty to improve the condition of native Christians in the Indian Archipelago, to increase aid to Christian missionary activity and to inform the entire administration that the Netherlands have a moral obligation to fulfill as regards the population of those regions In this connection, the decreasing prosperity of the people of Java has my special interest.¹

The practical point of focus in the implementation of this policy was the state of economic well-being of the subject races.²

Paradoxically, the first colonial budgets of the "ethical period" were dominated by huge military allocations³. (in 1903, 28% of the budget or f.53 million; in 1905, f.51 million) and, in the first years of the twentieth century, colonial rule was marked by the killing of hundreds of subjects for whose welfare the Queen had earlier expressed concern. Military campaigns in Kalimantan (1904), Sulawesi (1905-07), Bali (1906) and the continuing campaign in Aceh inaugurated what might have appeared to many as a period of military rule under the leadership of the fêted military tactician, Governor-General van Heutz.⁴

1. Quoted in J.M. van der Kroef, Dutch Colonial Policy in Indonesia, 1900-1941, PAD Columbia, 1953, p. 53.
2. This concern was expressed in the reports of leading spokesman on colonial affairs such as van Deventer, "Overzicht van de economische toestand der Inlandsche Bevolking van Java en Madoera"; E.B. Kielstra, "De Financien van Nederlandsch-Indie"; and D. Fock, "Beschouwingen en Voorstellen ter verbetering van de economische toestand".
3. Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 55.
4. ibid., p. 59. Criticism was being expressed particularly of the military campaigns of van Daalan in Aceh, who was responsible for the deaths of 1,100 women and children in the space of only a few months. Socialist opposition M.P., van Kol, urged the reduction of the military budget as a means of curtailing these ravages.


On closer investigation, the paradox was more apparent than real. The ethical colonial policy, the origin of which is to be found in the coming to power of the Anti-Revolutionary Christian party in 1888, marked a new era of colonial paternalism.⁵ It was an intensification of policies commenced in the last decade of the nineteenth century which merged two themes already apparent in that decade, namely, the need to integrate the Outer Island possessions into the Java-Sumatra colonial axis and the need to re-establish the colonial economic base on the broad foundations of an invigorated native economy rather than merely on that of European capitalism as advocated by orthodox Liberals. The fusion of these two elements occurred in the crucible of economic depression, growing deficits and the new wave of European imperialism.

The new colonial policy was based on the necessity to secure peace and order as the basis of revived prosperity. The Dutch version of Pax Romanica, achieved by van Heutz' pacification program, laid the foundations for the re-organization of the administration and for socio-economic co-existence at all levels within colonial society.⁶ The blessings of the ethical policy were unavailable to the inhabitants of the uncolonized areas of the Outer Islands until the Pax Nederlandia was

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5. J.S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: a study of a Plural Economy, (C.U.P., 1939), p. 229, dates the inauguration of the ethical policy from the time of van Deedem, (1891-1894). Van der Kroef disputes this on the grounds that, "despite van Deedem's markedly progressive intentions, he lacked the zeal and political skill to carry them out, achieving next to nothing". In terms of practical outcomes therefore, van der Kroef proposes 1901 or 1902 as the year in which the origins of the ethical policy can be dated. It has been argued in this thesis that a significant change in colonial policy can be identified with the coming to power of the Anti-Revolutionary Party and the appointment of Minister of Colonies, Keuchenius, in 1888. The hallmarks of this new policy were a greater interest in the Outer Islands and in the provision of mass education but it was not till the beginning of the twentieth century that these policies came to fruition.
6. This position was argued by Minister of Colonies, Idenberg, in defending the 1906 military estimates for the colony. See van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 59.

MAP 7

EXPANSION OF DUTCH COLONIAL RULE 1619-1942



From: A. Zainu'ddin, A Short History of Indonesia, (Cassell, Melbourne, 1973).

established. In the context of Central Sulawesi this meant the subjugation of those indigenous states capable of organizing an effective anti-Dutch stance and the destruction of as much of the traditional adat as would hinder the acceptance of the new order.

In the Outer Island regions such as Central Sulawesi, the new colonial policy was, by its very nature, heavy-handed and paternalistic. Its implementation was characterized by zachte dwang (gentle coercion). In this process the mission played a prominent part, seeing itself as performing the role of mediator between colonizer and colonized but in effect forming part of the colonizing process. The detail of the history of the ethical period in such areas differed from the detail of the Javanese experience but the policies and the social goals of the Outer Island administrators who shared the ethical vision were inspired by the same principles as their colleagues in Java. Engelenberg, Mazee and Gobee are unquestionably identifiable as ethici in their labours to impose colonial rule in isolated Central Sulawesi.

While the social and geographic context imposed different interpretations of the central theme, it was also inherent in the humanitarian concern of the colonial intruder that the individual European administrator's interpretation of justice and well-being differed according to his own philosophical orientation. The ethical movement was like the similarly inspired "New Education" movement, sufficiently broad to encompass many interpretations.⁷ Socialist and Liberal, Christian missionary and government official each played his part. Like its educational counterpart, the ethical program had to be accommodated within a social framework which was inherently characterized by concern for political and economic domination. As such, the logical consequence of the ethical position - independence - was denied and the movement itself took on a paternalism which often hid the genuineness of the

7. See R.J.W. Selleck, The New Education, passim. (Pitman, Melbourne, 1968).

legislative initiator. The ethical program in the colonial context was therefore essentially contradictory.^{8.}

In rushing to the Dutch capital in 1904, Engelenberg, one of hundreds of obscure Dutch officials stationed in isolated regions of the East Indies, was simply adding his voice to those in and out of parliament impatient to see the new Anti-Revolutionary cabinet of Prime-Minister Kuyper and Minister of Colonies, Idenburg, implement the new era of colonial politics.^{9.} On his return to Donggala, in charge of the enlarged Assistant Residency of Central Celebes,^{10.} he planned the pacification of Napu, the final subjugation of Tojo and favourably contemplated the military occupation of the entire island of Sulawesi.^{11.}

Kruyt, charged with bringing Christian morality to the To Pamona tribes, in turn waited impatiently for the effective imposition of Dutch rule. This would not only finally rid north Central Sulawesi of what he regarded as the negative influence of Luwu but would also abolish those "bulwarks of heathenism" and obstacles to civilization such as slavery, head-hunting, witch-hunting and trial by ordeal. Kruyt chose to be absent when this process was actually commenced but in 1912 was still criticizing the administration of 1904 for being "unable to recognize that without force, nothing could be achieved".^{12.} In Kruyt's absence, his new colleague, Hofman, facilitated the military pacification program and regularly hosted campaign-planning meetings held by Engelenberg and his military commander, Voskuil.^{13.}

8. Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 342. The same conclusion is true for its educational counterpart.

9. ibid, pp. 54-55.

10. The enlargement of the administrative region was provided for in the 1905 colonial budget and indicated Batavia's partial acceptance of Engelenberg's proposals which he had argued for in 1903-4. See Engelenberg, "Memorie van Overgave", 1906.

11. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 22 June, 1905.

12. This view was reiterated by Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 145.

13. Adriani, "Maatschappelijke ... veranderingen", in op. cit., p. 15.

Engelenberg's military campaign proceeded reluctantly and with limited objectives. It was characterized by a typically nineteenth century strategy of a punitive expedition against Napu. Its ruler, Uma i Soli, had arranged for the murder of two Dutch citizens (Minahassan traders) in Tambarana on Sigi's orders in June, 1904.¹⁴ Tambarana had been subjected to the rival claims of Sigi and Parigi but in 1901 the victor in this dispute, Sigi, nominally relinquished its claim over the area in its contract with the Dutch government.¹⁵ Sigi had nevertheless encouraged its vassal Napu to step up harassment of the area to signify its attitude to that contract. The inability of the Dutch to mobilize sufficient strength at the time, due to the government's concern to protect Dutch neutrality during the Russo-Japanese war, led to the unpunished Sigi becoming the focus point of mounting anti-Dutch sentiment.¹⁶ Indigenous resentment in north-west Central Sulawesi was stimulated by the increasingly forceful expression of Dutch claims to sovereignty in the region.

On his return to Donggala in 1905, Engelenberg had again been confronted by Napu provocation; this time in the Poso valley. On the pretext of confirming the peace with the To Onda'e, the To Napu warriors loitered in the area unheeding of the Controleur's commands to pay homage in Poso and to disperse.¹⁷ In June, Engelenberg prepared his strategy¹⁸ and in August, launched an expedition under Lieutenant Voskuil, the new military administrator of Poso.¹⁹ This expedition struck swiftly inside To Napu territory.²⁰

14. H. Colijn, "Organisatie van het bestuur enz. in de afdeeling Midden Celebes", 22 April, 1906, p. 2.

15. ibid., p. 3.

16. Engelenberg, "Memorie van Overgave", 1906 (manuscript). Despite the formal function of this document, Engelenberg did not end his term as Assistant Resident until 1909.

17. loc. cit.

18. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 99.

19. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 22 June, 1905.

20. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 99.

The campaign was rapidly followed by one against Sigi which was recognized as the initiator of Napu activities. With the defeat of Sigi in September, 1905, Engelenberg decided to push on against the remaining north-western states of Kulawi, Tawaelia, Bada and Besoa.²¹ Simultaneously a second military command under Captain Phaff struck against the rulers of the Palu valley with a troop of 150 men.²² By the end of 1905, the Korte Verklaring (short contract) was signed by each of these formally independent states.²³ Cognizance of subjugation was given by the payment of war indemnification and the commencement of road construction with unpaid labour.²⁴

With troops available in the Poso area, Engelenberg decided to extend the military campaign to "convince [the Torajans of the Poso valley] with the power of weapons that they now had to follow the orders of the Kumpania".²⁵ With a troop of one hundred men, Voskuil swept through the tribal territories of the To Pamona, meeting little resistance.

The military campaign in the Poso valley had two distinct phases. There was an initial thorough saturation of the region in which the mission had been operative, the coastal areas inhabited by sections of the To Lage and To Pebato tribes. Here, supported by detailed information provided by the mission, the military commander was able to achieve effective submission to Dutch rule of a small number of villages which had already embraced Kruyt as a regular and welcome visitor. South of the villages of Kuku and Buyu mBayau, Voskuil's operation was more superficial. In the more inland areas, the military commander was no doubt hampered by the absence of precise information available during the first part of his campaign and, limited by the size of his force, could not afford to embark

21. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 99.

22. Engelenberg, "Memorie van Overgave".

23. loc. cit.

24. loc. cit.

25. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 145.

on a village by village conquest.^{26.}

Mission sources make much of the fact that in those areas where they had been active, no resistance occurred, the implication being that prior missionary presence had smoothed the way for the colonial government.^{27.} It has already been argued that the key chiefs in the coastal regions had clear political motives for accepting the mission presence in the 1890's. Moreover, on the missionaries' own admission, there was little positive commitment of men such as Papa i Wunte and Papa i Melempo or Ta Lasa to Christianity per se. The To Kadombuku were already transferring their allegiance to the Dutch in accepting their independence from Tojo in 1902. Hofman described the To Kadombuku chief, Papa i Melempo as one "who would never have become a Christian" who supported the mission's presence for "political considerations".^{28.} He was also not in a condition to lead his people in a defence against the Dutch military in 1905 as he was dying of tuberculosis. Ta Lasa, his nephew, remained a non-Christian till his death in the 1950's.^{29.} Kruyt describes him as equally sceptical of Christianity and of traditional religion. Ta Lasa had simply gambled on which would be the winning

26. Adriani, "De ontwikkeling der zendingsscholen op Midden Celebes", in op. cit., p. 362.
27. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., p. 144. Hofman, Annual Report, 1905, in Mededelingen,
28. Hofman, Annual Report, 1906, in op. cit., p. 349.
29. Ta Lasa was given a Christian burial against his wishes in the 1950's. A Christian cross was erected on his large impressive monument in the village of Kuku. (Interview with his son, August, 1975). See also Albert C. Kruyt, Ta Lasa (The Hague, n.d.)

side and this gamble certainly paid off in terms of power and financial reward.^{30.}

Papa i Wunte was similarly motivated by political considerations. Like Ta Lasa, he had gambled on the winning side and in the ensuing conflict, he headed a smaller grouping of pro-Dutch To Pebato against what was already his rival To Pebato chief, Ta Rame, leader of the larger anti-Dutch Pebato grouping. Moreover, Papa i Wunte proved himself weak and ineffectual as Mokole of Pebato,^{31.} a position which his overt support of Kruyt and Engelenberg earned him. It was this same weakness of character that in the first instance had driven him to accept the mission

30. Ta Lasa advised his fellow chiefs to accept the Dutch presence. In a poem recorded by Adriani in 1911, Ta Lasa reminded his former colleagues of this:

"When we went to Landea in Dupo
I spoke the pure truth
But they took me for a liar

...

I called the chiefs to a meeting
But there was no-one who would come

...

On the journey to Pasayo Maya
When I spoke there
There was that Papa i mBagi
Who called me a liar
And now all the chiefs of the land
Have been removed from their position
And turned into ordinary citizens"

Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 3, pp. 603-604. In this poem, Ta Lasa was able to revel in the fact that he had correctly predicted the future. His support of the Dutch ensured him of a prominent position from which he was able to profit to become the richest To Pamona of his time. (Interviews, August, 1975).

31. Kruyt to Hofman, 20 December, 1907, 3 January, 1908 and 9 July, 1908. Although Papa i Wunte became the first prominent To Pamona to be baptised in 1909, Kruyt considered him a weak character and an obstacle to the expansion of the mission. He was an old man at this time and much addicted to sago wine. The Dutch official Mazee, had quickly lost patience with him as a native administrator. By 1910, the chief was regarded as too old and too weak of character to cope with the responsibilities of his position as Mokole. In these circumstances, the propaganda value of his conversion did not amount to much. (Mazee to Kruyt, 2 November, 1910).

in 1894 as protection against Napu harassment.^{32.}

Whatever their motives, these men were responsible for the passive acceptance of the Dutch in the coastal regions. The self-congratulatory mission attitude and the mission's conceptualization of the To Pamona as a "good-natured, naive and, to a certain extent, innocent people",^{33.} obscures the political maturity, self-interest and soul-searching which glimmer between the lines of mission sources.^{34.} The events of the pre-1905 period surrounding the issue of schools represent skillful political manoeuvring on the part of the To Pamona tribes involved, as superior Dutch and indigenous powers jostled for a position on the Central Sulawesi stage. At the same time, an increase in witch-trials and the intensification of religious experiences expressed the seriousness of the internal struggle.^{35.} The so-called primitive heathens were well aware of the significance of the gathering clouds of change. In anticipating the coming of the new

32. In 1908, an incident occurred in which Papa i Wunte's wife was dragged by the hair by a group of To Napu which her husband failed to prevent. Discussing this incident, Kruyt wrote to Hofman who had expressed doubt as to the truth of this story, saying that the affair was indicative of the low opinion the To Napu had of Papa i Wunte. (Kruyt to Hofman, 9 July, 1908).

33. Kruyt to Engelenberg, 13 July, 1901. This was Kruyt's first letter to Engelenberg.

34. The To Kadombuku had been forming a positive impression of Dutch rule since 1902 on the return of the son of Papa i Melempo from a trip to the Minahassa in the company of Kruyt. From it, Kruyt wrote, they drew the following conclusions:

"The fact that such a large number of people live in the Minahassa is evidence that they are prospering, otherwise they would have moved to other areas, and they are undoubtedly prospering because the Kumpania rules there." (Kruyt Diary, 18 April, 1902).

The mission of course did have a role in influencing the attitude of the To Pamona villages with which they had contact. Acquaintance with three mission families allowed them to form a positive impression of Europeans which was undoubtedly a factor in their attitude in 1905-06. Papa i Melempo influenced the passive stance of Onda'e and Bancea in the events of 1905-06.

35. Kruyt's Diary, 12 March, 1902. An abnormally large death feast was held that year.

order towards the end of the century, the To Pamona weighed the value of their independence and their loyalty to the ancestors and traditional life-style against the apparent inevitability of and the uncertain advantages offered by, the permanent presence of Kruyt and the government.

Engelenberg had arranged for his troops to meet with the southern military command which had simultaneously been completing its "pacification" of Bone and Gowa, the Pamona lands, and finally Luwu.³⁶ With the fall of Palopo, the military column was to proceed north to Pendolo on the southern shores of Lake Poso. Here Luwu representatives would, at the behest of the Dutch, announce to the assembled To Pamona chiefs that the Datu of Luwu had submitted to the ruler of the Netherlands and that thereby, all subjects of Luwu would become subjects of the Dutch crown.³⁷

The failure of the southern military command to ensure the presence of Luwu representatives aborted this exchange-of-allegiance ceremony. Instead, Luwu representatives secretly agitated for To Pamona resistance.³⁸ This resistance manifested itself when, with the return of Voskuil to Poso, the military commander announced to the new subjects of the colonial government that they were

36. See Indische Gids, Vol. 27, 1905, pp. 1561-1562.

37. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 146. A significantly different description is given by J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 99. He writes that at the Pendolo conference, Luwu representatives would, at the behest of the Dutch, personally renounce the Datu of Luwu's authority over the To Pamona. This was the same procedure Engelenberg had adopted in ending Tojo overlordship of the To Kadombuku. The latter interpretation (an original document does not appear to exist) implies that the To Pamona became direct subjects of the Dutch crown while maintaining a semblance of self-rule, whereas, on the basis of Albert Kruyt's interpretation, they remained subject to Luwu and thus, indirectly subject to the Dutch crown. It appears that the To Pamona themselves interpreted the matter in the latter sense. Ta Lasa therefore, awaited Luwu's decision before accepting the return of the Dutch in 1945.

38. ibid, p. 146.

now liable to perform herendiensten and to pay taxes.^{39.} There was immediate and widespread reaction to this announcement in the inland, where villagers withdrew from their fields and congregated behind the fortifications of their hill-top villages. Mission sources infer that Pamona resistance was the result of Luwu agitation^{40.} but, while undoubtedly a factor, it was clearly not the major motivation. Despite the fact that one of its village chiefs was the official Luwu representative in the area, the To Onda'e did not participate in subsequent active resistance to the renewed Dutch military campaign.^{41.} Nor did the To Bancea, inhabiting an area north-west of Lake Poso on the Luwu border. Both these tribes had sent representatives to the influential pro-Dutch chief, Papa i Melempo, to discuss the objectives of the foreign overlords and to assess the practicality of resistance. Both tribes accepted Papa i Melempo's advice and assumed a neutral stance^{42.} a position allowed for under the conventions of traditional Pamona warfare.^{43.} The remainder of the To Pamona tribes similarly appeared to have assessed the new situation carefully but came to the opposite conclusion: that it was desirable to resist the intrusion into their traditional life-style by the Europeans. In arriving at their decision, they undoubtedly believed that the semi-divine Datu of Luwu would come to their aid.^{44.}

The fact that opposition expressed itself only when the European overlord demanded that the To Pamona perform unpaid and arduous labour for their new masters and, as well, provide the foreigners with a substantial annual "tribute", further indicates the degree to which the

39. Adriani, "De Ontwikkeling ...", loc. cit..

40. loc. cit., see also Note 27.

41. Hofman, Annual Report, 1906, in op. cit., p. 349.

42. loc. cit...

43. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 207-209.

44. ibid, pp. 132-133. According to Kruyt, the Datu of Luwu had never given the To Pamona any material assistance.

To Pamona made an independent assessment of their predicament. Both demands by the colonial government were seen as novel enactments by an overlord. The Datu of Luwu had traditionally exacted an infrequent token tribute, had never interfered in daily village life and was regarded as a distant, and if obeyed, benign and god-like figure.⁴⁵ The To Pamona, whose proximity to their fellow tribesmen near the coast had enabled them to observe the gradual penetration of mission influence without experiencing it themselves, saw in the new demands an extension of that same influence which was aiming at the destruction of their culture.

Active resistance to the Dutch was initiated by three tribal groups: the more inland section of the To Pebato, the centrally-located and relatively new and expanding To Wingke mPoso and the inhabitants of the northern and eastern shores of Lake Poso, the To Lamusa. In each of these tribal areas, action centred on particular villages as a result of geographical or personality factors. To Pebato defences were centred on the village of Waro'e, home of the influential Pebato chief, Ta Rame,⁴⁶ and the nearby villages of Yayaki and Patimuli. The focus of To Wingke mPoso resistance was the village of Tamunke Dena a hill-top village invincible by conventional standards of To Pamona warfare,⁴⁷ and Tamungke. The third centre was the Lamusa village of Kandela, home of the most important of the To Pamona representatives of the Datu of Luwu.

While total numbers of To Pamona defenders do not appear in the records, military operations undertaken against the south-eastern villages of Tamungke Dena, Kandela and Tamungke left thirty-eight dead and fifty

45. ibid, pp. 131-132.

46. After the 1905-06 campaign, Ta Rame continued to resist Dutch imposed changes to traditional life. He complained bitterly of Voskuil's attack on To Pamona religion and accused Papa i Wunte of deserting traditional adat, (Kruyt to Hofman, 20 December, 1907). In 1909 he resisted Mazee's inoculation program, (Mazee to Kruyt, 22 March, 1909).

47. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., p. 147.

wounded with no loss of life amongst the government troops.^{48.} The battles lasted no more than two hours each.^{49.} The resistance of the To Pebato villages of Waro'e, Yayaki and Patimuli ended without loss of life with the news of the rapid fall of the renowned fortification of Tamungke Dena, announced by missionary Hofman and Papa i Wunte.^{50.}

After the fall of Mori and the pacification of eastern Sulawesi in 1907, the Dutch,^{51.} for the first time in their colonial history, could claim to have imposed their authority in the island of Sulawesi, brief as this turned out to be. For the Dutch, gaining of authority in the Poso valley in 1906, represented the culmination of a colonial interest which had evolved over fourteen years. This interest had originated in the politico-economic considerations of Baron van Hoevell in 1888 which, as Dutch penetration of the Gulf of Tomini had proceeded, had attracted to itself, a broader socio-economic legitimation. The specific goals of European capitalism and imperialist rivalry had given way to the broader goals of over-all economic viability of the Dutch colony which in turn was seen to depend on the decentralization and indigenization of resources.

In broad terms, the subjugation of Sulawesi to Dutch authority was seen as clearing the way for the implementation of a new colonial policy. As such, the immediate task confronting the Central Celebes administration was the establishment of an indigenous administration and a viable economic base as defined in Western terms. The authority of the Dutch, legitimized by military conquest, assigned it the right to re-arrange traditional society.

From a different perspective, missionary Kruyt had argued for a similar program of social reconstruction in order to train the To Pamona for independent and responsible

48. Engelenberg, "Memorie van Overgave." Kruyt stated that eight To Pamona had died. (Kruyt and Adriani, loc. cit.)

49. Kruyt and Adriani, op.cit., vol. 1, p. 147.

50. ibid, pp. 147-148.

51. ibid, p. 133. The last chief of Mori was shot dead by government forces during that chief's defence of his fortified village of Wula nDeri at the end of 1907.

decision-making to save them from the irresponsibility of communalism. The ethical nature of this process manifested itself in the extent to which the details of such a re-arrangement accorded where practicable with the existing status quo - and the extent to which such change could be seen to be in the indigenous population's own best interests.

Engelenberg's 1904 plans were sufficiently in line with the political climate in The Hague to form the basis for colonial reconstruction. By 1903, the Dutch Staten Generaal had accepted in its legislative program, the substance of van Deventer's economic blueprint.⁵² What old Indies hands queried in Engelenberg's proposition was the adaptability of a program of political and economic decentralization in such a backward area as Central Sulawesi. Moreover, Engelenberg was opposed by the Batavian government's Adviser for Internal Affairs, Colijn, for his use of the term "federation".⁵³ The legal and political implications of this concept went beyond the limits acceptable to the colonial administrators of the ethical period.

Within the terms of colonial constitutional law, the existence of a native administration was a pre-requisite for legalizing and facilitating the downflow of colonial directives to the village level. The legal document which set out the constitutional relationship between the colonial government and the indigenous state was the Korte Verklaring (short contract).⁵⁴ The impracticability of recognizing the legal existence of fifteen tribal states in Central Sulawesi in this way, led the administration to rationalize the situation in terms of population to

52. Van der Kroef, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

53. H. Colijn, "Memorandum to the Governor-General, Buitenzorg, 12 September, 1907, No. 2293. Engelenberg had used this concept in 1904 in Holland and reiterated his desire to establish a federation in his "Memorie van Overgave" of 24 June, 1906. Colijn commented in 1907: "A federation as Mr. Engelenberg wanted and clearly is still considering is incomprehensible to our constitutional law."

54. H. Colijn, "Organizatie van het bestuur onz", 1906, p.10

geographical area. Thus contracts were signed with persons who were assumed to act as territorial chiefs for the purpose, a function not traditionally recognized in To Pamona society.⁵⁵ The tribal groups were subsumed within the geographical region set out in the five contracts. Thus, contracts were signed with the "chiefs" of Lage (which included the To Kadombuku, To Paladia, and a majority of the To Wingke mPoso), of Pebato, of Onda'e (which included part of the To Pakambia), of Palanda (which included the small tribes on the eastern shore of Lake Poso) and with Bancea (which included all groups south and west of Lake Poso).⁵⁶

Initially, it was assumed that five autonomous rulers would be appointed, but by 1910, only two, Ta Lasa and Papa i Wunte, had been officially installed as Mokole bangke (ruler) of Lage and Pebato respectively.⁵⁷ Thus two native states were artificially created in the colonial sub-administrative district of Poso, forming part of the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes, which in turn was part of the Residency of Manado.⁵⁸

The Mokole bangke was assisted by a witi Mokole and a clerk. As the new enlarged village structure was imposed, the indigenous administration was expanded to include an official village head or Mokole lipu.⁵⁹ While the

55. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 149.

56. ibid, p. 149, Ch. 1.

57. Mazee to Kruyt, 7 August, 1910. Commenting on parts of the draft of Kruyt's subsequently published De Bare'e-sprekende Toradjas, Mazee wrote that while at that time only two men had been appointed as Mokole, the other tribal areas had been recognized as independent states. However, he continued, "it is the intention to reduce the number of states and thus, to arrive at the administrative divisions which you [Kruyt] have indicated," (ie. the formation of two states, Pebato and Lage).

58. Resident of Manado, J. van Hengel, lists amongst the thirty-four independent states of the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes, five To Pamona states of the sub-administrative district of Poso: Lage, Onda'e, Palande and Lamusa, Bancea and Pu'umboto and Pebato. (Mail rapport 1886/1910, "Memorie van Overgave".)

59. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 149.

Mokole bangke was legally an autonomous ruler, he was in fact subordinate to the European colonial administration, headed at the sub-administrative level by a civiel gegaghebber, or military administrator. The latter operated through a separate foreign indigenous administration made up of the so-called Native Assistant, who in turn depended upon a number of minor foreign indigenous officials or mantri charged with the practical supervision of road and sawah construction. The Mokole bangke tended therefore, to be a largely titular position.^{60.}

At the village level, the new administrative arrangements had translated the erstwhile interpreter of ancestral lore and mouthpiece of consensus decision-making amongst a small group of family heads into a minor territorial administrator and the spokesman of the external European government. The new village administrator was supervised by a junior European official, the Controleur, in consultation with the foreign indigenous expert, the Native Assistant. The Mokole lipu's formal functions were limited to ensuring the availability of unpaid labour for herendiensten, the fulfillment of a myriad of regulations regarding the new sawah and the care and upkeep of new villages and roads.^{61.}

In this way, the appearance of "native control over native affairs" was maintained. The paternal attitude of the colonialists, who assumed the inability of indigenous rulers and village administrators to carry out the minute detail of European regulations, ensured that power was effectively retained in European hands. At best, the

60. H. Colijn, "Organizatie van het bestuur enz", 1906, p. 25. J. van Hengel, "Memorie van Overgave", pp.17-19.

61. Adriani, "Maatschappelijke ... veranderingen", in op. cit., p. 19. Colijn in his document on the administrative restructuring admitted that no rulers existed in the Poso area in the conventional sense. However, he believed that "an organic administration was developing which was beginning to take on the appearance of territorial rule. While hereditary chiefs were not unknown ... a reasonable [ie. acceptable] solution was possible because, amongst all the kabosenyas, there were several who could be considered as exercising a significant influence over others and to whom even completely foreign tribes usually listened", pp. 12-13.

Europeans saw themselves as elder brothers or concerned parents. Yet this illusion of self-government was coupled with the reality of self-funding. The colonial administrative principle of ontvoegding (withdrawal from tutelage) imposed a concomitant principle of opvoeding (education) which was the centrepiece of the ethical ideology.⁶² Self-government depended upon financial self-sufficiency, which in turn necessitated the training of the indigenous population in skills and attitudes required to develop the financial and intellectual resources needed. It required a sense of individual responsibility and initiative which the administrators of Central Celebes and the mission considered the To Pamona did not yet possess and so the myth of self-government became the spur for exacting from the indigenous population a heavy financial and psychological commitment to colonialism. H. Colijn, the Governor-General's emissary for decentralization, drew up a report on administrative and financial arrangements in April, 1906.⁶³ The chief aim of this report was to order the financial relationship of the Assistant Residency, which stood in locum tenens for the newly established native states, with the colonial treasury. The issue for Colijn was to balance successfully the demands of the colonial treasury for restitution of expenses incurred by the central government in Central Celebes and its need for this region to contribute to the public purse, on the one hand, with the financial needs of the area itself on the other. The significance of the report was its insistence that the nineteenth century concept of exploitation by the colonial government was to be avoided. It showed the need for the establishment of a more long-term and more profitable financial basis for colonialism which essentially involved the taxation of greater indigenous productivity. This principle lay at the centre of the new colonial expansionist policy embarked upon by Governor-

62. Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 130.

63. H. Colijn, "Het Organizatie van het bestuur enz in de afdeeling Midden Celebes".

General van Heutz. By incorporating the Outer Islands which were as yet largely unexploited, it was hoped that a broader economic base would be provided for colonial rule which, at the same time, would relieve some of the pressure on Java, the object of much of the ethical concern.

The new economic base ultimately depended upon an adequate administrative structure and, according to Colijn, what was needed was an efficient form of self-government. This he stated, was "roughly what the Indies should have had a long time ago were it not so backward in its political development",⁶⁴. The efficiency of self-government could be ensured now, he continued, with the employment of the Korte Verklaring which had the advantage of "safeguarding for us, an almost unlimited influence".⁶⁵

Turning specifically to the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes, he pointed to its size (half that of Java and greater than Benkulan or Jambi) as making it potentially economically viable. The lack of a dense population needed to be countered by a larger geographical area to guarantee a sufficiently large tax-paying population. The economics of administration also suggested the reduction in the number of senior European personnel and a greater dependence on lowly paid indigenous and low-level European officials working in the field.⁶⁶ In this

64. ibid, p. 32.

65. loc. cit..

66. loc. cit.. Colijn urged the appointment of more civiel gegaghebbers. Traditionally, these officers of the Binnenlands Bestuur were selected from the ranks of junior military officers or from the ranks of public service clerks. The education of the latter had not proceeded beyond the Junior Public Examination (Kleinambtenaarsexamen), and they tended to be men who preferred speaking Malay at home (p.17). Colijn regarded them as often unreliable and at best, of limited use. However, in advocating their employment in the region, he hoped that this type of official might be more carefully selected in future. He also called for a better calibre of individual for selection as Native Assistant who would under careful European guidance, form a cheap but effective part of the administration. Special care appeared to have been taken in the appointment of both types of personnel in the Poso district. See Appendix No. 5.

context, self-government was also potentially more economical than direct colonial rule.

Having established administrative guidelines, Colijn next turned his attention to the financial arrangements. Colijn believed, as Baron van Hoevel had argued in 1891, that the intensification of colonial rule would lead to financial improvement. He provocatively cited Aceh as an example where, excluding military expenditure, a surplus of more than f.500,000 was already recorded and where, with the further implementation of taxation, a surplus of one million guilders could be expected in the near future.⁶⁷ The issue was to ensure that "the expansion of our authority did not lead to the exhaustion of our financial strength"⁶⁸ while at the same time, keeping in mind that in Central Celebes, "literally everything still has to be done".⁶⁹

The financial relationship between Assistant Residency and colonial government was founded on a division of financial responsibility. The apparent difficulty of the legal existence of autonomous states was technically solved by recourse to the Korte Verklaring by which the "autonomous ruler has given us the right, among other things, to regulate his state's finances in his and our interests".⁷⁰ Assuming this right, Colijn

67. This was better then for south-west coast Sumatra, Menado or Ambon, Colijn noted.

68. ibid, p. 31.

69. ibid, pp. 27-28. "There is not a single road, not a single bridge".

70. loc. cit.. The convenience of the Korte Verklaring was argued by Colijn several times in the document. In discussing the advisability of incorporating Eastern Sulawesi into the Assistant Residency and thus taking this region away from the Sultan of Ternate, Colijn stated that the Korte Verklaring gave the government the right to act as it saw fit. The difference between direct-rule by the Dutch government and self-rule by the native ruler was just a matter of semantics. "After all, the clearly apparent purpose of the government [in signing a contract] was nothing more than the creation of a better administration." In achieving this end, the government was entirely correct, Colijn stated, in equating self-rule based on the Korte Verklaring with direct-rule by the colonial government while "for the Sultan, after signing the contract, it is exactly the same, what form we give to the new government".

argued that those services which were inherently the responsibility of the central government, such as the provision of European personnel for the running of the administration, taxation and post and telegraphs, were to be financed by the colonial treasury. The remaining services including provision of an indigenous administration, all costs and services related to the improvement of the material welfare of the population and the provision of health and education services, were the responsibility of the self-governments via the regional treasury under the control of the Assistant Resident.⁷¹

This principle clarified the accounting procedures of the regional treasury, for, having isolated financial responsibility, Colijn then argued that the regional treasury should compensate the central government in full for the expenditure it had incurred in the region. As well, the region had to make a contribution to the general administrative costs of the colony as a whole. On the basis of an income tax of five percent on every head of family, Colijn estimated a regional income of f. 250,000 of which, the central government would receive half. On the 1906 figures, Colijn estimated net central government expenditure to be f.134,815 which was to be met in progressively increasing amounts by the region, beginning with a payment of f.50,000 in 1907 and f.100,000 by 1908. With the addition of taxation of Europeans, sale of leases for the exploitation of natural resources and duties on imports and exports, salt and opium, which were to be paid directly to the central government, Colijn estimated a total initial payment to the colonial treasury of f.150,000.⁷² While initially Central Sulawesi would not be able to make a significant contribution to general costs, it could handsomely refund central government expenditure and Colijn argued this was a considerable improvement on the 1905 net deficit of f.60,000 for the area which had been a direct result of the "inefficiency

71. ibid, p. 25.

72. See Appendix No's. 6 and 7.

and insufficiency of the administration at that time". With the more enlightened and effective administration brought about by the intensification of colonization, it was assumed that the indigenous population would benefit from the resultant prosperity.

The principle of restitution also had an inbuilt advantage in that it restricted government expenditure to the capacity of the region to pay. This in effect meant that the entire ethical program to be implemented in the region was to be self-funded. Since this program had its thrust in terms of greater material advancement of the indigenous population, now liable to taxation, the ethical program could only benefit the central government.

Within the region, Colijn estimated a fixed annual expenditure of f.67,000 for the payment of the native administration and the provision of education and health service. Subtracting this figure from the estimated regional income of f.250,000 (plus approximately f.42,000 in additional revenue), less the region's contribution of f.150,000 to Batavia, it left the Assistant Residency with f.75,000 for expenditure on other programs. Colijn felt obliged to excuse "this rather high figure" on the grounds that a complete communications net-work still had to be developed in the area.⁷³

The Colijn document crystalizes the administrative formulation of the ethical program. While the concern for financial profitability was clearly paramount, the economic principles were not the blatantly exploitative ones of the previous century. Nor were they the positive, if somewhat naive economic principles espoused by Engelenberg in 1904

73. H. Colijn "Organizatie van het bestuur", pp. 27-28. Colijn estimated that at least 1000 km. of road would be necessary and since much of this would be through uninhabited land, herendiensten alone would be insufficient and thus, "large sections of road would have to be constructed with paid labour". Furthermore, since priority would be given to repayment of central government expenditure, Colijn reckoned that "in the first years the surplus [for regional development] would not be as large as that".

and restated by him in 1907.⁷⁴ The colonial civil servant regarded his administrative blueprint as being designed to train the indigenous population to accept the responsibilities of its membership of the Dutch East Indies colony and to educate the population for the improvement of its standard of living in its and in the state's interests.

The same principles were similarly justified in the concept of the desa school established in Java and Madura in 1907. In rejecting Minister Fock's grandiose plan for the provision, at government expense, of a greatly enlarged "second-class school" system, Governor-General van Heutz instituted a system of self-funded basic village elementary schools. Van Heutz rejected the principle of open-ended government funding and sought, in his own education plan, to relate schooling to what his advisers perceived to be the needs and capabilities of the village

74. In 1907, Colijn sent a memorandum to the Governor-General commenting on the financial arrangements decided on by the Residency and set out in a document entitled, "Regulations for the administration of moneys and goods of the self-governing states in the administrative region of Central Celebes of the Residency of Menado", 8 July, 1907, No. 3503. This document was, Colijn believed, heavily influenced by Engelenberg who had, a month before its release, been severely criticized for his ideas on the financial administration of these states by the First Government Secretary in a letter of 18 June, 1907, No. 1626. Engelenberg had continued to fail to accept what Colijn recognized as the key to overall colonial prosperity - the principle of restitution of central government expenditure by the states in whose territories such expenses were incurred. Engelenberg was more inclined, as his political conception of a federation of self-governing states in Central Celebes implies, to consider only the needs of the local region. In this context, he guaranteed Kruyt liberal support for mission schools, a promise which the demands of the central government forced him to withdraw.

community.⁷⁵ Van Heutz' "genius for administration" lay in his application of the principle of self-funding which enabled him to bring in a budget surplus during his third year of office.⁷⁶ It was the same principle, both at the broad administrative level and in the area of education, which his emissary, Colijn, applied in his organization of the administration of the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes.

Colijn was also impressed with the importance of education in the colonization process. In 1907 he completed a massive three-volume memorandum on the political and administrative guidelines to be followed in the Outer Islands of which his Central Celebes report formed a part.⁷⁷ Education, he argued in the third volume of his Memorandum, had to be related to the needs and capabilities of the local area. It was not enough for the colonial power to establish peace and order in its concern to promote prosperity.

75. S.L. van der Wal, Het Onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands Indie, 1900-1940, Document 30, p. 122, Note 4. In a private letter to Idenburg quoted here, van Heutz reveals that he subverted Minister Fock's plans to provide mass education by a re-organization of second-class schools. Van Heutz' reasons were two-fold. Firstly, he estimated that Fock's scheme would cost f.100 million per year, altogether too expensive and secondly, because he considered that the type of school Fock was suggesting was unsuitable for 7/8ths of the population.

"If one proceeds on the present basis, India will be brought to the edge of a precipice ... because ... one thereby will not produce a strong and civilized population but purely a dissatisfied proletariat which can read and write but will not work".

The Governor-General and Minister of Colonies nevertheless started from a common assumption, the relationship between the stimulation of native productivity and the provision of mass education. Fock based his educational policy on his earlier investigations published in his report "Beschouwingen en voorstellen ter verbetering van de economische toestand der inlandsche bevolking van Java en Madoera, 1904".

76. J. Furnivall, op. cit., p. 237. Furnival indicates that van Heutz, "having a genius for administration and war ... was able by 1906 to have a surplus in the budget and was consequently given the necessary support from The Hague."

77. H. Colijn, Politiek Beloid en Bestuurzorg in de Buitenbezittingen, 3 vols., (Batavia, 1907), (Political policy and administrative objectives in the Outer Possessions).

It must positively promote the provision of education in order to inculcate elementary formal knowledge and also practical skills and European values. On no account was the education to be in advance of the needs of the community, for this, he stated, echoing many of his contemporaries, would lead to the production by schools of a class of "position-hunters" and would dislocate the community. Thus, Colijn concluded in 1907 that it was essential for the provision of popular education to be funded locally to meet local needs.^{78.}

Anticipating this conclusion in 1906, Colijn stressed the principle of self-funding in education as "the only guarantee to put a permanent end to the irritating exaggeration of expenditure [on education] which occurred in the Minahassa."^{79.} Colijn allocated a sum of f.10,000 for schools which formed part of the fixed expenditure of f.67,000. This was to provide twenty schools with f.500 per annum and would allow one school per 12,500 of population, "a favourable ratio if one keeps in mind the average for the whole of the Indies".^{80.}

Kruyt fully approved of the principle of self-support and agreed with Colijn's sentiments regarding education in the Minahassa. In practice, Kruyt extended the same principle to justify his desire to establish a school in each village. The differences between government and mission views on education did not become overt till almost a decade later. In the earlier period, Colijn was able to express his genuine admiration for Kruyt's work and his contribution to the colonization of Central Sulawesi. In his subsequent report on the Assistant Residency in 1907, Colijn strongly argued for the financial protection of the mission's unique educational provision:

The education in the mission area in Poso under the patronage of men such as Dr. Adriani and

78. ibid, vol. 3, p.62ff, quoted in H.J.H. Hartgerink, De Staten-Generaal en het Volksonderwijs in Nederlands Indie, 1848-1918, (Wolters, Groningen, 1942), (The States-General and Popular Education in the Netherlands Indies), p. 106.

79. H. Colijn, "Organisatie van het bestuur enz", p. 27.

80. loc. cit..

Albert C. Kruyt, who apply unlimited devotion to their understanding of the native society, can only be beneficial and must exceed in value the official intervention of the government, especially when the missionaries are, as it were, in daily contact with the schools.⁸¹

The necessity for co-operation between the two representative arms of Dutch culture, Church and State, was also recognized in similar terms by the mission administration in Rotterdam. At the 1906 annual meeting of the Netherlands Missionary Society, Director Gunning told his audience:

The acceptance of the Gospel by uncivilized peoples has its immediate consequence in significant changes in their social and political relations. In this way, missionary activity comes into immediate contact with the government Moreover, in all its attempts to implement its ethical policy, the government encounters the mission and finds in this organization a practically indispensable co-worker.⁸²

At a local level, Engelenberg's commitment to ethical ideals, in particular his interest in education and the history of his close co-operation with Kruyt since 1901, ensured continued consultation between local administration and the mission. For his part, Kruyt, who had expressed his conviction that "the result of the war would be advantageous to the work of the mission", fully appreciated the need for close co-operation between mission and government in the re-organization of the social life of the To Pamona, which he recognized as impinging at all levels on his evangelizing work.⁸³

Prior to 1906, Kruyt had shown himself to be in favour of village amalgamation and relocation, the prohibition of a number of religious practices and the isolation of the people from Muslim and other external indigenous influences. For practical reasons he favoured permanent

81. H. Colijn, "Memorandum for the Governor-General", 12 September, 1907, No. 2293.

82. Minutes N.M.S., 11 August, 1906.

83. Kruyt found a Biblical analogy for the mission's position after 1906 - that of Paul's evangelizing work within the Roman empire. Kruyt, "Zending en Volkskracht", Pt. 1, in op. cit., p. 42.

occupation of villages, individual houses for each family and a policy of zachte dwang to ensure school attendance. At a theoretical level, Kruyt was convinced of the need to train the people in greater self reliance and, in this context, he came to express his belief in the relationship between socio-economic sophistication and susceptibility to what he regarded as higher levels of religious awareness. In arguing this form of social Darwinism in 1924⁸⁴ and again in 1935,⁸⁵ Kruyt placed great emphasis on improvement in agricultural methods and on political centralization as the hallmarks of higher culture, whose religious orientation tended towards monotheism and away from Pantheism.

For Kruyt therefore, colonization was essentially an educational process in the broadest sense, in which formal schooling played a small but significant role. He shared with the concerned colonial administrator a belief in the need to develop the native but he argued that the impact of the introduction of innovations in a "heathen society" depended upon the catalyst of evangelization.

The religion of these people of nature hinders social progress because [their beliefs] petrify society into a solid block of conservatism. In this situation we feel that what is necessary in the first instance is to free them from the fetters forged by their religion. A religion can only be fought and conquered by [another] religion. Hence, this is the great struggle of missionary work.⁸⁶

Socio-economic changes were seen as educational only if they struck at the heart of the "heathen" mentality. This was only possible if, concurrently with the introduction of such innovation, an attack on their belief system and a gradual acceptance of a monotheistic religion occurred. The value of the change lay in its internalization, not in

84. A. Kruyt, "De Betekenis van den natten rijstbouw voor de Posso'ers" (The significance of wet rice cultivation for the Poso people), in Koloniale Studieen, vol. 8, 1924, pp. 31-53.

85. A. Kruyt, "Zending en Volkskracht", Parts 1-6, in Mededelingen, vol's. 79-80, 1935-36.

86. ibid, Part 4, "The social significance of the mission", in op. cit., vol. 79, 1935, p. 354.

the acceptance of its external manifestations.

Formal schooling was one of several broad educational processes which could be employed. It was specifically directed at the non-adult population which would otherwise remain unaffected by the predominantly economically-based changes to the adult way of life. The significance of the mission school, Kruyt argued, lay not so much in its promotion of Christianity which "is not great",⁸⁷ but in its development of a more receptive mentality.

It aims, not merely to provide children with a knowledge of reading, writing and arithmetic, a knowledge of which the majority of Indonesians have little need in their society, but it aims at forming the character of the pupils in training them to become thinking beings so that they can participate more consciously in village life, to improve it economically, socially as well as spiritually.⁸⁸

For Kruyt therefore, the central role of the mission in the colonization process was the essential task of transforming the spiritual basis of traditional society "so that it could develop itself freely".⁸⁹ For the mission, the high point of this new spiritual freedom was the acceptance by the people of their pre-destined relationship with their Creator. Kruyt believed that the awareness of this relationship developed from and manifested itself in the entire spectrum of daily life as the individual's involvement in the social, economic, political and spiritual spheres was raised to a more conscious and rational level. The broad educational impact of European colonialism was to free the individual from the essential irrationality and communalism of traditional culture. The mission's task ultimately was to re-direct the freed consciousness to an awareness of its subjugation to the will of its Creator.

The colonial government shared much of this objective. It too saw its task as one of freeing To Pamona society from those restrictions inherent in the traditional culture which hampered material progress as they defined it. In a conference with village chiefs in February, 1910, the

87. ibid, p. 362.

88. ibid, p. 363.

89. ibid, p. 364.

civiël gezaghebber of Poso, reiterating the beneficial actions the government had taken, attempted to convince his audience that:

Through all these measures, a region will ultimately exist with a larger and more energetic population, with proper cultivation and unhindered traffic, where everything operates smoothly without conflict and discord.^{90.}

Mazee's emphasis was clearly economic but the government had no hesitation in also supporting the mission's specifically religious objectives. Engelenberg, the Assistant Resident, was energetically supporting the development of Christian schools in all but strongly Muslim areas of his administrative region, a policy that received Colijn's unqualified support.^{91.} Moreover, the ex-Governor of Celebes, van Braam Morris, called on the mission to extend its area of operations to include the Toraja area of south-western Sulawesi in an attempt to hold back the tide of Islam.^{92.} As a general policy, Mazee prohibited the entry of Muslim traders into the Poso hinterland to prevent any attempt at Muslim proselytization.^{93.} The Queen herself had signed a document espousing a pro-Christian colonial policy.

90. Mazee to Kruyt nd., Summary of points to be dealt with in the conference, February, 1910. This conference is mentioned in Gobee's diary as being held on 6 February, 1910. The preamble to this document explained that a conference was necessitated in 1910 because of the unsatisfactory way in which the government's regulations were being carried out. See Appendix No. 8.

91. H. Colijn, Memorandum, 1907. "The policy adopted for the organization of education seems to me, in a word, excellent. Community schools in the Muslim areas and in some mountain states and mission schools in the area being worked by the Netherlands Missionary Society".

92. Minutes N.M.S., 31 January, 1906.

93. Mazee to Kruyt, 22 March, 1909. Kruyt had complained about the presence of two Buginese traders in the region and Mazee replied that he had refused them permission to trade amongst the To Pamona since "I never permit such things". Hearing that these traders had disobeyed his commands, Mazee promised to send out a patrol to catch them.

Even more than in the pre-1906 period, the success of colonization now depended upon the close co-operation of mission and government. The government's concern with the improvement in material welfare was dependent upon the existence of sufficient financial resources derived through taxation. Material progress depended ultimately upon the voluntary acceptance by the To Pamona of the social and economic innovations initially imposed on them. As Kruyt argued, success of colonization therefore had to be achieved on the spiritual battle-front.

There was indeed little argument as to the broad outline of the re-organization program which was implemented after the military campaign of 1905-06. A program designed to increase the population and improve its income-deriving activities was seen by both mission and government as the major responsibility of colonial intervention.

Kruyt and Adriani saw the major cause for population scarcity as the existence of slavery and its resultant effect on attitudes towards abortion and infanticide on the part of both slave and mistress.⁹⁴ The former, it was thought, saw herself as merely producing more slaves for her master and the latter, as the owner of slaves, was not enamoured with the prospect of raising many children, particularly male children.

Home life also contributed to negative population growth. The child mortality rate amongst the To Pamona was very high, ranging from fifty-seven percent amongst the To Lage to over twenty-two and a half percent amongst the To Pebato. This compared with eighteen percent in Muslim Napane.⁹⁵ Apart from reasons of irresponsibility, neglect and ignorance of the basic rules of hygiene and medical care, the missionaries considered that child

94. Kruyt, "Gegevens voor het bevolkingzvragestuk van een gedeelte van Midden Celebes", (Evidence regarding the population question in a part of Central Celebes), in Tijdschrift van het Nederlandsche Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, vol. 20, 1903, pp. 190-205. Adriani, "Maatschappelijk, speciaal economische verandering der bevolking van Midden Celebes sedert de invoering van het Nederlandsche gezag aldaar", loc. cit..

95. Kruyt "Gegevens ...", in op. cit., pp. 197-198.

mortality was the direct result of traditional building styles and village location. To Pamona houses were built close together in a confined space on up to two meter high poles on hill-top sites. In such locations:

the ground was little better than a dung-heap and water was rarely closer than at the foot of the hill. On these hill-tops, the poorly built houses offered little protection against the effects of wind and rain.⁹⁶

Hill-top sites had become traditional locations as a result of the constant state of warfare to which the ritualistic need for scalps contributed greatly. While wars themselves had little impact on the death rate, the indirect influence of the constant state of insecurity was regarded as a highly relevant factor. Moreover, when the To Pamona had to tend their often distant dry-rice fields, they left their crowded hill-top villages to take up residence in even more poorly constructed temporary garden huts. The labour-intensive methods and the non-sedentary nature of To Pamona agricultural methods exacerbated the difficulties of child bearing.

The long absences of the men on head-hunting expeditions and while collecting forest products or salt were, argued the missionaries, further reasons for population decline by detrimentally affecting male stamina and adding to the insecurity of marriage and family life and the reluctance of women to accept responsibility for more children. Finally impotence, a result of unbridled sexual activity and the absence of taboos on pre- and extra-marital relations, was advanced as a further relevant consideration in the question of lack of population growth.⁹⁷

Population scarcity resulted in the oversupply of land which in turn deprived the To Pamona of any stimulus to improve their agricultural methods.⁹⁸ Added to this

96. Adriani, "Maatschappelijke ... verandering", in op. cit., p. 459.

97. ibid, p. 459. Adriani added: "Men often come to us to obtain cures for impotence".

98. ibid, p. 460.

mountainous terrain, the poverty of the soil and the lack of water meant that food production remained at little more than subsistence level. Other potential sources of economic progress, animal husbandry, hunting and trade, failed for a variety of reasons to contribute significantly to the economic progress of the To Pamona. Buffalo, while to some extent a measure of wealth, were not capitalized upon, being traditionally maintained for slaughter at ceremonial occasions and as payment for fines. No attempt was made to develop the herd which was only rounded up once a year to prevent it from becoming completely wild.

While some trade resulted from hunting deer and collecting forest products, articles purchased from Chinese and Muslim traders formed the basis of a static family treasure for use in the payment of fines and during ceremonial occasions. Often collections of plates, jewelry and other valuables were buried with the deceased. In any event, the To Pamona rarely profited from trade with the more experienced foreigners. Inter-tribal trade in utility objects had also failed to stimulate capital accumulation, while tribal communalistic tradition rejected notions of private ownership and private enterprise, the hallmark of European economic progress.⁹⁹ Both government and mission found it in their interest to attempt to stimulate the development of a more dynamic economic individualism and thus to modify radically the To Pamona value system.

In the first year of military occupation, the military administrator, Voskuil, had prohibited a number of traditional practices which impinged upon the creation of conditions more conducive to economic advance. Apart from guaranteeing security against foreign indigenous intervention, he had outlawed slavery, head-hunting and witch trials. He had also demanded the relocation of all villages to the valleys and a reduction in the length of death feasts from seven to three days and for smaller ones

99. See supra, Chapter 2.

from three days to one.^{100.}

This latter requirement was considered of great importance to the welfare of the population since these large feasts, the focus of To Pamona religious life, "shamefully misused" the people's resources of rice and buffalo. Missionary Hofman, commenting on a funeral ceremony held at the beginning of 1906 at which fifty buffalo were slaughtered during the seven days, stated that, since the introduction of Voskuil's regulations, "there is now some progress, things are getting better".^{101.}

Meanwhile, "improvement" was also noticeable as a result of the introduction of taxation in 1906. Hofman commented:

Many taxpayers will smile when I assert that the payment of taxes works excellently. Previously, the Torajan did nothing for several months after the harvest The Torajan was busy doing nothing. Now, after the harvest, many go into the forest to cut rattan in order to sell it on the coast. Others fell large trees [to make] canoes. Many go to weed coconut plantations owned by coastal inhabitants [for money]. In this way, the Torajan is coming to life; he pays his taxes and then has something^{102.} left over to buy a jacket or a pair of trousers.

The slack period after the harvest when "the Torajan was busy doing nothing" was traditionally the period of religious observances. It was the period during which the taboos on story-telling and poetry recitation were lifted and thus a period in which the rich heritage of the To Pamona oral tradition was given full voice. The central feature of this period were the extensive funeral ceremonies traditionally accompanied by scalp-hunting and the rounding up of buffalo. It was only after the harvest that such ceremonial gatherings of isolated villages could be sustained.

100. Adriani, "De Toradja's van Midden Celebes, wat zij zijn en wat zij kunnen worden" (The Torajans of Central Celebes, what they are and what they could become), in Verzamelde Verschriften, vol. 1, pp. 186-188.

101. Hofman, Annual Report, 1906 in op. cit., p. 345.

102. loc. cit..

The "social evil" of squandering food was now being checked by forcing villagers to spend time in search of a means to procure money and by reducing the length of such ceremonies. Moreover, the rice and buffalo which were previously squandered at such feasts were now sold to raise money to pay taxes of f.2.50 per family. Therefore, in 1906 there were "less funeral feasts than last year". As Hofman stated, "It is self-evident that one has less time now to celebrate feasts."¹⁰³.

This attack on To Pamona culture based on economic considerations was also advantageous to the mission. The state of confusion resulting from these changes imposed by the new To Pamona overlord made it possible for "the Gospel to work on quietly to dismantle slowly but surely, the heathen house of idolatory".¹⁰⁴ It was indeed the missionary's calling to make the best use of the opportunities created by God out of the confusion resulting from colonialism!

One such opportunity was the command to leave the hill-top village. In the establishment of Panta, Kruyt had already enunciated his conviction that efficient evangelization and provision of schooling depended upon the establishment of large and accessible villages. In the confusion resulting from Voskuil's order, those Pebato villages familiar with the presence of missionaries turned to Hofman (in Kruyt's absence) seeking a guru for their village to "act as an intermediary" so that they would not "sin against the adat of the Kumpania".¹⁰⁵ Exploiting this need in one case, Hofman himself agreed to live in the new village which the elders of the village of Sawaka proposed to establish in accordance with government orders, provided certain conditions were fulfilled. These were substantial. The new village, the first to be established under the new order, was to be formed from an amalgamation of villages and was to be located on the healthier terrain of the left bank of the Puna River. The new village was to be constructed as follows:

a wide street in the middle with on either side,

103. loc. cit.. 104. ibid, p.346. 105. ibid, p.338.

houses with yards. You must take on the task of building a school and a teacher's residence. I will send you a carpenter to guide you in their construction. The material for our house you must supply free. And finally; Sunday must be honoured.^{106.}

By August, 1906 the new village of Kasiguncu was commenced. A road to the coast was constructed, properties of twenty-five meters wide were surveyed and a twelve by seven meter school building and a teacher's residence were built. The villagers themselves lived in temporary huts until the end of the 1907 harvest at which time, in between raising money to pay their taxes, they commenced the building of permanent houses. Meanwhile, Hofman, favourably regarding the prospect of a population of a little under 1,000, ("a goodly total if one considers that the largest village in the Poso region until now did not total more than 300")^{107.} hoped that with "the first sheep over the ditch, more would follow".^{108.}

The construction of the permanent houses of Kasiguncu^{109.} proceeded under the strict supervision of Missionary Hofman and his Minahassan teacher. All houses had to be built equi-distant from the road and centred on their twenty-five meter wide property.

Many times the poles ... had to be taken out of the ground again because they had been placed at an angle to the road.^{110.}

During a temporary absence, three houses had been built without the benefit of his supervision:

What had they done? The houses had been purposefully constructed with their backs to the road. There was of course, nothing

106. ibid, p. 340.

107. ibid, p. 343.

108. loc. cit.. Kasiguncu was formed by the union of five villages including Panta, consisting of a total of about sixty houses each containing two to six families.

109. In Baro'e this name meant "the place where people were assembled by the priest to be brought into communication with the gods". Hofman translated it as "the village where the people are assembled by the pandita to be brought into communication with God".

110. Hofman, "De Zending in den werkkring Kasigoentjoe in 1907", (Report, Kasiguncu district), in Nededeelingen vol. 52, 1908, p. 81.

ILLUSTRATION IV

TRADITIONAL PAMONA VILLAGE



From: Kruyt and Adriani, De Bare'e-Sprekende Toradja's van Midden Celebes, 1912, Folio.

else for it but to demolish and rebuild them".¹¹¹.

In making this blunder, the To Pebato villagers had attempted to adapt traditional beliefs to the requirement that houses be built on either side of the road. Adat demanded that houses face west so that on entry, one faced east, the source of life energy, while one's back was turned to the land of the dead in the west.¹¹².

Many To Pamona saw these dramatic changes to their way of life as the cause for the high death rate, an interpretation to which Kruyt later subscribed.¹¹³. In the new villages, many had "lost their souls" but the To Pamona were afraid to hold death feasts to appease the ancestors and to regain strength, out of fear for the Dutch God.¹¹⁴. A return to the now deserted villages to celebrate such feasts in the lobo was possible since neither missionary nor government had ordered their destruction but the prohibition of scalp-hunting made the celebration of such life-giving rituals meaningless for the living as well as for the departed. The lobo thus eventually decayed.¹¹⁵. In their confusion, the villagers turned to the missionaries but the increased numbers in

111. ibid, p. 82.

112. Adriani, "Maatschappelijke ... verandering", in op. cit., p. 17.

113. Kruyt, "The influence of Western Civilization on the inhabitants of Poso", in B.J.O. Schrieke (Ed.), The effect of Western influence on native civilizations in the Malay Archipelago, (Batavia, 1929), p. 5. At the same time, Hofman was using Pebato fear regarding the large number of deaths to persuade the population to become Christian.

114. Hofman, Report, Kasiguncu district, in op. cit., p.83. Nevertheless, Adriani commented:

"that many dying people had themselves carried up to the old village to die in the presence of the ancestors or to be revived by them".

"Maatschappelijke ... verandering", in op. cit., p.18.

115. Adriani, "Maatschappelijke ... verandering", in op. cit., p. 17. Long before 1915, there no longer existed any lobo or temples. The largest temple in the region near Pandiri was destroyed by Nazee in 1909 or 1910 as a result of an illegal death feast held there with a soldier's scalp.

which they attended Sunday meetings was not necessarily a response to a need for finding a new Protector; in Kasiguncu, the villagers had been threatened that if they did not attend such meetings in greater numbers, Hofman would leave.^{116.}

Kasiguncu was the first of the new villages which fulfilled Voskuil's orders and was established under the supervision of the mission. By the end of 1907 it had become mandatory for all to follow suit. Where guru had been appointed, primarily in To Pebato villages of which, by the end of 1907 all five had a guru,^{117.} the same procedures were followed. In the confusion and fear which resulted from this wholesale dislocation,

the Torajan seeks support and help [from the missionary] in the new circumstances which are so foreign to him. He now allows us to interfere in his daily life; he himself involves us [in his life] and by this means we are granted generous opportunities to exercise our influence over him, an influence which we hope will lead him to our Saviour and Lord.^{118.}

Nevertheless, the To Pamona objected to the requirement to unify old villages into one new large one and thought "that this order must have originated from the missionaries with the aim of getting their children more easily into schools".^{119.}

In 1907, Kruyt admitted to what he had denied in 1896. It was clear that the To Pamona had always seen the mission as an arm of government. They believed that:

In the same way as native assistants had been appointed by the government to supervise the layout of their [new] villages, so the missionaries were appointed by the same government to promote schools and Christian evangelization.^{120.}

116. Hofman, Report, Kasiguncu District, 1907 in op. cit., p. 83. Perhaps as persuasive was the general feeling that the government required church attendance as well as school attendance as part of the new order being imposed.


117. Hofman, Report, Kasiguncu District, 1907, loc. cit.

118. Kruyt, Report, Iuku District, 1907 in Mededelingen, vol. 52, 1908, p. 48.

119. ibid, p. 50.

120. loc. cit. In the circumstances, Kruyt considered it advisable not to disillusion them.

VILLAGE RESETTLEMENT AND SAWAH DEVELOPMENT
IN THE POSO BASIN 1907-1912



LEGEND

- + Original Village Site
- New Village Complex
- ▣ Sawah

Reproduced from Kruyt and
Adriani, De Bare'e-
Sprekende Toradja's van
Midden Celebes, 1912.

Whereas Kruyt had been very concerned to distinguish himself from the government in the earlier period, he and his colleague now made no attempt to disillusion the To Pamona. Kruyt, Hofman and their Minahassan gurus in fact functioned as government agents, sharing the same aims in wishing to reform To Pamona society and facilitating the realization of the first major reform measure. All accounts speak of the fear expressed by the To Pamona towards the missionaries; fear "that we will ... be fined if we sometimes offend you", fear that missionaries would avenge themselves against village chiefs who had earlier refused him.^{121.}

When the missionary's persuasion was not sufficient to produce results, as in Hofman's attempt to establish the new village of Maro 'Ajo, the military administration in Poso was requested to convince the people of the necessity to change.^{122.}

A swift beginning was also made with the introduction of herendiensten (forced labour). This involved four days labour per month by the entire physically-able adult male population. By the end of 1907, two major roads had been established although, as yet, unsuitable for vehicular traffic. One road joined Poso with Lake Poso, with a branch road to Mapane and Kasiguncu and from Tomasa to Longkida. The other linked Poso with Tojo.^{123.} Both roads had required the construction of numerous bridges and some major earth works which led one anonymous To Pamona to exclaim:

Just listen to what will happen,
the mountains must become valleys.
Get on with the clearing,
all neighbouring lands
have already bent their heads.^{124.}

To Lasa, in a more smug tone, on the same topic, recited the following poem to the chiefs who, in 1905 had refused to

121. ibid, p. 54.

122. Hofman, Report, Kasiguncu District, 1907 in op.cit., p. 91.

123. Adriani, "De Toradjas van Midden Celebes", in op. cit., p. 187.

124. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 472.

listen to his advice to accept Dutch authority:

Now you are subjugated to the Dutch
and now you will have to understand
that you must keep your yards clean
and extend your sawah
so that you will get a lot of rice
and supplies for [working] on the road.
The mountains must be pulled down
and the valleys filled up.
Don't be too tardy,
otherwise you will be sent to the river's mouth
and prison will be your accommodation.^{125.}

The introduction of herendiensten and the relocation and unification of villages were inter-related in several ways. The new villages were, as far as possible, located along the route of the new roads to facilitate the supply of labour for road construction and simultaneously, to render the control and supervision of the population easier. The government also appeared to favour the establishment of large villages as more viable economic units which would ultimately profit from the existence of roads to transport marketable produce. Finally, forced labour on roads and the construction of new villages, involving the introduction of different building skills, awareness of the essentials of European hygiene and moral life-styles, as well as the discipline of hard work, were seen as educative in themselves.

At the same time, the government was establishing the new economic base of the Central Sulawesi economy. The existence of a road net-work would stimulate trade.^{126.} The establishment of large villages, while more efficient to administer, would also generate greater efficiency in production because of the availability of a larger labour force and through the presence of more consumers.^{127.} School subsidies would also be more effectively employed in larger population centres. Individual family dwellings

125. ibid, p. 605.

126. Kruyt, "De betekenis van de natte rijstbouw", in op. cit., p. 47.

127. The existence of a large permanent village itself demanded and facilitated the establishment of large sawah complexes.

not only simplified the task of census-taking and taxation assessment but were also considered to be conducive to more hygienic conditions and a more orderly family life. This in turn was to stimulate larger families and the acceptance of the concept of private ownership.¹²⁸ In general terms, the Dutch implicitly believed that by regulating To Pamona village life they would bring stability and order to the basis of economic growth while the novel conditions would help dismantle the negative influences of traditional culture.

The extent of the change imposed on To Pamona life has already been exemplified in the case of Kasiguncu. On a broader scale, Kruyt's map, published as an appendix to the 1912 edition of De Bare'e-Sprekende Toradja's, indicates that, in the case of the To Pebato, approximately forty-three traditional villages were amalgamated into five new villages within a period of two to three years. For many inhabitants the shift, while within traditional tribal lands, would have taken them outside traditional village agricultural areas. Moreover, the transfer took place while the farming cycle had to be maintained and the extra burden of herendiensten and the payment of taxes had to be undertaken. The To Lage were incorporated into seven villages. The autonomous region of Lage, now also including the To Kadombuku tribe, resettled in two villages. The To Paladia resettled in one new village and most of the To Wingke mPoso in eight new villages (compared to the original total of twenty-seven). The autonomous region of Onda'e was made up of seven new To Onda'e villages, together with the To Pakambia villages, the rest of that tribe being located in the autonomous region of Mori. The population of the remaining two districts was similarly resettled in larger villages in government approved locations. Where the mission was involved in the process of resettlement, as was the case in most of the To Pebato villages, mission veto was exercised. In explaining the procedure, Hofman stated:

In all these removal parties I observe the following

128. Kruyt, "De Betekenis van de natte rijstbouw", op. cit., p. 49.

method: I allow the people to locate a site by themselves which they like and then [I come to] see if the chosen location also fulfills our requirements.^{129.}

This resettlement program was followed by a second major innovation - the introduction of wet-rice cultivation or sawah. Knowledge of sawah cultivation was limited and it had traditionally only been practised by the mountain tribes in the west and north and by the Toraja of South Sulawesi. Sawah cultivation was considered by the colonial government a much more productive farming method than dry-rice cultivation in terms of the efficient use of both labour and land resources and was considered to have a greater potential for surplus production.^{130.} Besides, Dutch agricultural expertise, based on its long Javanese and Minahassan experience, was specifically directed to wet-rice cultivation and, from both these areas, indigenous farming experts were imported to teach the "backward" To Pamona farmer more efficient methods.^{131.}

The benefits of sawah cultivation were apparent from a number of other perspectives. Geographically the relatively dry conditions of Central Sulawesi coupled with poor soil conditions and the existence of several large water channels favoured the introduction of irrigation. Particularly on the northern and southern shores of Lake Poso, the extensive alluvial plains were ideally suited to this.^{132.}

In addition, the new circumstances of large villages with the concomitant obligation to maintain these in good order, the need for a regular supply of compulsory labour and the attendance at schools of the children, demanded the existence, in close proximity to the enlarged village, of

129. Hofman, Report, Kasiguncu District, 1907, in op. cit., p. 90.

130. Kruyt, "Zending en Volkskracht", Pt. 4, in op. cit., p. 360.

131. Javanese and Minahassan experts were brought to Poso to teach the To Pamona people the new farming methods. As well, some To Pamona youth were sent to live amongst a Balinese colony in Parigi to learn sawah farming. (Kruyt, "De Betekenis van de natte rijstbouw" in op. cit., p. 53).

132. Adriani, "Maatschappelijke ... verandering", in op. cit. p. 5.

an efficient and sedentary food production area. The semi-nomadic life inherent in slash-and-burn, dry field cultivation could not be equated with the new permanent village life-style.

Sawah farming techniques also formed a reservoir of object lessons and became the basis of the educational impact of colonialization in this region. It imposed a sedentary life-style which promoted economic efficiency. It habituated the people to regimentation and order, unlike the dry-rice fields which, according to Kruyt, encouraged the To Pamona characteristic of "doing everything as they pleased whenever they think fit." In fact, "What the school is for the youth, the wet-rice fields became for the adults."¹³³ Sawah cultivation encouraged the formation of desirable attitudes as well as providing schooling in applied mathematics and mental arithmetic. This knowledge also assisted them in herendiensten because measuring the required size of new sawah fields taught the villagers to calculate the extent of road for which they were responsible. Long-term cultivation of a particular plot, impossible in traditional farming methods, now helped develop the notion of private property.

The distaste and fear of the To Pamona for the introduction of sawah manifested itself in the initial failure of these fields, caused by their refusal conscientiously to farm the rice according to the instructions they were given:

All the attention continued to be given to the dry fields and the construction and cultivation of sawahs was regarded as a sort of herendienst for the government.¹³⁴

All the rituals traditionally related to the growing of the staple, life-giving food, had to be abandoned in this

133. Kruyt, "De Betekenis van de natte rijstbouw", loc. cit. Kruyt argued in this article that the enforced introduction of sawah promoted every desirable change in To Pamona society. Kruyt listed the economy, hygiene, family relations, education, agriculture, private ownership and the acceptance of Christianity as areas benefiting directly or indirectly from the introduction of sawah farming.

134. ibid., p. 42.

new style of farming and sawah cultivation was seen by the To Pamona as an attack on their very existence. The new methods spurned the commands of the rice spirits, the earth spirits and the traditions of the ancestors. For the mission, the impact of the introduction of sawah on traditional religion was fundamental. In 1924, Kruyt wrote that there were still people who refused to eat sawah rice:

and there are probably more such fanatics. The sawah rice up to now is regarded as an article for export, which is sold to the foreigners on the coast ...

I would say that dry fields are regarded as more the possession of the women and the wet ones that of the men ... it often occurs that in a family where only some members are as yet Christian, the unbaptised are given the particular responsibility for the dry fields where they can bring offerings and carry out magical processes to their hearts content; while the sawah are more the responsibility of those members who are Christian. Eventually the wet-rice culture must win and then it will help them to place their trust even more in the Lord of heaven and earth.^{135.}

Sawah cultivation was only able to be introduced by the force and threat of the military presence. Even more than the forced labour regulations, it occasioned the humiliation, the punishment and dismissal of village chiefs whose responsibility it was to ensure that his villagers carried out the letter and spirit of the sawah regulations.^{136.} As the diary of Aspirant-Controleur Gobee reveals, it took all the concentration of the Dutch and the Dutch-appointed native officials to force this reform on the reluctant To Pamona. In an official exchange of opinion between the military administrator of Poso and the Controleur of

135. ibid, p. 53.

136. ibid, p. 43. "One had to sympathize with the chiefs because, with each visit of an inspecting official, they were the ones who were blamed if the sawah were not in order. And often, they had done their best, but their good intentions had been thwarted by the passive resistance of the people. Many a chief had the sawah to thank for his dishonourable dismissal because some government official regarded what was in fact powerlessness, as laziness or refusal."

Tentena the justification for this imposition was the "ethical" one: "these people must be protected against themselves by our authority".¹³⁷ Gezaghebber Mazee, under orders from his superiors, and himself convinced of the progress which strict enforcement of agricultural regulations would bring to Central Sulawesi, brushed aside his subordinate's defence of the villagers' failure to comply. What was needed he said was:

first and foremost, a continuous battering at the wall of indolence which impedes the development of these people. You can describe it as indolence or as unfamiliarity with industriousness or as aversion to anything new, being stuck in a routine, being conservative etc. ... the point remains the same - much more work can be done if better use is made of time; there is no understanding yet of the value of time.¹³⁸

While the cultivation of dry-rice fields or ladang was not prohibited (indeed had this been done, there clearly would have been wholesale starvation, if not revolt), the priority which was imposed on sawah cultivation interfered with the preparation and cultivation of the ladang. The often simultaneous preparation times of the two types of rice added to the opposition to the sawah, as Gobeë pointed out.¹³⁹

Mission and government were again in full agreement with this innovation. Both viewed the introduction of sawah as a valuable educational instrument. At a practical level, the mission did much to promote the acceptance of

137. Mazee to Gobeë, Confidential, 15 March, 1910.

138. loc. cit... Kruyt supported Mazee's policy of forcing the people against their will to carry out the government's wishes. In 1924, he wrote:

"In Mori and Malili, the authorities failed to exploit the population's fear resulting from the imposition of government rule, to force them to undertake wet-rice cultivation. And what do we see? In both administrative regions, the authorities are still having to cope with the people's opposition to sawah and only small and scattered fields have been constructed, while in the administrative district of Poso, large complexes have been energetically cultivated." (De Betekenis ...", in op. cit., p. 44).

139. Gobeë to Mazee, Tentena, 13 April, 1910.

the sawah, both directly and through the introduction of instruction in sawah farming in the schools. In return they benefited indirectly by the inherent onslaught on traditional religion and by the more regular attendance of children at school and of parents at Sunday meetings. Eventually, Christian harvest thanksgiving services and harvest offerings replaced the traditional agricultural ceremonies.

Kruyt was able to place the influence of Dutch colonialization within the context of the cultural evolution of the people he had studied. Looking back over the pre-historic development of the peoples of Central Sulawesi, he argued that Dutch colonization could be equated with the invasion of the region by several migrations of peoples who had brought with them all the skills with which the To Pamona were now blessed.

I have sketched in broad outline what a great influence the introduction of rice cultivation must have had on the Poso people; on their daily lives, on their character, on their religious conceptualization. But, for much of Central Celebes, the influence which rice cultivation exercises on the people was extended with the coming of the [Dutch] government to these lands and their introduction of wet-rice cultivation.¹⁴⁰

Like their predecessors, the Dutch used force to make radical change and improvement (as they saw it) to the way of life of the indigenous population. For Kruyt, the direction of the cultural evolution of the To Pamona people was a pre-destined movement towards God in which the Dutch government and mission, like the pre-historic invaders before them, were merely catalysts. Government officials like Mazee and Gobee who, in their different ways, shared the ethical vision, believed in a secular version of this cultural evolution.

Unlike the inexperienced Gobee and the impractical Engelenberg, Kruyt and Mazee were both prepared to justify the use of force to hasten the realization of

140. Kruyt "De Betekenis van de natte rijstbouw", in op. cit., p. 40.

their vision. There was no room here for false sentimentality and unjustified scruples.¹⁴¹ Both Colijn¹⁴² and Snouck Hurgronje,¹⁴³ two of the leading government advisers in the first decade of the century, supported them.

141. Mazee to Gobee, 15 March, 1910.

142. Colijn, "Memorandum", 1907.

143. Snouck Hurgronje to Kruyt, 12 January, 1911. Snouck Hurgronje's support was however, rather ambiguous. Commenting on Kruyt's report of the dispute between Gobee and Mazee, he wrote:

"Generally, I am still rather partial to a policy of first attempting to explain regulations which the administration wants to introduce". He was prepared to accept the imposition of ethical policies "by force and without much discussion," only where "the insights of the administration were generally correct". In general, he approved of "the union of civilian and military authority" in those areas where "authority has yet to be imposed and everything has yet to be organized".

CHAPTER SIX

MISSION SCHOOLS, POPULAR EDUCATION
AND THE ETHICAL POLICY
IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES 1892 to 1912

The establishment of a system of mission schools in the newly created villages of Central Sulawesi, while not in itself initiating policy in the colony, nevertheless involved the implementation of key features of turn-of-the-century Dutch colonial policy. Military conquest of the Outer Islands and the re-organization of the colony's economic base represented the final rejection of the nineteenth century onthoudingspolitick (policy of non-involvement) which, together with the cultuurstelsel, had its roots in that century's attempt to solve the economic problems inherent in political domination.

In many ways, the newly emerging colonial policy represented a return to the attempts of Van den Cappellen to re-establish the economic and political foundations of the newly regained colony after 1814 - encouragement, albeit hesitant, of the native economy and autochthonic schools and promotion of Christianity, within the context of attempting to re-impose political and military supremacy. These early attempts failed to provide sufficient economic momentum to extend Dutch political domination over the archipelago and indeed, brought the colony to the brink of bankruptcy, thus allowing Van den Bosch to leave his indelible mark on colonial thinking.¹

While the Liberal politicians of the second half of the nineteenth century rejected the principle of exploitation of colonial possessions by government monopoly, they concurred with the earlier period's disenchantment with colonial expansion. The theory of free trade capitalism pursued by European Liberals in the nineteenth

1. For a discussion of colonial policy in the first half of the nineteenth century, see P.W. van Weldren Rengers, The Failure of a Liberal Colonial Policy, (Dissertation, Chicago University, 1946).

century held that the benefits of trade could be obtained without direct colonization.² Thus, the climax of conservative Liberal politics of the 1860's and 1870's simultaneously represented the high point of anti-imperialism in Europe.³

The pressures of European economic expansion in the 1880's turned the attention of industrialists to markets which avoided the high tariff walls of European competitors and to regions which provided a source of raw materials. Competition by European nations for territories not yet claimed by rival imperialists increased and a new age of colonial expansion was ushered in. A new interdependence between the metropolitan industrial complex and its colonial appendages became essential to support this industrial growth, to provide European capitalism with a larger, more secure source for raw materials and an enlarged consumer base. These new economic needs highlighted the limited value of a purely exploitative approach to colonization, whether by government monopoly (cultuurstelsel) or by individual entrepreneur. Obtaining co-operation and association of interests became the

2. H.J.H. Hartgerink, De Staten Generaal en het Volksonderwijs in Nederlandsch Indie, (The States General and popular education in the Netherlands Indies), (Wolters, Groningen, 1942), pp. 96-97. "In France and England, theories which commended free trade and denied the benefits of colonial possession came into vogue. Around the 1860's and 1870's, this anti-imperialist position reached its climax and both Gladstone and Bismark as well as French statesmen of the time generally showed little enthusiasm for stimulating expansion of colonial territories".
3. This is not to deny that colonial powers like the Netherlands felt obliged to maintain their hold in areas already held and that consolidation of their authority in such areas took place. As Carnoy argues, the early Victorian whose theory of free trade capitalism held that "the benefits of trade could be obtained without direct colonization", nevertheless felt obliged to "protect free trade". While the British and French did not intend to build an empire in Africa, "The British thought they could convert Africans to Christian, free-trade capitalism and get them to accept the gains of integrating into the British system. They did not have a conscious policy of occupying and administering African territories. Strong anti-imperialist forces existed in both England and France. Africa was not occupied until the 1880's". (M. Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism, McKay Co., New York, 1974), pp. 118-119.

essential ingredients of successful economic and political domination. At a more idealistic level, the advocates of the new age of imperialism justified the interference in indigenous societies on humanitarian grounds which, unlike the economic rationalization, could be and were shared by the common man of the metropolitan electorate. In consequence, the banners of the forces of the new imperialists carried the slogans of "the white man's burden", the "mission civilisatrice" or the "ethische politiek".⁴

In the Netherlands, reaction against liberal laissez-faire politics found expression in 1888 with the election to government of the right-wing Christian faction, the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij. Rising to power on internal Dutch issues, this party related the developing humanitarian concern for the colony to its call for greater support of the Christian mission overseas by the State as the only way to achieve "the spiritual and cultural development of the [indigenous] population".⁵

The key to the Anti-Revolutionaire colonial politics was association (by the indigenous population with Euro-Christian culture) through education (in Christian mission schools). In its first Party Manifesto of 1879, its leader A. Kuyper, stated that:

the profit-seeking urge of our [Dutch colonial] politics to exploit the colonies in the interests of the state or the individual [entrepreneur] must be replaced by the politics of moral duty.⁶

Specifically, he called for a policy of voegdij (guardianship)

Guardianship, it should be noted, not to keep these peoples ignorant forever, but to accept them for what they are, ie. to accept them as ignorant, and as such, to accept the three-fold moral duty in relation to these ignorant nations which every guardian accepts towards his foster child. These are: (a) to raise it

4. Hartegerink, op. cit., p. 101.

5. B.J. Brouwer, De Houding van Idenburg en Colijn tegenover de Indonesische Beweging, (The attitude of Idenburg and Colijn towards the Indonesian movement), (Kok and Kampen, Amsterdam, 1958), p. 2.

6. ibid, p. 7.

properly, (b) to administer its estates to its best advantage and (c) to enable it in the future ... to take up a more independent position.⁷

An essential part of the government's duty therefore was to foster education and in particular to support the evangelical and educational initiatives of the Christian mission. The position of the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij became the moral touch-stone for colonial politics after 1888 because it provided a necessary rationalization for those seeking a new economic relationship between the colonial power and its Asian possession. The general provision of western-style education had come to be seen as the vehicle for "civilizing the natives", for changing those indigenous values and attitudes which prevented them from recognizing the social, economic and moral superiority of the colonizing nation and which more immediately inhibited their exploitation of the potential material benefits to be derived from their environment. Interpreted at the crudest level, "civilizing the native" was to provide the new basis for the economic viability of the colony.

It is against this background that the development of popular education in the Dutch East Indies must be seen. By 1907, when the school system was being established in Poso, a number of basic issues related to the mass education of the indigenous population had either been settled or had at least been defined. In the educational debates between 1890 and 1907, the role and nature of mission education was a major issue.

The history of the provision of mass education in the Dutch East Indies dates from 1892. The education regulation of that year represented a reaction against liberal education policy enshrined in the Education Decree of 1871 and the related regulation of 1874 prohibiting state funding of mission schools.

The 1871 Decree had been an attempt to meet the increasing demand of private industry for educated indigenous personnel and was the first major initiative

7. loc. cit.

by the government in education since the formation of the Department of Education and Religion in 1867.⁸ It resulted in the establishment of a significantly large number of schools - 248 in the succeeding ten years compared to the provision of only twenty-seven between 1851 and 1858.⁹ Nevertheless, the government continued to regard indigenous education as primarily for the training of native officials.¹⁰ The government schools established by the 1871 Decree, while modified to provide some measure of popular education, had in fact resulted in the design of a curriculum which

was too much for the needs of the ordinary man
... and too little for those pupils who, with

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8. As E. Graves indicates in her case study of the Minangkabau, (The Ever-Victorious Buffalo, University Microfilms International, 1973), the expansion of private enterprise and the corresponding extension of the government's infra-structure which this demanded in the area meant that "Both Minangkabau and Dutch alike, felt that the nagari schools could not provide the kind of training now seen as necessary." (p. 334).
9. L.N. van Asperen, Zending en Zendingsonderwijs op Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea (Dubeldeman, Leiden, 1936), (Mission and Mission education in Netherlands New Guinea) p. 6. The total number of government schools in 1858 was fifty-seven with 3,262 pupils. Private schools numbered forty-six with 1,433 pupils, while native Christian schools totalled 247 with a total attendance of 21,795.
10. H. Kroeskamp, Early Schoolmasters in a Developing Country, (van Gorcum and Co., Assen, 1973), p. 256. "According to section 1 of the Fundamental Education Decree, the new government school would provide education 'to the children of native chiefs, as well as to those of the further population of the Netherlands East Indies', ie. the government would, for the time being, give priority, for practical reasons, to the furnishing of education to the higher classes of society, whilst preserving the fundamental principle, viz. education for the whole of the population. What this amounted to of course, was that, even if it was only for the time being, the school aimed its education at a more or less qualified section of the population, the children of the native chiefs and those who, in a way, could be put in the same category. Hence, the new government school was still far from being a popular school." Thus, to modify Graves' conclusions, the scope of educational provisions immediately after 1871 demonstrated no more than "a philosophic bent which favoured spreading education ... as a part of a greater civilizing program", and in Carnoy's sense, demonstrated "a more general Liberal inclination to merge education and religion as part of more general economic development". (Graves, op. cit., p. 342). Religious instruction was at that time, expressly excluded from government and state-aided schools.

a view to a future official career were in need of more extensive education.¹¹

The criticisms of government schools as being mainly training grounds for indigenous officials and clerks and as thus providing an education inappropriate to the mass of the population, became the crux of the education debate in the following decades. It was this issue to which mission circles were responding when they argued that their own schools were best able to provide general elementary education suited to the mental development of the humble villager.

The collapse of the government school building program, due to the economic crisis of the 1880's, contributed a further element to the debate in support of the humble mission school. Not only was government education too academic and too Western-oriented and hence, unsuitable, it was also too expensive. In advising the dismantling of the monopolistic government education system in 1885, native school Inspector, Verkerk Pistorius pointed to the much cheaper and more effective mission school as a more suitable vehicle for the education of the masses.¹² Such schools, he stated, had been unwisely discriminated against by the subsidy regulations of 1874 which limited subsidy to privately initiated secular education. This had severely and unnecessarily restricted the extension of schooling for the indigenous population. Verkerk Pistorius was in fact advocating the provision of schools with an elementary curriculum which related more closely to the local community. Believing it unlikely that villagers themselves would initiate the establishment of schools, he recommended that the activities of non-government and particularly mission bodies in this field should be supported. The advice of this educationist appealed to the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij because it provided an educational rationale for the Christian party which could be shared by political parties of other persuasions who were also concerned with

11. ibid, p. 343.

12. Van Asperen, op. cit., p. 13.

the cost of extending education in the colony.

In developing a new educational concept for the Indies, the first Anti-Revolutionnaire Minister of Colonies, Keuchenius, gave physical expression to the dual function of education provided for the indigenous population by advocating two types of schools: one providing extended education for the well-to-do, the source of potential native officials and clerks; the other, providing a larger number of schools offering basic elementary education to the masses. The latter type,

would be best organized by the provision of subsidies to institutions established by the government in negotiation with the [indigenous] people or by the auspices of mission societies.¹³

Keuchenius, who soon after his appointment as Minister of Colonies, had called on the Netherlands Missionary Society to co-operate with the government in the education of the native,¹⁴ was unable during the brief tenure of his position to implement the new system. This occurred under his Liberal successor, Van Dedem who, in 1892, split the government native school of 1871 along the lines suggested by Keuchenius. Thus the system of first and second-class native schools was established but Article One of the 1892 Education Ordinance rejected the Verkerk Pistorius proposition that basic elementary schools be left to the private sector to organize - the principle of division of educational responsibility. While attempting to meet the major criticism of the 1871 Decree, the 1892 Ordinance continued the principle of government control. Elementary education to be provided in second-class schools was defined as a simplified form of instruction, taking less time, costing less in fees, taking place in more simply designed buildings and generally suiting the needs, capacities and environment of the common villager.¹⁵

13. Indische Gids, 1889, vol. 11, Onderwijs voor Inlanders (Education for Natives), p. 762.

14. Minutes N.M.S., 30 May, 1888. Minister of Colonies to N.M.S., 8 May, 1888.

15. J.G. Hoekman, De Voornaamste Voorschriften Betreffende het Inlandsch Onderwijs, (The major regulations relating to native education), (Batavia, 1915), p. 73. See Appendix No. 9.

The impact of this Liberal government's re-definition of education needs was minimal. In essence, it represented a rationalization of educational facilities and resources directed at an already established clientele in the more effectively colonized and better known areas of the colony. Regulations for the establishment of second-class schools were vague, stating merely that such schools "will be established according to need, both in places where first-class schools have been established and in other places"¹⁶. Thus, a need for education had first to be expressed before a school would be provided, a conservative approach to educational provision which contrasted strongly with the attitude of those who wanted to stimulate education as a positive feature of a more radical policy of colonial intervention. By the mid 1890's, the notion that "the establishment of Dutch authority was a blessing for the Indies" was generally accepted across the political spectrum in The Hague. For all parties, this view of colonial responsibility entailed a concomitant extension of educational facilities as the vehicle for spreading the benefits of European civilization.¹⁷ This concern related specifically to the long neglected Outer Islands.

The new thrust of colonial politics nevertheless foundered on the limitations of the colony's financial resources and specifically on the lack of teacher training facilities which made an expansion of a government school system a practical impossibility for the immediate future.¹⁸

16. loc. cit.. Minister of Colonies, Bergma, defined "need" in terms of the existence of sufficient "demand for the establishment of schools", (Hartgerink, op.cit. p. 85.). As Hartgerink points out, even this negative approach was not followed as the Koloniaal Verslag of 1897 stated many Javanese children were being prevented from going to school on the grounds that there was not sufficient room (Koloniaal Verslag, 1899, p. 132).

17. Brouwer, op. cit., p. 15.

18. In 1900, there were five teacher training schools with a total of 144 indigenous pupils, (S.L. van der Wal, Het Onderwijsbeleid in Nederlands-Indië, statistical appendix).

These practical considerations demanded a further review of existing education regulations in 1895. It was argued, particularly by Christian parties, that mission schools operating largely in the Outer Islands, provided a far cheaper and more suitable type of education than the government could provide.¹⁹ The success of Johannes Kruyt in Mojowarno moreover, provided useful evidence of the effectiveness of mission schools even in Java.²⁰ Hence, if there was agreement as to the need to expand elementary education amongst the indigenous people in order to bring them the blessings of European civilization cheaply, then a policy of subsidizing mission schools would provide a satisfactory solution. By 1895, the acceptability of this argument across the political spectrum was manifested by the new subsidy regulations approved in that year by a Liberal government. These emphasized that the mission school was recognized as equivalent to the second-class government school and could, as distinct from the 1874 restriction, be religiously based, provided religious instruction was not compulsory. In other words, the 1895 regulations accepted the mission organizations as partners with the government in the provision of popular education.²¹ As a result, mission schools increased in number by twenty-two percent in contrast to a meagre six percent increase in government schools between 1892 and 1900.²² (See Figure 1.)

By the end of the decade, the principle of extending elementary education to the village level had been incorporated in the political platforms of both sides of parliament. Since radical expansion of government schools was considered to be financially out of the question, it was recognized that support of simple mission schools "was the most practical and least expensive method of supplying the need for education of the ordinary man".²³

19. Hartgerink, op. cit., p. 107.

20. See Kroeskamp, op. cit., p. 420ff..

21. Hartgerink, op. cit., p. 92.

22. See Appendix No. 10. 23. Hartgerink, op. cit., p.92.




FIGURE 1

Private (Subsidized and Unsubsidized) and Government Elementary Schools in the Dutch East Indies 1881-1915*

*From: Hollandsch-Inlandsch Onderwijs Commissie, Publicatie 9. Appendices No. xxix, xxxiii.

Furthermore, all parties agreed that the aim of universal elementary education was to raise the Indies population to a more economically dynamic level, in order that they might develop, materially as well as spiritually, although some disagreement continued to exist in relation to the underlying principles. While Liberals and Socialists were primarily concerned to raise the material welfare of the indigenous population, right-wing Christian parties saw moral improvement as the pre-requisite to a permanent improvement in the material welfare of the villagers. It was argued that this could only be provided by acquainting them with the tenets of Christianity.

This difference in principles initially had little significance in practice, since there was a common interest in education as the catalyst for material improvement. In reporting to the right-wing Christian Party Minister of Colonies, Idenburg, the Liberal colonial specialists, Fock and van Deventer described education as the key to solving Java's economic problems. They argued for a secular version of spiritual improvement through education as the basis for improvement in the economic condition of the villager. In so doing, they quoted Japanese progress as an object lesson of the effectiveness of universal education.^{24.}

The importance of education in providing intellectual training as outlined in the advice of Fock and van Deventer, was the major argument used by colonial educationists such as Dr. D. Bos and the Inspector of Native Education, J. Habbema. Drawing on well-established faculty psychology, the latter argued for the importance of providing the "natives" with the opportunity to exercise their intellectual faculties through academic education. Such exercise would "develop the conceptual abilities of the pupils in order to turn them into logically thinking people", which it was assumed, the natives were not. It was this lack of ability which was seen as the root cause of their failure to arrange their lives profitably. The three "R's", and in

24. Hartgerink, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

particular, arithmetic were seen as fundamental to this training process. Habbema regarded the latter as providing the main opportunity for "spiritual gymnastics" in the school. The high level of concentration it demanded would result in "beginning the development of the spirit."²⁵.

Developing his position further in an article published in 1904, entitled "Educational policy and the economic importance of education for the population of the Netherlands Indies", Habbema concluded that:

simple but effective developmental education of the native population is in their and our political and financial interest and therefore the increase in native government schools, especially in Java and Madura, must be regarded as very important.²⁶.

Arguing a case reminiscent of the one advocating working-class education in England and Australia in the mid-nineteenth century, Habbema considered that the value of the three "R's" lay not so much in their contribution to the individual's knowledge, as in their effect on the pupil's moral and spiritual development. The native was not lazy but carefree and unconcerned about the future. Native children were spoiled and, without adequate moral training in the home, needed to be placed under the supervision of a well trained teacher in an elementary school. There they would learn "orderliness, neatness, diligence, a sense of duty and obedience", the main ingredients for material progress.²⁷.

In his article of 1904, the influential Inspector of Native Education touched on two sensitive educational issues regarding the provision of universal education. Calling strongly for an academic education, Habbema discounted both the educational views of the left, as put forward by Socialist M.P. van Kol, and those of the Christian

25. ibid, p. 105.

26. Habbema, "Onderwijs politiek en economisch belang van onderwijs aan de bevolking van Nederlandsch-Indie", (Educational policy and the economic importance of education for the population of the Netherlands Indies), in Indische Gids, vol. 22, 1904, p. 843. See also C. Penders, Indonesia, Q.U.P., 1977, pp. 155-156.

27 Habbema in op. cit., p. 844

right. Van Kol had stressed the need for universal elementary education to be relevant to the needs of the villager. In 1897, he had criticised the second-class school curriculum as "that present-day ridiculous education" which "while apparently simple, is still European". "One must not tear the natives from their element; popular education must be suited to the development and the needs of the land and the people".²⁸ Academic education, he believed, should be provided only in those areas where it was relevant, in the major towns and commercial centres. Elsewhere, learning to read and write was of little value since such skills were not relevant in a culture where reading and writing were not practised and would therefore be forgotten as soon as the pupil left school.²⁹ Instead, van Kol called for the erection of simple village schools providing object lessons for "farmers and fishermen" to "teach the children something about nature, about the sun, the stars, the plants, the animals, water and fertilizer; to teach them to work and to remove their superstitions".³⁰

Habbema countered this type of approach to the education question by arguing that the aim of elementary education as he saw it was not limited to the removal of illiteracy but was aimed at strengthening moral and intellectual development through developing habits of logical thinking. Intellectual education would not, as van Kol often stated, lead to the production of dissatisfied position-hunters if the provision of education was sufficiently wide-spread. The expansion of simple general education was the best remedy for the problem of the "learned proletariat" and would moreover have the added advantage of counteracting the tendency of the ignorant masses to follow a few educated trouble-makers. It would further help to prevent the exploitation of the people by

28. Van Kol, Nederlandsch-Indie in de Staten Generaal, (The Netherlands-Indies in the Dutch Parliament), (M. Nijhoff, s'Gravenhage, 1911), p. 268.

29. Hartgerink, loc. cit.. Van Kol's slogan was: "In a land without books, one can afford to cast them aside".

30. ibid, p. 107.

village heads as well as by Chinese and Arab entrepreneurs.^{31.}

The failure of the experiment in practical trades and domestic science education initiated by the Regent of Ngawi, Raden Mas Toemenggoeng Oetojo, appeared to support Habbema's assessment of the value of intellectual education. The school, established in 1904, was reported in the Koloniaal Verslag of 1907, as in a state of imminent collapse.^{32.}

On the other hand, the Inspector rejected the notion of placing popular education in the hands of the mission. The argument in favour of mission schools was supported by those who saw the rapid expansion of education, particularly in the Outer Islands, as of fundamental political importance. Habbema denied the urgency of educational provision in more primitive and less densely populated areas. The Outer Islands could therefore wait, he felt, while provision of mass education was made in regions such as Java where high population density made the struggle for existence and economic progress more difficult.^{33.}

In addition, he stressed that the beneficial impact of education depended upon the provision of well trained teachers. The establishment of schools per se was not the real issue. Good teaching was essential to attack the inefficiency of the currently existing schools which resulted from the deplorable attrition rate. In 1902, more than half the teachers in Java were untrained; thirty percent of pupils left school before completing first grade and only seven percent of the intake cohort completed elementary education.^{34.} Since, for Habbema, training in habits of logical thinking was the basis of spiritual and material advancement and not religious belief, he was disinclined to encourage the expansion of mission schools, with their over-emphasis on religious instruction and their dependence on teachers who were primarily religious leaders.

31. Habbema, loc. cit..

32. Hartgerink, op. cit., pp. 107-108.

33. Habbema, in op. cit., p. 843.

34. loc. cit.. The attrition rate in mission schools was sixty percent.

In his assessment of mission schools, the Inspector referred to the Annual Report on Education which repeatedly stated that:

the educational situation in private schools is in general, less favourable than that in public schools, which has to be explained by [the presence of] as a rule, untrained teaching personnel who are less suited to their task [than their colleagues in public schools] In most private schools one searches in vain for developmental education. In most private schools education extends no further than instruction in reading, writing and the four main processes of arithmetic.³⁵

Ultimately, the question of native elementary schools was decided in 1907 by the pragmatic Governor-General, van Heutz. Confronted by Minister of Colonies, Fock's f.100 million proposal for the expansion of second-class government schools, van Heutz countered with his proposal for the establishment of subsidized village schools. In rationalizing what was basically a financial decision, van Heutz drew on several aspects of educational and political thinking current at the time. Firstly, he argued that Fock's second-class school was irrelevant to seven-eighths of the population, i.e., those living outside the major centres. Accepting van Kol's position, the Governor-General stated that his Minister's scheme "would not produce a strong and civilized population, but purely a dissatisfied proletariat which could read and write but not work."³⁶ Nonetheless, he rejected van Kol's radical suggestion to introduce a largely non-literary education, thereby accepting the substance of Habbema's argument and the evidence of the Ngawi experiment. On the other hand, he expressed his belief that the simplified nature of the teaching in village schools would justify the employment of graduates from the second-class schools as teachers.

35. Algemeen Verslag van het Indisch Onderwijs, 1906, p.7. This paragraph was repeated substantially verbatim in the reports of 1904 to 1907. In terms of absenteeism, government schools in the first decade of the century were substantially better than mission schools. The latter recorded average absenteeism of one day in five compared to that in government schools of one day in 7.2. (Hartegerink, op. cit., pp. 86-87.)

36. S.L. van der Waal, op. cit., Document 30, note 4, p.122

Thus, van Heutz's village school was to be a simplified version of the already basic second-class government elementary school, whose staff, building, language medium and facilities more closely reflected the village environment. In this respect, van Heutz's concept had absorbed much of the argument favouring mission schools. The similarity between mission school and desa school was further increased by the fact that the initiative for the establishment of the latter was to lie with the private sector, which would receive subsidies from the government. Like mission schools, the desa schools would be built by the villagers, a procedure seen as encouraging a sense of responsibility and pride of ownership, while at the same time, promoting an interest in education at the village level. These financial and educational features also characterized mission schools, but the desa school, like the government elementary school, was designed for Muslim Java and therefore secular.³⁷

Finally, by encouraging the initiative of the village administration in the establishment of these schools, van Heutz was able to relate projects such as schools and rice-credit institutions to the politically attractive decentralization concept. The political and economic benefits of decentralization were cogently argued by

37. The difference between government school and community school was emphatically restated in April, 1908 by the Director of Binnenlands Bestuur, (administration) when he emphasized that the second-class school could not function as a vehicle for popular education, partly because of the high costs involved and also because in such schools, the desire to obtain an official position, preferably with the public service, would be awakened. "For the people in general, for the children of the ordinary desa-man, whose goal will have to be to continue in the life-style of their parents, the education given in the community schools as these are currently being developed, will in my opinion, be the appropriate training. The present level of development of the people of Java determines, for the immediate future at least, no higher demands." Historisch Overzicht van het Regeeringsbeleid van het Onderwijs voor de Inlandsche Bevolking, (Historical Overview of the government policy regarding the education of the native population). Publication 9 (second part) of the Dutch-Native Education Committee, 1930), p. 49. See Appendix No. 11.

Cohen-Stuart in 1907, in response to Colijn's official memorandum on the subject in the same year.^{38.}

Cohen-Stuart's argument for the indigenization of the colonial service was imbued by the same pragmatism as that of van Heutz and Colijn and expressed the approach to colonial policies in the higher echelons of the colonial government in the Indies. The support for decentralization, indigenization and education was in essence, an inversion of those arguments which had been used to justify the onthoudingspolitiek of the nineteenth century, a point which Colijn had recognized when drawing up his blueprint for the administrative organization of the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes.

The primary motivation underlying both colonial policies was the achievement of economic viability. In the early nineteenth century, it had been argued that colonial expansion was beyond the capability of Dutch resources, because political and military considerations necessitated the concentration of these resources in a limited geographical area in order that the maximum exploitation of economic potential of a subservient population could be guaranteed. In the twentieth century, it was being suggested that a broader economic base could be achieved by colonial expansion, if the indigenous population could be motivated to identify with colonial objectives in terms of economic productivity and self-administration.

Thus, Cohen-Stuart argued for a greater provision of education to supply the increased number of indigenous personnel needed to administer an extended colony. The indigenization of the civil service was essential to allow the government to finance the expansion of the administration because the native official "will be paid at a lower rate based on the lower standard of living of the people". Colonial expansion required indigenization to enable European personnel to be spread more thinly across a greater area so that "we restrict ourselves as much as

38. J.W.T. Cohen-Stuart, "Oprichting van Inlandsche Rechtscholen", Indische Gids, 1907, pp. 1332-1333. See also, Penders, op. cit., p. 165.

possible to a supervisory role and leave the task of governing wherever possible, to the natives themselves."

But indigenization required the decentralization of the administration. Decentralization was not only a logical response to the expansion of the bureaucracy but it enabled the restructuring of administrative tasks and a more rationalized division of labour which in turn allowed for the employment of cheaper, non-European personnel. There were two other beneficial side effects of decentralization. Firstly, by absorbing non-European personnel into colonial administration, there was greater opportunity for them to identify with European colonial interests and secondly, by promoting the appearance of self-rule, the negative effects of foreign colonialism could be disguised. In this sense, the policy of decentralization was not a change in policy but a refinement and more effective implementation of the nineteenth century practice of leaving native states in the Outer Islands fairly much to themselves, after, in theory, having gained the ruler's agreement to govern his people justly and humanely.

Finally, Cohen-Stuart intimated that the success of decentralization and associated indigenization would be enhanced by the extension of education among the masses generally. This provision, on the basis of arguments already described, would help "bind the people to us", thus easing the demands on the native administration. The requirement that the village establish its own school also represented a further step in decentralization and indigenization.

Van Heutz's solution to the problem of providing universal elementary education, even though it was initially restricted to Muslim Java and Madura and in 1908 to Aceh, was to have a significant impact on education throughout the archipelago. The neutral community school, later generally known as the volkschool, came to be regarded as

an alternative to the mission school in the Outer Islands.³⁹ It competed with the mission school but not with the government school. The introduction of the desa school revalued the educational standard of the government school but devalued that of the mission school which, since 1895, had been placed on a par with the second-class government school. By the middle of the second decade of this century, the mission school had been officially equated with the sub-elementary village school. The village school concept offered a solution to the political problem of providing basic Western-style education to the Muslim population, an issue which had hampered the acceptance of the proposition that mission organizations exclusively should provide relevant village level education.⁴⁰ Thus Colijn, van Heutz's adviser on decentralization, had welcomed the establishment in Central Sulawesi of community schools in Muslim areas and mission schools in "heathen" areas.⁴¹ By 1910, neutral community schools even began to encroach on traditional mission areas as in the school conversion controversy in the Minahassa.⁴² In developing his "association" concept, Snouck Hurgronje, while arguing the importance of education in the process of "associating

39. This was despite the fact that initially the van Heutz model found no support amongst the professionals in the Department of Education. It was its economic attractiveness and van Heutz's personal support which ensured the success of the desa school, (Historisch Overzicht, pp. 45-6).

40. Hartegerink, op. cit., p. 108.

41. H. Colijn, Memorandum to the Governor-General, September, 1907.

42. There are numerous references for this episode. One which is highly critical of the mission and its favoured treatment by the government is a pamphlet by T.F. Viersen, "De Invoering der Onderwijs-reorganisatie," (The implementation of educational re-organization), (Blikman & Sartorius, Amsterdam, 1913). The mission's position was outlined in a pamphlet written by the Director of the N.M.S., Dr. J.W. Gunning, entitled, "Het Inlandsch Onderwijs in de Minahassa en op de Sangir en Talauer Eilanden", (Native education in the Minahassa and S. & T. Islands), (Hollandia Press, Baarn, 1910). See also, "De Onderwijsquestie in de Minahassa", Indische Gids, 1911, pp. 680-681.

the civilization of the native population of the Indies Archipelago with ours", also questioned the "chances of success for the Christian missions in countries which have been touched with the spirit of Islam", and warned:

under no circumstances should our people and government even consider the possibility of delegating to the Christian mission, the implementation of the ideal of 'association' while neglecting the movement in the native world which is at present gaining momentum and which provides such a very favourable opportunity.⁴³.

In areas not "touched with the spirit of Islam" and particularly in the newly colonized inland areas of the Outer Islands, official colonial government belief was nevertheless that association could be achieved through conversion of the inhabitants to Christianity. Mission activity in such areas was of great political significance and van Heutz regarded "the mission as a welcome ally in the pacification of the Outer Islands."⁴⁴ The "conqueror of Aceh" valued its presence as a defence against the further expansion of Islam. Islamic penetration was generally believed to follow in the wake of colonization as Muslim traders, who had earlier been discouraged by the lack of security in such areas, now penetrated inland to the source of valued trade items. With trade went inter-marriage and proselitization. As Snouck Hurgronje outlined in his advice on rapprochement with "the half-hearted Muslim population of the Indies", Islamization made 'association' so much more difficult to achieve.⁴⁵

To these political considerations were now added the

43. C. Snouck Hurgronje, Nederland en de Islam, (Leiden, Brill, 1911), p. 85. (See also, Penders, op. cit., pp. 157-165). Snouck Hurgronje continued: "If the government forces people who desire Western-style education publicly to subsidize schools in which Christian religious instruction is imposed on the people, then one can undoubtedly expect strong opposition to be mounted against the idea of association". ibid, p. 88. This may well have been a reference to the Minahassan issue.

44. M.C. Jongeling, Het Zendingconsulaat, 1906-1942, p.52.

45. Snouck Hurgronje, op. cit.. Part Four, Passim.

benefits seen to derive from the provision of elementary education, a traditional adjunct of mission endeavour. In supporting the development of mission education in newly pacified non-Muslim areas, the government was able to exploit the only legally acceptable means of financially aiding Christian organizations to achieve both the political and socio-economic benefits of the mission presence.

Constitutionally, the government was constrained to maintain a strict neutrality in regard to religion and the official relations between state and mission were limited to the implementation of Article 123 of the 1854 Constitution and to the current subsidy regulations. Direct aid to the mission, unlike government funding of the official Protestant Indies Church, was seen to violate the principle of neutrality, since the object of the mission was the extension of Christianity while the Indies Church ostensibly serviced existing communities.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, the subsidization of mission schools effectively meant financial support of the mission itself since generally the indigenous mission school teacher operated simultaneously as the leader of the local Christian community. Further indirect financial aid was introduced officially in 1909 with the acceptance of the principle of a "civilizing subsidy" (Beschavingssubsidie) offered to the Rheinisch Mission Society in recognition of this organization's service in the interests of education and its contribution to knowledge of the language and customs of the indigenous population of Mentawai.⁴⁷

By not financing the Christian missions directly the government claimed to be maintaining its neutral position but its sympathy for mission activity in general could be gauged by its generosity in the matter of school subsidies. In this context, the question of subsidizing Islamic institutions was not, in theory, an issue of whether or not the government should support that religion but whether

46. For a history of the Protestant Indies Church, see W.T. Baron van Boetzelaer van Dubbeldam, De Protestantsche Kerk in Nederlandsch-Indie, (s'Gravenhage, M. Nijhoff, 1947).

47. Jongeling, op. cit., p. 188 ff..

Islamic schools such as pesantren in fact fulfilled the European criteria of a school.^{48.}

The motivation for offering subsidies and the legal nature of such financial aid could vary according to how the role of the mission school was perceived. There were those, such as Colijn, who argued for a generous extension of subsidies as a means of furthering the evangelical function of the mission. He favoured the transfer of the responsibility of educational provision to the mission where this was politically viable and, in so far as these private organizations accepted responsibility for carrying out this duty of the state, he believed the missions should receive full restitution of expenses incurred.^{49.}

Others argued that where the mission shared with the state the important task of providing elementary education and so contributed to the economic and social development of the colony, it could claim a right to receive a subsidy from the government but not a right to full restitution. This position appealed to those who saw support of mission schools as an interim measure while the government was not yet able to assume responsibility for the provision of universal elementary education. Consequently, inherent in this position was the requirement that mission schools follow the guidelines laid down for government-initiated schools.^{50.}

The third position regarded the mission schools as the most appropriate institution for promoting interest in

48. Hartgerink, op. cit., p. 91.

49. H. Colijn, "Onderwijspolitiek en Zending", (Educational policy and the mission). This was the text of an address given on May 5, 1910 on the occasion of the 49th Mission Day of the Netherlands Mission Association and printed in De Macedonier, vol. 14, 1910, pp.161-196.

50. Franken-van Driel, P.M., Regeering en Zending in Nederlandsch-Indie, (Government and Mission in the Netherlands Indies), (H.J. Paris - Kruyt, Amsterdam, 1923), pp. 35-36. This position was advanced by educationists K.F. Creutzberg and J. Hardeman in "Het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie", p. 106. Quoted in Franken-van Driel, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

education in those areas where local initiative for the establishment of schools was otherwise not likely to be forthcoming. This position presupposed the desirability of private initiative in education over the provision of education by the state. It was a position which logically appealed to, but was not necessarily held by, the missions as the most defensible one. It allowed them to argue that their involvement in schools was not based on motives of proselytization but rather was founded on the principle of guardianship; that they were simply nurturing positive values with the aim of handing schools over to the (Christian) communities when these were prepared to accept that responsibility. From this point of view, the mission school could be regarded as a type of volksschool, (community school) and, if this comparison were accepted, the financial responsibility for the school would be largely with the community itself. Like the village schools of Java, such schools would need to be adapted to the needs and conditions of the local area.⁵¹

The subsidy regulations of 1895 represented an expression of the second position: that it was desirable for mission organizations to share the task of extending the provision of education. In accepting the help of the missions, the regulations made clear that these non-state elementary schools would be required to offer an education equivalent to the second-class government elementary school. By 1906, partly as a result of the sixty-two percent increase in mission schools after 1900 made possible by a more sympathetic interpretation of the 1895 regulations and partly as a result of the increase in missionary activity following the opening up of Outer Island areas, subsidy regulations were again revised.⁵² Although these new regulations (applying initially only to

51. This position was argued by the Director of the Netherlands Mission Society on numerous occasions. The three positions are identified in Franken-van Driel. op. cit., pp. 34-38.

52. Hartgerink, op. cit., p. 94. See Appendix No. 12. Figure 2 shows the dramatic increase in government assistance to mission education facilitated by the further liberalization of subsidy regulations in 1906.




FIGURE 2

Subsidies Provided for Private Indigenous Elementary Schools 1881-1915*

*From: Hollandsch Inlandsch Onderwijs Commissie, Publicatie 9. Appendix xxviii.

Java and Madura) further strengthened the position of the mission by recognizing subsidies as a right and thus accepting the missions as equal partners. The basis of the extended subsidies modified the status of the mission school along the lines of the desa or community school.

Once again, financial considerations predominated in this process. In the school conversion issue in the Minahassa, the argument in support of the transfer of schools from government to mission control revolved around the greater economy which would be achieved. Further argument, advanced particularly by proponents of mission schools, was that these suited local needs better than the more academic government schools. There was an obvious connection between the arguments favouring mission schools and those favouring desa schools but this connection had not yet been made because in the latter half of the first decade of this century the mission school was still regarded in general debate as the Christian version of the second-class neutral government school. In fact, there had always been desa schools: those run by the missions in the Outer Islands. This point was finally grasped by Colijn in a series of addresses inside and outside parliament in the years 1909-1910.

For Colijn, mission education was simply an extension of the government's duty to provide education. In fulfilling part of the government's responsibility, Colijn argued⁵³. that the mission was entitled to full restitution of expenses it incurred but the overall responsibility for educational decisions remained with the government. Thus, the government should determine whether and, if so where, it wished to make use of mission schools. Similarly, the decision lay with the government regarding the nature of the education to be provided. Where it determined it had no need for the type of education provided by the mission, it would therefore not be obliged to meet the expenses incurred since, in that case, the mission was not fulfilling a function of the government.

53. H. Colijn, *Onderwijspolitiek en Zending*, loc. cit..

Since, as Colijn assumed, "in most cases [mission education] equates more closely to so-called desa education than to government second-class schools" and thus failed to meet the government's educational requirements, mission schools should not receive government subsidies under the 1895/1906 regulations. However, Colijn was sufficiently convinced of the value of mission education not to deprive it of all government financial support. His solution was that, where mission schools were comparable to desa schools, the government should treat them as such:

that is to say, they should receive the government subsidy which would have been given to the community and further, where school plantations or community tax cannot be applied to help meet the outstanding costs related to maintaining the school, the private schools will need to meet their further expenses by imposing school fees.⁵⁴

Colijn did not wish to imply that mission schools would be imposed upon a community. Only where the desa population "was prepared to accept" a mission school and "did not wish to have its own community school" would the mission school be supported by the government. Even then, missions could not expect unlimited assistance and he emphasized to his mission audience in 1910:

It should be clear to the mission that it would eventually be unjust that, where mission schools are on the same level as desa schools, their costs are largely met by the state, while the expenses of the community schools are almost entirely met by the community.⁵⁵

The policy outlined by Colijn was officially adopted by the government in 1912 from which time the distinguishing terms of "volkschool" and "standard school" were applied indiscriminately to relevant mission and non-mission schools. Moreover, the government, in a series of decisions from 1910, also adopted Colijn's suggestion that where the volkschool was being administered by a mission organization the government would, as it were, enter into a contract with the mission to administer such schools on behalf of the

54. Colijn, in op. cit., p. 183.

55. loc. cit..

community in return for a set annual amount of financial assistance.^{56.}

In the final analysis, Colijn was not aiming to limit the impact of the mission but to place the government's relation with it on a more rational and politically acceptable basis. For Colijn, the state was clearly a Christian state.^{57.} Where it was financially and politically possible for the government and the mission to co-operate, as in the vast non-Muslim areas of the colony,

There is every hope that the heathen peoples ... numbering about two and a half million ... inhabiting about one third of the archipelago ... could be converted to Christianity. Should the government, however, neglect active promotion of the mission then instead, it can be anticipated that people freed from the bonds of animism will by and large, throw themselves into the arms of undemanding Mohammedanism. The choice cannot be difficult.^{58.}

56. The best known and probably most influential of these "contracts" was the Sumba-Flores agreement.

57. Colijn entered the Dutch parliament as a member of the Anti-Revolutionaire Party in 1909, becoming Minister of War in 1911. Governor-General Idenburg, former Minister of Colonies and fellow Anti-Revolutionaire Party member, said of Colijn in 1913:

"Colijn is no philosopher. I suspect, should he read what I have written about him above, that he would call me a dreamer (or worse). He is, if I see it correctly, a man of big business, who expects great things from large capitalist undertakings and who, while he would never admit that the question of the treatment of natives is inconsequential, is however, fearful of what he describes as 'the ethical business.'

Idenburg to Kuyper, 1 January, 1913. (Quoted in Brouwer, op. cit., p. 32.) Colijn's emphasis on the distinction between village and government schools underscores the fact that the former schools were quite consciously regarded as educationally sub-standard. The wide-spread promotion of such schools as part of the ethical program was thus a sop to indigenous aspirations and genuine European concern. In themselves, they could have had no lasting impact and merely lengthened the period required to complete a recognized elementary education. Their trivial nature represented a compromise between providing education and avoiding a disruption of a status quo favourable to colonial interests.

58. Colijn, in op. cit., p. 190.

In Muslim areas, the provision of education would not aim directly at conversion but at the 'erosion' of the 'hard rock of Islam' and in this process of transmutation, potential could be created for an acceptance of Christianity.⁵⁹

Indeed, no party was prepared to argue for the complete freedom of Islam in education. The educational debate was limited to the benefits of neutral government education versus actively promoted mission education. While in the Netherlands itself the principle had been adopted that education was a matter of private (ie. religious) initiative and that the government's task was merely to supplement this, the transfer of this principle to the colony was being disputed. Strong pressure from the progressive Liberals led by van Deventer and from the Socialists, forced the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij Minister of Colonies, De Waal Malefijt, to maintain the appearance of neutrality in the Indies. Despite opposition from the party leader, Dr. Kuyper, who vigorously attacked what he regarded as Snouck Hurgronje's proposal for modern, ir-religious education as the basis of his association program, the Minister of Colonies maintained ambiguously: "Under the Dutch flag, there must be complete freedom of religion in the Netherlands as well as in the Indies."⁶⁰ Unofficially, Christian education continued to be covertly promoted and favoured.

In this pro-mission climate, the second official point of contact between government and mission, Article 123 of the Constitution, which allowed government control of the geographical area of missionary endeavour, became more or less a formality. Conceived in an earlier secular Liberal era,⁶¹ it was defined in its most restrictive

59. Idema, Het Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indie, (Parliamentary history of the Netherlands Indies), (M. Nijhoff, s'Gravenhage, 1924), p. 258.

60. loc. cit.. A practical result of this compromise was the acceptance in 1915 of the principle that in all state-aided schools established after 1915, religious instruction would be non-compulsory. (See Hartgerink, op. cit., pp. 148-149).

61. Its initial aim appeared to have been to check the entry of non-Dutch missionaries into the Dutch East Indies. See Franken-van Driel, op. cit., pp. 47-49.

form in 1876 as part of an anti-mission package designed to curb mission activity.⁶² With the shift in colonial policy towards greater Dutch intervention, these restrictions were gradually dismantled so that the law's major function in the twentieth century was the prevention of competition between different mission organizations in the one region.⁶³

So important had relations between mission and government become by the first decade of this century that the need was felt for the establishment of a permanent mission representative in Batavia. A mission consulate was opened there in 1906, the Consul representing most Protestant mission bodies. His function was to provide a link between the missionaries spread throughout the archipelago and the government bureaucracies, particularly the Department of Education and Department of the Interior. To use the analogy of the historian of this institution, his role was "to throw oil between the wheels where the machines of government and mission came into contact."⁶⁴ The maintenance of good relations between government and mission had become of fundamental importance at this time when the mission had been accepted into a partnership with the government in the socio-economic development of the Outer Islands of the archipelago. The mission continued to receive a sympathetic hearing from the central colonial administration between 1903 and 1921 under the Governor-Generalships of van Heutz, Idenburg and van Limburg Stirum,⁶⁵ although the official attitude was not always shared by government representatives in the field. For this reason, it was advantageous to the mission to be able to communicate directly with their man in Batavia who could fight their cause directly and thus circumvent the cumbersome bureaucratic channels of government.

62. Franken-van Driel, op. cit., p. 53.

63. ibid, p. 60.

64. Jongeling, op. cit., p. 52.

65. loc. cit. See also Brouwer on Idenburg's Governor-Generalship. (Brouwer, op. cit., Ch. 2, passim.).

Notwithstanding the sympathetic attitude of the government in the first decades of the century, financial considerations continued to limit the development of mission school networks. Since the financial link between mission and government was the principle of providing subsidies, it was in relation to this issue that inherent educational, political and philosophical differences between the two manifested themselves. While in general there was no real disagreement about the principle of providing subsidies, financial limitations led inevitably to considerations of eligibility for funding. Dependent on government aid for their existence but adamant about maintaining their individuality, missions were forced to enter into controversies with the government regarding the nature and purpose of colonialism and education, issues which had become obscured at higher levels in the general enthusiasm for progress in the colony.

The re-assessment of the role of education in colonial relations at the political level also promoted the re-evaluation of teaching methods. If, as was generally argued, the aim of extending the provision of basic education was primarily the cultivation of proper moral values at the village level, then a serious pedagogical problem presented itself. This had been perceived by those, particularly on the political left, who argued that schooling would produce a 'learned proletariat' or, as it was also expressed, a thin veneer of intellectual skills which left unaffected the moral persona.

The debate regarding curriculum relevance had been central in discussions surrounding educational administration and the mechanics of providing schooling. It now behoved educationalists to translate these politico-administrative decisions into pedagogical designs. The bureaucratic impulse had been to equate popular elementary instruction with an increasingly simplified curriculum, both in terms of breadth and duration. Opposed to this solution were those advocating a revolutionary curriculum oriented towards practical skills.

Amongst the latter group was the circle of friends who surrounded Raden Aju Kartini. As the new wife of the

Regent of Rembang, she proposed the establishment of a craft centre to train young Javanese in traditional arts and crafts, a plan later modified to concentrating on the training of the daughters of well-to-do Javanese officials.^{66.} As outlined by Kartini, the proposed school would provide more than an academic education.

It will include lessons in handiwork, household arts and kindred subjects, and there will also be classes in woodcarving and painting and in mid-wifery.^{67.}

The school would function as "a great household of which we are the mothers", rather than having "the air of a school".^{68.} The academic lessons would be taught in "all simplicity and modesty".^{69.}

Kartini in many ways represented the epitome of the "educated native" whom the educational idealists of the colony wished to create. She shared their educational goal when she declared as the objective of her own school:

we do not wish to make of our pupils, half Europeans or European Javanese. We want a free education to make of the Javanese, above everything, a strong Javanese.^{70.}

While critical of the excesses of the expatriate Dutchman, her letters continued to express an emotional association with the best of European culture. Her education, largely informal, led her to achieve a synthesis of traditional Javanese and European civilization from which she rejected the more regressive elements of each. More importantly, she did not simply become a "native young lady with European manners", nor a radical nationalist. What is appealing in her letters (almost overwhelmed by the excesses of nineteenth century European sentimentality of the cultured Dutch ladies who nurtured her development) is her modesty and emotional honesty. These qualities continue to attract interest to her autobiographical correspondence and it is her vulnerability to the penetration of the European

66. Kartini, Letters of a Javanese Princess, (Norton, New York, 1964), pp. 228-231.

67. ibid, p. 126.

68. ibid, p. 223.

69. ibid, p. 234.

70. ibid, p. 172 (My emphasis)

consciousness which continues to underscore the goal of the idealistic educator of the ethical period.⁷¹

What they were searching for was a pedagogical system combining intellectual with moral and practical training which was sufficiently coherent to be effective in the hands of the partly educated indigenous teacher less imbued with this sense of duty than Kartini was. By 1906 the educational climate in the colony was ripe to receive the doctrine of the "New Education" which was currently sweeping Europe. In a series of publications, J. Kats, an educationist working in the mission schools of Mojowarno in East Java, set out in a detailed form, the major elements of what he called the Nieuwe Richting, (new direction) in educational thought.⁷² Leaning heavily on German and Dutch formulations of Herbartian pedagogy, Kats successfully related European child-oriented educational theory to the education of Javanese children. As in England, where the effective education of working-class children occupied the minds of many in the latter part of the nineteenth century, educationists like Kats were attracted to Herbart's heuristic theory and moralistic approach to education. His pedagogy moreover came into vogue in Europe as a basis was being sought for a broader curriculum as an alternative to the refined three "R's" curriculum of the traditional European elementary school.

Despite some dramatic administrative changes, curriculum development in the second half of the nineteenth century was not prevalent in government-initiated schools

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71. Cf. the interpretation of A. Zainu'ddin, in her article, "Education in the Netherlands East Indies and the Republic of Indonesia", in Melbourne Studies in Education, (M.U.P., 1970), especially pp. 30-35.
72. J. Kats, Leerplan en Methode bij het Inlandsch Onderwijs inzonderheid op Java, (Curriculum and method in native education, particularly in Java), (G.C.F. van Dorp & Co., Samarang, 1906). This work was accompanied by a number of Javanese language booklets for the indigenous teacher setting out general pedagogic guidelines for the treatment of individual subjects, together with appropriate text books and a booklet containing lesson models for all subjects and for all levels.

in the Dutch East Indies. The first government schools, restricted to the sons of the Javanese nobility, provided basic instruction in reading and writing of the dominant local language, (Javanese, Sundanese or Malay), grammar of the appropriate language ("in as far as the native has need of it"), elementary arithmetic, geography of Java and surrounding islands and practical elementary surveying.

This minimum curriculum was effectively reduced in 1871 when the basic curriculum was restricted to the three "R's" with the provision that additional subjects from a list of ten could be added by the school committee in consultation with the teacher. These additional subjects included Dutch, geography of the East Indies, history of the colony and of the Netherlands, nature study, agriculture, drawing and singing. The education provided in government schools had to "serve both the moral and intellectual development of the native youth", a prescription presumably added more in hope than in confident anticipation.

The teaching of optional advanced subjects was regularized by the administrative revision of 1892, when the more important of these were included in the prescribed curriculum for the first-class schools. The second-class school course of studies represented a continuation of the flexible arrangements laid down in 1871. As in Europe, the results of elementary public schools had come increasingly under scrutiny in the 1880's and the report on native education of 1883 had commented:

the results ... are far from satisfactory ... and the purpose which [elementary education] must serve according to the regulations - moral and intellectual development of the pupils - was only partially achieved.⁷³

While mission schools had followed largely the same basic curriculum with the addition of biblical history and singing, by the late 1880's some attempts were being made in several mission areas to improve the quality and effectiveness of education. Graafland in the Minahassa, under the influence of Froebelian theory, had developed a

73. ibid, pp.10-14. See also Kroeskamp, op. cit., Ch. 8.

plan for an "industrial school" as an attempt to break down the heavily academically oriented curriculum. Popular education, he concluded in 1889, had to be adapted as far as possible to the practical needs of everyday life and in this way should constitute a real and apparent factor in the social and economic development of the population.⁷⁴

In the earliest formulations of his new type of school he envisaged that three of the six school days would be devoted to craft work when boys and girls would be engaged in learning and practising techniques of traditional arts and crafts of the Minahassa. In the higher forms, woodwork would be introduced while teachers would also be trained in the skills of carving, metal work and pottery. The academic part of the curriculum would be revised to place more emphasis on drawing and oral expression. Writing instruction would be reformed on the "global principle", making it an integrated part of reading lessons which now received pride of place in the new curriculum designed to develop the pupil's mind and expressive abilities. Arithmetic was also to be modified to become more practical and less bookish and mental arithmetic was to take a central position.⁷⁵

Other innovatory plans of Graafland included the establishment of nursery schools and a novel plan for the establishment of a boarding school for the daughters of the Minahassan nobility. The former failed to eventuate, but the latter continued to function till 1920 when it was absorbed into the standardized educational format imposed by the Department of Education.⁷⁶

Graafland's educational theory which emphasized practical education with socio-economic relevance was directly influenced by his own teacher in the Netherlands Missionary Society training school in Rotterdam, J.C. Neurdenburg. The latter also taught Johannes Kruyt, father of Albert Kruyt and pioneer of the successful East Java

74. Kroeskamp, op. cit., p. 193.

75. ibid, pp. 193-194. 76. ibid, p. 264.

mission at Mojowarno. Kruyt senior introduced several progressive educational practices in the western part of the archipelago at the same time as Graafland. Like his contemporary, Kruyt emphasized practical education, oral expression and the importance of nursery schools. Unlike Graafland, Kruyt managed to realize his plans for nursery education and by 1887 had an enrolment at this level of sixty children. Here children participated in:

only those things they are accustomed to doing, such as singing, saying the names of things and adding something to this according to their ability, counting things, learning and saying poems, playing with sand by drawing figures in it and making cakes of it or else working with thin bamboo sticks or wooden blocks to build houses or make figures with, and further engaging in round dances and all kinds of other games which are so plentiful in Java.⁷⁷

In the primary school, children continued this active, participatory form of education in the areas of reading, writing and arithmetic. In all areas, an emphasis was placed on oral participation and curriculum content and school organization was designed to relate "to the rhythm of Javanese life".⁷⁸ Provision was also made for engaging in agricultural activities while, for older students, mission education climaxed in their entry to an elementary technical school which provided boys with trade training to enable them to gain employment in European industry.⁷⁹

That these early forms of progressive education, so eloquently detailed by Kroeskamp in his book, Early Schoolmasters in a Developing Country, should originate in mission schools is not surprising. Unlike government education, mission education was administered at the local level by independent groups of missionaries and was an integral part of the mission's task of evangelization and moral training. Each mission area had more or less to adapt its approach to the needs and idiosyncracies of the particular culture and environment in which it laboured. Thus, mission education was potentially more flexible than the centrally

77. ibid, p. 421.

78. loc. cit..

79. ibid, p. 423.

administered government system which moreover was designed to fulfill broad national economic objectives. It was this ability of mission education to adapt to differing circumstances which advocates of mission schools emphasized when arguing for a greater role for the mission in the provision of popular education.^{80.}

Professionally also, missionaries were of necessity, more concerned with the moral and spiritual development of their pupils and potential converts. Moreover, in the area of education, in which few had been overly successful themselves, missionaries were less blinkered by the traditional demands of academia. This is not to say that qua missionaries they were free from their own set of biases. As late as 1915, two missionaries were murdered in Toraja for what the Governor of Celebes interpreted as their ill-advised and arrogant approach to conversion.^{81.} Indeed, the examples of East Java and the Minahassa stand out in the nineteenth century precisely because they were atypical and the innovations proposed or realized in these areas were very much the result of the vision and energy of the individuals involved. Nevertheless, it was because they were operating within a mission school context and it was because of their interpretation of the role of the mission school that they were led to formulate the educational ideals they held.

The old style mission school saw its role as preparing its pupils to take their place in the Christian community. Like the government school, it saw the three "R's" as central but for a different reason. Reading and writing and the mental agility demanded by arithmetic formed the basis for advanced religious instruction, for confirmation classes and, ultimately, for participation in the

80. Graafland said of government provided education: "there is no such thing as native education and what we usually understand by this figure of speech is nothing but an illustrated edition of our ordinary European education. It is true that it is education the natives are receiving, but not education suitable for natives." Kroeskamp, op. cit., p. 289.

81. Governor of Celebes, W. Frijling to the mission Conference of Ranto Pao, 15 August, 1917.

religious life of the Christian community.

Neurdenburg, Graafland and J. Kruyt raised the secondary role of the traditional mission school, its socio-economic function, to a predominant position making the school not the servant of inculcating dogma, but giving it the broader task of bringing Christian civilization to the indigenous population.⁸² The effects of this broader goal were to be seen in the daily social intercourse of the individual. Civilization and religion had to be imparted in the school in an harmonious combination providing at the one time intellectual, moral, aesthetic and social training.⁸³ For these three men, the task of education was to raise the population to a higher level by organizing it "in accordance with the needs of the national character, and the socio-economic background of the population".⁸⁴ As such, the school curriculum had to relate both to the child as it was and as it would become: a useful member of a Christian community. The school had therefore, to "serve to train the child in manual skills by which it may later sustain itself".⁸⁵ Reading, writing and arithmetic, in as far as they necessarily formed the basis of a school curriculum, had to be seen as the means to an end, "while the end of all education must be moral and intellectual development and thereby, the formation of a person and a useful member of society".⁸⁶ For them the task of the modern missionary was "the redemption of 'a great debt' which the Netherlands had vis-a-vis the peoples of its overseas territories by bringing them Christian civilization".⁸⁷

The thrust of this re-interpretation was broadly adopted by the colonial government in the first decade of the twentieth century but tended to become lost in practice as the government sought to finance and administer

82. ibid, p. 157.

83. ibid, p. 247.

84. ibid, p. 235.

85. Kats, op. cit., p. 16, (quoting Graafland)

86. loc. cit.. The rhetoric of this argument was substantially the same as that advanced for government education.

87. Kroeskamp, op. cit., p. 157.

the expanded popular school system. Relating to the child's social context was equated with the provision of simple school furnishings, relating to his intellectual aptitude was interpreted as demanding a simplified curriculum and relating to his future position in society was seen as refraining from restructuring his self-perception and avoiding the provision of extraneous skills.

Yet, while the government bureaucracy had not yet absorbed the mission school system into its homogeneous regulations, there was room for these equivalents of the Javanese volksschool to experiment with the progressive educational theories emanating from Europe. The manuals produced by Kats evolved in a direct line from the work of the educational progressives in the mission system of the latter part of the nineteenth century and formed the basis of the pedagogy taught later in Albert Kruyt's teacher training school at Pendolo. The embryonic schools of the Poso mission had already been influenced by the educational ideas of both Mojowarno and the Minahassa via Kruyt himself and through the lingering influence of Graafland which the Minahassan-trained guru had brought with him. Kats' manuals moreover had the advantage of providing amateur educationalists like Albert Kruyt, with a coherent and simplified overview of the educational theory and practice of the progressive school.

Basing his publications on the practice of the mission schools of Mojowarno and on the theory of Herbart and his German disciples such as Ziller, Rein and Pickel and the Dutchman de Raaf, Kats reformulated the central Herbartian concepts of moral education and the psychological implications of integrated learning and stage theory so that it would be applicable to the Javanese context. Kats, like his missionary predecessors, argued that education should have two basic aims; vis., the formation of character "to develop people who know what they want and want what is good",⁸⁸ and general preparation for "the practical life of a Javanese".⁸⁹ Methodologically, the

88. Kats, op. cit., p. 21. 89. ibid, p. 22.

educator should have as the starting point the Javanese child in its cultural context. The curriculum should then be designed to expand the real life experiences of the village child in a fruitful way to achieve the fullest possible integration of school and home life and of personal and learned experiences.

The proposed integration would be achieved by re-defining the position, function and content of the traditional elementary school course of studies. The declaration that formation of socially responsible character and not academic skills was the prime objective of education demanded that the elementary school should concentrate on developing children's imaginative and intellectual awareness of their relationship to the social and natural world around them. The school should provide the children with the skills of communicating with their environment.

Thus, the desired curriculum should take on a radically new design. Central to it would be the emphasis on man and his physical, social and spiritual attributes. This main theme would be expanded by a study of the animal and plant world as orders of life subordinate but essential to man. The curriculum would further be expanded by placing the study of man in the more abstract planes of place, time and number while the whole would find creative expression in the areas of language arts, drawing and singing. Each section of the curriculum would form part of an integrated whole, having both an internally organic inter-connection within subjects and between levels as well as having close links with the child's environment and its stage of mental and physical development.

From the point of view of the learner, Kats stressed the pedagogical necessity of engaging all the child's senses in a teaching method which emphasized pupil participation and, wherever practicable, concrete representation of concepts to facilitate discovery learning. Lessons as such were to conform to the principle steps as advocated by Herbart and refined by the German Herbartians, Dorpfeld and Rein. These Kats further modified and defined as

observation, interpretation or generalization and application.

To adapt the European theory to the Javanese environment required very little modification according to Kats. Basically, it required more careful implementation of the central tenets of the theory, particularly the requirement that the teacher make herself aware of the child's experiential world. The most serious modification necessitated was in regard to Herbart's theory of concept formation.

As is generally known, peoples at a lower level of civilization rarely reach [the stage of] well-developed concept formation. Events are seen as independent phenomenon and they have not learnt to notice common features [in order to] be able to classify them.⁹⁰

Kats gave as an example the absence in the Javanese language of the generalized verb "to carry" and concluded that therefore it would be impossible "for the time being always to progress from description to conceptualization" in the Javanese school. For this reason he advised that more time and more examples be provided at the introductory or descriptive stage of a lesson.

The Herbartian formulation of an essentially moral education as opposed to the more skills-based curriculum of the traditional government and mission school would logically have appealed to those supporters of the "ethical policy" in both mission and government circles who emphasized the colonial responsibility for bringing civilization to the East. Specifically, it appealed to those missionaries of the 'new school' who saw the mission's role as a broadly social one given its stress on moral development, social relations and the formation of abstract thought patterns.

On the other hand, it contrasted with the more simplistic view of the designers of the Javanese volkschool who nevertheless claimed to share the same educational objectives. Undoubtedly, practical considerations regarding the quality and supply of village school

90. ibid, pp. 40-41.

teachers helped determine the choice of a narrow curriculum and made the more sophisticated course outlined by Kats an impracticality in a universal system of elementary education. Nonetheless, the rhetoric of the government which spoke of uplifting the indigenous population rested on very slight foundations where it limited the education to be received by the majority of the indigenous population to a brief acquaintance with a limited number of foreign abstractions.

Furthermore, the inescapable momentum of bureaucracies towards centralization meant that, in time, the individually organized mission school networks, where a more progressive cachet was being nurtured, were absorbed into a universal state-aided educationally bland school system. Predominant in the government's view were the instrumental benefits of universal education and, while initially it accepted the partnership with the mission in its task of providing education for the masses, in the long term, it regarded this partnership as a pragmatic union of temporary convenience with a subordinate partner.

By 1910, what had commenced as an experiment in village school education in Java, had become a permanent and influential feature of the education system in the Dutch East Indies. In that year, Minister of Colonies, De Waal Malefijt, had determined that a dual education system would be established in which village schools would be provided

for the mass of the population so that the number of second-class schools could be limited to those places in each region where a need exists for a standard [educational] institution offering a more extensive education as well as training desa school teachers and further in those population centres where, with regard to the level of civilization of the inhabitants, the opening of a second-class school could be regarded as essential.⁹¹

By 1912, mission schools in the Outer Islands were formally

91. De Waal Malefijt in the "Memorie van Toelichting op de Indische begroting voor 1911", quoted in Hartgerink, op. cit., p. 128. See also Note 37.

absorbed into the village school system, becoming known thereafter as village schools administered by the mission and as such, coming increasingly under government control as educational contractors for the government. In 1924, the process of absorbing the mission schools was completed with the adoption of the General Subsidy Regulation. Simultaneously, the volksschool was being absorbed into an integrated school system⁹². by which the village child could theoretically proceed from the humble village school to the second-class or standard school via (after 1915) the vervolg or continuation school. After 1921, by making use of the schakel or link school, the ambitious pupil was able to achieve parity with the graduate of the former first-class school which had been progressively remodelled to become the Dutch-Native school. In the process, the educational interloper had eclipsed altogether the standard second-class school which was phased out to make way for a new dual educational system based on an educational hierarchy rather than on organizational division. This new system consisted of a Western-oriented system of schools for the well-to-do classes and a tripartate indigenous school system which theoretically allowed the humble villager to take up as much education as he required.

92. By 1912, the terminology of "volksschool" and "standard school" was in use to refer indiscriminantly to those types of school whether or not they were administered by the mission.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE SCHOOL SYSTEM IN CENTRAL SULAWESI 1907 - 1912
- THE SEARCH FOR A FINANCIAL FORMULA

The mission school system in Central Sulawesi was established towards the end of a period of educational ferment. Van Heutz's decision of 1907 removed the sense of urgency from the official debate concerning the education of the indigenous masses. It had been agreed in colonial circles that a literary education of a simplified nature was to be promoted as the means to train the "native" to be more productive, to co-operate with the process of economic rebuilding, to identify himself more closely with the attitudes and values of the colonial power. Snouck Hurgronje defined the process as one of association - the people of the Indies had to be educated to "participate in their own way in the life of their rulers". In the newly pacified non-Muslim areas such as Central Sulawesi, it was thought that this would be best achieved by handing over the superintendance of education to the mission.

It was primarily the political convenience of keeping the heart of Sulawesi free from Islam that had promoted and continued to motivate government support of a missionary presence there. Indeed, it was only the impatience of Assistant Resident Engelenberg to establish schools immediately, together with the limitations of European and indigenous mission personnel that created a dual school system of government and mission schools in the region.

Since 1903, Engelenberg had been making it clear in official correspondence and in public statements that he was impressed by the importance of missions and mission education. In March, 1905, he officially notified the Netherlands Missionary Society of his plans which had clearly evolved from discussions he had held with Kruyt on the eve of the latter's departure from Poso,¹ regarding

1. The Minutes for the meeting of the Society of 7 June, 1905 records that letters were received from A.J.N. Engelenberg on 9 March and from A.C. Kruyt on 6 March, 1905 on this subject. Both letters carried the postmark of Donggala, the administrative centre of the Assistant Residency.

the future development of the region after its military pacification.² The plan, as reported by Kruyt entailed the payment of an annual subsidy, initially of f.4,000, to be paid by the regional treasury. Apart from administering its own schools for To Pamona children, Engelenberg proposed that the mission also supervise the schools to be established and financed by the local administration which then, "would be treated entirely as mission schools".³ The latter type of school was to be established in mainly Muslim areas and in very remote mountain districts. Engelenberg's formulation of his educational plans was carefully designed to disguise the fact that he was, in effect, promoting mission schools in Muslim areas, a proposition which would have been unacceptable to his superiors as a clear breach of the principle of neutrality.

The concept of a mission monopoly in education, even in non-Muslim areas, was a contentious issue in some quarters. The sordid Minahassan schools debate had just been re-opened at this time with the government's offer to return its schools there to the Netherlands Missionary Society. This decision reversed that of 1882 as a result of which a significant number of government schools had been established, forcing the closure, or undermining the status of mission schools.⁴ In mission circles, the situation in the Minahassa had proved the destructiveness of competition in education. Kruyt at least was adamant that the Poso mission maintain a school monopoly in the Poso region, a policy he had espoused in the 1890's when he was prepared to over-extend his limited resources to maintain mission schools in Mapane and Tojo to prevent the imminent establishment of government (neutral) schools in these Muslim villages.

2. See supra, Ch. 5, pp.150ff. At the beginning of 1905, a military campaign against the To Sigi and To Napu had become necessary. The necessity for military action against the To Pamona appeared to have been determined by Engelenberg later.

3. Minutes N.M.S., 7 June, 1905.

4. H. Kroeskamp, op. cit., pp. 262-263.

Engelenberg's school building program had commenced as soon as peace had been restored once again after the military operations in the region. Frustrated by the mission's inability to provide indigenous teachers and by the Society's failure to make available sufficient Europeans, he embarked on a two point program to cajole the mission to meet his requirements. In the first place, he arranged to procure teachers directly, preferring to commence schools in newly pacified areas immediately without effective supervision, rather than waiting for the slower but more integrated development of a mission school network.⁵ Secondly, he badgered the mission with extravagant promises of financial aid to speed up mission expansion.⁶

The mission, concerned to establish a solid foundation for its long-term development, reacted cautiously to these overtures. In Kruyt's absence, missionary Hofman hesitated to accept Engelenberg's offers. Engelenberg was eager to establish schools in Napu territory where he had made it a condition of peace that the To Napu construct schools and guarantee the salary of a teacher.⁷ Kruyt and Adriani had been unable to enter this region prior to 1906 and Hofman was disinclined to embark on work here before adequate preparations were undertaken but from the Netherlands, Kruyt convinced Hofman to accept.

It is not desirable that the government also establish schools in Central Celebes. The

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5. In April, Engelenberg was preparing to establish a school in Una-Una hoping that missionary Hofman would be available to supervise the teacher there. The Assistant Resident was prepared to make the government steamer available to Hofman twice a year to enable him to visit the island. (Minutes N.M.S., 21 June, 1905. Hofman to N.M.S., 12 April, 1905).
 6. In 1906, Engelenberg had increased the subsidy to f.5,000. (Minutes N.M.S., 1906. Hofman to N.M.S., 9 May, 1906).
 7. Minutes N.M.S., 31 January, 1906. Hofman had reported to the Society that Engelenberg wanted a guru to be made available and supervised regularly for the first Napu school which he (Engelenberg) was setting up. This requirement was in line with the 1905 plan, as was the proposed arrangement for the Una-Una school.

Society must immediately take in hand the entire direction of education in order to prevent a repetition of the situation which exists at the moment in the Minahassa.^{8.}

In offering this advice, Kruyt expressed the attitude of the Society which had, in the same year, taken the initiative in appointing the first mission representative in Baron Boetzelaer van Dubbeldam, whose first task was to arrange for the re-establishment of the mission's educational monopoly in the Minahassa. More directly, the Society was prepared to make available to the Poso mission, two of the four candidates currently undergoing the mission training course in Rotterdam.^{9.}

But Engelenberg was not satisfied that the Society was moving quickly enough. He wanted at least another three missionaries to help develop the newly pacified areas.^{10.} He was in a hurry and he was grasping rather anxiously at theoretical solutions to turn his region into a show-piece of enlightened colonialism.^{11.} His idealism certainly gained him distinction and ensured his rapid promotion in this ethical period but it appeared untempered by administrative experience. His colonization

8. Minutes N.M.S., 31 January, 1906.

9. Minutes N.M.S., 19 September, 1906. The new missionary trainees selected were Ten Kate and Schuyt whose training would be completed in 1908. Two factors motivated the Society's concentration on the Poso mission. Firstly, the generous and co-operative attitude of the local administration, and secondly, the recognition expressed by the Society's Director, J.W. Gunning of the "socio-political significance" of the mission. Gunning was a firm supporter of the government's ethical policy objectives. (Minutes N.M.S., Annual Meeting, 11 July, 1906).

10. Minutes N.M.S., April, 1907. Hofman to N.M.S., 10 February, 1907. Engelenberg's attention was mainly directed to north-west and northern areas of the Assistant Residency. The Poso basin area where the mission attention was focussed, Engelenberg believed, would present no difficulties in the establishment of education. Moreover, an assumption persisted in Engelenberg's correspondence that there would be only ten schools for the To Pamona children in the immediate future, leaving the mission with sufficient financial and human resources to co-operate with Engelenberg's educational plans in the remainder of Central Sulawesi.

11. Engelenberg was implicitly committed to the two major planks of the ethical policy; provision of education and improvement of living standards.

program of agricultural reform, improvement in living conditions and the provision of education was caricaturized by Colijn as "flying the ethical flag"¹². and by his subordinate, Mazee, as "advertizing".¹³.

On his return to Poso in 1907, Kruyt soon realized that it would be unwise to rely on Engelenberg. For one thing, the Assistant Resident had shown himself liable to misuse his advice and, after an embarrassing episode in which Engelenberg heavy-handedly corrected his subordinate on Kruyt's advice, the missionary assured his colleague Hofman, "Mr. Engelenberg will now hear nothing from me about such things".¹⁴.

Snouck Hurgronje corroborated Kruyt's impression of the man with a damning assessment based on his personal observation and discussions with Engelenberg to whom he had frequently played host in Java. He wrote in response to Kruyt's letter which had discussed Engelenberg in December, 1907:

It is a pity that Engelenberg appears to have changed so much. I say "appears" because I believe that he was always like this but that the large shadowy side of his character has only become apparent now that he is able to act independently and with almost no control. He has much energy and experience but he has wild, vague and extremely impractical ideas. Where there is a superior above him ... his ideas would automatically receive timely tempering and his experience would express itself

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12. Colijn, Memorandum to the Governor-General, 12 September, 1907. See also Note 57, Chapter 6.
 13. Mazee to Kruyt, ND., 1908, "I have managed to ensure that Poso will in future also get a reasonable share and that not all the money will be spent on the advertising side. Next year we are going to put the roads in order for which purpose the [illegible] personnel with dynamite etc. will be sent over."
 14. Mazee had criticized Kruyt severely for interfering in administrative affairs after the former had twice been ordered by Engelenberg to change his line of action in accordance with those suggested by Kruyt. (Mazee to Kruyt, 16 February, 1908 and 29 February, 1908). Kruyt defended himself to Hofman saying that it was "not a matter of interference; everyone is entitled to have an opinion, but I still found it very distasteful that Mr. Engelenberg had made use of my information in this way. What an example of clumsiness!" (Kruyt to Hofman, 25 February, 1908).

in his normal work. But where he has to determine a direction by himself, then things go wrong because he lacks direction.¹⁵

Engelenberg was a good subordinate civil servant but lacked the qualities of leadership. This assessment was shared by the practically-minded but conscientious and hard-working military officer, Captain Maze, Engelenberg's subordinate, in whose hands the day-to-day policy decisions for the development of the Poso region lay between 1907 and 1912.

By 1910, it had become apparent that Engelenberg's strategy for the pacification of north-west Sulawesi had failed. The situation in the entire northern arm of the inland "was rotten" from Mamuku to Menado, "so that everything has to be once more taken in hand, beginning with the sub-district of Palu".¹⁶ The situation in Napu was also unacceptable. As a result of his investigations into a double murder in 1910 arranged by the To Napu chief Umana Solo "one of the least bad chiefs", Maze considered that amongst this mountain tribe was "a lack of respect for the person of [missionary] Ten Kate as well as for the To Belanda [Europeans] in general".¹⁷

Accusing the civilian officials of treason for continuing to provide false reports about the situation in north-west Sulawesi, Maze went on to lay the blame for the administrative shambles in the region on Engelenberg:

If Mr. Engelenberg had from the beginning shed full light on everything, then surely less blood would have flowed than [is going to occur] by the time the final goal is reached. The Resident has refused to admit that Mr. Engelenberg led him into this situation and Mr. de Vogel [Engelenberg's successor] who is afraid of his boss in Menado, has therefore also just fiddled around.¹⁸

Lacking self-direction and removed from immediate supervision, it is no wonder that Engelenberg turned so often to Kruyt for advice. The sober, knowledgeable missionary, who had the advantage of being outside

15. Snouck Hurgronje to Kruyt, Leiden, 9 December, 1907.

16. Maze to Kruyt, 29 August, 1910.

17. Maze to Kruyt, 25 January, 1911.

18. Maze to Kruyt, 29 August, 1910.

the administrative hierarchy, became his confessor-advisor. Moreover, he came to recognize in Kruyt and the mission the instrument to achieve a model colony. He could thus write to Kruyt and admit: "I have great difficulty and sorrow with my work. I hope I receive the strength to be understanding and open-minded in carrying out my task." In the next paragraph he could rally strongly and he exhorted Kruyt with all the strength of his idealism:

Do you know that the whole of Central Celebes is waiting to be worked [evangelized]. Besoa is asking for a school. In Kulawi I have not had so much success with the school due to the lack of a good teacher. Napu, Besoa and Kulawi must be worked and also the mountain people of my district [Donggala].

He then complained petulantly to Kruyt that Dr. Adriani surprisingly, did not appear to agree with his policy and failed "to give me moral support while I need this so much".¹⁹

Moral support is what he believed he gained from Kruyt and on one occasion when Kruyt postponed a planned visit to Engelenberg in Donggala, he wrote:

There is so much regarding the further spiritual development of the whole population which I want to discuss with a serious man We are responsible for what we can make of this people. That is why I tell myself: Halt! Let us consider calmly the remaining development. Our [government] direction must lead in the direction of the ideal. A practical, serious man must advise.²⁰

On the question of school subsidies it was becoming clear to Kruyt that Engelenberg was ready to exploit the mission for his own ends. Since 1906, Engelenberg had advised the mission to accept financial support from the local treasury rather than from the central government on the basis of a subsidy regulation.²¹ In proposing this Engelenberg was evidently concerned to retain control over

19. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 3 November, 1907.

20. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 10 February, 1908.

21. Minutes N.M.S., 20 March, 1907. Engelenberg to N.M.S., 13 January, 1907. Engelenberg's advice appears to have been influenced by the administrative re-organizations determined by the central government in the person of Colijn.

the provision of schooling so that, in this matter at least, he would not be limited by central government procrastination. On the surface this would also appear to have been in the interests of the mission.

In recommending that the Missionary Society accept his generous offer of a subsidy of f.5,000 or f.500 per school, Engelenberg anticipated that the mission would help him to establish and supervise schools throughout the Assistant Residency. He made it clear that the liberal funds he was planning to provide would cover not only the costs of establishing and staffing schools but would also employ extra missionaries, including an education expert and would provide for school inspection by the mission throughout Central Sulawesi.²²

This plan which Engelenberg had formulated in 1903 was spelt out in detail in 1905 and was the basis of understanding underlying all subsequent discussions. The liberal subsidy of mission schools was on condition that the Netherlands Missionary Society

would appoint a missionary whose duty would be the inspection, in the entire administrative region of Mr. Engelenberg, of schools to be established by the states of [Engelenberg's proposed federation]. Christian teachers would be appointed to head these schools and they would be treated entirely as though they were mission schools.²³

Kruyt's intimate knowledge of the local situation lay behind the Society's initial response to the offer in 1906.

If this subsidy [increased in 1906 from f.4,000 to f.5,000] from the regional administration can also be used in Central Celebes (ie. Poso), then there is no opposition. However, if as is assumed, the f.5,000 made available is meant for the schools which according to the wishes of Mr. Engelenberg will be erected along the coast of the Gulf of Tomini in various Mohammedan states under the supervision of the mission, the consequences would be that the inland schools would receive no subsidy.²⁴

22. Minutes N.M.S., 17 April, 1907. Hofman to N.M.S., 10 February, 1907.

23. Minutes N.M.S., 7 June, 1905. Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 March, 1905.

24. Minutes N.M.S., 20 March, 1907.

The aim of the Society in responding in this way was to force Engelenberg to specify precisely what he had in mind regarding education and the role of the mission in education. The Poso mission was very important to the Society which regarded it as the new Minahassa in which the problems of that North Sulawesi region would not be repeated.²⁵ The promise of financial support without the conditions specified in the 1895 regulations was undoubtedly very appealing, particularly while the Society was operating with a continued (though declining) deficit between 1904 and 1907.²⁶ Yet the Society was not prepared to accept Engelenberg's assistance if this meant the deflection from its self-appointed task of saving Central Sulawesi from animism and Islam.

Furthermore, there were also the questions of Engelenberg's ability to sustain his extravagant promises and whether this assistance would continue with Engelenberg's inevitable departure. The Society, which had had over one hundred years of experience in dealing with government officials and departments, realized that in the fullness of time, another official would take Engelenberg's place and thus it was not prepared to accept what might have been a personal and temporary arrangement.²⁷

The Mission Consul raised the latter question with Colijn,²⁸ government adviser on decentralization, who was

25. The Society at its meeting of 11 December, 1907, referred to Poso as "the land upon which, at the moment, all eyes are directed".
26. The Treasurer's report tabled at the Annual Meeting of 1907 noted a deficit of f.9,427.23 for 1906-07 compared to f.16,653.59 for the previous financial year. The improvement was due entirely to "the generous subsidy" which the government was now making available. Voluntary contributions had actually continued to decline.
27. The Society requested Kruyt to investigate the legal substance of Engelenberg's arrangements. (Minutes N.M.S., 11 December, 1907).
28. Minutes N.M.S., 6 May, 1908. Baron van Boetzelaer informed the Society that the subsidy of f.5,000 would be continued for 1908 but would thereafter be reviewed for the next five year period. He also indicated that alternatively, subsidy could be applied for from the central government. (Baron van Boetzelaer to N.M.S., 19 October, 1907).

supervising the establishment of the government of Central Celebes and this official shared the mission's concern. Colijn stressed in his memorandum of September, 1907, the necessity of providing the mission with long term financial guarantees if the mission decided to accept regional funding.

Naturally, the Netherlands Missionary Society could hardly be expected to give up the advantages offered by a [central] government regulation if, on the other hand, guarantees for continuity [of funding] were not established.²⁹

The problem was rectified by the end of the year and Kruyt reported to the Society that the regional government would guarantee the level of funding for three years, after which a review would be instituted every five years.³⁰

The second query, regarding the application of funds, was also solved by the clear specification in the estimates for 1907 that f.5,000 was to be made available for the Poso region and f.5,000 for schools to be established in Muslim areas. This arrangement corresponded to Engelenberg's promise made elsewhere that he would provide a maximum of f.5,000 per mission area and, in the light of the estimates, this would seem to indicate that Engelenberg continued to have in mind at least a supervisory role for the mission in the education of the Muslim youth.³¹

With these assurances, the mission withdrew the application it had made in 1906 when the 1895 subsidy regulations were being reviewed, for consideration to be

29. Colijn, Memorandum to the Governor-General, 12 September, 1907.

30. Minutes N.M.S., 19 February, 1908. Kruyt to N.M.S., 28 November, 1907.

31. In 1907, the Society was prepared to train an extra three missionaries in accordance with Engelenberg's proposals on the grounds of "the extra-ordinary favourable arrangements made by the Assistant Resident, Engelenberg to pay the costs of education from the regional treasury". In a later comment it appeared that the Society had interpreted Engelenberg's proposal as being f.5,000 per missionary district, and thus, that the four missionaries, operative in 1908, would have received f.20,000 in total which, incidentally, would have provided the Society with a surplus of f.11,500. (Extra-ordinary Meeting of the Executive 4 November, 1909).

given to a special subsidy arrangement for the Poso region.³² On the basis of the agreement reached and with the advice of the Mission Consul, the Society staked the future of the Poso mission on regional assistance because:

it was considered at that time that subsidy from the regional treasury was more desirable because it was greater than that offered by the central government and less formalities were attached to obtaining it.³³

Having obtained clarification of the financial arrangements which Engelenberg had proposed, it remained necessary to clarify with the administration what the role of the mission and its relationship to the administration would be. Engelenberg made it patently obvious that, apart from the personal assistance he required from Kruyt, which included the preparation of official reports,³⁴ he regarded the mission as a source of conscientious personnel who would enable him to realize his ambitious plans. He wanted to see:

the occupation of different points of this administrative region by women and men who,

32. Both the mission Consul and Kruyt advised this course of action. The official request to the central government for a special subsidy arrangement was dated 16 November, 1906. (Minutes N.M.S., 6 May, 1908).
33. Minutes N.M.S., 6 May, 1908. In 1909, however, the Conference considered that a central government subsidy would now be better than one from the region since the number of schools had risen from ten to twenty-three.
34. In December, 1907, Engelenberg requested Kruyt to comment on memoranda written by the administrators of Toli-Toli and Palu. In January, he required a report on the religious situation in Central Sulawesi and Kruyt's co-operation to collect artifacts for the Annual Exhibition and Fair at Surabaya. The following month he asked Kruyt to prepare the informative basis for the official memoranda on the state of various sub-regions of the Assistant Residency. For this purpose he provided Kruyt with copies of official information. Mazeo required the same help from Kruyt in the preparation of reports as well as constantly seeking his advice and information on a range of official and semi-official matters. On one occasion, regarding the question of whether the Bada region should join the Poso sub-district, Mazeo asked Kruyt to write the relevant report with the comment that "the higher authorities know that in these matters, you write with more authority". (11 October, 1908).

motivated by a love of the people, would want to work amongst its pleasant inhabitants. But, [what sort of people] make themselves available?³⁵

Kruyt refused to be drawn by this indirect appeal for he had made it clear on his return to Poso in September, that the mission was neither able, nor particularly interested to over-extend its limited resources to supervise schools in Muslim areas.

Responding to this intimation in February, 1908, Engelenberg indulged in self-pity. He felt himself surrounded by ineptitude: "Here [Donggala] there is not a single official who is capable of writing a composition which would be worthy of reading or study!"³⁶. Even the mission, he believed, had deserted him. His own attempts at establishing schools in the vicinity of his administrative headquarters had, he believed, failed because "here, there are no missionaries working. The intimate contact between a good pandita [missionary] and the people is lacking."³⁷. As a result, the school at Donggala had not yet been able to attract any Muslim girls, a clear sign for Engelenberg that his teachers had been unable to elicit the trust of Muslim parents in the school.

It would appear that, having obtained clarification regarding the financial arrangements, the mission made it quite clear that it would concentrate its attention on the non-Muslim population of Central Sulawesi. While accepting responsibility for education in Napu and eventually in neighbouring Besoa and Bada, Kruyt withdrew the mission from Tojo where he had conducted a school since 1897.³⁸. He maintained a strategic presence in Poso, the seat of regional government, and Muslim Mapane, the major export centre of the region, since both towns were geographically part of the mission area and were moreover, regularly visited by its potential congregation. In later years,

35. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 3 November, 1907.

36. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 10 February, 1908.

37. loc. cit.

38. Minutes N.M.S., 17 June, 1908. Hofman to N.M.S., 19 February, 1908.

Kruyt fought consistently to prevent the establishment of non-mission schools in the regional capital.

Kruyt's conception of the role of the mission in Central Sulawesi did not agree with Engelenberg's objectives and, while the latter accepted Kruyt's terms, he did so very reluctantly. Until the beginning of 1908, he continued to hold out the promises of more money as an incentive to Kruyt to expand his mission activity into Muslim areas.³⁹

Engelenberg's goal for education in these areas was to civilize the inhabitants rather than to convert them. His Tolstoyan life-view related to the humanistic views of Snouck Hurgronje, whom Engelenberg knew and admired.⁴⁰ His desire for more cultivated people to live amongst the indigenous population of Central Sulawesi, which he had expressed to Kruyt, together with his enthusiasm for colonization of certain areas by more advanced peoples from elsewhere in the archipelago,⁴¹ were manifestations of this goal. The objective of association through contact with civilized values could not be advanced on the basis of the type of officials about whom Engelenberg had complained to Kruyt.

In the non-Muslim areas, Engelenberg did expect a positive result from evangelization and, consequently, he desired that these areas would remain free from Muslim influence. In the Poso region, he was impatient for his support of the mission to achieve results:

Is there any hope? Of course. Is there hope that conversion will occur soon? The women, you say, they have to be taken first. Can Christianity, if its acceptance is regarded as an innovation of the new adat introduced by

39. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 14 February, 1908 and 10 February, 1908. These promises were made despite the clear directions given by Colijn in 1906 and 1907.

40. He had just finished reading Snouck's "Arabie en Oost Indie", when he wrote to Kruyt on 26 April, 1907. He commented: "It is true there is something about him which remains impenetrable for us."

41. A Javanese colony had been established in Palu and there was a Balinese colony in Parigi.

the Kumpania - cannot conversion to Christianity occur earlier? What is your opinion? Is Islam extending its influence among the Torajans?⁴².

Kruyt resisted this kind of political pressure for forced conversion and schooling of the To Pamona by the government because he wanted these developments to proceed as a result of the community's voluntary acceptance of the mission. This process of voluntary acceptance, which had characterized his endeavour prior to 1905, could not realistically be achieved in Muslim areas, which was a further reason for his lack of enthusiasm for a mission in Muslim districts. In Poso, his view of how the mission should approach its task led him to reject Engelenberg's suggestion that he hasten the conversion process by the application of government pressure. For this reason also his attitude to colonialism had been ambiguous prior to 1905 and he stated with some relief in 1908:

... to my great joy ... the imposition [of government control] has not been of such overwhelming influence as I had anticipated. I say: to my joy, because I had feared that becoming Christian would come to be seen overwhelmingly as a political matter in which there would be little mention of spiritual considerations.⁴³.

For this reason he was severely critical of Engelenberg in presuming to hasten the process of Christianization in Napu by demanding the construction of schools and the payment of teachers' wages as part of the peace settlement. Torn between a concern to prevent government involvement in education amongst the inland tribes and a realization that rapid expansion of a mission presence was vital to discourage the penetration of Muslim influence on the one hand and a painful awareness of the inadequacies of the mission's resources on the other, Kruyt felt obliged to reach a compromise. He advised Hofman that, despite the chaotic situation in Napu, the mission would have to accept immediate responsibility for the Napu schools.

Actually, the guru there [in Napu] is still a government guru because the mission is not yet

42. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 14 January, 1908.

43. Kruyt, Report mission district Kuku, 1908, in Mededelingen, 1909, vol. 53, pp. 11-12.

involved there and it is simply cruel if we are regarded as responsible for the guru. And regarding the one at Besoa, we know nothing. I would therefore, suggest to you that, since the situation [in Besoa] is so disorganized, you pay no attention to Besoa. I wrote to Mr. Engelenberg that I would arrange a guru for Besoa and without our knowledge he sends one there; thus, it is Mr. Engelenberg's responsibility. [But] to provide no help to Napu is morally impossible; the man cannot handle it on his own, and now that we, relying on Engelenberg, have taken him under our wing, we cannot leave him there on his own. Now that there are so many schools in our district, I would prefer that we left it as it was but these villages [in Napu] must be provided with the preaching of the Gospel.⁴⁴

While Kruyt objected to government pressure where this failed to accord with his plans, he was not averse to manipulating the state of confusion consequent upon the introduction of the colonial regime. With the very real threat of military, or at least, of civil punishment, the mission could not cope with the number of requests for schools emanating from the region. Such was the state of confusion amongst the To Pamona that, as the newly arrived missionary Schuyt remarked, even in Kuku, many were unable to distinguish between the mission and the government.⁴⁵ Kruyt openly admitted that "it was regarded as being part of the new order of things that everywhere where teachers were located, children would be sent to school".⁴⁶

Under the same impression the villagers constructed the teacher's residence and the school. This practice was defined as an issue of mission policy by the newly established Conference at its second meeting in July, 1910. Significantly, the practice was interpreted by a newly arrived missionary as another "herendienst" or compulsory

44. Kruyt to Hofman, 17 April, 1908.

45. Schuyt, Report mission district Kuku, 1909, in Mededelingen, vol. 54, 1910, p. 40. Hofman had made the same comment in 1907, (Hofman, Report mission district Kasiguncu, 1907), in op. cit., p. 91.

46. Kruyt, Report mission district Kuku, 1908, in op. cit., p. 14.

labour and he acted on this assumption in establishing schools in Besoa. Reprimanded for this by Mazee, he excused himself on the grounds that he understood that "the building of schools in Lage and Pebato occurred on this basis".^{47.}

Apart from his concern for the establishment of schools, Kruyt was also involved in advising "his people" regarding the government's sawah cultivation program. Specifically, he acted as intermediary for the government in grooming the village chiefs in their new role as village administrators and in attempting to educate the people to accept the new and difficult role of the latter as part of the colonial chain of command.^{48.} In this way, Kruyt was not simply facilitating the implementation of the government's program but was also working towards his own ends, which involved what he considered to be the best interests of the people. In the circumstances, the villagers came to see the missionary and the teacher as useful advisers and counsellors. They were thus, eager to have their own "guru" and were prepared in return, to provide the required buildings.

A further area of policy where mission and government interests co-incided, was the issue of the expanding influence of Islam following in the wake of colonization. Where the "pacification" of the notoriously "savage" head-hunting tribes of the north-western mountain districts appeared to facilitate a southerly penetration of Muslim propaganda from the disorganized Palu valley, Kruyt felt constrained to accept a responsibility for schools in that region. Similarly, the southern borders of the mission field were susceptible to penetration from Malili and consequently, schools were soon commenced here. In the east, trading routes between Onda'e and Kolone Dale represented a further threat, suggesting a third priority for school construction.

Towards the end of the decade, financial considerations

47. Mazee to Kruyt, 29 August, 1910.

48. Kruyt, Report Mission District Kuku, 1908, in op. cit., p. 6.

had become the major influence in determining the limits of mission activity. In early 1908, Kruyt had become aware that there was no possibility of an increase in the local administration's financial support for mission schools. This decision, imposed on Engelenberg, reached Kruyt some time in April; in February, Engelenberg had written confidently to Kruyt:

The school subsidy can of course, be raised. The expansion of schools at the moment has resulted in increased expenses and it is of course, fair to make available a larger subsidy. The granting of f.500 (per school) is not dependent on my opinion alone. After the budget is prepared, it is approved by the Resident and he also supports the liberal subsidization of mission schools.⁴⁹

Then in March, Engelenberg was informed that the central government demanded f.45,000 "as a contribution out of the taxation raised in Central Celebes".⁵⁰ Colijn had budgeted for this figure in the revised estimates he had drawn up for the Governor-General in September, 1907. Mazeë, who informed Kruyt of this requirement commented that he

had expected this for a long time. Mr. Engelenberg has spoken far too much about the satisfactory financial situation At the [budget] conference in January this year, thousands were played around with as though it was nothing.⁵¹

By May, Engelenberg had to admit to Kruyt that more money would not be forthcoming.⁵² Kruyt responded in his last extant letter to Engelenberg asking the official to support a renewed application by the Missionary Society for central government funding. In so doing, he served notice on the Assistant Resident that he no longer had faith in his scheme.⁵³ Thereafter, communications between the two men ceased, and in the final months of office, Engelenberg was at pains to avoid Kruyt for as Mazeë commented with a

49. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 14 January, 1908.

50. Mazeë to Kruyt, 29 March, 1908.

51. loc. cit..

52. Minutes N.M.S., 10 July, 1908. Hofman to N.M.S., 12 May, 1908. Hofman informed the Society that the proposed increase in the subsidy from f.5,000 to f.6,185 would not be forthcoming.

53. Kruyt to Engelenberg, 31 May, 1908.

great insight into the character of his superior:

- . I think a certain person still feels too embarrassed to appear in Kuku or Kasiguncu [the mission centres].⁵⁴.

In April, Kruyt had confidently requested for Poso another missionary with teaching qualifications to establish a teacher training school for To Pamona students. This Kruyt had considered as urgent for the proper development of an education system and he believed at the time that the associated costs could be met entirely by the increased subsidy. The financial limitations imposed by the government brought these plans temporarily to an end. In October, the new financial situation was officially communicated to Kruyt in a meeting with the new Assistant Resident, De Vogel and the Resident of Manado.⁵⁵

The idealistic but inexperienced Engelenberg had finally been entangled by the administrative thoroughness of Colijn's system of central government control which he had consistently attempted to avoid. A memorandum from the First Government Secretary in July, 1908 had confirmed the principle laid down by Colijn in 1906 that, in reference to improvements effected in a region and particularly, in regard to schools, financial resources for regional development must be found within the region itself.

It stands to reason that the [regional] administration has other concerns besides the care of schools. These needs are such that in 1909, no more than f.10,000, the same as for last year, can be made available for education viz.: f.5,000 for you and f.5,000 for the regional schools.⁵⁶

The combination of three developments in these years, the perceived threat of Muslim penetration, the financial limitations and the heavy demands placed on the mission in the Poso basin itself, resulted in what appeared to have been a secret arrangement between Kruyt and the Civiel Gezahebber of Poso, Captain Maze, to safeguard mission interests. This agreement, for it was impossible that

54. Maze to Kruyt, 28 June, 1908.

55. Assistant Resident De Vogel to Kruyt (formal), 9 November, 1908, No. 3120/V.

56. De Vogel to Kruyt, 9 November, 1908.

Mazee could have acted as he did without Kruyt's knowledge, was only uncovered in 1914. In that year, Mazee's successor, Van Wijk, requested that the mission recommence its activities in Tojo⁵⁷. and two missionaries who had arrived in 1909 undertook some preliminary investigations into the circumstances which had led to the mission's withdrawal from Tojo in 1908. These investigations were carried out against the wishes of Kruyt. The two concluded that:

Fearful of conflict, he [Mazee] conscientiously separated the Muslim and heathen areas of his administrative responsibility. In two of his four administrative sub-districts, the mission was active and he [Mazee] promoted this work as much as possible. He even prohibited Muslims from the coast from venturing inland and it was amazing how this command was heeded. Through the intervention of Mr. Mazee, mission activity in Lage and Pebato was able to develop peacefully He also provided freedom of action to the Muslims in the other two sub-districts and here, he kept us out The Makassarese Native-Assistant, Intji Mohammed therefore, with the approval of Mr. Mazee, worked hard to convert his area to Islam.⁵⁸

By 1909, the geographical limits of the Christian mission in the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes appear to have been settled and the task which faced the missionaries was one of consolidation. Financial limitations on its growth had been imposed and the mission had lost a strong supporter in the person of Engelenberg, who had at this time, been promoted out of his predicament to become Resident of Jambi.⁵⁹ Simultaneously, further limits were placed on the mission as a result of a renewed decline in the Society's financial situation. The deficit

57. Gerth van Wijk (Controleur of Poso) to the Poso mission Conference, 12 May, 1914.

58. Undated report entitled: "Memorandum regarding Tojo undertaken by missionaries Schuyt and Ten Kate without official approval of the Poso Conference and in reaction to the suggestion of G. van Wijk".

59. According to Mazee's letter of 11 December, 1908. The cryptic mention of the fact by Mazee appears to confirm that communication between Engelenberg and Kruyt ended with the subsidy embarrassment.

in 1909 was f.70,000⁶⁰. and this had forced it to request a twenty percent reduction in the budgets of all its mission fields for the forthcoming year.⁶¹

To meet the new circumstances several emergency decisions had to be made by the mission. In the Netherlands, the Society instituted a scheme whereby the financial responsibility for the new Poso missionaries was accepted by specific groups of Dutch churches or missionary aid organizations.⁶² It had already held an audience with the Minister of Colonies after receiving the news of subsidy limitations in 1908 to discuss the implications of the unanticipated financial set-back. The result of this meeting was that the Society received permission to re-apply for consideration for a scheme of central government funding.⁶³

In Poso, Kruyt and Hofman were faced with the difficulty of seeking immediate alternative forms of additional finance while at the same time avoiding, where possible, any adverse impact on the expansion of schools as a result of these financial difficulties. The principle

60. Minutes N.M.S., Extra-ordinary meeting of the Executive, 4 November, 1909. This time the deficit was not the result of less interest in the Netherlands. Voluntary contributions had been f.9,000 more than the previous year and f.5,000 more than the average of the previous three years. The deficit was due to the transfer of the government schools in the Minahassa to the Society and the fact that the anticipated increases in the Poso subsidies were not forthcoming.
61. Minutes N.M.S., 18 May, 1910. Ten Kate to N.M.S., 25 February, 1910. Hofman to N.M.S., 18 May, 1910, Hofman commented that a twenty percent reduction was impossible to achieve but that he was able to economize to the extent of f.67.50.
62. Minutes N.M.S., 19 January, 1910. The Classicale Zendings Vereeniging of Zutphen accepted responsibility for Napu while the "Classis Arnhem" became responsible for the Kuku mission district. A range of propaganda material relating to the separate mission areas was printed in Holland for distribution to the appropriate bodies. In April, 1908, the Society had made the availability of Ten Kate and Schuyt conditional on finance being available. In July of that year, Zutphen agreed to finance Ten Kate.
63. Minutes N.M.S., 17 June, 1908. The meeting was held on 13 June.

of community responsibility for the construction of school building and teacher residence had been established in 1894 but had to await the government intervention of 1905 before it could be universally implemented. It did not appear to the missionaries that the ordinary villagers could be expected to contribute financially to the costs of their school, to which they had already contributed liberally in terms of labour and materials, because of the insufficient opportunities at their disposal for obtaining money which was still in limited circulation.⁶⁴

Expenditure related to the employment of foreign teachers was the single largest cost factor in the running of the schools, the missionary's own salary excepted. Kruyt was obliged to pay a competitive wage to his Minahassan teachers, commensurate to their accustomed living standard, if only to attract them to Poso.⁶⁵ Once posted, the Minahassan had to integrate himself into the rural life-style of communal mutual assistance. The teacher, as the only member of the village who held a position which occupied his day-time hours, was unable to reciprocate and thus, it had become the practice for the village, not only to construct and maintain the teacher's residence, but also to tend his rice crop. This was now systematized to form the community's contribution towards the teacher's income.⁶⁶ As well, the village provided a range of

64. Kruyt re-affirmed this requirement in a letter to the N.M.S. of 25 July, 1910. In the two coastal towns, where cash circulation was more normal, fees were charged in lieu of building construction and maintenance.

65. A Minahassan guru received f.15 per month with an increase to f.20 after three years. An untrained assistant received f.7.50 with an increase to f.10 after two years. A school of sixty children would cost f.380 to run annually - f.240 teacher's salary, f.120 assistant's salary, f.20 books and equipment - or f.6 per child. In a school of one hundred children which employed two trained teachers, costs amounted to f.520 per annum. (Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 March, 1912. Report on discussions held with Kielstra in October, 1911). In a draft contract of October, 1911, Kielstra, the official sent out by Batavia to negotiate a subsidy contract with the Poso mission; noted by way of explanation, that the mission was proposing to pay trained indigenous teachers f.7.50 per month, increasing to a maximum of f.15.

66. Kruyt to Controleur Karthaus, 8 March, 1915.

incidental services such as transportation of goods and the carrying of messages which might normally have been performed by the teacher's extended family.

Potential for exploitation of the To Pamona by the superior foreign teacher clearly existed, particularly in the more remote areas where it was difficult to attract and supervise teachers.⁶⁷ Within his first year in Napu, Ten Kate was obliged to dismiss all his staff,⁶⁸ but on the whole, while the teachers were not particularly effective, they appeared to have fulfilled the tasks required of them.

The use of expensive foreign teachers was not simply a financial issue for Kruyt. He regarded the presence of a sizable foreign element amongst "his" people as undesirable. Kruyt applied this attitude consistently, particularly regarding Muslims, but also in regard to Engelenberg's plans to station soldiers in Tomasa in 1903 and later his attempt to introduce north Sulawesi colonists.⁶⁹ Later still, Kruyt objected to plans to encourage European

67. In 1912, Mazee explicitly told Kruyt that he was not in favour of such services and should have written to his superior about it but Kruyt consistently maintained that services provided by villagers enabled him to keep guru salaries to a minimum. Karthaus, who was a strong critic of the mission, declared the arrangement illegal to which Kruyt responded that it had been approved by that official's predecessors. loc. cit.
68. Minutes N.M.S., 26 October, 1910. Ten Kate to N.M.S., 5 July, 1910. The guru of Watutau had been accused of stealing. It had become a matter of public debate so that Mazee considered that "it will be difficult to end the case simply by his dismissal". (Mazee to Kruyt, 21 February, 1910). The previous teacher there had resigned to become a government official. Minutes N.M.S., 17 November, 1909. Ten Kate to N.M.S., 31 August, 1909). Kruyt had to dismiss a guru in 1908 on the grounds that "he had carried out a number of unauthorized activities and had done nothing in the last two months". (Kruyt to Hofman, 17 April, 1908).
69. Three colonies were established by 1906. A White-Cross colony was established in the Palu valley with a government subsidy for four years. A Minahassan colony was established in Parigi which also included the banished sons of the Lombok ruler. The third colony was a penal settlement for a group of Balinese prisoners (Mail Rapport No. 1986-1910, Memorie van Overgave, Resident of Menado, J. van Hengel).

entrepreneurs in the region. For Kruyt, intermarriage was a related issue and he maintained an unbending opposition to the marriage of his teachers with To Pamona women and, in one devastating case, the proposed marriage of a European mission worker to a Minahassan woman. His concern on all occasions was to prevent the introduction of foreign ideas, attitudes and life-styles, other than those introduced by the missionaries. Government officials were of necessity tolerated, although the bulk of the Kruyt archive deals with the missionary's attempts to ensure that their administration concurred with Kruyt's objectives. At best, Kruyt's concern can be interpreted as a desire to protect the sensibilities of the "naive" To Pamona; at worst, as a desire to limit their acquaintance with the outside world to that filtered down to them by the mission.

Kruyt therefore, responded angrily to Maze'e's intimation in September, 1908 that eight Tondanoese families would be settled in Kasiguncu to help develop Pebato sawah farming techniques.⁷⁰ Firstly, he complained that he had not been consulted. This was a rather strange attitude for a missionary to take in response to a government decision relating to government affairs, were it not that Kruyt believed that everything pertaining to To Pamona village life lay within his domain. Kruyt had similarly involved himself in the military's pursuit of the rebel leader Ta Batoki and had requested Engelenberg to order Maze'e to desist from his action because the constant hunting of this fugitive unsettled the people. Kruyt was particularly sensitive to Maze'e's new proposal to establish a colony in Kasiguncu since this was the primary mission village and a mission district headquarters which protected the mission's northern border with Islam.

Secondly, he argued that the people in question, as with the Balinese colony in Parigi and the Javanese colony in Palu, would adopt a superior stance towards the To Pebato and exploit the villagers whom they were supposed

70. Kruyt to Hofman, 4 September, 1908.

to instruct. Since Kruyt also suspected the church attendance habits of these nominal Christians, he believed their behaviour towards the villagers coupled with their poor example would have a detrimental impact on the mission's success in educating the Pebato people. Implicit in this argument was Kruyt's belief that the more wordly-wise Tondanoese would undermine the respect and authority that the mission had acquired in Kasiguncu.

Thirdly, Kruyt was concerned about the future consequences of establishing this colony. The introduction of this initially small foreign element would eventually lead to the creation of a separate community which would become the focus for all "lost Minahassans" in Central Sulawesi, particularly the retired expatriate Minahassan teachers. The foreign community would inter-marry with local girls⁷¹ and so infiltrate To Pamona society, bringing to the Poso area "the Minahassan cachet that we want so much to prevent".

Having succeeded in gaining government support for the prohibition of the entry of Muslims, Kruyt now sought to reverse the decision to settle this nominally Christian group which would not be effectively under his control. What made its presence even more undesirable was Kruyt's suspicion that the persons concerned were "coolies of Ong Hi Bie or perhaps Akow, ten to one unmarried" and who, because their employer wanted to settle them close to

71. Kruyt to Hofman, 12 September, 1908. A social gathering of the two families almost ended in uproar when Mazee informed Kruyt of the proposed marriage of a Poso resident with two women which Mazee had approved. Kruyt wrote to Hofman, "I then told him angrily that he [Mazee] was not to involve himself in matters of marriage." At the same time, a marriage had just taken place between a Muslim and a Tomasa woman. Kruyt had advised the people of Tomasa to make their feelings heard because otherwise, more podangka would come to take away their women. (Kruyt to Hofman, 20 June, 1908). In another case involving a Muslim and a To Pamona woman, in order to achieve some kind of compromise between accepting the marriage and defending the Poso inland from Muslim prozelytization, Mazee "determined that each time [he wished to visit his wife] he had to ask me for permission to travel there. ... I don't of course, always allow it, and then only for a short period". Mazee to Kruyt, 18 November, 1908.

Mapane, had convinced Mazee to allow them to live in Kasiguncu under the pretext of acting as agricultural instructors. Kruyt's fears regarding the difficulty the mission could experience from such a community were realized in the 1920's when he was confronted with attempts by the Minahassan community to establish their own superior elementary school in opposition to Kruyt's own plans to establish such a school under mission auspices.

Potentially, the mission's heavy dependence on expatriate Minahassan teachers and ministers presented in Kruyt's mind, a similar problem. While the communications network in the region remained primitive, their dispersal amongst widely scattered villages prevented the immediate development of a Minahassan clique in the interior, while the constant supervision by European missionaries helped to ensure their religious orthodoxy. Kruyt feared that as the local government bureaucracy expanded, a number of Minahassans would be tempted to enter the more prestigious employ of the local civil service. As early as February, 1908, he felt obliged to inform his teachers that:

as soon as I noticed that they made attempts to enter government service, I told them they could leave immediately because we did not wish to give them the preparation we were providing for nothing.⁷²

Partly to try to avoid potential difficulties, the mission prohibited the marriage of Minahassan teachers to Pamona women on pain of instant dismissal. Instead, the mission encouraged the employment of married teachers or, in the case of single men, encouraged them to take leave to find a wife in the Minahassa. This produced the situation where, though being required to integrate himself into the village community, the Minahassan guru always remained an outsider without blood-ties with his congregation. One positive side-effect of this policy was that the mission representative did not become embroiled in family disputes and was able to maintain a discreet reserve which Kruyt seemed to consider desirable.

One difficulty which remained was that on the

72. Kruyt to Hofman, 15 February, 1908.

dismissal or the retirement of gurus - the mission lost its authority over its former staff and this was Kruyt's chief concern. One notorious case involved the original Minahassan teacher, guru Kolondam, who had preferred not to return home after his retirement.⁷³ Kruyt had arranged with Mazee for him to live outside the village of Kasiguncu, presumably so he would not hinder the mission's activities there. In 1911, he was reported as demanding recompense for his plantation taken over by one of the new missionaries.⁷⁴ In 1913, the mission Conference decided that, despite "his bad behaviour", the pension paid to Kolondam had to be continued in order to "retain a hold over this man who could otherwise become a danger to the mission".⁷⁵

Because of their potential "danger to the mission", Kruyt recognized in 1908, that it was of utmost importance that local school graduates be trained to teach in mission schools since, "the more Minahassan elements we have to import, the more difficult it will be to get them out again".⁷⁶ The establishment of an indigenous teacher training school was therefore a high priority.

In the optimistic period of early 1908, Kruyt could write that the costs of such a school "could be entirely met by the subsidy".⁷⁷ In 1909, this had become problematic. Simultaneously, recognizing that he would have to continue to depend on Minahassan teachers in the interim, Kruyt also wanted to establish a more advanced elementary school equivalent to a second-class government school for the children of his Minahassan teachers as a means to attract more and better quality teachers from northern Sulawesi.⁷⁸ One of the obstacles to engaging staff was

73. Minutes N.M.S., 18 July, 1910. The annual conference agreed to pay Kolondam a pension of f.5 per month.

74. Mazee to Kruyt, 30 November, 1911.

75. Minutes N.M.S., 21 May, 1913. Annual Conference, 7 January, 1913.

76. Kruyt to Hofman, 25 February, 1908.

77. Minutes N.M.S., 18 June, 1908.

78. loc. cit..

the concern that suitable education was not available in Poso for their children and the recruitment of unmarried staff Kruyt considered undesirable for reasons already mentioned.^{79.}

As a result of the government's refusal to increase its aid, the employment of indigenous staff and the establishment of a training school became more urgent. To Pamona teachers, with their lower standard of living and recourse to family services, could be employed at half the rate of a Minahassan and did not need three months paid leave every five years.^{80.} There was also an increasing urgency regarding the establishment of a superior school for the indigenous population. The longer the mission delayed the establishment of an advanced elementary school, the greater the likelihood would become that the government would establish one to meet its own needs for teachers in government schools and for indigenous clerks.^{81.} Government officials, Hofman wrote, "were engaged in sending boys under ten years of age to the Minahassa for training". If proposals for the establishment of a government training school proceeded, the mission could more legitimately register their protest against it, Hofman pointed out, if a similar institution was already established by the mission.^{82.}

It appeared that the government was already moving in this direction. In February, 1908, the government's Inspector of Native Schools for the Menado inspectorate had, much to the annoyance of Engelenberg and Kruyt,^{83.} made a tour of mission schools and discussed Poso's educational future with Kruyt. Like many of his colleagues, Inspector Boes was critical of the educational level of mission schools and of the mission's education monopoly in the Outer Islands in general. Kruyt doubted whether the

79. loc. cit...

80. See Note 67.

81. Minutes N.M.S., 16 December, 1908. Hofman to N.M.S., 15 October, 1908.

82. loc. cit...

83. Engelenberg to Kruyt, 10 February, 1908.

man was in fact, a Christian!⁸⁴ Mr. Boes considered the establishment of a training school where non-mission school teachers also received training as "a good idea". Another proposal which the meeting canvassed, was a school for the children of chiefs (a hoofdenschool) for Donggala, the provincial capital of Central Celebes. Kruyt feared this precedent because it might have repercussions for similar government initiatives in Poso. Not only would this introduce a comparative element in education which would be detrimental to mission schools but its attractiveness to Minahassan parents and To Pamona chiefs would almost guarantee the refusal of any application by the mission for subsidies to establish a similar school. Since for Java, a second-class government school education sufficed as the qualification for village school teachers, it could mean that the mission would lose control over the training of its teachers and co-incidently, the sons of village chiefs. Fortunately for Kruyt, he managed to obtain Inspector Boes's "co-operation to have the idea shelved".

The Missionary Society consistently rejected Kruyt's appeals for finance to establish a training and/or superior elementary school on the ground that there was no money available. Nevertheless, Kruyt continued to pursue the matter at the local administration level after the Inspector's departure. In September, 1909, Mazee informed Kruyt in an official letter (a rarity in the large archive collection of Mazee's correspondence with Kruyt) that the government was prepared to consider central government funding of an extended elementary school administered by the mission "for the education of potential

84. Kruyt to Hofman, 15 February, 1908. "I spoke to him straight out about his opposition to mission schools. Mr. Boes disclaimed this very emphatically" but later admitted that he preferred government schools. He also considered the high subsidies granted to mission schools an injustice. The Inspector questioned the mission's right to retain the school in Poso, which he appeared to have seen as a good example of mission irresponsibility, returning to it time and again during his discussions. Kruyt defended the status quo on the grounds that: "I wanted to keep everything in one hand and ... we needed a guru in Poso [in connection with our] barang".

chiefs and teachers". Mazeo emphasized that the government would not approve:

subsidies for a training school [specifically] for teachers ... even if it would be your purpose that future chiefs would be appointed from the ranks of the teachers.⁸⁵

Kruyt responded (again officially) by suggesting that the proposal be postponed.⁸⁶ He informed Mazeo that the mission did not have the resources at this stage to administer such a school but the more relevant motive was Kruyt's awareness that the proposed school would be of more direct benefit to the government than to the mission and would possibly interfere in his attempts to obtain a subsidy for a teacher training school. It was after all the training of teachers and Christian community leaders, and not the provision of extended elementary education for clerks or chiefs with which the mission was concerned.⁸⁷

In the meantime, Kruyt proposed that the government consider making available a special subsidy to enable the mission to send promising murid to the Minahassa for training. Kruyt had already sent one To Wingke mPoso youth, whom he had adopted soon after his arrival in Poso, to the Minahassa and later, he had become the first

85. Mazeo to Kruyt, 9 September, 1909. Urgent No. 824.

86. Kruyt to Mazeo, 11 September, 1909. Kruyt considered the difference in the school he had proposed and that indicated by Mazeo as a matter of semantics, "only a training school for teachers would be better subsidized by the government than an extended government school". The difficulty was that such a school would need a European as director and would need to be a boarding school; the mission lacked the necessary resources.

87. Although his letter does not mention it, Kruyt must have been concerned that an extended elementary school would have to be opened to a wider range of children including, presumably, Muslims who would attend the school with the children of Pamona chiefs, a situation Kruyt would never have tolerated.

indigenous teacher of the region.^{88.}

But as a general principle, Kruyt rejected this method of obtaining trained local teachers. In a strongly worded response to a circular originating from the coordinating committee of the Depok seminary in Batavia, Kruyt had set down his views regarding the training of indigenous ministers collectively in a central school. The attitude he expressed here in 1903 is equally applicable to his view regarding the preparation of teachers that "the only proper training of [church] leaders is that which takes place in their own land and in their own language". This he argued, was essential to prevent their estrangement from family and culture and to ensure that they learnt in the way and in the language they were later to use as teacher or minister.^{89.}

Since the inception of the Poso mission, Kruyt had adhered to the principle that the spiritual and intellectual development of traditional peoples had to occur within their own cultural environment. What had to be achieved was a total cultural transformation; a superficial veneer had to be avoided. In essence, this was the same issue which concerned those who believed that the provision of popular education might lead to the establishment of a "learned proletariat". As a foreigner himself, Kruyt had spent years in studying the culture and mentality of the people so that he could bridge the cultural gap and preach to the To Pamona in their own cultural-linguistic concepts. For this reason, he also required his Minahassan teachers to acquaint themselves as thoroughly as possible

88. Appeals to the Society for finance to send young boys to various Minahassan institutions were made regularly each year. Apart from the teacher training school in Kurananga, entrance to the trade school at Kokos was also desired. There is no evidence of how many trainees were sent or whether any of them were To Pamona youth. Each of the missionaries had young trainees or murid living in who were being prepared as teachers and religious leaders. They appeared mostly to be Minahassans.

89. Kruyt's response to a questionnaire, from the Centraal Commite', Depok Seminary, 1903.

with the Bare'e language and culture prior to commencing their work.^{90.}

Trained in a different cultural-linguistic context, his Minahassan teachers were still too prone to introduce Minahassan religious concepts and were mostly incapable of successfully relating their teaching to the capabilities of their pupils. The main task of schools was not simply to pass on the skills of reading, writing and arithmetic, but to develop the pupil's capacity to think logically. This required the teacher to be thoroughly acquainted with the mind and the cultural context of the child and to avoid imposing a foreign frame of reference on his students. Kruyt was sceptical of the ability of the average indigenous teacher to achieve such objectives. First-hand experience with his Minahassan staff led Kruyt to conclude that

Their development is too limited to transpose what they have learnt into the local language and where it is generally accepted that [education] has to be given to a people in their own language, it is certainly no longer tenable that the teachers ... are introduced to education in a foreign language.^{91.}

Kruyt's assessment coincided with the professional judgement of Inspector Boes. According to Boes, instruction in arithmetic in the Central Sulawesi schools was beyond the grasp of the pupils, the treatment of language material was generally too rapid, resulting in the "faltering reading" of many children.^{92.} The

90. Kruyt, Report mission district Kuku, 1908, in op. cit., p. 8. Much of the time of the Annual Conference was devoted to establishing a specifically Pamona Christian adat, relating to baptism (1909), marriage and divorce (1910) and communion (1910). In 1909, the Conference decided that European-Christian baptismal names would not be given:

"The community of Poso would [otherwise] be regarded as a Minahassan colony where Minahassan habits would be followed - this solely to satisfy the desire of Minahassan guru who wish their children to be baptized in the way it is customary in the Minahassa".

(Minutes N.M.S., 20 October, 1909, First Annual Conference, 1 July, 1909).

91. Kruyt's response to a questionnaire from the Centraal Comite', Depok Seminary, 1903.

92. Kruyt to Hofman, 15 February, 1908.

quality of the teachers inspected was minimal.

Kruyt could agree with these comments but arrived at his conclusions from a different perspective "because we see in education, something else than Mr. Boes does". For Kruyt, the educational goal of the school was preparation for the acceptance of a Christian-cultural view of life. This preparation occurred most effectively where local people could be initiated into the Christian culture and, having thus bridged both civilizations, could reproduce this development in the minds of their own people. Consequently, the training of To Pamona teachers by the mission within their own cultural environment was, for Kruyt, the basis for the long term effectiveness of the Poso mission.⁹³ For missionary Kruyt, the Christian religion had a universal application that transcended its Euro-semitic cultural origins.

With the pressure of financial restrictions threatening to halt the expansion of the mission, it was a most fortunate coincidence that the first "converts" amongst the To Pamona appeared at this critical juncture, ensuring the continued support of those whose interests in the conversion of the "heathen" of Central Sulawesi may have begun to wane.

Of significant interest to the mission and the government was the fact that in almost every village in which baptism was recorded in 1909, the village chief was included. To a large extent this was to be expected since, even in the new villages, a decision of this magnitude involved a consensus of opinion. In this regard the baptism

93. Nevertheless, the 1909 Conference decided to adopt the Lage form of the Bare'e language as the official language medium throughout the mission, including Napu and Besoa. Mazee, correctly, questioned this proposal in a letter to Kruyt (23 June, 1909), that is, prior to the conference. He had discovered the practice when officially touring Napu. Ten Kate was struggling in Napu with unreliable teachers (he later sacked them all of whom only one spoke Napu. This man left the mission in August to enter the public service (no doubt lured there by the government because of the man's scarce and valuable talent). The apparent inconsistency of this decision therefore, appeared to have been forced on the mission in its attempt to cope with its staffing problem.

of Papa i Wunte "and all family heads of any significance" in Kasiguncu, totalling sixty-eight adults and thirty-three children was very influential. His baptism was accompanied by that of thirty-six adults and thirty children in Longkida, and a further application for baptismal instruction by thirty people in Kuku and twenty in Pandiri in 1910.⁹⁴ Everyone had waited for the decisions of their Nokole before farewelling their ancestors.⁹⁵ In Lage they continued to wait on the decision of Ta Lasa who kept taunting the mission with his ambiguous attitude towards Christianity.⁹⁶ Nevertheless, there was no question of mass conversion of the To Pamona. Most candidates for baptism at this time, as far as they are identified in mission reports, appear to have been former residents of villages with which Kruyt had contact prior to 1905 and recent or former school leavers.

Equally providential was the renewed spate of official requests for the expansion of the Central Sulawesi mission. The new Assistant Resident, De Vogel, asked the mission once again to consider assuming the task of supervising community schools outside the Poso basin.⁹⁷ but in the face of what Kruyt considered to be a f.2,350 shortfall in subsidies for the coming year for his own schools, this was

94. Minutes N.M.S., 9 February, 1910. Hofman to N.M.S., 10 December, 1909.
95. Minutes N.M.S., 26 October, 1910. Schuyt to N.M.S., 30 May, 1910. Schuyt informed the Society that outside these villages, "everyone was waiting for the result of Papa i Wunte's harvest"; the assumption being that they would wait to see how the spirits and ancestors would react.
96. Ta Lasa's attitude remained ambiguous but in 1912, Schuyt was confident that the population was no longer prepared to wait for his decision. (Minutes N.M.S., 25 September, 1912. Schuyt to N.M.S., 23 June, 1912.) Mazee was of the opinion that Ta Lasa was quietly working in opposition to Christianization in Lage. (Mazee to Kruyt, 29 August, 1910).
97. Minutes N.M.S., 20 October, 1909. Report of the first Annual Conference of the Poso mission, 1 July, 1909. Perhaps as a result of this, the Mission Consul was asked to investigate the possibility of obtaining an inspection allowance.

again refused.⁹⁸ Specifically, De Vogel had called on the mission to consider operating in Kulawi, a sub-district of the Palu region. De Vogel considered Kulawi, "at the moment, still a potentially rewarding area, but slowly and surely, Islam is penetrating there. If it is not speedily seized, it will be lost!"⁹⁹ In the light of De Vogel's attempt to cover up the chaos in this area for which he was responsible, the appeal for mission involvement here undoubtedly had ulterior motives.

His request was reinforced by a similar appeal from the Protestant Church of Makassar which called for Kruyt's assistance to expand the Christian presence in the entire west coast of Sulawesi including the Toraja lands.¹⁰⁰ Kruyt rejected these appeals on the grounds that, even if finance was made available, the Poso mission's first priority should be its extension into Onda'e and neighbouring Mori where Muslim penetration was threatening the eastern boundary of the Poso mission.¹⁰¹ Similarly, he failed to respond to a plea from the Minahassan community in Parigi to provide Christian leadership there.¹⁰²

The following year, when Kruyt estimated he should be entitled to a further f.4,500 beyond the f.5,000 subsidy being made available,¹⁰³ official support for the expansion

98. loc. cit.. Kruyt believed that since the number of schools had risen to twenty-three, the regional treasury should now be providing f.7,350 instead of f.5,000.

99. De Vogel to Kruyt, 11 October, 1909. See supra, Note 18.

100. Minutes N.M.S., 20 January, 1909, 19 January, 1910 and 24 March, 1904. Kruyt to N.M.S., 17 January, 1909.

101. Minutes N.M.S., 16 July, 1909. Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 May, 1909.

102. Annual Conference, 1 July, 1909. This request was supported in 1911 by the Resident of Menado who suggested that one of the missionaries visit the colony twice a year in return of free travel and an allowance of f.25 per visit. The 1911 Conference decided that the missionaries could not undertake this commitment.

103. Kruyt presented the 1910 Conference with an estimate for the mission's educational expenses between 1911 and 1916 of f.9,870 per year, excluding books and materials.

of missionary activity in Sulawesi increased even further. In May, 1910, the Mission Consul, Baron Boetzelaer van Dubbeldam sent the Missionary Society a copy of an official government letter which "urged the Society to commence work in Palu".¹⁰⁴ In October, he reported to the Society on his discussions with the Governor-elect of Celebes, Coensen, and the former Governor, Quarles de Quarles, currently a member of the Council of the Indies. Expressing the meeting's consensus opinion, the Consul wrote:

If Central Celebes is not to fall into the hands of Islam, it is absolutely necessary that mission schools are introduced there to meet the awakening demand for education, since every other school would become a powerful propaganda medium for Islam. For the establishment of mission schools, missionaries will have to be sent out. The government is prepared to meet all costs of education.¹⁰⁵

What could the Society reply? Certainly it was willing to assist but it lacked the financial resources. The government would first need to support the mission much more liberally.¹⁰⁶ In June, 1910 therefore, the Missionary Society, recognizing the short-sightedness of its decision

104. Minutes N.M.S., 15 July, 1910. Baron van Boetzelaer to N.M.S., 26 May, 1910 and 17 June, 1910.

105. Minutes N.M.S., 23 November, 1910. Boetzelaer to N.M.S., 13 October, 1910. Boetzelaer commented that this would create an even heavier burden on the supply of teachers which meant that priority would have to be given to the establishment of a teacher training school for the Poso mission.

106. One possible basis for obtaining more support was for the government to extend the principle of "a civilizing subsidy" as approved for the Rhenish Mission in 1910, (Government Ordinance, 26 May, 1910, No. 22). The Mission Consul supported this method and suggested the Society apply to the government for such a subsidy for a period of five years at the rate of f.20,000 per year. The advantage of such a subsidy was that it was non-specific and would be paid as a lump sum regardless of the number of schools, to be spent as the mission thought best. The figure of f.20,000 was the amount considered by the Society it should have received if Engelenberg's initial proposal had been implemented. Meanwhile, the Society had applied to the Governor-General for a lump-sum payment of f.3528.85 as recompense for total education outlay in Poso by way of regional subsidy during 1910-1911 above that already received. (Minutes N.M.S., 20 December, 1911).

in 1907 to withdraw its application for central government subsidies, requested the Mission Consul to initiate negotiations with the Director of Education, Religion and Industry regarding the development of a new subsidy concept for the Poso mission.¹⁰⁷ The timing of this suggestion was opportune since it was at this very time that the influential Colijn was elaborating his ideas for the reorganization of financial relations between the state and the mission.¹⁰⁸ The first of the new spate of subsidy contracts was already being developed in 1910,¹⁰⁹ against the background of the establishment by Islamic/Nationalist groups of Budi Otomo (1908), Sarekat Islam (1911) and the Indies Party (1912).

A subsidy contract such as the one signed in 1911 between the government and the Roman Catholic order on Flores never eventuated for Poso because Kruyt never accepted the central tenet of Colijn's proposal: that mission schools received government funding because they were fulfilling a government responsibility. Kruyt continued to deny the right of the government to dictate school policy, a denial which was necessarily tempered by his need to obtain government finance.

In the meantime, static funding from the regional treasury was being rapidly outstripped by the needs of an increasing number of schools and while negotiations were taking place between the Society represented by Baron van Boetzelaer and both levels of government, interim measures were being proposed in Poso.

At the annual conference of missionaries held in Poso in March, 1910, Kruyt presented his three colleagues with a five year financial projection of mission expenditure of

107. Minutes N.M.S., 15 February, 1911. Boetzelaer to N.M.S., 19 January, 1911. Negotiations commenced on 30 June, 1910.
108. See supra, Chapter 6.
109. Minutes N.M.S., 20 September, 1911. Boetzelaer to N.M.S., 25 July, 1911. The Consul had sent a copy of a draft of the new Sumba regulation to Poso with the comment that "This Sumba regulation will undoubtedly be used as a model for elsewhere". At its previous meeting (20 August, 1911), the Society expressed its hope that "before 1912, Central Celebes will have a similar regulation".

approximately f.50,000 or f.9,870 on average per year between 1911 and 1916. The Conference decided to apply once more for an increase in its subsidy and presented a request for f.9,500 for 1911.

Kruyt obtained Mazeë's co-operation for the presentation of a request for a larger subsidy to the financial discussion meeting of the regional administration. Mazeë, aware of the political climate and the personal idiosyncracies of his immediate superior, took the initiative to modify Kruyt's submission and thus it ultimately took the form of a request for a f.300 per annum subsidy for each of the twenty-five schools, or a total of f.7,500.¹¹⁰ The increase was nevertheless refused by the Resident of Menado on the advice of the government adviser for the Outer Islands, Frijling.¹¹¹

It now became clear to both parties that the only opportunity for raising the government's financial support for mission schools lay in increasing the contribution from the community. This method was in line with the policy adopted for the financing of desa schools in Java and, to some extent, was an extension of the policy already adopted in Poso, where the population supplied the buildings and partly financed the wage of the teacher. The principle of funding thus far adopted in Poso was that the government rather than the community bore the brunt of educational expenses, supplementary funding being provided by the Missionary Society. Where the thrust of administrative thinking regarding community schools was to transfer financial responsibility to the community, it was this option that was adopted in Poso. There were two difficulties related to the application of this solution in Poso. Firstly, there was the problem of where the

110. Mazeë to Kruyt, 10 October, 1910. The last complete statistics available until those for 1925, those published for 1910, are reproduced in Table 2. The five extra schools for which subsidies were applied were those planned for 1911.

111. loc. cit.. Mazeë informed Kruyt privately of Frijling's decision that the subsidy of f.5,000 should not be exceeded.

TABLE 2

SCHOOLS AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES
IN THE PCSO REGION 1910*

Community and Year of School Commencement	Your Native Minister or Helper (Guru)	No. of Schools	Number of Pupils				Total Reg	Ave Att	Community Members				Ave. Church Att.
			Christian B	Heathens G	Mohammedans B	G			M.	W.	H.	G.	
<u>Kasiguncu Mission</u> A.C. Kruyt													
Banano 1907	Alb. Possumah	1	37	18			55	52				50	
Kasiguncu 1906	Ph. Kaligis } D. Lasut }	1	71	25			96	86	39	51	39	140	
Longkida 1909	S. Rapar	1	42	29			71	65	33	28	17	23	100
Mapano 1894	J. Karwur	1	2	2	24		28	20					
Mara'ayo 1907	A. Rumajar	1	27	22			49	48				40	
Pepewoloka 1909	Ahas Possumah	1	28	17			45	41				70	
Poso 1894	A.M. Sepang	1	5	5	25	2	37	31	21	15	11	15	20
Total	8	7	212	118	49	2	381	343	93	94	28	77	420
<u>Kuku Mission</u> P. Schuyt													
				Christian	Heathen								
<u>Datunoncu 1909</u>												150	
Sangira } Soajo }	J.A. Wagey	1		66	34	100						80	
												70	
Buyu mPondoli	S. Wawor	1		21	15	36						90	
<u>Kuku</u>												110	
Tampeta'a }	J. Kaligis	1	10	14	31	8	63					90	
<u>Maliwuko</u>												130	
Silance }	Th. Orah	1	19	6	53	16	94	20	8	2	1	60	
<u>Pandiri</u>												60	
Watuawu } Imbu }	A. Lumentut	1	15	5	17	1	38	15	5	-	-	90	
												100	
<u>Panjoka</u>												110	
Jo'emloyo } Wo'omPada } Pino }	W. Tawaluyan	1		60	25	85						70	
												50	
												100	
Peura	D. Supit	1		24	12	36						90	
<u>Tentena</u>													
Katodena }	F. Sigilipa	1		50	10	60							
Total	8	8	44	25	302	127	518	35	13	2	11	450	
<u>Napu-Desoa Mission</u> P. Ten Kate													
<u>Watutau</u>					39	25							
Gaa } Wuasa }	B.D. Temboken	1		3	3			70	46			25	
<u>Doda</u>					13	1							
Bariri } Lompe } Hanggira } Rano }	Al. Rantung	1		10	8	3		42	24				
					2	2							
Total	2	2		80	32	112	70					25	
<u>Pendolo Mission</u> A.C. Kruyt													
				Christian + Heathen	Mohammedan								
Pendolo	E. Mengelep H. Wokas	1	39	20		59	57					125	
Bancea (Binowoi)	C. Goni	1	26	19		45	39					110	
Taripa	I. Supit	1	15	11		26	25					105	
Total	4	3	80	50		130	121					340	
Total Poso Mission (36 Villages)													
	22	20				1141	534	128	107	507	8	223	

* As Published in Mededelingen 1911

community would find the source for a greater monetary contribution to education. Secondly, there was the difficulty of deciding which sections of the community could legitimately be requested to contribute to the financing of the schools.

Since 1908, Kruyt had been conducting experiments with growing coffee trees as a cash crop in Kuku. In the event these attempts proved failures and, even had they been successful, it would have been at least seven years before the product could be sold.¹¹² The traditional source of money and the basic means by which the To Pamona were able to pay their newly imposed taxes was the sale of forest products, particularly of resin and rattan. Mazee had endeavoured to restrict this activity since it necessitated the absence of substantial numbers of villagers from their homes for many weeks, from which expeditions many returned ill or undernourished. Mazee had therefore attempted to encourage the planting of coconut palms to develop a copra industry as a replacement cash crop. As part of this policy he had, by 1908, succeeded in suppressing the export of forest products and promoting that of copra. This was a risky policy which could have resulted in "nasty letters ... since the government is naturally very interested in the export duties" but, since the suppression of these forest product-gathering expeditions suited Kruyt, the latter co-operated. Thus, Mazee advised him:

When you enter the field against forest product gathering and perhaps also intimate that the administration does not support it, you might point out the increase in copra export as of great significance for the future.¹¹³

112. The Controleur for Poso to the Assistant Resident, 14 April, 1914. The Controleur had stated in an argument regarding the likely sources of extra school finances, that Kruyt and Schuyt had agreed that the coffee experiment had failed. In the margin of his copy, Kruyt had written - "I know nothing of this. The first lie! My coffee plantations are going well." The Assistant Resident agreed with the Controleur as to the inadvisability of using coffee as the basis of a community chest. (Explanatory note to the Regulations regarding community funds in Central Celebes).

113. Mazee to Kruyt, 2 November, 1910.

In subsequent years, Kruyt actively encouraged the establishment of school coconut plantations as a source of school funds but, like coffee plantations, coconut plantations involved a considerable time lag before becoming revenue-producing although they had the advantage of being less labour intensive.

Meanwhile, an immediate financial solution had to be found from both the government and mission point of view. In 1911, as a direct result of changes in the government's education policy, the Resident of Manado made it known to the Assistant Resident of Central Celebes, who in turn informed the Poso administrator, Captain Mazee, that "gradually, a policy of levying school fees had to be implemented".¹¹⁴ This was in accord with the general principle applied to the volkschool that the people should pay for their education. In April, the Resident came to Poso to discuss this policy change with Kruyt personally.¹¹⁵

When the matter was raised at the mission's annual conference in June, opposition was expressed to the principle of school fees on the grounds that the construction and maintenance of schools and teacher residences, the cultivation of the teachers' rice fields and the establishment of community plantations already placed heavy burdens on the community. Despite this apparent concern to prevent the exploitation of To Pamona villagers, Kruyt informed the Conference that he had suggested to the Resident that the government impose a surcharge on the income tax of ten percent. The Resident had rejected this "because it was too high"¹¹⁶ and the government decided to push ahead with its proposal. Mazee was ordered to hold a conference with To Pamona chiefs to discuss its

114. Assistant Resident de Vogel to Civiel Gezaghebber of Poso, 23 June, 1911.

115. Mazee to Kruyt, 1 March, 1911. The Resident was taking this opportunity to visit the major mission centres and Mazee advised Kruyt "to arrange your plans in such a way that you will be in Kasiguncu on April 28".

116. Minutes N.M.S., 20 September, 1911, Annual Conference, 9 June, 1911.

implementation.^{117.}

. In deciding that school fees should be levied, the government was manifesting its assumption of the right to decide any matters related to education. This right had been cogently argued by Colijn in his address to the Netherlands Missionary Association in 1910. Until then, the government had not interfered in the organization of the mission schools in Poso and even the brief visit by one of its Inspectors in 1908 was considered by Engelenberg and Kruyt to be an unwarranted interference. Content, organization and, up to a point, financing, had been left to the mission.^{118.} Now as the mission increased its demand for extra funding, the government began to look more closely at the organization of these private schools. Mazeë, to whom the implementation of this policy had been delegated, disagreed with the basic assumption. He thus wrote to Kruyt in August:

As you will have read, Mr. de Vogel wanted me to discuss this with the chiefs but of course I will not do this since the schools have been entrusted to the mission; if anything has to be discussed with the chiefs, that is with the population then it is not my business, but yours. Don't you see it that way too?^{119.}

The question was rhetorical and subsequently, Kruyt held a meeting with the representatives of the people on the basis of which he drew up a report in 1911 entitled, "Regulations related to the levying of school fees in the

117. Mazeë to Kruyt, 16 August, 1911.

118. The mission was of course dependent on the government for the subsidy but Engelenberg had not asked Kruyt to account for the way he used it. When Kruyt introduced regulations whereby the population was obliged to contribute to the income of the guru, Mazeë expressed his displeasure but did not actively interfere. (See Note 67).

119. Mazeë to Kruyt, 16 August, 1911. To fulfill his superior's command, Mazeë did hold a preliminary meeting with the chiefs to announce that the government desired the introduction of school fees. He told Kruyt: "Further regulations I will leave to you since it has been determined that school fees will be levied and we are generally agreed as to its amount". (Mazeë to Kruyt, 19 September, 1911).

Poso area drawn up together with various chiefs of the region". According to this report, the chiefs concurred with Kruyt's view that the levying of school fees would be too burdensome for the people. The Resident had suggested fees of ten cents per month for a school year excluding the vacation period, thus totalling one gilder or f.1.10 per annum for the first child. The chiefs had argued that a straight fee per pupil would disadvantage too many parents, particularly those paying the minimum tax of f.2.50 who were in the majority. Such parents would not be able to afford to pay fees of between f.1.50 and f.1.80 for two children for instance. The meeting therefore suggested, again in accordance with the decision of the Conference, that parents pay a percentage of the tax rate rather than that a standard fee be applied to all. In this way the lowest taxable income earners could still be expected to contribute and, according to a further argument presumably added by Kruyt,

with this method, the way is opened for increasing school fees as the amount of income tax increases as a result of coffee and coconut cultivation.

Further, the chiefs declared that the monthly payment of fees as the Resident and Mazee desired (although for different reasons) was impossible to implement in the Poso region:

The chiefs themselves requested to make the payment once per year since the children as a rule were admitted and dismissed once a year. Thus, when the people go out to search for money, ie. obtain products for sale for their taxes, the chiefs would remind them to collect some extra in order that they would be able to pay their tax and their school fees concurrently.

It was in this vein that the school fee question was settled. For Kruyt, whose views on this matter coincided entirely with the opinion expressed by the chiefs, the advantage in what was, in effect, a tax surcharge was, that in this way, the payment of school fees would not be noticeable. It had the further advantage that, because the payment was levied at the same time as the income tax, it carried the same legitimation and the majority of the villagers could be expected to regard it simply as a

further imposition of the government, and not of the mission. Kruyt quite correctly feared that a monthly payment would have created difficulties which would have manifested themselves in resentment against the mission which would then have been responsible for the collection of school fees each month and this would have resulted in a sharp decline in school attendance. Like the initial construction of school and residential buildings, the mission was once again able to use the people's fear of the government to promote its own development.

It was therefore decided that, from the commencement of the school year in 1912, school fees would be paid in a lump sum at the same time as taxes were collected and they were to be based on the tax assessment. For all those whose father or guardian paid tax, a further twenty percent would be paid as a school fee for the first child, ten percent for the second and third, while any remaining members of the same family attended free. Thus, those paying the minimum tax of f.2.50, paid fifty cents; those paying f.4, eighty cents and those paying f.5, f.1 for the first child. The first child of a village chief paid f.1.20 and the child of a district chief paid f.1.50. The required sum was to be determined by the village chief together with the teacher after the annual assessment of taxation was completed. The Society recorded in its Minutes for December, 1911 that Brother Kruyt was very pleased with this outcome: "In this way, the Poso people will be able to learn to meet their own needs."¹²⁰.

The new source of income was indeed most welcome but the Conference in 1912 resolved that the school plantations "of 1,000 coffee trees and 300 coconut palms", which, as a result of earlier experiments, were now to be established for each school, were not to be used to provide the money for the paying of these fees.¹²¹ Further, what had now become two separate sources in finance were on no

120. Minutes N.M.S., 20 December, 1911. Kruyt to N.M.S., 9 October, 1911.

121. Minutes N.M.S., 25 September, 1912. Annual Conference, 17 June, 1912.

account to lead to a reduction of the f.5,000 subsidy from the administration. The funds derived from school plantations were to form the basis of a (Christian) community treasury and were not part of school funds. The ethical problems of a village community labouring in a plantation to raise money for a community chest, theoretically under the care of the heads of families but in practice controlled by the mission for the benefit of the Christian element of that population were, for the moment, overlooked.^{122.}

The potential financial position of the mission had thus, suddenly significantly improved. In the fairly prosperous Pebato district, the mission could count on a contribution of seventy-five cents per head, while in the poorer areas around Lake Poso where the minimum tax rate generally applied, fifty cents could be anticipated.^{123.} Unfortunately, the obscurity of the accounting system applied by the missionaries and the absence of enrolment statistics make it impossible to compute the relevant financial contributions of the three parties involved in funding the schools after 1911. The account for Kuku for

122. The Conference expressed as its opinion, that the funds raised as a result of the community plantations were to pay for 'extras' and the expenditure of any remaining funds was to be "determined by the family heads". In 1913, Schuyt who was establishing a reputation of being something of a rebel, wrote to the Society that "the school is not being maintained by the church community but by the entire population". (Minutes N.M.S., 18 June, 1913, Schuyt to N.M.S., 17 March, 1913).
123. Minutes N.M.S., 20 March, 1912. Kruyt to N.M.S., 14 January, 1912. In the same letter, Kruyt estimated that school fees for the Kasiguncu mission district would amount to f.311. The villages of Kasiguncu and Malitu each had established coffee plantations consisting of three hundred trees, while other Pebato villages had plantations of 1,000 trees.

1912 shows the following receipts:^{124.}

School fees, 1911	f.439.10	
School fees, 1912	f.531.15	
Sale of produce from school plan- tations	f.281.83	
Sale of school articles	<u>f.135.10</u>	
Total Receipts		<u>f.1,387.18</u>

Added to this was Kuku's share of the f.5,000 subsidy which amounted to f.1,460, thus making a total of f.2,847.18. Against this the mission claimed expenses of f.2,807.50 for the cost of running ten schools (inclusive of salaries), f.4.50 for school equipment, f.364.77 for maintenance of buildings (mission buildings as distinct from schools or teacher residences) and f.97.25 for maintenance of three teacher residences. If the cost of the maintenance of mission buildings were subtracted and the school fees for 1911 removed, the mission's contribution to the cost of educating the To Pamona of the Kuku mission district in 1912, was f.501.17. This was hardly a large sum but if, as mission accounts consistently did, the salary of the missionary was included, a further f.1,950 would be added so that, without the new revenues, the mission could claim to be paying twice as much for the school system of the Poso region as the government. With the addition of school fees and the annual revenue from school plantations, the mission could still argue that it was contributing an amount comparable to the government subsidy and comparable to the amount contributed by the community.^{125.}

While the financial position of the mission schools

124. Minutes N.M.S., 17 December, 1913. The relevant figures for the Kasiguncu mission district were:

<u>Income</u>		<u>Expenses</u>	
School fees, 1911	f.311.80	Maintenance of	
School fees, 1912	f.261.80	buildings	f. 491.00
Sale of produce from plantations	not given	Cost of running ten schools	f.2536.25
Sale of school equipment	f.116.42	Payment to book Depot (for entire mission)	f.1035.03
Proportion of Subsidy	f.1230.00		

125. loc. cit.

had clearly improved by 1912,^{126.} educationally, the mission schools of this period remained very primitive. The imposition of colonial rule and the impact of the changes introduced by the government had stimulated a demand from some hard-pressed village chiefs for the presence of a guru but an understanding of the purpose of education and the habit of school attendance had yet to be implanted. Privately, Kruyt admitted to Hofman that the process of conversion and school attendance amongst those who had not previously been in contact with the mission was largely a political matter.

Earlier, it was more spiritual; at the moment more political. More than ever it is considered that to become a Christian is the same as to become a Hollander ... [two chiefs spoken to recently] used both terms synonymously with the assurance that in a little while, they would become Christian but that they were not yet biasa[able to].^{127.}

School attendance, similarly viewed as part of the adat of the new overlord, was thus accepted or rejected depending on the attitude of a village towards the colonial government. Referring to the school in Kuku, Kruyt wrote in January, 1908:

... attendance is not improving. We can notice in this that there is still a mass of opposition here. I will, however, keep on and I hope that we will yet achieve an increase. The original Kuku villagers are willing but the opposition comes from Kapulia and Walensa. The people from these villages have built houses in Kuku but these remain empty and they continue living in their old nests [former hill-top villages].^{128.}

The local administration's solution to the problems was to force To Pamona commitment to the requirements of the new adat. While Engelenberg and Mazee were tempted to promote conversion to Christianity, respect for the person

126. Schuyt claimed in 1912 that school fees only provided one-eighth of the actual costs and that the coffee and coconut plantations would not yield until 1919. (Minutes N.M.S., 19 June, 1912. Schuyt to N.M.S., 19 April, 1912.

127. Kruyt to Hofman, 10 December, 1907.

128. Kruyt to Hofman, 9 January, 1908.

of Kruyt persuaded them against adopting this solution ¹²⁹. but, in all other matters, Mazee was not prepared to leave things to choice. The new adat would be adopted. Thus, village chiefs had instructions from Mazee to ensure the regular attendance of those whom the village had selected to attend school. When the issue of the payment of school fees was mooted in 1911, Mazee warned the gathering of chiefs that on no account must they allow the imposition of school fees to affect school attendance negatively. ¹³⁰.

The To Pamona were pastmasters in the art of fulfilling the minimum requirements and demands imposed on them while retaining their independence as far as possible. It was this skill which had frustrated Kruyt since 1894. This negative attitude was best exemplified by the general attitude toward forced sawah cultivation. The difficulties experienced by the government led the sympathetic Gobee to report in 1910:

Generally speaking, there is little concern for timely preparation; the people cannot see the use of this yet and everything is left to the last possible moment unless constant supervision is exercised. ¹³¹.

Confronted by the same attitude, Kruyt had cursed the stubborn conservatism of these people fettered by the bonds of tradition and ancestor worship. Mazee, Gobee's

129. In an emotional response to Kruyt's accusation that Mazee had interfered in religious matters, Mazee wrote to Kruyt in 1911:

"I read between the lines that you believed the people's tales and I have honestly to say that I was offended. For more than four years, we have worked together; in matters relating to the mission I have never interfered with you, I have informed you of important affairs of state and often asked for your opinion both in the interests of better administration and out of respect of your long experience. Have I now earned your opinion of me that I would be capable of such a stupid act in a matter lying entirely outside my domain?" (Mazee to Kruyt, 19 September, 1901).

130. Mazee to Kruyt, 19 September, 1911.

131. Gobee to Mazee, 13 April, 1910.

superior, interpreted the people's reaction in the more familiar colonialist fashion:

... it is their indolence again which postpones everything only commands and more commands and sometimes only punishments can convince the people to persevere with the cultivation of the sawah.¹³²

All three men failed to perceive adequately the people's attitudes by implying that the people "could not see the use of the sawah". The To Pamona saw quite clearly that sawah cultivation was a threat to their culture and were reinforced in their opposition by the serious failure of sawah harvests in previous years. Had it not been for the continuation of traditional rice gardens, starvation would have been widespread.¹³³

The cause of the crop failures according to Mazee was the people's refusal to follow instructions. In a letter to Kruyt at the end of 1907 (the first year of compulsory sawah cultivation) he listed the methods whereby the To Pamona obstructed the success of the sawah. In Buyu mPondoli, the centre for instruction in the new farming methods since 1906, the villagers had mixed dry rice seed with the newly introduced sawah seed. They had failed also to "properly cultivate" the land. Clearly, the inhabitants of Buyu mPondoli were attempting to continue traditional practices as far as possible.

In Pendolo and Bancea, the people had not effectively protected the rice crop from birds, while in Singkona, the population physically removed the strings which had been

132. Mazee to Gobee, Confidential, No. 6, 15 April, 1910.

133. There was serious starvation in Besoa in 1906. "Strangely, even the guru of Doda knew nothing about it until it was too late; the people were too shy to tell him". Even then, according to Mazee, the people were only prepared to accept emergency help. (Mazee to Kruyt, 23 June, 1909). "Thinking this over, it struck me that in Europe also, respectable people are reluctant even in great need to make their needs known so that I could then ... understand the To Besoa and appreciate their hesitation". While a commendable example of empathy, Mazee had not yet delved deeply enough into the religio-cultural motivations involved in the behaviour of these people.

tied across the field to frighten the birds away.¹³⁴
 This was a serious issue for the To Pamona. Frightening
 birds away or tying lines with leaves attached across
 the growing plants was taboo in traditional agriculture
 because it was believed that this would frighten away the
 spirit of the rice so that no rice would form in the ears.
 Simultaneously, it was held by many that the birds were
 the spirits of ancestors coming to obtain a share of the
 rice. Similar beliefs surrounded the active dispersal of
 animals such as apes, deer and pigs which continued to
 destroy much of the sawah. In 1912, Kruyt felt able to
 write that "the fear of frightening away destructive
 animals has significantly decreased".¹³⁵

In the administrative sub-districts of Kolone Dale
 (Mori) and north-west Sulawesi, lack of personnel and,
 most significantly, the absence of a network of mission
 teachers, which in the Poso region effectively multiplied
 the personnel the government had at its disposal,¹³⁶
 meant that in these areas, government commands were not
 able substantially to "convince the people to persevere"
 and they thus continued in their "indolence". Kruyt wrote
 in 1924:

In Mori and Malili [the administration] failed to
 make use of the fear which the people felt when
 the government imposed its authority to force
 them to change to wet-rice cultivation. And
 what do we see now? Both administrative sub-
 districts are still struggling with the aversion
 of the population towards sawah and, where they
 have been established, they are small and in-
 frequent.¹³⁷

134. Mazee to Kruyt, 18 November, 1908.

135. Kruyt and Adriani, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 251-257.

136. Regarding the administration of Mori, Mazee commented:

"If I just consider how many eyes and ears are helping
 to keep watch here and then compare this to the
 minimal assistance which the civiel gezaghebber of
 Kolondale has at his disposal, then it can't be any-
 thing else but that in his region in many respects
 it is as dark as night." (Mazee to Kruyt,
 21 February, 1912).

137. Kruyt, "De Betekenis van de natten rijstbouw voor de
 Possoers", in op. cit., pp. 43-44.

Opposition to European innovations was interpreted as "indolence", "the solid wall of conservatism", "inability to think logically". Generally, this opposition was passive although military expeditions were organized against the To Wana in Tojo,^{138.} the To Napu^{139.} and fairly extensively in north-west Sulawesi.^{140.} In the Poso area itself, the only significant campaigns were conducted in the hunt for Ta Batoki, one of the 1906 defenders of the Pebato fortification and, in the eradication of the Meyapi religious movement. Ta Batoki, who had, since Ta Rame's surrender in early 1906, been hunted down, proved very elusive. Eventually in mid 1909, he turned himself in as a result of intervention by Adriani and Ta Rame^{141.} but only after Kruyt managed to convince the administration to call off the military pursuers.^{142.} Ta Batoki was considered a threat to government authority and his hide-away had become "a place of refuge for the dissatisfied".^{143.} During his pursuit, four To Pamona were killed and "many wounded".^{144.} Ta Batoki died of tuberculosis soon after his surrender.^{145.}

More serious was the religio-political reaction to the imposition of Dutch rule, known as Meyapi. Drawing on the strength of their traditional religion, "many" villagers from Buyu Mapipi in Onda'e fled into the

138. Mazeo to Kruyt, 20 April, 1909.

139. Mazeo to Kruyt, 25 June, 1911.

140. Mazeo to Kruyt, 23 June, 1909.

141. Gobeo Diary, 5 June, 1909. Mazeo to Kruyt, 23 June, 1909. Mazeo was somewhat sceptical of Adriani's involvement. He wrote to Kruyt: "His [Ta Batoki's] story to Adriani was rather simplistic, he was completely silent about the attempts that had been made to get him to return. I heard that Mr. Adriani was planning to come here again on Ta Batoki's behalf. Could you perhaps have a quiet word with him so that he changes his mind?"

142. See Note 14.

143. Mazeo to Kruyt, 23 June, 1909.

144. loc. cit.

145. Mazeo to Kruyt, 12 July, 1909.

surrounding forests to escape the new demands of the government and to resume contact with the ancestors. According to Kruyt's interpretation, the ancestors had forbidden them to submit to the government and to avoid the revenge of the Kumbania they would be taken up to heaven.¹⁴⁶ It was Kruyt's opinion, presented in his official advice to the Menado administration, that this religious movement had clear political overtones and was potentially highly dangerous. A good, energetic leader had only to take control of such a movement for it to become an influential opposition movement. "That is why it is of such importance that the movement be strangled in its infancy", he concluded.¹⁴⁷

The rather emotional language of his official advice suggested that Kruyt was concerned with more than the political ramifications of this development. Indeed, he saw in it a potential revival of traditional religious life. Consequently, he also advised the destruction of the village from which most of the movement members had come since "this village is more or less regarded as holy by the To Pakambia". This religious interpretation was not shared by Adriani whose accompanying advice emphasized Mevapi's role as a traditional, if infrequently used, safety valve employed by disaffected elements in a village.¹⁴⁸ Mazee later instituted a pass system to control the movement of villagers, for it appeared to him that many people were attempting to leave their villages to avoid the irksome requirements imposed upon them.¹⁴⁹ Many of these appeared to want to escape to areas beyond the supervision of the demanding civiel gezaghebber and of the mission to

146. "De godienstige-politieke beweging "Mejapi" on Celebes", (The religious-political movement "Mevapi" on Celebes), Bidragen, Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, vol. 69, 1913, p. 137. This article compiled by the editor, quotes Kruyt's official advice presented to the Menado administration dated 10 July, 1910.

147. Kruyt in op. cit., p. 145.

148. Adriani's interpretation of the movement dated 3 July, 1911, was appended to the Kruyt article.

149. Mazee to Kruyt, 29 August, 1910.

the less well administered adjoining districts of Mori and Malili. In this way, they too were carrying out Meyapi as Adriani interpreted it.^{150.}

Another form of resistance which was seen to have political overtones was the Ghandi-style passive resistance of the leader of the former anti-Dutch Pebato force. Despite his opposition, Ta Rame's prominent place in Pebato society was recognized by the government in its appointment of him as Witi Mokole of Pebato, assistant to the pro-government but ineffective, Papa i Wunte. Even in this position, Ta Rame continued to resist the spirit, if not the letter of government regulations. His village, Banano, was described as too filthy to billet soldiers there.^{151.} Yet there is no mention of his punishment. Ironically, one of his descendents is now a member of the synod of the Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah. At the height of the serious small-pox epidemic of 1908-09, Ta Rame consistently refused to be vaccinated and refused to assist in the precautionary measures being implemented by Mazeo with the assistance of the mission.^{152.} This drew from Mazeo the comment, "one of these days I will wash out that gentleman's ears. He is too impudent in my opinion."^{153.} Ta Rame also refused to give effect to the

150. Kruyt remarked to Gerth van Wijk who had expressed his opinion that anyone could live anywhere he liked, that "if the people in Pendolo were given the freedom, the population would run away to Luwu because in Luwu the taxation is minimal, herendiensten not worth mentioning and supervision does not exist". (Kruyt to van Wijk, 14 March, 1913). To Baron van Boetzelaer on the same subject, Kruyt admitted that it was precisely the anti-mission element of the Pendolo inhabitants which would run away if given the chance. While Mazeo's restrictions on movement was also clearly in the interests of the mission, Kruyt defended it generally on the grounds that without such restrictions, the people "who are not at all used to living a sedantary life" would simply leave a village where a chief was seriously attempting to implement the wishes of the government and move to the village of a less conscientious chief. (Kruyt to Boetzelaer, 26 April, 1913).

151. Mazeo to Kruyt, 22 March, 1909.

152. loc. cit..

153. Mazeo to Kruyt, 19 March, 1909.

prohibition on maintaining slaves. At the beginning of 1912, Mazeo was forced to admit that the government orders in this matter were being ignored. He was sufficiently realistic not to demand that former slave owners send their slaves away but he was not prepared to tolerate the division of a slave's off-spring or the retention of slaves against their will. Ta Rame was a prominent offender and he was informed that if he continued holding slaves against their will beyond the end of the month, he would be punished.¹⁵⁴ There is no record of Ta Rame ever having been punished for his activities but he never did become district chief of Pebato.

While Mazeo remained in charge of the Poso district, he maintained his policy of "commands and more commands", keeping a tight rein on the people and on most issues, such as school attendance, enforcing the authority of the mission. He established and maintained high ideals of professional conduct and was strongly imbued with the task of colonial rule. Very critical of the administrations of surrounding districts, he complained, at the end of his period of service in Poso in 1912, of the quality of his colleagues:

It is truly a tragedy to hear and to read that the Director of Internal Affairs welcomes just anyone to serve. Must the great work of van Heutz be ruined in this way?¹⁵⁵

He warned Kruyt not to expect too much from his successor, Gerth van Wijk,¹⁵⁶ who was included in Mazeo's poor opinion of the contemporary colonial official whom the government was forced to employ to cope with the demands of its expanding administration. Firmness and understanding

154. Mazeo to Kruyt, 21 February, 1912.

155. Mazeo to Kruyt, 7 November, 1912. This was the last letter Mazeo wrote to Kruyt while he was civiel gezaghebber of Poso.

156. Gerth van Wijk, according to Mazeo, had been a cadet and later sergeant in the Netherlands Indies Army. His last appointment had been as civiel gezaghebber of Kuala Murun. In Mazeo's opinion, his prior career "inevitably detracts from the expectations". (Mazeo to Kruyt, 20 October, 1912).

were the basis of Mazee's recipe for fruitful colonial rule. It was an attitude which Kruyt had come to respect over the years, although initially, he had believed:

that Mr. Mazee does not want a bar of us. Fortunately, everything is going well but he knows nothing of governing. It is remarkable that people who are called to exercise authority immediately take an attitude of "I know everything about it", which is the greatest fault of local administrators. I usually accept his advice with a smile in my heart.¹⁵⁷

Several years later, Kruyt had changed his mind and had used his influence to secure Mazee's promotion.¹⁵⁸

By the end of the second decade of the twentieth century, Kruyt found himself forced to write to Batavia asking for the removal of the local administrator. By then, government officials appeared to him to be actively undermining the mission's position and Kruyt was no longer responding to their advice with a smile in his heart.¹⁵⁹

157. Kruyt to Hofman, 9 July, 1908.

158. Mazee to Kruyt, 16 August, 1911 and 19 August, 1911. Baron van Boetzelaer had also intervened on Mazee's behalf. Mazee's difficulty was that by staying on as civiel gezaghebber of Poso he was endangering his promotion opportunities in the army. Kruyt and Boetzelaer appear to have tried to have him promoted to Controleur. Resigned to the failure of these efforts, Mazee wrote to Kruyt: "Even though there are no prospects for promotion within the civil service, I prefer to stay in Poso; my motives you know. I hope to continue to work together with you for a long time to come."

159. Within six months of the arrival of Mazee's successor, Kruyt wrote to the Mission Consul to get van Wijk replaced. "I had not thought that I would have to write to you so soon about Mr. G. van Wijk, but I feel myself driven to it in the interests of Central Celebes". (Kruyt failed to add "of the expansion of the mission in Central Celebes"). (Kruyt to Boetzelaer, 26 April, 1913).

CHAPTER EIGHT

VILLAGE SCHOOLS: DEFINING THE ROLE OF CHURCH
AND STATE IN CENTRAL SULAWESI

The departure of Captain Mazee from Poso in the latter part of 1912 marked the end of an era in government and mission relations in Central Sulawesi. To a large extent the pioneering days were over. The agricultural, village resettlement and road-building plans, which it had been Mazee's task to implement after their initial introduction by his predecessor, Lieutenant Voskuil, were by this time well under way. Schools had increased rapidly in number and by 1912 the mission had established regular contact with thirty-six villages and was employing twenty-two teachers. The European mission itself had grown to five and had been officially organized since 1909 as a Conference, nominally ending the primacy of Kruyt as the leader of the Poso mission. The year 1912 marked the twentieth anniversary of the mission's presence in the region and the tenth year of an effective government presence. The close co-operation between mission and government, which had been imposed on the representatives of the two arms of European colonial society in their isolation, was beginning to be disrupted with the influx of new personnel and the region's gradual absorption into the maelstrom of colonial politics and debate.

By 1912, Poso was no longer an isolated colonial outpost administered according to the whims of individuals and influenced by the interplay of the philosophies and personalities of the two or three men involved. This change had already become apparent in 1911 in the school fees issue. Pressures were mounting against the continuation of arbitrary, personal administration based on gentleman's agreements and mutual respect and understanding. As local government administration necessarily became more formalized in the second decade of the century, it came increasingly under the influence of central government control. In the process it began to lose its flexibility and individuality, characteristics which the mission considered essential in a local administration preparing a traditional

society such as the To Pamona to accept the new order.

Not least amongst the externally-influenced changes which occurred in the Poso region at this time was the resurgence of Islamic consciousness. In mission correspondence, "the penetration of Mohammedanism" southwards from the coast was becoming a matter of concern. The new missionaries, Wesseldijk and Schuyt, the latter described by Mazee as "not wide in thought or vision",¹ summed up the situation in the "border town" of Kasiguncu as "a serious struggle".² In that village, a significant minority had become Muslim and had now requested to form a separate village. Wesseldijk stated that those involved were motivated by the belief that, as Muslims, they would have less herendiensten to perform, which was an accurate analysis if herendiensten were regarded by these villagers as including unpaid services for the mission school.³ In nearby Mapane, a new mosque had been erected, while in the village of Maliwuku the first of the purely Lage villages due south of Poso, there was at this time a strong desire to become Christian which the mission considered "all the more pleasing, since in this way, a dam could be erected against the penetration of Islam."⁴

The assertion of the Islamic presence along the coast was, to a large extent, a response to the crusading spirit of the new missionaries, particularly that of Wesseldijk and Schuyt who were in charge of the two northernmost mission districts. Civiel gezaghebber Mazee expressed some concern about their attitude and the conflict which could develop but believed the situation in Kasiguncu would improve:

if Mr. Wesseldijk does his best not to draw out

1. Mazee to Kruyt, 16 November, 1913.
2. Minutes N.M.S., 8 May, 1912. Wesseldijk to N.M.S., 27 February, 1912.
3. Minutes N.M.S., 25 September, 1912. Wesseldijk to N.M.S., 25 May, 1912. The mission proposed that a Minahassan teacher would nevertheless be posted in the new village in order to "retain a Christian link". This would have continued to involve the villagers in financial contributions to the school.
4. Minutes N.M.S., 18 January, 1911. Schuyt to N.M.S., 19 November, 1910.

any action under the banner of Islam on the part of the Mohammedans. Recently, Mr. Wesseldijk prohibited the burial of a Mohammedan in Kasiguncu and this sort of attitude is of course, unacceptable.⁵

In the Poso basin, these developments were limited to the extreme coastal strip, affecting only the northernmost To Pamona villages. They occurred despite the watchful eye of mission and government and were partly due to the proximity of the new villages established at the behest of the government. Prior to 1906, a broad stretch of no-man's land existed between the Muslim influenced coastal settlements and the traditional To Pamona villages, a border all the more impenetrable because of the absence of roads.

In the expanding settlement of Poso itself where, since 1894, the mission had conducted a school, the establishment of the government's regional administration had promoted trade and the influx of Muslim traders.⁶ By 1914, when the issue of the establishment of a mission-administered standard elementary school was coming under review, the Director of Education and Religion, C.A.J. Hazeu, questioned whether it was still appropriate that such a school be conducted under the auspices of the mission in the light of events elsewhere in the colony. Recognizing that up till this time "parents of children had never objected to the religious instruction given at the existing mission school" he nevertheless warned that:

events which have occurred in recent years within the Muslim community in other parts of the archipelago undoubtedly mean that there is no guarantee of the continuation of the accepting attitude of

5. Mazee to Kruyt, 29 September, 1912.

6. In 1915, all the major export/import establishments were compulsorily moved to Poso from the traditionally more important trading centre of Tojo. The declared aim of this re-location was "to promote shipping", but it was primarily an attempt to consolidate trading outlets in Poso in order to bring trade under more effective supervision and control of customs officials and to isolate the Muslim stronghold of Tojo. Decline of trade during the war was a further contributing factor. As a result of this transfer, there was a significant influx of "Mohammedan foreigners" to Poso. (Minutes N.M.S., 15 September, 1915. Ten Kate to N.M.S., 2 June, 1915).

the Mohammedans in Poso in regard to mission education.⁷

Beyond the immediate Poso region, the work of a White Cross missionary in Kulawi to the west had led to a noticeable increase in "Mohammedan activities" which were penetrating southwards,⁸ while from the east coast Islamic prozelytization was "threatening" the population of Mori.⁹ On the far west coast, Adriani reported that it was "terrible to see how the population was slowly falling prey to Islam". In the state of Mandar a mosque had recently been built by the local population "under threats from several Mohammedan traders".¹⁰ Similar activities were observed in the south, in the former kingdom of Luwu.

The former Poso administrators, Engelenberg and Maze, had effectively shielded the mission areas from this colony-wide manifestation. The latter had adopted a practical but nonetheless non-legal policy of containing Islamic and Christian prozelytization to distinct areas of his administrative region.¹¹ Kruyt had endorsed this arrangement but the gentleman's agreement no longer applied as the new personnel on both sides introduced new perspectives which challenged the old. For example, in 1909, as a result of a paragraph in Hofman's annual report published in that year's Mededelingen which described how Hofman's wife ordered Papa i Wunte, Mokole of Pebato, to eject a Muslim trader from Kasiguncu, Engelenberg's successor, Assistant Resident de Vogel, commanded Maze to inform Hofman:

that from now on, he refrain from interfering in

7. Director of Education and Religion, C.A.J. Hazeu to the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, Batavia, 26 March, 1914, No. 5871.
8. Minutes N.M.S., 12 November, 1913. Schuyt to N.M.S., 15 August, 1913.
9. Minutes N.M.S., 21 May, 1913. Minutes of the Poso Conference, 7 January, 1913. Minutes N.M.S., 17 September, 1913. Schuyt to N.M.S., 23 June, 1913.
10. Minutes N.M.S., 22 January, 1913. Adriani to Baron van Boetzelaer (nd.).
11. See supra, Chapter 7, pp. 247-248.

government affairs. Any Mohammedan or Christian is free, within certain predetermined limits, to settle where he chooses. If it is considered necessary to remove someone ... then the proper methods should be employed and use should not be made of the personal influence of a missionary or his wife¹².

It is unlikely that Mazeé was ignorant of this affair since he had discussed similar circumstances regarding the settling of Muslims in To Pamona villages with Kruyt before. In this case, which involved the proposed marriage of a Muslim with a Pebato woman, Mazeé had reached an agreement with Kruyt which flaunted the guideline laid down by the Assistant Resident.¹³ As in most situations, Mazeé took little notice of this newcomer whom he regarded as old and incompetent and, where possible, he refrained from informing his superior of events which he knew should have been brought to his attention.¹⁴

With the departure of Mazeé, the protection he afforded the mission ended. The new administrator of Poso, Gerth van Wijk, expressed as his view, which accorded to civil law, that people had a right to live where they desired. On this point, Kruyt felt obliged to inform the new official of the historical justification for the restrictions on movement which had been imposed in the region by his predecessor.¹⁵

It was also Gerth van Wijk who suggested that the mission should re-establish a presence in Tojo, unaware of the arrangements which had been made by Mazeé. Van Wijk's motivation was purely political and was mainly influenced by the government's concern for the growing strength of Islam. He considered that an opportunity presented itself for the mission in Tojo with the resignation of the Muslim native assistant, Intji Mohammed, who was at that time preparing for a pilgrimage to Mecca,

12. Assistant Resident de Vogel to Civiel Gezaghebber of Poso, 14 August, 1909.

13. See supra, Chapter 7, Note 71.

14. Mazeé succinctly described his attitude to de Vogel in a letter to Kruyt, 20 October, 1909.

15. Kruyt to Gerth van Wijk, 14 March, 1913. Kruyt to Baron van Boetzelaer, 16 April, 1913.

prior to his resettlement in Tojo. Van Wijk proposed that the mission should take over the village schools being developed, convert "the great number of heathens" to save them from the new haji and convert "the weak Mohammedans" before they become stronger. As an inducement, van Wijk offered the mission the use of the government steamer and the appointment of a Christian Minahassan native assistant for the area. Kruyt and Adriani rejected the offer but their more crusading junior colleagues were attracted by it and their subsequent investigation exposed Mazee's arrangement.^{16.}

By contrasting government-mission relations before and after 1912, it becomes apparent that the earlier good relations were achieved largely as a result of the officials at that time being prepared to re-interpret or ignore aspects of colonial law. This was possible as long as the region existed in its pioneering stage and remained relatively isolated so that the individuals involved were able to do what they thought was in the best interests of the colonialization of the region. After 1912, the Poso administrators tended to "follow the book" and it was this, together with a certain amount of personal animosity and an official reaction against the monopolistic position of the mission, that led to the breakdown of the co-operation between government and mission.^{17.}

In his lengthy complaint to the mission Consul regarding Mazee's successor, Gerth van Wijk, Kruyt's main criticism of the man was that he ruled Poso according to "the law book". In so doing, he failed to bend the law

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16. Gerth van Wijk to the Conference of the Poso mission, 12 May, 1914. Conference note by Kruyt, Memorandum by Adriani, 26 May, 1914. Report on Tojo by Ten Kate and Schuyt, (nd. 1914?).
17. The more aggressive stance by junior government officials is also noticeable in the adjoining administrative regions. A notable exception was that of the Civiel Gezaghebber of Mori, G.A.J. Beukers (correspondence, Beukers to Kruyt, 1913). Beukers had served as military commander under Mazee in Poso for a period from October, 1911. His personal attitude was expressed in an address to the Netherlands Missionary Society published in its journal, Mededelingen, 1916, vol. 60, pp. 154-165.

to suit the requirements of local conditions and To Pamona adat.

He is dismantling the policies of Mr. Mazee presumably because his measures did not entirely agree with the stipulations of the law book ... Mr. van Wijk is an uncultured man who understands the articles of the law book and who feels safe while he is following them because then he cannot be caught out. But, if he has to leave go of the law then he does not know what to do He is afraid of the mission because we could tempt him to take measures which differ from the regulations and then he might get into trouble.¹⁸

This is not to say that Kruyt was breaking the law or that he desired government officials to do so. Kruyt's objection to the law-book administrator, related to the unbending nature of centralized administration and the inappropriate nature of universal laws in uniquely different and, as he would have it, less civilized areas. The difficulty of Kruyt's position was that it left the mission open to attack by outsiders who claimed that its actions were arbitrary and motivated by self-interest and paternalism, accusations which were not entirely unwarranted. It was also a position which could not be sustained where there was, of necessity, a regular transfer of government personnel. In such a situation, the permanency of the mission created the impression amongst the missionaries that they were the self-styled guardians of the people, which in turn tended to result in the petrification of objectives and perceptions: like parents, the mission was in danger of being unable to perceive that its children were growing up.

In the final analysis, the mission had to face a number of conflicts in its dealings with the government in the second decade of the twentieth century, which related to two levels of government with which it was involved. At the local level, tensions arose as a result of differences of interpretation regarding the people's best interests. The mission based the legitimacy of its views on its longer association with the people and on its

18. Kruyt to Daron van Boetzelaer, 26 April, 1913.

belief in the mission's moral superiority. On the other hand, government officials saw themselves as the legitimate designers of the people's destiny and resorted to the law and the heritage of colonial experience to support their authority. They regarded the mission as subservient to the secular power and resented its interference. They were strengthened in this view with the official change in the status of the mission school in 1912 when it was reclassified as a "volksschool" administered by the mission under the Department of the Interior. Thus, the Controleur became officially responsible for arrangements affecting the running of these schools whereas, since 1906, the direct authority of the government official in Poso had been limited to that of Chairman of the school committee, in which Mazee had never involved himself.¹⁹

With regard to the central government, where the immediate issues of everyday policy decisions were not at stake, conflict centred on the government's desire to streamline and systematize its financial relations with mission organizations regarding the provision of education. The same question of local differences characterized the Poso mission's case against these attempts at standardization but the argument here tended to be less emotional and more abstract. The major reason for this was that a central government subsidy for the Poso mission never eventuated in this period despite lengthy negotiations and numerous revisions of the initial 1911 draft. In this context, the role of the Mission Consul in Batavia became of utmost importance, particularly during the war when communications with Holland became more difficult. Access to the Mission Consul and, through him, with central government department heads enabled the Poso mission to defend its position against what it regarded as persecution by local administrators.

Access to the central government was important to the Poso missionaries because, by and large, Batavia held a

19. Mazee appeared to have regarded his role as Chairman of the school committee as a mere formality. He was encouraged in this interpretation by Kruyt.

broader and more sympathetic perspective regarding the political significance of mission endeavour in Sulawesi. According to the pro-mission Governor of Celebes and Dependences in 1916, the basis of government policy in this regard was a secret government decision of 3 June, 1889, which Governor Frijling at least, interpreted as meaning that:

in mainly heathen areas, mission activity must be promoted by suitable means without giving offence to adherents of other religions.²⁰.

In 1911, the first attempt was made to establish formal relations between a mission organization and the colonial government by the formulation of a contract between the government and the mission on the island of Sumba. The concept of a contract had been suggested initially by Colijn in late 1908 prior to his departure from the Indies for Holland.²¹ In July, 1911, the Mission Consul notified the Conference of the Poso mission:

Since this regulation for Sumba had now been accepted and since Sumba and Central Celebes have always been regarded by the government as the first areas for which a trial with the contract principle could be considered, it is clear that they wish to bring about a similar arrangement for Central Celebes.²².

20. Governor of Celebes and Dependencies, W. Frijling to the Assistant Residents of Mandar, Pare-Pare, Luwu and East Celebes, Circular No. 358 (Secret), Makassar 3 July, 1916 (Official copy to Dr. A.C. Kruyt, missionary at Pendolo). The secret document from the register of Decrees of the Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, was drawn up in response to directives from Minister of Colonies, Keuchenius. It stated: "in those areas where Islam is not the accepted religion, no Mohammedan chiefs or officials will be appointed, nor will regulations and customs facilitating Mohammedanism be introduced; in regard to the latter, local custom relating to the type of government and judicial procedure will, in those areas, be retained as far as possible". Frijling described himself as one who "has visited most of the mission centres in the Outer Islands, has read, spoken and thought much about missionary methods, and ... who has a warm heart for missionary work". (Governor of Celebes, W. Frijling to the Conference of Missionaries at Rante Pao, Makassar, 15 September, 1917).

21. Baron van Boetzelaer to Kruyt, 30 July, 1911.

22. loc. cit..

Entailed in the "contract principle", as outlined by Colijn in 1910, was the notion that mission organizations were fulfilling a government responsibility in establishing simple elementary schools in Outer Island villages. Implicit in this notion was the belief that the mission school was no more than a volkschool and that it should be financed as such: viz. by the local community with only supplementary grants from the government. Secondly, as Colijn expressly stated, the principle held that the initiative for educational provision lay with the government even where it was considered expedient to leave its organization to the mission.

The first of these implications had already been incorporated, albeit reluctantly, into the educational system in Poso by the Resident's insistence that school fees be levied. It was the mission's appeal to the central government for increased and regularized financial assistance which hastened the government's formulation of a "Draft agreement for a contract for the provision of native education in part of the sub-district of Poso (a division of Central Celebes in the Residency of Menado) with the Netherlands Missionary Society", in October, 1911. The draft agreement was negotiated by the government's advisor for administrative affairs in the Outer Islands, J.C. Kielstra civiel gezaghebber Mazee and missionaries Kruyt and Schuyt.^{23.}

In drawing up this draft contract the government's primary intention was to reduce expenditure on education and to engage the mission in a temporary capacity as guardian of the volkschool in this region.^{24.}

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23. In a letter to the Governor-General dated 9 August, 1911, Baron van Boetzelaer suggested that "the Sumba regulation proposed by G. Luloffs, Assistant Adviser for administrative matters in the Outer Possessions be introduced" and that Kielstra discuss its implementation in Central Sulawesi with the local missionaries. The participants in the negotiations are listed in a letter by Kruyt to Controleur Karthaus of 8 March, 1915.
24. Article three of the draft specified a ten year contract. Explanatory note to Article six, Clause 1B(b) specified that the aim of the contract was firstly to achieve economies in the provision of village school education and secondly to shift the major burden of financing the schools to the local population.

Eventually, as the local people became habituated to school attendance, the care of the schools would revert to the indigenous community under the supervision of the colonial government. The mission entered the negotiations confident that a contract such as the one for Sumba provided it with a guaranteed income free from the interference of individual government officials and departments. This financial and political freedom, Kruyt had hoped to gain when he had advised the acceptance of regional rather than central government funding in 1906. Events beyond his and Engelenberg's control had dashed these expectations. The model expressly employed was that of the Sumba agreement and the contract was to cover a period of ten years. For the duration of this period, the Netherlands Missionary Society would agree to provide for the needs of indigenous education in the administrative district of Poso on behalf of the colonial government (Article One) while the latter agreed during this period "not to provide native education, nor to offer subsidies to any private or other institution apart from the contracting party for the provision of such education (Article Two)." Article Four formally introduced for the first time the legal distinction "which till now had not been put into practice", between standard and popular education (volksonderwijs).

The contract stipulated that the government required the mission to establish a standard (second-class equivalent) school in the town of Poso within twelve months of the signing of the contract and a second such school in the vicinity of Lake Poso within five years. These requirements represented a compromise between the views put forward earlier in discussions between Kruyt and the local government in that the proposed Poso school would be exclusively for the children of colonial civil servants, coastal notables, traders and personnel from the Poso garrison, while the inland school was to cater for children of Pamona chiefs as well as providing further education for prospective teachers. In his explanatory note, Kielstra accepted the mission's argument for the need for two distinctive institutions, while he noted the mission's acceptance of the government's revised objectives for the

standard school.^{25.}

From the mission's point of view, it did not appear that these requirements posed any major difficulties and it was quite prepared to meet these in return for the government's support of its own village school system, which was its main concern. What was significant for the mission, and what remained a contentious issue, was its desire, supported by the affable Kielstra, to maintain its educational monopoly in the area by retaining control of the coastal standard elementary school. For the government, standard elementary education was government education and, where it contracted the provision of such education to a private organization, it was concerned to stipulate its requirements quite precisely.^{26.}

The contract afforded the mission a large degree of flexibility in its administration of the village schools. This was partly a recognition of the lower status of such schools and partly an attempt to maintain the goodwill and involvement of the mission in its task of nurturing education in this undeveloped region until such a time as the school could be handed over to the community itself. Nevertheless, a number of aspects of mission-controlled education, particularly the financial arrangements, related to the legitimate concern of the local government.

The newly emerging colonial education policy established a distinction, not only in terms of a specific educational hierarchy of standard and village schools but also in terms of an administrative division between the educational responsibilities of the central and local government. Thus, the relatively few standard schools became the specific responsibility of the central government's

25. These were originally outlined in a ministerial dispatch of 17 October, 1910 and formalized by the Director of Education and Religion in a memorandum, No. 19156 of 20 November, 1912.

26. Conversely, these schools attracted a high government subsidy equivalent to three-quarters of the actual cost of establishment and conduct of an equivalent government administered school.

Department of Education and Religion and were regulated from Batavia, while village schools were organized by the local representatives of the Department of the Interior. In both cases they could be administered in conjunction with the local representatives of a missionary society. In the educational partnership proposed for the Poso region, the definitions of "organization" and "administration" were not clearly determined and remained susceptible to conflicting interpretation. It was a partnership which could only operate effectively given good-will on both sides and a general agreement as to what was in the best interests of the region's development.

The draft agreement gave the mission the right to determine age-grade levels in its schools but required it to open the schools to all indigenous children regardless of religion (Article Four, Clause Eight), thus ensuring that religious instruction remained optional. The mission was further authorized to determine the location and number of new schools to be opened annually "in agreement with the head of the local administration, subject to the approval of the Resident of Menado", (Clause Twelve). The education to be provided in village schools would be adapted to the needs of the population according to the judgement of the mission "with the education given in the desa schools in Java as a guideline" (Article Four, Clause Sixteen). Government officials were exhorted to "provide their co-operation" in the organization of these schools.

The articles expressing the mission's authority to regulate its schools were ambiguous but implicit in Clauses Eight and Sixteen was the freedom for the mission to arrange the detail of the curriculum, mode of instruction and, within the broad specification of ensuring "sufficient light and space and proper shelter against wind, rain and sun", (Article Four, Clause Seven) the design and furnishing of buildings. The explanatory note to Article Four, Clause Nine, expressly stated that this freedom was based on the subsidy regulation applying to Java and Madura and on the Sumba regulation, which also expressly refrained from enumerating regulations regarding minimum daily hours of instruction, curriculum content and number of teachers.

Kielstra noted that as, in Sumba, "the mission should be left free in its conception and the implementation of its task".²⁷

Nevertheless, the freedom the mission was granted to implement its task was more apparent than real since other articles of the contract clearly impinged upon it. The government assumed a basic similarity between mission schools and the Javanese desa schools, other than in the former's instruction in biblical history and in the saying of prayers. The financial arrangements which formed the substance of the contract were based on the same assumption.

Primarily, the contract made it clear that financial responsibility for the maintenance of the school would lie largely with the local community. While this proposition had been accepted in part by the mission in its requirement that the population construct school buildings, supplement the teacher's income and, since 1911, pay school fees, it justified these demands on the grounds that they were educational in promoting an appreciation for the school. It had not been the mission's intention that the schools would be totally supported by the village.

The draft document ratified the arrangements which the mission had already made, including the levying of school fees. Kielstra noted approvingly that this newly instituted levy would have a broad educative effect in making parents more attentive to their children's regular attendance and in a wider cultural context:

The low stage of development of commun [a]lism which exists in their community and which is a restriction on their social and economic progress is affected by it, in that the parents of the children will come to feel that a contribution is being demanded, not of the family, but of the individual who enjoys the services of the school.²⁸

For a similar reason, Kielstra, who littered the explanatory notes to the document with anthropological detail he had gleaned from Kruyt, approved of the mission's attempts to establish school funds as a further attack on

27. Draft agreement, 1911, p. 12.

28. ibid, explanatory note, Article Four Clause Thirteen p. 18.

the foundations of traditional communalism. He believed that the establishment of school plantations would help promote the government's endeavour to curtail the familiary nature of the village community and to develop a primary allegiance to the village "in a territorial sense".

However, Kielstra recognized there would be real difficulties in developing school funds as the major source of revenue for the village school, not the least of which was the "low level of cultivation of these people". Despite "detailed and lengthy discussions", Kielstra was forced to conclude that:

the details of this business will have to be regulated locally [but] the attention of government and mission will remain on this method of obtaining contributions for the school.²⁹

In this way, Kielstra left unresolved one of the most contentious issues which separated government and mission.

The draft document limited the government support of the village school to an initial grant of f.75 for the construction and furnishing of the school building and an annual subsidy of f.3 per regularly attending pupil. Further, the Missionary Society could apply to the government for restitution of "reasonable expenses" related to travel costs of indigenous and European personnel, including travel from Europe.

The total funds thus accumulated from the government and the local community had to suffice for the maintenance of the Poso school network and within these limitations, the mission was to be free to implement its educational policies but it was precisely these financial limitations accentuated by the dubious success in establishing school funds which defined and limited mission flexibility in the implementation of its educational objectives. On the basis of current practice, Kielstra estimated the cost per child in a school with an enrolment of one hundred at f.4.80, and in a school of an enrolment of sixty, at f.5.92. Even

29. ibid, p. 21.

though in Kruyt's estimation, these were conservative estimates,³⁰. Kielstra concluded:

It does not need to be demonstrated that this figure will be much too high for a volksschool, especially in an extremely poor land such as is inhabited by the Torajans in the administrative region of Poso.³¹.

The representative of the Director of the Department of the Interior therefore listed three economies that would make it possible for the community eventually to shoulder the entire financial burden of the village school. Each of these economies had its impact on the education practice of the mission schools.

The first economy, which a comparison with the Javanese desa school suggested to Kielstra, was a reduction in the school course from four to three years. Kielstra considered that more extended education was given in the Poso mission schools than was demanded for elementary education. The four year course had sprung from the historical connection which existed between the government and subsidized mission schools and was justified by Kruyt on the grounds that in order for the school to exercise a sufficient influence on the person's later life, pupils needed to be kept at school as long as possible. For Kielstra, the longer course was related to what he considered to be the exaggerated academic level of the school.³². He therefore advised the removal from the curriculum of the teaching of Malay language and the geography of the island of Sulawesi and a reduction in the arithmetic syllabus.³³. In this way he concluded, "the course of

30. Kruyt in his report to the N.M.S. calculated the real costs at f.5.20 per child in a two teacher school and f.6 in a school with sixty pupils. (Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 March, 1912.
31. Draft agreement, 1911. Explanatory note, Article Six, Clause 1B(b), p. 33.
32. Kielstra implied that Kruyt's village schools were attempting to emulate the four year standard school.
33. In regard to the standard school, on the other hand, it was only in the face of persuasive argument that Kielstra was prepared to accept a modification to the Sumba contract which specified that all instruction in these schools would be in the Malay language. Article Four, Clause Five, stated that at least half of the instruction in the proposed standard schools would be in Malay language.

study can be brought back from four to three years which will allow a reduction in staff". Kruyt on the other hand, considered precisely those subjects as the vehicles for extending his pupils' mental ability and their awareness of the natural and social world beyond the culturally imposed barriers of traditional To Pamona society.

The second area for economizing recommended by Kielstra was the replacement of imported teachers by local personnel. Kruyt had actively promoted this policy for many years so that, in itself, this proposal created no difficulties but Kielstra equated the use of local teachers with the introduction of a more simplified curriculum. Kielstra could be forgiven for assuming that this was also the mission's aim for he noted that he had been assured that:

in no way was it the intention to establish a fully-fledged training school similar for instance to that in Kuranga ... but only a more extended elementary course along simple lines where village school teachers would be provided with some more education but mainly in method, class control and moral development.³⁴

Kruyt had no intention of reducing the quality of the education of his schools but he did want to integrate formal education more closely with the experiences and environment of the school children for which reason the use of the local language and of indigenous teachers recommended themselves. Kruyt was also sufficiently practically-minded to recognize the financial benefit of employing local teachers.

Thirdly, Kielstra wanted to increase the teacher-pupil ratio to produce further economies. Again, employing the Java model and the recently prepared subsidy regulation for Menado, the adviser for administrative affairs considered it unwarranted that "for Poso, another necessarily more expensive method of organization be taken as the basis for calculating the subsidy".³⁵

34. Draft agreement 1911, explanatory note, Article Four, Clause Six, p. 11.

35. ibid, explanatory note, Article Six, Clause 1B(b), p. 35.

Where possible, Kruyt had appointed an assistant for each school of over twenty-five pupils.³⁶ This policy had been introduced as a method of obtaining teachers. Up to that time, an assistant was generally "a boy of about seventeen who has completed the elementary school in the Minahassa".³⁷ During his training as a pupil-teacher, the youth provided the older Minahassan with his services in and out of school hours, while simultaneously providing the missionary with an informant on the conduct of the otherwise largely unsupervised and isolated teacher.³⁸ Kruyt intimated that he was prepared to discard this practice once a local training school was established. He was then willing to limit the appointment of assistants to one where the school enrolment was between forty and eighty pupils and two where there was an enrolment of between eighty and one hundred and twenty.

Kruyt's "generous" staffing ratio, as Kielstra inferred, was dictated by the existence of a four year course with the resultant number of classes which one teacher was unable to manage. Equally significant was the fact that the teacher was only employed part-time in the school, spending the remainder of his time ministering to the growing Christian community: conducting church services and bible-reading evenings, holding catechism and baptismal classes as well as visiting the sick and providing the village chief or other notables with his services as a scribe and adviser. Thus, the greater the number of pupils, the greater the existing or potential adult Christian population was likely to be. Often, as the statistics of 1910 indicate, larger schools represented the combined enrolment from several neighbouring villages, each of which had to be served by the guru in his priestly capacity.³⁹ For all these reasons, it was essential for Kruyt to ensure that the financial agreement was based on as generous a ratio as possible.

36. Where the school population and potential Christian community was large, Kruyt employed two teachers and one assistant.

37. Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 March, 1912.

38. loc. cit...

39. loc. cit...

Kielstra estimated that if the mission progressively replaced its Minahassan teachers with To Pamona teachers, while simultaneously increasing the ratio to one teacher for every forty pupils, with the addition of one assistant where the attendance was over eighty and two assistants for schools of over one hundred and sixty, the cost per pupil would be reduced from f.4.80 and f.5.92 to f.2.25 and f.3.06 respectively, depending on the size of the school. With the reduction in the course from four to three years, extra savings would be gained due to the overall reduction in enrolment, but this was only possible if Poso schools adopted the practice employed elsewhere of the "split-school", whereby the junior and senior sections of the school attended at different times in the day.

This arrangement was steadfastly resisted by Kruyt, primarily because it over-burdened the guru qua teacher, leaving him insufficient time and energy as a pastor and also because it would have affected school attendance. As staffing was the largest factor in the cost of the school, the logic of the "split-school" could not have escaped Kruyt but, on the other hand, he could not fairly counter its force by the argument that he needed the guru, who was to be largely paid for by the government through its per capita subsidy, to attend to the mission's evangelizing task. As quoted by Kielstra, Kruyt's arguments against the split-school were that:

the work-load of the gurus (5½ hours per day) would become too heavy and that they would not then have sufficient time for their farming while the children would be too briefly under their influence.⁴⁰

Despite Kruyt's objections to the rationale underlying his calculations, Kielstra recommended to the government that its subsidy be limited to f.3 per pupil. On the basis of the enrolment for 1910, this would have provided the mission with f.3,423, supplemented by an establishment

40. Draft agreement 1911, explanatory note, Article Four, Clause Sixteen, p. 24. In his report to the N.M.S., Kruyt denied that this argument had been seriously advanced, since as he here admitted, the community undertook most of his farming work.

grant of f.75 for each new school which would have added a further f.275. Even with the unspecified travel allowances, total government subsidy based on 1910 figures would have been significantly less than the f.5,000 currently received from the regional treasury. To make up the short-fall between government subsidy and actual costs, Kielstra reckoned on the contribution by the community which for 1910 would have brought f.570 in school fees at an average of fifty cents per pupil and an indeterminate amount from school funds which were to be supplied from community plantations. Even then on Kielstra's own calculations based on projections for 1912, an amount of no more than f.4,500 would be available for the mission's schools which he recognized would be insufficient. This insufficiency, he considered, would have a positive effect and would act:

as a motive for government and mission to limit the establishment of new schools in the future, where the means do not exist to have the community immediately carry the costs involved and, where schools already exist, continually to be conscious of the need for the community to accept a larger share in the burden of maintaining a school.⁴¹

As a result of this draft contract, 1912 was a year of much debate, experimentation and calculation and it led to a vigorous three-way correspondence between Poso, the Society's headquarters in Rotterdam and the mission consulate in Batavia. On the basis of Kruyt's reported acceptance of the document, the Mission Consul expressed himself as generally in favour of the agreement but regretted that "the financial capacity of the population is the only criterion for the character of the education to be provided". Nevertheless, the Consul was sympathetic to Kielstra's criticism of the high standards of the mission's schools which had resulted he said, in "the attendance of only fifty percent of the children" and he supported the government's call for a narrowing of the curriculum and the introduction of the widely accepted

41. ibid, explanatory note, Article Six, Clause 1B(b), p. 39 and explanatory note, Clause 11, B(b).

principle of the "split-school" as a means of reducing the cost of education.^{42.}

In March, 1912 when Kruyt had had time to reflect on the document, he withdrew his initial acceptance on the somewhat doubtful grounds that he had "misinterpreted" the basis on which the government was to calculate the subsidy.^{43.} In a detailed letter to the Society at that time, Kruyt entirely rejected the draft contract as spelling financial disaster. He informed his superiors that the maintenance of the type of education currently given to To Pamona children required f.6 per child or double that recommended by Kielstra. Calculating on this basis, he estimated that, for 1912, the thirty-one schools with their enrolment of approximately 2,260 pupils would cost a total of f.10,310. Of this, the government on Kielstra's formula, would contribute f.6,780, fees would provide f.950 leaving the Society, with some assistance from school funds, to provide the remaining f.2,580.

Faced with the prospect of reduced government assistance and a number of unpalatable suggestions for economizing, the Poso conference of missionaries in 1912 arrived at an alternative to the most significant of Kielstra's proposals, the introduction of the split-school. Rather than splitting the school on a daily basis, it decided that from the next school year, it would admit pupils only every two years. In line with Kielstra's new teacher-pupil ratio, in a one-teacher school of less than eighty children, the teacher would then have only two grades in any one year; ie. grades one and three or two and four. In a school with two teachers, each guru would, for instance, have sixty pupils divided into two groups and in both small and larger schools, instruction would be given to one group while the other group or class was involved in written work. This ingenious solution permitted

42. Minutes N.M.S., 8 May, 1912. Crommelin to N.M.S., 8 March, 1912.

43. Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 March, 1912. Kruyt had believed that the village school would, like the standard school, receive a subsidy corresponding to three-quarters of the actual cost.

the mission to adhere substantially to the economies suggested by Kielstra while maintaining a four year course which the mission considered essential for reasons of moral and intellectual training.

The accusation that a four year course was unnecessarily demanding and that it resulted in a lower rate of school attendance was partially borne out in figures made available by Kruyt's son Jan in response to a comparable criticism of the mission schools made in 1929. While in the period 1908 to 1911, the majority of children completed the four year course, only a minority completed it in minimum time. The graphs provided by Jan Kruyt also show up a further advantage for the mission in maintaining an elementary course which was more extensive than the average village school. Through failure and the repetition of classes, the mission was able to inflate its enrolment figures substantially. Figure 3 shows that one hundred percent (or 465 pupils) of the 1909 intake completed the four years of the school but only thirty-three percent completed their schooling in minimum time, the remaining two-thirds presumably staying on at school for most of the following decade. This would have boosted the enrolment for the years immediately after 1913 by 310, increasing the mission's school income by over f.1,000 in Kielstra's subsidy formula.⁴⁴

The only other avenue which the mission considered open to it was an attempt to increase the community's contribution to the maintenance of the mission. Since school fees paid by individuals were not expected to increase beyond an average of fifty cents and indeed, some areas were exempted from fees altogether because of the general state of poverty,⁴⁵ the mission was forced to focus on increasing the financial input derived from the agricultural

44. Remarks in respect of the "Report and Comments subsequent to a visit to several schools in the Poso district of the Residency of Menado (1-17 November, 1929) by the Inspector of Native Education in the eighth district, dated Menado 8 April, 1930, No. 479/I 34" by Jan Kruyt (31 May, 1930).

45. This applied specifically to Napu-Besoa. (Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 March, 1912).




FIGURE 3A

Percentage of the Class One Cohort Completing the Four Year Course of the Mission School in the Poso Region 1908-1925*




FIGURE 3B

Percentage of the Class One Cohort Completing the Four Year Course who did so in Minimum Time*

*From: J. Kruyt, Comments on the Inspector's Report on Mission Schools, November, 1929.

labours of the community. While the local and central governments were impressed by the need for the population to increase its contribution towards the maintenance of village education, government officials in Poso were suspicious in this context of the mission's possible misuse of the influence it had over the population. The mission contributed to this suspicion by being reluctant to involve the administration in these schemes except in so far as it was obliged to account to the government for money raised and to seek legal approval for the agreements reached. The mission maintained that the arrangements it made with the population regarding the maintenance of mission schools were not the direct concern of the government. The new Assistant Resident, Wenthold, believed that the mission's proposed plantations of coffee, coconut and rice would become "a sort of cultuurstelsel".⁴⁶ The mission assured the official that its administration of these plantations was only temporary as long as the chiefs were incapable of organizing such projects themselves. Besides, as the tree crops matured, the constant labour involved in sawah cultivation would end and only minimal cultivation would be required to maintain the other forms of production.⁴⁷ Some villages, Kruyt informed Wenthold, had agreed to make an annual contribution in rice to the value of f.100 from their own plots, instead of establishing a separate school plantation. Administratively, the entire scheme of community contributions was to be arranged by one missionary who would provide the government with an account of the monetary value of the produce received.⁴⁸

Despite these assurances, it was clear that the mission had to exercise a significant degree of influence, if not overt pressure, to ensure that the required labour was carried out. At the village level, this would mainly

46. Assistant Resident Wenthold to Kruyt, 3 September, 1912.

47. Minutes N.M.S., 21 May, 1913. Conference of the Poso mission, 7 January, 1913.

48. loc. cit.

have become the responsibility of the guru, supported under pressure from the mission, by the village chief. This responsibility placed the guru in an even more influential position in the village. The villagers were already obliged to tend his sawah field, build and maintain his house and school room, carry his belongings and run messages for him.

However, no alternative to agricultural production as a source of revenue existed. The gathering of forest products had been partially suppressed by Maze and any other form of commercial enterprise either could not be established or lacked financial support. The inland of Central Sulawesi had disappointed the hopes of the speculators of twenty years earlier.

One suggestion made by the Assistant Resident as a possible alternative was the introduction of credit institutions similar to the Javanese desa lumbung. In the light of the evaluation of such institutions in Java by the economist Boeke and given the communal self-help principle in Pamona society, Kruyt considered their introduction premature and undesirable.⁴⁹ The prosperity of the Poso region, argued Kruyt, lay in the vigorous and intelligent cultivation of the over-abundant supply of land. The availability of credit would merely encourage the lazy, would interfere with the mission's establishment of its own community funds and, in as far as its administration would become an extra task for the guru, it would interfere with the mission's work.

Wenthold's objective in proposing the establishment of a credit institution went further than Kruyt's interpretation of it. The funds to which the community plantations were to contribute were specifically directed

49. Kruyt to Gerth van Wijk, 5 November, 1913. The Controleur had sent Kruyt a copy of Assistant Resident Wenthold's letter of 8 September, 1913 in which Wenthold had requested the Controleur to elicit the mission attitude to such institutions. In his letter, Kruyt referred specifically to the results of Boeke's investigations as reported in Boeke's article in the Indische Gids of 1912 entitled "De Politiek van het Inlandsch Credietwezen", (The Politics of Native Credit Institutions).

towards the mission activities and in the immediate future would be entirely absorbed by the school. While the ratio of Christian to non-Christian villagers is not evident due to the absence of statistics, it is obvious that the majority of the population would not substantially or immediately benefit from these communal labours. As a result of the underlying notion in Kielstra's document that the schools in the Poso region were the property of the village, it was becoming pertinent to consider the establishment of a village fund, part of which could be used to maintain the local school. It was this that Wenthold had in mind.

The issue which was evolving, to which the draft contract was a catalyst, was the extent to which the mission's involvement in this part of the Outer Islands was a temporary one and how far the school was to be seen as an adjunct of that involvement rather than part of the emerging autonomous village. While indigenous personnel did not yet exist to staff the village schools, education appeared even more to be a foreign imposition except in as far as it could be regarded as an expression of the will of the Christian element of the village population. While this element remained in the minority, the mission's authority depended solely on the support of the government and its appreciation of the mission's socio-economic contribution to To Pamona society and on the resultant influence it had on the indigenous population itself. In the increasingly tension-laden exchanges regarding the financial arrangements for the support of education, the mission's stance was being seen to relate only to its own advantage and was thus in danger of losing the unqualified support it once had. The changing relationship between mission and government introduced by the government's re-definition of mission schools was increasingly pushing the mission into a state of legal limbo, being neither the representative of the people (although it could conceivably claim to represent the Christian community) nor the representative of the colonial government, since the draft contract failed to clarify that relationship, trusting instead on mutual co-operation and goodwill. For this reason, the Netherlands

Missionary Society, in its negotiations with the Minister of Colonies regarding the revision of the original draft, pressed for the contract to be altered so as to involve the indigenous administration directly. By making the representatives of the people party to the contract:

the whole ordination would become, instead of a subsidy regulation in the interests of the Netherlands Missionary Society, a regulation for the education in Central Celebes ... temporarily under the administration of the mission.⁵⁰

This modification to the draft proposal would have had the advantage for the mission of removing from it the onus of the financial administration of the schools and would ensure the government's enforcement of the agreement. It would also have implied the loss of the schools to the mission, an implication which Kruyt would not have accepted. As it was, the mission was obliged to ensure the financial solvency of its education system, a situation it had to pursue in spite of and, at times, in opposition to the expressed interests of the local colonial government representatives and of the indigenous population.

The uncertainty of the mission's position in regard to its financial arrangements with the indigenous population was aggravated by the fact that the proposed Poso contract never eventuated, partly as a result of the effects of World War 1 and partly as a result of the inability of the government to determine a fixed course of action. As a result, the mission continued to be dependent upon the local government grant of f.5,000 supplemented by extraordinary grants from the central government made available after 1911.⁵¹ It was therefore left to arrange a modus

50. Minutes N.M.S., 9 December, 1914. Minutes of a meeting of the Society's executive regarding the revised draft of the Poso regulation.

51. The mission Consul presented the government with a request on 27 October, 1911 for restitution of expenses incurred by the N.M.S. in the years 1910 and 1911 over and above the subsidy it received from the regional government. The sum of f.3,523.85 was granted by a decision of the Governor-General of 13 April, 1912 (Crommelin to Kruyt, 23 April, 1912). Had the Poso mission been in receipt of a central government subsidy at this time, it would have also been eligible to receive an inspection allowance to a maximum of f.1,500 per inspecting missionary under a regulation promulgated on 21 January, 1911. This was a further reason for the Mission Consul and the N.M.S. to accept a subsidy regulation for the Poso mission.

vivendi with the local government representative regarding its legal and financial position vis-a-vis the indigenous population, with the unimplemented contract, revised in 1914, 1915 and 1916, as a non-official guide.

The mission reacted to this situation by transposing the verbal agreements it had reached with the various villages into a generally applicable set of regulations and presenting them as semi-legal documents to the government for ratification. Thus, what had become an unquestioned tradition of support for the guru by the village became the "guru regulation" which specified the size of the sawah field, the value of the annual production to be achieved, the conditions under which the community worked the guru's sawah, as well as the salary range and leave entitlements of the teachers.⁵² A similar document was produced to cover arrangements made by the mission for the establishment of school plantations. The mission's stated objective in this process was to "gain the approval of the government ... to give them legality [in case of] a possible difference of opinion between mission and population".⁵³ While these documents were fully discussed by the mission with local government officials at the time (1912-1913), the latter were not able to give the agreements official status because the mission had no legal status vis-a-vis the government to make its agreements with the population legally enforceable. Assistant Resident Wenthold expressed his verbal agreement of the regulations after some modification and informed his superior of the arrangements but the latter did not respond to the request for an official sanction. Even the sympathetic Mazeé had to inform Kruyt that it was not possible for him officially to accept these agreements as binding on the government. Forced by financial constraints, the mission was nevertheless obliged to proceed along the established path, assured that it was implementing a practice which at least had the blessing of the government.

For the conscientious government official who "ruled

52. Kruyt to Karthaus, 8 March, 1915.

53. loc. cit.

by the book", the status of the arrangements was regarded as little more than a gentleman's agreement. Particularly the guru regulation, which was not included in Kielstra's draft contract, nor in succeeding revisions, was seen by him as an arbitrary imposition. From the mission's point of view, the provision of services by the community for the support of the Minahassan guru was an essential component of the teacher's income enabling the mission to keep wage costs to a minimum in order to make the maximum use of government assistance to expand the number of mission schools. Successive controleurs after 1912 considered these arrangements as unnecessary exploitation of the people. Gerth van Wijk, whose approach to his administration was based on the assumption that "all chiefs oppress their subjects", actively sought to remove what he regarded as a source of exploitation of the community which the guru regulation placed in the hands of the village teacher.⁵⁴

Van Wijk's administration was characterized by the vigorous and humiliating punishment of village chiefs "for every conceivable thing ... and the minimum punishment for them was to sit in front of his office for fourteen days."⁵⁵ Amongst those chiefs punished were some of the foremost Christian leaders, including the aging Papa i Wunte.⁵⁶

54. loc. cit... Assistant Resident Grijzen to Kruyt, 8 February, 1915. Wenthold informed the Resident of Menado of the two sets of agreements with various To Pamona villages entered into by the mission, one relating to the establishment of plantations and one relating to contributions required to be made to the teacher's income. This letter was dated 20 July, 1912 and contained Wenthold's official approval of the agreements.

55. Kruyt to Boetzelaer, 26 April, 1913.

56. loc. cit... Chief Ta Mesampo of Pendalo received a fourteen day punishment for being too lax. He had been baptized and had actively supported the government since 1906. Chief Umai Reke of Buyu mPondoli received the same punishment for allowing sawah to be planted irregularly. Papa i Wunte was punished "for not providing a good example to the inhabitants of Kasiguncu in the maintenance of his yard and coconut plantation". The chief of Malitu had to sit in front of the Controleur's office for one month for giving permission to a Chinese without a travel pass to stay regularly in Malitu. (Native Assistant Nayoan to Kruyt, 25 January, 1913).

Kruyt had much to fear from the consequent undermining of the village chief's authority since the mission depended on the respect of the population for its chiefs and teachers to ensure regular school attendance and attendance at church. Under Maze's administration, this respect had been carefully and consistently fostered and public reprimand of village chiefs had been avoided. Simultaneously, it had been made clear to the chiefs that they were to encourage attendance at school and at church in the same way as they were responsible for the attendance at herendiensten and for the timely planting of sawah. Van Wijk's punishment of the Assistant District Chief of Pandiri for chastizing a recalcitrant school child had the effect of weakening the resolve of chiefs in the area to enforce regular attendance, since the affair was interpreted as punishment for interfering in the school. In consequence, Kruyt reported that: "school attendance in the area is declining and when news of the punishment becomes known in other areas, it will have a similar result."⁵⁷.

In 1914, van Wijk proposed to remove the basis of the guru's power over the village community by substituting a tax surcharge of thirty-three percent for the contribution the community made to their teacher's income and the school. This would have reduced the unwarranted power of the guru in the village and removed the control over community funds from the mission. Van Wijk's proposal went beyond that of financing the school for he anticipated that the levy would also provide the village with a source of revenue to pay the salary of the village chief. The mission which had, by instituting its agreements with the various villages, gained a certain amount of financial independence, was now concerned about a renewed threat to its position which the loss of control over community contributions would represent.

The mission Conference therefore expressed its opinion that:

it would be most desirable for the Netherlands
Missionary Society to receive firm guarantees

57. Kruyt to Boetzelaer, 26 April, 1913.

that the payment over and above the subsidy, out of the surplus of the new taxation, would not be dependent upon the personal preference of the administrative official of this district.^{58.}

The Conference's motion represented a compromise, since not all of the six missionaries shared Kruyt's view of the desirability of maintaining control over the direct contributions to the school. One or two of the missionaries felt that an official tax, administered by the government, would be more straightforward and reliable than one dependent on the rice harvest and later on coconut and coffee production and it would relieve the mission of the irksome task of ensuring that local agreements were properly carried out.^{59.}

Kruyt had pointed out in his defence of the status quo that the proposal did not coincide with the central government's guidelines regarding the principle of self-funding of the village school. The poverty of the Poso sub-district would mean that the richer regions of the Poso administrative district, such as the Tomini Gulf island, would need to subsidize it. Basing his case on figures from the Pendolo mission district, Kruyt estimated that a thirty-three percent surcharge on income tax would raise a mere f.1,303 for the fifteen villages involved, which would cover only half the cost of the existing schools, if the salaries of village chiefs were also to be paid.^{60.}

58. Kruyt to van Wijk, 20 May, 1914.

59. Minutes N.M.S., 1914. Minutes of the Poso Conference, 25 March, 1914. Schuyt in particular expressed himself in favour of replacing the various agreements with a percentage contribution of rice or money per tax-paying villager. Schuyt to N.M.S., 9 May, 1914.

60. Kruyt to Gerth van Wijk, 20 May, 1914. cf. Appendix. The latter figures were provided by Kruyt nine days earlier in response to a letter from van Wijk requesting information concerning community contributions. While these were similar, Kruyt argued that 1913 represented an unusually good harvest (harvests in 1910-12 would not have raised a quarter of this value) and besides this, where the money collected in 1913 did not fully cover the costs of schools, van Wijk now wanted to pay the salaries of village chiefs from the same funds as well.

The Assistant Resident accepted Kruyt's argument and shelved the proposed tax surcharge but not until van Wijk had unilaterally set aside the agreement between the people and the mission regarding the maintenance of school plantations in a conference with village chiefs. But the principle of establishing a general community fund for financing village projects persisted and came to represent one further source of friction between government and mission. The episode facilitated the later encroachment by the government into the village community which had previously been the preserve of the mission.

In 1915, Assistant Resident Grijzen prepared a nine-point regulation for the establishment of general purpose village funds for the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes. This proposal was the successor of the two earlier suggestions but was also evidently an adaptation of the mission's practice of establishing community plantations to provide funds for financing its schools. The articles of Grijzen's document which concerned the establishment, cultivation and maintenance of coconut plantations replicated the agreements drawn up by the mission. One of the major purposes of the new document was in fact to provide a source of finance for the schools established on the initiative of the government in those areas of the Assistant Residency where the mission was not operative, including the schools conducted by the Salvation Army in the Palu valley.

The rationale for the community fund was, according to the Assistant Resident, Grijzen, self-evident.

Each community has its local needs which, because they are of a local nature, cannot be provided by the regional or district treasury. In the region of Central Celebes, such funds are more than useful, they are essential. The village chiefs enjoy almost no benefits other than an allowance for the collection of income tax. This is much too little. If a proper administration is to be guaranteed, then it is in the first place necessary to make the function of the village chief more attractive and therefore, more lucrative. Furthermore, education (except that given in the few government schools) will have to be financed by those involved. The government wants the regional treasury

to contribute no more than f.100 per school per annum. The expenses of village education can be met in no better way than by the establishment of a school fund.⁶¹

This statement expressed approval of the mission practice but simultaneously implied that the government preferred such arrangements to be in its hands, a view shared by the Netherlands Missionary Society's executive administration.⁶² The Assistant Resident was nonetheless careful not to encroach on the mission's arrangements, particularly after Gerth van Wijk's debacle.

I do not believe that the mission would desire to divest itself of [its school gardens] in order to have them replaced by general community plantations. ...If this assumption is correct, I do not consider it desirable that next to these, other gardens for the financing of education be established. That would be too much for the population. Therefore, in Poso, in those villages where mission schools are established, community plantations of only three trees per person liable for compulsory community service will be established to meet the requirements of other community needs.⁶³

In this assumption, Grijzen was correct and indeed, he did not insist on the amalgamation of mission funds with those of government initiated ones. Despite this, Kruyt rejected the proposal on the grounds that it was agriculturally impossible since: "there are perhaps, no more than ten places in the Poso area where mission schools have been established and where coconut cultivation is possible".⁶⁴ Secondly, Kruyt believed that it was desirable to maintain a unity in the administration of the entire mission school system which now included substantial areas of the neighbouring district of Mori, so that even in those villages where the government could establish coconut plantations, mission gardens would remain separate. More formally, as Chairman of the Poso mission Conference,

61. Regulation concerning community funds in the Central Celebes (nine Articles with an explanatory memorandum). Explanatory note, Article One. See also Table 3.

62. See Note 50.

63. Grijzen, Regulation, Explanatory note, Article Eight.

64. Kruyt to Karthaus, 25 August, 1915.

Kruyt conveyed to Controleur Karthaus, the mission's opinion that it:

raised objections to the unification of the school funds with the funds which would pay the village chief because the schools of the mission belong to the local Christian community and the unification of the funds could lead to difficulties.⁶⁵

To the Mission Consul, Kruyt admitted his darker fears regarding the establishment of village funds: "It could happen that a small majority of the inhabitants of a village would want to establish a neutral community school and then we would not be able to do anything against it."⁶⁶

This stress on the Christian nature of mission schools and the concern over the establishment of non-mission schools within the mission's territory, reflected the marked deterioration of the mission's position as a result of the attitude of the current Controleur, Karthaus.⁶⁷ This official, more rigorously than his predecessor, Gerth van Wijk, pursued a policy of protecting the population from what he regarded as exploitation by the mission and its staff of foreign teachers. While recognizing the legality and financial necessity of the community's support of schools by the payment of fees, maintenance of buildings and contributions in produce, he firmly rejected the more dubious legality of services which the mission required the population to perform for the village teacher.

Karthaus justified his involvement in the administration of village schools on the basis of the 1914 revision of Kielstra's draft Poso contract which stated:

As to the agreement regarding the financial arrangements ... the officials of the local government administration will co-operate ... to ensure,

(a) the erection of a school building, the

65. Kruyt to Karthaus, 22 November, 1915.

66. Kruyt to Baron van Boetzelaer, 15 April, 1916.

67. In April, 1916, Kruyt informed the Mission Consul that Karthaus "had proposed to declare the schools as officially belonging to the local Christian community". Kruyt at the time, saw no difficulty in this, although several years later, the concept of the school owned by the indigenous community became a central and delicate issue for the mission.

manufacture of school equipment and, if necessary, the building of a teacher's residence by means of unpaid community service;

- (b) the establishment ... of a school fund, (Article Seven).

and more specifically, in Article Sixteen

As long as the Netherlands Missionary Society has not appointed a visitor of schools ... village schools are placed under the supervision of local government administrators.⁶⁸

The 1914 draft, which was drawn up by the Director of Education, C.A.J. Hazeu, specifically stated that the school fund, to be supervised by the government, was to be a source for paying the village school teacher.⁶⁹

Karthaus's opposition to the guru regulation was shared by other officials with whom Kruyt was forced to negotiate. One such official was the Assistant Resident of Luwu who declared his total opposition to the introduction of a guru regulation for the mission schools in Malili "which always provides an opportunity for fiddling".

If the subsidy is insufficient, then first of all, one should consider opening less schools. If the population wishes to transport, free of charge, food and goods for the guru, then there is no objection to this, but no authority must be given to the mission to buy herendiensten Everything must be by voluntary labour.⁷⁰

Karthaus first had cause to complain to Kruyt about this issue when he encountered school children in September, 1914 carrying goods from Poso to the mission shop in Kuku. In December of the same year, he learnt of sixty pupils from Kuku and Tentena travelling for several days with their teacher "for an unknown purpose" while in early 1915, he discovered pupils of the Batu Noncu school involved in "coolie labour" related to the construction of the

68. Draft document attached to the submission of the Director of Education and Religion of 26 March, 1914, No. 5871 to the Governor-General. This is noted by Kruyt in his letter to Boetzelaer, 15 April, 1916.

69. ibid, Article Seven of this draft.

70. Assistant Resident of Luwu to Civiel Gezaghebber of Malili, 16 September, 1914.

missionary's residence in Kuku. As "administrator of regional funds", Karthaus asserted that it was his duty to ensure that regional funds were properly spent. His protest, he assured Kruyt, was not against the use of pupils as free labour, which could have been construed as interference in the mission affairs, but against the ineffective use of government subsidies when truancy was permitted on a large scale. He further questioned Kruyt as to the objective of mission schools for which the inhabitants of the technically self-governing states of Central Sulawesi paid so handsomely via their taxes and directly through school fees and physical labour.^{71.}

Kruyt, in this first trial of strength with the new Controleur, assured Karthaus that, as official Chairman of the school committee, he was entitled to enquire into the administration of mission schools and, if missionaries themselves were involved in removing children from school, "then you have every right to comment on this." The apparent cases of truancy Karthaus mentioned, Kruyt explained away generally as occurring during vacations, which occurred at different times according to when teachers attended a monthly teacher's conference. As to the aim of mission schools, Kruyt justified the mission's acceptance of subsidies on the grounds that it was not the intention of the mission to use the school "as a means to make school children Christians"; instead, mission-run schools aimed to:

develop the spirit, to train [individuals] to think so that the pupils would profit from it for their entire lives, even if they gradually lost the skill of writing. ... The government school is an end in itself; that is to say, a certain degree of knowledge is provided there, not so much to develop the mind of the pupil, but in order that such knowledge can be used later [in occupations such] as merchant, clerk etc.. Once acquainted with the school books and syllabus you will be convinced that the subsidy from the regional treasury is well spent and relates to the stated objectives, ie., to educate in such a way that both intellect and heart are developed.^{72.}

71. Controleur Karthaus to Kruyt, 7 May, 1916.

72. Kruyt to Karthaus, nd. 1916.

In responding in this restrained way, Kruyt had correctly perceived Karthaus's philosophic objection to the mission's control of public education. While accepting the sincerity of the mission's educational objectives, Karthaus was still determined to remove from its control the financial arrangements for the support of village schools. These, he considered, were the responsibility of the colonial government whose authority extended to the regulation of the economic, social and political manifestations of indigenous society on behalf of the emerging indigenous government. He saw the proposed amalgamation of community plantations put forward by his superior as an opportunity to divest the mission of its de facto authority but he was forced to accept the impracticability of this idea.

At the end of 1915, Karthaus made another attempt to replace village contributions to the income of the guru by a flat increase in the teacher's salary.⁷³ The mission argued that this was impossible, since the newly revised draft Poso contract which appeared in February, 1915 specified a maximum teacher salary of f.20 per month, while the substitution of the services provided by the community by an increase in salary would add a further f.5 per month.⁷⁴

Undefeated by this technicality, the Controleur managed to convince the Resident of Menado to request Batavia to review the teacher's salary specified in the draft Poso contract.⁷⁵ Thus, with the backing of his superior who had also expressed his opposition to the unpaid services the mission required the community to perform for the guru and European missionary, Karthaus arrived at Pendolo to negotiate the changes he required in the

73. A suggestion discussed by Karthaus with Kruyt during a visit to Pendolo.

74. Kruyt to Karthaus, 22 November, 1915. Kruyt indicated that the Conference did not oppose this suggestion in principle but that it desired the details of the proposed changes be discussed with the missionaries.

75. Kruyt to the members of the Poso Conference, 12 February, 1916.

financial relations between mission and population.^{76.} The Controleur informed Kruyt that his superior had demanded that unpaid personal services be dispensed with forthwith and that the Assistant Resident of Central Celebes had reiterated his desire to amalgamate mission and village plantations. In the face of continued mission opposition, Grijzen now offered to ensure the precedence of schools over all other calls on community funds. Finally, Karthaus put forward a new financial proposal from the Assistant Resident to replace another aspect of the community's labour in the service of the mission: in this case, a twenty percent tax surcharge was suggested to replace the population's maintenance of mission, teacher and school buildings.^{77.}

Apart from the express command of the Resident, the 1915 Pendolo conference ended inconclusively. The Controleur commenced the new year determined, as he brusquely informed the Kasiguncu missionary, "that I will use every means in my possession to end this practice [of unpaid labour]".^{78.} In reality, his threat extended over the entire spectrum of the mission's relations with the indigenous population. Convinced that in all areas the mission employed pressure to obtain the co-operation of the population, Karthaus embarked on a mission to save the indigenous population from its oppressor. While the unpaid construction of schools and teacher residences was not prohibited, Karthaus believed that the latter were larger and more ornate than necessary and the fact that they were better maintained than the people's own houses also proved to the Controleur that the mission employed undue pressure.

76. It appears from Kruyt's letter of 12 February that Karthaus made two visits to Pendolo in December, 1915 and January, 1916 to present Kruyt with a number of proposals originating from the Resident, Assistant Resident and the Controleur himself.
77. loc. cit.. Kruyt advised the Conference that he personally saw no difficulty in accepting the amalgamation of mission plantations with the proposed village plantations as the Assistant Resident desired.
78. Karthaus to Kruyt, 28 February, 1916. Two consecutive crop failures and a decline in the export trade due to the war had increased the burden which mission schools imposed on the people.

Henceforth, he warned Kruyt, he would only co-operate in ensuring their construction "when the people informed him that they were prepared to undertake such work."⁷⁹ At the same time, Karthaus sought to make it apparent to village chiefs and the population generally, that the mission had no authority to make any demands on them. Not only was unpaid labour not permitted but village chiefs were not to make paid labourers available to the mission any longer, nor were such individuals to feel obliged to perform any work for the mission if they did not wish it. Chiefs would be dismissed and punished if they co-operated with the mission in the provision of labour for personal services. On no account were the people to work on mission buildings or the sawah of the guru if other essential tasks had not been completed.⁸⁰

In a five page letter to the Resident of Menado, Kruyt described the damage the Controleur was inflicting on the mission by his doctrinaire attempt to force a division between Church and State in Poso. Kruyt claimed there was no substance to Karthaus's belief that the mission used undue pressure to obtain the people's co-operation and described the approach of the mission in Poso in the following terms:

We do constantly urge the people to go to church but it is only due to our influence that people attend. Those entirely against Christianity do not appear and, of those who do come, a part has been convinced and the other part continues coming to please the missionary or guru, or because they are still searching for certainty. We stress church attendance because this is the main means of becoming acquainted with the Gospel. [But] we leave the people completely free in [the matter of] joining the Christian community.⁸¹

But what had concerned the Controleur and what was not gainsaid by Kruyt, was the impression promoted by the mission amongst the To Pamona people, that church and school attendance and co-operation with the mission were part of the new colonial order. This impression had been strengthened by Mazee who, without expressly stating that

79. Memorandum on the mission in Poso, nd. 1916. Prepared by the Poso Conference for the Resident of Menado.

80. loc. cit...

81. loc. cit...

such attendances were compulsory, made it clear that the government desired them. Karthaus was attempting to dismantle this de facto connection between the government and the mission and to remove what the official considered to be the unsanctioned exercise of authority by the mission.

The "success" of Karthaus's intervention in the relations between the mission and the village population was dramatic according to Kruyt's interpretation. Truancy in schools in 1916 increased from five to twenty-nine percent and in 1917 rose to thirty-five percent.

Church attendance also decreased markedly; the people were to a large extent impossible to reach. The prevailing attitude became surly, unfriendly, even impertinent.⁸²

How far this reaction was evidence of the unwholesome basis of the mission's "influence" and how far the deterioration of the relationship with the people was indicative of the fear they had of the government official, as Kruyt interpreted it, it is difficult to estimate. Both factors were undoubtedly involved and the middle of the second decade of the twentieth century therefore, marks an important stage in the evolution of the mission's work amongst the To Pamona people. The mission had now to begin seriously to come to terms with its stated objectives and the means whereby these would be achieved.

Whether or not a more independent spirit was being promoted by the actions of Controleur Karthaus, or whether the freer expression of opinion was the result of having come to terms with their conquest after a decade of colonization, the people of Central Sulawesi were at this time, beginning to assert their independence from mission control. In Onda'e and neighbouring Mori, opposition was being voiced to the obligatory contribution to the maintenance of teacher residences and schools, apparently in response to greater Buginese influence in eastern parts of the island.⁸³ Similar opposition was expressed by the

82. Memorandum on the administration of government officials, 1913-1921, nd. 1921.

83. Minutes N.M.S., 20 September, 1916. Ritsema, 26 July, 1916. Minutes N.M.S., 11 October, 1916. Ritsema to N.M.S., 29 August, 1916. Early signs of Islamic penetration were noted at the end of 1914.

village chiefs of Tentena and Buyu mPondoli, two of the wealthiest To Pamona villages. Karthaus used these appeals from the people to justify his policy of replacing the agreements imposed by the mission with tax levies.^{84.}

In the town of Poso, the Minahassan inhabitants, supported by Arab and Chinese parents, initiated a request for the establishment of a second-class government school, as permitted by the 1914 version of the Poso contract. The Minahassans in particular had become accustomed to a high standard of educational provision for their children and were becoming increasingly critical of the Poso mission school believing "that the Netherlands Missionary Society cannot provide education at the same level."^{85.} In nearby Malitu and in Muslim Mapane, a request was presented to the Controleur for the establishment there of a superior school of the type proposed for Poso, a request which, according to the mission, was promoted by the hope of being relieved of compulsory labour in support of the mission school.^{86.}

Further south, an assertion of independence from the mission took a more substantial form. By 1915, mission correspondence characterized the village of Banano as a centre of refuge for the consciously anti-Christian elements amongst the Pebato tribe, and its chief, the former rebel Ta Rame, "the protector of conservatism or of the unconverted".^{87.} Meanwhile, the influential and generally acclaimed chief of the Lage tribe, Ta Lasa, had resigned as District Chief of Lage and had chosen to settle

84. Karthaus to Kruyt, 7 December, 1916. The Annual Meeting of the Poso Conference of 1915 noted that, for the second consecutive year, villages in the Pondolo area had asked to be relieved of cultivating separate fields for the maintenance of school and guru. Apparently, little attention was given to such fields and in consequence of not producing the required amount of rice, they were obliged to "make good the amount lacking due to their carelessness".

85. Minutes N.M.S., 13 January, 1915. Wesseldijk to N.M.S., 14 November, 1914.

86. Kruyt to Karthaus, 6 September, 1916. Minutes N.M.S., 8 December, 1915. Wesseldijk to N.M.S., 21 August, 1915.

87. Minutes N.M.S., 16 July, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 14 April, 1915.

in the "Mohammedan inclined" village of Watuawu, thus continuing his ambiguous stance towards the mission.^{88.}

Beyond the administrative region of the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes, Kruyt was confronted by manifestations of a revival of traditional religious practices. The To Lampu in "a reaction to the activity of the guru there", were "energetically" engaged in reconstructing the traditional village temple or lobo.^{89.} Unlike Poso, this southern region had never undergone the intensive colonization experienced by the To Pamona since 1906 and reaction to the mission amongst the To Lampu took the form of a public reassertion of traditional practices secretly maintained by tribal elders. Kruyt was able to convince the Governor of Celebes to order a halt to the construction of the To Lampu temples before traditional ceremonies could be resumed in these villages.^{90.}

Further to the southwest however, reaction to the Christian mission in the Toraja area took an even more dramatic form with the murder of missionary Loonsdrecht, a member of the Gereformeerde Zendingsbond. His death, as Governor Frijling felt obliged to emphasize to the mission Conference of Rante Pao, was a reaction to the method of their work amongst that population.^{91.}

Kruyt was in no doubt as to the cause of these anti-mission manifestations and blamed them entirely on

88. Minutes N.M.S., 14 April, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 26 January, 1915.

89. Kruyt to Governor of Celebes, 27 May, 1917 and 28 September, 1917. This issue arose out of a conflict with the Assistant Resident of Luwu regarding the financing of mission schools, a conflict which traversed similar grounds to that which had taken place with Karthaus.

90. As a result of Kruyt's first letter to the Governor, Frijling wrote to the Assistant Resident of Luwu stressing the importance of mission schools and directing that official to co-operate with Kruyt.

91. Governor of Celebes, Frijling to the mission Conference of Rante Pao, 15 August, 1917. The Gereformeerde Dutch Protestant Church is a more conservative fundamentalist church and perhaps for this reason, its missionary methods had antagonized the sophisticated Toraja.

the policies and attitudes of Karthaus and like-minded officials. Kruyt concluded in 1921 that:

The difficulties with which we now have to cope are largely a result of the actions of Mr. Karthaus. The task before his arrival was proceeding well Mr. Karthaus, however, established an atmosphere of suspicion and doubt as to the real motives of the mission Heathenism was revitalized. Traditional days during which work was prohibited, largely forgotten, were now honoured again, to the detriment of agricultural activity Traditional heathen feasts were again held. As a result of all this, not only was our prestige undermined, but also that of the government.⁹²

The Poso mission therefore felt itself threatened from two sides. Not only was it losing the co-operation of the local representative of the colonial government but the comfortable position it had enjoyed amongst the Pamona people themselves was endangered. The immediate cause of both developments was the issue of the financing of mission schools.

There is no evidence from the comments of his critics that Karthaus was deliberately setting out to destroy the establishment of a Christian community. He was prepared to accept the support that the Christian community provided to the mission as long as he could be assured that it was genuinely based on religious convictions. He was also prepared to accept the mission's involvement in education as long as this was not limited to being an adjunct of the church but properly met the educational needs of the entire community. His other policies, particularly his ambitious plans for an articulated road system, indicated that he was concerned to pursue policies designed to improve the economy of the region.⁹³ In this context, he regarded the mission's agreements with the local population as depressing their economic potential. Although in Karthaus's extant correspondence this motive remains implicit, the Assistant

92. Memorandum on the administration of government officials, 1913-1921.

93. W. Holtus, Celebes: Onbekende Gebieden en Volken (Scheltema and Holkema, Amsterdam nd. 1926), pp.157-159.

Resident of Luwu had no qualms in describing the mission's agreements with the population as "laying on the shoulders of a not very strong people, a heavy financial burden which eventually would mean the death of further economic progress."⁹⁴.

How accurate the opinion of these officials was, can be gauged by the comparison of two sets of roughly comparable figures, those available from mission sources for the Pendolo district and the estimates provided by Grijzen in 1915, (See Table 3). Such a comparison suggests that the mission schools were in fact cheaper than those initiated by the government in the Muslim districts of the Assistant Residency. Grijzen's estimates show that the latter schools cost f.340 annually for a one-teacher school and f.590 for a school with two teachers. Similar sized mission schools cost under f.300 and under f.500 respectively. The difference was that government initiated schools would be completely self-supporting in Grijzen's plan, whereas mission schools depended on a regional government subsidy approximating fifty percent in 1913 although this later declined to thirty-three percent under the administrations of Karthaus's successors.

The argument regarding the impact of the maintenance of mission schools on the economic development of the people was therefore twofold. On the one hand, since mission schools depended on a subsidy, the existence of such schools reduced the total budget available to the regional administration for promotion of specifically economic endeavours. On the other hand, Karthaus appeared to be implying that if the population had not to contribute to the maintenance of schools, it would have more money and time available for other activities.⁹⁵.

This second argument is rather curious in the light of the government's advocacy of the principle of self-support. Yet this implication is apparent in his suggestion that the people's contribution in labour should be replaced

94. Assistant Resident of Luwu to Kruyt, 19 March, 1917.

95. There was no suggestion here that the contributions by non-christians to a mission school was reprehensible but neither, on the other hand, was he prepared to concede that church members may have been prepared to make abnormal contributions.

TABLE 3

COMMUNITY FINANCES IN SELECTED VILLAGES IN NON-MISSION
AREAS OF CENTRAL SULAWESI AS ESTIMATED BY
ASSISTANT RESIDENT GRIJZEN 1915

Calculated on the basis of 5 or 3 coconut palms per villager liable
for unpaid community labour and f.1 (net) per tree per annum

Village	Population	Persons Liable for Community Labour	Value of Production of Village Plantation	Salary of Village Chief	Cost of Education X	Other Expenses
			f.	f.	f.	f.
<u>Donggala District</u>						
Balo	337	67	201	130	*	71
Kola Kola	1264	252	756	330	*	426
Momboro	959	191	955	270	590	95
Surumana	690	138	414	230	*	184
Tanjong Panda	612	122	366	230	*	136
Towaya	1998	399	1197	420	*	777
Wani	1484	296	1480	360	590	530
<u>Toli Toli District</u>						
Lingadang	648	129	645	230	340	75
Nalu	1282	256	768	330	*	438
Saloompaga	521	104	312	190	*	122
Santiga	219	43	129	100	*	29
<u>Poso District</u>						
Ampana	514	102	510	190	340	-20
Malotot	282	56	168	100	*	68
Matako	843	168	504	270	*	234
Una-Una	1107	221	1105	300	590	215
Salinggohoo	220	44	132	100	*	32
Sumoli	456	91	273	160	*	113
Tojo	574	114	570	190	340	40
Tombuyano	566	113	339	190	*	149
<u>Palu District</u>						
Biromaru	845	169	845	270	340	235
Bora	1020	205	1025	300	340	385
Dolo	1966	393	1965	420	590	955
Kaleke	1667	333	1665	390	590	685
Kawatuna- Lasoani	831	166	830	270	340	220
Loloo	214	42	126	100	*	26
Pakulie	950	190	570	270	*	300
Sibolaya	1377	275	1375	330	590	455
Sidondo	908	181	905	270	340	295
<u>Parigi District</u>						
Bajo	206	41	123	100	*	23
Eoya	1112	222	666	300	*	366
Manilili	453	90	450	160	340	-50
Mautong	1420	284	1420	360	590	470
Sausu	394	78	390	130	340	-80
Tinombo	497	99	495	160	340	-5
Toboli	702	140	700	230	340	130
Toribuli	868	173	865	270	340	255

* No school in existence in 1915 - only 3 trees required per liable villager

X f.590 for a two-teacher school
f.340 for a one-teacher school

by the payment of a supplementary subsidy of f.60 per annum per school. There was, however, one further element in the discussion. Grijzen, in a footnote to his proposal, specified that he wished to see the establishment of a one teacher school only in villages with a population of more than eight hundred and a two teacher school in villages with a population of over twelve hundred. On this criterion very few villages in the mission area would have had a school and in this sense, it would be true to say that mission education was a burden on the population.

Regrettably, a thorough investigation of the mission archives failed to uncover detailed statistics over consecutive years for population and school attendance before 1925, when the maintenance of such records became mandatory under the terms of the general subsidy regulation. The population in the relevant villages in 1925 were as follows: Pendolo, 547, Bancea, 318, Mayoa, 396, Koro Bono, 285, Tindoli, 259.⁹⁶ Since population statistics for other villages which are available show a significant decline between 1914 and 1925, it can be assumed that these figures were higher during the period under discussion. When it is also noted, as Grijzen's statistics show, that those liable for community labour and thus liable to maintain the schools represented roughly one quarter of the village population, then it becomes evident why conscientious government officials found the maintenance of mission schools in small Pamona villages an excessive demand. The alternative, which a number of these officials suggested, was the closure of many of the schools but this would have defeated the mission's objective of enticing as many children as possible into its schools. In the light of that alternative, Karthaus's attempt to lighten the burden of maintaining the mission school by increasing the government subsidy, represented a laudable interest by this

96. Taken from statistics prepared by the mission in conformity with requirements of the general subsidy regulations. See Table Six.

colonial official of extending the "benefits" of Western education. Nevertheless, he was not prepared to offer more financial aid for mission schools unless he could be satisfied that mission education was fulfilling the needs of the population as he perceived those and thus he wanted to ensure that schools were not simply treated as appendages to the mission's aim of evangelization.

Kruyt on the other hand, did not accept Karthaus's premise that separation between Church and State was possible or desirable in a primitive society. Kruyt's response to the challenge of the local government representative was to reassert his long stated conviction that the two arms of European culture had to co-operate in the colonization of this region. Karthaus's policy, he informed the Resident, was not appropriate "in the existing situation in Central Celebes".⁹⁷ Rather than accept change, Kruyt resorted to using all his political skill to maintain the status quo. He concluded his appeal to Menado with a piece of veiled political blackmail warning the Resident that:

where we are intent on the Christianization of a people, something which the government also desires, it is essential that our influence is not opposed as long as it is exercised within the limits of legitimate missionary concern.⁹⁸

This warning and the possible political ramifications of a worsening of the conflict between Controleur Karthaus and missionary Kruyt sufficed to cause the Resident of Menado to feel obliged to intervene. As a result, a special meeting was convened between Karthaus and the members of the Poso mission attended by the Resident in Tentena in July where the hope was expressed

that all differences of opinion would be removed and that government and mission would work harmoniously together in the interest of the land and its people.⁹⁹

This hope remained an unfulfilled wish and Karthaus

97. Memorandum on the mission in Poso, 1916.

98. loc. cit.

99. Noted by Karthaus. Karthaus to Kruyt, 1 August, 1916.

directly objected to Kruyt's written report of the meeting.^{100.}

Karthaus emphasized that he had not quoted the Resident as being of the opinion that all forced labour should be abolished. He had, he assured Kruyt, specifically referred to personal services provided by the population for the guru. This was an important distinction, for the Controleur did not want to be seen as denying the principle of self-maintenance of village schools. What he was concerned to eradicate was what he regarded as the more arbitrary area of forced labour under the control of the missionary or his representative, the guru. It was precisely this area which Kruyt saw as most pedagogical but he also argued that services provided by the population for the maintenance of the guru were a practical necessity for containing the costs of schools. Because of both considerations, Kruyt's report of the meeting specifically failed to distinguish between 'forced' and 'personal' labour services. To overcome the financial necessity argument used by Kruyt to justify the continuance of the demand for contributions to the guru's income, Karthaus had proposed the replacement of contributions in rice and demands on villages to maintain buildings by a supplementary subsidy of f.60 per school. As this involved a departure from the principle of self-financing which he himself defended and as it placed a further demand on the regional treasury, this proposal did not eventuate. Nevertheless, the fact that the meeting was held indicated that good relations with the mission were of great political significance at the higher levels of government. The Resident wrote to Kruyt privately after the Conference cautiously expressing his own doubts regarding Karthaus's suitability.^{101.} He also informed Karthaus's immediate superior,

100. Karthaus to Kruyt, 5 August, 1916.

101. A hand-written letter by Resident Kroon, dated 29 December, 1916 in response to a private letter from Kruyt of 1 December, 1916. The Resident expressed himself cautiously regarding Karthaus: "From my discussions with him, it has more than once become apparent that he regards this [mission] work generally very highly. Unfortunately, the personality traits of all are not such that each can appreciate the other's work on its own".

the Assistant Resident of Central Celebes, that it was essential that the government retained close relations with the more experienced and knowledgeable missionaries and that the government approach its task cautiously without creating "too rapid a change in the evolution of the people".¹⁰² Meanwhile, Kruyt had also engaged the Mission Consul to bring the troublesome Controleur to the attention of the Department of the Interior. In May, 1916, Baron van Boetzelaer was able to inform Kruyt:

Mr. Karthaus will be spoken to at the Department of the Interior regarding his attitude towards a range of issues in which the mission is involved and an attempt will be made to get him to understand that it is his duty to ensure that as much as possible, the population does as much as it can for the school teachers and that it is much less serious that thereby some abuses occur than that the population forms the impression that it is against the wishes of the Controleur that voluntary services are performed for the benefit of the school. It is to be hoped that these discussions will help.¹⁰³

Despite his having secured the support of the higher levels of government, Kruyt continued to feel threatened by Karthaus's attempts to rid the school system of contributions in the form of physical labour controlled by the Poso mission. In early 1917, Kruyt felt obliged to write to the Resident again.¹⁰⁴ This time he could complain of no specific actions but only of Karthaus's attitude. Karthaus was taking care not to offer any concrete grounds for criticism. Nevertheless, the Resident felt it was appropriate to travel to Poso for the second time and on 13 and 14 April, 1917 he participated in a round table conference at the mission centre of Kuku, a conference also attended by a representative of the Department of the Interior, Mr. Lulofs.¹⁰⁵

The essence of the problems which were to be dealt with by this meeting was the question of ownership of the

102. loc. cit.

103. Baron van Boetzelaer to Kruyt, nd..

104. Kruyt to the Resident of Menado, 2 March, 1917.

105. Minutes N.M.S., 28 September, 1917. Report of the special meeting of 13 and 14 April, 1917.

village school. Underlying the long drawn-out dispute between Kruyt and Controleur Karthaus was the failure of the central government to decide on a firm policy. Having in 1911 adopted the notion of "the village school in the care of the mission", the legal and financial interpretation of this concept remained an area of disagreement between the Department of Education and the Department of the Interior. The policy pursued by Karthaus was fundamentally that adopted by the latter department under whose auspices the village school formally rested.¹⁰⁶ By analogy with the Javanese desa school, the village school in the care of the mission was the possession of the local community. The Department of Education which, since the initial Kielstra document, had been responsible for drafting the 1914, 1915 and 1916 revisions of the proposed Poso regulation, perceived the issue in terms of the ownership of the schools resting with the Netherlands Missionary Society to whom it was prepared to make available subsidies per village school established.¹⁰⁷ This dispute was in turn related to broader policy developments regarding the granting of greater autonomy to regional governments. By 1915, the Department of Education was claiming its control over all education and questioned the inclusion of education in the devolution of authority to the regional governments. By modifying the original Kielstra document from one which was basically a contract involving a lump-sum payment to one involving a specific subsidy per school, the central Department of Education was ensuring its control over educational provision. The contract notion on the other hand, would have severely limited its right of interference and granted supervision of the schools to the local

106. At the April meeting, this policy was forcefully promoted by Luloffs.

107. Minutes N.M.S., 13 January, 1915. The Society's executive, presumably on the advice of the Mission Consul and as a result of its own discussions with the Minister of Colonies, perceived the policy of the government (ie. Minister of Colonies and the Governor-General) as favouring mission control of schools.

representative of the government, an employee of the Department of the Interior.¹⁰⁸ The notion of a subsidy per school also maintained the traditional relationship between a private educational organization and the Department of Education. The plans of the government for the re-organization of the colonial administration and the development of a general subsidy regulation which would largely follow the Sumba-Poso concept were delayed partly as a result of the war and partly because of the matters of principle that such changes involved. The implementation of the draft Poso regulation into which the government appeared to want to incorporate the legal principles applicable to all mission school systems was thus continually postponed and discussions on the draft which continued till 1919 haunted by the awareness that it would set a precedent, only came to an end when the idea of a specific regulation for Poso was abandoned and serious discussions commenced in 1921 to draw up a universally applicable subsidy regulation. The other major obstacle in formulating a subsidy regulation for Poso which was universally applicable was Kruyt's insistence on a guarantee of certain principles safeguarding mission autonomy which the government, influenced by the arguments of the Department of the Interior, was unable to accept while that Department claimed formal control over village education.

A resolution of these issues did not take place till 1918 when the administration of the volkschool was officially transferred to the Department of Education but in the meantime it had been left to the local representatives to develop a modus vivendi. It was this constitutional limbo in which Kruyt and Karthaus found themselves and it was for this reason that the April round table conference was not able to produce any effective solutions. Six specific issues were discussed and, as far as possible, a mode of conduct was determined. The free transportation of the guru's belongings was permitted only on his arrival to Poso, final departure and when leaving

108. loc. cit..

and returning on formal leave, on the grounds that the appointment of a teacher and the granting of furlough was in the community's interest and that such unpaid services could therefore be regarded as community services. The village chief could nominate those villagers available for paid services to the mission but could not force a person to make himself available for such services. School children could not be engaged for paid or unpaid services. The Resident considered that the abolition of the unpaid cultivation of the guru's garden could not be achieved until the subsidy regulations were modified to allow for this although he believed that the teachers should be requested to maintain their own houses in the case of minor repairs. Major repairs would be arranged by the Controleur in consultation with the village chief. All other contributions would be maintained in accordance with the generally accepted principle of self-financing of schools. Finally, the Resident expressed his desire that Sunday would, where practicable, be observed as a rest day. Karthaus was informed that he should generally "provide his moral and, where necessary, practical support" for the collection and administration of community finance for the support of mission schools.¹⁰⁹

While not providing a set of water-tight regulations, the meeting laid down a code of conduct designed to clear away the irritating and seemingly trivial misinterpretations which had resulted from the deterioration of relations between government official and mission. It also had the effect of producing a change in the tone of Karthaus's later complaints which became less abrasive. As a consequence of the meeting, the Controleur was transferred several months later but the principle issue at stake, the ownership of the schools, was left in obedience. The legal

109. Minutes N.M.S., 28 September, 1917. Report on a special meeting of the Poso Conference chaired by Director Gunning. Gunning was on a tour of mission centres in the Indies in preparation for discussions regarding the changes mooted in government thinking about financial aid to mission schools.

rights of the mission over the schools now appeared to rest upon whether or not the school was regarded as the property of the local community. The mission's acceptance of this would depend on:

Whether the government will recognize the right of the local community to determine the religious character of the school. To accept at this time the ownership rights of the local community which Mr. Lulofs desired, would result (as long as the community is still so dependent) in the establishment of government schools under the guise of naming them community schools.^{110.}

Kruyt perceived immediately that, in the current climate, were the schools established by the mission to be defined as community schools, this would give the Controleur control over them in his position as locum tenens of the emerging indigenous self-government. Even if this were not the case, it was equally clear on the basis of a number of instances which had already occurred that, if the various villages already maintaining schools were given possession of them, they were likely to decide to throw off the yoke of the mission.

Two years earlier, Kruyt had attempted to ward off such a situation by drawing up an adat code for the emerging Christian communities. His only motive for acceding to Batavia's request to formulate the adat law for the Pamona people which he "would ... [otherwise] not have considered desirable", was the current "attitude of local officialdom".^{111.}

The formulation of a Christian Pamona adat would have legally defined the existence of the Christian communities to which the mission schools could have been safely ceded. The attempt was resisted by Karthaus on the valid grounds

110. loc. cit..

111. Minutes of the Poso Conference annual meeting, 6 January, 1915. The initiative for this came originally from the government (Kielstra to Kruyt, 28 November, 1911, Government Secretary to Heads of administrations in the Outer Islands, 30 October, 1911). The first draft formulation was prepared in 1915, again on the insistence of Kielstra. This draft was sent to Kielstra for his approval and when gained, (20 July, 1915) was sent by Kruyt to Karthaus (Kruyt to Karthaus, 6 September, 1915.)

that it was "premature because an adat law of native Christians still has to evolve in consequence of the still small number of Christians".¹¹². A self-governing Christian community, Kruyt admitted himself, had less likelihood of coming into existence than a state of effective self-government in the Poso administrative district generally. Karthaus correctly interpreted Kruyt's efforts as a further attempt to formalize the authority of the mission over the people, a situation which Karthaus was endeavouring to dismantle in the case of the mission's "agreements" regarding the financing of schools. Karthaus believed that the acceptance of a Christian adat code would, as in the education sphere, impinge upon the legitimate authority of the state, since such a code "would be regarded as a guide for the courts".¹¹³. In the event of Karthaus's acceptance of Kruyt's codes, this would have been even more unacceptable since, according to the Controleur, Kruyt had drawn up the documents without consulting village chiefs. Furthermore, Karthaus found the document unacceptable on the grounds that it did not sufficiently correspond to European standards of morality. This was a rather strange criticism for an official to make of the work of a churchman but it reflected Karthaus's implicit belief throughout his dispute with the mission that the latter did not necessarily have the correct vision of the future of Central Sulawesi.

With the failure of this attempt to define established Christian communities legally, and in the face of a determined effort by Karthaus to gain control of the schools, the only alternative left to the mission was to claim the schools as mission property but this alternative was also fraught with difficulty as Kruyt informed the Missionary Society:

If [the schools] were claimed as mission property this would, it is true, remove all the difficulties ... but this could not be done without attracting the appearance of greediness while moreover, the

112. Karthaus to Resident of Manado, 2 January, 1917. Although complete population statistics are not available, an indication of the size and nature of the christian community may be gained from Table 4. Kasiguncu was the oldest mission area.

113. loc. cit..

TABLE 4

SCHOOLS AND CHRISTIAN COMMUNITIES IN THE KASIGUNCU MISSION DISTRICT 1918

Village	Indigenous Teacher/Minister	School	NUMBER OF PUPILS				Regular Attendance	Member of Christian Community M. W. B. G. Total	No. Baptized in Previous Year M. W. B. G. Total	Average Church Attendance										
			Christian B. G.	Heathen G. B.	Muslim M. W. B. G.	Total Registrars														
Kasiguncu	K.A. Lumi	1	27	9	4	5	45	42	84	93	47	27	256	16	18	5	6	256	105	
Satu Sano Pinedapa	{ W. Tewalujan }	1	1	1	17	14	2	35	30	16	10	3	29	-	-	-	-	-	75	
Malitu	Z. Rapar	1	48	20	15	9	-	100	92	125	137	60	36	353	12	12	13	8	45	115
Po'encu	L. Rompas	1	-	-	25	16	-	41	37	33	31	5	8	77	9	10	2	4	25	75
Ganano	M. Toewoulai	1	4	3	13	5	-	25	15	15	15	17	13	63	11	6	5	11	33	30
Kara 'Ayo	A. Rumondor	1	1	1	41	33	-	81	76	52	51	14	18	135	8	2	5	6	21	66
Peso	A.J. Panjomenan	1	9	7	20	3	7	47	45	61	58	47	36	195	-	-	-	-	-	67
Kawua Maliwuka Tegolu	{ L. Mompow }	1	3	1	25	17	-	46	38	19	13	10	10	77	2	3	2	4	11	34
Watuvu	K. Lenggara	1	-	-	30	14	-	44	40	13	10	1	1	22	-	-	-	-	-	67
Pandiri	T. Rasire'e	1	12	11	13	3	-	39	33	63	47	17	14	141	15	13	4	3	36	64
Silanca Barodi	{ T. Pembolo }	1	4	1	33	22	-	60	35	10	16	4	1	30	-	-	-	-	-	37
Sape Kalaka	{ M. Mompala }	1	1	2	26	14	-	47	38	30	33	7	3	81	-	-	6	1	7	61
Saluga Matabo Toliba	{ A. Rumajar }	1	-	-	45	10	6	67	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90
Mal'e'i Tonjko Kalana	{ P. Undap }	1	-	-	16	1	13	30	23	3	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	78
SUB TOTAL		14	110	64	333	161	26	5	707	606	1543	74	64	42	43	223				1019
Dutch Native School - Poco N. Kamu		1	15	14	2	1	3	35	33											
TOTAL		15	125	78	325	192	29	5	742	639	1543	74	64	42	43	223				1019

danger exists that the people would show less enthusiasm for the [contributions to the school].^{114.}

In the last resort therefore, it suited the mission to maintain the status quo, to leave the schools and the mission's control over them in a state of legal limbo and to fight each attempted encroachment on his traditional domain as it occurred. In its struggle to maintain the existing state of affairs, its trump card remained its political significance as a counterweight to Islam in the vast inland of the island of Sulawesi. As the pro-mission Governor of Celebes informed his subordinate, the Assistant Resident of Luwu, who like Karthaus, in Poso, wished to curb Kruyt's abrogation of what were perceived as state powers, the establishment of mission schools was of vital importance "in the interests of the formation of a bulwark against the penetration of Islam".^{115.} With such powerful allies and in the face of such significant political considerations, the Poso mission managed to retain its hold over the To Pamona of Central Sulawesi.

114. Minutes N.M.S., 28 September, 1917. Report on an extra-ordinary meeting of 24 and 25 April, 1917.

115. Governor of Celebes, W. Frijling to the Assistant Resident of Luwu, 18 July, 1917.

CHAPTER NINE

SPREADING THE GOSPEL OR HELPING THE PEOPLE:
DEFINING THE MISSION'S ROLE

Underlying the tensions between the mission and the local representatives of the colonial government on the one hand and between the mission and the increasingly restive Pamona communities on the other, was the impact of the first World War. The disruption to trade and the ramifications this had for the central and regional colonial treasuries as well as for the financial capacities of the indigenous population exacerbated the philosophical and personal conflicts the mission had to confront. At the trading depots of Poso, rattan and other commercial products were no longer being bought up,¹ while rice sales were affected by the failure of the 1914-15 harvests.²

The sale of forest products as well as that of surplus rice were the traditional and only means whereby the Pamona people obtained money. Whereas, prior to 1906 the proceeds of rattan and resin were "invested" in textiles and other decorative items,³ since the introduction

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1. Minutes N.M.S., 8 December, 1915. Wesseldijk to N.M.S., 21 August, 1915. As a result "several villagers were not able to pay their school contributions." Minutes N.M.S., Schuyt to N.M.S., 21 February, 1916. One missionary believed the war was beneficial because "it provided an opportunity to point out the weakness of Turkey" and because exporters were no longer buying local produce, "tax money had now to be largely earned in their own land. Therefore, people stayed more at home". Minutes N.M.S., 15 September, 1915. Ten Kate to N.M.S., 25 May, 1915.
 2. Minutes, Poso Conference Annual Meeting, 6 January, 1915. Kruyt blamed the attitude of the people for this. An unsigned and undated memorandum on the administrations of Controleur Karthaus, van der Meulen and Nieboer, probably written in 1921, states "The years 1915, 1916 and 1917 were hunger years." Schuyt informed the Society in 1915 that "the hospitals have had very few patients in the last few months because of the difficulties experienced by families in providing food". (Minutes N.M.S., 14 April, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 26 January, 1915).
 3. See supra, Chapter 2 passim.

of taxation, the gathering of such products became a necessity to obtain the money in time to pay income tax. Kruyt had supported Mazee's attempt to foster copra as an alternative source of income because of its "pedagogical" value in training the To Pamona to recognize that material advancement was the reward of earnest labour. Later administrators desired to extend this industry to fund community projects while Kruyt fostered coconut plantations and later coffee plantations to finance the future needs of the embryonic Christian communities. In the interim, rice production formed the basis of the villager's contribution to their only community project, the village school.

It was during the period when the most rapid growth in the number of schools occurred that the financial base of the community was undermined by the dramatic decline in the export trade. This in turn required the guru and missionaries to apply increasing pressure to ensure fulfillment of village obligations which, due to the economic difficulties, were no longer being met as promptly and as willingly as before.⁴ The regional and local governments, themselves affected by the state of the economy, were keen to exploit previously untapped sources of income and were thus led to become competitors of the mission in exploiting the village resources. The concept of the community fund to pay for local needs was an attractive one for the government from an economic and a community development point of view.⁵ Both as competitor and as concerned official, it was to be expected that in this period of economic contraction, the Poso administrators would become increasingly sensitive to the measures taken by the mission to maintain its economic existence.

4. In the mountain regions of Napu, Besoa, the mission had not yet even succeeded in gaining acceptance of similar contracts by 1916. (Minutes N.M.S., 13 December, 1916, Woensdrecht to N.M.S., 26 August, 1916).

5. Assistant Resident Grijzen's proposal to establish community funds, represented an exploitation of a potentially rich source of village finances.




FIGURE 4

Mission, Neutral and Government Schools in the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes 1909-1920


The war had its effect in another way by retarding the acceptance and implementation of a regulation to subsidize mission schools in Central Sulawesi.⁶ Kruyt's defence of the financial basis of his school network in the face of what he perceived as harassment by the Poso administration was frustrated by the hesitancy of the policy-makers in the central government and in the Netherlands. With each revision of the Poso regulation, Kruyt's expectation of its imminent implementation was disappointed and he was thrown back into a situation of having to depend upon his own negotiating ability.

As a consequence, the expansion of the mission school system in the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes was halted while Kruyt sought to consolidate his position. The provision of schools in mission areas was already more liberal than the local government considered necessary and contrasted sharply with the provision of schools in non-mission areas, as Figure 4 indicates. But it was at this time that the Poso mission was invited to extend its presence southwards into the administrative districts of the government of Celebes, specifically Mori and Malili. With the appointment of the former adviser of the Department of the Interior, W. Frijling, as Governor of Celebes, Makassar embarked on a policy of intensifying colonial rule in the inland regions of the south-central administrative districts of Sulawesi. The major motivation for this policy was Frijling's concern regarding the expansion of Islamic influences. In the implementation of this policy the Governor found a useful ally in Kruyt, as the Poso administration had found a decade earlier. Kruyt saw in the expansion of the mission to Mori and Malili, an

6. Minutes N.M.S., 13 January, 1915. Wesseldijk to N.M.S., 14 November, 1914. The annual meeting of the Poso Conference held in November, 1915 was expecting the imminent introduction of the subsidy. In a letter to Karthaus in April, 1915, Kruyt indicated he expected its introduction in the following year. In 1919, the Mission Consul informed Kruyt that subsidies for the training school would be delayed till a special subsidy regulation was introduced for Poso. (Kruyt to Inspector de Nes, 3 January, 1919).

MAP 9

THE EXTENT OF POSO MISSION ACTIVITY
IN CENTRAL SULAWESI 1925



opportunity to "round off" the Poso mission and to secure a buffer zone against the encroachment of Islam. In extending southwards, the mission simply imposed established policy regarding the organization, administration and financing of schools.⁷ While receiving from Makassar generous financial and moral support, Kruyt found himself engaged in disputes with local officials very similar to those in Poso, regarding the financial contributions the mission demanded from the people for the maintenance of school and guru and the major issue of principle, that of mission autonomy over village schools.⁸ Similar tactics were employed by Kruyt in meeting such attacks, in this case by corresponding directly with the Governor of Celebes, to obtain assurances not voluntarily offered at the local level. Governor Frijling was able to deflect the secular orientation of his subordinates more effectively than the Resident of Manado, and as both Frijling and Kruyt provided local officials with copies of their mutual correspondence, the mission held the upper hand in its relationship with them.⁹ In 1916, in a memorandum to all Assistant Residents in the context of the Poso mission's establishment of schools in Malili, Frijling made his position in regard to mission schools very clear:

I expect mutual discussion and loyal co-operation between government and mission who [in the promotion of elementary education] have both a task to fulfill It is true that the government could itself organize elementary education without involving the mission but ... this must be the exception and I therefore do not wish the erection of elementary schools, ie. neutral schools, by the administration without compelling reasons

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7. Jan Kruyt, op. cit., p. 133.
 8. Controleur of Malili to Kruyt, 19 March, 1917. Kruyt to Controleur of Malili, 2 April, 1917. Mission schools within the territories administered by the Government of Celebes received f.100 per annum and f.200 per initial establishment.
 9. For instance, Governor of Celebes to Assistant Resident of Luwu, 18 July, 1917, supporting Kruyt in his dispute with the former. A footnote signed personally by the Governor informed the Assistant Resident that Kruyt had been sent a copy of the correspondence.

and on no account without the express permission of the relevant departmental head.¹⁰.

Despite the changes in the economic and political climate the second decade of the twentieth century marked not only a geographical expansion of the mission, but also an extension in its activities and, if its geographical expansion left the mission's methods of operation unaffected, the new activities in which it became involved in this period left a very tangible impact. Indeed, the second decade witnessed the emergence of two diverging interpretations of the role of the mission which disrupted its harmonious development. At one level it represented an attack on Kruyt's authority and a serious clash of personalities but, more fundamentally, it was a local manifestation of a philosophical debate which was reverberating throughout the mission world. The issue concerned the extent to which the mission ought to be involved in the socio-economic advancement of traditional peoples as part of its educational work.

For Kruyt, European-initiated change in traditional societies needed to "allow the people to remain in their old atmosphere as much as possible and to let them develop in it".¹¹ He was philosophically averse to initiating change beyond that which he considered essential to facilitate the gradual evolution of traditional society towards the formation of an indigenous Christian agricultural community. In practice, this policy meant that Kruyt failed to involve the Pamona people sufficiently in the process of change which he had helped to initiate but the parameters of which it was beyond his powers to determine.

The fundamental conflict inherent in Kruyt's position which he shares with all those working for "progress" in

10. Governor of Celebes, confidential circular to the Assistant Resident of Mandar Pare-Pare, Luwu and East Celebes, 3 July, 1916. Copy to Kruyt, same date.
11. Kruyt, "The influence of Western civilization on the inhabitants of Poso (Central Celebes)" in B. Schrieke, Ed., The effect of Western influence on native civilizations in the Malay archipelago, (G. Kolff, Batavia, 1929).

"developing societies", expressed itself in a long-drawn out debate within the Poso Conference. Kruyt's victory in this debate has had an important impact on the development of Central Sulawesi, where until recently, the indigenous church has remained implacably tied to Kruyt's narrow view of the role of the church. As his grand-niece, Dr. Sophia Kruyt has commented:

The church [in Central Sulawesi] has traditionally preached a gospel with a strong emphasis on the 'other world'. It has been present in traditional ceremonies with prayers, sermons and singing. But except in Christian schools, not much educational work has been done so far to improve life in this world. Now [1975] very gradually, the church has begun to open its eyes to the enormous opportunities present for bringing the message of healing and salvation to its people here and now. Gradually, it has begun to understand that its message includes nutrition, sanitation, responsibility for health and better stewardship of the things God has entrusted to us.¹²

Specifically, the debate in the second decade of this century centred on three practical issues: the mission's promotion of more advanced educational facilities, the systemization of medical facilities and the mission's involvement in commercial projects. All three issues derived from Kruyt's pioneering work in the 1890's and erupted at a time when the scale of operations had become such that a resolution of the status of the mission's various activities had become mandatory.

Essentially, a history of mission schools in Central Sulawesi tends to distort the function of the Poso mission as Kruyt perceived it. For him, schools were little more than an aid to the mission's task of bringing Christianity to a traditional society by providing a specific focus for mission activity in a pre-Christian community and a preparation ground for the future Christian adult. As an appendage of evangelical endeavour, the school did not concern Kruyt as provider of intellectual or

12. S. Kruyt, "Tonusu: Community health and development project in Central Sulawesi", in International Review of Missions, April, 1975, p. 196.

marketable skills and was therefore not interested in providing extended educational opportunities. Between January 1913 and April 1935, only 154 pupils were admitted to the Pendolo training school, of which 120 graduated. Of the remaining thirty-four, three were removed for medical reasons and ten were employed as assistants.¹³ Not till 1930 did the Dutch-Native School operate effectively in Poso, and then mainly for non-Pamona pupils, while at the outbreak of World War Two, there were only three vervolg schools providing indigenous children with the equivalent of a complete primary school education. Despite a long and uneven history, the existence of the Dutch-Native superior school administered by the mission was motivated mainly by a desire to maintain an educational monopoly to prevent a competitive school being established by the Muslim or Minahassan community (or by the government on their behalf) and to prevent the possibility of the establishment of a Roman Catholic administered school. Its continued existence also formed part of the Mission Consul's strategy of proving that the mission in general was capable of conducting other types of schools besides the volkschool, a strategy aimed at maintaining the status of Protestant education vis-a-vis government and Roman Catholic initiatives.¹⁴ The establishment of a training school at Pendolo in 1913 specifically represented not an expansion in education but a contribution to the mission's resources for its evangelization task. Similarly, its geographic expansion into south and east Sulawesi was undertaken for reasons of proselytization and as a defence against a doctrinal rival and not in the first place for reasons of expanding the provision of education. It was this failure to give the school primacy which disturbed local administrators and led to accusations of mission self-interest.

Kruyt regarded the provision of medical services in much the same way. He refused in principle to allow an

13. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 216.

14. Archival papers related to the Poso Dutch-Native School.

expansion in what he regarded as an incidental aspect of the mission's work to the extent where it attained an independent existence. Not only did he regard this as a deflection of scarce resources away from the prime objective but also he feared that such a degree of specialization and the resultant division of labour would disrupt the unity of the mission and dissipate the full impact of the mission on the indigenous society. Furthermore, like the provision of advanced education, specialization and sophistication of medical services would inevitably demand changes at a faster rate than that dictated by the natural evolution of society which Kruyt anticipated. Partly for the same reason, he was disinclined to encourage the development of new industries and commercial enterprises involving the indigenous population, believing that the To Pamona were essentially an agricultural people whose future lay in the application of hard work and more sophisticated methods to existing agricultural pre-occupations. Kruyt's views on this issue were distorted by the desperate financial needs of the mission and the interference which this aspect of the mission elicited from government officials.

Of all three issues, the question of mission involvement in commercial enterprises attracted most outside criticism while internally, the issue became obscured by emotionalism and cultural bias against the business of "making money". The major initiative for mission involvement in commercial enterprises came from missionary Schuyt. Pieter Schuyt came to Poso in 1909 as a young man to an established mission field, two years after the major intervention in the region by the colonial government. Schuyt and his colleague, Ten Kate, were selected for the Poso mission in 1906¹⁵. (presumably with the involvement of Kruyt who was in the Netherlands at the time) completing their training in July, 1908.¹⁶ Prior to their arrival, Kruyt and Hofman had determined that Ten Kate should assume responsibility for the mission in Napu-Besoa, a region which had been infrequently visited by the

15. Minutes N.M.S., 4 November, 1909.

16. Minutes N.M.S., 9 April, 1908.

missionaries since 1906,¹⁷ while Schuyt was to take over Kruyt's own district of Kuku so that the latter could open a new mission district in the southern "border" area south of Lake Poso. In offering a well established mission field on the brink of achieving its first converts rather than an opportunity to pioneer a new area, Kruyt may well have been already expressing his reservations regarding Schuyt's suitability. In Kuku, the senior missionaries would be able to supervise him more closely than in the isolated mountain area a week's march from Poso. Kruyt himself seemed always more at ease in pioneering new areas and for that reason his placement of the two new missionaries takes on an added significance. In the event, Ten Kate proved an unsatisfactory choice. Initially the brunt of much official criticism and proving a poor employer, by 1916 he had, in contrast to the rest of the mission, achieved little:

... few are baptised. Here and there stands a school, but without benches. A single guru residence can be found, but for the most part there are only bamboo houses.¹⁸

Part of Ten Kate's difficulty was the fact that the region was too isolated to receive the intense attention from the government experienced elsewhere. The energetic Schuyt who was much admired by Ten Kate who, of all the missionaries, was the only one wholeheartedly to support his projects, would seem to have been a better choice for this semi-independent and largely isolated mission district.

From the beginning, Schuyt's letters reveal him to be a man of energy, vision and commitment. He was deeply conscious of the mission's evangelical task but from the very first expressed an equal concern for the physical welfare of the people. Schuyt's strong personality and independent approach to mission work led him rapidly into conflict with the equally strong-minded Kruyt who was many years his senior. Schuyt was not prepared to be muzzled

17. Minutes N.M.S., 18 June, 1908. Kruyt to N.M.S., 6 April, 1908.

18. Minutes N.M.S., 11 October, 1916. Woensdrecht to N.M.S., 20 August, 1916.

by the strictures of convention and established opinion. He vigorously pursued his point of view by appealing beyond the confines of the Poso Conference to the Missionary Society's executive and where he considered this desirable, communicated directly with all levels of government.

Schuyt's expressed concern for the physical well-being of the population placed him in the modern school of missiology propounded by the executive of the Netherlands Missionary Society.¹⁹ His was an interpretation of the mission's role not shared by Kruyt, one which found consistent support in the Poso Conference only from Ten Kate and, during his brief stay in Central Sulawesi, from the young missionary van Eelen.²⁰

The difference in the philosophy of Kruyt and Schuyt shattered the harmonious relations within the mission at the very time that it was being criticized strongly from without. The dispute severely tested the function of the Conference as the official policy-making body of the Poso mission.²¹ In the course of Kruyt's dispute with his colleague, it was revealed as being little more than a forum for formalizing the views of Albert Kruyt.²² As a

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19. See Circular No. 5, Confidential, June, 1919. Appendix No. 13.
20. Minutes N.M.S., 13 January, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 5 October, 1914. Van Eelen took up his position in Mori in 1914. In the debate regarding Schuyt's proposed hospital, van Eelen and his contemporary Ritsema, (in charge of the Onda'e mission district) felt themselves in no position to offer an opinion having only recently arrived but they did note that "They were impressed by the great deal of sickness from which the population was suffering and as a result of which many children died".
21. Jan Kruyt, op. cit., pp. 125-27. The difficulties experienced with Schuyt led directly to the formulation of a draft conference constitution in 1917 formally approved by the N.M.S. in 1919.
22. ibid, p. 126. The new constitution adopted in 1919 was designed to strengthen the powers of the Chairman and limit the freedom of the individual members. Although Kruyt was re-nominated for the position in 1919, he declined and missionary Ritsema was the first Conference Chairman to operate under the new constitution.

result, Schuyt tended to operate outside the cognizance of the Conference, a practice which further alienated him from the majority of his colleagues. Events also revealed the nature of the relationship between the Netherlands Missionary Society in the Netherlands and its representatives in the field. The Society found itself unable to arbitrate adequately because it wished neither to place itself in a position of overriding the autonomy of the Poso mission Conference, nor to offend a "favoured son" by overtly supporting the policy being pursued by Schuyt.^{23.}

In the pioneering days of the mission, Kruyt had exploited the contacts with the people he had gained by bartering goods and providing simple medical attention in order to announce the basic tenets of Christianity.^{24.} By 1901, he had already formulated his basic position regarding the value of medical care in missionary work.

It is only useful when it is provided by a missionary who knows the people or who comes into contact with the people through providing medical care; ... medical help as such, does not make people into Christians and a hospital is only justified when events demand it As long as possible, medical care must be provided by a missionary himself. I do not see a hospital with a missionary doctor as a means for preaching the gospel unless the doctor is in the first place, a missionary and in the second place, a doctor.^{25.}

This comment applied equally to education. To Kruyt, the value of schools as a means of furthering the mission's objectives, similarly depended upon the correct balance of priorities. Government schools, Kruyt believed, only

23. W.J.L. Dake, Het Medische Werk van de Zending in Nederlands Indie, (The medical work of the mission in the Netherlands Indies), (Kok and Kampen, 1972), vol. 1 Part 3, pp. 139-173. Dake is very critical of the lack of action by the Society in Holland, but the Directors in Rotterdam could have done little else. Each missionary was ultimately answerable to his own conscience and his own perception of his role in spreading Christianity.

24. See Dake, op. cit., pp. 141-143. Jan Kruyt, op. cit., pp. 58-63 and 70-75.

25. Kruyt to his father, 10 March, 1901.

produced facility with a variety of intellectual skills but failed to develop the person.²⁶ In the face of criticism from government representatives, Kruyt maintained the necessity of combining the educational function of the guru with his paramount task of attending to his duties.

While the mission school remained for Kruyt an important, if secondary, concern it had, unlike the hospital, a firm theological basis. The pedagogical work of the mission found its support not only in tradition but in biblical exegesis. The fulfillment of the mission's command to convert the heathen, rested not only in the hands of God; the missionary's task could not simply be evangelical but was, of necessity, also pedagogical, to prepare the mind of the recipient of the Christian message.²⁷ While for Kruyt the school, like the hospital, did not produce Christians, the former was significant as a preparatory institution for catechism classes, baptismal instruction and church attendance as well as more broadly, developing the rational faculties necessary for the acceptance of Protestant Christianity.

In taking this view which Kruyt held consistently while working as a missionary in Poso, he was reacting both to the progressive beliefs of Director Gunning, and also to that of his brothers in Mojowarno. This part of the famous missionary family involved with a people of a different cultural, economic and historical background was, in the educational, economic and medical aspects of its work, far more avant garde than the equally well-known sibling in Central Sulawesi. The ideas of Albert Kruyt bore more affinity to the late nineteenth century school of thought of Gunning's predecessor, Neurdenberg, who in 1893 warned the twenty-three year old Kruyt:

Helping the sick has become an important aid to the mission. In earlier years it was customary for our missionaries to help the sick and wounded but there were few doctors. This aid to mission work has an important drawback.

26. Kruyt to Karthaus, 9 March, 1915.

27. J. Kruyt, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

Your father still uses medicine in the old way; your brother, better prepared than any other, has to resort to the establishment and organization of a hospital because medicine creates an ever greater demand for medical care which leads to significant expenditure ... which also increases as a result of present-day methods of treatment.²⁸.

For Kruyt and Neurdenberg, apart from the specific definition of the mission's role in which evangelization was the sole concern of the missionary and everything else was judged in terms of its ability to contribute to this function, there was the second and very worldly consideration of finances. In Mojowarno this difficulty was largely solved because the Kruyts were able to exploit funds from outside the Society.²⁹ In general, the school, unlike the hospital, was a very important source of income for the church and, unlike commercial enterprises, did not involve the mission in "making money". Indeed, without the establishment of schools, mission endeavour would not have been possible on a wide scale.

While condemning Schuyt's plans for extending the Poso mission's activities, Kruyt could justify the establishment of a training school for teachers and Christian leaders on philosophical and financial grounds even to the extent of proposing the employment of a director for such an institution. He defended the apparent contradiction in his position to Schuyt on the grounds that "A director for the training school is very necessary and therefore he must come but a hospital is, in my opinion, not necessary".³⁰ In the event, a director was not appointed until 1929 because the Society lacked the finances and was unable to gain the services of a suitably qualified person. Probably in order to underscore his argument with Schuyt, Kruyt undertook this task himself and, in so doing, ensured the symbolic unity of the mission.

In the final analysis, as Dake in his commentary on the medical work in Central Sulawesi concludes, Kruyt failed to see the significance of medical and economic aid

28. N.M.S. to Kruyt, 12 December, 1893.

29. loc. cit..

30. Kruyt to Schuyt, 23 August, 1915.

to the indigenous population. Kruyt's conflict with Schuyt was in essence, the same as his dispute with the local government in the matter of ownership of schools and the establishment of community funds. Kruyt believed that the people were not ready to undertake these responsibilities; they had to be protected by the mission and their gradual initiation could only be adequately achieved by the maintenance of the mission's unitary and fatherly guidance. Schuyt and Karthaus, in their different ways, wanted to speed up the process of achieving self-sufficiency in the new circumstances. Both implied that Kruyt's perception of the inadequacies of the To Pamona was a self-fulfilling prophecy. By failing to extend their responsibilities over their own destiny, Kruyt limited the To Pamona's opportunities to develop their capabilities to grapple with their changed environment and to "allow the people to share in the promises of the present and future [Europeanized] civilization".³¹ As Schuyt expressed it in the context of the training of indigenous shopkeepers:

The potential does apparently exist but, just as in any other branch of work, these dependent people need guidance. Just as the Torajan guru fails without guidance, so it is with Torajans who embark on trade. If there is mention of a pedagogical task in regard to gurus, who while working must be supervised, then the same applies to those people who, while trading ... must be trained to become reliable personnel.³²

Kruyt did pay some attention to the development of the agricultural potential of the area but largely as a result of the financial pressures of the expanding mission. Mission initiatives in the promotion of a copra and coffee industry had the limited aim of contributing to the maintenance of mission schools while the compulsory harvest tithe which formed the basis of Christian community funds, remained firmly under the control of the mission. Kruyt justified both developments on the grounds that they would

31. Schuyt quoted in Dake, op. cit., p. 48.

32. Schuyt to N.M.S., 20 March, 1922.

ensure the economic security of the emerging Christian community but, in reality, this simply meant that they provided a fund for the maintenance of the mission and eventually of the indigenous church. Beside the fact that these initiatives had little apparent impact on the economic training of the villagers, neither potential export industry had any widespread applicability and most commercial farming undertaken for the support of mission activities took the form of more sawah. Thus, apart from initially encouraging the use of the techniques of wet-rice cultivation, both in and out of schools, Kruyt had not involved the mission in any major contribution to the welfare and material advancement of the community.³³ By failing to support Schuyt's proposals and by consistently hindering the governments' well-intentioned attempts to involve itself in the reconstruction of village life, Kruyt cut off for another decade, any avenues for the progressive advancement of the Pamona people in the colonial context.³⁴

The opening of the Pendolo training school on January 27, 1913, made little contribution to this advancement. The first fourteen pupils of unspecified ages were all chosen from amongst the household boys (anak piara) of the various missionaries,³⁵ the majority of whom were the sons of village chiefs.³⁶ While no consideration was given to training household girls for the position of guru, a not unrealistic possibility in a matrilineal society in which

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33. Controleur Karthaus wanted to abolish the mission schools' garden plots operated by school children. He was finally prepared to allow them to continue on condition that they were operated along more educational lines and that other crops besides rice were grown and that methods used were clearly described. (Minutes N.M.S., 10 May, 1916, Woensdrecht to N.M.S., 19 December, 1915).
34. Kruyt also refused to allow the appointment of indigenous assistants and missionaries as suggested by Schuyt, a proposal which may have gone some way in preparing indigenous church leaders.
35. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 214. Anak piara, the term used by Jan Kruyt means literally, "foster children".
36. P. Schuyt, Memorandum to the Poso Conference, nd. (1918).

the traditional religious leaders were female, the future gurus were encouraged to marry those girls who had been trained in domestic routines by the missionaries' wives.³⁷

The policy was advantageous to the mission since in this way it could ensure that its indigenous gurus were of high social standing in the community and were well socialized into the European domestic life-style, while increasing the likelihood of village chiefs becoming leaders of the Christian communities, thus blurring the division between their functions and between the civic and Christian community. The pupils of the training schools had all been closely scrutinized and selected for personal qualities, not for their academic ability. Not all had completed their four year elementary course but most had received some training while living with the missionary in their capacity as house help.³⁸ Intellectually, "there is no-one who stands out", Kruyt wrote in his first report but the first fourteen students were selected to represent all major tribal groups.³⁹ Only one of the first group of students was from the slave class, a classification abolished by the government but still recognized by the people. When his appointment to a school was rejected by the village on the completion of his course on the grounds that he was of slave origin, a decision was taken to prohibit former slaves from the training school, a regulation which was only removed in 1937.⁴⁰

37. J. Kruyt, loc. cit..

38. Kruyt, "Report on the first examination", 30 June to 3 July, 1913. "Some had only attended the ordinary school for one or two years, others for several years".

39. Kruyt, "Report on the first six months (January to July, 1913) of the training school in Pendolo". Students consisted of one To Pebato, one To Napu, two To Bancea, six To Wingke mPoso, four To Lage. A further Pebato youth joined the course on his return to Poso with the Adriani family whom he had accompanied to Java.

40. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 216. Even then it was considered politic not to announce this decision publicly: "through personal discussions, we will be able to spread the news where we regard this as useful and necessary". Referring elsewhere to this case, J. Kruyt reveals that the grandmother of this guru was a slave and while the youth was accepted by his tribe as a full member, his past was objected to when he "got into difficulties with the district chief", (p.297). He was in fact transferred to another area.

The Pendolo school did not represent an extension of opportunities for the Pamona people, not only because admission was restricted to the sons of chiefs (the one recorded exception probably being an experiment) but also because the limited number of pupils accepted was selected from those youths who had, as it were, been removed from Pamona society.⁴¹ Kruyt would not allow any but those who were prepared to become gurus to undergo instruction at Pendolo.⁴² He also discarded an earlier-held idea that each missionary establish higher grades in the village school where he lived from which to select potential gurus,⁴³ a plan which could have contributed to the extension of education in favour of the private tuition of selected children in the home of missionaries.

The education provided at the school was extensive and rigorous. Much of the first years of the course was taken up by the revision and extension of the village school curriculum, while apart from the actual teacher training, Kruyt also envisaged the school as providing an opportunity for the all-round practical, moral intellectual and religious preparation of the future leaders of Pamona society. The Pendolo school was in effect a formalized and enlarged version of the training and moulding given by each of the missionaries to his adopted family of Pamona youths and young women.

The Pendolo students lived under a strict regime commencing each day with prayers and ending with hymn singing at half past eight each night. Formal instruction took place between seven and ten in the morning, during

41. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 216.

42. Kruyt, Memorandum to the Poso Conference, nd. (1918), in response to Schuyt's request for broadening the aim of the Pendolo school.

43. Minutes N.M.S., 25 March, 1914. Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Poso Conference, 2 December, 1913. This idea, first mooted in the annual meeting in January, 1913 as a result of Schuyt's suggestion of appointing assistant gurus, was postponed at the annual meeting of 1914 specifically due to the lack of finance. In 1915, Kruyt had expressed his approval of "higher grade schools to provide further education" but this issue was never pursued.

two hours in the afternoon and a further hour after dinner. The remainder of the day was fully occupied with practical activities. The students were housed in two dormitories, a necessity which resulted from their widely dispersed origins and from Kruyt's desire to maintain a close control over their moral development. Sexual promiscuity was Kruyt's main concern and he noted in his first report:

I made no rules or prohibitions. Only, in respect of the circumstances of Poso, I had to give serious warning that if I ever found anyone not in his bed during my unannounced inspection, I would have to dismiss him instantly.⁴⁴

However, only two instances of dismissal on this ground were reported. Ironically, one concerned the behaviour of the school's first Minahassan teacher guru Possumah, who had "relations" with a Pamona girl employed by Mrs. Kruyt.⁴⁵

A. Possumah was one of the most experienced of the Minahassan teachers, initially employed in 1906. He was, like most of the imported staff, lacking in formal qualifications. He failed the qualifying exam for government teachers when he was given the opportunity to sit for it in 1916.⁴⁶ He completed a Malay language translation of Kruyt's geography text book which the latter then requested the government to print and for which a government gratuity was requested.⁴⁷ The unqualified Possumah had been consciously selected over guru Paluau,⁴⁸ a graduate of the Kuranga training school because, in Kruyt's opinion, such graduates:

usually cannot teach in any other way than in accordance with the method they had been taught; they are not capable of freeing themselves from the course of study they themselves have

44. Kruyt, "First half year report, January to July, 1913", (M.S.).

45. Kruyt, "Report on academic year, 1917-18, Pendolo training school" nd..

46. Kruyt to Inspector de Nes, 21 August, 1917.

47. Kruyt to Inspector de Nes, 8 June, 1917.

48. Kruyt, "Report on academic year, 1917-18".

experienced. And here in Poso, we must for the time being, take a different path than that followed in both the training schools mentioned [Kuranga and Depok].⁴⁹

In rejecting the established mission training schools, Kruyt had in mind the methodology advocated by J. Kats. Kruyt was acquainted with his pedagogy at first hand from observing Kats' work in Mojowarno and with the similar work of missionary Rooker in the Minahassa, who was developing the ideas of Graafland.⁵⁰ What had impressed Kruyt was the practical emphasis of their methodology and the stress on the integration of learning experiences. Kruyt declared that the major purpose of the education provided in his training school was:

to get the students to reflect upon phenomenon and circumstances surrounding them ... upon their own lives. We therefore want to develop them in the true sense of the word. I believe that the objectives of the new direction in education in Holland aim at nothing else.⁵¹

The value of Kats was that, unlike the educational progressives of the homeland, such as Ligthart, he was prepared to modify the doctrinaire application of the new methods in accordance with the capabilities of "natives who are only beginning to learn to reflect."⁵²

Kruyt's own first report consequently stressed the practical training received by the students as part of their daily routine. The students were entirely responsible for their own domestic existence and when not attending lessons were rostered to prepare meals, to maintain their quarters and the school grounds, to construct outhouses and furniture as well as to sew clothes and to produce items of everyday use such as baskets and mats. Like the village school pupils, time was set aside "on two or three entire mornings in the week" for the trainees to cultivate crops during the rice growing season. Kruyt hoped that in time

49. Kruyt, "First half year report".

50. loc. cit...

51. loc. cit...

52. Minutes N.M.S., Kruyt to N.M.S., 10 June, 1913.

he would:

obtain a team of oxen to teach the students to plough, so that these prospective teachers may later promote this little known and unpopular means of cultivation amongst the population.⁵³.

The practical activities undertaken by the students had obvious financial benefits in curtailing the costs of the school which received no government aid till 1919. Kruyt's justification for the time thus spent was that the Pamona teachers would thereby maintain and improve their traditional agricultural and craft skills and "sharpen their practical insight". It would help deter them from scorning the occupations of their fellow villagers. Morally, the full day's program left little scope for "idle hands and idle minds".

The teaching of the school was divided between Kruyt and his Minahassan assistant; Kruyt teaching in the afternoon and evenings. The subjects taught in the first half year of the course were essentially the same as those of the fourth year of the village school and much of the lesson time was given over to the revision of that curriculum. This was made mandatory since Kruyt had expressly avoided an entrance examination and the students entering the Pendolo school had differing educational backgrounds.⁵⁴. The curriculum consisted of arithmetic, (practical and theoretical), geometry, object lessons, reading, composition, grammar, parsing, Malay language, geography, nature study, drawing, biblical history and singing.

In the teaching of all subjects, a heavy emphasis was placed on oral discussion and reference to the Pamona life-style. Material presented by the teacher had to be re-presented by each of the students to their peers, thus promoting the active participation of students while simultaneously providing them with training in oral presentation and public speaking. Topics taught were later

53. Kruyt, "First half year report". There is no indication that this ever occurred.

54. Kruyt believed "Examinations furthermore provide a very limited basis for judgement, which also appears to be correct for Torajans". loc. cit..

consolidated by application work and essay writing where appropriate. In this way, Kruyt incorporated the main features of the new education which Kats had advocated for indigenous schools.

All teaching was conducted in Bare'e and most of the text books used had been written by Dr. and Mrs. Adriani or Kruyt. Other texts were translations of government prescribed books. Much attention was given to Bare'e grammar and parsing of Bare'e sentences, as well as to style exercises, since Kruyt sought to improve his students' formal grasp of the language which Adriani and he had been the first to transfer to the written page. As in the village schools, Adriani's collection of oral literature formed the basis of reading and language studies although the nature of the language presented Kruyt with some difficulties when he came to apply the niceties of formal European grammar.

Most of the first students also had a basic knowledge of Malay which Kruyt had apparently introduced at the insistence of Inspector Boes in 1908 but had discarded again after Kielstra complained of the unnecessary sophistication of the curriculum in 1911. A functional knowledge of the lingua franca of the colonial administration Kruyt considered essential for the indigenous teachers to enable them to use government text books and also, more generally, to enable them to represent their community at an official level after replacing their Malay-speaking Minahassan colleagues.⁵⁵

Elementary geometry provided the prospective community leaders with skills to design sawah fields which, unlike traditional ladang, gave ample opportunity for the application of skills in constructing parallelograms, triangles and polygons. Geography gave the parochial tribesman an insight into the topography of the rest of

55. It was usual for Minahassan gurus to act as scribe for the village chief. Controleur Karthaus had attempted to abolish this practice to enable young school graduates to undertake such tasks. This proved unsuccessful and eventually chiefs reverted to employing the local teacher again. (Kruyt, Memorandum on the Poso mission nd. 1916).

Central Sulawesi and surrounding states together with "a short history of the area". After the second year course, students came to learn about the entire island of Sulawesi and, in particular, about the colonial administrative structure, the chief colonial administrative centres, the colonial hierarchy and the shipping routes of the K.P.M. as well as major rivers, mountains and lakes.

While Kruyt had little to teach his students in the identification of plants, an area in which they were able to participate authoritatively, Kruyt felt that the educative value of nature study lay in the opportunity it provided to teach students to generalize.

Of this they have not the least understanding It can only act developmentally if the Torajans gain a greater insight into a plant type when up to now they have only been able to recognize ... an individual plant.⁵⁶

Another serious omission which Kruyt sought to rectify through his course was the students' lack of a critical faculty. This disadvantage

while much praised by the admirers of the primitive man of nature ... is a great hindrance in the moral development of the Torajans, since it prevents him from distinguishing between good and evil.

In accordance with Hebartian theory, Kruyt regarded history as the teacher of morality but the To Pamona "did not have a history of their own", at least, for Kruyt, not a morally instructive history. Thus, biblical history gained an added significance:

The history of the Old Testament is of great value at the initial stage of the development in which they find themselves; it is the history of their forefathers in which they can learn about the administration of God in order to come to recognize it also in their own lives.⁵⁷

The three hours devoted to this subject concentrated on the character of Old Testament personalities and "the moral and religious motives of their actions". More formal doctrinal training of these prospective leaders of the indigenous Christian communities was encompassed in compulsory Saturday

56. Kruyt, "First half year report".

57. Kruyt, "Report for the academic year, 1914-15".

evening catechism classes and in the preparation of essays on the topic dealt with during the previous Sunday's sermon.

It was not until the completion of the first examination in July, 1913 that Kruyt firmly decided on the further development of the training course. The Pendolo school was to follow the traditional four year mission teacher-training school model. The second year, he decided, would be largely an extension of the elementary school curriculum while teaching practice would not begin until the third year, at which time a normal school would be established nearby. Concurrently with teaching practice, greater emphasis would be placed in the third year on pedagogy and teaching method together with human physiology. Training for their role as ministers would occur simultaneously during the third and fourth years.

As a result of the first examination, two students who proved incapable of applying themselves, were removed from the course. The thirteen remaining students proceeded to what was in effect the first year of their training, while a new intake of fourteen students was enrolled at the beginning of 1914. As with the initial intake, no entrance examination was imposed and the students, representing all tribal groups, were again selected from amongst the household boys of the various missionaries.⁵⁸ One member of the new intake had to be dismissed early in his career after being discovered at night in the home of his fiance'. He was subsequently appointed as assistant guru, a position he was no less qualified for than his Minahassan counterparts.

The existence of a second class created even greater burdens for the already overworked Kruyt who was consequently obliged to appoint the Pendolo village school teacher to the staff of the training school. The village school was prematurely translated into a normal school at

58. The 1914 intake consisted of three To Napu-Besoa, three To Pebato, three To Lage, three To Wingke mPoso, one To Pu'umbato and one To Onda'e.

which both Kruyt's Minahassan assistants taught. The instruction of the new group was undertaken by the latter guided by the teaching notes Kruyt had developed during 1913, while Kruyt concentrated on the higher class. Their second year proceeded in much the same way as the first with the exception of biblical history, which was increased to six hours per week. This subject had become a general course in moral and intellectual development in which many aspects of Pamona life were discussed and measured against Christian beliefs.⁵⁹

In 1915, the initial group of students commenced practical teaching experience in the normal school.⁶⁰ This consisted of two parts since Kruyt had halved the village school and transferred half the pupils to a building in the training school grounds. Daily, two students taught at each of these schools for the three hours in the morning, one month at a time, three times per year.⁶¹ In the course of two years, the twelve students thus received an intensive practical training.

In their absence, between seven and ten o'clock, their colleagues were involved in practising skills such as wood carving, book binding and preparation of teaching aids. Academically, Kruyt introduced the students during afternoon lessons to natural history, elementary cosmology and climatology, world geography, advanced drawing and the interpretation of the Gospels. Instruction in arithmetic, Malay, Bare'e language and object drawing was also continued and taught by the Minahassan assistants.

The advanced subjects taken by Kruyt were all designed to expand the student's consciousness and to break down the religio-cultural pre-conceptions he had retained. In this, Kruyt was concerned to prepare his students, not just as village school teachers and church ministers, but to enable them to be in all senses, leaders of the communities to which they were to be posted. Natural history, dealing

59. Kruyt, "Report for the academic year, 1914-15".

60. loc. cit..

61. Kruyt, "De Kweekschool at Pendolo, (1914-15)" in Mededelingen, 1910, p. 168.

largely with human physiology, was designed to instruct the students in the parts of the human body and their functions. In the course of such lessons, "all sorts of incorrect Pamona perceptions are discussed and many hints on hygiene are given". In geography, the students who had previously dealt with the Poso region, the island of Sulawesi and the rest of the Netherlands East Indies, now ventured into the wider world. As a basis for this course, Kruyt treated the countries of "those people whom the students may have, or were likely to, come into contact with such as China, Japan, India and Arabia [sic] ". In the fourth year, Europe was dealt with, with the emphasis naturally on the Netherlands. In teaching this geography course, Kruyt touched on the culture, history and religion of the countries selected, in as far as he suspected that such information would be of use and interest to them.^{62.}

As his first group of students entered their fourth and final year, Kruyt expressed his concern as to whether this vanguard of Pamona teachers would be officially credited with a recognized diploma. As an unsubsidized training school, it lacked any official recognition and, for this reason, Kruyt wrote to the Inspector of Native Education in Menado requesting him to supervise their final examination in 1916 and to award them government diplomas.^{63.} The students themselves were "too timid and unworldly" to travel to Menado to undergo such an examination, he informed the official. Kruyt expressed the hope that he would simultaneously be able to examine and award certificates to those of his Minahassan teachers who had not previously been awarded pupil-teacher and assistant-teacher certificates. Kruyt saw in the certification of his practising and newly trained teachers, a powerful weapon in his defence of mission schools against the implicit attack on their worth by Controleur Karthaus.^{64.} The

62. ibid, pp. 166-172.

63. Kruyt to Assistant Inspector of Menado, 10 September, 1915. Minutes N.M.S., 8 March, 1916. Minutes of the Poso Conference, 16 November, 1915.

64. Controleur Karthaus approved and supported this tactic, undoubtedly as a means to upgrade the schools in his administrative area.

official recognition of their ability as teachers, awarded by an Inspector of Native Education would forcefully demonstrate to the critics of the mission schools that these institutions were not amateurish by-products of Christian evangelization but were substantial institutions contributing to the development of the region. This, as Kruyt had argued in a letter to Karthaus in 1915, was his justification for requesting financial assistance from the government.⁶⁵ At the same time, a visit from the government Inspector would form the basis for official recognition and hence, the granting of a government subsidy for the training school, without which, as the Mission Consul informed the Poso Conference, the qualifications of its teachers could, in the event of central government funding, not be officially recognized.⁶⁶ As a superior educational institution, the training school had to fulfill certain government requirements including that its Director was to be adequately qualified.

Unfortunately, the sympathetic Inspector de Nes was unable to oblige Kruyt. He claimed overwork as the reason for his inability to come but possibly, he felt reluctant to lend his official presence to the final examinations of an unrecognized institution. His report, when he was able to come to Pendolo in 1917, was more descriptive than inspectorial and he concluded his report somewhat lamely:

On the basis of what I had the opportunity to see and on the way changes have been made in a short period of time, I predict a good future for this institution. Already it is providing a useful service for this developing region.⁶⁷

In the Inspector's absence, Controleur Karthaus supervised the final examination and officially recognized the qualifications of the twelve graduates.⁶⁸

65. Kruyt to Karthaus, 9 March, 1915.

66. Minutes of the Poso Conference annual meeting, 16 November, 1915.

67. "Report of a visit to the private training school for teachers and Christian leaders in Pendolo", Acting Inspector of Native Education, Ninth Region (Menado), de Nes, May, 1917.

68. Minutes N.M.S., 11 October, 1916. Minutes of the Poso Conference annual meeting, 19 July, 1916. The examinations were completed the day after the meeting in the presence of the Controleur who awarded the graduates certificates, thereby making them eligible for central government subsidies.

In the final months of the fourth year of the course, Kruyt recommended to the surprise of the Poso Conference that no new students would be enrolled after 1916.⁶⁹ This recommendation for the temporary closure of the apparently successful training school was based on the assumption that the indigenous teachers produced would be employed as assistants and only by way of exception would be replacing Minahassan teachers.⁷⁰ Thus, Kruyt estimated that only fifty To Pamona graduates could be employed, a maximum which would be reached after the intake of another twenty-seven students in 1916.

In a published account of the training school's development in 1921, Kruyt declared that the closure of the school was due to the fact that he proposed to take his furlough in 1920 and that "the number of workers in the mission was too small to spare one for running the school in my absence"⁷¹. But privately to his colleagues, he argued that the closure was necessitated to avoid a surplus of educated Pamona without positions.⁷² Kruyt was therefore concerned to limit the supply of trainees to the number of anticipated positions to avoid producing a number of unemployed or 'unsuitably' employed Pamona men which would place them outside the sphere of mission influence. The existence of such a group would presumably have had the result of awakening the wrong kind of expectations in on-coming students while simultaneously creating a group of articulate and disaffected leaders of the people.

69. Kruyt, Memorandum to the Poso Conference, April, 1916.

70. Kruyt, "Draft regulation for Torajan gurus" nd. (late 1915 or early 1916, ie. prior to final examinations). The preamble stated,

"Should a young man successfully complete the final examination of the training school, then there is still the problem that he is not sufficiently prepared as head of the school for his role as spiritual leader of the community".

71. Kruyt, "The history of the training school in Poso", Mededelingen, 1921, p. 253.

72. Kruyt, Memorandum to the Poso Conference, April, 1916.

Moreover, by limiting their function to assistant teachers; Kruyt in effect, further depressed the aspirations of the Pendolo students and clearly signalled to them the mission's greater faith in the personal presence and worldly knowledge of its Minahassan staff in exercising authority over Pamona villagers.⁷³

Both justifications are consistent with Kruyt's declared views and his decision to close the training school is entirely comprehensible in that context. Nevertheless, other more immediate considerations were also involved. At the time of his announcement, the mission school system was facing a sustained attack from the local government representative while internally, Kruyt's policies were simultaneously being disputed. By limiting the number of Pamona teachers to that which could be absorbed as assistants, Kruyt was ensuring that no change would be made in the basis for the financial arrangements with the school communities. Kruyt had admitted to Kielstra that indigenous teachers could make do with less income than their Minahassan counterparts and a mass employment of To Pamona head teachers would automatically lead to pressure to modify financial arrangements which were already under threat by Karthaus.⁷⁴ If Kruyt had envisaged such a possibility, he was proved correct in the following year when the Controleur used the argument of the employment in Tentena and Buyu mPondoli of indigenous teachers as head teachers to propose the replacement of

73. loc. cit..

74. Article Two of the Draft guru regulation specified that To Pamona teacher/ministers would receive f.7.50 per month, of which an unmarried teacher would provide the Minahassan guru with half in exchange for full board. A married indigenous guru would receive a separate allowance of f.2.50 for food. Pamona gurus were eligible for a f.3.50 per month increase after two years. The unmarried Pamona teacher would live in with the Minahassan while the married teacher would inhabit the outhouse (usually a separate building was constructed as a kitchen) on the Minahassan teacher's property. Furthermore, Kruyt believed "It is also not necessary for the population to establish a sawah [for the Pamona assistant] since he will have sufficient time after school hours".

traditional contributions by a reduced annual monetary levy.⁷⁵

If Kruyt had doubted the ability of his first group of local teachers to take on the responsibility as community leaders and sought to extend their apprenticeship under the more experienced Minahassans, such doubts would have had added substance in the tense situation then prevailing when the population was openly expressing its fear, antagonism and confusion in the face of Karthaus's attack on the mission. Furthermore, it would not have been possible for Kruyt to dismiss his Minahassan teachers and since, at this time, the future for the expansion of the mission school looked bleak, Kruyt may not have thought it advisable to prepare more teachers than he could expect to place.

Being simultaneously embroiled in a dispute with Schuyt regarding the appointment of a medical specialist, Kruyt's decision to close the training school in his absence rather than recommend the appointment of a qualified European or directing a colleague to concentrate exclusively on this task enabled the senior missionary to maintain a consistent position.⁷⁶ He had already contributed to the general criticism directed at Schuyt for the latter's heavy involvement in his shops at the expense of his pastoral duties. Moreover, Kruyt was undoubtedly correct when he held that there was a more immediate practical need for the appointment of new missionaries to supervise the mission's existing operations more closely to avoid giving the Controleur cause for criticism.

75. Karthaus to Kruyt, 7 December, 1916. Kruyt to Karthaus, 14 December, 1916. In this exchange, Kruyt argued that a reduction in the communities' contributions would be a backward step and would offend the basic government principle of self-support.

76. Kruyt's difficulty was that in order for the mission to benefit from the proposed new central government subsidy, his teachers had to be in receipt of a government recognized certificate. It is in this context that Kruyt's comment, "A director for the training school is very necessary ... but a hospital is, in my opinion, not necessary", probably needs to be interpreted. (Minutes N.M.S., 11 October, 1916. Kruyt to N.M.S., 17 July, 1916. Kruyt to Schuyt, 23 August, 1915.

Since the third intake of students in 1916 was to be the last for some time, Kruyt decided that this time he would institute an entrance examination. Experience had shown that personal characteristics did not necessarily represent the most adequate criterion for the selection of a guru.

In the assessment of character, we are often wrong. Often one hears: "He is such a good boy, he is clearly suitable to work for his people". In this 'goodness', suitability to become a good Christian is being remarked upon. But what is forgotten is that this 'goodness', perhaps more accurately 'good-heartedness', is not a virtue but a consequence of having insufficient self-confidence, a sort of unconsciousness of self. Usually, there is little of value in such boys They don't know how to make their presence felt; they let things slide and haven't the least influence over people. Therefore, we have to demand that these boys have some intellectual abilities.⁷⁷

In consequence of the entrance examination, twenty-five youths were selected from forty-five candidates. This number represented the combined intakes which would have been enrolled if the previous method of biennial intakes had taken place in 1917 and 1919 with the same number of students as had been accepted previously since, by 1917, Kruyt was emphasizing the necessity of an enlarged enrolment. With the likelihood of gaining central government funding in the near future, with the rapid expansion in the south-east to which Minahassan gurus could be transferred, Kruyt now saw the need to prepare as many indigenous teachers as he could prior to his departure.⁷⁸ However, by this time, Kruyt's argument that there were insufficient missionaries available for one to take over during his absence became the operative premise against a decision to accept more students.

The altered circumstances after 1916 which led Kruyt to modify his earlier pessimistic predictions were largely as a result of the visit to Pendolo by Inspector de Nes in

77. Kruyt, "Report of the private training school at Pendolo for the academic year, 1916-17".

78. loc. cit..

1917. In the first place, the Inspector supported an official recognition of Kruyt's qualification as Director of the training school.⁷⁹ While Kruyt had no professional educational qualifications, he did possess an honorary doctorate granted by Utrecht University in 1913 and since 1897 had been official correspondent of the Royal Academy of Science in Amsterdam.

As a result of being recognized as "suitable to provide instruction" in a training school, and on the basis of modifications made to the curriculum in line with de Nes' requirements, Kruyt could confidently apply for a government subsidy towards the end of 1917.⁸⁰ This application was not approved till 1919 (although then backdated to 1917) by which time the government had changed its policy regarding subsidies for private teacher-training institutions.⁸¹ This policy-change was related to the transfer of all educational administration to the Department of Education and Religion and its policy to translate second-class schools into vervolg schools.⁸² As the Pendolo school was, as regards its first two years, equivalent to the latter type of school, the new subsidy only applied to the last years of the course which was officially designated a normal school training course.

79. Inspector de Nes to Kruyt, 11 July, 1917.

80. Kruyt first requested a subsidy in a letter to de Nes on 8 June, 1917. He was advised in a letter from the Inspector of 11 July, 1917 that such a request had to be formally made through the Resident of Menado. The latter invited Kruyt to provide him with an application which would be considered on the basis of Government Gazette, 1906, No. 242. (Resident of Menado to Kruyt, 10 September, 1917). An application was officially made on 30 October, 1917.

81. Resident of Menado to Kruyt, 10 January, 1920, No. 3 and extract, Decision of the Governor-General nd..

82. Kruyt to Inspector de Nes, 3 January, 1919. Kruyt was informed of this by the Mission Consul who also intimated that the subsidy for the normal school would be postponed till the introduction of the special subsidy regulation. The subsidy which was approved one week later was, like the other subsidy the mission in Poso received for its schools, an extra-ordinary ad hoc measure.

The subsidy received for the years 1917 to 1920 which included f.1,800 per year for Kruyt, nevertheless substantially covered the costs of the school since its inception, if Kruyt's salary as a missionary is excluded.

In 1921, Kruyt handed the directorship of the school over to his son Jan, after which he embarked on his postponed furlough and study tour. Despite the apparent success of the training school, its contribution to the educational facilities of the Pamona youth was limited. Between 1913 and 1920, a total of forty-eight carefully chosen young men had, through it, gained an extended elementary education together with specific training for their roles as teachers and ministers. For Kruyt indeed, the training school was designed to contribute to the expansion of the mission's resources and not directly to the extension of educational facilities for the mass of the Pamona people.

In the absence of such facilities, missionary Schuyt, a member of the training school committee, suggested to the Conference that the objectives of the school be extended. In line with his belief that the mission should be seen to be contributing more directly and effectively to the material development of the indigenous population, Schuyt proposed that pupils be admitted for further education leading to positions as government clerks and store managers.⁸³ Requests on this basis had already been received and Schuyt argued that if the school were only open for those prepared to become teachers, this would encourage deceit amongst those desirous of further education but not interested in the position of guru. On these grounds, Schuyt suggested that private students be admitted into the first two years of the course on payment of a fee of f.750. He considered that this change of policy would have the added benefit of undermining the argument for the

83. Schuyt, Memorandum to the Conference nd. (1918)? If this memorandum was written in 1918, Schuyt would have already left or would have been about to leave for Yogyakarta. The Minutes for the annual meeting of the Conference in July, 1916 make mention of a similar discussion which may suggest that the date pencilled on the memorandum is incorrect.

establishment of government standard schools and would allow more students to be admitted who were not sons of chiefs, specifically slaves (presumably wealthy ones). The latter "could be helped to advance which would tend to diminish more quickly the gap between slaves and chiefs".

Kruyt rejected this suggestion and advanced the argument that mission education was not intended to prepare people for jobs but to educate "in the true sense of the word". The recently imposed entrance examination, which appeared to have motivated Schuyt's suggestion was not, Kruyt noted, an attempt to select students on the basis of results but on innate ability.⁸⁴

Kruyt's implicit definition of education as initiation into Euro-Christian culture did find expression at the practical level up to a point as the training school program indicates. In the village school also, cultivation of school sawah took up a considerable proportion of the week's morning classes during the planting and harvest periods.⁸⁵ Beyond the school, Kruyt had been personally involved in village relocation, sawah cultivation and the establishment of village plantations but these initiatives were in the first place, directed towards establishing a

84. In August, 1917, Kruyt informed the Inspector in Menado in the context of his subsidy request that two students were specifically enrolled for only two years in preparation for their employment in the mission stores. It is not clear whether this was in response to the Schuyt proposal (see Note 79) which appears to have been written later (in which case, Kruyt's reaction is rather curious), or in response to a suggestion by Wesseldijk quoted in J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 211, that children of Minahassan teachers be admitted to the Pendolo school. There appears to be no other reference to these two students leaving three possible conclusions: 1. that these two were Minahassan youths, 2. that they were two of the three oldest pupils who the 1917-18 report stated were making no progress and who Kruyt thought could be given a position in a toko. (The 1917-18 report, written ten months later noted that these pupils were however, posted as assistant gurus); or 3. that despite Kruyt's antipathy, two students were included in the 1916 intake by way of exception or experiment on the direction of the Conference in July, 1916.

85. See Note 33.

more regular and disciplined way of life as a pre-requisite for the acceptance of a more acceptable moral code.^{86.}

The inclusion of practical activities in both village and training schools were specifically designed to counteract any tendency towards what Kruyt referred to derogatively as the situation in the Minahassa - the tendency of its school graduates to disdain physical labour. Kruyt's enthusiasm for practical activities in the school timetable thus highlights the motives for the conservatives' support of the progressive school movement.

It was not until after his return from a Menado internment camp at the conclusion of the second World War that the Poso mission headed by Jan Kruyt was prepared to re-define the role of the mission as laid down by Albert Kruyt, as one which was directed to the "whole person" and as such, to include a concern for socio-economic aspects of life as well as the spiritual and intellectual existence.^{87.} In 1901, when Albert Kruyt first considered the mission's role in the economic development of the Pamona people, his reaction to the suggestions of the new Missionary Society Director was cautious in the extreme.^{88.} Director Gunning in his discussion with Kruyt in February of that year, had mooted the possibility of the mission contributing to raising the standards of the village blacksmith, a traditional craftsman in To Pamona society. Earlier, the commercial production of bark cloth had also been suggested as a traditional craft which could be fostered to provide villagers with an opening to world trade. When Kruyt had complained in the early 1890's that no European food was available, it had further been proposed that he might introduce the cultivation of European vegetables.^{89.} None

86. In a letter of July, 1914 to the Society, Kruyt notes that for the first time, he was able to make use of a Pamona carpenter. Significantly however, this person was a former member of Adriani's household and had gained his training in Mojowarno where Adriani had taken him while on the most recent of his extended absences from Poso.

87. Dake, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

88. Kruyt to his father, 10 March, 1901.

89. N.M.S. to Kruyt, 19 July, 1894.

of these suggestions attracted Kruyt's support. However, one proposal discussed by Gunning did gain his cautious approval. Gunning had described the plans of the Utrecht Missionary Association in New Guinea to establish mission stores in inland areas and Kruyt believed that on a temporary and limited scale, these could be fruitfully adopted in Poso to enable the villager in the inland to buy essential items such as salt, without having to travel to, and come into contact with, unscrupulous Muslim traders on the coast.⁹⁰

Kruyt's response did not adequately meet the objectives Gunning had had in mind. Gunning's proposal was influenced by the ambitious designs of the new Controleur, Engelenberg, who hoped to develop an indigenous economy based on the export of copra and forest products. This trade would be entirely in the hands of educated Pamona traders and local Muslims, circumventing foreign entrepreneurs and would be linked directly with world markets via Makassar or directly by exporting to Singapore.⁹¹

Kruyt would not have countenanced the involvement of the mission under his control in such plans and the only value he saw in Gunning's more modest suggestion (which may have been only the tip of a large commercial iceberg revealed by Gunning in his discussions) was its value as a means of bringing the mission into contact with the people and of curtailing the influence of coastal Muslims on the inland population. Even under those circumstances, Kruyt had stressed that such a commercial enterprise would be of a temporary nature until communications improved and, apart from the initial wholesale purchases, would not directly involve missionaries. When in 1919, Director Gunning again attempted to encourage the formation of indigenous industries Kruyt joined the Mission Consul in obstructing the plans of the "businessmen of the finance committee in Rotterdam". The Consul, Crommelin, defined all such proposals for an

90. Kruyt to his father, 10 March, 1901.

91. The plans are referred to in J. Kruyt, op. cit., pp. 247-248.

"economic mission" as:

earning money for the mission ... which does not correspond to the economic improvement of the population, which in fact should be the goal of this economic mission. Either one or the other, although I admit that eventually, when the economic development of the population really succeeds, advantages will flow to the mission treasury via the greater capacity of the population to become more self-supporting.⁹².

But this either/or proposition meant in effect, a denial of any opportunities to prepare for eventual autonomy, a prospect which Crommelin was prepared to admit as a future possibility. In the long-running school plantations dispute, Kruyt could as readily be bracketed with the "businessmen of the financial committee" for his apparent concern with the finances of the local mission organization to the detriment of "the economic improvement of the people" as his government adversaries were not slow in pointing out. The plans of Gunning and the practice of Kruyt in this regard differed only in their degree of commercialization, not in their essential principles.⁹³.

Kruyt consistently claimed that the act of making contributions towards the maintenance of the schools was pedagogical by which he meant that it helped them to come to appreciate the value of the school. In 1912, he was still able to defend the small toko established by Schuyt and a similar one established by Ten Kate in Napu as a method of developing the economy of the villages in which they were located and as a means of providing the Pamona

92. Mission Consul to Kruyt (confidential), No. 937, 3 August, 1921. The letter (presumably confidential because it contained such criticism of the Society) referred to a Society plan for the promotion of commercial projects announced in a circular to all N.M.S. missionaries in July 1919, (see Appendix No. 13). Specifically in 1921, the Society had sent out an agricultural expert, Meyhofer and his "refined farmer's daughter" wife to initiate animal husbandry and other agricultural projects in Sumba after which similar projects were to be considered for Central Sulawesi.

93. This Kruyt seems to have been prepared to admit (see Appendix No. 14). There is no indication, however, that he had given any thought to contributing directly to the people's economic development. He considered the people not yet ready to accept any significant changes in their life-style.

people with a new livelihood.⁹⁴ This favourable appraisal changed when Schuyt confronted the 1914 Annual Conference with a fait accompli in the establishment of a second toko in Tentena in the southern extremity of his mission district.⁹⁵ Co-incidently, but undoubtedly influencing the reaction of the Kruyt-dominated Conference, Controleur Karthaus had commenced pursuing his policy of suppressing the mission's long established practice of employing unpaid labour. This practice was exacerbated by the necessity for obtaining cheap transport of goods to Schuyt's shops. Furthermore, the Controleur had indicated that he was not in favour of the mission extending its influence over the population's economic activities. To counter the mission's control over commercial agriculture, Karthaus had attempted to introduce village communal plantations and in a direct attempt to block its expansion into retailing, he had given permission for the establishment of a private store in Tentena to be administered by a Dutch ex-army sergeant who would simultaneously supervise a government warehouse which had been established there by Maze.⁹⁶

How far Kruyt's philosophical opposition to Schuyt's commercial project was influenced by his recognition of the political inappropriateness of the mission to become involved at this time in areas not directly related to mission work is not recorded. Given his political acumen, it is likely to have been a contributing factor. The trenchant and personal criticism of missionary Wesseldijk who had himself experimented with a toko in 1913, also contained, unconsciously perhaps, a valid argument against

94. Kruyt felt obliged to write a letter in the Minahassan periodical Tjehaja Siang, justifying Schuyt's toko in Kuku, (Dake, op. cit., p. 150). It may not be correct to infer from this that Kruyt was in favour of the project.

95. Minutes N.M.S., 13 January, 1915. Kruyt to N.M.S., 10 October, 1914.

96. Minutes N.M.S., 10 March, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 23 December, 1914. This letter was written in his defence in reply to the criticism voiced by Wesseldijk and Kruyt.

increasing the range of the mission's activities in the face of the Controleur's attempt to limit the existing parameters of mission work. Wesseldijk pointed out the serious impact supervision of a network of shops would have on the missionaries' time qua missionaries.⁹⁷ With Karthaus openly searching out any unacceptable conduct on the part of guru and missionary, and with the need for increased personal supervision by the missionaries, necessitated by the greater reluctance of the population to co-operate as a result of Karthaus's anti-mission attitude, the missionaries' time was now fully occupied. The planned expansion of missionary activity into Mori and Malili was to place further demands on the mission. Besides, the likelihood of the mission stores being profitable while continuing to maintain parity with an increasing number of Chinese shops, permitted in inland regions after Mazee's departure, was questionable, especially where the mission was now obliged to pay for the transport of its wares.

Unlike the commercial activities of Wesseldijk who, despite his earlier criticism, administered Schuyt's shops and developed a significant inland trade between 1918 and 1920, Schuyt was not concerned with making commercial profits.⁹⁸

Where Wesseldijk, and later Kruyt, were prepared to admit the significance of commercial projects as a means of making money which could be used to support mission work, they were not prepared to allow, nor could they visualize, commercial enterprises forming part of the mission to the

97. loc. cit..

98. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 253. J. Kruyt says of Wesseldijk's administration: "Turnover was good because Wesseldijk understood that commerce was not philanthropy, but that it could only exist according to its own rules and in its own interest. Prices of goods in the mission shops were no lower than in those of the Chinese, sometimes higher prices were given to the people than paid by other traders because transport to Poso took a lot of time and in the meantime, the price on the world market could have dropped".

people.⁹⁹ Schuyt's view differed precisely because he wanted to integrate commercial activities into the missionary's evangelical task. By denying Pamona involvement in commercial activities initiated by the mission, as the Netherlands Missionary Society had suggested in response to criticisms by Wesseldijk of Schuyt's scheme, Schuyt believed:

one of the threads will be cut off along which a beneficial effect can be had on the population, if we prohibit them to have anything more to do with the affairs of the toko.¹⁰⁰

Wesseldijk's commercial success after he took over control of the shops was achieved only at the expense of the experience the indigenous population may have had.

That he spent three years administering these commercial activities after severely criticizing Schuyt for spending so much time on this activity, was only logically plausible when it is understood that Wesseldijk's concern related to Schuyt's attempt to involve Pamona people in the enterprise; when in fact, Wesseldijk's criticism is seen as a rejection of Schuyt's interpretation of his task as missionary. Underlying Wesseldijk's attitude and that of Kruyt expressed in 1921, was also an unseemly reverence for money which on no account was to be "wasted" in providing the indigenous population with an opportunity to learn how to handle it. Kruyt stressed for the same reason, the necessity for commercial activities to be administered by missionaries until the indigenous community proved itself capable of administering its own affairs.¹⁰¹ Schuyt, in the dispute about his Tentena store,

99. Kruyt, Memorandum on the financial independence of the (Christian) community, (see Appendix No. 14).

100. Minutes N.M.S., 13 January, 1915, quoted by Kruyt in his letter of 10 October, 1914 which was a response to that of the Missionary Society of December, 1913 in which it had attempted to provide a solution to the conflict surrounding Schuyt's toko plans.

101. In Kruyt's opinion, the mission had to maintain control so that the toko "would not become a danger to the mission". loc. cit..

on the other hand, declared that "it was no longer a possession of the mission as such, but a community enterprise". In the same way, he organized his medical project and he perceived the schools similarly as belonging to the community and was thus more prepared than his colleagues to support the subsidy proposal announced during the administration of Gerth van Wijk.¹⁰²

For Schuyt, "preaching the Gospel was also his first priority. ... But hereby, he did not mean that he did not regard preaching as the only means of spreading the Gospel. In a developing society, God indicated that the task lies in various directions".¹⁰³ In contrast to most of his colleagues, the Society, of which the missionaries were increasingly critical, shared his belief:

Preaching the Gospel on its own will not reveal sufficiently that Christians also have a vocation to fulfill in the society at large.¹⁰⁴

Schuyt saw his shops as a means of providing the people with another avenue for coming to terms with their new socio-economic and cultural environment. He saw in 1914, what Jan Kruyt only came to realize after Merdeka, that the mission's task was to educate the "total person". On the other hand, Kruyt senior had consistently argued, when faced with government proposals for change, that the people were not yet ready. While Schuyt was prepared to accept in part Kruyt's argument that the people lacked the innate talent for commercial enterprise at this stage of their cultural evolution, he believed justifiably, that Kruyt's interpretation of Pamona capabilities was self-fulfilling.¹⁰⁵

Schuyt's projects were defeated, not by the lack of

102. Minutes N.M.S., 9 September, 1914. Schuyt to N.M.S., 9 May, 1914 and 19 May, 1914. At this time, discussion centred around the level of subsidy which would be provided with the implementation of a modified Sumba Regulation.

103. Minutes N.M.S., 10 March, 1916. Schuyt to N.M.S., 23 December, 1915.

104. Quoted in Dake, op. cit., p. 150 (according to Dake, this statement was undated).

105. See Note 32.

innate ability of the To Pamona but by the lack of European missionaries, the failure to provide opportunities for appropriate training and the distaste of most of Kruyt's colleagues for being seen to be associated with such worldly activities.¹⁰⁶ Underscoring this distaste was a theological rationalization of the task of a missionary.

According to Mrs. Adriani in a private letter of 1922 to her cousin, Director Gunning, during the life of the Society sponsored commercial company "Nihil" (into which Schuyt's 'disreputable' stores had blossomed under their administration by Wesseldijk), all but one of the untrained Pamona store-keepers had to be dismissed due to incompetence.¹⁰⁷ A European, Mr. Vasseur, sent out from Rotterdam specifically to take charge of the stores, failed to improve matters and departed after only a few months. Vasseur distinguished himself from the Pamona store-keepers, only by the fact that he resigned and was not dismissed. Mrs. Adriani agreed with Kruyt's assessment of the Pamona character:

the untidiness, laxity, lack of commercial enterprise and insight ... the inbred habit of incurring debts, and selling on credit, make the Torajans poor traders.¹⁰⁸

But far more influential on her assessment of the mission

106. Schuyt to N.M.S., 20 March, 1922. Schuyt quotes Kruyt as saying "it argues in favour of a Christian when he is unable to be a merchant". Kruyt, in a footnote to the letter of which he had made a typed copy, states that he had said "It argues in favour of a missionary if he is unable to be a merchant". Schuyt concludes: "Stable administration has not been possible and knowledgable administration [of shops] has never existed. ... If everyone had done his part, then the result could have been much different."

107. Mrs. Adriani to Dr. J.W. (Willem) Gunning, 12 April, 1922. Apologizing for involving herself "as a missionary's wife", she wished to comment nevertheless, as one who had been involved in running the shops and to remove the impression that only Kruyt was against the project. All the Brothers (except Schuyt) were against "Nihil", she assured her cousin.

108. loc. cit.

stores was the disgust expressed by the wife of a government doctor, "the daughter of an Amsterdam minister", at seeing Chinese and Arab traders constantly entering Wesseldijk's residence in Poso to conduct commercial deals.^{109.}

In 1922, after Vasseur's failure and when, after five years of supporting the project against the will of the Poso Conference, the Missionary Society finally allowed the mission's commercial venture to be wound up, it was apparent that under the circumstances, the project had failed. The store-keepers of "Nihil", Mrs. Adriani wrote, were "actually managers for Rassan, the Arab trader of Poso from whom almost everything was obtained".^{110.} The indigenous population had gained little and in terms of the politics within mission circles at the time, Kruyt's conservative views had been "proven" more sound than the socio-economic orientations of the progressives in the Missionary Society's administration. The personality of Schuyt and the violent antipathy his projects attracted from most of his colleagues contributed to that failure as did the cultural prejudices of those missionaries who abhorred "the world of hard business".^{111.} Not least in contributing to its failure was the continued friction between the mission and the local government which made any co-operation towards the economic advance of the indigenous population impossible.

109. loc. cit..

110. Mrs. Adriani to Kruyt, 18 April, 1922. Kruyt had apparently asked her whether he could use her letter of the 12th to send to other members of the N.M.S. administration and whether she could provide him with other facts. Kruyt was in Holland at this time.

111. It also appears that Schuyt fell victim to the long-running dispute on principles between Gunning, who continually provided Schuyt's argument with a measure of official support, and Kruyt. Jan Kruyt comments that "the mission administration did not see, nor ever recognized our real objection against the new direction, or at least, never expressed it". (J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 250).

The development of Schuyt's other and conceivably less controversial project fared little better. Schuyt, from his first year as a missionary in 1909, expressed great concern for the physical health of the Pamona people. Epidemics of smallpox, cholera and a severe form of influenza and related respiratory diseases had ravaged the region throughout the European recorded history of the area. The most serious was the smallpox epidemic in 1884 which decimated the northern tribes.¹¹² An equally serious epidemic broke out in 1918 which resulted in a death rate of about nine percent of the population and in some villages, was as high as twenty percent.¹¹³ In total, two thousand people died during the course of this epidemic and amongst its victims was missionary Ten Kate.¹¹⁴ Smaller outbreaks occurred regularly but were particularly serious in 1897¹¹⁵ and 1909 (smallpox).¹¹⁶ 1910 (cholera and an unidentified chest disease),¹¹⁷ 1911 ("fever" causing the deaths of fifty-three people in a total population of five thousand in the Kuku District over two months and halving the population of the village of Taripa)¹¹⁸ and 1912 (probably influenza).¹¹⁹

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112. Kruyt, "Gegevens voor het bevolkingzbraagstuk van een gedeelte van Midden Celebes", Tijdschrift van het Ned. Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, 1903, p. 204.
113. Kruyt to Karthaus, 6 March, 1919. (Karthaus was at this time Controleur in South Nias).
114. Dake, op. cit., p. 155.
115. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 237. In that year a government "vaccinator" was appointed to Poso. In order that Kruyt could facilitate control of the epidemic in 1897, the Resident of Menado reversed an earlier decision limiting the amount of free medicine made available by the government. (Minutes N.M.S., 28 June, 1897. Kruyt to N.M.S., 7 April, 1897).
116. Mazee to Kruyt, 26 February, 1909, 19 March, 1909 and 22 March, 1909.
117. Minutes N.M.S., 21 December, 1910. Schuyt to N.M.S., 16 October, 1910.
118. Minutes N.M.S., 20 September, 1911. Schuyt to N.M.S., 16 July, 1911. Mazee to Kruyt, 26 July, 1911.
119. Mazee to Kruyt, 29 September, 1912.

TABLE 5

BIRTHS AND DEATHS IN THE KUKU MISSION DISTRICT
1913-1925

Village	Pop. at 1 Jan. 1914	DEATHS		BIRTHS	
		1 Apr. to 31 Dec. 1913	January to June, 1914	1 Apr. to 31 Dec. 1913	January to June, 1914
* Kuku	345	12	8	3	6
Jo'Emboyo	339	9	10	1	3
* Panjoka	380	17	9	5	6
Wo'omPada	373	10	6	3	7
* Sincimaya	304	16	-	2	-
Pabaje	460	19	-	7	-
* Imboe	674	41	8	15	4
Sangira	350	8	6	1	3
* Batunoncu	731	43	30	-	9
Saojo	370	6	9	-	1
Rato Dena	442	17	36	8	2
Kele'e	700	-	9	-	3
* Tentena	995	34	24	9	12
* Buyu mPondoli	382	2	6	10	7
* Peura	349	12	2	5	2
Tala	237	2	1	3	3
* Pandiri	411	22+	10	9+	2
* Watuawu	620	17+	16	9+	5
	8462	287	190	91	75

Villages	Pop. at Dec. 1915	January to June, 1915	June to Dec. 1915	January to June, 1915	June to Dec. 1915
18 Villages	8433	195	137	71	116

Village	Pop. at Dec. 1925	at December, 1925	
* Kuku	209	?	?
* Sangira	101	?	?
* Saojo	170	18	17
* Rato Dena	205	21	22
* Kele'e	273	12	31
* Tentena	603	13	30
* Buyu mPondoli	163	6	15
* Peura	212	3	16
* Pandiri	235	?	?
* Watuawu	112	?	?

* Villages with schools
+ for the last quarter of 1913 only

From: W.J.L. Dake, Het Medische Werk van de Zending in Nederlands-Indie, Vol. 1, p. 146.

Mission Statistics, 1915 and 1925.

The occurrence of a large number of deaths added to the difficulties of the cultural transformation required of the To Pamona who, during such periods, returned to their trust in traditional priestesses. Internal disease was regarded as the withdrawal of tanoa or life-giving substance and was traditionally seen as a sign of having transgressed the laws of the ancestors.¹²⁰ On the other hand, it was after the 1909 smallpox outbreak, the effects of which were softened by the wholesale vaccination ordered by Mazee, and after the second sawah harvest in the history of the region, that the first group of To Pamona were baptized. What stimulus the success of the vaccination campaign and the harvest had in proving the strength of European methods cannot be determined. The mission did report that the first group of converts specifically awaited the results of Papa i Wunte's 1909 harvest before deciding to accept baptism.¹²¹ Some no doubt interpreted both phenomena as physical manifestations of the power of the new God. Others like Ta Rame, consistently resisted, where possible, the new ways, including vaccination and suffered no apparent ill effects and were therefore, confirmed in their opposition to the mission.¹²² Even in years such as 1913/14, when harvests were abnormally abundant, the death rate surpassed the birth rate by a ratio of three to one;¹²³ only slightly better than Kruyt's estimate of ten years earlier of five to one. A significant number of deaths occurred during child birth.¹²⁴

Since the appointment to Poso of a government vaccinator in 1897, Kruyt had used his limited medical training to assist the government in this area, but the

120. Kruyt and Adriani, De Bare'e Sprekende Toradja's van Midden Celebes, 1912, vol. 1, Chapter 13.

121. Minutes N.M.S., 26 October, 1910. Schuyt to N.M.S., 30 May, 1910.

122. Mazee to Kruyt, 22 March, 1909. Hofman, "De dorp Banano", (The village Banano), in Mededelingen, vol. 52, 1908, pp. 57-66.

123. See Table Five.

124. Dake, op. cit., p. 160, J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 242.

treatment of illness was never conceived by Kruyt as more than an incidental aspect of his work. The provision of basic medical assistance brought him initially into contact with the population but he lacked both training and inclination to attempt more serious cases.¹²⁵ A more concentrated effort in the field of medicine moreover, as the Missionary Society warned, would have placed a heavier demand on the time, energy and financial resources of the Poso missionaries.

On his arrival at Poso, Schuyt immediately set out to develop medical treatment in his district more systematically. He sought and gained approval to transform an unused mission building into a poli-clinic and began to instruct his murid in the principles of medical care. At the end of his first year, the Missionary Society had received a request from Schuyt to approve the training of two students in the Minahassa.¹²⁶ Of all the missionaries, he rivalled Kruyt in his involvement in policy decisions and like Kruyt, possessed a strong personality. His views, perhaps untempered by the deeper intellect of Kruyt, did not allow him to accept uncritically the beliefs of the older pioneer of Poso as others did and this inevitably contributed to a collision with Kruyt. Only Ten Kate, his training school contemporary, consistently supported Schuyt against Kruyt.¹²⁷

Schuyt's principle point of departure was his broader social perspective of the work of the mission and

125. All missionaries had received basic medical training as part of their preparation. Kruyt had gained added experience while in training at Rotterdam, in a nearby hospital.

126. Minutes N.M.S., 17 November, 1909. Schuyt to N.M.S., 23 August, 1909. In this letter he requested permission to send two of his murid (presumably Minahassan) to Kuranga and Kokos (Minahassa) for medical training.

127. This similarity of views by the two class-mates of the Rotterdam training school was apparent in every major issue, including, apart from the shops and medical care, re-establishing the mission in Tojo and expanding the mission in 1915 when Kruyt had advised a temporary pause.

his view of the missionary as helper rather than guardian. He could not accept the continuation of the primitive treatment of framboesia when he knew that modern medicine could provide a cure.¹²⁸ But modern medicine demanded specialization and the centralization of services, a development which Kruyt had wanted to avoid because, in his opinion, it would have a disruptive impact on traditional life. This argument cannot but be specious, coming from a man who supported the whole scale dislocation of traditional village life. What centralization of medical care would cause was the removal of the patient from immediate contact with a missionary and, Kruyt feared, in the neutral atmosphere of a hospital ward, a cure would be effected without the patient being aware that he had the mission to thank for it.

Schuyt persisted in his view and in 1912, had persuaded the villagers of Kuku to erect a twenty-bed "hospital" which, in 1913, was treating twenty to twenty-five patients per month.¹²⁹ The apparent success of his Kuku venture encouraged him to open another centre in Tentena in the charge of one or two Minahassans he had sent to the Talaud Islands for training by missionary Stokling.¹³⁰ Both hospitals incurred no significant extra expense for the Missionary Society, primarily because they lacked specialized personnel and equipment to undertake more serious cases. At the basic level they were able to be maintained by a patient fee of ten cents per week, and the sale of rattan products produced by those being treated. Food was provided by the

128. Framboesia (ichthyosis) was a skin disease initially thought to be a form of leprosy and also often considered a tertiary stage of syphilis. Traditionally, this skin disease was treated by the application and imbibing of extracts from the root of an unidentified plant referred to throughout the Poso region as 'kasina', a contraction of "kayu cina" in deference to its origin. The treatment which included the isolation of sufferers, was sufficiently simple to be self-administered and after 1903, Kruyt charged his guru with the task of supervising such patients. (Dake, op. cit., p. 144. J. Kruyt, op. cit., p.241).

129. Minutes N.M.S., 17 September, 1913. Schuyt to N.M.S., 23 June, 1913.

130. Minutes N.M.S., 24 June, 1914. Schuyt to N.M.S., 3 April, 1914.

families of the sick.^{131.}

While the two modest hospitals were designed mainly for the centralized treatment of framboesia sufferers, they steadily attracted patients suffering from a range of illnesses, including stomach and liver complaints, syphillitis, malaria, bronchitis, pneumonia and tuberculosis. Towards the end of 1914, sixty to seventy patients were received per week, placing a great strain on the limited project.^{132.}

Schuyt proposed to the Conference that a European deacon with medical training be appointed to allow the gradual expansion in both the size and proficiency of the hospital in proportion to the increase in the degree of trust and confidence expressed by the To Pamona in European medicine.^{133.} To underscore the importance of his cause, Schuyt produced figures to prove the continuing decline in population but his colleagues failed to accept that isolated hospitals would stem this trend.^{134.} Schuyt therefore, had to cope using existing facilities and personnel. In Tentena, his staff consisted of one nurse and one cook. Little wonder that Wesseldijk could sneer at Schuyt's "private interests" when referring to the hospital which was interfering with his work as missionary.

Circumstances changed in 1917 when, as a result of a suggestion by Director Gunning, Schuyt was given the opportunity to undertake specialized medical training at the Petronella mission hospital at Yogyakarta. Kruyt felt unable to oppose this solution to the long-standing dispute between Schuyt and himself by the Missionary Society's Director. He had himself envisaged such a development two years earlier when he admitted in a private letter to

131. Minutes N.M.S., 13 January, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 5 October, 1914. By 1914, a subsidy of f.30 per month was being received which left the Society with only the initial cost of the building and part of the salary.

132. loc. cit.

133. loc. cit.

134. Minutes N.M.S., 10 February, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 14 November, 1914.

Schuyt,

if someone is to become specifically involved in medical care, then you should accept that task because we can expect that you will undertake it in a missionary way, that you will not disturb the general way of things.¹³⁵

Nevertheless, Kruyt made it clear that he was still against the notion of a hospital and a doctor. Other motivations influenced the decisions arrived at during this 1917 meeting. Kruyt insisted that the mission stores, supported in principle by Gunning, would have to be substantially re-organized if they were to be retained after Schuyt's departure and this was agreed to. Indeed, in the light of later events, it appears that Kruyt was willing to support Schuyt's medical training because he felt that Schuyt was no longer suited to work as a missionary and because he wanted to use Gunning's presence to depersonalize what would otherwise have been an extremely painful decision. Only with Schuyt's departure was it possible for Kruyt to interfere with the mission

135. Dake, op. cit., p. 149. Kruyt to Schuyt, 23 August, 1915. Kruyt however, began his letter by stressing that such an appointment would only be considered "when the [Society's] administration believed the time had come for a division in the mission's activities". Gunning's 1917 visit to Poso and the other mission centres in the Indies was aimed at convincing the missionaries in the field of the necessity for introducing administrative and financial innovations. The circular of June, 1919, (see Appendix No. 13). was the result of these discussions.

store administration.^{136.}

Schuyt left prematurely for Java, leaving his colleagues aggrieved and emotional.^{137.} A year before his return in 1920, his colleagues voted to remove him from actual mission work in order that he could concentrate on the work in the proposed expanded hospital.^{138.} This decision, in the context of Kruyt's hierarchy of the functions of a missionary, represented Schuyt's dismissal as a missionary and it was interpreted as such by Schuyt himself. To the Annual Conference in 1920, he suggested a compromise whereby he would maintain his pastoral duties but discard his supervision of schools. This was rejected. By way of consolation, his colleagues permitted him to embark on the construction of a new hospital for which he was negotiating with the Society and the government while in Yogyakarta, before a guarantee of a government subsidy had been received.

136. Kruyt in other words, "did a deal" with Gunning. His conditions for accepting the continuation of the toko were: 1. no mission interests were to be sacrificed as a result of the commercial concern; 2. no capital could be invested in the toko other than the profits made; 3. within a reasonable period, profits should provide the salary of a missionary administrator; 4. profits should also enable the establishment of an export trade; 5. the Society should establish a trading society to take over the control of the enterprise; 6. that portion of the profits over and above that required for re-investment should be given over to the Christian community in Central Sulawesi, (J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 253). Under Schuyt and Ten Kate, capital to run the shops consisted of community funds (harvest and regular Sunday collections, money collected from wedding and baptism certificates) and guru money (f.5 per month, paid by guru into a fund which provided them with a pension on retirement). In 1915, Schuyt had recorded a profit of f.1,099.85 (over and above a payout of five percent interest) since their establishment which had been mostly re-invested in buildings. (Minutes N.M.S., 15 September, 1915. Schuyt to N.M.S., 8 June, 1915).
137. Schuyt had to leave Central Celebes prematurely because of his wife's health. On the brief return to Poso he was accused of leaving without notifying the Conference, even though several of his colleagues had helped arrange his initial trip to Java. (Dake, op. cit., p. 154).
138. ibid, p. 156. Significantly, this sensitive period, 1917 to 1923, is glossed over by J. Kruyt. Compare J. Kruyt, op. cit., p. 243 and Dake, op. cit., pp. 155-161.

The first patient was admitted to the partially completed complex in October, 1922 without any ceremonial speeches or official blessings. Indeed, the entire plan was little more than tolerated by the Conference, despite the fact that since Schuyt's return to Tentena, the number of patients he had treated had more than trebled. In the last six months of 1920 alone, the old hospital had averaged 29.5 patients per day while the poli-clinic had treated 905 new patients. The new buildings were referred to by some members of the Conference as a "luxury" and there was little support for the request promoted by the Society that each mission district contribute f.50 per annum to its costs.^{139.}

In 1923, the Conference rejected an offer by the Officer-in-charge of the Community Medical Service of Makassar to make available a nursing sister with mid-wifery and pediatric qualifications on the grounds that Pamona mothers were not yet ready to accept outside help in the care of their infants. As Dake comments in his book, Het Medische Zending in Nederlands Indie, this rejection indicated once again the mission's failure to comprehend "the necessity of concentrated and organized work" in the area of medical care. In the same year, the Conference, led by its Chairman, Jan Kruyt, rejected the offer from the Resident of Menado to make available a suitable dokter Jawa during Schuyt's proposed furlough.^{140.} Jan Kruyt, writing to Schuyt on this suggestion, employed the same arguments his father had used twenty years earlier:

The Conference is of the opinion that the time has not yet come for the appointment of a medical man to Tentena Given that an Indies doctor took over the running of the medical centre, the Conference could only give this person a free hand in purely medical matters but the spiritual leadership and the general supervision on behalf of the Conference would stay with the missionary

139. ibid, pp. 155-157.

140. A Dokter Jawa school for the training of indigenous vaccinators was established in 1851 and re-organized in 1900-02 as S.T.O.V.I.A. - school for training native doctors.

in whose district the centre was located. That missionary would have the responsibility to see that the hospital answered to its purpose, that is, as an aid to, and part of, missionary work.¹⁴¹.

Events came to a head in October, 1923 when Jan Kruyt decided to organize an extra-ordinary meeting of the Conference, which Schuyt refused to attend, to make a decision of principle between the "Kruyt direction and the Schuyt direction".

The Conference decided in favour of the Kruyts (father and son) and declared itself unable to continue working with Schuyt. In the Netherlands meanwhile, Kruyt senior, who had withdrawn from the personal confrontation, convinced the Society to withdraw Schuyt. To soften the impact of being recalled, the Society offered Schuyt a two year furlough to enable him to complete his medical studies but refused to re-employ him as a missionary doctor after he had completed his studies.¹⁴².

Immediately after his departure from Poso, the medical work in Tentena was scaled down dramatically on the basis of the Kruyt-view. As a result, the qualified staff resigned. Embarrassed by the expensive, under-utilized buildings, consideration was given to handing the complex over to the government which, however, refused because it was unable to find a willing applicant to take charge of it.¹⁴³.

Only at the end of the decade, when the memory of the sordid affair had somewhat dissipated, emotions had cooled and Schuyt had withdrawn to private practice in Holland, was the medical centre re-activated. Four qualified personnel were employed and patients patronized both hospital and clinic again in growing numbers. By 1930, the number of persons treated reached 453 bed patients and 2,410 clinic patients, compared to the

141. ibid, p. 162. J. Kruyt believed that Schuyt "took little or no account of the nature of our missionary work, and for you, the medical-technical side of the hospital's work is given prominence."

142. ibid, p. 163.

143. ibid, pp. 166-169.

respective figures in 1924 of 125 and 1,341.¹⁴⁴

An assessment of the appropriateness of the diverging views regarding the nature of developmental aid represented by the two main protagonists can only be tentative in the absence of adequate documentation of the attitudes of the Pamona people at this time. Undoubtedly, the position taken by the Kruyts was a conservative and narrow one and the implicit and explicit criticism expressed by Schuyt and the local government officials between 1914 and 1921 was sparked by an impatience with the rate of development acceptable to Kruyt.¹⁴⁵ After World War Two, which had brought with it the imprisonment of the Europeans and had unexpectedly transferred responsibility to indigenous Christian leaders, the Synod of the independent Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah, representing 80,000 people, persuaded the returning missionaries, led by Jan Kruyt, to embark on a far-reaching rural development plan which included central emphasis on community health and medical care. For a few brief years, till the traditional relationship between the former missionaries and the now independent church could no longer be sustained, a belated revision of five decades of missionary policy was undertaken; five decades which had left Sulawesi Tengah at the time of Independence.

In general, in comparison with other areas of Indonesia, far behind, at least in the field of medicine.¹⁴⁶

144. ibid, pp. 169-170.

145. In 1929, Kruyt noted enthusiastically that "by encouraging the planting of coconut and coffee trees, numerous small plantations of coconut trees have been made on the seashore, while in the hill districts, every village has its coffee gardens. Due to this prosperity, the everyday needs have also increased. At night, the houses are illuminated by oil lamps; sewing machines are used in many houses and this prosperity is shown in better clothing." (Kruyt, "The influence of western civilization on the inhabitants of Poso", in Schrieke, op. cit., p. 7.

146. Dr. van Doorn. From a report on plans for a rural reconstruction plan in Central Sulawesi, 1952. Quoted in Dake, op. cit., p. 182.

Today the region has changed little from what it must have been like in the 1920's. The Pamona people are still the good-natured, forthright men and women of half a century earlier, but, apart from recent changes resulting from the government's five year development plan and specifically from the INPRES program, and the recent inclusion of the town of Poso in the country's air transport and television networks, the Poso region continues to confront one with an aura of decent poverty. Roads unsealed in 1925¹⁴⁷ are still (or again) unsealed. The retail and wholesale trade remains in the hands of non-To Pamona. Schools where conscientious teaching takes place still suffer from lack of finance under circumstances similar to those existing in colonial times. The church administration continues to be burdened with its historical educational function inherited from the Poso mission. Thus, when a community development program was instituted in the Poso region in a small village in 1973, it was as if, despite the existence of church and school, everything had yet to begin.¹⁴⁸ In this village typical of many, whose population was poor, children undernourished, its lands under-utilized, education inadequate and medical provision "useless", a beginning was made with an integrated health and rural development scheme conducted by the villagers themselves with the aid of a few Javanese farmers under the guidance of the Tentena doctor. This voluntary self-help scheme operating with the encouragement of but not initiated by, the Synod of the Gereja Kristen Sulawesi Tengah, and whose goals were formulated within the context of the community's own resources, is in recent years, spreading to neighbouring communities.

Change is both an inevitably slow process and an inevitable process. The issue is not that change occurred in Central Sulawesi, but the way in which it was brought about. In the words of Sophia Kruyt, "people develop,

147. Holtus, op. cit., pp. 158-159.

148. S. Kruyt, "Tonusu," in op. cit., pp. 195-197.

they are not 'developed' from outside".¹⁴⁹. Despite Kruyt's protestations to the contrary, both he and his government counterpart in Poso were colonialists and thus for both, the goal of their labours was to subserve the interests of the foreign institution each represented.

149. ibid, p. 197.

CHAPTER TEN

THE VOLKSSCHOOL IN THE CARE OF THE MISSION

When Controleur Karthaus left Poso in the latter part of 1918 and took up his new position in the island of Nias, he found himself embroiled in the aftermath of a similar conflict between government and mission representatives regarding the administration of mission schools. Indeed the temporary truce signed in Poso in April, 1917 had been succeeded seven months later by a similar agreement in Tapanuli between the government and members of the Rheinisch Missionary Society.¹

The situation in the Batak lands and Nias had more important political ramifications than that in Poso. The more out-going Bataks had voiced their dissatisfaction with the disturbing rate of change and the consequent burdens on their financial and physical resources demanded by the energetic administration. Resident Vorstman, an admirer of the Colijn/Lulofs policy of rapid government-initiated progress, had instituted a heavy program of road building, re-organization of administration and a policy of self finance which had outstripped the capacity of the indigenous population to absorb such change. The people's protest had led to an investigation by a member of the Council of the Indies, J.H. Liefrink, which had resulted in the resignation of Lulofs, the architect of this style of enforced modernization.²

If there was substance to the Batak protest, there was also evidence of the effects of the German mission's reluctance to accept change. Holding a monopoly over education, the mission had failed to provide the educational wherewithall for the indigenous population to adapt to the new situation. While they accused the government of proceeding too quickly, they were at the same time, criticized by "many Bataks for obstructing their development".³ As in Poso, the German mission in Tapanuli had acted as

1. M.C. Jongeling, Het Zendings consulaat in Nederlands-Indie, 1906-1942, (Van Loghums Slaterus, Arnhem, 1966), pp. 100-103.

2. ibid, p. 100.

3. ibid, p. 101.

unchallenged rulers in the region until the middle of the second decade. As in Central Sulawesi, they had done much in preparing the region for regular colonial administration and were now reluctant to hand over their de facto powers to the local administration. The mission feared that its policy of nurturing gradual change would be overwhelmed by the vigorous policies of the new style of administration.⁴

Central to the dispute between mission and government was the mission's fear, created by Lulofs, that its control over schools would be diminished by the introduction of a contract limiting government aid to a ten year period after which the schools would revert to the community. This was the same principle that Lulofs had attempted to re-vitalize in Poso in April, 1917. In the resulting state of confusion, government officials asserted their right to dictate school policy, placed unacceptable interpretations on subsidy regulations and interfered with traditional agreements between the mission and the population. This had in turn soured the mission's relations with the indigenous population. After the departure of Gunning for Poso, it was the Mission Consul who personally mediated between the Resident and the mission. The result was an agreement drawn up by Resident Vorstman modelled on Governor Frijling's circular of 1916 in which the latter had clearly stated the central government's appreciation of the mission's political significance.⁵ After this settlement was achieved, there was a temporary lull in the dispute as missionaries and local government officials awaited the effects of the transfer of the administration of village schools from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Education and Religion. The Mission Consul at least, left the area optimistic that the new Director of Education, K.F. Creutzberg, would revert to a sympathetic interpretation of the Sumba-Flores style of contract to finance the thousands of mission schools in the Outer Islands.⁶

4. ibid, p. 102.

5. ibid, p. 103. cf. Chapter 9, Note 10.

6. ibid, p. 102.

It was during this lull that Karthaus arrived in South Nias fully briefed on the type of task which was to face him. He was replaced as Controleur of Poso by P.J. van der Meulen, who took up his new position in October, 1919. Van der Meulen's previous posting is obscure but circumstantial evidence suggests that he had worked in Sumatra. Whether or not this is the case, he had taken a strong interest in the situation in Tapanuli and revealed himself in 1923 to be thoroughly acquainted with the events which had occurred there.^{7.}

Kruyt characterized him as an "overly energetic man", "one who goes his own way and takes notice of no-one else".^{8.} In his new position, he actively pursued a policy of road construction and according to Kruyt, results were achieved at the expense of greatly increasing the number of compulsory unpaid labour days. Simultaneously, every effort was made to promote agriculture. Under his administration, Kruyt was forced to admit, "although it was perhaps promoted too energetically ... the first years of abundance [were experienced]". The cost of achieving this surplus was high. Large numbers of chiefs were sacked "only because of the fact that there was something wrong with the sawah ... the people had to work like slaves in their sawah". In connection with the success of farming, strict regulations were imposed on the husbanding of buffalo herds. Kilometers of fencing had to be constructed to enclose them but, according to the mission, the villagers

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7. It has proved impossible to trace van der Meulen's career. His article on mission control of volkscholen published in the Koloniaal Tijdschrift of 1923, indicates an intimate knowledge of Tapanuli. There are also various references to personalities and events in this area in his correspondence with Kruyt, although this may indicate an interest only. P.J. van der Meulen should not however, be confused with his name-sake, D. van der Meulen, stationed in that area between 1915 and 1920. See also infra, Note 70.
8. Kruyt, Memorandum on the administration of Controleurs Karthaus, van der Meulen and Neibour, 1921.

were kept too busy to be able to maintain these fences adequately.⁹ The energy and vision of van der Meulen in promoting the economic advancement of the region did, in the event, enable the administration and indirectly, the Pamona people, to profit from the dramatic increase in prices in the years directly following the war.

The reaction of population and mission to these policies was reminiscent of that which had led to the intervention of Liefvink in Tapanuli in 1917. The prestige of the government, already shattered according to Kruyt, by the actions of Karthaus, dropped to an even lower level in the estimation of the indigenous population. The people had become bitter and "had the nature of the Torajans been different, they would have expressed their bitterness in other ways".¹⁰ This implicit threat in Kruyt's complaint to the Resident regarding the administration of van der Meulen, was a sufficiently clear reference to the Batak experience to suggest that Kruyt was exploiting his knowledge of the events there to politicize a purely missionary quarrel which lay at the heart of the Poso mission's dissatisfaction with the Controleur. The declared motive for the mission's protest against van der Meulen was identical to that voiced by the Rheinisch Mission. The official was moving too rapidly in producing the desired changes in Pamona society. Van der Meulen, Kruyt declared, "was not the man for Poso ... he takes no account of the people and their life-style", he had no knowledge of the conditions and the society of this people. He was moving too fast. At the same time, Kruyt complained that the Controleur did not give recognition to the abilities of the people in those situations where he had taken away rights previously enjoyed. Van der Meulen was a man who only wanted to do things his way.¹¹

Kruyt's real complaint and the reason why a special meeting was arranged on the government steamer in the Poso

9. loc. cit...

10. loc. cit...

11. Report on the meeting with the Resident of Menado, 16 June, 1920.

Bay on 16 June, 1920 was that "the Controleur wants sole authority over the schools and this we dispute".¹². At stake for the mission was not simply the loss of control over the financial resources of the school, as Controleur Karthaus had attempted but a complete denial of educational autonomy in what van der Meulen described with emphasis as "the volksschool in the care of the mission". It is quite apparent that van der Meulen more consistantly and more objectively than the Roman Catholic Karthaus, saw his involvement in education as part of an integrated policy for the promotion of the material well-being of the indigenous population. For him, the time and energy expended by the population in the maintenance of school and guru was an obstacle in the economic advancement of the region. The various arrangements entered into by the mission with the villagers for the upkeep of the schools were administratively cumbersome and legally ineffective. From his stand-point, he was forced to conclude that the mission had a vested interest in the exploitation of the people to their detriment. In doing so he did not appear to oppose the mission in principle but rejected, in the words of the socialist M.P. van Kol, "the usurption of power by the missionaries".¹³.

On completion of his term of office in Poso, van der Meulen returned to the Netherlands to provide an academic basis for the views he had developed on this matter as a colonial administrator. The topic "village school education in the care of the mission in the light of the relevant government regulations" formed the focus of his studies.¹⁴. It was this topic which provided the vehicle for a public attack on the Poso mission in an article of that name in the

12. loc. cit..

13. Quoted by van der Meulen in "Het volksonderwijs in beheer bij de zending en de te dien aanzien bestaande regeeringsvoorschriften", (Village school education in the care of the mission and relevant government regulations), in Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 1923, p. 247.

14. ibid, p. 243.

journal, Koloniaal Tijdschrift of 1923. In it he set out the reasons for his philosophical disagreement with the bases upon which the colonial government gave financial support to mission schools. There were he argued, two types of elementary indigenous schools: the volksschool, or community-initiated school and the indigenous elementary school initiated by private organizations. Historically influenced by government-initiated elementary schools, the private school was subsidized on a formula which allowed the mission to establish government equivalent schools without needing to have recourse to financial contributions from the local population. The character of the mission school was obscured by the decision in 1912 nominally to convert private subsidized schools into community schools, (volksschool). As van der Meulen saw it, this gave the mission free reign to exploit the financial provisions of the volksschool system whereby the people were obliged to contribute to the construction and maintenance of the schools while simultaneously continuing to receive generous government subsidies. It was this fundamentally unjust shift in policy, consolidated in a series of regulations for specific mission areas, (viz. Tapanuli, south and east Borneo, Halmaheira, New Guinea, Bolaang Mongondau, Sangi and Talaud Island and, most importantly, Sumba and Flores) that van der Meulen rejected. Rhetorically, he asked his readers,

What is actually the purpose of the government? Does it wish to leave the mission free in its relations with the population to apply not the least control over it; does it wish consciously to sacrifice the rights and interests of the population to mission interests?

Does it consider that after all the information and all the evidence regarding mission activity which it has at its disposal, it is still justified, regardless of the interests of the population, in giving unlimited power to the mission and to those government authorities which support it through thick and thin, simply because of the political interest [the government] has in mission work?¹⁵.

For van der Meulen, the answer was clear. The central

15. ibid, p. 246.

government was prepared to support the mission generously because of its importance in maintaining a balance of power in favour of the colonial government in the wake of emerging Muslim nationalism. The trust the government placed in the mission to protect the interests of the indigenous population was, he considered, unjustified. Citing a number of examples from his experience with the Poso mission to prove his point, van der Meulen concluded that, in the interests of the indigenous population, and in accordance with established legal principles, the terms under which missions administered the village schools had to be tightened up.

In general, he agreed with the proposition that what was not paid for was not appreciated. Education was of such importance that regardless of whether the government was prepared to subsidize some schools more heavily than others, the principle of community contributions for their schools had to be maintained. In that case, both in mission and non-mission areas, the principle of community ownership of schools had to be clearly stipulated. Where missions were operative, and van der Meulen was not arguing for their removal, these community-owned schools could be leased free-of-charge to the mission which could then provide suitable elementary education free of any restrictions other than the requirements of government inspectors and the principle of religious freedom. The mission's rights over education could extend to administration of school funds, employment and dismissal of teachers, receipt of school fees and the other administrative matters relating directly to the running of the school but any matters which related to the physical and monetary contributions of the population in regard to the maintenance of the school, were government matters, the colonial government acting in loco parentis for the developing indigenous self government. Only when the government implemented such a system "laid down in complete, clear and unambiguous regulations could mission education in community schools exercise a salutary influence".

There was nothing radically new in van der Meulen's proposal, not even the venom of his comments on the

malpractices of missionaries; his position was essentially that of the former hard-liner in the Department of the Interior, Luloffs, who regarded education as a central feature of that Department's version of the ethical policy. Lulofs had clearly enunciated the position in 1913 and van der Meulen quoted him several times:

The need for education is determined by negotiation between mission and administration official. On the basis of the agreement reached, the mission makes its services available for the provision of education, the official and the indigenous self government administer the resources of those involved to erect and maintain the school.¹⁶

There were others in the Department, particularly the top echelons who, recognizing the overall political significance of the mission were prepared to water down the strict division desired by Lulofs in the interests of promoting greater missionary activity. These latter were led, perhaps by personal conviction, perhaps by pragmatic considerations to achieve advances quickly, undoubtedly by their sensitivity to the political climate and the orientation of successive Governors-General, to offer the mission unfettered rights to cultivate the undeveloped and therefore more difficult to administer, areas of the colony which would otherwise have lain barren. In such areas, the mission would prove useful in bringing the people to a point where they would be susceptible to more regular and systematic administration. Hence, the notion of contracting the "civilizing task" in such regions to the missions and the government's flirtation with the notion of a beschavingssubsidie (subsidy for civilizing work).¹⁷ It was the mission's stolid defence of its untrammelled freedom of action in regions inhabited by unsophisticated peoples and the political muscle it could bring to bear at home, which saved it from losing its increasingly contested authority in the middle of the second decade. In Poso and the Batak lands, both an increasingly confident European administrative corps and an

16. ibid, p. 266.

17. Jongeling, op. cit., p. 188 ff..

increasingly aware indigenous population were threatening this position. The crisis point for both the Poso and Batak missions came just as the Department of the Interior's control over village education was taken over by the Department of Education and Religion. This transfer of power brought only a temporary respite, for in the end, the professional interference in the mission school classroom proved to be a greater threat to its autonomy by the end of the 1920's than the threat to its control over its financial resources had been. Van der Meulen merely threatened the external features of the mission's pedagogical task, government school inspectors threatened its very soul.

Kruyt's mandatory response to van der Meulen's public attack on the Poso mission (he, like the former Poso Controleur, was in the Netherlands at the time), must have failed to placate a critical readership. Van der Meulen, according to Kruyt, 'over-generalized', 'failed to understand the nature of Indonesian life', 'mis-stated the facts'.¹⁸ The malpractices of missionaries in Poso which van der Meulen had publicly listed to the surprise of regular readers of the mission journal Mededelingen, gave a distorted picture in which

our good faith is being brought into question and we are being presented as people who do not promote the interests of Indonesians (sic.) according to our convictions, whereas that is the very purpose of our going to the Indies (sic.).¹⁹

Kruyt's response was lacklustre since he was at this time more concerned with a dispute within the Conference involving the removal of missionary Schuyt from Poso but one apparently incidental comment stung van der Meulen into a reply. Kruyt had indicated without further comment that van der Meulen's attempt to regulate the organization of mission schools in Poso along the lines advocated in his article, had been found unacceptable by higher authorities.

18. Kruyt, "Het volksonderwijs in beheer bij de zending", (Village school education in the care of the mission), Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 1923, pp. 426-433 passim.

19. ibid, p. 433.

Van der Meulen's reply underlined the main concern of his original article. His article was not in the first place, directed towards the mission but towards his political superiors; those "who had not for any length of time, experienced at first-hand, the real situation".

Had the judgement [of his regulations] rested with higher officials who had a better perspective on the matter, then my regulation would ... most probably have been given a better treatment.²⁰

During his three year term in Poso, van der Meulen had witnessed what he seemed to have regarded as the emasculation of the authority of the regional colonial administration at the hands of pro-mission bureaucrats. In the conflict he and his predecessors had entered into with the mission in Poso, both sides used what they considered as the welfare of the unsophisticated indigenous population as the touchstone in the defence of their policies. The goal of both was to involve these people in their vision of the future of Central Celebes.

The point of contact where these two visions clashed was the school. For Kruyt, the government's aim in establishing schools was thoroughly instrumental: to train personnel to fill the lower ranks of the colonial administrative corps and to provide a suitably sophisticated self government. For government officials like Karthaus and van der Meulen, the mission's objective was equally instrumental:

Why is the mission in the Indies? To spread the awareness of Christianity isn't it? And for that purpose it needs schools. Not in the first place to raise the population to a higher level because, if this was the case, then it would quite easily leave the task of education to the government. Why then, do we have another attempt by Kruyt to hide behind nice phrases. The spread of Christianity is the goal, the school is merely the means.²¹

The circumstances resurrected in this public exchange in 1923 on the eve of the introduction of the universally

20. Van der Meulen, "Antwoord op het artikel van Dr. A.C. Kruyt", (Reply to the article by Dr. A.C. Kruyt), Koloniaal Tijdschrift, 1923, p. 434.

21. ibid, p. 435.

applicable Algemene Subsidie Regeling were instigated seven months after van der Meulen was appointed as Controleur of Poso. In an abrupt announcement which "surprised" the usually well-informed Kruyt,²² van der Meulen declared that it was the Assistant Resident's intention immediately to replace the regional subsidy of f.5,000 provided since 1906 with a central government subsidy.²³ Kruyt was surprised because the Mission Consul had recently informed him that another revision of a specific regulation for Poso was being prepared in Batavia.²⁴ Indeed, it was not until June, 1920 that the Poso mission was made aware of an official government decision by the Mission Consul that changes had taken place in plans to subsidize mission schools in Poso.²⁵ Kruyt thus carefully intimated his doubts as to whether van der Meulen's action was legal.

The Controleur's announcement represented an attempt to impose a unilateral financial settlement with respect to mission schools. Not prepared to wait for a specific regulation, the Poso administration commenced to implement the full rigour of the latest version of the Sumba regulation. Having had sufficient time to acquaint himself with his predecessors' correspondence archive, van der Meulen must have consciously ignored or refused to accept the arguments raised by the mission since Kielstra's 1911 draft document against the application in Poso of school regulations applicable elsewhere.

Kruyt's suspicion that the Controleur was acting without the authorization of the Department of Education and Religion was strengthened when van der Meulen informed the mission that in anticipation of the central government's approval, he had recommended to the Assistant Resident the continuation of present financial arrangements for one more year. The proposed change from regional to central

22. Kruyt to van der Meulen, 10 May, 1919.

23. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 15 April, 1919.

24. Kruyt to van der Meulen, 10 May, 1919.

25. Mission Consul Schepper to Poso Conference, 4 June, 1920.

government funding would have allowed van der Meulen to dispense with a range of administrative details which had grown up historically in the decade in which the mission school network had developed. In the first place, it gave the Controleur greater authority over the schools in his function as intermediary between mission and Department of Education. Provocatively, he had headed his letter announcing the changes with "Controleur and Chairman of the school committee of the village schools in the sub-district of Poso". In this dual capacity, he informed Kruyt that he wished to receive formal subsidy applications for each school within four months to allow him time "to form and express an opinion" on them prior to sending them on to the government. Together with such applications, the mission was to apply for an issue of free school books from the government as was permitted for other village schools. This privilege, he emphasized "could allow the subsidy to be significantly reduced!"²⁶. Further, he informed Kruyt that, as the administration of village schools now resided with the Department of Education and Religion and because subsidies would shortly be provided by the central government, "it was to be expected that very soon they would come under the supervision of native school inspectors [opzieners]". He advised Kruyt therefore, to prepare the relevant statistics for his schools "to facilitate the inspection by such officials".²⁷ From now on, Kruyt was informed, absentee lists were to be sent monthly to the Controleur. In this context, the Controleur concluded, Kruyt would see to it that he adhered to the regulations applicable to the village schools and prohibit the practice of allowing the school children to be absent from school during harvest time.

This crass attempt by van der Meulen to change a decade-old system of educational administration with the stroke of a pen was followed by another in a letter three days later.²⁸ In it he made mention of two features of

26. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 15 April, 1919.

27. loc. cit.

28. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 18 April, 1919.

Kruyt's schools which differed from usual practice: the existence of a four year school and the biennial intake of school students. Van der Meulen made it clear that such modifications were unacceptable and unnecessarily increased government and community contributions, as Kielstra had shown eight years earlier. Kruyt responded politely with the request that the Controleur should discuss his plans at the forthcoming annual meeting of the mission Conference in June.²⁹

Among the missionaries of the Poso Conference, there was great consternation. Uninformed about the details and totally unprepared for the Controleur's announcement after years of procrastination on the part of the central government, they recognized the threat the new rules represented in the hands of a Controleur who gave the mission no quarter, who threatened their financial position, their autonomy over education and ultimately, over their evangelizing work. The crisis which had threatened since 1914 had come at last.

The key issue in van der Meulen's plan, as Wesseldijk outlined to his colleagues, was finance.³⁰ The altered situation was only threatening as long as the mission continued to accept financial aid from the government. Acceptance of the new conditions would mean the effective loss of the schools, and thereby, the loss of the community support for the indigenous leader of the Christian community.

The principle of self-support, Wesseldijk argued, which had been nurtured by the mission in respect of the schools had aimed at training the Christian population to support its ministers. In regard to schools, the principle of self-support was already well established but at the moment, the people did not differentiate the school from the guru and his 'community work'. Were such a separation

29. Kruyt to van der Meulen, 10 May, 1919. The invitation was repeated in a letter of 23 May, 1919.

30. Wesseldijk, Memorandum to the Conference Chairman, 2 June, 1919. This argument was substantially repeated by Wesseldijk in a memorandum to the annual meeting of 1921.

to be imposed, Wesseldijk hinted, the population would not support the guru qua minister "and then all the work in relation to nurturing a habit of self-support would be wasted" and "we would have to see how we would maintain our evangelical work".

This is probably the most honest explanation of the mission's method of work recorded in the Kruyt archive and fully justified the opinion of an unsympathetic observer such as van der Meulen, in saying that the mission used the schools for ulterior purposes. What applied to community contributions, applied equally to government subsidies to mission schools.

Wesseldijk's solution was as honest as his description of the problem. The mission he proposed, should refuse to accept a government subsidy. Instead, schools should be clearly shown to belong to and be maintained by, the Christian community and the principle of self-support extended further. The policy of replacing Minahassans with To Pamona teachers should also be speeded up.

In this way, we will sooner or later realize the desired goal for which we have worked from the beginning; that is, self maintenance by the Christian community. At the moment, much is still contributed by non-Christians but in the future, all will be Christian. And then the school will belong to the Christian community.³¹

Wesseldijk's solution was as naive as it was honest. He implied that because the community was a Christian one, it would be free from interference from the government, or alternatively, would belong to the Poso mission, at least for the foreseeable future. The vision of the totally Christianized region with a Christian self-administration and Christian schools could only, given the conception of the development of its inhabitants often expressed by his senior colleague, mean a theocratic state. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that:

In many administrative officials, a certain irritation can be perceived regarding the fact that missionaries exercise an influence on the population beyond that of the government. The

31. loc. cit.

mission forms a sphere of influence or a group of knowledgeable and critical people, whose existence plants in the mind of the administration a feeling that their exercise of power and authority is being limited.³²

In his 1932 commentary on the development of mission schools in Poso, Jan Kruyt categorizes this attitude as an indication of the small-mindedness of such officials which he believed was amplified by the process of "replacing the personal administration of responsible individuals with the mechanical processing of a mass of data on the basis of figures, regulations and models". In contradistinction, Jan Kruyt described "the protestant mission amongst an unsophisticated people [as] characterized by a personal and particular leadership in spiritual and thus, in school affairs".³³

In 1919, while there was no time to consider such abstract notions, the mission certainly acted on the basis of this assumption, failing in the process to see the logical consequence of Wesseldijk's suggestion. The Conference agreed with Wesseldijk in as far as he argued for the maintenance of a unity between school and church (a principle used to defeat Schuyt in 1920) but it refused to accept his challenge of making a financial sacrifice. Instead, it waited to see what impact van der Meulen's regulations would have while preparing, if it were necessary, to embark on a third round of tactical political negotiations to maintain both its autonomy and the financial support of the government.

Kruyt himself, seemed initially prepared to compromise under the impression that he was dealing with a central government policy change. Van der Meulen, not meeting any resistance, developed his own principles further and advised the Conference on June 18, 1919 that he desired that all contributions made by the communities towards the maintenance of school and guru be converted into a specified percentage of income tax.³⁴ The Conference did not oppose

32. Jan Kruyt, "Het Inlandsch Onderwijs", memorandum written for the Research Committee of Netherlands-Indies Mission Union, 26 March, 1932, p. 7.

33. loc. cit.

34. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 26 August, 1919.

the suggestion and in September, Kruyt was able to state categorically, that all fields cultivated by the community for the maintenance of schools had been abolished.³⁵ Van der Meulen's reason for demanding a standardized contribution from the taxpayers' own resources was twofold. First he wished thereby to "avoid the possibility of opportunities presenting themselves for malpractice and avoidance of community work" and secondly, to impose a uniform burden on the community in accordance with its ability to pay as determined by taxation assessment. With the start of the new agricultural season, van der Meulen considered the time had come to regulate the changes he desired.³⁶

The Conference's acceptance of these changes was facilitated by its having been accustomed to them in the operation of the tax surcharge principle in the administrative areas of the government of Celebes. More importantly, both Jan Kruyt, in charge of the mission in Mori and Woensdrecht, who had taken over control of the mission in Napu, Besoa and Bada after the death of Ten Kate, had experienced difficulty in obtaining the co-operation of the people in these even less prosperous areas in the cultivation of separate guru fields. In 1918 therefore, Jan Kruyt had suggested alterations to the guru regulations along the lines demanded by van der Meulen.³⁷ In the meantime, van der Meulen notified the Conference that on the basis of the provisional information he had been given in May, he had calculated that the Poso mission would be eligible for a subsidy of f.3,750 and had applied for this amount to the Department of Education and Religion.³⁸ This sum was f.850 less than that which the mission should have received on the basis of f.100 for each of its forty-six schools, the formula applying in Mori and Malili and significantly less than the annual grant of f.5,000 plus

35. Kruyt to van der Meulen, 18 September, 1919.

36. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 26 August, 1919.

37. Jan Kruyt to the members of the Poso Conference, 19 March, 1918.

38. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 24 July, 1919.

extra-ordinary grants from Batavia which it had been accustomed to receiving since 1910.³⁹ Together with an expected reduction in community contributions as a result of the introduction of the twenty percent tax surcharge to replace traditional contributions it became obvious that van der Meulen's plan was to have a serious effect on the mission's financial position.

The Controleur's intimation of the amount of the forthcoming subsidy was contained in a cryptic seven-line note in which he advised the mission that any unused monies were to be returned. The figures on which van der Meulen calculated the subsidy are unfortunately unavailable but the Controleur used three principles in coming to his conclusion. Firstly, he considered that government subsidies should be kept to a minimum and that such subsidies were to be determined in accordance with the amount contributed by the community. This was fully in accord with the regulations covering neutral village schools. Secondly, he assumed that where the maximum school subsidy, together with a contribution of twenty percent of the income tax per eligible villager, did not suffice to cover the cost of a school, that school was to be closed or alternatively, be kept in existence by contributions from the mission. Thirdly, he implied that in determining whether or not a school could be retained, no increase in community contributions could be considered.⁴⁰

These principles differed sharply from previous practice and the perceptions of the mission. Kruyt had always based his calculations on the assumption that the amount of government subsidy remained constant, while the amount contributed by the population would vary from the expected total as a result of harvest variations and the extent to which the people co-operated in the matter of voluntary contributions. In the undetermined amount of

39. Schools established by the Poso mission outside the Poso administrative district were funded on the 1895 subsidy regulation receiving f.100 per annum per school.

40. Kruyt to van der Meulen, 18 September, 1919, (private). The comparative overview provided by Table 6 reveals the extent of the changes in the proportion of the contribution made by each of the parties involved.

TABLE 6

GOVERNMENT, MISSION AND COMMUNITY CONTRIBUTIONS TO SELECTED
SCHOOLS IN THE PENDOLO MISSION DISTRICT 1913-1922

1913

Location	No. Pupils	Education Expenses	Govt. Subsidy	Contribution from Population			Total	Costs to N.M.S.
				Produce	Money	Fees		
		f.	f.				f.	f.
Pendolo	121	444.61	210.00				167.90	66.71
Bancea	54	300.96	192.50				108.46	-
Mayou	42	205.39	105.00				100.39	-
Koro Bono	59	294.17	140.00				139.40	14.77
Tindoli	41	<u>239.45</u>	<u>105.00</u>				<u>124.40</u>	<u>10.05</u>
		1484.58	752.50				640.55	91.53

1919

Location	No. Pupils	Education Expenses	Subsidy	Contribution from Population			Total	Costs to N.M.S.
				Produce	Money	Fees		
		f.	f.	f.	f.	f.	f.	f.
Pendolo	?	480.00	200.00	60.00	160.00	60.00	280.00	-
Bancea	?	240.00	85.00	60.00	75.00	20.00	155.00	-
Mayou	?	190.00	55.00	40.00	70.00	25.00	135.00	-
Koro Bono	?	240.00	65.00	60.00	90.00	25.00	175.00	-
Tindoli	?	<u>240.00</u>	<u>60.00</u>	<u>60.00</u>	<u>90.00</u>	<u>30.00</u>	<u>180.00</u>	-
		1390.00	465.00	280.00	485.00	160.00	925.00	

1922

Location	No. Pupils	Education Expenses	Subsidy	Contribution from Population			Total	Costs to N.M.S.
				Tax Surcharge	Fees	1921 Surpl.		
		f.	f.	f.	f.	f.	f.	f.
Bancea	?	257.60	68.10	122.78	22.50	44.22	189.50	-
Mayou	?	266.60	65.35	140.04	24.50	31.70	197.14	-
Koro Bono	?	258.75	28.30	179.60	28.00	22.85	230.45	-
Tindoli	?	<u>263.72</u>	<u>54.83</u>	<u>151.64</u>	<u>26.00</u>	<u>31.25</u>	<u>208.89</u>	-
		1046.57	216.59	594.96	101.00	130.02	825.98	

community contributions, he considered that the pedagogical value of the practice of self-support resided, the amount raised year by year providing some measure of the willingness of the community to support its school and teacher. To meet the fluctuations in this latter source of income, Kruyt wanted the right to have control of the allocation of aid to individual schools from a lump sum subsidy made available by the government on the basis of an average of expenses and incomes. He believed that excesses in community contributions should not lead to reduction or repayment of school subsidies but should be used to cover salary increases and deficits in other schools.⁴¹

Kruyt's major opposition centred on the principle of the payment of subsidies per school which entailed the removal of mission control over this source of finance on which Kruyt's system was based. The mission wanted to be able to manipulate the contributions of the people and be in a position to maintain schools otherwise not viable. Retaining control over government subsidies was an essential pre-requisite for the implementation of the missions interpretation of a policy of self-support on a large scale.

Kruyt's public criticism of van der Meulen, however, rested on two politically sensitive points: that van der Meulen was over-taxing the financial capacity of the population in his attempt to reduce government subsidies and that he failed to have adequate consultations with the mission.⁴² In September, Kruyt again appealed to the Controleur to discuss school matters with the mission prior to the implementation of new regulations but without success. It was clear that van der Meulen considered the type of schools in his administrative region as volkscholen belonging to the community and thus, coming under the supervision of the government.

41. Kruyt to van der Meulen, 18 September, 1919, (formal).

42. Ritsema (Chairman) to Resident of Menado, 6 November, 1919.

By November, the situation had become critical. If subsidies were to be obtained for 1920, application had to be made on the Controleur's terms. On 6 December, the Chairman of the Conference, Ritsema, wrote to the Resident protesting against the attempt to treat the mission school, which in the context of the current dispute the Conference now characterized as a private institution, as if it were a community or volkschool under the care of the government. Ritsema requested the Resident to arrange a meeting forthwith to arbitrate in this dispute.

The mission's worst fears were realized when, not long after Ritsema's appeal to the Resident, van der Meulen sent to the Conference a document regulating the legal and financial principles governing what he defined as community schools in the care of the mission. In accordance with the Sumba regulations, the key article of van der Meulen's regulations stated:

The daily conduct of the schools together with the administration of school funds rests with the relevant missionary; who is also responsible for the curriculum on the proviso that it accords with the demands required by the Inspector of Native Education in Menado and that the children whose parents or guardians so desire, are not obliged to attend religious instruction.⁴³

The regulations also established school committees on the Javanese principle consisting of the local colonial government official, local missionary and the local indigenous administrator. Individual contributions by villagers were fixed at a maximum of twenty percent of income tax paid.

The Resident of Menado did arrive in Poso not long after receiving Ritsema's letter but, unlike his predecessor, the new Resident, Kroon, shared van der Meulen's view and was either unable or more likely, unwilling to meet with

43. Van der Meulen, "Antwoord op het artikel van Dr. Alb. C. Kruyt", in op. cit., p. 434. This repeats the content of the Controleur's letter to Kruyt of 1 December, 1919. Van der Meulen concludes this letter by saying "if a decision (from the Resident) is not forthcoming by the end of the year, then only the regulation approved by the Assistant Resident replacing the peoples' contributions in labour and money with a surcharge will be operative in 1920".

the mission immediately. Ritsema nevertheless made use of his presence to write two strongly worded letters in response to van der Meulen's latest policy statement. The letter to the Controleur was accompanied by a subsidy application for schools in one mission district on the basis of van der Meulen's guidelines. This application for the smallest of the mission districts was to be a test-case and the covering letter was clearly meant to be perused by the Resident.

In making these forms available, I must declare on behalf of the Conference of missionaries in Central Celebes that we do not agree to this method of subsidizing. We cannot conceal from you that we see in your actions, nothing else but an attempt to take out of our hands the schools established and administered by us in order to place them under the control of the government official. For this reason we must declare that we cannot accept any alteration which you desire, neither as regards the organization of the school, nor in the method whereby the community supports them, until after a meeting with the Resident of Menado has determined the position of these schools, even if this results in the loss of a year's subsidy.⁴⁴

This challenge was accompanied by a letter to the Resident in which Ritsema protested against the new regulations and the methods by which they were introduced without consultation with the mission. Again he appealed to the Resident to intervene. The letter concluded with a hint of the mission's suspicion that van der Meulen's action was illegal.

You are not unaware that the procrastination in the subsidizing of our schools is a result of their extraordinary position, which has consistently given rise to consideration for a separate subsidy regulation for Poso. For this reason we think it strange that the matter has now been suddenly settled in this way, without any discussion with the mission.⁴⁵

The mission, however, found it difficult to protest against the substance of the Controleur's regulations which were not in themselves, extraordinary. Besides, the mission

44. Chairman J. Ritsema, on behalf of the Poso Conference to the Controleur of Poso, 23 November, 1919.

45. Chairman J. Ritsema, on behalf of the Poso Conference to the Resident of Menado, 23 November, 1919.

had not yet gained any indication of what was happening in the Department of Education in Batavia and thus, its case rested on suspicion regarding the Controleur's ulterior motives and on the way he interpreted the regulations.

The Resident responded to Ritsema's second letter on his return to Menado, presumably fully briefed by the Controleur and the Assistant Resident. He made it abundantly clear that he supported his subordinates. The schools in Central Celebes, he assured the mission, should be regarded as volksscholen, although their operation remained the preserve of the mission. The local government official was entitled to supervise the running of such schools and make changes "in consultation with the mission". A maximum twenty percent surcharge was acceptable to the Resident, although he did accept the possibility of this being increased in exceptional circumstances. The Resident further questioned whether there were not too many schools:

If, with regard to the financial capacity of the population, this should be the case, then the number of schools should be reduced and the remainder expanded.⁴⁶

The Resident therefore, vindicated the action of the Controleur, although he did promise to arrange a later meeting with the mission. The mission interpreted the Resident's response as "offering some hope in the battle over the control of the schools".⁴⁷ The worst fear remained, however, that by linking school contributions to a percentage of the income tax paid by those liable to taxation, the existence of small schools would be threatened, resulting in the need for the Missionary Society to increase its contributions substantially. It was apparent to the mission that van der Meulen's regulations would substantially reduce the contribution required of the population and,

46. Resident of Menado to J. Ritsema, Chairman of the Poso Conference, 16 December, 1919.

47. J. Ritsema to the Brothers Kruyt, Zuppinger, Wesseldijk and Woensdrecht, 19 December, 1919.

while this would not seriously affect the operation of the large schools, it would affect the schools supported by smaller communities, which, on the mission's own admission, therefore, were only maintained by an inordinate burden on these villagers' financial resources.

It was in these terms that the Controleur defended his decisions in a letter written on behalf of the Resident soon after the latter's return to Menado. He assured the mission Conference that it was mistaken in its assumption that he wished to take over mission schools. The aim of the regulations was twofold:

1. To guarantee the rights of the people; that is, that the schools for which they provide the giant share of the finances apart from the regional government and which, regardless of their origin, have become purely community schools, remain community schools, thus schools which do not belong to a private corporation but belong to the community which has hitherto borne the financial burden for them but has been denied its rights in respect of them;
2. To ensure that from now on, the unwarranted high contributions demanded till now, do not recur.⁴⁸

This 'assurance' was not couched in terms which would allay the suspicion of the mission and it remained convinced that the "new regulation was exclusively the work of the three gentlemen [that is, Controleur, Assistant Resident and Resident]"⁴⁹.

At the beginning of the new year, the new regulations to be introduced from January were outlined to a meeting of the Pamona chiefs. To forestall any difficulties, van der Meulen also reiterated the main points made in that meeting to Kruyt.⁵⁰ In his memorandum to Kruyt, van der Meulen emphasized that no further demands were to be made on the community other than the twenty percent surcharge, which was to be collected by the village chief without the involvement of the teachers as previously. This money

48. Controleur of Poso to the Chairman of the Poso Conference, 1 December, 1919.

49. Ritsema to the mission Consul, 1 August, 1920.

50. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 20 January, 1920.

was to be brought, together with the income tax, to Poso from where it would be made available on a monthly basis to the missionary in charge. As from the beginning of the 1920 school year, the teacher and, implicitly, the missionary would have nothing more to do with the population in regard to the maintenance, financial or physical, of the school other than the collection of school fees. Where it was apparent that, apart from the "normal subsidy from the government" (that is, f.100) and the tax surcharge, there was not sufficient money to maintain the school, and where the mission still considered it desirable to continue it, the Missionary Society would, van der Meulen stated, be permitted to support such a school from its own resources. Even in such cases, the Controleur assured Kruyt, these schools would be considered as coming under the scope of the regulations. Van der Meulen thus made it very clear that even if the mission could maintain the schools without recourse to government subsidies, as Wesseldijk had suggested, it would not thereby avoid the interference of the Controleur. Routine maintenance of schools by the population was also forbidden and left to the guru himself; substantial repairs being carried out under the terms provided for by the gemeentedienst (community service) regulations.

Victory for the Controleur was thus apparently complete and a half a decade of disputation was ended by the thoroughness and determined perseverance of van der Meulen. Kruyt appeared to have resigned himself to the inevitable at last and made his feelings known to the Conference that he:

was looking forward to the time when we no longer have to worry about the schools and when we will only have to concern ourselves with the religious instruction in such schools.

At last, openly revealing his attitude to the schools, he declared:

It has worried me that we missionaries have spent most of our time on the schools and education. I constantly did this with all my heart, both because the Poso society could not, for the time being, be served in any other way, and as a means whereby

the seed of the Gospel could be spread.⁵¹

The long-term future, Kruyt believed, lay in the training of Christian teachers through whom, despite the loss of physical control over the schools, the influence of the mission over the development of the Pamona children could be maintained. Kruyt was tired after twenty-six years of labouring, the last thirteen without a break. His melancholy resulted not only from the actions of van der Meulen but from the far more painful consequences of discord amongst his colleagues for which he, as their mentor, accepted responsibility. He had handed over technical leadership of the Conference to a younger colleague, Ritsema, in preparation for his planned departure in 1920. Kruyt's plan was temporarily to enter the service of the government as ethnologist to further his studies of the peoples of Central Sulawesi and, as he indicated to Karthaus in 1919, to follow up his studies of stone monuments in other parts of the Archipelago including Nias. This plan which had been mooted since 1916, now took on added significance with the return of Schuyt in early 1920. Kruyt wrote privately to Crommelin, the assistant mission Consul:

A tenseness has settled over the Brothers again. you cannot imagine what a suspicious nature that man [Schuyt] (and his wife) have; and this has an influence on all of us. ... I foresee a great deal of unpleasantness with the Brothers and if I temporarily leave the mission work, then the administration in Holland will not be able to say that it is my fault that there is no peace.⁵²

It is more than coincidental that Kruyt's last furlough was taken in 1905 at another critical period in the mission's development; the significance of which was fully realized by Kruyt at the time he left. The climatic juncture of the mission's internal and external crises in 1920, left Kruyt uncertain and the tone of his letter to Crommelin expressed weariness and a certain degree of detachment, uncharacteristic of his earlier correspondence.

51. Kruyt to the members of the Poso Conference, 12 April, 1920.

52. Kruyt to the mission Consul, Crommelin, 12 April, 1920.

Was it all becoming too much? Did his 1916 decision to close the training school, his desire to withdraw from the Chairmanship, to concentrate on the new mission area of Lampu in north Malili, to hand over the Directorship of the training school, indicate his inability to come to grips with the new order? If so, his reaction was similar to his period of self-questioning prior to the effective introduction of colonial rule in 1906.

For Kruyt, the mission's task was first and foremost, evangelization. In the earlier years of the twentieth century he was troubled by the consequence of working as an agent for the government as Engelenberg had clearly desired him to do. Under the administration of Mazee, he had, however, been able to establish an independent and prominent role for the mission. This role had come under seige as a result of the actions and attitudes of Mazee's successors but it was only with van der Meulen that the mission was effectively muzzled. It was also in the latter years of the second decade of the twentieth century that the progressive ideas of Schuyt threatened the dominance of Kruyt's vision of the missionary task.

Kruyt's correspondence reveals a man of immense energy, political cunning and aggressive pursuit of what he believed. His strength however, was Samson-like, feeding on the certainty that he was in control but disappearing when new situations left him shorn of the basis of his self-confidence. When Engelenberg wished to impose his plans for effective colonization, when Schuyt threatened the harmony of the mission with his distinct interpretation of the role of the mission, Kruyt left it to others to re-assess the new situation rather than make a definitive decision himself. In the new circumstances created by van der Meulen, Kruyt looked forward with some detachment to the forthcoming meeting with the Resident. He wrote to the mission Consul:

I am curious to see how this affair will end because, if things stay as they are, and the Controleur can simply declare which schools are to be closed and so forth, then I am in favour of simply handing education over to the government. It is tiring to negotiate with people who understand nothing about the people

in Poso and who specifically think they know what is right.⁵³.

Perhaps his was the only way for a man who knew what was right but who did not have it in his power to bring it about.

Nevertheless, Kruyt was obliged once more to lead the defence of mission schools when, due to a last minute change of plans, the Resident found himself unable to meet with the members of the Conference in Tentena. The discussions were eventually held on a government steamer in the bay of Poso. Ritsema, the Conference Chairman, who was to lead the discussion on behalf of the mission, was unable to do so, leaving Kruyt to put the mission's point of view. Kruyt's report of the meeting stressed the causes leading to his assuming the role of mission spokesman on that occasion.⁵⁴.

The change of venue for the Conference was symbolic, reflecting the new Resident's attitude to the mission which contrasted decisively with that of his predecessor. The previous Resident had travelled to Pendolo three years earlier when the condition of the roads, which was the reason for the change, could not have been any better. The meeting in consequence did little to improve the mission's position although the Resident was reported to have "made notes" on Kruyt's complaint regarding the attitude and actions of the Controleur. The missionary deputation may also not have expected much from the meeting since it had been made aware by the acting Mission Consul, Schepper, that the central government itself was finally about to announce a subsidy regulation for the Poso mission schools.⁵⁵ Since 1911, the central government had been providing the mission with a supplementary grant to cover the expenses of the mission over and above the f.5,000 subsidy it received from the regional government. There is no indication that van der Meulen was aware of this and it does not appear as a separate item in mission

53. loc. cit..

54. Report on a meeting with the Resident of Menado on 16 June, 1920.

55. Mission Consul Schepper to the Poso Conference, 4 June, 1920.

accounts.⁵⁶ In June, 1920, Schepper reported that this procedure would be abolished retrospectively to 1916 and replaced by the 1918 version of the Sumba regulation under which it had been recently decided to increase the annual subsidies per school from f.100 to f.175. With the implementation of this scheme in the near future, backdated to 1916 when the special Poso regulation was to have been introduced, a total payment for the preceeding years was to be made from which was to be subtracted the f.5,000 received annually from the regional treasury and the varying amounts received annually from Batavia.

This information reached the Conference several days before its meeting with the Resident and it was clear that the two schemes were in conflict. It was while the missionaries were preparing the relevant statistics for the schools for the period 1916 to 1920 for the Mission Consul that the meeting was held with the Resident. With the strong support of the Assistant Resident and the views of the arbitrating Resident already revealed as broadly in support of the principles underlying the Controleur's policies, the meeting as Kruyt had suspected, was inconclusive. The Conference now pinned its hopes on the intervention of the Mission Consul.

In October, the latter was able to report that the Director of Education and Religion, Creutzberg, was not in agreement with the Controleur's regulations.⁵⁷ In the meantime, however, the crisis had worsened for the mission. Having had to accept as a fait accompli, the loss of control over village contributions to the schools, it was now faced with the interference in its classrooms by the school inspector. Since the disputed visit of Inspector Boes in 1908, no official inspection had taken place until

56. It appears that these payments in restitution of expenses incurred by the Netherlands Missionary Society were paid directly to the Society in the Netherlands.

57. Mission Consul Schepper to Ritsema, 1 October, 1920. Ritsema had written to the Mission Consul (1 August, 1920) after the Conference had discussed the financial and administrative implications of the local regulation confirmed by the Resident and Schepper's announcement in a letter of 4 June, that the Sumba Regulation would be introduced in Poso.

mission schools were again inspected in 1920. The Inspector's report of 1920 nonetheless, was generally full of praise for the education given.⁵⁸ He was impressed by the availability of Bare'e-language texts although he considered some of them too wide-ranging and insufficiently restrictive. The Inspector believed that: "one had to specify exactly what the village school teacher had to teach" and not leave it to the guru to make a selection. Other material was too abstract and it was more suited to a secondary school, since the aim of the village school, he said, was simply to "teach reading and knowledge of numbers to one thousand". In this context, the Inspector considered a fourth year unnecessary, particularly since, on the mission's own argument, the school should not interfere with the parents' need of children in their agricultural pre-occupations. Biennial intake was also detrimental to effective education since,

those children who could not proceed to the higher grade have to be removed from the school and one thus could never achieve a systematic school with a sequence of grades.

Inspector Wilmink therefore, advised the institution of three year schools together with the annual intake of students. He did not insist, as other officials had done, on the introduction of a "split school" which the mission had seen as the only alternative to biennial intake, but believed a more rigorously supervised time-table would allow one teacher to cope with three grades at once. Where a biennial intake was justified because of the smaller number of children, Wilmink determined that these schools should simply be closed down. Since only five of the forty-six schools were large enough to justify two teachers, this recommendation which accorded to the views expressed by the Resident and van der Meulen, was likely to effect a significant number of mission schools.

On the other hand, the Inspector was in favour of the

58. Extract from the Report of the Acting Inspector of the Eighth Region (Menado), sub-district of Poso.

wide-spread use of Bare'e and the practical teaching methods employed, particularly in the teaching of arithmetic. In the latter:

Questions posed related to the situations which occurred in daily Torajan life. The necessary coins are all available in each school and the children are encouraged to buy and sell, pay money and provide change.

Simulated commercial transactions, the Inspector believed, would have an important benefit for later life and currently,

Torajans who purchase goods in Poso often take a boy with them who has completed his schooling and who therefore knows the value of money.⁵⁹

In this context he was favourably impressed with the erection of small mission shops "aimed at counteracting the cheating" occasioned by Chinese and Arab traders.

Overall, he considered the teachers of good quality, even those without diplomas in whose schools "no children were encountered who literally knew nothing". Attendance, particularly at the inland schools, was very good and here he found many successful volksscholen at which the pupils "among whom there were already many girls" complete their courses. In the words of his assistant, it was hoped that "Poso may become another Minahassa".

The 1920 report represented a seal of approval for the conduct of mission schools but opened a new Pandora's box of government interference. As Kielstra had done, the report assumed standards for these schools which diverged radically from those of the mission. The purpose of the village schools was to train children in reading, writing and ciphering. Since the Resident of Menado had clearly defined them as such and indeed appears to have instigated the Inspector's visit, the last remnants of what Kruyt perceived of as the pedagogical function of the school, were liable to disappear. The Inspector's recommendations together with van der Meulen's regulations signalled the end of these unique schools which were now to be absorbed into a universal system of volksscholen. Anticipating this, Kruyt had declared in April that in the future, the

59. loc. cit.

mission would find itself involved only the giving of religious instruction.

If these series of circumstances effectively stripped the mission of all but its evangelical task (Kruyt was simultaneously attempting to divest the mission of its commercial and medical involvement), one further event threatened its autonomy even here. In line with his decree that the mission would not demand any further contributions from the community in support of schools, van der Meulen outlawed the so-called harvest feast collection.⁶⁰ This collection, levied since 1910, together with collections made at holy communion and at weddings and payment made for wedding and baptismal certificates constituted the core of the embryonic (Christian) community funds. With the abolition of mission-instigated and controlled plantations and the government-imposed neglect of coffee plantations, the twenty-five cent per family contribution in rice after the harvest, constituted an important source of income.⁶¹

The money thus raised, together with a compulsory pension contribution levied from the guru's salary as well as private savings of Pamona's individuals living in the Kuku mission district, had been invested by Schuyt in his toko. The 1917 balances for the store in Kuku, Sangele, Peolo and Rato Dena show the total investment from twenty-one village community funds at f.784.30. Money collected in other mission districts seemed to have been deposited in mission accounts in the Minahassa. Van der Meulen stated that Kruyt had informed the Resident in their 16 June, 1920 meeting that funds made available by harvest

60. Van der Meulen to Kruyt, 20 January, 1920, 20 September, 1920 and 3 November, 1920.

61. Ritsema also recommended the abolition of school farms cultivated in school hours by pupils and their teacher in a letter to his colleagues of 1 March, 1919. The ostensible justification for this was to avoid the abuse of this scheme by teachers but it is more likely that their value for the mission in training children to work in the fields for the guru was seen to have disappeared with the replacement of community farms by a tax surcharge.

collections were used by the mission to make up shortfalls in school accounts under the guise of subsidies paid by the Missionary Society.⁶² He repeated this accusation in November, 1920 and again verbatim in his 1923 article. This procedure van der Meulen categorized as a further contribution by the community over and above the twenty percent surcharge and it thus fell under the Resident's prohibition.

There is no reason to doubt the substance of van der Meulen's accusation although his interpretation was not shared by the mission. The latter maintained that these various collections were designed to train the embryonic Christian community in the practice of self-support, in which context contributions towards the maintenance of schools made from harvest collections provided a real example of how a future community would support its institutions. Van der Meulen of course, saw only that these contributions were in fact mandatory levies, the purpose of which villagers could not comprehend and in the expending of which they were not involved.

Ritsema as Conference Chairman, expressly denied that Kruyt had said this and in the belief that van der Meulen was now proceeding to attack the very heart of the mission's endeavour, he informed van der Meulen that:

We refuse to explain to you again the purpose of the harvest collection but via the Mission Consul we will turn to the government in Batavia in order that this issue will be settled once and for all.⁶³

The intervention of the Mission Consul on this particular matter proved no longer necessary. The harvest collection for 1920 had already been gathered (in October) and Ritsema could "see no need to inform the guru of the prohibition of the Resident since we dispute the legality of the prohibition".⁶⁴ Long before the next harvest, van der Meulen had been transferred. Six days after writing to the Mission Consul, Ritsema received a letter in which the Consul reported on his recent discussions with

62. Van der Meulen to Ritsema (Chairman), 3 November, 1920.

63. Ritsema to van der Meulen, 14 October, 1920.

64. loc. cit.

the Directors of the Department of Education and the Interior.⁶⁵ Director Creutzberg had declared the Resident of Menado unqualified to draw up a regulation such as the one designed by van der Meulen. This lay only within the competency of the central government. Nor did the Department of Education and Religion accept the Resident's application of his definition of the term of volksschool to cover the mission schools in Poso.

You have therefore, as a Conference, to concern yourselves only with the old situation and need not recognize any alteration to it. You may if necessary, refer officials to the government or to the Mission Consul. Should they still want to introduce changes, then inform us immediately (if necessary, by telegraph). In the discussions regarding the general subsidy regulation in 1921, the matters of principle which the Resident thought he could determine locally, will be dealt with.⁶⁶

The head of the outer island section of the Department of the Interior had already been informed about the general conduct of the Controleur by the Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies! His Excellency, van Limburg Stirum, had in turn been informed by Adriani who had incidentally mentioned the matter in a letter thanking the Governor-General and his wife for their hospitality while Adriani was in Java.⁶⁷ With such support, the Poso Conference was entitled confidently to ignore the threats of the lowly Controleur! The assistant to the head of section had already been despatched to Poso to investigate the complaints against van der Meulen and the Mission Consul expected that a guarantee for the freedom of the mission "would be successfully negotiated on the latter's return in December".

Once again the mission had been saved as a result of the political climate in the higher echelons of the bureaucracy and by the effective intervention of the

65. Mission Consul Schepper to Ritsema, 10 November, 1920.

66. loc. cit.

67. Handwritten note by Adriani disputing Schepper's insinuation that Adriani had made a formal representation to the Governor-General dated 22 December, 1920.

mission ambassador in Batavia. With van der Meulen's departure in 1921 (according to a note by Adriani, this had been determined as early as September, 1920 and thus, was not the result of the investigation) and the preparation of a new subsidy regulation, the Poso mission again re-focused its attention on converting the heathen and strengthening the conviction of the converted. In recent years this had suffered not only through the interference of two successive Controleurs but according to the opinion of Mrs. Adriani, because of the mission's involvement with its shops.

There is not yet a replacement for Schuyt ... the whole Pebato land has existed for years without a Pandita [minister, that is, European missionary]. Ritsema has recently had to supervise three huge districts and to his regret, has had to work very superficially. He had much too much travelling to do. Clearly, he could not cope with half the work he was confronted with. And now Wesseldijk will not be available to undertake mission work [because of his proposed shift to Poso to supervise the mission's wholesale transactions on the coast].⁶⁸

This was clearly an argument for more personnel but the effect was nonetheless significant. Even sympathetic European Christians were, according to Mrs. Adriani in 1922, disillusioned with the mission in Central Celebes, at least of what they saw of it near the coast.⁶⁹ For the open-minded observer, which van der Meulen was not, missionary methods at their best tended to be arrogant, at worst parsimonious.⁷⁰ In Poso, for both liberal-oriented and Christian controleurs, the mission's involvement in financial affairs gave the impetus for criticism. With the shock occasioned by van der Meulen's regulations, together with the deterioration of morale, it was under-

68. Mrs. Adriani to J.W. Gunning, Director N.M.S., 12 April, 1922.

69. In 1922, both the Controleur and the government doctor and their wives were "serious Christians".

70. For an interesting parallel account of aspects of mission-government relations in another non-Muslim area, the Batak lands, see D. van der Meulen, Hoort gij de donder niet? (Wever-Franeker, 1977), Chapters Four and Five.

standable that in the new lease of life offered by the intervention of the central government, the mission Conference took stock and was determined, in the absence of a decisive judgement by the Missionary Society in Holland, to rekindle its evangelical fervour. In its treatment of Schuyt and the project he had initiated, an attempt to start afresh, to return to the basic task can be observed. Almost symbolically, from the lassitude of Albert Kruyt, arose a vigorous phoenix in the form of his son, who in 1921 took over as Director of the training school and, on the belated departure of his father, assumed the Chairmanship of the Conference from Ritsema.

The visit to Poso by the assistant to the section head for Outer Island Affairs in the Department of the Interior, Staargaard, resulted in a compromise document which was to regulate central government funding for Poso schools as an interim measure until the introduction of a universal subsidy regulation.⁷¹

As a result of Staargaard's visit, van der Meulen's extreme interpretation of the concept of volksschool, was modified to the extent that control of these schools was returned to the mission who regained "the right to administer the contributions from the population".⁷² While the precise details of funding arrangements in this confused period are obscure, it was not till 1923 that the regional subsidy of f.5,000, provided since 1906, was abolished.

Central Sulawesi was not the only mission area which experienced financial uncertainties between 1921 and 1925 when the Algemene Subsidie Regeling was finally implemented for all mission schools. Discussions held in 1921 in Batavia resulted in the formulation of a budget estimate which was sent to the States General in the Hague in 1922. After some hesitation on the Minister's part, this item was finally accepted for inclusion in the second reading

71. Inspector of Menado, Wilmink to Albert Kruyt, 15 April, 1924. This letter throws doubt on whether a formal regulation actually appeared in the office of the Controleur in Poso.

72. loc. cit..

of the budget. During the two years since the general subsidy concept had been mooted, an interim provision had been declared for those schools in receipt of central government subsidies. This took the form of simply continuing existing arrangements with the addition of a fifty percent increase in 1921 and a one hundred percent increase in 1922 on the sums allocated under the original subsidy regulation.^{73.}

None of these decisions immediately affected Poso since it did not yet receive central government support.^{74.} The short-sightedness of the decision to accept regional rather than central government finance made by Kruyt and the Mission Consul in 1906 was now all too apparent.

The Poso mission, like all other mission organizations conducting elementary schools in the Netherlands East Indies, was nonetheless suffering from the effects of the post-war inflation. It was this increase in prices, apparent in the immediate post-war years, which had also greatly contributed to van der Meulen's attempt to rid the Pamona people of the control of what he considered the rapacious mission. The Algemene Subsidie Regeling was an attempt to meet the financial difficulties imposed on mission organizations by these new economic circumstances. As the Mission Consul pointed out:

It will not be unknown to your Excellency that discussions regarding the improvement of existing subsidies have already been in process for seven years and have only resulted in changes for schools in the administrative district of Menado. Besides this, the extra payment of two months salary in 1920, and a fifty percent increase in subsidy payments in 1921, have only brought some relief.^{75.}

The chief method whereby missions everywhere had attempted to contain costs was in the area of teacher salaries. By 1922, a teacher employed by the Netherlands Missionary

73. Secretary, Department of Education and Religion to heads of regional administrations, 24 August, 1922.

74. Mission Consul Crommelin to J. Kruyt, 15 September, 1922.

75. Quoted in the memorandum from the Department of Education and Religion, 24 August, 1922.

Society in East Java, in receipt of a diploma from the Mojowarno training school, received between f.20 and f.50 per month, while teachers with an equivalent diploma, teaching in a non-mission school, received between f.55 and f.125 per month. While this was not a problem in an isolated area such as Central Sulawesi (particularly once indigenous teachers were being recruited), it clearly created difficulties in Java where the Mission Consul described the situation as "unsustainable".^{76.}

The war and its aftermath had prolonged and intensified the debate concerning improved subsidies, while issues of principle and administration had complicated attempts at arriving at a conclusion. The Poso experience was part of this history but was distinguished from it in that the question of government assistance had to be fought out at close quarters by confrontation between personalities and emotionally charged principles.

The Algemene Subsidie Regeling was the climax of almost a decade of political debate concerning the nature of the legal and financial expression of the relationship between government and mission. In the process, the government stiffened its control over the mission's expenditure of government aid. This change, already apparent in earlier versions of the Sumba Regulation, facilitated the imposition of government-determined educational criteria governing the conduct of mission school classrooms. The much debated Algemene Subsidie Regeling was therefore a compromise between a financial expression of the continued support by the Batavian and Dutch governments of mission initiative and the state's need to maintain control over the main instrument of the associatie politiek. But the compromise was an expensive one. In 1922, it was anticipated that for salaries alone the new regulations would mean an increase of 250% on the existing aid granted to mission schools in Java and Madura, the regulations governing which were "more modest than most regulations applying to the Outer Islands."^{77.}

76. loc. cit...

77. loc. cit...

Not till early August, 1923 was J. Kruyt informed on behalf of the Poso Conference that Batavia had decided to apply the 1895 subsidy regulations to the Assistant Residency of Central Celebes as modified by the articles of the forthcoming subsidy regulation.⁷⁸ The decision, twelve years after the formulation of an initial Poso regulation, was greeted by Jan Kruyt with mixed feelings. In a circular letter to his colleagues, he warned that the substantial increase in government assistance would "encourage government officials to regard our schools more critically". He therefore advised them to concentrate on "the more obvious aspects of our school work". In particular, he directed their attention to absenteeism, neatness of buildings and equipment (including supply of school cupboards, teachers' desks and books and equipment which he designated as "those more or less superficial matters") and hygiene (which was not to be pursued beyond the point where this might lead to absenteeism). Particularly the first matter Jan Kruyt perceived as the most sensitive aspect of mission schools regarding which he expected "a question or an attack". He therefore requested his colleagues ambiguously to do their best "to force absences down to a minimal percentage".⁷⁹

Other sensitive and superficial aspects had also to be reckoned with. A month prior to the subsidy announcement, Kruyt had been informed by the new Controleur, Derx, that the Resident, during a recent visit had expressed his concern regarding the childrens' ignorance of "the person of Her Majesty the Queen". While it was admitted that this was to some extent understandable, the Resident had stated as his opinion that "in schools, too little mention had been made of Her". Some schools visited did not even have a picture of Her Majesty!⁸⁰

To rectify this situation, Derx sent Jan Kruyt a

78. Controleur of Poso, Derx to Jan Kruyt, 7 August, 1923.

79. J. Kruyt to the members of the Poso Conference, 21 August, 1923.

80. Derx to J. Kruyt, 7 August, 1923.

number of copies of a photograph of the Royal Family, apologizing that they were "several years old, but would suffice for our purposes". Derx suggested that any excess pictures could be beneficially used as prizes to reward outstanding school attendance records. The Resident was also impressed by the children's ignorance of the colonial administrative structure in the island of Sulawesi; they had believed that the Assistant Resident of Central Celebes lived in Poso and were unable to identify "their raja" who had stood in front of them.⁸¹

Jan Kruyt was quite correct in predicting that greater financial aid would bring in its path increased government interference. Inheriting much of his father's flair for diplomacy, he realized that with a solution to the subsidy question in sight, the sensitive interface between mission and government now lay in the more purely educational domain and that the government official who would, from now on determine the nature of that relationship was the Inspector of Native Education in Manado. Jan Kruyt therefore concentrated on developing closer relations with the Inspector and the indigenous schoolopzieners in the field.⁸²

In response to Inspector Wilmink's offer to hold a conference "to discuss broad policy" in the light of the changing subsidy regulations, J. Kruyt advised his colleagues that they should co-operate in order to

determine what we can and cannot accept of that which we are being presented with as being necessary. Sympathetic interference is for the character of our mission, as dangerous as inimical interference.⁸³

Refusal to do so would create the impression that "we want to go our own way" which would be "very damaging".

The tactic J. Kruyt hinted at here, was essentially the same his father had employed in the establishment and general organization of schools in which circumstances the mission had also felt obliged to co-operate with the Poso

81. loc. cit..

82. J. Kruyt to Inspector of Native Education (Makassar), 11 August, 1923.

83. J. Kruyt to Mission Consul, 27 October, 1922.

administration. With the increasing involvement of government inspectors in decision-making on the content of education, this area which was once the exclusive domain of the mission, even when their autonomy over school finances was being disputed, now also became a sensitive area where demarcation of authority was problematic. As missionary Kooistra commented, in regard to the proposed intensification of inspection in Mori and Malili, the teachers would get two masters, the missionary and an inspector; the latter (in this case the Inspector of Native Education in Makassar) claiming authority over the "technical side" of education. Just as the transfer of school finances was supported by some missionaries on the grounds that it relieved missionaries of the arduous task of enforcing agreements so Kooistra was prepared to accept that involvement of the inspectors "would partially relieve missionaries of responsibility of a task which they do not completely master".⁸⁴

To complicate the issue further, with the anticipated introduction of central government subsidies, missionaries in Poso would be eligible to receive an inspection subsidy under a 1917 regulation covering private schools. Thus, next to government inspectors and Native schoolopzieners, there would also exist government financed missionary school superintendants or beheerders.⁸⁵ For Kooistra, the new concentration on the operation of the classroom placed the missionary, as amateur educationist, in an embarrassing position. What was needed he argued, was the appointment of an educational specialist to the Poso Conference who could lead the mission in negotiations with the government inspector.

We must be able to depend on someone who can speak with authority on educational matters so that discussions regarding technical issues with the Inspector of the relevant inspectorate can be conducted by that person. And we missionaries will then follow the guidelines prepared for us by that expert. I don't mean to imply by this,

84. Missionary Kooistra to members of the Poso Conference.

85. J. Kruyt to the members of the Poso Conference, 2 February, 1923.

that from then on, we have nothing more to do with such things, or that our expert becomes a pope of education. ... Education is a very interesting matter, and therefore it is important that we continue to know something about it, but the lead must be given by an expert.⁸⁶.

Both relevant Inspectors, Molenaar in Makassar and Wilmink in Menado, were claiming authority over the technical decisions in mission schools in their respective districts, the latter unjustifiably so, according to the Mission Consul, because in 1922, there was as yet no subsidy regulation applicable to the schools.⁸⁷.

Jan Kruyt, lacking the subtlety of his more experienced father, took the initiative in defending the autonomy of the beheerder of the mission school against the encroachment of government inspection. The essence of Kruyt's letter to Wilmink of October, 1923 was to define the limits of the authority of the mission superintendent and of the Inspector and the ramifications of this on the process of inspection.

The Superintendent of a school is someone who, on behalf of an association or society, establishes a school, who administers it, employs and dismisses teachers, determines the nature and goal of education, provides the equipment and is finally responsible for the entire running of the school. It follows that he 1. determines what and how teaching is carried out, limited in this only by the regulations prescribed by the government; 2. that no internal or external feature of the school can be altered without his approval and cooperation and 3. that the guru ... is responsible only to the Superintendent and no-one else and need respond to no other orders than those flowing from the Superintendent.⁸⁸.

This all-embracing authority left the Inspector with the task of ensuring that regulations were fulfilled and

86. Missionary Kooistra, 26 September, 1923. In 1922, Jan Kruyt had suggested to the Conference and the Society that he would be prepared to undergo training to fulfill the function of mission educationist.

87. Mission Consul Crommelin to Jan Kruyt, 8 March, 1924. This was not the case in Mori and Malili where the schools were funded by Batavia and had thus been eligible for this "inspection subsidy".

88. J. Kruyt to Inspector Wilmink, 12 October, 1923.

that "the result of that education is acceptable".^{89.}
Naturally, the Inspector could not accept this.

Kruyt's real concern in wanting to restrict the role of the Inspector was that this task would be undertaken not by the European official himself but by his native assistants. What concerned Kruyt was that an enlarged role for the government inspection would entail increasing authority for a native official over the guru which Kruyt already implied, would weaken the European missionary's position in the eyes of the teacher who had in a different context, to accept his subordination in the mission's evangelizing work.^{90.}

Wilmink rejected Kruyt's position entirely; he viewed the non-European schoolopziener as qualified representatives of himself and as such, he fully endorsed their right to comment on

the method by which subject content is taught, to take over from the teacher, to point out mistakes, to teach and instruct in everything which involved teaching methods.

The area of teaching practice was the province of the schoolopziener because it was precisely this area that the school Superintendent was incompetent to judge but beyond the classroom practice, the opziener was not permitted to intervene. General school policy decisions were the concern only of the European Chief Inspector and mission.^{91.}

The Inspector admitted his surprise and shock in receiving Jan Kruyt's implicitly critical and offensive draft concepts regulating the newly developing relationship

89. This conclusion was supported by the Mission Consul (Crommelin to J. Kruyt, 8 March, 1924).

90. Inspector Wilmink to J. Kruyt, 25 March, 1924. The affable Inspector felt compelled to exclaim:

"What the union of two vocations in one person has to do with my method of work and how the technical educational direction provided by my schoolopziener could possibly damage any missionary interest, is not explained by you with a single word and is completely incomprehensible to me".

91. Inspector Wilmink to J. Kruyt, 20 December, 1923.

between educationist and mission. This was particularly so since the year before Wilmink had spoken at the 126th anniversary meeting of the Netherlands Missionary Society attended by Albert Kruyt where he had expressed his admiration and support of the educational work of the mission.⁹² In treating the sympathetic Inspector as though he were the worst kind of oppressive gezaghebber, which his correspondence indicates he was not, Jan Kruyt revealed the extent to which its disputes with the local government had produced in the Poso mission a persecution complex which expressed itself in the intensely inward-looking and defensive stance of Jan Kruyt's memorandum.

Fortunately, good relations could be restored with the return of Albert Kruyt in April, 1924. With his sense of diplomacy, absent from the correspondence archive for the preceding two years, Kruyt was able to smooth the ruffled feathers, apologize for the tone of previous correspondence and in the process, achieve precisely what the mission wanted; that is, relief from standard regulations and a recognition of the precedence of the mission opinion in decision-making regarding the education provision in Central Celebes.⁹³ Before the new Algemene Subsidie Regeling was introduced to Central Sulawesi therefore, the mission had managed to secure its autonomy over the "technical aspects of education" while the Algemene Subsidie Regeling provided it with maximum freedom and financial support in the administration of the school system. Even the painful question of the proposed mission standard school for Poso (later the Dutch-native school), the question which had lingered on since 1917 was settled in favour of the mission to the annoyance of the large

92. W. Wilmink, "Indrukken van het zendings-onderwijs", (Impressions of mission education), in Nededingen, 1923, pp. 246-270 (especially pp. 263-270).

93. A. Kruyt to Inspector Wilmink, 24 April, 1924. Kruyt had arrived in Pendolo from Holland on 19 April from which date he had resumed the Chairmanship of the Conference.

Chinese and Arab middle-class in Poso.⁹⁴ In the positive result gained by the Poso Conference, however, lay the seeds of later difficulties. A new cycle in the development of schooling in Central Sulawesi was about to begin, based on a new set of issues.

This is not to say that the old issues had disappeared. After a period of fruitful co-operation with Controleur Niebour, the mission was once more thrown into despondency by the stance taken by the new Controleur, Derx, who had revealed himself to be "anti-mission" in his views regarding the implementation of the interim subsidy regulation and in his attitude towards the Poso standard school question.⁹⁵ In December, 1924, Ritsema was asked by Kruyt to prepare a memorandum on the actions of Derx⁹⁶ in preparation for a third official meeting in seven years between representatives of the mission and the local government under the auspices of the Resident of Menado.⁹⁷ Once again the discussions brought about a compromise which had little effect due to the transfer of the Controleur a short while later.

One consolation the missionaries had this time was the presence of E. Gobee as Assistant Resident between 1923 and 1926. He had proven himself a conscientious aspirant controleur when stationed in Tentena in 1909-1910

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94. The history of this institution is a further thread running through the relations between mission and government which largely replicates the debates surrounding the provision of village schools.
95. Controleur of Poso Derx to J. Kruyt, 18 October, 1923. J. Kruyt to members of the Poso Conference, 19 October, 1923 and subsequent correspondence. J. Kruyt informed the missionaries: "The attitude of the Controleur (revealed in the letter of the 18th) towards our school activities is not friendly. And if I see it correctly, then the reason for this attitude is to be found in the burden which the regional treasury will have to carry as a result of the new school subsidy. When the Controleur says that the regional government could conduct schools "much more cheaply" than we do, then it is a clear indicator that he is aiming at drastically reducing the number of schools. It is therefore, the same old story It is clear that the Controleur is doing his best to get the standard school of Poso into his hands".
96. Ritsema to A. Kruyt, 1 December, 1924.
97. A. Kruyt to the Resident of Menado, 1 April, 1925.

and after studies in the Netherlands had been appointed Consul to Jeddah and acting Adviser of Native Affairs before taking up the position of Assistant Resident. His breadth of vision helped ensure the smooth introduction of the new subsidy regulation and with the transfer of his office to Poso as a result of the territorial changes of the Assistant Residency he was able to temper the independent actions of the Poso Controleur. With the confidence derived from Gobee's support, Kruyt in April, 1925 was able to protest to the Resident of Menado about Controleur Derx's replacement; Controleur van Duuren's appointment was also objected to by Gobee. Kruyt flatly declared to the Resident:

It will no longer be possible for us to place our trust [in the government official] if Mr. van Duuren becomes our Controleur since he has shown himself during his lengthy stay in this administrative area as aspirant controleur to be incapable of coping with the job.⁹⁸.

The combined forces of Assistant Resident and missionary brought about van Duuren's replacement but a year later Kruyt again found cause to communicate to the Resident of Menado his fears that the current Controleur was too effective in pursuing anti-mission policies:

I am ... afraid that the Controleur will create tense relations between mission and government if he continues as he has been. This fear is strengthened in view of the personality of Mr. Eradus⁹⁹.

Thus the personality and philosophical clashes continued but, whereas the central point of issue in the preceeding two decades was the nature of financial support and the consequent question as to the legal position of the volksschool in the care of the mission, in the next two decades the nature of the education provided in these schools became a matter of government scrutiny. In consequence of that shift in focus, the central dialogue was henceforth to be conducted between the government's regional professional educationist and the mission's educationist. The days of amateurism were left behind

98. loc. cit..

99. A. Kruyt to the Resident of Menado, 1 April, 1925.

but the foundations from which the mission argued remained similar. These, Albert Kruyt enunciated on the eve of the introduction of the Algemene Subsidie Regeling.

The situation is that the school in Central Celebes is not yet sufficiently integrated for demands to be imposed. Mostly, children are still sent to school at the request of the missionary and because school attendance is considered as part of the new situation connected to conversion to Christianity. If we were now to formulate demands which the people regarded as too troublesome, they would become stubborn and many would then not offer their children. Only after another ten or so years or even longer, can we lay down conditions when the people themselves begin to feel a need for education.¹⁰⁰.

It did not appear as though there had been much advance from the days when Kruyt expressed similar sentiments to Maze. Inspector Wilmink, like Maze, accepted Kruyt's interpretation but like Maze's successors, those of Wilmink became increasingly impatient. In the mid 1920's, as the author of a travelogue on Sulawesi revealed, in isolated regions it was still possible for a government official to impose a personal cachet on his work.¹⁰¹. By the beginning of the third decade of the twentieth century, this could no longer be stated as confidently.

After almost twenty years of intensive colonization, the administrative district of Poso remained a curiously contradictory area. As Table 7 indicates, in a population of approximately 30,000 there were about 10,000 nominal Christians of whom 3,500 regularly attended church. Forty-three mission schools were attended by just over 1,700 children, but if we are to accept Kruyt's comments, most parents were still uncertain why they did so. The classrooms were populated by children still "incapable of thinking for themselves";¹⁰². the teachers achieving little more than mechanical responses of memorized skills. Little more than fifty percent of these students completed their

100. A. Kruyt to the Director, Department of Education and Religion, 23 April, 1924.

101. W. Holtus, op. cit., pp. 146-163. Holtus was impressed by the changes brought about by Gobe.

102. N.M.S. to the Poso Conference, 13 April, 1922, quoting J. Kruyt.

TABLE 7

CHRISTIAN POPULATION, MISSION SCHOOLS, SCHOOL ATTENDANCE AND TEACHING STAFF
IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICTS OF POSO, MORI AND MALILI 1925

Mission District	Kasiguncu	Tentena	Pendolo	Onda'e	Napu	Bada & Leboni	Mori	Malili	Total
Missionary	IJ Wesseldijk A Kooistra	IJ Wesseldijk H Zuppinger	AC Kruyt	R Veldhuis	JW Wesseldijk	J Woensdrecht	K Riedel	J Ritsema	
Villages	16	8	12	21	11	17	30	14	129
Total Population	8710	3495	3661	4944	4253	5648	6460	4000(?)	41171
No. Baptized Church Members	3379	1886	1830	1996	833	1084	3802	721	15531
No. Schools	16	1133	819	-	-	573	-	-	4117
No. Pupils	696	8	6	13	8	11	17	14	93
Indigenous Teachers	7	279	283	456	332	860	736	491	4133
Minahassa Teachers	9	8	11	7	5	3	9	4	54
		-	1	6	3	8	8	10	45

schooling. In the training school, a measure of success was only gained according to Jan Kruyt by "more or less drilling" the students.¹⁰³ This pessimistic evaluation by the mission of its achievement in the field of education was shared by Inspector Wilmink who advised his agents that the stage had not yet been reached where strict enforcement of regulations could be insisted upon. In 1924 he wrote:

The first goal in Poso must be to get the children to school and to keep them there, and everything which in the meantime may interfere in the achievement of this goal must be avoided.¹⁰⁴

The Christian population was to be found in the inland areas while coastal regions were almost exclusively Muslim. In Gobee's estimation, this population group evidenced none of the hallmarks of "fanaticism" and generally, relations between the three religious groupings was good.¹⁰⁵ Even the local organization of Sarekat Islam which had held its latest meeting on the island of Una-Una in February, 1926 to consider the resolutions of the Congress of the central body, presented no significant political threat. The February meeting had been attended by no local representatives from within the Poso administration while the most prominent Tomini Gulf propagandist of the party had lost any credibility he may have had. The local Sarekat Islam organization, as a result of the meeting now officially a branch of the Sarekat Islam Party, was mainly pre-occupied in establishing schools, particularly the maintenance of their Dutch Native school in Una-Una and the proposed establishment of a teacher training institution in Gorontalo, both dependant on Javanese personnel.¹⁰⁶

After twenty years of forced sawah cultivation, Kruyt

103. loc.cit.


104. Inspector Wilmink to A. Kruyt, 17 July, 1924.

105. Assistant Resident Gobee, "Algemene Beschrijving van de afdeeling Poso," (General description of the administrative district of Poso, 13pp., 7 April, 1926, p. 5.

106. Assistant Resident Gobee, "Bestuurs-memorie van de afdeeling Poso," (Administrative memorandum for the division of Poso), 32pp., 28 March, 1926, pp. 19-20.

MAP 10

THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF POSO, 1925



From: E. Gobe, Bestuurs
Memorie, 1926

could still write that a large portion of the population scrupulously avoided that method of farming,^{107.} a conclusion shared by Gobee who in his final bestuurs memorie (administrative memorandum), noted that sawah cultivation was the exception rather than the rule and, where sawah cultivation was carried out, this was usually inefficiently performed.^{108.} The preponderance of ladang cultivation, while in part due to geographic circumstances, must also be seen as resulting from and resulting in the continuing influence of traditional culture.

After twenty years there existed only one sealed road in the region leading out of Poso itself and, while that town was the "end of the gold train of the Packetvaart", the home of wealthy Arabs and Chinese traders profiting from the inflated prices of copra and forest products, it lacked telephone and telegraph communication with the outside world, was prone to malaria, lacked running water, fresh vegetables and a sufficient labour supply.^{109.} Partly as a result of the transfer of the Assistant Resident's office from Donggala to Poso, ambitious plans to correct these inadequacies were initiated by Gobee but their completion remained a task for the future which was soon to be clouded by the world-wide economic depression.^{110.}

The economic gulf separating foreign entrepreneurs from both the indigenous Muslim coastal population and the Pamona people of the inland had also been a matter of concern to Gobee but the ineluctable laws of commerce made these concerns little more than pious hopes. In 1926, Gobee was forced to admit that the entire import trade was in the hands of "foreign orientals" who also controlled the local market of the two major export items, copra and forest products. The Chinese and Arab middlemen, by providing credit to the inland populations had also

107. A. Kruyt, "De betekenis van het nattenrijstbouw", in op. cit., p. 52.

108. Gobee, "Algemeen Beschrijving," pp. 8-9.

109. W. Holtus, op. cit., p. 160.

110. Gobee, "Bestuurs-memorie," pp. 15-19. The revival of a plan to transfer the Poso settlement to Mapane interfered with Gobee's plans, Holtus, op. cit., pp. 160-162.

managed to gain control over most of the commercial agricultural projects.¹¹¹

Gobee expressed his conviction that the economic situation in Central Sulawesi could only be improved by the intervention of the regional government and, in the longer term, by the effective education of the population. Employment-generating enterprises established by foreigners he considered the only avenue for raising the economic potential of the indigenous population. However, the Netherlands Indies Trading Bank had informed Gobee that North Sulawesi had been declared unsuitable for European-financed commercial primary production. Dutch capitalists were only interested in land leases involving more than 15,000 hectares. Direct involvement by the regional government (and presumably by the mission, although Gobee did not mention this) would therefore be necessary to establish smaller scale enterprises particularly in the area of the exploitation of timber resources. Even then Gobee realized, as a result of the low population density,

nearly all commercial enterprises of any significance would need to operate with its own employees ... only suitably located timber projects would be able to attract as is the case at present, significant numbers of indigenous workers.¹¹²

In the meantime, it would be the responsibility of the government to protect the indigenous population from the rapaciousness of oriental entrepreneurs, particularly in the matter of the availability of credit and to promote the efforts of the schools in preparing a more assertive and self-sufficient people.

Europe's impact after twenty years was little more than superficial. In 1925, little time remained for the colonists to deepen that influence. Nor was it likely that its impact would ever penetrate deeply into Pamona

111. Gobee, *Algemeen beschrijving*, pp. 8-9.

112. *ibid*, p. 9.

society for, despite the mission's protestations to the contrary, the government and mission approach to change was essentially imposition from above. Even then it was piecemeal, with the task jealously divided between the secular and religious arms of the colonial power.

APPENDIX NO. 1.

LETTER FROM KARTINI TO DR. ADRIANI, 19 MARCH 1901.

Highly honored Dr. Adriani:

For a long time I have wanted to write to you, but several things, among them the indisposition of almost all of my family have prevented me.

Now that the whole kabupaten, great and small, is again rejoicing in excellent health, I shall not allow this letter to remain any longer unwritten. It has been in my thoughts so long, and doubtless you have expected it as well. Forgive me for the delay.

First of all I want to send my hearty thanks for your kindness in sending the books.

The three of us were made so happy by them, and are still for that matter. We think it is splendid that you should think of us. We also think and speak of you and of your Toradjas, of your work, and of everything that we discussed that evening at the Abendanons. The hours that we spent in your company are among the most delightful memories of our visit to Batavia.

We hope with our whole hearts that will not be our only meeting, but that we may see you often again. What a pleasure it would be to us, if some day we might bid you welcome to Japara.

We have much sympathy for the work of the Christian missionaries in Dutch India, and we admire the nobility of heart of those who have established themselves in the most remote stretches of wilderness, far from their own country and kindred, and from all congenial companions, and cut themselves off from the world in which by virtue of birth, ability and education they would have an honorable position, to bring light into the lives of fellow men called by the cultivated world "savages".

We read both your letters with deep interest and I am grateful to you for telling us so much interesting, and of which we were ignorant.

In 1896 we had the privilege and pleasure of witnessing a solemnity the memory of which will probably remain with us all of our lives. That was the dedication of the new church at Kedung Pendjalin. It was the first time that we had ever been in a Christian church, and at a Christian service, and what we saw and heard there made a deep impression upon us. It was long ago, but it is still fresh in my memory. The spacious building was decorated with green foliage and the singing which echoed under the high roof was beautiful. With the reverent attentive multitude we followed the words which came forth from the chancel in pure Javanese.

Besides Heer Hubert, there were three missionary students, who preached upon the occasion; and it was certainly not the least solemn moment of the whole solemn service, when an old decrepit Javanese stood up to speak of his faith to his fellow countrymen. Everything was so impressive that the occasion has always been a memorable one to me.

Appendix No. 1 (cont'd.)

It was on that morning that I had seen the outside world again for the first time since my school days.

We read in the paper under the sailing news that Mevrouw was back again in India, so she will be with you very soon. We were very glad for your sake, when we read it. This letter is as though we made you and Mevrouw a visit of felicitation upon her return, to wish her, although we are still unknown to her, welcome to Mapane. Are not the Toradjas very happy to have their "Mother" among them again?

From Raden Adjeng Kartini, Letters of a Javanese Princess, (Norton & Co., New York, 1964), pp.101-103.

APPENDIX NO. 2,

EXTRACTS FROM THE DIARY OF GURU H. KOLON DAM OF PANTA 1895

- 4 July - 3 children came to learn to draw figures and 2 came to talk about the school.
- 6 July - 2 children came to learn.
- 13 July - Today 2 children came.
- 25 July - Today 2 children came for instruction.
- 17 August - Today 3 children came to school. Kabosenya Taurana came ... and sat on the floor to watch 2 children weave mats from paper [Froebel work].
- 20 August - 3 children came to learn.
- 31 August - 4 children came to learn.
- 1 September - 2 children came to learn.
- 29 September - 2 children came to school but they did not stay long. In the evening 3 youths came. They asked: How can we learn the Malay language from the books?
- 31 October - As regards the children, from the 11th of this month they do not want to come back any more.
- 14 November - 4 children appeared at school again.
- 17 November - 3 children came to learn.
- 22 November - 2 children came to learn but very soon had had enough.
- 30 November - 2 children came but they had not much desire to learn.
- 1 December - 15 children came but they were very mixed: [there were children] from Panta, Mapayawa and from Buyu mBajau. They learnt some letters and a little writing.
- 4 December - 5 children came but all for the first time.
- 6 December - Not one child today.
- 7 December - Some children did come but they would not learn except one child who learnt a little sewing from the Nyora [guru's wife].
- 8 December - 3 children came but I had only just begun to teach something when they left.

Taken from diary extracts as provided by A. Kruyt and published in Mededelingen, vol. 39, 1895, pp. 77-81 and 201-207.

EXTRACT FROM THE BARE'E LANGUAGE,
 OLD TESTAMENT READER USED IN MISSION SCHOOLS

25. I Moesa pai i Haroeni ri soeara i Datoe Pirao.

Pangkita nTo Isaraeli i Moesa pai i Haroeni da ndjo'oe mompaoe pai i Datoe nTo Masiri, da mampetompaka To Isaraeli da ndjo'oe mosoesa ri sambote nTasi Mawaa, mawongkomo rajanja, nato'o: Setoemo djaja ngkalapata ri kawatoeata.

Meponemo ntano i Moesa pai i Haroeni ri langkanae, mekakore ri soeara i mPirao. Meoasi i Pirao: Noendjaa ndikama'ika? Mesono i Moesa: Ewase'i songka mPoeë Ala: To Isaraeli da ndjo'oe mosoesa ri sambote nTasi Mawaa. Mesono i Pirao: Bare'e koewai, bare'e koeintjani Poeë Ala, bare'e koeaja songkanja. Da koepakanee tetala nTo Isaraeli, bare'epa gana powianja woengka eo, da koepokaoe mampomontjoe watoe, mampowia banoea, ma'ai da potetalanja. Naepe nTo Isaraeli i Pirao madja'amo rajanja, kabare'enja napodjo maaja pompaoe i Moesa pai i Haroeni; kadja'a ndajanja se'e, ri To Isaraeli katoedoenja, maka narangani tetalanja.

Ri raja ngkawase'enja nato'o i Moesa pai i Haroeni da ndjo'oe sangkanipa ri Datoe Pirao. Napopeasi ntaoe santoea'i setoe i Pirao ri wiwi ngkoro Nili. Bare'e masae djelamo i Pirao, rajanja da mandioe. Bare'epa toedoe ri oeë, se'i i Moesa pai i Haroeni mantjeko si'a, nato'o: Kabare'enja ndiwai To Isaraeli mesoewoe oengka ri tanami, da ndadjeani mPoeë Ala komi pai wa'a ntaoemi. Roo mompaoe ewase'e, nalaenaka i Haroeni tokonja ri wawc oeë, mewalimo daa oeë poera², ri koro Nili, ri tomba, ri limbo, sako oeë ri wojo aoe natomboemo ntaoe, mewali daa poera². Mate baee, masapi, garango, toempa, woewoenja anoe toewoe ri oeë, bare'emo manginoe taoe, bare'emo nakoto kawaoenja. Paikanja bare'e naaja i mPirao pedjeani mPoeë Ala se'i, nato'o: Njaoe kami, kakoto wo'oe mampowia anoe ewantjetoe. Bare'e koewai To Isaraeli da malai.

Oengka lairia bare'emo ndaowe² mPoeë Ala madjea²ni To Masiri. Ndapakaria²mo mPoeë Ala wa'a nggaroepoe ntana anoe masii pesengoenja: tamboea, njaoea, oeani, nasengoe taoe, nasengoe pinatoewoe, bare'emo nakoto ntaoe kadjoe'anja. Dja ri tana Gose bare'e re'e. Sangajanja wo'oe, wa'a mpinatoewoe nTo Masiri madjoe'a: kepapoea, kewela, maria anoe mate: njaranja, djapinja, mboelanja, bimbanja. Paikanja ri pinatoewoe nTo Isaraeli bare'e re'e aoe mate. Bare'e masae melimbamo wo'oe ri taoe djoe'a mpinatoewoe setoe, bare'emo toa taoe kasondo bisoenja, sako i Pirao bare'e nakoto membangoe. Merapimo wo'oe poeroe i Pirao ri Moesa pai i Haroeni, mekakaimo i Moesa ri Poeë Ala pai ndapampapaowe moeni mPoeë Ala wa'a ndjoe'a setoe pai naka'osa ntaoe. Naepe i Pirao osamo moeni koronja, bare'emo wo'oe nawai To Isaraeli malai. Ntje'e pai ndapadjeanimo wo'oe mPoeë Ala taoe setoe. Maetamo jangi, mesoewoe berese, kila, goendoe, se'i wo'oe oedja watoe toedoe ri wa'a nTo Masiri, mate taoe pai pinatoewoe maria². Dja ri tana Gose bare'e re'e oedja ewantje'e. Poeramo setoe, maria kodjo toepako mangkoni pinamoeja pai ewo pai nakaparasimo, sako ira ngkadjoe nakoni poera². Nepa re'e wo'oe pedjeani: mawengimo sambawo ntana Masiri, dja ri tana Gose mareme. Ma'ai kawenginja, mapari naepe ntaoe, bare'emo re'e reme. Setoe pai napanto'o i mPirao: Ndipalaimo, komi Moesa, Haroeni pai wa'a nTo Isaraeli, maka kami bare'emo kakoto, mapari gaga katoewoe mami.

APPENDIX NO. 4.

SUBSIDY REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS 1895

Private Schools Ordinance of 10 July, 1895 (Staatsblad No. 146)

Rules for the awarding of subsidies paid from the treasury to private native schools.

Article One

Subsidies can be paid to private native schools which provide elementary education.

To be eligible they must fulfill the following conditions:

- (1) The government must be assured that a real need exists.
- (2) Instruction must consist of at least:
 - (a) the reading and writing in its own and Roman script of either the local language or Malay language where the former is judged unsuitable for use in instruction.
 - (b) the four main rules in arithmetic with whole numbers.
- (3) Instruction is given for at least three hours daily; when religious instruction is also given the minimum school time will be increased accordingly.
- (6) The teachers, unless in possession of a diploma which would make them appointable to a government elementary native school, and trainees, must present evidence to the local school committee which satisfies them as to their suitability for the job. A written declaration will be given to them of this.
- (9) The classrooms will as far as possible, be arranged according to the locality and provide proper protection against wind, rain and sunshine.
- (10) The schools must be provided in a simple but sufficient manner with furniture and teaching material The seats should as far as possible, be in line with the local style.
- (13)
School fees may be levied up to the amount laid down for government second-class native schools.

Translated from J. Hoekman (Ed.) De Vernaamste Voorschriften Betreffende Het Inlandsch Onderwijs, pp.217-218.

Other requirements which had to be fulfilled were:

- (a) a minimum of twenty-five pupils,
- (b) accessibility to all children between six and seventeen regardless of religion.

Subsidy was offered as a lump sum for the initial cost of erection together with an annual allowance for general maintenance and upkeep as follows:

Number of Pupils	Lump Sum Payment	Annual Payment
25 - 50	f. 200	20
51 - 100	f. 300	30
101+	f. 400	40

Further allowances could be claimed to meet other approved expenses on the following basis:

25 Pupils	A maximum of f.100
26-30 Pupils	" " " f.125
31-40 Pupils	" " " f.150
41-50 Pupils	" " " f.175
51-75 Pupils	" " " f.200
76-100 Pupils	" " " f.225
101+	" " " f.250

From J. Kats, Overzicht van het onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie (revised Edition, 1915), pp.47-48.

APPENDIX NO. 5.

COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL FOR SEVERAL AREAS
OF SUMATRA AND THE ASSISTANT RESIDENCY OF CENTRAL CELEBES (FROM H. COLIJN, 1906)

Name of Region	Area in Square Population		Administrative Personnel				
	1000 Meters		Resident Ass.	Controleur or Military Civil Administrator	Aspirant Controleur Admin.	Civil Native Ass.	
Bengkulen	443.9	161,185	1	8	3	-	13 Mantris
Lampongs	533.3	141,364	1	6	4	-	-
Jambi (with Koring)	± 850	± 225,000	1	8	1	-	8
Central Celebes	600	175,000	-	3	1	2	3

APPENDIX NO. 6.

POPULATION OF THE ASSISTANT RESIDENCY OF
CENTRAL CELEBES, 1906
(from H. Colijn)

A. WESTCOAST REGION

State of Mamuju	15,000
State of Banawa	18,000
State of Tawaeli	12,600
State of Toli-Toli	<u>16,750</u>
	62,350

B. PALU REGION

State of Palu	15,500
State of Belomaru	6,300
State of Sigi	10,000
State of Dolo	7,700
State of Kulawi	11,800
State of Bada	9,900
State of Besoa	<u>3,700</u>
	64,900

C. POSO REGION

State of Tojo	8,700
State of Poso (Right Bank)	17,000
State of Poso (Left Bank)	2,210
State of Napu	<u>2,700</u>
	30,610

D. PARIGI REGION

State of Parigi	8,000
State of Toribulu	6,300
State of Moo'Etong	<u>11,000</u>
	25,300

Colijn also argued for the inclusion of Eastern Celebes and Mori in the Assistant Residency. Thus he added:

E. BANGGAI REGION

State of Banggai	24,250
State of Una Una	2,000
State of Togeau	<u>3,000</u>
	29,000

F. BUNGKU REGION

State of Bungku	7,000
State of Mori	<u>20,000</u>
	27,000

APPENDIX NO. 7.

STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSED BUDGET FOR THE
ASSISTANT RESIDENCY OF CENTRAL CELEBES
(from H. Colijn)

INCOME	f.	EXPENDITURE	f.
<u>Income Tax -</u>	250,000	<u>Compensation to the</u>	
5% of income of		<u>Central Government</u>	
each indigenous		European Admin.	87,420
family in total		Police & Govt.	
population of		shipping	10,640
330,710		Compensation for	
		loss of native	
<u>Income Tax on</u>		taxation rights	19,925
<u>Europeans</u>		Payment of native	
Export Duties		rulers	
Import Duties		Customs Officials	11,250
Salt Duties	150,000	Medical Services	2,760
Opium Duties		Post	480
		Misc.	<u>2,350</u>
			134,815
		<u>Contribution to</u>	
		<u>Colonial Exp.</u>	
		$\frac{1}{2}$ Income Tax	125,000
		Total European	
		Tax & Total	
		Duties	<u>150,000</u>
			275,000
		Less Compens.	
		direct colonial	
		expenses	<u>134,815</u>
			140,185
		<u>Fixed Annual</u>	
		<u>Expenditure</u>	
		Native Admin.	52,000
		Education	10,000
		Medical	3,000
		Misc.	<u>2,000</u>
			67,000
		<u>Development</u>	
		<u>Projects</u>	
		Roads	30,000
		Agriculture	<u>45,000</u>
			75,000
	400,000		

NB. (Figures as listed do not balance. This balance sheet is made up from figures given in the body of the Colijn document).

APPENDIX NO. 8

OUTLINE OF A CONFERENCE WITH TO PAMONA CHIEFS
HELD BY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF POSO, 6 FEBRUARY 1910

Because the commands of the government have been carried out poorly or not at all it has become necessary to point out once again the aims of the government. These are nothing else but the implementation of measures which will promote the prosperity of the people and of the region and include among other things:

1. The maintenance of peace (protection against hostile attacks, prohibition of head-hunting).
2. The maintenance of law and order (recognition and support of the authority of village chiefs and improvement of justice by the prohibition of trial by ordeal).
3. Promotion of better health (establishment of villages near good water supplies, maintenance of hygiene in these villages, vaccination and other medical provisions, provision of medicine).
4. Concern for the availability of sufficient food supplies (regulations for timely preparation of sawah and plantations).
5. Education, which will become, for example, a safeguard against cheating.
6. Construction of roads, initially disliked, but the value and convenience of which will now have to be recognized.
7. Restriction of time spent gathering forest products as many return ill from such expeditions and usually with little financial gain.

To meet the costs involved, tax has to be paid and this money is to be spent on:

1. Salary for administrative personnel, chiefs etc..
2. Education.
3. Medicine.
4. Seed.
5. Tools and equipment etc..

Through all these measures a region will eventually be established with a more numerous and energetic population, whose land is properly cultivated, whose traffic is not too greatly inconvenienced, where everything is conducted in an orderly fashion and where disputes and internal strife do not exist.

One element which remains of the bad or rather wrong institutions of the early days is the funeral feast (motengke) where much of the food supplies gathered together by hard work are squandered, the nest-egg, consisting of the buffalo herds, broken into, where health and hygiene are forgotten and where, last but not least, a great danger of contamination exists while cleaning the skeletons. Therefore, this will also be prohibited; the dead must receive a timely burial and may not be dug up again.

APPENDIX NO. 9.

EXTRACT FROM THE 1892 EDUCATION DECREE

Royal Decree of 28 September 1892 No.44.
(Staatsblad, 1893 No. 125)

Article 1

The public native schools for elementary education in Netherlands-India are divided into two categories as follows:

- a. first-class schools, more especially meant for the children of native nobles and of other notable and well-to-do natives;
- b. second-class schools are meant for the children of the native population in general.

.....

Regulation for the public elementary native schools defined by Article 1 of the Royal Decree of 28 September, 1892.

1. Of the erection and arrangement of first and second-class schools

Article 1

- (1) First-class schools ... will be situated in the capitals of regions, districts and sub-districts and similar places and also in centres of commerce and industry and generally in such places where there is a need for more extended elementary education.
- (2) When more than one first-class school is situated in one area, one of these can be exclusively set aside for the children of notables.

.....

Article 2

- (1) Second-class schools ... will be erected according to need, both in places where first-class schools have been established and in other places.
- (2) Second-class schools conform as much as possible to the environment of the pupils as regards building and furniture.

APPENDIX NO. 10.

PROVISION OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLING FOR THE INDIGENOUS POPULATION
OF THE DUTCH EAST INDIES 1854 - 1913.

YEAR	GOVT. ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS		MISSION ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS		PRIVATE NEUTRAL ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS		VILLAGE SCHOOLS	
	JAVA	OUTER ISLANDS	JAVA	OUTER ISLANDS	JAVA	OUTER ISLANDS	JAVA	OUTER ISLANDS
1854	29	12						
1857	36	14	247		46			
1860	41	17						
1864 TOTAL	66							
1870	79	181	14	135				
1872	83	184	13	125				
1882	193	319	25	150				
1887	201	318	59	214				
1892	203	301	39	438	115	15		
1897	205	296	44	461	164	31		
1898	204	296	43	524	175	37		
1899	207	299	49	547	188	33		
1900	209	310		864				
1901 TOTAL	536		921					
1902 TOTAL	559		994					
1903 TOTAL	580		1077					
1904	258	345	77	704	281	72		
1905	264	361	83	774	326	85		
1906	276	374	90	808	355	161		
1907	278	382	93	891	468	257	122	
1908	335	394	98	979	500	283	367	
1909	412	395	117	1074	499	363	723	
1910	546	407	125	1117	421	443	1161	
1911	633	417	149	1270	378	537	1740	
1912	718	433	146	1406	327	517	2531	474
1913	737	452	156	1478	325	355	2948	621

APPENDIX NO. 11

CURRICULUM OF THE VOLKSSCHOOL IN
JAVANESE-SPEAKING REGIONS

No. of Subject	Subject or part of subject	Hours per week	
		First Half Year	Second Half Year
1.	<u>Class 1</u>		
	Language		6 $\frac{1}{4}$
	a. Practical instruction related to oral and comprehension exercises	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	
	b. Reading exercises using Javanese characters from the board and from the book	3	
	c. Transcription and dictation (Javanese script)	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	
	d. Story telling	$\frac{1}{2}$	
2.	Arithmetic		5 $\frac{3}{4}$
	Numbers 1-20 with the use of aids		
	a. Oral arithmetic	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	
	b. Mental arithmetic	1	
	c. Written arithmetic (also cyphering)	3	
3.	Writing		2 $\frac{1}{2}$
	Writing characters and figures on a slate		
4.	Drawing	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
	Total	15	15
	<u>Class 2</u>		
1.	Language		6 $\frac{3}{4}$
	a. Practical instruction related to oral and comprehension exercises	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	
	b. Reading exercises using Javanese and Roman script	3	
	c. Language exercises	$\frac{3}{4}$	
	d. Transcription and dictation (Javanese and Roman script)	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	
	e. Story telling	$\frac{1}{2}$	
	Sub. Total	6 $\frac{3}{4}$	

CONTINUED

Class 2

2.	Arithmetic		
	Numbers from 1-100 with the use of aids		
	Reading the time on a clock		
	a. Oral arithmetic	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	5 $\frac{1}{4}$
	b. Mental arithmetic	1	
	c. Written arithmetic (also cyphering)	3	
3.	Writing on a slate in Javanese and Roman script	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
4.	Drawing	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
	Total	15	15

Class 3

1.	Language		
	a. Oral and comprehension exercises	$\frac{3}{4}$	1 $\frac{1}{2}$
	b. Reading exercises using Javanese and Roman script	3	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
	c. Language exercises	$\frac{3}{4}$	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
	d. Transcription and dictation (using Javanese and Roman script)	1 $\frac{3}{4}$	3 $\frac{1}{4}$
	e. Story telling and/or singing	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
2.	Arithmetic		
	Numbers 1-1000 as much as possible with the use of aids		
	Measuring and weighing with native measures and weights. Some understanding of fractions		
	a. Oral arithmetic	1 $\frac{1}{4}$	3
	b. Mental arithmetic	1	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
	c. Written arithmetic (also cyphering)	3	6
3.	Writing on paper using Javanese and Roman script	2 $\frac{1}{2}$	3
4.	Drawing	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
	Total	15	30

(Translated from H.I.O.C. publication, No. 9 (part 2), Appendix 5)

APPENDIX NO. 12

SUBSIDY REGULATIONS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS 1906.

Staatsblad 1906 No. 241-495

Rules for the subsidizing of private native schools in Java and Madura.

The conditions for eligibility for government subsidies were altered in two significant ways: to be eligible, a school needed a minimum enrolment of only twelve pupils and the calculation of subsidies also differed as follows:

Lump sum payment for initial erection and installation as well as any subsequent "rebuilding, renewing or extensions" would be calculated at three-quarters of the actual cost.

Annual Subsidy

- (a) f.75 for each teacher
- (b) a bonus of f.30, f.60, f.90 or f.120, depending on the qualifications and classification of each teacher.
(Regulations also specified that for every forty pupils, a further teacher must be employed)
- (c) An amount intended to cover incidental expenses calculated on the basis of enrolment:

12 Pupils	f. 40
13-20 Pupils	f. 55
21-30 Pupils	f. 70
31-40 Pupils	f. 85
41-50 Pupils	f.100

and for each pupil over fifty, an additional f.2 up to a maximum of f.800.

These regulations were applied to the mission schools of Bolaang Mongondou (North Sulawesi) in an agreement with the mission covering the period 1911-1915.

(From Kats, op. cit., pp.48-49)

The Minahassa school problem was solved by a special subsidy regulation gazetted in 1912 (No. 579) and 1914 (No. 781). It replaced the 1895 regulations and enabled government subsidies to be granted to the wide range of school types which arose out of the conversion of government schools.

Subsidy to these schools remained substantially the same as those provided under the 1895 regulations with the addition of the payment of the teachers salaries as established in the 1906 regulations. As in the latter case, these related to the qualifications of the teachers involved.

Assistant without diploma	f.5 per month
Teacher with diploma	f.7.50 per month to f.17.50
Head teacher	f.20 per month to f.35

For school equipment etc., a further f.0.75 per pupil was provided.

APPENDIX NO. 13.

CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 5 FROM THE NETHERLANDS MISSIONARY SOCIETY TO ITS MISSIONARIES IN THE DUTCH EAST INDIES, JULY, 1919:

The financial independence of [Christian] communities.

[After stressing the significance of direct contributions by indigenous Christians to their church which "because of their spiritual influence must be maintained and capital accumulation must not make them redundant", the circulaire continued to discuss the value of projects intended to accumulate funds for the support of indigenous Christian communities.]

The benefits of capital formation, not for each separately, but for districts and if necessary, entire ethnic church areas, are obvious. Undoubtedly, one will have to generally resort to a particular crop, for instance, the cultivation of rice, or coconut or other plantation. To administer them, one will have to rely on missionaries for the foreseeable future who, should each community undertake such a project, would be overburdened with work. By organizing such projects per mission district, the task would become simpler.

On the other hand, such plans would replace unpaid labour in gardens. That is certainly to be regretted, but experience has taught us how difficult it is to realize this principle [of unpaid labour]. As a result, to maintain it, we cannot do without the support of the civil administration, even if only the kampong chief. Opposition to this is already apparent from European officials and such criticism is not entirely without substance. The difficulty is increased because in some of our mission fields, the administration is establishing community plantations to meet the needs of the civilian community, a measure, which is certainly praiseworthy, but as a result of which we are coming into difficulties, and confusion is created because the distinction between civilian and church communities is not clear to the people of the Indies. By means of unpaid labour [in Christian community gardens] the requirement for voluntary giving can be imposed; but this can also occur by holding collections for all kinds of ends

We therefore earnestly ask you to direct your attentions to capital accumulation for the support of Native [Christian] communities. Where community plantations exist, and their administration is not too onerous, these of course need not be closed down. But it should be remembered, that difficulties which do not exist at present, may reveal themselves later. Therefore, it does seem advisable to consider centralizing them.

Probably, particularly in the Outer Islands, capital will be necessary to initiate these plantation schemes. This we do not consider an insurmountable problem. Prepare a good proposal, including an estimate of cost, inform us [N.M.S. finance committee] how much capital would be necessary and over how long a period this could be repaid, preferably inclusive of a small rate of interest; we will then try to make the necessary capital available. To find the necessary help we do not consider entirely impossible.

The question as to whether such schemes would be instituted for each district, can be worked out in relation to local circumstances. At the moment there is much that can be said in support of complete centralization. The enterprises could then take the form of the coconut plantation established in Tabolo (N.G.) by the Utrecht Missionary Association and for the administration, a European could be sent out. But it must be remembered that eventually

Appendix No. 13 (cont'd.)

the administration of these gardens must be transferred to the Native communities. Because of that, too great a degree of centralization as a result of which the enterprise would become too complex, should be avoided. It will certainly be many years before the administration can be entrusted to the Indies people. Perhaps it is worthy of consideration that when this happens, they would be as easily able to administer a large as a small enterprise. The most important thing is that it is a question of financial independence of Native communities or Native Churches; definitely not a matter of providing financial support for the mission treasury. When the scheme in Tabelo was commenced, this had been the intention We declare with emphasis that the above considerations apply to capital formation in the interests of Native communities; that the capital advances we provide must be repaid, including interest so that these projects can be regarded as completely owned by Native communities.

Spiritual independence of Christian communities

Financial independence is of course, closely linked with spiritual independence. In this regard, we must again direct attention to the significance of the attitude you have taken towards the members of your communities. The greatest weakness in the Indies people is their lack of independence. They think, speak and act as the majority does, and do not dare to go against the current of opinion. For this reason, when these large scale conversions have taken place, the Indies people lean on the missionary and ask him for leadership and regulations in all types of situations.

It is extremely tempting for the missionary to give in to this. He feels only too well that his congregation cannot stand on its own feet; he perceives that everything will go wrong if he does not organize it himself, and he has too much regard for his own work to let things run their course and develop by themselves. We feel very acutely the difficulties with which you are faced, and it is not in the least our aim to express an opinion about your detailed activities, even less to judge them. We fully realize that often the control has to be exercised in order to avoid worse problems.

But we expressly speak of worse problems. Because there are great disadvantages attached to taking or maintaining control. Sometimes it is better to let matters go wrong so that people will become wise as a result of their own misfortune or shame. One has to dare to do this. Also it should not be forgotten that in each person there exists the desire to exercise authority over his fellow man. This desire is powerfully stimulated by the people of the Indies. Someone, who knows these people well, has once said that a native Indies person constantly awakens the schoolmaster in the European. We are so bold as to add to this; also the governor. And thereby, we transfer the relationship to a domain in which every sinful person must be extra-ordinarily careful. The situation is this, that you guide your community; not that you rule it. In this we ask your special attention and we are convinced we do not do so in vain.

REPLY TO CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 5 BY ALBERT KRUYT

Financial independence of the Christian community

I cannot desist to state once again that I very much regret that government officials, by their untimely interference, have disturbed the healthy evolution of our Christians towards independence by now separating the spiritual from the mundane, a separation which our still very communalistic and animistic thinking Christians cannot comprehend

As a result of the just mentioned disturbance of our work by government officials, this has become necessary. But in practice this will prove to be very difficult, just because religion will not be able to be separated from the society. In this lies the difficulty mentioned by Brother Wesseldijk, that it will not be understood that Christians will be asked for contributions for the same person for whom they already give twenty percent of their tax. But this should be possible; even if it is not completely understood, it will still be known who contributions are being given to.

But the question at issue is how a fund is to be formed out of which later expenses will have to be met. For this, no per capita levy can be levied on the Christians. It is not understood now, what the purpose is of community money, from collections and baptismal certificates, and for that reason, none of our Christians will want to accept a tax (because that is undoubtedly how the per capita levy will be called) for something that does not yet exist. Such a fund can, in my opinion, only be established out of profits from enterprises initiated by the mission such as trading and plantation projects. Brother Wesseldijk states correctly, that such enterprises contribute nothing to the independence of the community. But this is not necessary, because such enterprises will only serve to supplement communities which later may appear unable to completely support themselves. In other words, such a fund is a sub-account of the Missionary Society.

When the administration of the mission in Holland therefore, is not strong enough to support the community ... then I do not see any objection in the administration searching for other means to provide funds as a result of which coconut and retail projects are established. But I cannot agree that such schemes should be regarded as branches or services of the mission. They are simply means to raise money set up by the administration of the mission society but apart from that, has nothing to do with the mission. That is; these projects have no effect on the Christians and contribute nothing to the spiritual well-being of the Natives. Therefore, I continue to find it unjust that the managers of such projects have an equal role in the Conference to that of missionary teachers.

I would regret even more if missionaries were burdened with the task of maintaining such plantations. Even apart from the fact that most plantations would fail, the mission would thereby be greatly damaged because if the management of such a project was given to a missionary, who by nature was attracted to such work, then the plantation might be successful but the real missionary work would be neglected. Furthermore, giving this task to the missionary would represent a shift in duties, which, until now, was the concern of the administrators of the Missionary Society or of the Native communities themselves. I would wish that plantations or trading enterprises which served to support mission work, were independently administered I am convinced that too close a link between such enterprises and actual mission work must lead to damage of the latter.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bulk of contemporary sources used in this thesis is located in the archive of Dr. Alb. C. Kruyt and Rev. J. Kruyt, 1890-1954 deposited at Oegstgeest in 1970. The Kruyt archive has been collected in twenty-five boxes and further subdivided in folders within which separate bundles of documents have been isolated. No apparent system has been followed in the arrangement other than that which suited the purposes of the original collator. Original folder headings are used in this bibliography.

The remainder of the bibliography has been set out to provide the most convenient overview of the major sources consulted in the preparation of this thesis. The key official unpublished government documents located in the Kruyt archive have been identified separately. Articles originating from missionaries working in the Poso area have been listed separately. A complete listing of articles written by A.C. Kruyt can be found in an appendix to K.J. Brouwer, Dr. A.C. Kruyt, Dienaar der Toradja's and for a more inclusive bibliography on the "Toradja Group", the reader is referred to R. Kennedy, Bibliography of Indonesian Peoples and Cultures, (Yale Anthropological Studies, Volume 4, 1945).

The bibliography is arranged as follows:

- I Contemporary Sources
 - A. The Kruyt archive
 - B. Other Mission Sources
 - 1. Limited edition publications
 - 2. Articles published by Poso missionaries
 - a) Annual Reports, 1895-1913
 - b) Other
 - C. Government Sources
 - 1. Unpublished
 - 2. Published

- II Other Contemporary Sources (Pre 1930)
 - A. Articles
 - B. Books and Pamphlets

- III Later Works (Post 1930)
 - A. Books and Articles
 - B. Theses

I Contemporary Sources

A. The Kruyt Archive

Letters by Dr. Alb. C. Kruyt to:

Administration, Netherlands Missionary Society,
1907-1922 (Box 101A, II, folder i)

Dr. N. Adriani, 1900-1915 (Box 96A, I, folder iv)

Baron van Boetzelaer van Dubbeldam, 1907-1915 (Box
101A, VI, folder iv)

Missionary Hofman, 1907-1908 (Box 106A, V, folder
iii)

Parents (J. Kruyt, Modjo-warno), 1901-1904 (Box
106A, V, folder iii)

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Correspondence between Dr. Alb. C. Kruyt and
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cies, 1915-1922 (Box 96A, VII, folder iii)

Correspondence dealing with:

Commercial enterprises (mission) in Central Celebes,
1914-1942 (Box 96A, V, folder ii)

Mission policy issues, 1910-1941 (Box 101A, III,
folder i)

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1909-1940 (Box 96A, V, folder iii)

Relations with the government inspectorate, 1917-1940
(Box 101A, IV, folder ii)

Correspondence, copies of reports, government policy
statements and official decisions dealing with:

Education, Dutch-Native school, 1922-1938 (Box 101A,
IV, folder iii)

Education, establishment new schools (Box 101A, V, folder i)

Education of guru and guru regulations (Box 101A, V, folder i)

Education policy, 1915-1941 (Box 101A, IV, folder i)

The General Subsidy Regulation (Box 101A, III, folder ii)

Schools prior to the introduction of the General Subsidy Regulation (Box 101A, III, folder ii)

Schools self-maintenance, 1911-1940 (Box 101A, III, folder i)

Teacher training, 1913-1941 (Box 101A, V, folder ii)

Teacher training school, 1908-1941 (Box 101A, VIII, folder ii)

Reports and official government documents:

Important documents, 1888-1914 (Box 101A, I, folder ii)

Various official documents, 1892-1926 (Box 101A, VII, folder ii)

Miscellaneous:

Statistical information, 1917-1918, 1920, 1924-1930 and 1933 (Box 96A, V, folder i)

B. Other Mission Sources

1. Limited edition publications

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2. Articles published by Poso missionaries

a) Annual Reports, 1895 to 1913

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