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The colonial conquest of Palu and Kulawi Valley in western Central Sulawesi, Indonesia, is characterised by the so-called “ethical policy”, which was introduced to Dutch colonial policy at the beginning of the 20th century. An in-depth analysis of Dutch colonial sources, the memories van overgave, which have never been analysed in such detail on the subject of cultural geography, reveals that almost all facets of cultural landscape were influenced by the Dutch rule. These sources also disclose the ambiguous use of ethical policy by justifying or withdrawing colonial intervention in this area.

Introduction

While the central regions of Indonesia have a long-standing history of scientific research in cultural geography, Central Sulawesi still represents uncharted terrain. The Dutch colonialists, who ruled the Indonesian archipelago from 1602 to 1942, largely ignored this region for centuries. When they did station colonial officials in Indonesia at the beginning of the 20th century (see Fig. 1), the short interval of their presence (1905 to 1942) left a legacy of enormous structural modifications to the cultural landscape. These effects were all carried out under the pretext of a so-called “ethical policy”. Postcolonial development of the region was thus shaped by Dutch colonial interventions, which provide a basis for explaining structures and processes of recent spatial settings.

The memories van overgave, reports prepared by the regional colonial officials, offer an abundance of data and information for the reconstruction of cultural landscape development in Central Sulawesi. However, they represent a one-dimensional view, namely that of the colonial ruling power. Moreover, these reports are very clearly structured that makes it, on the one hand, easier to compare developments over time but, on the other hand, makes them also a rather limited source. The appearance of erased passages in the reports reflects the censorship that limits the use of the sources as well. Nevertheless, the memories van overgave are, besides published
Figure 1: Chronology of Dutch Conquest of the Indonesian Archipelago (Missen, 1972: 131f, in Dunn, 1984:161)
Figure 2: Dutch Colonial Borders in Western Central Sulawesi in 1938

**Places and rivers**

1. Penguwu
2. Balane
3. Watudea
4. Kabonera
5. Duju
6. Katkukuba
7. Tanamodindi I
8. Sidarta River
9. Sidera
10. Tinggede
11. Tautura
12. Djonoge
13. Donggala-kecil
14. Porame
15. Doda

**Borders**

- Black: Border of Afdeeling
- Light gray: Border of Landschap
- Dark gray: Border Residentie- Gouvernement
- Green: Coastline

**Legend**

10 km

Designed after KAUDE RN 1925, KRUYT 1938 and METZNER 1981

Draft: Robert Weber

Cartography: Johannes Winter & Robert Weber
sources, the only pool of relatively micro-level data that delivers information about the impact of Dutch colonial rule on cultural landscape. Additionally, one should not forget its importance of characterising the authors’ attitude towards the ethical policy that is dealt with in this paper. Although other authors have already used them, no detailed analysis of these reports exists so far in reference to impacts on the cultural landscape of western Central Sulawesi. They have been analysed for the Dutch colonial administrative unit onderafdeeling Palu\(^1\) (Fig. 2, see also Weber, 2000) under the special research approach of STORMA\(^2\) sub-project A1.

The study of cultural landscapes, which is linked with genesis and therefore always comprises a historical (time) and a regional (space) component, represents an original geographical field of research. The colonial impacts on Sumatra as one of the bigger Outer Islands have been dealt with, among others, in the publications of Reid (1997), Kipp (1990) and Thee Kian Wie (1989). Research results on the cultural landscape of Bali and Lombok are compiled for example by Tarnutzer (1995) and Leemann (1976; 1989). Those on Sulawesi, can be seen in the works of, among others, Henley (1989; 1996a; 1996b; 1997), Jäckel (1990), Tonelli (1992), Rössler (1997), Poeze and Schoorl (1991) and Schrauwers (1999) who use a geographical or cultural anthropological approach. However, the amount of publications on the Dutch colonial era especially in Central Sulawesi is still quite small. While Côté’s detailed dissertation (1979) engages only in the eastern part of Central Sulawesi, the very useful publications of Kotilainen (1992), Acciaioli (1989) or Aragon (1992) examine the western part of Central Sulawesi, but dedicating only a small part to Dutch colonial period and do not portray the complexity of cultural landscape. Thus, this paper is to fill the gap in missing research on the cultural geography of this topic.

In order to understand better the effects of colonial rule on Central Sulawesi and the specific role played by the ethical policy, a brief overview of Dutch colonial history in Southeast Asia should be given first.

**Phases of Dutch Colonial Rule over the Indonesian Archipelago and its Relations to Central Sulawesi**

*European Colonisation*

The developments in the Indo-Malayan archipelago before the arrival of the Europeans (see e.g. Kötter et al., 1979; Ricklefs, 1981) left Central Sulawesi quite untouched. “In contrast to Java, Bali, and, to some degree coastal South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi was little affected by Indianization during and after the first millennium A.D.” (Aragon, 1992:105). In the deep valleys of Central Sulawesi — whose steep terrain continues to present
a problem for infrastructural developments to this day — the different ethnic groups developed their own languages and lived in isolation from each other for a long time (Kruyt, 1935:586f). The territories of the raja of Palu, Banawa and Dolo situated on the western side of Palu River and Palu Bay and those of Sigi and Tawaeli situated on the eastern side were hostile (Kruyt, 1938, 1:27). The Buginese did not seek closer relations with the people of the mountain regions (the term toraja was introduced for these groups by the Europeans) for fear of their supposed headhunting (Emmer et al., 1988:216; Ricklefs, 1981:61f).

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to reach the Indonesian archipelago by navigating around the Cape of Good Hope. Like the Dutch who followed a little later, they were attracted to the South East Asian archipelago by the profitable spice trade. In 1596 the first Dutch trade ship arrived at West Java (Gretzer, 1939:20; Kö tter et al., 1979:78). On 20 March 1602, Joan van Oldenbarnveld’s Dutch East Indian Company (Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie, VOC) was granted rights to the area between the Cape of Good Hope in the West and the Magellan Strait in the East. The policy of the VOC was brief and concise and based on the principle of few imports but expensive exports (Fieldhouse, 1965:97, 100). The actual presence of the Dutch in the archipelago was thus restricted to Java and individual ports like at Ambon, Maluku Islands. After the conquest of Malacca in 1641 (at that time an important commercial centre for the whole of South East Asia), the Dutch commercial realm rapidly expanded from Ceylon until Formosa. Even Makassar in South Sulawesi, which served as a refuge for all forces hostile to the Dutch, was conquered by the Company in 1668 (Kö tter et al., 1979:78ff).

The first indirect impacts of Dutch rule on the cultural landscape of Central Sulawesi were thus created by the migration of Bugis people from South Sulawesi. After the Dutch conquest of Makassar, many Bugis fled to Borneo or Malaya. Others took refuge at the Ternate (Maluku)-controlled coasts of Central Sulawesi (Kotilainen, 1992:46). As early as the 17th century the present provincial capital of Palu was considered an important port in maritime trade traffic (Aragon, 1992:136). In 1684, the area fell to the VOC but remained subject of the Sultan of Ternate and was put under Makassar rule of South Sulawesi in 1710 (Wichmann, 1890:984).

Meanwhile, the Company grew rapidly until the beginning of the 18th century. After securing a monopoly in the Indonesian archipelago, contracts of alliance were signed with native princes to implement the principle of indirect rule. One century after the establishment of the VOC, the Dutch — apart from Java — still controlled the so-called external possessions (Buitenbezittingen, the so-called Outer Islands of the archipelago) via ports, such as Makassar in Sulawesi (Fieldhouse, 1965:89ff; Kahn, 1981:189). Attempts at Christianisation or assimilation of the population, i.e. by means of missionary schools, were not made at that time. Fieldhouse (1965:101)
concludes that, “had the Dutch given up Indonesia and Far East Asia at the end of the 18th century, only slight tracks would have remained of their two hundred years of rule.”

At the beginning of the second half of the 18th century the illusion of the successful commercial company still persisted. Apart from the shareholders, the Dutch state also profited from the VOC’s success from enormous tax revenues derived from the Far East Asia trade (Fieldhouse, 1965:102; Kahn, 1981:190). After 150 years of positive balance of payments, the debts of the Company grew, with the shareholders increasingly growing richer at the VOC’s expense (Fieldhouse, 1965:101). With the end of the Charter on 31 December 1799, the Dutch state took over debts and possessions of the VOC, thus marking the end of the “golden age” of Dutch colonial history.

From State Colony to Colonial State

After the English interregnum (1811–1815 under Thomas Stamford Raffles), the new Gouverneur-General, Herman Willem Daendels, quickly reversed his liberal attitude upon arrival in the archipelago. Instead of abolishing forced labour, he extended it to include the Javanese aristocracy. While a certain respect was still accorded to the native princes at the time of the VOC in order to ensure their loyalty as intermediaries and controllers of the population, Daendels simply replaced difficult princes with others (Altona, 1890:18).

At that time, the Dutch intensified their rule by making a turn from the former indirect rule of the VOC towards direct rule especially in Java, the core of the colony. By this, the Dutch did not only use strategic ports for their trade but started to put more effort into the establishment of an infrastructure on the island. The takeover of the administration by the so-called Binnlandsch Bestuur intended to make the state colony a colonial state that is able to exist independently from the Netherlands. But even after the Vienna Congress of 1815, which once again permitted unrestricted Dutch expansion in the Indonesian archipelago, few port bases on the remaining islands, apart from Java, the Banda islands and Ambon, fell under direct rule of the Binnlandsch Bestuur, the internal administration for Dutch East Indies.

With the lifting of restrictions for the spice trade, colonial interests shifted to the development of plantations. During the conversion to the so-called cultuurstelsel (forced cultivation system), which began in 1830, attempts were made to expand the Dutch direct spheres of influence. This, however, was largely limited to the island of Java (Sieber, 1949:165ff). The introduction of the cultuurstelsel by Johannes van den Bosch was intended to secure the financial independence of the colony, a maximum expansion of plantations on Java, and the export of colonial products for the European
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market. Van den Bosch sought to achieve this by resorting to slave labour, which he preferred as a cheap alternative to free labour (Frank, 1911:22). Coffee, tea, indigo, sugar and tobacco were exported to Europe from that time. With the system of *cultuurstelsel*, coffee became an obligatory crop on plantations on the west coast of Sumatra and in the *residentie* of Manado, North Sulawesi. Central Sulawesi, however, continued to be of little interest to the Dutch.

Apart from representing a new dimension of plantation cultivation, Fasseur regards the *cultuurstelsel* as transition points to the official *racial* classification in the Dutch East Indies. This is because the introduction of this system, combined with all sorts of compulsory labour services, emphasized the seemingly unbridgeable gap which existed between Europeans and “natives”. Let us quote J.C. Baud, one of the architects of this new colonial policy: “Language, colour, religion, morals, origin, historical memories, everything is different between the Dutch and the Javanese. We are the rulers, they are the ruled” (Fasseur, 1994:33).

The system of forced cultivation proved a gold mine for the Dutch state. As early as 1831, first payments could be made to cover VOC debts (Ricklfs, 1981:117).

Starting from the mid-19th century, the system of obligatory cultivation gradually ended. Caldwell and Utrecht (1979:21) quote three causes for the collapse of the *cultuurstelsel*. Apart from a fall of coffee and sugar prices (97 per cent of the *cultuurstelsel* yields) and rising private business interests in the archipelago, the liberal spirit of 1848 also affected the centrally organised system of forced cultivation. Famines caused by cash crop monocultures (Gretzer, 1939:21) led liberal Dutch minds to propagate a more liberal economic course in the colony.

With some exceptions, the state gradually withdrew from active cultivation in the country. From then on, its action was limited to maintaining *rust en orde* (peace and order) as well as providing infrastructural developments. This opened the gates for “the great surge of economic activity that was to occupy the years until the First World War” (Prince, 1995:22).

With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the number of Dutch who were keen to establish themselves in the colony began to rise. To meet these demands, enormous imports of consumer goods and substantial infrastructural developments were required. The Agrarian Law of 1870 also guaranteed liberty and security of the entrepreneurs. Although only natives were allowed to own land, foreigners were permitted to lease land from the government for 75 years or from native owners for 5 to 20 years (Ricklfs, 1981:118). “The gates were now open for the development of capitalism in the colony” (Kahn, 1981:194).
After 1870, the direct rule of the Dutch expanded to the large Outer Islands of Sumatra, Borneo and Sulawesi. Indigenous states were incorporated into the Dutch hierarchy as *Zelfbesturen* (autonomies) (Cribb, 1994:5). “By far the most dynamic growth of tropical export agriculture, however, occurred in the Outer Islands, chiefly in Sumatra” (Barlow, 1989:231). Plantations on Sumatra extended far into the island, and the Dutch expanded their plantations on Borneo, too. They strengthened their sphere of influence in South Sulawesi while Bali and the small Sunda Islands (*Nusa Tenggara*) to the East had already been subjugated in 1840 (Sieber, 1949:167).

According to Cribb (1994:3ff), the 1880s were marked by an increasingly rapid change of the VOC’s merchant’s “state” to a typical colonial state. The most notable modifications began to appear from the second half of the 19th and particularly at the beginning of the 20th century. They became visible within three areas:

1) the colony’s increasing independence from the mother country,
2) the increasingly complex and uniform structure of the administration, and
3) a policy shift towards a paternalistic development policy from 1900 onwards.

The dual colonial state system, in which well-trained but nevertheless unspecialised European officials governed via indigenous structures, changed at the end of the 19th century. Newly created offices took over the coordination of special areas of administration such as finance or agriculture. The all-powerful *Binnlandsch Bestuur* thereby lost their importance (ibid.).

The position of the *Anti-Revolutionaire Partij*, which stated that natives in the colony had to be educated like children, became a moral yardstick for colonial policy after 1888, the year when this Christian-conservative party came to power (Coté, 1996:90). Kielstra (1922:10) saw that the main role of the colonial power in the Indonesian archipelago was in rapidly enabling this region to gain the kind of prominence in global trade it is capable of based on its rich resources.

With respect to Central Sulawesi, the *resident* Logeman (MMK 304:164) later ascribes the backwardness, which some regions of the *residentie* still experienced — i.e. the major part of the *afdeeling* Midden Celebes — to the century-long absence of colonial power. Their interference and intensive intervention, he states, led to a favourable turn of events. These regions would, however, require administration by efficient officials, who could carry out their duties ambitiously and who would know how to lead the local administrators (*Zelfbestuurders*). Difficulties in this area could also affect another desired factor which was the preservation of peace in the colony in order to obtain good yields. As Kielstra (1922:16) states, there would still be a social problem. One had to be mindful to avoid a situation where outsiders exclusively led each enterprise and the natives were only involved as auxiliary workers. If such a situation ever occurred, then considerable
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Dangers could ensue since the economic contrast between the entrepreneur and the worker would, at the same time, become a racial division between European and Native, a situation far more dangerous for peace.

In the last period of its rule in today’s Indonesia (approx. 1890–1942), the Dutch-Indian colonial government focused on the emancipation of the native population. This emancipation should not be understood in an anti-colonial sense, but as support for the continued, century-long existence of a colonial state that the Dutch were hoping for. This colonial state was to be based on the loyalty of an educated native elite. The effects of the colonial age on the cultural landscape and the population in the case study area in Central Sulawesi must be measured against this background.

In the 20th century, the colonial power forcibly expanded its direct sphere of influence to the Outer Islands. With the pacification of the external possessions and the introduction of the so-called Korte Verklaringen (short declarations), the Dutch finally distanced themselves from the policy of non-intervention practised before. With the signing of the short declarations the zelfbesturende landschappen were created, i.e. areas still administered by the local traditional princes as opposed to direct administration (e.g. in the Gouvernement of Celebes in South Sulawesi). The Beginsel Programma by J.B. van Heutzs of 1907 points towards profound intervention within the traditional structures of the cultural landscape in Central Sulawesi. This programme aimed to improve administration and jurisdiction as well as “den oeconomischen en socialen toestand der inheemische bevolking” (Loze, 1929: supplement 1) while at the same time avoiding violent interventions. This would require support by development “van de natuurlijke bronnen van welvaart des landes” (ibid.). With the signing of the Korte Verklaringen the created zelf-besturende landschappen agreed not to sign contracts with any other powers and to obey all instructions of the Dutch queen or her officials (Spit, 1911: supplement VII).

Whilst Christianisation, under the leadership of the Dutch missionaries Albert Christian Kruyt and Nicolaus Adriani, began in 1891 in the eastern part of Central Sulawesi and particularly in the region around the Poso River, the remote mountain population of western Central Sulawesi was still relatively undisturbed. Kruyt and Adriani also rank among the most important contemporary researchers for the region south of Palu. Kruyt’s De West-Toradjas op Midden Celebes, for example, published in 1938, provides interesting ethnographic sources for the present research.

The Era of Ethical Policy

Two important components determined the last phase of the Dutch colonial rule. On the one hand, the rise of imperialism at the end of the 19th century posed the question whether the expansion of Dutch rule was an imperialistic act or not; on the other hand, the 20th century brought
forward a new ethical policy whose elements were of great importance for developments in Central Sulawesi. This ethical policy was chronologically closely linked to the attempt to expand the area of influence. Fieldhouse (1965:167) gives three reasons for the expansion onto the Outer Islands of the archipelago:

1) Pirate attacks endangered trade, so the appropriate areas had to be secured by locally installed military forces.
2) Rebellious movements of native princes continued to endanger the stability of the islands.
3) The economic interests of the Dutch expanded, which led to the occupation of areas rich in tin and coal as well as land suitable for the cultivation of coffee.

“The economic expansion was export-induced”, states Lindblad (1995:17), and aimed at increasing the choice of export products. Doel (1994:96) comments on the expansion to the Outer Islands:

The expansion in Indonesian foreign trade was remarkable for both its strong momentum and its exceptional duration: about one-quarter of a century of uninterrupted expansion. It goes without saying that this expansion had a profound impact on economic structure in the regions immediately concerned, in particular among the Buitenbezittingen. Production became oriented towards foreign exports to an unprecedented degree and the Buitenbezittingen acquired their characteristic position as prime earners of foreign exchange in the Indonesian archipelago, a position which has since then grown permanent.12

The so-called peace policies in Aceh and other regions of the Outer Islands represented a reorientation of the colonial policy in the Netherlands. In 1901, the journalist J.P. Broosthoft published a pamphlet entitled “The Ethical Course in Colonial Policy”, in which he demanded a larger sense of responsibility towards the natives in the colony and referred to “de edel-moedige drang van den sterkere om de zwakkere rechtvaardig te behandeln”13 (Locher-Scholten, 1981:177). Two years previously, C.Th. van Deventer had already condemned the exploitation of the colony in his article, “Een eereschuld”, and demanded both financial and moral compensation (Wedema, 1998:1). These two publications led to a changing point in Dutch colonial policy. When even the Dutch queen emphasised ethical considerations in her 1901 speech from the throne, Parliament also accorded room to ethical thought (Prince, 1996:35). However, especially in the Outer Islands, development of the colony based on enrichment with western values was to be preceded by pacification, i.e. military subjugation and the installation of a Dutch administration.

Max Havelaar, a novel published by Douwes Dekker under the alias “Multatuli” condemned the situation in the colonies. Disguised as an insider’s
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report by a colonial official, the novel accelerated the development of an ethical policy. The academic circle at Leiden in the Netherlands, whose members had pushed ethics to form a constituent part of colonial policy, quoted Dekker with preference. However, according to Van Niel (1991:22), this novel was actually interpreted unjustly as an accusation against the system of forced cultivation and colonialism itself. Although the opponents of the cultuurstelsel referred to this novel, Van Niel points out that “the little man was no better off under the new governing system; in fact, many would argue that he came to be noticeably worse off” (ibid.).

So, what was really the core of the ethical policy? Boomgard (1993:248) comments that no targets were set in this context concerning national per capita income, rice yield per hectare or infanticide. Politicians instead used the vague term of Volksverheffing (lifting the population from their situation). Cultivating sufficient food was, according to Prince (1995:35), one of the central tasks of this welfare policy: “One did hope to achieve one’s aims by agricultural research, by agricultural education and by agricultural extension.”

A further central aspect of this policy was the emancipation of the native population. This was supposed to lift the local elite from their passivity in terms of economics and politics and to enable their greater participation in political life. However, this emancipation should not undermine Dutch rule (Wedema, 1998:2). Van Hinloopen Laberton points out the small emancipatory content of the autonomy policy: “De Zelfbesturen o.a. in Celebes zijn volgens hem, willoze automaten in de handen van een absoluut autocratisch bestuur. Hij noemt de Korte Verklaring een, contract van schijn” (op. cit., Loze, 1929:24).

The ethical policy was conceived as development aid for the native population, while the Gidslandsgedachte, the concept of a guidance nation, was linked to a Dutch desire to lead the way in terms of a European ethical policy (Wedema, 1998:18). The local people of the Netherlands’ East Indies should be led by the morally best European colonialist country. With Van Vollenhoven, who according to Kuitenbrouwer (1991:322) attempted to legitimise the military procedure of the colonial power in the Outer Possessions with the designation of his country as the “Jeanne d’Arc among the nations”, the ethical policy was increasingly instrumentalised to maintain a certain image for the Dutch colonial policy.

The early years of the 20th century were characterised by a boom in sugar and copra production (see Fig. 3), and thus, it enabled a partial implementation of the ethical policy. The situation in the colonial state, however, grew increasingly worse after the first decade. “Colonial Indonesia was bound to the Netherlands by burden of its debt”, states Prince (1996:67) describing the situation at the beginning of the 1930s. Goods from the Dutch East Indies were unattractive because of their high price on the world market, as a result of the link to the Dutch guilder. Even splitting
the Dutch East Indian guilder from the Dutch currency did not substantially change the colony’s situation. Due to its unilateral focus on the export of agricultural products and resources as well as its situation as debtor country, the 1929 economic crisis affected the colony particularly badly. Export prices fell more heavily than import prices and led to a progressive decline of the Dutch East Indies’ terms of trade.

The following chapter will link these overall political and economic changes in the Netherlands and in their colonial archipelago with their impacts on the cultural landscape of the investigated area.

The Dutch Conquest and its Effects on the Cultural Landscape of the Onderafdeeling Palu

In the early 18th century, the magau\textsuperscript{16} of Palu had already asked for an intervention of the VOC against the pirates of Mandar. According to Acciaioli (1989:76), the Mandar people devastated the Palu region so heavily that not enough coconut oil could be produced anymore to pay the contributions to the Gouvernement in Makassar.

Despite this early dependency of Palu vis-à-vis the Dutch rulers and despite the fact that Palu was already officially subordinated to the Netherlands in 1864\textsuperscript{17} (Atlas van Tropisch Nederland, 1938: sheet 10a), the direct conquest and the subsequent Dutch administration of that area occurred in the early 20th century following the ethical expansion and development aid politics. In 1888, Central Sulawesi was protected against England (Coté, 1996:93). In the region of Palu Bay, a Posthouder\textsuperscript{18} was employed in Donggala in

\textbf{Figure 3: Export of Selected Agricultural Products from the Dutch East Indies (constant price in 1929 in thousands of Guilders)}

\begin{figure}
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
  \caption{Export of Selected Agricultural Products from the Dutch East Indies (constant price in 1929 in thousands of Guilders)}
  \label{fig:figure3}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source:} Maddison & Prince, 1989:36
1891. Two years later, the *afdeeling Paloebaai* was founded, and another two years later the *Posthoudere* was replaced by a *Civiele Gezaghebber*. The *afdeeling* *Midden-Celebes* was installed in 1904 comprising the districts Western Coast of Midden-Celebes, Palu, Poso and Parigi.\(^{19}\) Donggala and Tawaelia came under the supervision of a *Controleur* in Donggala, while the areas south of the Palu Bay (Palu, Sigi-Biromaru, Dolo and Kulawi) were governed by the *Controleur* of Palu (Acciaioli, 1989:73f). While the *raja* of Sigi had already signed the *Korte Verklaring* in 1904, Palu, Dolo and Biromaru followed one year later (Hissink, 1909:95).

The Dutch tried to conquer the Kulawi Valley in 1905 but failed to overcome the natives of Kulawi who defended their land during the war at Mount Momi, the geographical border between Palu and Kulawi Valley. Finally, the Dutch army, consisting mainly of Minahasa soldiers from North Sulawesi, managed to enter Kulawi via the River Miu in 1906. The subsequent takeover of the control in Kulawi occurred without bigger incidents as the Kulawi people surrendered after the *raja* Towoalangi subordinated himself to the Dutch (Pamei, 1997:6ff). In 1908, the subject kingdoms south of Palu signed the *Korte Verklaringen*. By doing that, the way was paved for Dutch changes in that region.

After the conquest, missionaries, members of the army, natural scientists and anthropologists travelled to this region. Missionaries like Woodward or Loois studied the local languages and cultures. The army officer Hissink investigated the area around River Palu and to the south until River Koro, while Captain Boonstra van Heerdt was busy searching for the source of those two rivers. The geologist Abendanon studied Central Sulawesi in 1909 and 1910. One year later, Grubauer crossed the region coming from Poso via Gimpu (Kulawi) to Palu. Then, the American Raven began dealing with zoological collections of Lindu, Kulawi and Gimpu area. The Sarasin brothers, two natural scientists, mapped the watercourses along the so-called Sarasin line from Palu in the North till Palopo in the South. According to Kaudern (1925:30), they were the first Europeans to visit Gimpu, Bada and Lebone.

In the second half of the 19th century, colonial officers in the Netherlands had to acknowledge that they were increasingly badly informed about the situation and the developments in the colonial territories of the Indonesian archipelago (Boomgard, 1991:24). This was no fault of technology since developments in navigation (steamships and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869) if anything accelerated communication between the Netherlands and the colony. Rather, the problem had its roots in the colonial government in Batavia, which had begun to rule without considering the interests of the Netherlands (see Cribb, 1994). Colonialists were only concerned with safeguarding their own financial interests.

In order to counteract this increasing independence of the Dutch East Indies, the colonial Ministry issued a statement in 1867 that required
colonial administrators to send regular reports on the situation in the colony to The Hague. Two years later, this new governmental regulation was implemented. These mailrapporten were sent from Batavia to The Hague, which now form part of an important source for scientific research. This source is the so-called memories van overgave, the reports of governors, residents and controllers of the individual administrative territories of the archipelago that were written by the respective officials as a report for their successors upon leaving office. Through these memories, The Hague was kept informed of the status quo and learned of alterations to e.g. infrastructure, settlements, population, migration, economics, trade and religion in the respective regions. These sources thus provide an effective overview of colonial interventions to the population structure and cultural landscape in western Central Sulawesi at the beginning of the 20th century (see Weber, 2000). The effects of colonialism can be detected in the onderafdeeling Palu in almost all areas of the cultural landscape (see Table 2). Dutch colonial rule had also exerted its influence in areas of social life such as religion, education and health care. The latter is not surprising considering the ethical policy of the early 20th century described above and its demands for classic development aid. Spatially, the Dutch colonial era most strongly influenced the northern coastal region and the Palu Valley. The Kulawi region in the south as well as the mountain areas was also affected by colonial measures. According to Acciaioli (1989:83f), the area around Lake Lindu remained relatively isolated despite the substantial modifications in the surrounding countryside that took place during the Dutch rule and after Indonesia’s independence.  

The most important effects can be noted in agriculture, particularly the complex irrigation systems, as well as in migration and traffic. There is, however, much interchange between the processes of colonial modification, so that a clear systematisation is difficult.

Expansion and Intensification of Agrarian Land Use

According to Kruyt (1903:91) the population of Central Sulawesi was not spread out very densely. Quite a number of people lived only in the Palu Valley. However this did not lead to an overpopulation due to the already existing sawah production. Hart (1853:264) says the following about Palu Valley: “Het land vertoont zich zeer vruchtbaar en wanneer de grond goed bewerkt wird, zoude hij ruimer voorraad, dan nu, van allerlei aardgewassen en vruchten kunnen voortbrengen, aan tropische gewesten eigen.” However, according to Hart, the natives were lazy and sluggish and did only the things that were necessary for their daily life. Wichmann (1890:984f) also describes the fertility of the valley but denies a “bad character” of the natives. In contrast to Java or Sumatra, agricultural production did not involve plantations under
Dutch influence. Instead, old structures of ownership were largely maintained and the returns collected for the Dutch consisted primarily of forced labour for road construction or through the levying of taxes.

In agriculture, the character of the colonial policy and especially its focus on production for export is demonstrated in several places. The colonial power began a large-scale irrigation of old *sawah* fields\(^\text{22}\) and expansion

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of the total production area (see Fig. 4). Contrary to the inhabitants of the Poso region, methods of paddy cultivation were already well known to inhabitants in western Central Sulawesi before the arrival of the Dutch, as indicated by Valentyn (1724:74f). According to Metzner (1981:47), the introduction of the sawah technique dates back to the Buginese immigrants. Sawah cultivation was also established in the local adat (KTLVK, 1911:30f). To increase effectiveness, the Dutch heavily promoted the plough from the 1930s onwards (KIT 1203:20), but uptake of this technique was slow (KIT 1206:9).

Since in many areas insufficient water supply represented the main obstacle for a rapid expansion of agricultural production, ambitious irrigation projects such as that of Fenger Petersen were implemented within the area of the rivers Gumbasa, Wunu and Paneki on the eastern side of the Palu plain in the early 1930s. These projects, like those in other areas, were hampered by the need to economise, which had spread throughout the colonial territories with the 1930s economic crisis (see KIT 1202:34). Nevertheless attempts were made to increase production as far as possible because “de bevolking kann thans sawahs aanleggen een rijst verbouwen op plaatsen waar dit te vonen door uitdroging van de natuurlijke waterloopen niet meer mogelijk was.” (KIT 1203:20).

In 1924, a sergeant was charged with the care of the Da’a-speaking people of the mountains west of Palu. Under his guidance, big sawah complexes were created between the villages Bobo and Sidondo in order to get tax incomes out of the yields (Kruyt, 1926:543).

“[..] enormous further areas of coconut were planted in Celebes (Sulawesi),” stresses Barlow (1989). Hengel (MMK 303:26) noted in 1910 that the coconut plantations were also increasing in the afdeeling Donggala. Coconut trees already existed mainly in the Palu Valley (Hissink, 1909:121). The cultivation of coconut trees was significantly influenced by a price boom for the export product copra as “copra is een voornaam artikel van uitvoer” (Hissink, 1909:121). The colonial administration determined that each household had to plant 50 coconut trees. With each addition to the family, this number was to increase by a further 10 palm trees (MMK 303:26). This highlights the shortsighted policy of linking increases in production to the situation in the global market. As a result, the population was frequently confronted with new instructions to change production. This link to the world market also led the local population to neglect subsistence production, which was also noticed by the Dutch: “Voor een blijvende vooruitgang in de voedselseleitatie in de Residentie Manado is het noodzakelijk, dat de sawahs uitgebreid worden” (MMK 308:43). Successful agricultural export production was considered particularly dependent on the health of the population. The containment of epidemics and contagious diseases was among the most important targets of the colonial public health policy. Medicine against malaria, which was a major problem in the lowlands, and other tropical diseases, were provided by the Dutch (Grubauer, 1913:557f).
Figure 4: Sawah Plots in Palu Valley 1938

Source: Kruyt, 1938, supplement
The progressive monetarisation (Jäckel, 1990:113) arising from a growing anonymisation and centralisation of rule (Kruyt, 1929) made the population increasingly dependent on the capitalist economy which undermined the traditional subsistence economy, but which did not destroy it at all. The example of the onderafdeeling Palu shows what Suryo (1987:275) generally observed for the Dutch East Indies: “Rural development in the colonial period was to benefit the colonial rule and not the welfare of the indigenous people.” Analysis of the sources reveals that Kolff’s (1929:116ff) positive picture must be treated with caution, at least with respect to the case study area, since private small farmers on the exterior islands opposite Java were so strongly dependent on export.

Apart from rice, corn was cultivated under the Dutch as an annual crop. The colonial administration promoted the cultivation of corn on harvested sawah fields “opdat op deze wijze grootere inkomsten uit den grond worden verkregen” (KIT 1206:8). This intercropping system became increasingly important.

Salt production also played a role in the regional colonial economic policy (MMK 304:73; KIT 1198:11ff). This partly overlapped with the cultivation of coconut trees, which was encouraged by rising copra prices. Great efforts were made by the colonial administration to promote salt production. It relied on locating the manufacturing plants in different places, so that local variations could be exploited to guarantee a relatively continuous salt yield over the whole year.

The huge number of goats and sheep, which were kept in the onderafdeeling Palu, provided a significant source of income for the indigenous population, especially after the fall of copra prices in 1930. The local climate and vegetation in the Palu Valley was, according to the colonial administration, ideal (MMK 308:79).

Reforestation and Forest Reserves

In 1919, the colonial government ordered that a ranger should check the amount of forest in the residentie Manado. In the onderafdeeling Palu, three rangers were employed in 1926. The Dutch were especially interested to find teak (MMK 305:128). The colonial rulers also faced the problem of increasing deforestation in the mountains surrounding Palu Valley due to slash-and-burn and the cultivation of ladang by the mountain population (MMK 305:128f). Deforestation caused a reduction in available water for the numerous sawah areas in the valley (KIT 1203:15). The former fertile Palu plain became in large part a dry area covered by cactuses. Flood endangered sawah fields and tracks in the valley (MMK 305:134).

The rangers’ reports showed that there were no bigger areas which were useful for timber exploitation. Building timber had anyway a very low price on the world market. Ebony was only found in the neighbouring onderafdeelingen Donggala, Parigi, Poso and Bolaang Mongondow. Rubber
and rattan still existed in a vast amount in the hardly accessible mountainous regions but had disappeared almost totally in coastal areas (MMK 305:129).

These results were the foundation for several orders:

- The mountain forest in the vicinity of areas under cultivation should be protected from deforestation; if trees are cut down on hills, which endangered the water supply for agriculture in the plain, reforestation should be carried out.
- In order to keep the local population and the colonial officers informed, these areas should be marked.
- Within these borders, no more trees were allowed to be cut down for reasons of cultivation. All forest areas on good soils that are located outside these borders should be used for cultivation.
- In contrast to governmental exploitation of forest, private exploitation of forest should be supported as much as possible, but national and local government should be given their legitimate share.
- Exploitation of rattan or rubber should be sustainable.
- Rejuvenation and forestation of timber of high quality that was important for trade (e.g. ebony) should be accelerated, while building timber should only ensure the supply for local needs.
- Roads and tracks had to be built in order to facilitate access to the particular forest areas (MMK 305:129ff).

Unfortunately, the archival data does not give a detailed overview of the results of these plans. The reforestation programme started in 1923, and it was expanded until 1926 (MMK 305:134). The Dutch installed a protected forest border along the mountain ranges east and west of the Palu Valley (KIT 1203:15). In the regions Kulawi, Rio and Palentuma, a forest reserve was not necessary as the ratio of human beings to forest had been declared to be balanced (ibid.).

Reforestation was taken to be as important as the irrigation programmes (KIT 1198:17f). If the reforestation of the slopes succeeded, “dan zal een prachtig bebouwbaar areaal kunnen worden verkregen en Paloe zal weer worden ‘het land van melk en honig’ waarover Valentijn reeds spreekt” (KIT 1198:18).

The memories also deliver statements of one colonial officer who criticised the reforestation and forest reservation programmes that they neglected too much the needs of the local population. The government reacted to these critics by expanding the programmes and restrictions (KIT 1202:39).

As an example of a mixture of forest exploitation and reforestation efforts, Kruyt (1926:543) mentions that in 1926 all Da’a-speaking people from Pekawa till the border of onderafdeeling Donggala were forced to collect rattan, as they still had to pay about 100,000 guilders of taxes. Besides this, they had to work on reforestation areas twice a year (Kruyt, 1926:544). This handling shows the exemplary exploitation of the local population.
Colonial Impacts on Migration

Resettlements initiated by the Dutch took place as inter-island migration or local migration as it will be described below.

Forced resettlement of the mountain population had already preceded the forest reservation during early phases of colonial influence, especially down from the mountain range west of the Palu plain into the valley. A section of Adriani emphasises the economic driving force of such colonial modifications and sets it apart from an ethical driving force:

Een tweede, zeer belangrijke maatregel was het stichten van nieuwe dorpen. Binnen het grondgebied van de stam moesten alle dorpen van hunne heuveltoppen afkomen en herbouwd worden op vlakke, althans toegankelijke plaatsen, in de nabijheid van water en zóó, dat de groote weg, die door het gebied van den stam werd aangelegd, geen groote bochten behoeve te maken om alle dorpen van den stam te doorsnijden. Alle doorzettingskracht van den heer Mazee en alle overredingskracht der Zendelingen is noodig geweest, om te zorgen dat dit gebeurde.34 (Adriani, 1915:469)

The aim was to settle the people in the plain and cultivate paddy fields. When the Dutch finally recognised that the mountain population could not adapt to life in the valley, they permitted their return to the mountains, but not without introducing the limitations for the use of the forest as described above. Migrations of this type occurred more notably on the western side of the Palu Valley than on the eastern side.

One may ask why people settled first in the mountains and not in the lowlands where the relief makes agricultural cultivation easier. One reason can perhaps be found in the myths of origin that do not speak of the sea coast as a starting point for the genesis of their ethnic group but mentions “a kind of ethnogenesis in the mountains” (Reid, 1997:61).35 However, a distinction has to be made between maritime groups like the Bugis, Makassar or Mandar people who came from the south of Sulawesi on the one hand and the Kulawi or Kaili people of Central Sulawesi. According to Reid (1997:78ff) different reasons for this ethnogenesis can be found: danger of flood, labour intensive wet rice cultivation, diseases caused by unclean water like cholera or typhus or the strategic position in the mountains in case of war led people to settle down in the mountains.36

The Dutch seemed to follow three objectives when resettling people from the mountains in the valley: they hoped to be able to prevent further deforestation; for political reasons so that they can manage the people more easily by concentrating their distribution in only a few villages;37 and to drive the agricultural economy of the valley to plant sawah.

People from the mountain settlements west of the Palu Valley (Pekawa or Mamerak area) were resettled on the plain, e.g. to Sambo and Bobo (KIT 1203:26; Kruyt, 1926:542). The migrants were hardly able to cope
with their new situation in the lowland. The climatic conditions especially drove most of them back to the mountains. The Dutch counted many more cases of death than of birth.\textsuperscript{38} All efforts of the Dutch, like the installation of barracks for the sick or interdictions (Kruyt, 1926:543), did not help to keep these people in the plain. The Dutch officer Vorstman stated, perhaps stimulated by the ethical policy: “\textit{Men zou deze zielige menschen dan ook graag naar hun bergen laten terugkeeren}”\textsuperscript{39} (KIT 1203:13). A second statement of Vorstman puts his sorrow for the highland population into perspective: “\textit{Ik heb de menschen alle vrijheid gegeven, die ik ze kon laten, maar de belang van de 10 maal talrijker vlakte bevolking gaan boven die van enkele bergbewoners}”\textsuperscript{40} (ibid.). However, the migrants were allowed to settle down in areas below the forest restriction area, although tax collection became more difficult. Only Bobo\textsuperscript{41} stayed populated by migrants from the mountains (Kruyt, 1926:543). Until 1936, only a small part of the mountain population was concentrated in villages (KIT 1203:13). Although the Dutch colonial government tried to keep on controlling the distribution of the upland population, no further serious attempts of resettlement were undertaken (Kruyt, 1926:544).

A case of indirect local resettlement was reported of the village Darangunau (east of Biromaru). After creating forest reserves that were of big importance for the water supply of the irrigation systems of Paneki and Wunu River, no more \textit{ladang} fields could be allowed. Thus, the inhabitants had to leave the village. As the villagers did not want to settle down in the Palu Valley, they decided to leave for Parigi (KIT 1203:13). It is difficult to judge how much the Dutch forced the migrants to their decision as the sources lack additional information.

Immigration from the other areas of Sulawesi due to colonial pressure is not documented in the sources.\textsuperscript{42} For administration, the Dutch used the South Sulawesian Bugis as they “were recognized as a political counterweight to the recalcitrant indigenous Kaili rajahs”\textsuperscript{43} Acciaioli (1987:4). As the Bugis were already resident in the northern part of the Palu plain since the 18th century (KIT 1206:6), representing a Muslim centre at the \textit{landschap} Sigi-Dolo,\textsuperscript{44} it seems quite obvious that the Dutch did not influence Bugis migration, at least directly. This population group had already held most of the aristocratic posts in the lowland of Central Sulawesi before the arrival of the Dutch (see Kruyt, 1938, vol. 1). The colonial power enforced its indirect control of the indigenous population in the individual \textit{landschappen} by means of autonomies, which were based on these aristocracies. This system of indirect administration enabled the Dutch to draw maximum profit from the colony with minimum personnel and financial expenditure by requiring individual \textit{landschappen} to be self-sufficient. During periods of crisis, especially during the 1930s, these political structures in Central Sulawesi at least permitted the maintenance of the economic status quo.
Immigration from the other islands of the archipelago was limited.\textsuperscript{45} A preferred plan for resettlement, for example, included Kalawara naputih (Palu Valley), where the Javanese began to settle from 1906 (MMK 303:21). Shortly after the Dutch took over the administration of the region, an agricultural colony of Christian Javanese was founded under the guidance of the Salvation Army, whose numbers grew from 69 to 208 persons between 1922 and 1928 (MMK 304:43; Metzner, 1981:51).

Under the influence of the ethical policy, this transmigration from Java could be understood as developmental aid project. The settlers were to pass their agricultural knowledge to the native population of the little populated Palu plain, especially in the cultivation of paddy fields (\textit{Encyclopaedie}, 1921, Bd. 2:257). The colonists got, for example, the order to support the Da’a-speaking people in building big sawah complexes in the Palu plain (see Chapter 3.1) But the project failed, not least because of the exploitation of the settlers by the Salvation Army and their reluctance to mix with the native population (MMK 305:91). The Salvation Army owned all coconut and coffee trees and the colonists got only a small piece of sawah land and some cows. They had to work up to three days per week, partly paid, on the missionaries’ fields. As a result, further projects of this type were not initiated. As settlers became dissatisfied, some of them moved on to other villages in the Palu Valley (e.g. Sibalaya, Sibowi) and became successful. Others became servants in houses in Palu city. The rest of them became impoverished (KIT 1203:28f). No other implementation of a transmigration programme of this type was reported in the sources for the investigation area.

\textit{Education and Missionary Activities}

In order to breed a local administrative elite that could ensure the continuation of Dutch colonial rule in future centuries, an educational system was established. Based on a hierarchical model, the most important descendants, i.e. those of the indigenous administrators and aristocratic families, were to be given the opportunity to study as long as subjects were relevant to the needs of the colonial power. In the \textit{memorie} of commander Voorn, these developments were exemplified by Donggala Boarding School: “Het internaat van Donggala vormt nu de bibit, waaruit later de hoofden en Zelfbestuurders kunnen worden gekozen”\textsuperscript{46} (KIT 1198:18f). Education of the common population was encouraged only to the degree that good soil management and the correct payment of taxes were facilitated.

The attempt of the Dutch administration to secure their hold over the native population by indirect rule led to the preservation of many legal units that were determined by adat. “Aan de toestand is feitelijk niets veranderd, alleen heeft nu elk landschap een hoofdmadika,\textsuperscript{47} erkend door’t Gouvernement, terwijl ’t ambt van tadoelaka vervallen is”\textsuperscript{48} (Anonymous, 1912:13).
The Salvation Army was the most important institution that built schools in the investigation area. Education and mission of the people ran parallel when missionaries founded schools and churches at the villages.

On the other hand, the Dutch administration in Central Sulawesi strongly relied on the Buginese potentates, whose wielding of political power was accompanied by the spread of Islam\(^\text{49}\) (Kruyt, 1938, vol. 3:10). This placed the colonial officials in a dilemma between the continued protection of rule and the strengthening of Christianity. In this context, Jäckel (1990:113) points to the Dutch goal of rationalising the traditional structures of power, which were characterised by a mixture of political and ritual or religious functions. The Dutch were keen to obtain control of power in the secular sector, while the religious part was given into the hands of the missionaries, in this case the Salvation Army. The Dutch first asked Albert C. Kruyt, a Dutch missionary, to lead Christianisation in western Central Sulawesi as he had done in the Poso region in the east. However, Kruyt refused, and so the colonial government asked the Salvation Army to take on this mission (Aragon, 1996b:47). The Salvation Army wanted to change all aspects of traditional adat animism that did not fit into their own religion and to leave the other aspects untouched as the Salvation Army officer Roselund states in 1933:

Many officers seem to consider that the age-long customs of primitive peoples — so-called heathen customs — are all of the Evil One, and must therefore be rooted up. To my mind this is a great mistake. In the ancient customs of the Torajas in the interior of Central Celebes, for instance, I have found much that is good, and, if properly adapted, they will provide a structure into which one can fit all the new practices belonging to the Christian life — after the Spirit of God has changed the people’s hearts, of course\(^\text{50}\) (op. cit., Aragon, 1992:168).

In 1922, most of the important centres of mission of the Salvation Army in the Palu Valley were in Kalawara-naputih, Bora, Rowiga and Sidondo, while posts were set up in Kulawi,\(^\text{51}\) Gimpu, Kantewu, Winatu and Lindu in the mountainous Kulawi region. Posts of the Salvation Army also existed in part in Pakawa (MMK 304:42). Four years later, missionaries had built 18 schools in the Palu Valley. However, their main place of action for the Palu plain remained in Kalawara-naputih, the transmigration settlement of the Christian Javanese, and Kantewu became a mission centre in the district Kulawi (MMK 305:167). Just 18 years later, in 1931, the Salvation Army had 50 officers in 71 villages, keeping 18 schools for 1,300 pupils (ibid.: 172).

In the mountain areas, where the inaccessible terrain had prevented even the rapidly spreading Buginese Islam from gaining a foothold until the early 20th century, Christian mission was increasingly pursued by the
colonial administration (MMK 304:42). However, Grubauer (1913:147) mentions Islam as the leading religion in the highland of Lake Lindu. Before taking over colonial control in the case study area, the Dutch had already sent missionaries into the mountain regions, especially south of the onderafdeeling Palu, in order to prepare the local population for colonisation. However, the officers of the Salvation Army in western Central Sulawesi did not set great store by pure religious mission. Instead, they were concerned with preparations for facilitating effective colonial development. This is exemplified in their handing out of gratuities (especially to the children), which later ended up in the collection box of the mission, and thus acquainting people with monetarism. At the same time, the mission destroyed the balanced exchange of goods between the highland population and the lowland population. Dependencies created by the import of European exotic goods can be regarded as preparation for state colonial control (see Aragon, 1992; 1996b). Aragon (1996b:56) summarises the effects of the activity of the Salvation Army as follows:

In the precolonial Central Sulawesi situation giving and receiving were perceived to elevate the status of both lowlanders and highlanders. In the colonial situation the inability of highlanders to counter European gifts compromised their position as participants in an exchange relationship. Second, the Central Sulawesi evidence moves the concept of shifting hierarchy in political exchanges from narrow regional contexts into a cross-cultural context and shows how the presentation of supposedly “free” gifts can construct an unprecedented and skewed form of colonial disequilibrium.52

Christianisation was thus more than a pure change of religious beliefs. Whether intentionally or not, it supported, in a significant way, the colonial government’s aim to create a state of dependence. In this sense, we would be assessing the ethical policy, by way of expanding the systems of education or by way of introducing a better religion. Either of these would advance colonial political and economic interests.

Colonial Changes to Transportation Infrastructure

Infrastructural developments were less concerned with improvements to individual houses — except where the colonial buildings, especially in the capital Palu, were concerned — but rather with creating a network of roads whose effects were documented in the memories van overgave. Providing access to the main agricultural areas, these roads were built or improved to ensure the smooth and fast transport of products. Road construction therefore focused on the area west of Palu, where the best sawah areas of the onderafdeeling were situated, the eastern side of the Palu River with its irrigation projects of Gumbasa, Wunu, Pandeki and so forth, as well as areas in the south towards the fertile Gimpu plain. Transport was also increasingly motorised.
In 1925, a horse track already existed connecting the Kulawi Valley with the Palu plain, but an upgrading of this track as a road for car transport was slowed down due to the lack of villages nearby which could provide the needed team of forced labourers (KIT 1198:2). However, the colonial administration pushed the upgrading as the Kulawi region was economically very isolated but important because of its big amount of sawah and forest products (ibid.).

The ethical policy became visible in Kruyt’s observation concerning the officers’ moral problems with the extension of infrastructure: “En het onaangenaamste voor de bestuursabtenaren is, dat zij bij de bevolking den indruk den indruk wekken, dat de menschen maar steeds de wegen moeten herstellen te gerieve van de heeren, opdat zij er met hun auto’s langs kunnen snorren”53 (1929:527).

In contrast to the Poso area, where the colonial administration had vainly attempted to launch markets (Kruyt, 1926:539), Kruyt and Adriani witnessed busy market life as early as 1897: “Lang voordat het Gouvernement in Palu kwam, had men in de streek tal van passars”54 (ibid.). Under the Dutch, trade focused particularly on agricultural products and was dominated by the Europeans, Chinese and Arabs (MMK 304:70; MMK 305:137).

A mixture of ethical policy thinking and strictly economic calculation as well as the different attitudes towards lowland and upland population is exemplified in the plans of the Dutch to build tracks up to the Pekawa mountain range east of Palu Valley. The Dutch planned a way starting from the Palu-Bobo road 600 metres up to the west as there would be excellent places for fruit and legumes cultivation at 800 metres above sea-level. After that, the track would continue until Matantimali situated at an altitude of 1,200 metres. This mixture is best reflected in the following two citations:

Het z.g. Pekawa bergland is door deze weg uit zijn isolement verlost. Ik wil niet beweren dat de bergbevolking zelf hierop erg gesteld zal zijn, maar uit bestuursoogpunt is de weg van veel belang en de vlaktebevolking zal hier graag groenten, koffie en andere bergcultures beginnen55 (KIT 1203:8).

A part of the track should be built by the local mountain population as “hierdoor de niets-bezittende bergbevolking in de gelegenheid wordt gesteld haar achterstallige belastingen (vaak 3 en meer jaren was niets betaald) in arbeid te voldoen op niet te groote afstand van hun woonplaats in een voor hen passend klimaat”56 (ibid.).

One can presume that transport infrastructure acted on the economic interests of the colonial government for the transportation of export products. Where transport was concerned, the ethical policy was based mainly on ulterior economic motives.

In the memorie of 1935 it was mentioned that a horse track existed between Bora (Sigi-Biromaru) and the vruchtbaar57 Palolo Valley where the Chinese people planted coffee and legumes (KIT 1203:8). Many local people
had built gardens in and around the main village (ibid.). The Dutch recognised the big economic potential of that valley for the expansion of the sawah production. The border area to Parigi was suitable for rattan and rubber exploitation (the products were carried on horseback), but in 1932, forced labour was used to upgrade the track for car transport (ibid.). The Palu Valley itself, the Kulawi region, Palolo Valley and the westerly mountain ranges of Pekawa were thus spotted as the economically most important regions for the rapid development of routes of transport.

Forced Labour under the Ethical Policy

The colonial power would not have profited from economic gains in the investigation area to the same degree without the use of forced labour on a local (kampondiensten) and regional (heerendiensten) level and the introduction of income, market and head taxes. The tax system, which also served to discipline the native population, was initially adapted to the small degree of literacy in the region in order to be able to collect taxes as fast as possible (MMK 304:131).

Infrastructural measures were carried out almost exclusively by drafting in forced labourers. These services could be demanded up to one month per year. Heerendiensten were used for road and bridge construction, kampondiensten for the maintenance of village roads and squares. The introduction of these services was justified with the disputed statement that the local population would have already carried out such services for their princes before the beginning of colonisation and were hence used to it.\(^{58}\)

Conclusion

In the region of Central Sulawesi examined here, Dutch colonial power extensively influenced the traditional society and economic structures. The dimensions of this colonial intervention are particularly striking considering the relatively short phase of direct administrative actions (1905–1942).

While the “Leiden orientalists”, the academic circle from Leiden in the Netherlands that promoted ethical values in colonial policy, no doubt meant well, the implementation of the ethical policy was unsuccessful. This was due to the local executive who was charged with managing the colony. The authors of the memories "van overgave" often describe — between the lines — the interventions to cultural landscape carried out under their rule as ethically motivated. Facts apparent in their descriptions, however, point another way, which is the effective exploitation of export goods and the safeguard of the continued existence of the colony by means of appropriate administration. The ethical policy described above must thus be seen in large sections as a camouflage for a “non-imperialistic image” (Kuitenburg, 1991:18) which the Netherlands intended to present to their European opponents as an example of a morally strong colonial power.
In the area of study, the ethical policy must be regarded as a failure with respect to its original objectives. A general *Volkswerffing* did not take place at all. There was no construction of schools for the whole society. Even the possibility for descendants of the local elite to attend school was limited, since the colonial rulers intended to extend their power while giving as little as possible in return.

Changes in agricultural production were governed by world trade which had influenced Central Sulawesi since the conquest of the Dutch. New transportation facilities were closely linked to economic needs, like roads to transport crops from cultivation areas. However, the need for sufficient subsistence production was recognised by the Dutch administrators. Thus, agrarian exploitation in this area was limited by concerns about the people’s basic subsistence. No large-scale plantation systems or forced cultivation (*cultuurstelsel*) were introduced, and thus, in contrast to Java or even Sumatra and Borneo agricultural economy was negligibly changed under the Dutch rule.

On the issue of migration, the Dutch began local and inter-island resettlements that continued after Indonesia was given independence by the postcolonial governments. The driving force then was — and is until today — an easier governing of the people. Tax collection or supply of forced labourers for roads or irrigation systems should be facilitated. The valleys should be cultivated more intensively with wet rice and coconut trees. That the colonial administrators did not resettle the people from the mountains to the plain on a large scale was perhaps due to the ethical policy of that time as some authors indicated. Therefore, the colonial rulers did not act as a stabilising force in the area of study but confused the local population through a range of new influences. Only their own colonial system was stabilised.  

However, as far as the sources reveal, there were at any time no attempts of the Dutch to change the cultural landscape of the investigation area completely and without any respect towards the local population. There may be two reasons for this. First, one might assume that the impacts on the region would have been much worse, seen from the perspective of the local population, without this new colonial policy that accompanied the start of the 20th century. Second, the Dutch needed the benevolence of the local principals to rule this part of the colony as easily as possible. Third, the mission, in this case the Salvation Army, played a major role by preparing the ground for the Dutch administration, not least the facilitation of the resettlements from the hardly accessible mountainous areas.

The results presented here are based to a large degree on the *memo- ries van overgave*. Although numerous insights into the development of Central Sulawesi under Dutch rule can be gained by a detailed analysis of these sources, they must be treated with caution. The *memories* were subjected to censorship by the colonial ministry and other authorities in the Netherlands,
and it was down to the respective authors to decide which aspects to include in the documents. It seems very likely that numerous effects of the colonial presence in Central Sulawesi were not entered on purpose. Based on this analysis, information from oral history, as used by Aragon (1996a) for her research on the Japanese Occupation in the Tobaku region of Central Sulawesi, will be a next step in which to obtain a more complex image of the colonial development of the cultural landscape of this region. This will also help to clarify the factors and processes that influenced post-colonial development of Western Sulawesi and determine today’s land use patterns, especially with regard to (de-)stabilisation of the rain forest margins of neighbouring Lore Lindu National Park.

Notes

1. Under Dutch colonial rule the Indonesian archipelago was divided into the following administrative units: Gewesten (e.g. Groote Oost), Residencies (e.g. Manado), Afdeelingen (e.g. Donggala), Onderafdeelingen (e.g. Palu) and Landschappen (e.g. Sigi-Biromaru).

2. STORMA (Stability of Rainforest Margins in Indonesia) is a Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)-financed collaborative research programme of the Universities of Goettingen, Kassel (both in Germany) and Palu (Central Sulawesi, Indonesia), and Institut Pertanian Bogor (Indonesia). Since July 2000, researchers of these institutions study the processes of stabilisation and destabilisation in the vicinity of Lore Lindu National Park, Central Sulawesi. Sub-project A1 examines these processes in terms of cultural geography.

3. Principals, kings.

4. The classification of the different language or ethnic groups of Central Sulawesi has always been a subject of controversy (for the construction of “ethnic group”, see Balibar and Wallerstein, 1992). Generally, the term toraja is used. According to Coté (1979:42), Kruyt first applied this term to the tribes of northern Central Sulawesi in 1897. Together with Adriani, he called the eastern Central Sulawesi tribes Posso’sch-Todjo’sche groep, Oost-Toradja groep or Bare’e-Toradja and the western tribes Parigi’sch-Kaili’sche groep or West-Toradja groep. This was completed by the Sadang-groep which was situated to the south of this area (Adriani and Kruijt 1912–1914, vol. 1:3). According to Vroklage (1936:227) the word toraja is composed of To which means “human being”, and the Bugis-influenced raja in order to denote toraja as “highlander” or “remote human being”. The word raja has the same meaning as the Malayan word dajak which is used in a similar way to name the mountain population of Dayak. Coté (1979) was perhaps the first non-Indonesian to use individual language group names for a more precise description of the people of this area. Kotilainen (1992:16) points out that Central Sulawesians never used a single term to denote all groups of this region. Since the universal term toraja however was used in primary and secondary sources until the late 1970s, which renders a precise differentiation of peoples impossible, the term is also used here, although the generalised meaning of toraja must once again be underlined.
5. The Far East Asia trade of that time represented one-quarter of the Dutch export trade.

6. Administration of inner affairs. The Dutch did not only want to control a few ports but also the economic and infrastructural development of the interior parts of the islands. For that reason a special administrative system had to be established.

7. Dutch head of a residentie.

8. The *afdeeling* Midden-Celebes was later called *afdeeling* Donggala.

9. “Self-administrated landscapes”; but the term “self-administrated” in this context excludes all emancipatory concepts.

10. Engl.: “the economic and social status of the local population”.

11. Engl.: “of the country’s natural source of prosperity”.

12. According to Madison (1990:326), the export surplus from the Dutch East Indies in the period 1840–1869 (*cultuurstelsel*) was much higher than that of other Southeast Asian countries. In addition, in the following period (1870–1912) it exceeded the surplus generated by any competitors. Between 1913 and 1938, the export surplus of the Dutch East Indies was the highest in Southeast Asia.

13. Engl.: “the generous drive of the stronger to treat the weaker fairly”.

14. According to Dahm (1974), emancipation means the process of consciousness of the colonial population, which by western education and social uplifting leads to consciousness of unity especially among their elites. This is not the same as obtaining independence in an anti-colonial sense.

15. Engl.: “The self-administration, among others in Celebes, are, according to him, languid machines in the hands of autocratic self-administrators. He calls the *Korte Veklaring* a contract of semblance.”


17. The residency Manado as the northern part of Sulawesi was founded in 1824 as a part of the *Gouvernement* of the Maluku Islands. After the Dutch gave up their monopoly of the spice trade in the northern provinces it became an independent administrative unit in 1865 (Leirissa, 1996:267).

18. *Stadhouder*.

19. In 1910, the reorganised *afdeeling* Midden-Celebes comprised the following 34 *landschappen*: *Westküste Midden-Celebes*: Banawa, Tawaeli, Toli-Toli; *Palu*: Palu, Biromaru, Sigi, Dolo, Kulawi, Lindu, Tobaku, Benasu; *Poso*: Todjo, Lage, Ondu, Palandu und Lamusa, Bantjea und Puumboto, Pebato, Napu, Besoa, Tawaelia, Bada, Uma-Uma, Batudaka, Bobongko und Malenge, Walea kecil, Walea besar, Togean; *Parigi*: Parigi, Sausu, Moutong, Toribulu, Kasimbar, Sigenti, Ampibabo (MMK 303:12f).


21. Engl.: “The land seems to be very fertile, and when the ground is cultivated, a large variety of different crops, as it is usual for tropical areas, will be harvested.”

22. In contrast to *ladang*, sawah is rice planted in irrigated fields.

23. The plan of Fenger Peterson, which was eventually implemented on a smaller scale, aimed at converting the entire area between the rivers mentioned above to paddy fields (KIT 1206:32f).

24. Engl.: “the people are thus able to open sawah fields and plant rice at sites where it was not possible any more because of the drying up of natural watercourses.”

25. Engl.: “copra is a main export product.”
26. Engl.: “In order to keep up the supply of food in the Residentie Manado it is necessary that the sawah fields expand.”
27. According to Kolf (1929:117), the proportion of the export yield from local agriculture in the so-called Outer Islands rose from 10 million guilders in 1894 to 350 million guilders per year during the period 1925–1927. The corresponding amounts for Java are 7 and 88 million guilders.
28. Engl.: “in order to get a large output from the land”.
29. Such restrictions conflicted with the traditional adat rights, which also regulated access to arable land (KTLVK 1911:130f).
30. The export of rubber from onderafdeeling Palu increased from 1932 to 1934 by 50 percent (KIT 1203:24). Rattan had a good price only in 1933 and the beginning of 1934. After that, the price for this product dropped again.
31. Engl.: “then, a great cultivatable area shall be made available and Palu shall become again the land of milk and honey that Valentyn was already talking about.”
32. The government also reacted by censoring parts of the memorie van overgave of this officer.
33. The workers were paid with maize.
34. Engl.: “A second, very important rule was the building of new villages. Within the territory of the tribe, all villages have to relocate from the top of the hills and be rebuilt on flat or on least accessible places near to water courses, so that the road, which is to be built through the territory of the tribe, does not have to go in too big curves in order to pass all villages of the tribe. All persistence of Mr Mazec and all persuasion of the mission were needed to make that happen.”
35. See Coté (1979) for the Poso region. Central Sulawesi is not the only region of Indonesia where inhabitants first settled in the highlands as Reid states: “During the rapid population growth of the twentieth century, the most significant migrations in Indonesia have not been of lowlanders into the sparsely settled highlands, as has been a marked feature in China and Vietnam [. . . ], but the reverse” (1997:62).
36. This explanation of Reid misses an answer to the question why other ethnic groups chose the lowland for their settlements if there were so many reasons against this option. The sea orientation of population groups like the Bugis may be one example.
38. Kruyt (1926:542) states that there might be a correlation between the bad physical condition of many people from the mountains with the results of a heavy dysentery epidemic where hundreds of people died.
39. Engl.: “One should then let these people return directly to their mountains.”
40. Engl.: “I have given these people all freedom that I could let them, but the needs of the 10 times larger population of the plain go beyond those of some inhabitants of the mountains.”
41. The sources give no hints for the reason that they stayed on in Bobo.
42. The Minahasa, who were employed in the administration of Central Sulawesi because of their loyalty, had already been in the service of the Dutch before then.
43. Acciaioli’s statement is based on Masyhuda et al. (1977). According to this
book (Vol. 1:45), Petta Lolo, a Bugis noble, was nominated by the Dutch to become mayor of Donggala, western Palu Bay.

44. Under the Buginese influence, all Kaili-speaking people of Central Sulawesi called themselves Muslims, nevertheless only a few villages in Sigi-Dolo accommodated faithful Muslims (KIT 1206:6).

45. Despite this the roots of the expanded transmigrasi programmes under President Soeharto date back to the Dutch colonial time (see also Boomgard et al., 1991:55).

46. Engl.: “The boarding school of Donggala sows the seed out of which the principals and self-administrators can be chosen later.”

47. Madika or maradika (in Kulawi and Koro region) are derived of maharddika, which in Malaysia and other regions of that area means “free of slavery”. In Bugis language the word maradeka has the same meaning (Kruyt, 1938, Bd. 1:25).

48. Engl.: “The status has not been changed. Merely, each landschap now has a hoofdmadika, appointed by the governor. At the same time, the position of tadoe-lako was abolished.”

Matters of the kampong were subsequently only dealt with by the madika (inside the village) or totueba (outside the village). According to adat the tadulaka were only consulted in case of war.

49. In the primary sources, the existence of mosques at the onderafdeeling Palu is already mentioned at an early stage of the colonial rule (KTLVK 1911:113).

50. Author’s emphasis.

51. Until now, the local people call the area of Bolapapu, today’s main village of Kulawi district and its surroundings, simply Kulawi. In several, even recent maps of this area, the main village Bolapapu is still called Kulawi. According to the locals, a village called Kulawi never existed in this region.

52. Italics as in the original source.

53. Engl.: “And for the administrators it is most unpleasant that they evoke among the people the impression that the people have anyway to build the roads at the service of the masters so that their masters can drive in cars.” According to Encyclopaedie (1921, Vol. 4:745), the colonised population was not allowed to use the roads as they would disturb traffic. Although this regulation was lifted after introducing the ethical policy, the Dutch, so Cribb (1993:239) kept on bans for special traditional vehicles. Regulations of that kind could not be found in the searched sources for the investigation area.

54. Engl.: “Long before the government in Palu was set up a lot of markets existed in this area.”

55. Engl.: “The so-called Pekawa upland is in this way led out from its isolation. I do not want to argue that the mountain population is very pleased with that but from the point of view of the administration the way is of big importance, and the population of the plain shall eagerly commence with the cultivation of legumes, coffee and other upland products.”

56. Engl.: “to give through this an occasion for the mountain population who own nothing to pay their outstanding taxes (nothing has been paid for almost three years and more) with labour that is not too far away from their place of residence and in a suitable climate.”

57. Engl.: “fertile”.

58. The Japanese also used forced labour during their short rule on the archipelago
to exploit the Mica mines in the south of the investigation area from 1942 onwards. Apart from mining, which was of little importance at the time of the Dutch colonial government — only individual geological investigations were carried out — the Japanese also intervened in agriculture by putting an end to the crop rotation that was introduced by the Dutch. Land use in this region therefore changed three times in the span of a few decades. Apart from that, the Japanese forced the cultivation of cotton for their textile industry. “The Kulawi Valley slopes were so thoroughly cleared of trees for Japanese cotton production that severe erosion occurred, and a post-war prohibition on swidden farming remains in force to the present day” (Aragon, 1996a:60).

59. Indeed, a destabilisation of the colonial power occurred at the end of the Dutch rule and during the Japanese Occupation when nationalist anti-colonial circles — especially in the centre of power, Java — articulated their demands for independence.

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