

THE ART AND
POLITICS OF
WANA SHAMANSHIP

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Contents

List of Illustrations	ix
Preface	xi
A Note on Transcription	xvii
Introduction	1
PART ONE	
1. Summoning Powerful Allies	25
2. A Divided Reality	36
3. Hidden Knowledge	52
PART TWO	
4. Therapeutic Endeavors	79
5. Shamans as Seers	91
6. An Anatomy of Dependence	102
7. Power and Therapy	120
PHOTOGRAPHS	127
PART THREE	
8. Ascents to the Sky	159
9. Exchanges with the Owner	179
10. Rituals Through Time	195
PART FOUR	
11. Foods for the Spirit Familiars	217
12. Emotional Performance	230

PART FIVE

13. Shamanship and Leadership	255
14. Shamanship, Gender, and the Life Cycle	279
15. Bringing History to Bear	297

MAPS	325
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Notes	329
Glossary	345
Bibliography	351
Index	359

Illustrations

PHOTOGRAPHS

1, 2. Views of Wana farms and houses	128
3. Indo Lina	130
4. Women relaxing in the heat of the day	131
5. A transcribing session	132
6. Preparing a rain hat for a ritual	133
7. Indo Ngonga taking an infant to the ground for the first time	134
8. Apa Iki performing a harvest ritual	135
9. Drum and gongs	136
10. Children at a mabolong	137
11. The offering tray	137
12. Apa Weri invoking his spirit familiars	138
13. Apa Mene invoking his spirit familiars	139
14. Shamanic dancing	140
15. Women's dancing	141
16, 17, 18. A ghostly visitation	142-44
19. Shamanic instruction	145
20. Apa Linus and child	146
21. Children as patients	147
22. Retrieving vital elements	148
23. Restoring a dream agent	148
24. Restoring a soul	149
25. Preparing an offering for the Owner	150
26. A shamanic dialogue	151
27. Addressing the Owner	152
28. An unconscious shaman	153
29, 30. Dueling in gratitude for the Owner's gift of life	154-55

Shamanship and Leadership

The question of the functional or dynamic relationship between ceremonial and ordinary, non-ritualized social action and the question of the nature of the structure of ceremonial or ritual itself must, then, be seen as aspects of the same question, not distinct and mutually independent questions as they have almost invariably been treated by anthropologists.

T. Turner, "Transformation,
Hierarchy, and Transcendence"

At the start of this book I stated that my aim was to show how the mabolong articulates a cosmic order and at the same time constitutes a political one. Parts One through Four have explored the cultural premises, structural logic, and ritual practice of the mabolong. In this final section I shall develop my claim about the political dimensions of the mabolong by showing how this ritual not only symbolizes but is also integral to the very workings of Wana society. The argument developed here for a peripheral Southeast Asian population will address the relation between cultural forms and social action, an issue germane to both the recent literature on more complex Southeast Asian political systems and the discipline of anthropology at large.

First, it will be useful for what follows to recap my analysis of the mabolong itself and the issues it raises. Part One considered the ritual as an occasion for publicly invoking and displaying power, as defined in cultural terms. Wana notions of power are not partitioned into religious versus secular categories;¹ rather, culturally, power involves access to exogenous resources, including special knowledge and hidden agents. At first blush that view seems quite alien to social scientific concepts of power. Yet if power in the social scientific sense is defined as the ability to control other people's actions, then an overlap, if not full identity, does obtain between the two. In the Wana context one comes to control people and events in the world by tapping exogenous resources. For this reason it is neither reductionistic nor cynical to analyze the mabolong as both a religious event and a political one.

Giddens (1979, 93) observes that "power relations . . . are always *two-way*, even if the power of one actor or party in a social relation is minimal compared to another." Among the Wana, the "power" that people can wield over one another derives principally from claims of personal control over exogenous resources, including magic, spirits, and knowledge of customary law. For this reason, the relational dimensions of power are particularly evident: a person has "power" in social terms only insofar as others acknowledge it. By taking (or being given) charge in collective ritual (both shamanic and nonshamanic), certain individuals can gain recognition as persons with authority.

Part Two examined the nature of shamanic experience and cultural notions of personhood, health, and illness as they operate in Wana ritual. Two points are particularly striking about the model of the person as a concatenation of vital elements prone to disperse at the slightest provocation. First, it underscores a person's reliance on shamanic mediation by restricting direct access and control over these vital elements to individuals with shamanic powers. And second, it reveals a homologous relation between person and polity. Like a healthy person, the Wana homeland is depicted as having thrived at a time when knowledge, power, and wealth resided at their point of origin; with these elements dispersed, the land languishes like a person experiencing soul loss. Hence millennial visions posit a revitalization of the Wana region only when knowledge, power, and wealth return to their source. The oscillation between concentration and dispersal fundamental to models of person and polity is, as we shall see, also evident in social practice and in the Wana experience of community life as temporary aggregations of households that are easily dissolved. The homology permits the mabolong ritual to invoke simultaneously issues for the individual, the community, and the cosmos.

Consideration of shamanic experience revealed the liminal nature of the shaman as mediator between human and nonhuman realms. To overcome the centrifugality of his patient's vital elements, the shaman must transcend the otherwise discrete domains of Wana and spirit communities (see T. Turner 1977). Wana terms for shaman (*tau walia*, *tau kawalia*) reveal that fusion of separate domains, human and spirit. So too does shamanic conduct.

In the journeys to the Owner, discussed in Part Three, shamanic mediation assumes an explicitly hierarchical form. The geography of power that figures in other aspects of the mabolong is largely horizontal: most of the spirits that cause illness, as well as the spirit familiars

who help combat it, are of this earth, lying beyond the bounds of human communities, sometimes in elevated places like mountains. Whereas the geography of power is primarily outward in other phases of the mabolong, when a shaman makes a pantoo it is upward. Verticality here involves rank as well as altitude. Whereas spirit friends and foes on the human plane require no deference, to approach Pue a shaman and his spirits must take careful ritual measures to avoid the condition of buto, brought on by violations of rank.²

By intervening with a higher power on a patient's behalf, a shaman necessitates a future demonstration of social solidarity (*kasintuwu*) by the community. Shamans who can claim responsibility for continuing and extending the lives of others thus instigate and perpetuate community events that celebrate their own management of human lives. Just as they assemble spirit familiars at a mabolong, so too do they initiate collective events that bring together people to support their mediation with higher powers.

And yet the shamanic centrality and influence implied in these three segments of the ritual are not achieved by every mabolong performer. Claims to shamanship are not a given but rather a goal of performance. The mabolong serves as a public arena in which reputations may be asserted and tested. Summoning spirits at a mabolong is to conjure hidden powers before an audience of one's peers. Being asked by others to investigate the sources of their own and their children's conditions is to have one's powers acknowledged by others. To undertake a journey to Pue is to display the confidence and authority to approach the godhead. To ask one's human companions for "foods" is to call for affirmation of and commitment to one's shamanic endeavors. Such requests underscore the fact that shamanship is not a unilateral matter: to be a shaman, a performer requires the acceptance, support, and encouragement of others. For this reason, I have argued, the baku mwalia episode holds special fascination for an audience because it can occasion an improvisational articulation of a performer's relations both to other shamans and to the community at large.

RITUAL AND POLITICS IN ISLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Having considered the internal dynamics of the mabolong, we are now in a position to ask how the models of power, community, authority, autonomy, and dependence created in the ritual context

may translate into the rest of Wana life. As Errington (1989, 49) has observed, a traditional "division of labor" in scholarly investigations of Island Southeast Asia has accorded the study of courtly elites to historians and the study of commoners, peasants, and hill populations to anthropologists. The result has been a vision of the region as a scattering of Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms floating atop an autochthonous "soup" of local cultures. In her monograph, then, Errington has sought "to correct the vision of the Indic State as a different sort of entity from a hill tribe in Island Southeast Asia."

In a related effort, the historian O. W. Wolters (1982) has drawn on ethnographic analogy to propose a political evolution from a Southeast Asian equivalent of Melanesian "big men" to dynastic kings who legitimated their rule through Hindu symbolism. I shall focus here on Wolters's model of politics in early horticultural communities that match some conditions of contemporary Wana social organization—namely, small clusters of households isolated from one another by great forests, subsistence practices based on "forest efficiency," and cognatic kinship systems with no corporate kin groups.

By no means does studying shamanic ritual in twentieth-century Sulawesi offer an unobstructed window on ancient Southeast Asian politics. As Anna Tsing (1987) has demonstrated for a similar population in Kalimantan, local culture and politics in the hinterlands are profoundly shaped through interaction with the nation-state. In the final chapter of this book I shall argue that the political significance of ritual in the Wana area has been shaped as well by contact—both direct and indirect—with local manifestations of the *negara*, the royal political center that once dominated the Indonesian Archipelago. Here I shall apply Wolters's model to more recent political dynamics.

Wolters hypothesizes that political integration within and between early horticultural communities of Southeast Asia was provided by what he terms "men of prowess." In the absence of corporate kin groups, influential leaders mobilized people through cognatic and neighborhood networks to carry out joint endeavors. These men of prowess owed their leadership, Wolters (1982, 6) suggests, to the fact that others attributed to them an abnormal amount of personal and innate "soul stuff," which explained and distinguished their performance from that of others in their generation and especially among their own kinsmen."

Political integration within and beyond settlements occurred as

people allied as dependents of influential men of prowess, whose success was gauged not only by their own achievements but also by those of their followers, presumably in such activities as warfare, feasting, and ceremonies. Focused as they were on the leadership of individuals, such networks typically did not survive the deaths of their central figures. Wolters proposes that cults built around dead leaders were one way that would-be successors could attempt to draw on political capital from a former generation, and the importation of Hindu political concepts was a further means of enhancing the possibility of dynastic succession.

Wolters leaves the details of this evolution vague. His achievement is in recognizing the continuities in political leadership across levels of sociopolitical integration in Southeast Asia and in clarifying some of the commonalities of the shaman of the periphery and the raja of a center. What he does not do is specify the conditions that might promote political integration on local and regional levels or account for regional variation and change. In Chapter 15 I shall attempt to specify those conditions for the Wana and to account for change in that corner of Sulawesi.

With a bit of tailoring, Wolters's model applies admirably to Wana political processes. On the basis of his familiarity with the Southeast Asian literature, Wolters posited "soul stuff" as the *sine qua non* for "prowess" as regionally defined. For the Wana, prowess is epitomized by magical knowledge, the prerequisite for success at any enterprise. Thus Wolters's suggestion is by no means wide of the mark: as we have seen, power, knowledge, and soul stuff are as integrally related for the Wana as for other peoples in the area—only the configurations differ. Among the Bugis of South Sulawesi, for example, spiritual potency or soul stuff is inherited: the more noble of birth one is, the greater is one's potency (Errington 1983). By contrast, Wana "souls" are equal; what differs is people's achievement in the quest for magical knowledge—a quest that, among other things, confers control over other people's souls.

Like Wolters's soul stuff, magical knowledge is a key social value through which Wana relations of power and dependence are culturally articulated. As an intangible quality derived from sources exogenous to mundane social existence, its possession must be publicly iterated and validated. Whereas Wana presume that everyone possesses *some* magic, shamans have in addition personal ties to spirits, the sources

of magical knowledge. The mabolong, then, is the paramount occasion for shamans to display evidence of those spirit ties. Like other politically charged theatrical spectacles in Island Southeast Asia, the mabolong provides an arena for performers to strive to match their culture's ideals of power. Given this aim, such endeavors are highly self-reflexive, by which I mean that they highlight the relation of a performer to attributes of power. Herein lies a contrast between Southeast Asian "men of prowess" and the Melanesian "big men" to whom Wolters compares them.³ Big men's reputations for magic, oratory, and bravery support their entrepreneurial efforts to accumulate and distribute vast amounts of wealth in intergroup exchanges. In much of Melanesia, moreover, "agonistic" exchanges among social actors are mutually transformative for the participants involved; political reputations are built through public exchanges with competing rivals. By contrast, in many Southeast Asian theatrical displays the focus is on the connection between a political actor and a spiritual quality, such as soul stuff, spirit familiars, or deities. Relational dimensions of rituals, and hence their dialectical potential, are suppressed. One might say that politics of this sort posits audiences instead of adversaries; it is theatrical rather than transactional.

What are the consequences of theatrical performances beyond the ritual context? In the case of the exchanges of Melanesian big men, ritual displays and economic production are linked. Noting a correspondence between big man politics and the generalized exchange of women (whereby wealth, in the form of pigs and the like, may be exchanged for wives), Godelier (1982, 1986) has argued that Melanesian big men control the reproduction of human life and kinship through the grip they exert on economic production.⁴ Wana shamanship, in contrast, confers no control over production or marriage. In this regard, Wana politics resembles the "great man" pattern outlined by Godelier rather than the familiar Melanesian "big man" pattern. Godelier coined the term *great men* to characterize influential political actors among the Baruya of Highland New Guinea. Although individual Baruya may achieve recognition as outstanding warriors, shamans, or hunters, these successes do not translate into control of production and distribution of wealth in Baruya society. For both the Baruya and the Wana, political reputation and influence are a function of personal control over prestigious resources exogenous to the social system (such as spirits, enemies, and game), not of material production and exchange.

SETTLEMENTS, SHAMANSHIP, AND THE CREATION OF COMMUNITY

Wana shamanship does not offer control over economic production, but it does play a part in constituting Wana communities. To understand how this is so, it is necessary to consider the nature of a Wana community and the processes of its formation and dissolution.

Wana build their houses in their swidden fields: in a single large clearing of contiguous swidden sites there may be anywhere from two to ten, twelve, or more houses. This pattern of many households sharing a single swidden site is unusual for swidden farmers in Island Southeast Asia. More commonly, smaller areas are cleared and farmed by fewer households. In Wana judgment, however, the more households in a swidden settlement, the better.

Each house is usually occupied by a conjugal couple and their dependent relatives, both old and young. Occasionally two or more conjugal couples will share a house; a fairly common arrangement is a combined household of parents and a married child with spouse. The occupants of a house may change over the course of a year—for example, two families may share a dwelling during the early part of a farming year, then separate when the men have time from their work to build individual houses. There is also a good deal of visiting within and between settlements for friendship, courtship, healing, celebrating, and pursuit of rice and trade goods.

Just as household composition may change over the course of a year, so may settlement composition change considerably over several years. Settlements are relocated each year after the harvest and before planting time. How near or far the new swidden site will be from the old is a function of many factors, including proximity of suitable farming land, the success of the previous harvest, the health and happiness of residents over the past year, and local concerns about Indonesian governmental policies regarding minority populations. Decisions about where to move are made by community farming leaders in consultation with both neighbors and oracles.

Not all householders may choose to accompany their neighbors to the new site. Residential mobility is permitted by swidden farming practices, the absence of private ownership, a lack of pressure on available farmland, and options for households to attach to new settlements where their members have kin or friends. Moreover, a Wana practice of exchanging a fixed amount of unhusked rice and a

midday meal for a day's farm labor makes it possible (and, if supplies are low, desirable) for people to relocate, often over long distances, during a farming cycle as well as after it. Thus, although the future of settlement composition is most in question after harvest time, splintering can and does occur at other times.

Residential mobility has also been enhanced historically by a succession of coastal regimes in this century, which have sought (with varying degrees of success) to impose resettlement, corvée labor, taxation, religious conversion, and other unpopular policies on the Wana (see Atkinson 1979, 1984a, b). Kruyt put the matter simply: "The Wana are known to be a much plagued people." Their traditional enemies, known to them as the To Lage and to anthropologists as the Bare'e-speaking Toraja, marveled at their seemingly magical ways of disappearing—by making themselves so small they could hide under tree leaves and by transforming their fires into red tree ants when their enemies approached. The Wana "always had to be prepared for flight, and for this reason provided their pigs with nose rings . . . something that sounded ridiculous to Toraja ears; with these nose rings people could pull these domesticated animals along with them with every rumor of an enemy approach" (Kruyt 1930, 403–4). (I saw precious few domesticated pigs during my time in the Wana region, the difficulty of transporting them with every move being a possible reason for their absence.)⁵

Wana openly acknowledge their cowardice as a people. Apa Iki, the father of the shaman Apa Mene and head of the settlement in which I worked, told of his paternal grandfather, Liwa, himself the head of a settlement, who would lead others off into hiding at a moment's notice. It was Liwa's habit to eat a full meal early in the morning, so that if there were something to fear he wouldn't have to flee hungry. Apa Iki's sister-in-law recalled how once Liwa led them all in flight in the middle of the night on account of a dream. And one of Liwa's close friends and drinking companions, known as "Tall Fellow" (Ngkai Malangang), composed the following verse (*kiyori*) for him:

baru yangu yangu la'u
 anumu pei inu yau
 ane ma'imo nsa tau
 siko Liwa lampu yau

There's the beer sloshing back and forth.
 Come on and drink it down.

If a stranger should arrive,
 you, Liwa, will go feral.

Liwa's timidity had its roots in the endemic regional warfare of the nineteenth century. In the regional game of headhunting, the Wana were often the heads, the victims of neighboring peoples (see Kruyt 1930, 505). There is also evidence that the coastal raja of Tojo and Bungku instigated war against the Wana to force their submission (Kruyt 1930, 403, 467). Subsequent history brought new trials for Liwa and his contemporaries. As Kruyt documents, pressures on Wana settlements did not cease with pacification. Although the imposition of direct Dutch rule in the region at the beginning of this century put an end to raiding, it inaugurated a new form of local terrorism. Kruyt (p. 404) recounts:

In the beginning of the occupation, the Administration supposed that these shy people should come to know order and law most easily if they were forced to live near the coast. But they did not wish this, and the result was that—from the north by the government official of Poso as well as from the south by the administrator of Bungku and Mori—patrols of soldiers were sent repeatedly into this land to draw the people down [to the coast]. The result of all this was that a small portion of the people settled themselves in the vicinity of Bone Bae; another portion made villages close by the coast of the Moluccan Sea, but most chose an uneasy existence in the forest. Whenever the pressure of the patrols became strong in the north, people yielded from there to the south. When danger threatened from the south, then people moved to the north. The distress of these people must have been great. Of those who had let themselves be forced to live by the coast, many died.

Some of my older acquaintances were children when this Dutch effort took place, probably in the 1910s. By the late 1920s, when Kruyt conducted his survey, the policy had changed. People who wished to return to the interior were granted permission to do so, but only if they registered as members of villages or kampung. Some chose to settle near Bone Bae in the north; the coastal settlements in the south were generally abandoned. At the time of Kruyt's visit in 1928, "hundreds of Wana [were] still unregistered in the mountains and woods" (p. 404). Dutch patrols continually endeavored to "uncover" settlements of unregistered Wana. Offenders would be taken to the government capital at Kolonodale to become familiar with "society," whereupon they would be allowed to return home on the condi-

tion that they "build a village at a mutually agreed upon place." After such treatment, though, Kruyt (p. 405) noted, "most disappear again into their inaccessible hiding places."

Opportunities for trade, not government coercion, have brought Wana into willing contact with the coast. In the years leading up to World War II and once again in the 1950s and 1960s, a regional market in resin engaged Wana, who energetically tapped wild damar trees and traded resin for cloth, knives, pots, salt, and other coastal luxuries. Holdouts who refused to register in villages traded in turn with the more courageous village registrants, who had direct access to markets. At various points coastal traders would come into the interior as well to obtain forest products in return for coastal trade items.

After World War II, traders brought horses to the Wana region to enable people to bring out resin in quantities too great for a person to carry. Villages apparently thrived with this trade. Many Wana were willing to put up with taxation, corvée labor, and other impositions of the government when they saw benefit as well as hardship. With political turmoil in the wider society, however, they would easily return to their reclusive ways. World War II and the presence of seven Japanese soldiers in the area sent village people into hiding. So too did the Indonesian political turmoils of the 1950s and 1960s.⁶ Both resulted in millenarian movements in which whole communities would vanish into remote areas of the woods. Three large settlements in the vicinity where I worked, for example, including the one in which I lived, were composed largely of refugees from one such movement in the late 1960s.

In the 1970s the Indonesian authorities engaged in an endeavor reminiscent of the abortive Dutch efforts to relocate the Wana population as the Social Ministry created new settlements along the northern coast in which to settle upland residents. Opposition to these plans was widespread among Wana, who felt that the coastal plains were unsuitable for farming, feared exploitation by local officials, and were anxious about forced conversions to Islam and Christianity. Plans to resettle interior peoples replaced any government interest in sustaining interior villages; they also provoked withdrawal by many Wana who would have been willing to cooperate with the government so long as they be allowed to remain in their homelands. Thus both external policies and historically conditioned skittishness have fostered residential instability in the area.

Like Wana models of personhood and homeland, Wana settlements

exhibit centrifugal tendencies. A verse attributed to an influential Wana leader portrays his constituency as a flock of birds lighting on a tree, but likely to fly off at any moment.

COMMUNITY, RITUAL, AND LEADERSHIP

In light of this picture, one might well ask if there is anything to counterbalance the centrifugal tendencies of Wana settlements. Two factors seem critical: one is a sense of community, built on histories of familiarity, cooperation, and affection; the other is a reliance on leadership and the protection of key individuals. At work in everyday life, both factors are manifested and joined in collective ritual.

The factor I am calling community is epitomized by the term *kasintuwu*, which refers to the moral quality of living together. People to whom the adjectival form *masintuwu* can be applied are mutually supportive: they share with one another and come to each other's assistance. *Kasintuwu*, which is part of the moral texture of quotidian existence, is highlighted as a primary social value on collective occasions when people are expected to come together.

Settlementwide gatherings take place on two kinds of occasions: the first predictable and associated with the farming cycle, the second unpredictable and associated with the life cycle. In the first category are a series of four annual farming celebrations held at the beginning and end of the planting season and the harvest season. Depending on the success of the harvest, the final harvest feast may attract celebrants from many settlements. These four celebrations are scheduled and directed by a community leader known as a *woro tana* (literally, the one who "bores the ground"), a mature man usually, who is a successful farmer and possesses knowledge of rice ritual and magic.

The second category of collective occasion includes funerals, marriage feasts, and mabolong performances. Like harvest feasts, these can be occasions when people gather from many settlements; but they may be smaller affairs, drawing principally on the residents of a single settlement. Whereas *woro tana* assume a centrality in farming festivals, experts on customary law (*ada*) occupy center stage in marriage negotiations, and shamans dominate mabolong, which may be held in conjunction with other kinds of festivals as well.

Attending a collective celebration is a demonstration of *kasintuwu*. Contributing food or rice beer is a further demonstration of neigh-

borly commitment. Although it is expected that residents within a settlement will participate in collective events, between settlements attendance is a more fluid and overtly "political" matter. Funeral feasts and harvest festivals in particular are occasions when representatives of settlements within a radius of several miles make a point of appearing in order to demonstrate kasintuwu.

The spirit of collective gatherings, whether they involve members of a single settlement or of several, is cooperative, not competitive. In situations where opposition might be expected—for example marriage, in which at least some of the guests are associated with the bride's side or the groom's—formal procedures are designed to establish a sense of harmony and consensus among all who have gathered. Even *ada* discussions to settle disputes over adultery, divorce, and other disagreements work on this principle. This is not to say that political competition and rivalry are absent from Wana gatherings; but the articulated goal of a collective event is not to defeat or to shame a rival, but instead to celebrate community. As I noted earlier, political performance in this region is self-reflexive. So, for example, one local leader planned to stage a large harvest festival, a woman explained to me, because he wanted his community to have "great news" or "great fame" (*bae kareba*). Individuals and communities compete with others not by defeating them in explicit contests, but by outshining them.

Collective celebrations reflect on both a settlement and its inhabitants. The larger the settlement, the wider the personal networks of its members; and the greater its prosperity, the more brilliantly it will shine on festive occasions. A settlement with poor harvests will likely keep its collective celebrations to itself. It is also not going to attract people willing to trade farm labor, cloth, and other desired goods in return for rice, nor will its farming leader, shamans, and *ada* experts be able to increase their regional profile by being at the center of collective celebrations. Should fortunes change—should harvests improve, should people be attracted from elsewhere not simply to work or trade but to settle—the new situation can boost the reputations of prominent individuals who in various ways can take credit for community prosperity.

Farming Authority

Abundant harvests reflect well on the people who coordinate community farming decisions and ritual. Although bad harvests can be

blamed on a variety of factors, ranging from pestilence to sorcery from other settlements, a *woro tana* can take credit for successful harvests. To become *woro tana*, one must be an effective and successful farmer, as well as a cooperative and persuasive neighbor whom others can trust. In addition—and this is critical—one must possess knowledge of ritual and magic handed down from one generation to another that people consider vital to the success of their own fields. Put another way, many Wana are effective farmers and cooperative neighbors, but not all claim to know the magical knowledge and ritual procedures to make their own and their neighbors' crops thrive. Vital as that expertise is to Wana life and livelihood, proximity to an admired *woro tana* is cited as an important consideration in Wana residence decisions.

Legal Authority

Just as association with a prominent *woro tana* lends a measure of security in matters of subsistence, so association with an effective legal orator provides assurance of another kind. The Wana possess a system of *ada*, or customary law.⁷ They regard this system as a historical importation, maintaining that sometime after Wana submitted to the *raja* of Bungku in the last century three Wana went to Bungku and there were given *ada*. Without *ada*, they claim, "people would kill people"; with *ada*, disputes can be settled peacefully within a shared legal framework. The code specifies in metaphorical language payments to be made to settle matters of marriage, marital infractions, and a host of social breaches including slander, theft, and murder. That the code originated under the hierarchical conditions imposed by coastal sultanates is evident in the fact that the size of payments varies according to the social rank of the parties involved. In the Wana region in the nineteenth century, the various rankings consisted of the chiefs (*basal* or *makole*) and their kin, ordinary commoners, and debt slaves; in the 1970s, then, descendants of these former leaders could still be expected to pay more than others.

A variety of sanctions surround the use of the *ada* code. These sanctions place limits on the power of *ada* specialists. One must never claim to "know" *ada*; instead one should only allude to having heard others discuss a point of *ada* in a particular way. This stipulation mitigates against exclusive claims of authority and correctness on the part of *ada* experts. Furthermore, one must never accept rice in exchange

for ada objects. This stipulation asserts a separation between ada exchange and subsistence production. To violate these principles results in the debilitating condition of *buto*.

What promotes adherence to the ada code? Principally the negative sanction that without it, vengeance taking would be rampant: if people did not submit to ada, it is said, they would kill each other. Regarding adultery, a more specific and fearsome sanction is at work. An act of adultery gives rise to "constricting" afflictions as a "monkey" (*kuse*) grips the guilty parties or their innocent relatives. The withholding of neonates or placentas in childbed is a classic form of *kuse*. In times of serious illness or difficulties in childbed, people may be quizzed about any affairs they might have had that could account for the problem. Confession and payment of a fine should release the grip of the "monkey" and restore the patient to health.

As I saw ada in operation, legal discussions were held principally over matters of marriage—the establishment, violation, and dissolution thereof. Ada provided a forum for willing parties to come together to resolve a matter of mutual concern. When parties were unwilling to talk, threats to report matters to coastal authorities a four-day hike away were sometimes made (but, in the interior, rarely acted upon). One of my neighbors, who had grown up in a community with powerful ada orators, observed that although I had achieved a thorough understanding of Wana shamanic practice, I had lacked the opportunity to make a comparable study of ada. I would agree. Ada practice is, I believe, livelier in settlements located at the "Old Mountain" (Tongku Tu'a), the Wana homeland, than in the region where I worked. The settlements I knew best were composed in the main of people who had moved away from the Old Mountain into wider expanses of land across the Bongka River to the northeast. There they settled near the To Linte, the northern branch of the Wana who in the past were subject to the raja of Tojo and a somewhat different code of ada. A lack of long-standing relations with others in the area and a low concentration of authorities versed in the same form of ada may therefore have dampened the enthusiasm of local experts for seeking out reasons to "talk ada."

Ada specialists are people with the confidence to engage in public deliberations, an activity that requires familiarity with highly embellished legal oratory, a quick wit, and people to depend on one's advocacy. It also requires access to objects suitable for payment,

which one obtains by being party to prior ada discussions and through a double exchange pattern. For although one finds barriers to direct conversion of ada objects into rice, there are no barriers to exchange of ada objects for cloth; people who can acquire substantial stores of cloth through trade either of forest products like rattan and resin or of rice, then, can thereby obtain copper trays and china dishes to use in ada exchanges. They can also use cloth for some payments as well. (The possibility of translating cloth into ada payments gives men an advantage over women in this arena because men participate more actively than women in long-distance coastal trade.)

The importation of ada from the kingdom of Bungku was related directly to the institution of debt slavery in the Wana region (see Chapter 15), since in the nineteenth century people who could not pay their legal fines became the slaves of those who paid the fines for them. Although debt slavery ended in the colonial era, indebtedness to ada experts persists. People who marry, divorce, or become embroiled in complicated extramarital entanglements involving people in other communities may find themselves in need of an effective orator and assistance in paying large fines. If someone else pays a large fine on one's behalf, people say, the person who was rescued should make a point of residing near the benefactor and offering assistance occasionally. Although an ada expert has no recourse if a dependent chooses to move away, a follower may be persuaded to stay by the thought of future assistance from a past benefactor. Thus, paying fines for others is one way of invoking their allegiance. Slavery this is not; but dependency it most decidedly is.⁸

Shamanic Authority

Just as knowledge of rice ritual and ada attracts and sustains a following, so too does effective shamanship. Besides endeavoring to restore integrity to persons through ritual means, successful shamans can combat the centrifugal tendencies of Wana communities by encouraging the dependence of others on their skills.

The "shaman as hero" (Lévi-Strauss 1963a) is a dominant theme in both ritual and nonritual contexts. The action of the *mabolong* features a shaman as a powerful protagonist leading a spirit cohort in a struggle to save patients' lives. The private side of shamanship involves pressing beyond the limits of ordinary experience to engage

alien and dangerous powers. Stories of heroic shamans abound—such as Towambo, a shaman so powerful that he was said to “defeat the Owner” by bringing people back to life even after forest had regrown on their gravesites. Although no living shaman can equal Towambo, people look for—and, I will argue, create—powerful ones to depend on.

In times of illness, Wana rely not simply on shamanic mediation but on mediation by particular shamans. Dependence on one special shaman comes about if people feel they owe their lives or the lives of their dear ones to this person who fought against all odds to save them, once or on numerous occasions. Shamans may impress on others this dependence. “If it weren’t for me, this person would not be alive today” is a boast that shamans often make in the hearing of their patients. Patients and their families may likewise voice their reliance on a particular shaman. Children grow up being told that they owe their lives to the efforts of one shaman or another. In this way shamans and patients make reciprocal claims on each other, the shamans asserting their patients’ dependence, and the patients insuring future assistance from the shamans.

SHAMANSHIP AND LOCALITY

Contrary to the biblical dictum that a man cannot become a prophet in his own land, it is precisely in one’s own neighborhood that a shamanic reputation must be cultivated. In characterizing Javanese notions of power, Anderson (1972, 22) observed: “Perhaps the most exact image of the ordered Javanese polity is that of a cone of light cast downwards by a reflector lamp,” its intensity being strongest at a central point and diminishing gradually as one moves outward toward the periphery. (This image has historical roots; see Moertono 1968.) Not only in Java, but elsewhere in the archipelago as well, political efficacy diminishes with distance. As Kiefer (1972) argued some time ago, this pattern is a function of the ego-focused networks through which political coalitions are created in this area. Wana followings of shamans, rice magicians, and *ada* specialists alike comprise first and foremost the people (generally close cognatic kin) who reside in the same swidden settlement. Beyond that cluster may be people in other settlements who periodically express commitment

to those influential people but do not interact with them day to day. And still further beyond are acquaintances and strangers whose attitudes toward these persons of influence may be neutral, competitive, hostile, or denigrating.

The immediate neighbors of a prominent shaman stand to benefit most from his skills. Their advantage is not only logistic but also political. Established shamans use their reputations to attract people to their settlement, for only those who live nearby have primary claims on a shaman’s services. The way in which access to a powerful shaman can serve as an enticement and a justification for residence choice is illustrated in the following case. (Given the potential sensitivity of the case, I have changed the names of the parties involved.)

Dodi and her husband Ngalo were a young married couple who had resided for several years with his parents, not hers. Dodi’s parents were Christian converts who lived in a government village near the coast. Relations between Dodi and her parents were somewhat strained, and Dodi claimed that she preferred to live with her in-laws, despite Wana sentiment that married daughters should live near their parents. After considerable pressure from her parents, Dodi and Ngalo decided that once their harvest was completed, they would go to farm by her parents.

During the harvest season Dodi and Ngalo’s infant daughter fell sick. Ngalo’s brother, Apa Leru, a prominent shaman, along with Apa Jampu, the brother of Ngalo’s sister’s husband and the leading shaman of a neighboring community, took charge of the case. After a succession of *mabolong* and *potudu* performances and other healing measures, the baby showed some improvement. Apa Jampu instructed the baby’s father to summon him to perform again in fourteen days. When the time came, though, the child was much better, and the father neglected to fetch Apa Jampu for a follow-up *mabolong*. Soon after, the child fell sick again; the relapse was attributed to the failure to perform the required *mabolong*. Once again Apa Leru and Apa Jampu made a heroic effort to save the child, and the parties concerned vowed that if the child lived to make the trip to her maternal grandparents, Dodi and Ngalo, with the help of Apa Leru, would set an offering afloat in the river. The child survived, and as the family set off on their journey the vow was fulfilled.

Not long after, Ngalo returned to his parents’ settlement for a

funeral feast. During his stay, a messenger arrived with an urgent request from Dodi that Ngalo and his shaman brother Apa Leru should come immediately: the baby had fallen sick again, and Dodi was terrified. Although Dodi's father was a shaman, there was fear that the baby's condition would not respond to his treatment but awaited that of her uncles. Ngalo left immediately, but Apa Leru declined to make the long journey; instead he sent his spirit familiars to investigate the child's condition and take proper measures. The child's paternal grandmother made a vow for the child's recovery, amid much negative talk insinuating that Dodi's parents were putting the child at risk by demanding that she be taken away from the shamans on whom her life depended. The point was apparently not lost on Dodi's mother and father. Within a week the young family returned, with the blessings of Dodi's parents, for it had been shown that the child could not live apart from the shamans who had sustained her life.

Dodi and Ngalo's choice of residence involved issues of religion, farming considerations, and family sentiments. Its resolution was not framed in terms of those issues, however, but rather in terms about which all parties could agree—namely, the welfare of the child and her dependence on the powers of particular shamans.

REMUNERATION AND SHAMANSHIP

To attract others to him, a shaman must present himself as being indispensable to their life and health. He also must appear to be doing more for them than they are for him. This stance cannot, however, be maintained indiscriminately. Instead it is cultivated for a core following and allowed to diminish with social distance.

A consideration of direct remuneration for shamanic treatment shows how this process works. Within a community, a shaman receives no special payment for shamanic performances or treatments with spells, although he is hosted with betel, tobacco, and rice beer, and occasionally a meal as well. For certain procedures a gift may be required to protect the shaman and his family or to encourage his spirit familiars. These prestations are phrased as spiritual requirements and sharply distinguished from wages.

Shamans from other settlements may require a more direct incentive to perform. An *oko mwiti* ("to take the feet") is a gift given to entice a shaman to travel to help a patient. Similarly, if there is social

or spatial distance between a shaman and those in need of his services, a gift of clothing is in order. Once again, a distinction is made between this gift, which demonstrates "whiteness of heart" (*buya nraya*) to encourage a shaman's spirits, and payment or "wages" (*gaji*).

Shamans who demand payment for healing are viewed as "crooked" (*maneo*), in contrast to "good" or "decent" (*magao*) shamans who do not. Yet the matter of remuneration, be it phrased as *buya nraya* or *gaji*, is more a matter of social relationship than of personal character. A shaman may be judged as "decent" by those to whom he is committed, with whom he is engaged in the ongoing "give and take" of community life, and as "crooked" by those whom he feels no obligation to assist and from whom he has no expectation of future remuneration.

Although generous shamans will ostensibly work selflessly on their neighbors' behalf, people who depend on a certain shaman's services often do find ways of reciprocating. One woman, for instance, periodically brought supplies of piper leaf and areca nut to the shaman whose aid was continually requested by her household of six. Portions of meat, fish, fruit, and the like may also be directed to the households of prominent shamans. In one settlement, I was told, residents on one occasion went so far as to join together to help an old shaman with his farm work to compensate him for his tireless efforts on their behalf.

In general, such remuneration is subtle and evident only in the breach. For example, I overheard a prominent shaman and his wife discuss the fact that a neighbor had allegedly found some honey and neglected to share it with the shaman's household. Sometime, they noted, the neighbor would ask the shaman to perform, and he would decline.

The same couple was involved in another incident I witnessed. One day the shaman's sister-in-law brought her infant by for a visit. In a style of baby talk used among women in the company of infants, she declared that her husband was irritated because his brother (the shaman) was picking his piper leaf. The shaman's wife answered, also in baby talk, "Don't criticize, so he'll be willing to treat us [*kita*] with spells." The use of baby talk kept the exchange on a joking level; moreover, the use of the inclusive first-person pronoun (*kita*) delicately avoided an opposition between the two women.

Should a shaman's household become too tactless about its expectations of remuneration, people may seek shamans elsewhere. I did note

that people, used to patronizing one shaman, would visit another when the first had been less than gracious about helping. Uncooperativeness was also cited as a reason why some had chosen not to live near one powerful shaman who in his old age had refused, I was told, to perform without payment.⁹

To sum up, shamans themselves underscore the dependence of others on them and demonstrate a particular willingness to help those who choose to live nearby. Others, for their part, are attracted to the neighborhood of a prominent shaman and often see it as in their best interest to be generous with such a person if he will reciprocate when they need shamanic attention.

So far I have focused on the fact that an alliance with a powerful shaman assures assistance in times of illness. Significantly, however, illness may according to Wana etiology have human as well as spirit sources; thus, to protect their followings shamans must defend not only against illness-bearing spirits but also against human sorcerers. The cliché that the best defense is a good offense applies aptly here: sorcery is an important part of an expert shaman's medical—and political—kit, and one that often comes into play beyond the ritual context.

SORCERY AND SHAMANSHIP

Like other cognatic peoples in the region, Wana distinguish a sense of "usness" based on social and spatial proximity through contrast to an undistinguished "them," referred to sometimes simply as *tau*, "people," or more definitively as *tau yusa*, "other people" (see Errington 1989). This contrast is morally charged. The rules of conduct that should hold among people who view each other as "us" break down as interaction with strangers comes into play. Within a community of "us," sorcery should not be used. In fact, the rare accusations of intrasettlement sorcery that I heard of always coincided with and were used to fuel the breakup of a residential cluster. Sorcery, in short, comes from "other people," those beyond the margins of one's moral community.

Sorcery is not, however, the weapon of the socially marginal. Instead, as a form of special knowledge, it is at its most powerful among powerful people. Anyone thought to possess magical spells should be presumed to know sorcery; mature and influential men especially war-

rant both respect and caution on this account. People with sorcery need not be people with spirit familiars, but there can be no doubt that people with spirit familiars are people with sorcery. After all, included in the category of spirit familiars are precisely those creatures who make a practice of "eating out people's insides." Whereas anyone can study sorcery spells for self-defense or malicious intent, shamans necessarily cultivate ties with the spirit agents of sorcery, whether their intentions are to heal or to harm.

Except in playful boasting and serious challenging, people with spells commonly deny that they know or use sorcery (a category of magic labeled *doti*, a term borrowed from the Buginese). Rather, they say that they possess "walls of the body" (*rindi ngkoro*)—spells used to defend against sorcery. Even people with reputations for powerful sorcery, when asked, are likely to say that they strive "to support the lives of [their] companions" (*potuwu yunu*), not to harm people. When incidents of alleged sorcery are raised, people may solemnly observe, "The Owner is not blind," suggesting that divine justice condemns sorcery. But such ethical judgments are applied relativistically, not universalistically. Wanton use of sorcery is condemned, defensive use is not—a judgment that in any given instance depends on the evaluator's place in the social field. Thus a man whom neighbors consider to be a champion and protector may be regarded as a deadly sorcerer by people in other communities.

Sorcery, like other forms of special knowledge, can be used to benefit a following. Because a shaman defends his community from dangers emanating from human as well as nonhuman sources, sorcery, used in retaliation for suspected sorcery by others, is one means shamans have of protecting those close to them. Thus sorcery is integral to the shamanic endeavor.

Politically, the value of sorcery derives not from its actual use but from its *potential* for use. A reputation for sorcery is an advantage when persuading others to do what one wishes them to do. Consider the place of a shaman's reputation for sorcery in the following dispute.

Apa Bale had an orphaned niece, Neli (both pseudonyms), who lived far away in another settlement. He and his wife were elderly and wanted the girl to come live and work with them. He visited the girl's guardians and intimated that his son, a powerful shaman, would be "angry" if the girl were not allowed to reside with him, an anger that might translate into sorcery if the request were not granted. Not long

after, one of the girl's guardians developed a terrible stomach pain, the source of which was determined to be a "crab" (*bungku*) sent into his body by Apa Bale's son, who was renowned for this particular sorcery technique. The girl was sent to live with her uncle and later married into his community. (Apa Bale told me this story; I do not know how Neli's guardians would have explained their decision to give up the girl. The value of Apa Bale's account is the light it casts on the plausibility of using sorcery as leverage in achieving compliance from others. Note that it was Apa Bale himself, not his shaman son, who used the younger man's reputation for sorcery in these negotiations.)

In an incident that I witnessed, a shaman's stepmother instructed a relative returning to a distant settlement to tell people there that the shaman would "be angry" if they did not hand over a gong to which the shaman's community felt entitled. Like the previous example, this incident shows the perceived advantage of a reputation for sorcery, not simply for the person who holds it but for those allied with that person as well.

As it turned out, the woman's threat did not bring about the immediate return of the gong. People may worry about intimations of sorcery, but they do not automatically capitulate when so threatened. More likely, they take stock of their own defenses, for possessing sorcery themselves or being allied with someone who does effectively diminishes such worry. For example, when a marriage proposal came for a young woman whom I will call Lina, both Lina and her parents were distressed. All were opposed to the match, but the suitor's mother and stepfather were widely regarded as powerful sorcerers. Although Lina's father was a shaman, he feared retribution from this powerful pair if the suit were rejected. As Lina's relations discussed the matter, however, they reassured themselves with the knowledge that Lina's brother-in-law and *his* brother-in-law were powerful shamans who could rebuff any vengeance the suitor's parents might wreak on Lina and her community. The proposal was rejected.

Like rice ritual, *ada*, and shamanic prowess, sorcery is an important form of knowledge on which others in a community may come to depend. Because of the intrinsic relation between sorcery and the shamanic pursuits, sorcery is a means whereby the authority achieved through *mabolong* performance can be carried over from ritual to nonritual contexts.

LIMITS TO THE SYSTEM

In characterizing early "men of prowess" politics in Southeast Asia, Wolters hypothesized that political constituencies, focused as they were on powerful individuals, were likely to collapse at the death of their leaders. Indeed, the Wana lack effective measures for perpetuating authority intergenerationally. In contrast to societies such as the Sa'dan Toraja of South Sulawesi, with their famous funeral rituals directed at transferring status and property rights from the dead to the living (see Volkman 1985), the Wana seek to defend the integrity of the living against the contagious dangers of the dead; instead of occasioning orderly succession, death calls for collective measures to ward off physical and psychic threats to the survivors. The powers that a shaman concentrates about himself in life dissipate at his death, like the dead man's own soul parts. Only by keeping vigil at his grave (and so risking death themselves) can would-be successors hope to intercept a few of his spirit allies.¹⁰

CONCLUSION

This chapter has considered the ways in which knowledge of rice ritual, *ada* expertise, and shamanship figure in the creation of communities. People who develop reputations in these three specialties can attract followers who depend on them to sustain the life and health of their crops and themselves, and to serve as advocates in social and spiritual matters alike. In highlighting how each specialty comes into play, I have spoken as though these were three separate categories of social actors. Yet although the forms of knowledge and practice are culturally discrete, their social control is not: there is nothing about expertise in one domain that prohibits expertise in another. In fact, there are good reasons for the same person to possess expertise in more than one domain. First, all three forms of expertise are highly prized; hence it is desirable and enviable to control them. Second, because each form requires the memorization and articulation of lengthy formulae, people who can master one domain have the mind and verbal skills to master another. Finally, all three forms confer a measure of political authority. If people well versed in one area develop expertise in one or both of the others, they may free

themselves and their associates from dependence on the expertise of others.

Developing authority in any of these domains seems to be a social, not an individual, matter. Not every person seeks full independence of everyone else; consociates generally prefer to look to each other rather than outside for advocacy in human and spirit realms. It is in this spirit that a senior shaman urges "the little children" (*ngana miyuni*)—his own children and those of his siblings and cousins—to seek shamanic knowledge so they won't have to "pay" others for help in time of illness. It is in this spirit as well that people seek special knowledge from aging relatives, lest a community be left bereft not only of its "great old people" (*tau bose tu'a*) but also of their expertise.

Shamanship, Gender, and the Life Cycle

Habitus, as the social inscribed in the body of the biological individual, makes it possible to produce the infinite acts that are inscribed in the game, in the form of possibilities and objective requirements. The constraints and requirements of the game, although they are not locked within a code of rules, are *imperative* for those, and only those, who, because they have a sense of the game's immanent necessity, are equipped to perceive them and carry them out.

Bourdieu, quoted in Lamaison,
"From Rules to Strategies"

The ideal of shamanship promotes the image of a powerful agent surrounded by passive but appreciative dependents. The last three chapters should have dispelled the notion that all performers are equally powerful and appreciated. Only some can match the self-characterization of one renowned shaman who declared, "As for those who defeat me, there are none. Only those who equal me are there" (*ane to manangi taare ane kasiwajuka re'e*).

What does it take to achieve such a profile of shamanic agency? Culturally, success is attributed to possession of secret knowledge and spirit alliances, an achievement that is in turn attributed to individual qualities of bravery, industry, and good fortune. Yet in practice, shamanic claims entail social negotiation. As Giddens (1979, 93) put it, "Power relations are relations of autonomy and dependence, but even the most autonomous agent is in some degree dependent, and the most dependent actor or party in a relationship retains some autonomy." Although shamanship may look like an individual achievement, I will argue here otherwise: first, that a shaman is powerful only insofar as others attribute power to him; and second, that motivation for shamanship does not rest solely with the individual but rather derives from, and is promoted by, the interests of wider social groups.

To develop this argument I shall consider the relations between two categories of people, one from which a disproportionately large number of shamans come and another that is poorly represented in the ranks of mabolong performers. The imbalance between the shamanic achievement of men and women suggests unequal access to key resources on which ritual and political authority depend.¹

For Morton Fried (1967, 33), the inequality of which I speak was a nonissue: "An egalitarian society is one in which there are as many positions of prestige in any given age-sex grade as there are persons capable of filling them." That differences of age and gender should entail unequal access to positions of prestige does not imply for Fried the inappropriateness of the label *egalitarian*. Age, of course, is mutable: a person may attain eligibility for various forms of prestige and privilege at different points in the life cycle. But what of gender? Are Wana forms of prestige simply structures of male privilege, as Ortner and Whitehead (1981) might argue? Or are there separate and incomparable hierarchies of prestige and privilege for women and men in Wana society (see Leacock 1978; Weiner 1976)? Or is it perhaps the case that Wana women simply become enamored of hegemonic forms of male domination despite their own best interests (see Llewelyn-Davies 1981)?

When I initially undertook fieldwork among the Wana, I intended to examine the gendered division of religious specialization. Among the neighboring peoples of the Poso region, men's headhunting and women's shamanship appear to have been complementary endeavors (Adriani 1932):² men insured the vitality of their communities by their expeditions on a worldly plane, while women protected people's lives and health through trips to the Upper and Lower Worlds. The only men to engage in these shamanic journeys were those who forsook male pursuits and lived as women. By contrast, Kruyt found Wana shamanship to be the purview of men, except among the Barangas group where some women did serve as shamans.³

As I discovered, to examine Wana shamanship with questions of gender in mind conflicts decidedly with a Wana perspective on the matter. People objected to phrasing ritual specialization in gendered terms. When I asked who could become a shaman, people told me *anyone* could, provided that person was "industrious" (*madota*) or "brave" (*makoje*) about seeking shamanic knowledge and possessed the "fortune" (*dale*) or "palm line" (*ua mpale*) to succeed. It was

obvious to me that almost without exception those anyone were men.⁴ When asked to explain why most shamans were men, people resisted the suggestion that gender was a qualification for shamanship or other ritual activities.

If not articulated as a categorical rule, however, differences in social practice create a pattern whereby access to shamanic skills—a highly valued form of cultural expertise—is differentially accorded by gender. A close look at the cultural construction of Wana shamanship reveals that its emphasis on physical mobility and the external derivation of secret knowledge conform more closely to the contours of male rather than female experience in Wana society.

As we have seen, the sources of shamanic power are not contained within society but lie beyond it, an externality that translates into spatial terms. It therefore follows that a person in pursuit of shamanic knowledge should ideally frequent remote reaches of the forests and mountains. Culturally, it is deemed coincidental that these are more typically the sites of men's activities than women's. Both men and women tend swiddens and children close to home; both make regular trips through the forest between old and new swidden sites; and both venture into the forest to collect food and materials used in the manufacture of household items. Typically, however, men travel farther and faster than women. (Hunting, gathering resin for coastal trade, and making long trips to coastal markets are distinctively male activities and require long absences from settlements.) Moreover, it is appropriate for men to travel alone, but not women. Solitary trips to the forest are portrayed as dangerous by men and women alike. People continually admonish others, "Don't go out alone. A feral cat may come"—"feral cat" being a euphemism for a liver-eating demon, precisely the kind of spirit a shaman may seek as a familiar.

A shaman, then, is someone brave enough to confront murderous demons. Men, people say, tend to be braver than women. It therefore makes cultural sense that there are more men than women in the shamanic ranks. Thus construed, this imbalance appears to be the outcome of a statistical, not a mechanical, model (Lévi-Strauss 1963b)—a result dictated by probability, not fiat. Wana undercut the suggestion of male superiority on this score by freely characterizing themselves as a timid and cowardly people. (Recall that Liwa, described in Chapter 12 as a man who fled at the slightest provocation, was a respected Wana leader.) By braving hidden dangers, shamans represent excep-

tions; and in describing their solitary vigils in the forest or by newly dug graves to a wide-eyed audience, even shamans openly confess their fright.

Women have something additional to worry about when walking through the forest. "Feral cat" is a double entendre, applying not only to liver-eating demons, but to genitals—both male and female—as well. A woman should avoid solitary journeys in the forest lest she encounter a feral cat of one sort or another. But what of a man? Does the pun work the same for him? While gender differences are suppressed in matters of procreation, they assert themselves in the initiation of sexual intercourse (Atkinson forthcoming): a woman who encounters a man alone in the forest is considered vulnerable to his sexual initiative (cf. Tsing forthcoming). Wana cautions on women traveling alone are not comparable to the Mundurucu threat of gang rape,⁵ but they do identify a limit on women's access to the very realms in which knowledge and power are to be found.

In fact, women *do* go to the forest in search of spirits. What is more, despite the stereotype of the solitary shaman keeping vigil in a remote place in the forest, in practice many male shamans obtain their knowledge closer to home. Some simply study with human teachers. Some, like Apa Mene, claim that new familiars seek them out at home in their own settlements. Apa Linus, to many people's amusement, occasionally called on spirit familiars he encountered in the sweet potato patch. And a woman called Indo nTiti, a generation older than my oldest acquaintances, could sit in a room and pluck medicines, gifts from spirits, out of thin air. As these examples show, the disproportion between men and women shamans cannot be explained simply as a functional outcome of the fact that shamanic resources lie beyond human settlements and men travel farther than women. However people obtain shamanic powers, exercising those powers proves to be more consonant with male experience than female experience.

As I explore elsewhere (Atkinson forthcoming), Wana women do not possess a unique sphere of comparably elaborated power. Men's and women's procreative and household roles are closely matched in cultural terms; nurturance is cast as a parental, not a uniquely female, act;⁶ and both women and men are food producers. Women and men are conceived to be fundamentally the same—but *some* men, by pressing beyond the limits of ordinary experience, are somehow more so. Because notions of gender are constructed as a continuum rather than as a set of dichotomies, shamans can exploit a range of behavioral

styles without couching their actions in transvestite imagery. For example, the nurturing stance of a shaman toward a patient is parental, not feminine, and by no means incongruent with the warrior persona the shaman may adopt in the same performance.

Although men's access to the forest gives men an edge over women in achieving shamanship, this edge is not categorically stated. By no means are all Wana men shamans. In contrast to societies in which all adult men participate in special flute cults, headhunting, or initiatory activities that exclude women, the line between shaman and nonshaman does not divide women and men in Wana society. Nor is a man who is not a shaman likened to a woman. Rather, a man who does become a shaman stands out from other men and women. Thus the gendered dimensions of the "prestige structure" are blurred.

SHAMANSHIP AND THE LIFE CYCLE

Having asserted that shamanship fits, in some way, the contours of male experience, I want to look more closely at how people become involved in shamanic activity. I will begin with the observation that in 1976 among residents of the settlement I know best, at least sixteen of the twenty-five males over the age of twelve had taken some steps toward becoming shamans. Of the sixteen, six were recognized as shamans, six more were still pursuing shamanic knowledge and experience, and four had given up their shamanic aspirations (two perhaps only temporarily). Of the twenty-four women past puberty, at least fourteen had danced the aesthetically pleasing *salonde*, the female version of the shaman's dance, or *motaro*. Of these, several did so with express hopes of gaining shamanic powers; none was yet a *mabolong*-performing shaman. Besides the obvious gender divide, we need to account for the waxing, waning, and sustaining of shamanic commitment and ambitions over a lifetime.

Wana children are born into a world of shamanic activity. Far from being cut off from this prestigious adult domain, they are its center, figuring prominently among the patients treated at a *mabolong* (Fig. 21).⁷ Understandably concerned, in this area of high infant mortality, about children too young to articulate what ails them, parents rely on shamans and their spirit familiars to monitor their offspring's welfare. Whether or not a child displays symptoms of illness, parents engage shamans regularly to check for problems that may be pending. Many

of the vows (*pantoo*) made by Wana shamans represent extensions of life for children. Another factor is responsible for turning children into patients: I observed that aspiring shamans who were not in great demand as healers at mabolong often devoted considerable time and attention to treating their own children, whether these youngsters were ailing or not.

Not only do children learn early to submit as patients to shamans' ministrations, but they are also playfully coached in shamanic activities. Infants of both sexes are bounced up and down in explicit imitations of shamanic dancing, at mabolong and other times as well. Toddlers are sometimes urged to motaro, to the delight of their elders. Playing shaman is a common childhood pastime. Although they are not allowed to beat the drum and gongs lest real demons come or the instruments be damaged, children make do with bamboo zithers and perhaps a pan lid or two. Little children also learn early to sing in the style of a shaman. Shamans' songs are likened to lullabies. (As one mother explained the difference, the former require magical spells and the latter do not.) Intriguingly, I observed young children on different occasions adopt the shaman's song style to express feelings of hurt, resentment, and self-pity, shifting from ordinary speech like shamans experiencing "small feelings" to voice their alienation.

Besides participating as patients and experimenting as shamans, children take part in the festive aspects of mabolong (Fig. 10). A mabolong is a social event for children no less than for their elders. Like adults, they don new clothes, apply makeup, and affect new hairstyles before a performance. From an early age, seated on laps or toddling to and fro, they are in the thick of things. One treat for a small child is to share a beater with an adult gong player, and older children commonly monopolize the instruments during lulls in the evening until adults shoo them away. Because gong playing is easier than drum playing, preadolescent girls may accompany older players at an age when boys still lack the requisite drumming skills.

Little girls also begin shyly to dance the *salonde*. By contrast, boys in my experience do not motaro in public until adolescence. This difference may reflect the fact that the *salonde* (meaning literally "something beautiful") serves as sheer aesthetic entertainment, whereas the motaro is not ornamental but specifically implies shamanic intent (Figs. 14, 15). The *salonde* allows women to dance without appearing

to assert shamanic claims—although it can also mask a woman's intention when she *does* want to have her shamanic aspirations recognized.⁸ Whereas older women may hold sessions to instruct their daughters, nieces, and granddaughters in the art of *salonde*, I never heard of comparable sessions for teaching boys to motaro.

Shamanic endeavors begin in earnest in adolescence, when young people (both boys and girls) begin to study spells, seek advice from established shamans, set off to the woods in search of spirits, and dance at mabolong. These quests for spells and spirits coincide with young people's increased mobility. Boys at this age may begin to hunt, to travel to coastal markets, and to visit other settlements in search of work and lovers. Girls, too, travel to other settlements in the company of relatives, and some go to the markets.

Adolescent dabbling in magic and shamanship generally has nothing whatever to do with healing, however; instead, it often has to do with courting. Adults joke that young people foolishly seek love magic instead of more important and useful forms of special knowledge. Indeed, a reputation for spells implies to a potential lover that one has the power of irresistible attraction as well as the power for cruel punishment through sorcery for trifling with one's affections. People occasionally joke about the inspiration of youthful mabolong performers, saying that they are possessed by "the spirit familiars of people who want to make love." A reputation as a budding *kawalia* can enhance a young man's prospects with both a lover and her parents, who may see shamanic potential as an asset in sons-in-law. (I have seen too few young girls overtly display shamanic aspirations to know how young men and their families view them.) Whether one's goals are courtship or shamanship, the initial steps may be the same.

Becoming a shaman means putting secret knowledge and spirit connections to work in the context of mabolong. When I would ask why more women with knowledge of magic and associations with spirits do not perform at mabolong, people typically said that women were "embarrassed" or "shy" (*mea*) about doing so. Their attitude suggests that public performance is tacitly structured in a way that excludes women from shamanic camaraderie and competition. Unlike healing rituals involving a single performer (such as *molawo*, *pantende*, *posuyu*, and *potudu*), a mabolong is an occasion for performers to converse, carouse, cooperate, and compete. An aspiring performer must find a place among the coterie of shamans who dominate the

performance. Established shamans invite male companions to the offering tray (*lango*) to drink and to talk. (Women, in contrast, congregate around the *lango* in the capacity of hosts and patients, not drinking companions or shamanic peers.)⁹ As they perform, shamans summon novices to their side for instruction, perhaps planting special amulets in the novices' bodies to serve as "bridges for spirit familiars" (*tete mwalia*) and in other ways make them attractive to spirit benefactors. They may encourage these young people to dance along with them (Fig. 19). During my field stay, Apa Mene was sponsoring several nephews and his son in this way. Meanwhile, his orphaned niece was seeking spirits in the forest and dancing alone at *mabolong* without his encouragement or assistance.

Apart from tacit assumptions about gender and shamanship, notions of sexual propriety interfere with the formation of mentor-student relations between men and women. The relationship of mentor and student, like that between shamanic colleagues, involves public allusions to shared secrets and experiences and is demonstrated through loving exchanges of words and embraces. When mapped onto cross-gender relations, such behavior may convey more than a teacher-student relationship in this society where even husbands and wives avoid overt demonstrations of affection. Significantly, women appear in greater numbers among performers of rituals that imply no backstage secrets or adventures with mentors, rituals that can be learned by listening to the performances of others in a public setting.¹⁰

Marriage is regarded as a potential disruption in shamanic pursuits. The spells and spirit familiars one possesses before marriage may lose their potency after marriage—they are said to be "squeezed by the white thigh" (*rumpit mpa'a buya*). To restore their efficacy, one must "seek back companions for them" (*liwuka muni yununya*), that is, go out in pursuit of new spells and spirit familiars to revive the old. Simply put, one must renew one's shamanic commitment.¹¹

This cultural perception of a decline in shamanic prowess after marriage may relate to several factors. For one thing, the shamanic efforts of young people are closely tied to their increasing mobility and romantic inclinations. Marriage should bring an end to courtship, and thus to shamanic pursuits. What is more, marriage introduces new responsibilities for both men and women as farmers, householders, and, eventually, parents.

To continue shamanic pursuits as a married adult is to engage in

something more than youthful dalliance. If one is taken seriously as a mature shaman, one will be asked to treat others. The therapeutic side of shamanship involves sacrifice and a tedium absent from the dancing, drinking, and revelry that novices enjoy at *mabolong*. Despite its prestige, the possession of shamanic powers is not an unmitigatedly enviable proposition. It means being called away from work or sleep to perform, going to the aid of others "in spite of darkness, in spite of rain, in spite of heat of day, in spite of distance." People express distaste at the notion of sucking forth intrusive objects from ringworm-infested bodies. Indo Lina characterized a shaman as "a dog of many people" (*asu ntau boros*). As the daughter of one shaman and the wife of another, she is fully aware of how a shaman must work to serve and maintain a constituency.

Parenthood, however, introduces a new incentive for shamanic pursuits. Acquiring the means to heal small children is a concern for both mothers and fathers. New parents seek knowledge of minor spells and amulets and cultivate ties with established shamans. Some chafe at their dependency on others: I have heard shamans claim that as young fathers they went in search of special powers so they would not always have to seek help from others. Whether one relies on others or becomes a shaman oneself depends on a variety of factors, including gender and temperament. Another consideration, I suspect, is the relations one has to other shamans, a factor that can work two ways. On the one hand, if one has close ties to powerful shamans, one need not "pay" for shamanic services from unfamiliar people. On the other hand, having close ties to powerful shamans also means access to mentors, should one care to study.

Having established shamans nearby can be both an asset and a liability for an aspiring *kawalia*. In a community with such *kawalia tendamo*, "experienced people with spirit familiars," younger men are commonly regarded as novices; not yet "shamans indeed" (*kawalia koje*), they are instead "shamans just becoming accustomed" (*kawalia owo pomananyang*). The exchanges between Apa Mene and his younger cousins examined in Part Four exemplify the difference. Apa Linus and Apa Miin gain credibility from their association with Apa Mene, but they are also patronized. As long as they must defer to local experts, they cannot establish their autonomy as prominent shamans in their own communities.

Both Apa Linus and Apa Miin have more leeway performing in

other settlements where being related to Apa Mene enhances their reputation but his presence does not cramp their style. Apa Mene's younger brother, too, almost never performed in his own settlement during my field stay, but reputedly did so elsewhere. By contrast, Apa Mene and his brother-in-law Apa Weri perform together as equals and bosom buddies. It is my hunch that a shaman who marries into another community away from senior kinsmen with shamanic reputations may exercise and develop his shamanic claims more freely than one who lives with those elder kin.

Eventually, however, older shamans must give way to younger ones. Because of age, infirmity, or weariness with continual requests to perform, they defer to younger, more active shamans. In Apa Mene's neighborhood, for example, the eldest shaman was Apa nTode, father-in-law to Apa Mene. Apa nTode complained of painful joint and back problems, performed infrequently, and deprecated his own talents in comparison to his son-in-law, himself a grandfather. Nearby, PaimBela, a young father of four, became the principal shaman for his own small settlement and for farming clusters across the Bongka River when his shaman stepfather, PaiGete, began to express a reluctance to travel about and perform.

PROVING ONESELF

As powerful factors molding shamanic careers, gender and age are relational constructs. Shamanship favors men over women, senior over junior dependents, active juniors over dependent or soon-to-be dependent seniors. Yet if Wana shamanship favors mature men, it is not simply a reflection of or a gloss for the power of age and masculinity in Wana society. There is more to achieving a shamanic reputation than meeting criteria of gender and age.

A married man who continues his shamanic activity confirms that he does so not as a carefree youth out to impress would-be lovers, but as a mature, responsible, and potentially influential adult man. His is a bid not for a lover, but for recognition within and beyond his community. The public test of shamanic confidence and proficiency comes in mabolong performances.

One might imagine that shamanic success would correlate with therapeutic achievement. As it turns out, attributions of therapeutic success are jointly negotiated by shamans and constituencies—rarely

conclusively. No immediate signs of recovery are expected from a patient at time of treatment. What is more, over the course of a serious illness it is uncommon for a patient to be treated by a single person. Indeed, anyone and everyone with any claim to healing knowledge—shamans or not—may be asked to help the patient in both ritual and nonritual contexts. Alternative possibilities in diagnoses of conditions, healing measures, and justification of outcome further complicate matters.

For example, let us say that a patient experiences a relapse immediately after being treated by a shaman. Numerous causes could be asserted. Perhaps the shaman erred in his diagnosis or treatment. Alternatively, the relapse may have been a predictable reaction to the shaman's spirit familiars, with full recovery following shortly; or perhaps the patient or a close relative has violated some prohibition on diet or conduct. It might also be claimed that the shaman has corrected only one source of the patient's condition, and another still requires treatment. In short, what dictates therapeutic success is control over discourse, not disease—and that control is negotiated between shamans and their communities.

Two cases illustrate how prominent shamans can be absolved of responsibility when a patient's condition takes a negative turn. In the first, a tiny baby with a high fever was treated by two shamans. Within a day or two of treatment, the child's condition worsened. The child's family—close kin and neighbors of the shamans—attributed the downturn to a dogfight that had taken place in their house: frightened by the dogs, the child's soul parts had fled again after the shamans had restored them. In the second case, a shaman had treated his aunt for chest pains and she seemed to rally. Shortly thereafter, though, she died. As the shaman explained it, he had mended the problem in her chest, but then the woman asked a visitor from another community to treat her for pain. In examining her and administering spells, the young man bungled the repairs that the shaman had effected; hence the woman died. For those who depend on a shaman, it is preferable to attribute error or ignorance to someone else.

Judgments of success or failure are contingent and political. Furthermore, no consensus is sought in these matters. Take for example the case of Apa Weri, who experienced a lengthy bout of incapacitating pain in his head and ears. Two shamans—Apa Eri, his brother, and

Apa Mene, his brother-in-law—treated him repeatedly and eventually claimed to have healed him. On a visit to another settlement, however, I heard Apa Jango (a pseudonym) boast that actually he had healed Apa Weri when the shamans around him had been stymied. He was alluding to a brief visit he had made to Apa Weri's settlement during the latter's illness. One night when Apa Weri was experiencing considerable pain, he asked Apa Jango to treat him with a spell; the visitor did so and Apa Weri said he felt better. To members of Apa Jango's community who relied on his shamanship, his boast no doubt rang true, yet to a resident of Apa Weri's community, Apa Jango's treatment was not a decisive event. Claims of therapeutic success, then, can be seen as a form of coup-taking that is heavily governed by impression management.

Even a patient's death need not reflect badly on a shaman's skills, if he can effectively assert knowledge and control of the situation. I was told of one shaman who failed in this and continued to dance in search of a patient's wandering soul parts after the patient had expired on the floor nearby. A more fortunate or more alert shaman, aware that death is near, may decline when asked to perform, or he might declare on the authority of his familiars that nothing more can be done to save the patient. Apa Mene possessed a "no-lose" spell: if the patient was fated to die, treatment with the spell would bring on death within a week; if the patient was destined to live, survival for seven days was an equal indicator of the spell's efficacy.

Such authority in matters of life and death is not the purview of young and inexperienced shamans. The idea of having a loved one die without the care of a powerful shaman is grievous. In such a case, it is said that the surviving relatives will "not stop thinking about it." Fear of an unattended loss is one reason given for settling in the vicinity of a prominent shaman. Engaging the talents of a renowned shaman validates the outcome of an illness, be it life or death.

Creating the authority to validate fate in this way cannot be accomplished solely through performance in ritual. The mabolong does, however, provide a public arena for asserting and testing one's reputation, with the various ritual segments serving particular functions. Summoning spirits at a mabolong is to conjure hidden powers before an audience of one's peers. To be asked by others to investigate the sources of their own and their children's conditions is to have one's powers engaged and acknowledged by others. To undertake a journey

to Pue is to display the confidence and authority to do so. To request "foods" from one's human companions is to call for affirmation of and commitment to one's shamanic endeavors. In this fourth act we see that shamanship is not a unilateral matter. To be a shaman a performer requires acceptance, support, and encouragement from others. For this reason, I have argued, the baku mwalia episode holds special fascination for an audience; it has the potential to occasion a spontaneous negotiation of relations between performer and audience, and among performers as well.

If successful shamanship entails convincing others of one's claims, it also entails convincing oneself. A reputation for shamanship carries with it danger—the danger that other people with hidden powers may test one through sorcery. Pursuing shamanship requires having the confidence in one's own magical defenses to withstand the sorcery of rivals. Because such attacks are likely to come not from one's own community but from beyond it, some people perform only in the company of those they know well. But the more prominent one becomes, the more likely a target one is for others beyond one's coterie of close associates.

Even if a shaman is "tough" (*mapene*) enough to withstand attacks of sorcery himself, however, his close kin are vulnerable. Illnesses of a shaman's wife and children are frequently diagnosed as attacks by rival shamans who want to test his mettle. Thus, individuals with doubts about their ability to protect themselves and their families from sorcery are likely not to assert themselves as experienced shamans. They may perform potudu rituals for their own households, treat neighbors with spells, and perform at local mabolong when no prominent visitors from other settlements are present, but they are unlikely to perform in the company of strangers or to boast about their prowess. By contrast, those who are "shamans indeed" (*kawalia kojo*) have confidence that they can match their rivals. They are the ones who can claim, "As for those who defeat me, there are none. Only those who equal me are there."

In contrast to political leaders, the shamans of Poso protected their communities by ascents and descents to spirit worlds above and beneath the earth. Through these journeys, women could transcend the fact that their mundane activities and experience did not extend far beyond their settlements. Whether or not upward ascents to Pue are a recent addition to the mabolong (see Chapter 10), Wana shamanship

seems decidedly more earthbound; also in contrast to Poso, it is not explicitly restricted to one gender. Yet as a spiritual and political form that shapes and protects local constituencies, Wana shamanship promotes leaders who are mobile, brave, and experienced in confronting strangers and negotiating with them. As it turns out, these mobile, brave, and experienced individuals are likely to be mature men.

SHAMANIC DEPENDENCY

As I have sought to establish in this analysis, the Wana version of "men of prowess" politics relies heavily on self-reflexive display that casts others in the role of audience, not agents. Wana shamans are active, their patients passive. Power is culturally perceived as a function of the relation between a shaman and exogenous agents; two-way negotiation between a shaman and his constituency is unelaborated. It would be wrong, however, to take this cultural emphasis on the agency of the shaman and the passivity of his constituency at face value.

To be a shaman is to be recognized as a shaman by one's close associates. Every successful shaman has a following of supporters who praise his talents and thereby support his reputation. In addition those shy or ambivalent about their shamanic pursuits may, sometimes to their embarrassment, be talked about by others as promising shamanic talents. Shamanic reputations depend on such talk, so much so that there is reason to ask where in fact the motivation for shaman-ship lies. Instead of ascribing political initiative solely to political leaders, I would argue that Wana communities seek—and thus create—their shamans every bit as much as individuals strive to become shamans on their own.

One does not become a shaman through deeds alone. Deeds must be revealed to others and remembered if they are to contribute to a performer's reputation. Shamanic actions take two forms: hidden and public. The former involve secret dealings with spirits; the latter can include both ritual performances and public behavior in nonritual contexts. Private encounters with spirits must be made public if they are to enhance a shamanic reputation; public demonstrations must be recalled if they are to sustain a shaman's standing. Shamans' deeds, as communicated to and among shamanic constituencies, must be cast in terms of culturally intelligible scenarios or scripts.

Shamans themselves may make revelations of private shamanic experience. These might take the form of storytelling or boasting at large gatherings such as mabolong or of confidences to one or two peers, who may then pass the story along to others, as in a game of "telephone," in which alterations and additions to the original message are made along the way. (Indeed, Wana millenarian expectations of the sort to be described in Chapter 15 probably originate not so much as the promises of a movement's leader, but as the escalating hopes that attach to the leader's words as they are passed from person to person.)

Accounts of private shamanic experience often do not derive from the shaman or would-be shaman, however. Instead they may be projections by others of their expectations onto a person's silence or lack of details. An unexplained absence from the settlement, a new possession whose source is unidentified, a report of an odd occurrence—all may provoke speculation about shamanic adventures. Even if the person about whom the stories are told denies them, the denial may not be accepted. Apa Linus, for example, told one day of climbing a tree to escape an anoa (a forest ox unique to Sulawesi). When someone suggested that the animal had been a spirit in disguise, Apa Linus dissented—but this did not stop speculation about his encounter. Similarly, his younger brother Mpaa, a strong and handsome young man, was teased for his trips to the forest; even though, embarrassed, he denied shamanic intent, others persisted in attributing it. Unlike Mpaa, some invite speculation about what they have been up to. One night Apa Mene was discovered by his parents in a tree outside their house. People concluded that he had been traveling through the sky, as powerful shamans are wont to do, and had caught himself in the branches.

Shamans and their constituencies play on the difference between what ordinarily happens and what *may* happen, according to cultural expectations about shamanship. Indo Lina often tells of the time she and her family went one day to fetch rice from their old swidden. Her husband, Apa Mene, vanished for a while. When he returned, she detected the smell of rice beer. She commented that he had been drinking, but he denied it, telling her to go count the bottles of beer they had stored at their granary if she doubted him. The conclusion she drew was that Apa Mene had gone off to the woods to drink with his spirit companions. The case illustrates that a shaman need not

always fill in the details of his hidden adventures; by dropping a clue he may insure, advertently or not, that others will supply the details the clue implies.

Although individuals may prompt interpretations of their behavior, they cannot control what those interpretations may be and how they may be used. For example, I was told of one man who wished to create the impression that he could travel through the air. This he did by arriving at a mabolong one night and dropping broad hints about the unconventional route he had taken. Alluding to fresh scratches on the man's body, someone jokingly asked if there had been sharp grasses on his path too. In a real sense, people who would gain recognition as shamans are at the mercy of their audiences, who serve as arbiters of their claims.

And who constitutes those audiences? Everyone—men, women, and children. But the relationship of constituents to shamans may differ greatly according to age and gender. Given the centrality of men in Wana shamanship, it is noteworthy that my best authorities on the subject were often neither shamans nor men. Contrary to the passive or willful silence Edwin Ardener (1975) would have us expect from women who do not play active roles in their societies' dominant institutions, Wana women proved insightful, enthusiastic, and engaged commentators on shamanship. By contrast, although male shamans articulate critical dimensions of the Wana social system through their performance, structural articulation does not necessarily lead to verbal articulation. Indeed, I often found shamans to be less articulate—or, perhaps better put, more guarded—in discussions of shamanic practice.

For a man to talk about another man's shamanship necessarily involves issues of relative prowess. If he is not a successful shaman, building another's reputation underscores his own lack of power. But for women, who generally have no direct stake in shamanic competition, there is freedom and pleasure, it seems, in sharing stories and opinions about performers and performances. As girls sizing up suitors, as mothers seeking protectors for their children's lives, and as noncompetitors in the mabolong arena, women hold a privileged place as critics and commentators on shamanic performers.

For their part, shamans are quite conscious of women in their audiences. Whereas a youth with courtship on his mind hides sexual motives in the guise of shamanship, an established shaman may freely

engage in ribald joking and flirtation in the course of a performance. To do so is read not as a sign of his "real" motivation, but rather as the temporary influence of his spirit familiars. Sex is a matter that ordinarily is kept out of the public spotlight; the fact that powerful shamans engage in sexual joking is one way they demonstrate their prerogative to exceed the conventional bounds of community life, in the process of controlling life itself.

But flirtation as a motif may also speak to issues besides a shaman's temporary release from conventional propriety. Performers must seduce their audiences. Just as adolescents seek to attract lovers, mature performers strive to impress a public—of which women are an important sector. They and their children constituted roughly three-quarters of the patients at the thirty-four mabolong for which I have good records. A shaman's portrayal of himself as an attractive man with sex on his mind may be tacit acknowledgment of the significance of women's support. It is perhaps because of their role in shaping shamanic reputations that women were particularly open, willing, and informed in discussing shamanship. And it was perhaps for the same reason that Apa Mene kept his distance from the transcribing sessions in which my companions and I played and replayed mabolong tapes and "talked lies" about the performances.

Although they are largely absent from the ranks of mabolong performers, women are key players in creating and sustaining shamanic reputations. Upholding the centrality of shamanship in Wana social life does not cost Wana women control or ownership over what they produce, in the way that supporting the hegemony of warriorhood seems to disadvantage Maasai women (Llewelyn-Davies 1981). Nor does it support a ritual complex that explicitly denigrates their womanhood. Instead, Wana women promote an expertise that offers them protection from dangerous agents, both human and nonhuman, lying beyond their moral communities. That men may sometimes threaten or coerce them using that very same expertise is not sufficient cause for them to reject the system, but only to seek protectors against such violence.

In a valuable paper on Melanesian political systems in which differential control of knowledge is shown to be the basis for political inequality, Lamont Lindstrom (1984, 304) declines to answer "why women and more-or-less exploited social classes allow others to define their realities." In the Wana case, nonshamans—including most

women and many men—allow shamans to define some of their realities because political inequality does not pervade all cultural domains and social contexts, because shamanic authority is experienced as being more beneficial than oppressive, and because followers do indeed wield a measure of control over those whose authority they support.

Bringing History to Bear

And so far am I from thinking with some philosophers, that men are utterly incapable of society without government, that I assert the first rudiments of government to arise from quarrels, not among men of the same society, but among those of different societies.

Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*

In a 1952 article, "The Shaman's Tent of the Evenks and the Origin of the Shamanistic Rite," the Soviet ethnographer A. F. Anisimov developed a richly textured analysis of a Siberian shamanic ritual. At the same time, he discerned a political dimension to Evenk shamanism. Although Evenk shamans portrayed themselves as suffering on behalf of their followings, Anisimov perceived that they in fact enjoyed social privilege as a consequence of their special access to spiritual resources. Thus the Evenk, like the Wana, represent an instance of a small-scale noncentralized society in which special knowledge serves as a basis for political inequality (see Godelier 1982; Lindstrom 1984; Myers 1986; and T. Turner 1979 for comparable analyses).

Having recognized a form of inequality implicit in Evenk shamanism, Anisimov invoked the "scientific" tenets of historical materialism to explain it. In an abrupt switch from a contextualist to a reductionist mode of argument (see White 1974), Anisimov contended that Evenk society had evolved from an egalitarian condition of totemic clanship to an inegalitarian one in which shamans monopolized access to spiritual resources.

The present chapter will also examine issues of shamanship and political change. Unlike Anisimov, however, who treated the development of Evenk inequality as an endogenous process, I shall ground an understanding of Wana political change in a regional context and show how political inequality has been shaped historically by Wana interactions with neighboring peoples and polities. Instead of looking past symbolic forms to locate political reality, I shall retain

my view of ritual as an inextricable element of Wana political relations (see Sherzer 1987).

In the final paragraph of his essay that so jarringly contrasts his sensitive rendering of Evenk ritual, Anisimov asserts that Evenk shamans showed their true colors as exploiters of their people by resisting Soviet reforms in order to protect their own political privilege. By regarding the Soviets as liberating the Evenk from their shamans, Anisimov ignores the possibility that, whatever the differences that divided Evenk shamans and their followings, all may have shared a common outlook regarding Soviet encroachment on their local autonomy. This reading—one that Anisimov (1963, 112) would surely condemn as being “of a subjective-idealistic, populist tendency”—could lend insight into one way that a noncentralized population can mobilize against external threats.

My own analysis of Wana political leadership will show how, historically, Wana have relied on “men of prowess” with special access to exogenous knowledge to promote social cohesion and to cope with the hegemonic advances of a succession of coastal regimes—a trend that has only gained in strength in recent Wana history. My aim in this chapter, then, is to develop a historical analysis of the relations between Wana leadership and ritual in the context of changing systems of political organization in the region. For a time at least in the last century, there existed in the Wana highlands a ranked political system with chiefs, commoners, an debt slaves—quite unlike the comparatively egalitarian nature of more recent Wana organization. In each of these areas, ritual has been integral to the creation and maintenance of polity and authority. The former chiefdoms, I will argue, made special use of liturgy-centered rituals conducted by priestly functionaries to consolidate constituencies above and beyond the settlement level. Hence, in the absence of chiefly sponsors, contemporary communities rely heavily on charismatic ritual leaders to lend cohesion and direction to settlement life.

The first step in my analysis is an exercise in conjectural history—namely, the reconstruction of nineteenth-century Wana political organization. The single major source on the Wana for that period is A. C. Kruyt’s rich account, over two hundred pages in length, based on his visit to the Wana area in 1928 and published in 1930. Although Kruyt’s portrayal of Wana political organization is vulnerable to the charge that it presents a “top-down” view of the Wana political sys-

tem as seen by high-ranking informants, nonetheless Wana in the 1970s painted a very similar—and no doubt also idealized—picture of the politics of an earlier age. In practice the system was probably more fluid than either Kruyt or my Wana sources recognized. To his credit, Kruyt was sensitive to political changes in the area (although he did not connect them to the colonial presence and his own part in it), and consequently his report offers valuable clues as to what was transpiring in the region.

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Wana appear to have possessed a system of what Service (1975, 74) might call “embryonic chiefdoms” (see also Carneiro 1981). Kruyt details the political ascendancy of nineteenth-century local leaders with ties to coastal Muslim polities, in which ideology of rank, political use of ritual, a corner on the system of legal payments, and an economic pipeline to the coast were critical factors. This system was deflated instantly by the Dutch, who instituted direct rule in the first decade of the 1900s and removed the external bases of economic and political leverage that had briefly upheld the authority of local chiefs.

But notions of power and dependency persist—for reasons to be explored. Unlike similar populations in regions of the Philippines that lacked relations to royal centers or *negara* (the Hanunoo and the Ilongot, for example), the Wana maintain a sense of hierarchy, of the mystique of rank, and of the prestige of the entourage. Differential claims to knowledge, unbolstered by economic clout or the authority of the *negara*, produce relations of autonomy and dependence. These relations are as much the creation of followers seeking security in the authority of leaders as they are the creation of leaders working to attract followings.

Extending my conjecture, I propose that the political significance of Wana shamanship in contemporary times has been fostered by a political vacuum created by the dismantling of the incipient chiefdoms in this century and by the failure of colonial and nationalist governments to extend their authority to the Wana interior. Specifically, I intend to show how both local-level politics and resistance to colonial and Indonesian hegemony have been fortified by the memory of pre-colonial associations with coastal polities, which are invoked to enhance the authority of Wana leaders.

In so arguing, I offer a local case study to the wider literature on the development of political inequality. Instead of starting “from the

ground up" with factors standard to the literature on political change like population density, production, warfare, and exchange, this study began with cultural notions of power. Now I shall read those notions back into a changing social and historical context.

Contemporary Wana talk about power has a history, at least some of which is recoverable. My aim here is not to engage in "chicken and egg" debates about the priority of cultural or material factors in political evolution, but instead to show how a cultural pattern of Wana political authority has figured in a constellation of factors effecting political change in the Wana region for more than a century (see Hastorf forthcoming). After all, culturally intelligible ways of "making claims over other people" (Baker 1990) must be part of the negotiation of asymmetrical relations in political systems (Giddens 1979). An examination of nineteenth-century Wana politics will reveal how contemporary Wana leaders and followers may strengthen their claims on each other by drawing on shared assumptions about power deriving from an earlier political discourse, one that has retained its importance as an idiom for promoting both social unity and resistance against subsequent forms of coastal domination.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF WANA IDENTITY

The very fact that the Wana population possesses an ethnic identity testifies to its history of interaction with outside rivals and authorities. The word *wana* itself has an external derivation: ultimately from the Sanskrit, *wana* means "forest" in many Indonesian languages. For the Wana themselves, the word has no meaning apart from its use as the name of the land near the Old Mountain, suggesting that the Wana have adopted outsiders' identification of them as "people of the forest."¹

The history of Wana interaction with outsiders has been a bloody one (see Chapter 13). Kruyt (1930, 505) puts it simply: "The To Wana have never had a peaceful life; as from the east as from the west they were ever being pressed." Until Dutch pacification in this century, the Wana suffered attacks from the To Lage, their neighbors to the west. Kruyt's evidence and my own conversations with Wana suggest that some of the Wana population moved east and south in response to these attacks. Occasional peace treaties were struck with To Lage and

their relatives, the To Lalaeo, who had spread along both the northern and southern coasts that border the Wana region, while on the east Wana fought unceasingly with the Loingang people (Kruyt 1930, 505-6).

During—and perhaps because of—these struggles with other populations, the Wana, in historical memory, maintained a measure of internal peace. Kruyt (p. 507) asserts that intersettlement warfare was lacking in the Wana area; although feuds might lead to occasional deaths, these would be settled with fines, not chains of vengeance killings. The key to this *Pax Wana* seems to have been a system of chiefly authority, heavily dependent on ritual, that was in effect at least in the nineteenth century.

WANA CHIEFS AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES

A chiefly constituency was a grouping which Kruyt called a "clan." According to Kruyt (p. 459), the Wana of the upper Bongka were divided into four main "clans": To Barangas, To Kasiala, To Untu nUe, and To Pasangke.² These "clans" (what the Wana, using a word borrowed from the Indonesian, call *bangsa*, meaning "people" or "group") resemble the *be:rtan* that R. Rosaldo (1975) has described for the Ilongot—namely, descent constructs based on cognatic kinship and locality. Like the Ilongot *be:rtan*, these Wana groups played an important part in warfare.

How such *bangsa* might have arisen is evident in the ongoing processes of local group identification that I witnessed in the 1970s. For certain purposes, people identify themselves by their current place of residence. Hence people farming a locale known as Wata nSuyu may speak of themselves as "the people of Wata nSuyu"; if they and their children should stay in that area for a long time, then, their descendants may become generally known as To Wata nSuyu. More likely, they would identify themselves with reference to a large topographic feature of the vicinity, such as Mount Bareng, in which case they would be known as To Bareng. At the same time, these people may still remember that they or their parents had come from the locality of Barangas or Untu nUe and so for certain purposes might identify themselves as To Barangas or To Untu nUe.

I found during my fieldwork that older people from the southern

half of the Wana region identified themselves as members of the "clans" named by Kruyt, but younger people often did not. These categories had little salience in contemporary life except in reference to historical relations to coastal raja. It is my guess that the ongoing processes of local group identity were frozen by the political circumstances of the nineteenth century to produce the more enduring fourfold "clan" identity described by Kruyt.

These circumstances—involving regional warfare and political patronage—very likely promoted hierarchization and centralization of authority and leadership in certain parts of the Wana area. By the late nineteenth century, three of the four southern Wana "clans" described by Kruyt had a leader called a *basal*, and in the case of Kasiala, a *makole*. Kruyt (1930, 460) guesses (correctly, I think) that the term *basal* is a borrowing of the Malay word *besar*, meaning "big" or "great"; the term *makole*, he notes, derives from Pamona speakers to the north. The use of foreign terms to identify this political personage may point to external factors that led to its creation.

A *basal* or *makole* was chosen from a particular "family" (*geslacht* is Kruyt's term), along with a subordinate, the *bonto*, whom people approached to intercede with the *basal* (Kruyt 1930, 461–62). *Geslacht* is perhaps best glossed as "kindred." Kruyt (p. 462) indicates that a *basal* would marry a woman of his own *geslacht*—a close cousin, I would suspect—although he could also take an additional wife from the "multitudes" (*tau maborosi*). Kruyt does not address the relative ranking of children by each wife, or the range of kin who could claim prerogatives associated with the *basal*. What is clear is that for a time the Wana possessed a system of rank whereby an elite distinguished itself by birth from the common folk.³

According to Kruyt (p. 460), a *basal* was selected from the "*basal* family" by members of his "clan." In making their decision, people sought a leader "in a position to defend the interests of the clan." Thus, a *basal* was selected on the basis of personal achievements, not of ascribed criteria of descent (beyond *basal* rank) or birth order. (In this respect, the case conforms to Wolters's model discussed in earlier chapters.)⁴ How in fact the decision was made, who participated in the decision, whether there was jockeying, campaigning, and competition for the position, whether leaders were ever overthrown, is unknown. Nor does Kruyt clarify what it might mean "to defend the interests of the clan" or what qualifications might be important for this task. From his article, however, we can identify the arenas in which a *basal*

operated, suggest how prospective leaders might come to lead, and determine the ways in which ritual was used to create and uphold chiefly authority.

Kruyt's account emphasizes the chief's role in military and legal affairs. (p. 523). Yet a *talenga*, the leader of a war party, would if possible be chosen from the family of the *basal* (p. 462). Successful warriors were publicly distinguished: anyone who had killed a person was permitted to wear red and blue (or green) feathers in his turban;⁵ one who distinguished himself as especially brave could in addition wear a special headcloth and tie a hank of human hair to the hilt of his sword (p. 526). Undeserved appropriation of the trappings of a "brave person" (*tau makoje*) would, I was told, result in *buto*, the debilitating condition characterized by a bloated abdomen, jaundice, and chronic weakness brought on by violations in rank. Presumably commoners as well as relatives of the *basal* could achieve a reputation as a *tau makoje*. For someone to become *basal*, I suspect that this achievement was an imperative.

According to Kruyt (pp. 507–11), Wana raiding parties had two leaders—a *tadulako* and a *talenga*. The former acted as an "aggressor" and led the charge against the enemy, while the latter—the one who might be of the chiefly family—acted as a "protector." The *talenga* directed the attack from the rear (often at the camp from which the raiders set out), performing offerings and ritual procedures to insure the warriors' success. Responsibility for the warriors' safety lay in his hands.

My companions, several generations removed from actual warfare, spoke only of *talenga*. The fact that *talenga* is a Loinang term, whereas *tadulako* is common in many upland languages of Central Sulawesi, led me to suspect that Wana originally used these two terms (one familiar to their enemies on the east, the other familiar to their enemies on the west) for a single kind of war leader. Just as Wana spirits and legal payments may proliferate through the use of multiple metaphors, so, I suspected, did headhunting leaders as well. But further thinking about the Wana system of rank inclines me to accept Kruyt's account. If a *talenga* was likely to be of noble rank and to be a contender for the position of *basal*, it makes sense that he might have served as the brains and not the brawn of the raid. By successfully protecting his warriors through ritual and rhetorical means, a *talenga* could demonstrate his qualifications as defender of his people.

Kruyt does not directly state what role the *basal* played in initiat-

ing a raid. He does, however, assert (p. 524) that the To Pasangke, who had no basal, would not go off on a raid without the "knowledge and consent" of the basal of Untu nUe. Presumably, then, members of groups that *did* have basal would consult their leaders about intentions to raid.

Kruyt (p. 524) is clearer about what happened after a successful raid. The victorious warriors returned to the house of their basal carrying pieces of their victims' scalps on palm branches. Three days later a feast would be held, at the house of either the talenga, who had managed the raid, or the basal. Kruyt rationalized that because most settlements had only one large house and talenga were often kinsmen of the basal, "these two functionaries might well have used the same house during the feast time." Whether the host was a basal or an eligible candidate for that office, hosting a headhunting festival was certainly a way to call attention to his own achievements and those of his followers.

Besides basking in the glory of their followers' military successes, basal had a role to play in negotiating peace and enforcing *ada*. If there were a quarrel within his constituency, the basal had authority to mediate the matter. When people could not settle a dispute among themselves, they would refer it to the bonto, who would then bring it to the basal. Basal apparently conferred about disputes involving members of different *bangsa* as well. Large-scale feuds that could not be settled in such a manner could be referred to a coastal *raja* (Kruyt 1930, 526–27).

Speculating on what we know about the relation of basal to warfare, peacemaking, and negotiation, it seems likely that a young male relative of a basal could enhance his chances of becoming basal himself by distinguishing himself as a warrior and eventually being selected as the talenga responsible for raids. His success as protector of numerous war parties (publicly celebrated at headhunting festivals) could testify to his ability to "defend the interests of the clan." Once he became basal, his role would switch from war leader to negotiator and peacemaker.

A parallel could be drawn to "men of prowess" among the Ilongot, a Philippine population lacking the notions of rank held by the nineteenth-century Wana. M. Rosaldo (1980) examines how, in cultural terms, the youthful display of passion in headhunting is the condition for a mature man's exercise of knowledgeable authority in

directing matters of war and peace. Among the Ilongot, this pattern operates on the local level with no superordinate authority beyond it. In parallel fashion, among nineteenth-century Wana local *tau tu'a*, or "older people," distinguished by their maturity and experience, probably held authority over their juniors, just as they do in Wana settlements today. The basal rank, however, added a level of authority beyond the local community.

LEADERSHIP AND RITUAL

The basal were set apart from others in several ways. Disrespect shown them would be punished by the debilitating condition of *buto*; offenders could then atone for their actions by paying four copper trays, called *dula*. Basal and their families, in turn, owed higher *ada* payments for marriage and for wrongdoings. Their funeral rites would be grander and different from those for ordinary people in a number of respects, including the precipitation of headhunting expeditions, which themselves generated lavish celebrations.

Some of these differences are differences of degree, not kind, from the privileges mature Wana parents are owed by their children and children-in-law. The risk of *buto* is strong for offenses against parents-in-law; funerals of respected local elders, too, attract wider attendance than funerals of younger, less prominent people. Yet by virtue of local and regional networks, the basal could clearly marshal far more assistance and stage far grander celebrations than ordinary Wana householders or local elders. Whereas older people can expect some assistance with housebuilding and farming from their resident children and children-in-law, chiefs were to receive such assistance from their entire constituencies.⁶ This additional labor should have increased the size of a chief's house, granary, and stores of rice beer, and thus enhanced his ability to host large feasts and rituals.

Basal received more, but they gave more too. Like chiefdoms elsewhere, this system was a redistributive one. Although Wana worked for their basal—building their houses, tending their farms, and, as we shall see, assembling tribute for presentation to coastal *raja*—they gained in return, sharing in the achievements of their leaders, who provided them with identity, peace, and prosperity. Sponsoring large feasts and rituals was one way a basal could promote his stature. Hocart (1970, 104), for one, argued that "the clan is partly artificial:

it is a family cut and trimmed and adjusted to one particular purpose, the feast." And indeed, what Kruyt called Wana "clans" seemed to assume their shape in the context of celebrations staged by their basal.

I have already mentioned the association of headhunting festivals with the basal, the cultural rationale of which was to promote the vitality of crops: "If we don't go raiding, the rice does not succeed," said Kruyt's (1930, 507) sources. In this area where rainfall is highly unpredictable, seasonality is determined by the order in which wild fruits appear. Shedding blood through warfare insured that wild trees would bear fruit. In this formulation, the achievements of headhunters were culturally linked to the regulation of the rains, a critical matter for Wana farmers. By negotiating matters of war and peace, and by hosting victory celebrations, the basal asserted their influence over regional prosperity.

The *salia*, the three-night regionwide ritual discussed in Part Three, was performed "to procure good health for the clan, or so people put it: so there shall be no pale faces and weakness among us" (Kruyt 1930, 450). Although Kruyt does not link the *salia* directly to the basal, the ritual was performed expressly for the benefit of this leader's constituency.⁷ And tellingly, Kruyt's unusually detailed description of the ritual came from the basal Apa nTjabo, "'the father of Sabo,' [who] gave me in his calm manner an orderly account of the feast" (p. 450).⁸ We can infer that a basal could provide the coordination of labor required to construct the giant building for the ritual and, with his large stores of rice and rice beer assured by the labor of commoners and debt slaves, could underwrite the elaborate festival. The fact that the *salia* waned in tandem with the power of the basal is further evidence of the tie between this ritual and the political authority of the basal.⁹

Finally, the death of a basal occasioned an enormous funeral and complicated set of observances that engaged not only his own following but others as well. It precipitated in addition a headhunting raid, an endeavor directed at insuring future prosperity and no doubt orchestrated by his would-be successors. Such a raid might also be staged at the death of a family member of the basal; in this way a basal could translate his kindred's grief into warfare and victorious celebration—both achievements that would reflect on the glory of his followers and himself.

CHIEFLY AUTHORITY IN A REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Over time certain Wana leaders gained access to exogenous sources of power and wealth that certainly altered their relations with their followers. The Wana had a long-standing exchange relation with the polity of Banggai to the east (Kruyt 1930, 466): each year one or more of the basal would lead a contingent of Wana to Banggai to present a mat, seven bunches of onions, and a barbed spear. Kruyt could not determine just how Banggai reciprocated. The relationship was not one of lord and subject, but of elder and junior in which the two groups pledged mutual support (of a military nature, I would guess).

A more significant political alliance took shape in the middle of the nineteenth century. The southern Wana submitted to the authority of the raja of Bungku, whom they acknowledged as "owner" or "lord" (*pue*). This relationship was decidedly unequal, with both economic and political consequences. Raja Bungku recognized one basal—the makole of Kasiala, the first Wana leader to yield to Bungku—as paramount (a matter that did not sit well at all with Kruyt's Barangas informant; p. 465). Each year Raja Bungku sent cotton cloth worth eight silver coins to this *makole tongko*, as he was called. The makole in turn divided the cloth among his fellow Kasiala. In return for cloth worth half a silver coin, the recipients had to give the makole four pieces of beeswax, each the length of a hand. The makole then presented the beeswax as tribute to the raja.

As Kruyt (p. 467–68) tells it, the Kasiala leader, backed by the military force of Bungku, pressed Barangas to assist with the tribute. Later the other two groups followed suit. The tribute came to include, in addition to beeswax, a small gift of rice and a white chicken from each household. The makole of Kasiala led a delegation to present this tribute to the raja of Bungku at the coastal village of Tokala in the south.

From Kruyt's account, (pp. 467–69), it is hard to gauge the magnitude and economic significance of the tribute, but it does suggest that basal could derive power by negotiating exchanges with coastal royalty. In addition, it demonstrates that they could draw on the power of a coastal raja to intimidate their neighbors.

From this account, one may legitimately ask why Wana submitted

to Bungku. Even if some leaders recognized the political desirability of exchange relations with exogenous polities, how and why did their followings support them in forming these relationships? The conventional Wana answer to this story, Kruyt (p. 468) tells us, is the same one "that we find all over Central Celebes":

When the Bungku people were back in their capital. . . , they sent a buffalo horn to the Wana with a challenge to hack it with a single blow. The Wana cooked the horn, and when it was soft, they hacked it with a single blow. In turn the Wana now sent to Bungku a *noti buya*, a piece of white wood that as long as it is fresh is easy to work, but when it becomes dry, can no longer be chopped because of the toughness of its fiber. In this [exchange] the Bungku were no match for the forest people. Then the Bungku sent the Wana two pieces of leafstalk from a sago palm, bound together in the shape of a cross, with the charge to chop the pieces with a single blow. The Wana were so crafty that they didn't chop it but sliced it into pieces. Then the raja of Bungku acknowledged the superiority of the Wana and he came with a great boat to Tokala as a sign of his homage. He let a great cannon be fired that was named *ndindi wita*, "that which makes the earth shake." The Wana heard this and they said to one another, "People who can cause such a condition must be gods. They should also bring us misfortune if they render honor to us; let us do so to them." And in this way raja of Bungku because the lord of the Wana.

This story pits the craftiness of the interior people against the military power of the coastal sultanate. It explains the submission of the uplanders as being a rational calculation based on an established sense of hierarchy (gods should not defer to mortals) rather than a military defeat. Indeed, it is unlikely that the forces of Bungku could have subjected the entire Wana population any more effectively than the Dutch and the Indonesians have succeeded in doing during this century. What is more, from what we know of Indonesian *negara*, it seems unlikely that subduing the hinterlands would have been an objective as it later was for colonial and nationalist authorities.

Why, then, did the Wana submit instead of hiding out in the hills? Those seeking to form a tie with Bungku could have persuaded others by the claim (widely held in the region) that raja bring fertility and prosperity to their domains, and they certainly cited the military threat from Bungku. (Recall that actual military pressure had allegedly been brought to bear on the Barangas by the Kasiala leader.) Association with a raja may also have offered some hope of protection against

attacks by other upland populations who perhaps paid tribute to the same raja or one of his relations.

Finally, we do not know if indeed all Wana participated fully in this tributary relation to coastal authority. Was in fact the political effectiveness of the basal, like that of the raja, greatest among their close associates, and did it diminish with physical and social distance? Did basal have to exercise persuasion and threats to secure the cooperation of people beyond their immediate circle? Were there evaders of raja and their upland representatives, just as there were, and are, evaders of subsequent coastal authority? I have no answers—only questions—regarding these matters.

Besides engaging in tributary exchanges with coastal rulers, the basal were implicated in a more perfidious exchange as well (Kruyt 1930, 460–61). According to Kruyt, until the Wana yielded to Bungku there was no debt slavery in the Wana region, but after that the basal parlayed the Wana *ada* system into a source of people for the regional slave trade (see Reid and Brewster 1983; Bigalke 1981). If a person could not afford an *ada* payment, a wealthy person could pay the fine and claim the person as a debt slave (*wotua*). *Wotua* constituted the bottom tier of the three-step system of rank composed of nobles, commoners, and debt slaves.

Some debt slaves were kept as dependents to work for their owners. Others were sold to Bungku for twenty-five pieces of unbleached cotton. Because one length of cotton at the time could also bring one copper tray, a key object in *ada* exchange, payment for debt slaves could thus be fed back into the *ada* system, which in turn generated more debt slaves. The makole of Kasiala (the one whom the raja of Bungku had elevated above the other basal) was particularly active in the slave trade. The basal were not, of course, the only people to claim debt slaves and to play the regional slave market—other wealthy people did the same; but the ties of the basal to the coastal kingdoms no doubt enhanced their role in this traffic.

It is telling that the system of *ada*, which made debt slavery possible, was allegedly given to the Wana by the raja of Bungku. What is more, the raja—to whom basal had special access—was the source of objects used for *ada* payment such as copper trays and cloth. Kruyt's (1930, 471) sources (as mine) were well aware of the potential for abuse in the *ada* system, speaking of legal corruption as *alibiru* (from the Malay *harubiru*, meaning "to stir up mischief or confusion"). To-

day's "corrupt" use of subtlety in legal debate payments can result in high fines and indebtedness to *ada* experts; in the past it could make one a slave (in the Southeast Asian, not the Euroamerican, sense; see Bentley 1986: 291). I suspect that judgments of *alibiru*, like judgments of a shaman's goodness or "crookedness," were and are conditioned by one's place in the social field. Like a shaman or a modern *ada* expert, then, a *basal* would be regarded as honorable by his supporters and as less so by those at a distance from him.

Basal were chiefs, not dictators. They cast their actions in an idiom not of despotism but of beneficence. In Kruyt's account (p. 460)—much of which seems to come from an individual who was himself a *basal*—*basal* assumed the role of protectors for debt slaves: "If someone did something for which people would kill him, then he'd take refuge with the *basal*. People must then threaten his life no more; the matter would be settled with a fine which was paid mostly by the head, after which the culprit would remain with him as a slave." Thus, enslavement was couched as a form of assistance. People who required such "help" were likely to be without large and influential kindreds to assist them with legal fines. When, for instance, a human sacrifice was required for peacemaking ceremonies, the victim would likely be an orphaned slave, not a profligate debtor whose kinsmen were important members of a leader's constituency.¹⁰

Kruyt (p. 461) does hint at rebellious acts by debt slaves, but these were rebellions directed at individual masters, not at the system of debt slavery itself. And once again *basal* figure as protectors in his account:

If a slave were beaten a great deal, or was given too little to eat, or was mistreated in some other way, he could flee to the *basal* of his own or another clan and destroy some things in this person's house. In such a case, those among whom the slave had climbed would claim such a high compensation for the destruction that the old master found it preferable to permit the refugee to live in the new house. Sometimes, however, he would pay the required fine to get the slave back, then sell him to Bungku in revenge.

CENTRALIZATION AND CHRONOLOGY

Just how long the incipient chiefdoms I have described were in place in the Wana region is not clear. Apa nTjabo, "the last *basal* of Baran-gas," told Kruyt (pp. 465–66) that his grandfather had taken the first

tribute to the raja of Bungku. Kruyt placed his Apa nTjabo's age between fifty and sixty years in 1928. Assuming that the man's grandfather was a mature Wana leader when he traveled to Bungku, this tribute could have been offered in the mid-1800s or later. Whatever the chronology, if it was the tie to Bungku that gave Wana *basal* economic and political leverage over their subjects, this system was in effect for no more than two generations. Prior to that time we can imagine that there were Wana "men of prowess," resembling very much the "great men" whom Godelier describes among the Baruya—prominent men whose influence, based on dealings with exogenous agents (such as enemy warriors and spirits), did not translate into direct control over people and production.

What elevated some of these "great men" into *basal*? One important factor may have been a chronic condition of regional warfare to which Wana responded by developing intersettlement defense networks. The *basal*—modeled perhaps on the leaders of the enemy To Lage—were critical nodes in these networks. The further transformation of *basal* into nobles probably came about as these leaders allied with coastal polities that backed them with regal ideology, prestigious exchange, and military power.¹¹

Local Wana reactions to the ascendancy of their *basal* are hard to gauge. A hint of ambivalence regarding these leaders is contained in Wana trickster tales, in which Ngkasi the trickster is forever turning the tables on the *makole* (the other term for *basal*) who represents the dominant coastal culture. My familiarity with these tales, of course, is modern. One wonders when the genre began and if it carried the same weight at an earlier time. Whatever sense of oppression may have been brewing at the turn of the century, however, was soon to turn to nostalgia.

THE ENCROACHMENT OF THE STATE

Like a cake that falls when the oven door is opened, these incipient chiefdoms collapsed abruptly with the arrival of the Dutch. In the 1890s the missionaries A. C. Kruyt and N. Adriani established a base in the Poso region to the west of the Wana; by 1908 the Dutch formally controlled this area of Central Sulawesi (Kutoyo et al. 1984, 107). In Chapter 12 I described the initial efforts of the Dutch to resettle the Wana in areas where they could be governed effectively. Kruyt's

account offered one view of Wana resistance, but it did not clarify Wana views on the new situation, nor did it give a sense of Wana strategies for coping with crisis. The history of Wana relations with outsiders makes clear the reasons for initial fear of the Dutch. Once Dutch intentions became clearer to the Wana, further objections can be understood: the Dutch were replacing chiefdoms with a state.¹²

The changeover was experienced locally in the Dutch attempt to organize Wana into villages. Village membership involved paying taxes, performing labor, maintaining a house, and meeting other government demands. The eventual development of coastal markets for forest products offered some compensation for the burdens imposed by village membership. But the benefits of involvement in coastal trade were offset by taxes, regulations, and indignities at the hands of coastal authorities. Later, Indonesian authorities would impose further demands, including conversion to Islam or Christianity and participation in a feared election system, as demonstrations of commitment to the nation-state.

Dutch rule spelled an end to the regional integration of Wana settlements through affiliation with basal; it also removed some of the conditions that had promoted such integration, notably regional warfare. As a result of Dutch policies and the subsequent turmoil they produced, political authority in many areas reverted to the settlement level.

Structural reversion, however, does not mean historical reversion. The return of political leadership to locally influential *tau tu'a* ("elders") did not restore the Wana to a pre-basal condition. For one thing, the newfound "autonomy" of local communities was now under the shadow of the state, whose designs on the Wana were more comprehensive and far-reaching than those of the coastal chiefdoms that preceded it. What is more, the historical consciousness of the Wana population had been transformed.

CONTEMPORARY SHAMANSHIP AND ITS TIES TO THE PAST

We can now reconsider contemporary Wana shamanism in light of the foregoing reconstruction of the nineteenth-century Wana political order and its twentieth-century aftermath. Kruyt provides little sense of the political dimensions of shamanism in the 1800s. Did shamans

wield political influence locally or regionally? Were basal ever shamans? There is no definitive answer. I shall argue that with the dismantling and disappearance of some other forms of traditional leadership, along with twentieth-century unrest, shamanism has assumed increasing political significance. (This is not to say that formerly Wana shamanism lacked political significance, only that in recent times its political dimensions are no longer combined with, rivaled by, or superseded by chiefly structures.)

Both the Dutch and the Indonesian nationalists who followed imposed a new system of political authority that obtains in settlements near the coast. Under the new regimes Wana give, but they do not receive. The government does not appear to be their protector and defender, nor is it a fount of life and vitality for people and crops. The new system, moreover, is distinctly at odds with Wana-style leadership. In the former, orders are given top down, and subordinates are simply expected to follow. In the latter, a leader must attract followers and maintain their conviction that they benefit by their dependence on him. He must appear to be doing more for them than they are for him; if he cannot sustain that conviction, they can simply choose to follow someone else. Of course, a government-appointed village head who is *also* a respected shaman, *ada* expert, or farming leader can compensate to a degree for the governmental demands he must make by serving his constituency in other ways. Hence, it would be desirable from the government's point of view to appoint mature and respected leaders as headmen—and indeed, this tactic has been used. But such individuals do not always match modern nationalist notions of what a progressive village administrator should be. Nor are they always willing to serve.

One persuasive technique used by leaders in both traditions is to emphasize external threats to the followers' well-being. A shaman may stress potentially fatal attacks by spirits and human sorcerers that only he can ward off. A millenarian leader (see below) may claim that only those who follow him will be preserved from the impending destruction. And a village headman may assert that people who flee from villages will be rounded up, even massacred, by government troops. But unlike a shaman or a millenarian leader, a village headman is at a disadvantage in convincing his following that he offers the protection and benefits they desire—and invoking the state as a threat to exact compliance does not instill nationalist sentiment in Wana villagers.

Whatever the realities of life in an earlier age, Wana glorify a prior era to emphasize the misery and powerlessness of the present. *Katuntu*, or stories of a mythical past, celebrate a former era of magical power, *baraka*, associated with the former royal centers. In these stories, voicing one's wishes makes them happen. Poor Wana men wind up marrying the daughters of makole. The present is negatively contrasted to that former age: the earth now is "worn out" (*mariuwam*), the rice does not grow as it used to. There have been "many layers" (*malagi ntapim*), many generations; people are smaller and weaker. Pestilence—for crops and people both—has multiplied. The "great old people" (*tau bose tu'a*) are dead. The old stories are no longer known. Efficacious knowledge has been lost.

On the surface, this new consciousness suggests a linear notion of time. But time in this conception is really a journey that begins with a departure and ends with a return. The prior age of glory coincides with the presence of "knowledge, power, and wealth" in the Wana homeland; the era of impoverishment coincides with their absence. Their return to their homeland at the Old Mountain will be the resolution. This model of history can be compared both to a shamanic journey and to the plot of a Javanese *wayang* play. As Becker (1979, 225) shows, the wayang constitutes "movement out and back, a trip": its plot must begin and end in a royal court; its middle part transpires "in the forest on a mountain, but sometimes, too, in or beside the sea." By posing the Old Mountain, not a regal abode, as the center, Wana history presents itself as the inverse of the negara—"power to the periphery." Shamans in their performances establish their own centers, call on powers from both forested mountains and royal courts, and journey out and back on behalf of their followings. As mediators between the near and the distant, the visible and the hidden, they possess privileged insight into what others cannot know.

POWERFUL RESOURCES

Whereas basal leadership became the locus of growing political authority in the nineteenth century, shamanship has, I suggest, been a locus for political leadership among upland Wana in the twentieth century. A contrast can be made to a similar population, the Ilongot of the Philippines. Ilongot shamans are said to have died off during World War II, whereas Ilongot political authority continued to reside

until the 1970s in effective warmaking and peacemaking. In contrast to the Wana, Ilongot were able to hold outsiders at bay through headhunting; hence, directing raids was a vital element of effective political leadership. Because the Wana learned early in their dealings with outsiders that they could not resist militarily, shamanship rather than military leadership became a major avenue for creating and maintaining polities.

A closer look at privileged forms of knowledge suggests why shamanship in particular has assumed political significance in the twentieth century. Although "knowledge, power, and wealth" are absent from the homeland, lesser forms of exogenous resources are still available to Wana. One form is magic and ritual from the past. Another (like that controlled by the basal) consists of prestigious ties to coastal polities. And yet another is found in the knowledge and allies of the forest.

The past is the source of valuable knowledge for sustaining the lives of crops and people. The authority of *woro tana*, farming leaders, is based on knowledge of magic and rituals going back to creation, knowledge that is passed from one generation to another.¹³ Much healing magic and ritual is similarly derived. For example, the ritual experts who officiated at the *salia* gained their knowledge by listening to their elders, and in the same way people learn how to make offerings to the Owners Above and Below and to perform chants to heal the victims of Lamo and the malevolent *tambar* spirits. Possessing these forms of special knowledge from the past is a matter of conservation, not innovation and augmentation. Knowledge of *ada* derives from the coast, from the far-off kingdom of Bungku. The same is true of a historical succession of authority that backed both basal and modern village officials. The ultimate authority, however, lies far beyond the coast at the "end of the earth": this is the "knowledge, power, and wealth" that had their origin in the Wana land, then departed, leaving the land and its people wretched.¹⁴ Only their return will eclipse present-day coastal authority and revitalize the homeland.

Although the most powerful "knowledge" has departed the land, some knowledge can still be had either through study with older people or through personal quest. There are reasons why an emphasis on winning knowledge and spirit alliances "on one's own" has been particularly strong in the area where I worked. First, I did not reside at the "navel of the world" in the vicinity of the original Wana home-

land. The fact that locally there was no grave of Pololoiso or sacred rocks, the transformed bodies of the "powerful people" who had gone off to the end of the world, may have engendered greater reliance on newly discovered knowledge than on mythical ties to the past. Second, many of the people with whom I worked had participated in a millenarian gathering a decade earlier that itself had been above all an exercise in encountering spirits. The powerful shaman who led the gathering encouraged his followers—both women and men—to seek knowledge in the forest. (People joked that what people in fact obtained in so doing were babies, as spirit quests often turned into romantic trysts.) Although the movement failed, many of its members came away with shamanic skills and experience in gaining knowledge "on their own." Thus local history may have accentuated the importance of knowledge obtained in the forest over other kinds of knowledge for the communities I know best. Nevertheless, more general dynamics in Wana shamanship promote this emphasis as well.

The principal one is the necessity for a shaman to, in Weber's (1963, 32) words, "keep up his charisma," and in Wana terms, maintain the "freshness" of his shamanic powers. To do so he must provide his following with evidence that he is actively engaging spirit familiars. Long absences from the settlement, stories told by himself or others about adventures in the forest, as well as the introduction of new spirit epithets and requests for foods during shamanic performances are ways of demonstrating an ongoing commitment to shamanic pursuits.

Pressures on shamans to uphold their reputations simultaneously promote innovation and sustain continuity in Wana shamanship. Shamans are expected to pursue new knowledge and skills, and the premium placed on shamanic entrepreneurship virtually guarantees the incorporation of both the exotic and the novel. Formulae from Muslim and Christian prayers, words from foreign languages, all manner of spirits and sorcery enter shamanic practice in this way. At the same time, however, Wana performers must be convincing to their audiences. Therefore, whatever they introduce in their public practice cannot remain either idiosyncratic or alien, but must be rendered in a way that impresses others as a sign of genuine shamanic potency. By encouraging both enterprise and intelligibility, Wana audiences insure the ongoing regeneration of Wana shamanship.

Among the ways shamanic authority sustains its interpretability is through links with past forms of authority. The Wana "shaman as hero" (Lévi-Strauss 1963a) participates in the heroics of two forms of leadership now gone from the scene: warriorhood and chiefly authority. Because of gaps in our knowledge about past ties among shamanship, warriorhood, and chiefly authority, it is difficult to say whether the overlaps we find are continuations or appropriations of the past.

Regarding the past relationship between warriorhood and shamanship, Kruyt (1930, 512, 525) tells us that shamans performed at the departure of headhunting parties and that the drum was played as part of headhunting festivities. And indeed, warlike bravado survives today in Wana shamanship. Contemporary shamans dance to the drum songs of headhunters. Some are possessed by the ghosts of headhunting victims, the very same spirits that would possess a warrior and make him kill. Vows made by shamans on behalf of patients may be fulfilled by grand performances of ritual dueling at which only the powerful magic of the presiding shamans can prevent murderous attacks by the headhunting sangia spirits. Through acts of courage—epitomized by lonely spirit quests—shamans gain the powers to serve as protectors and defenders of their communities. No longer threatened by headhunting raids, contemporary Wana fear sorcery from strangers and enemies; thus shamans must acquire special proficiency in *sangka langkai*, "men's accoutrements," to do battle with hidden forces.

The relationship between shamanic authority and chiefly authority is more complicated to trace. Kruyt does not indicate whether the same individuals ever possessed both. He does, however, present a hierarchy of shamanic skills in which the spirit familiars associated with the mabolong ranked below the spirit familiars associated with the salia.¹⁵ The mabolong was and is held locally on behalf of sick individuals, whereas the salia was a regional celebration held for the chief's constituency. In the mabolong, performers engage familiars won through personal quest or study; in the salia, performers sang of traditional spirit familiars associated with the ritual chant. The mabolong highlights shamanic initiative, while the salia featured priestly function. The ritual authority of salia performers apparently derived from their knowledge of a highly prized liturgical form and from the

chiefly authority of the basal under whose auspices the ritual most certainly took place. By contrast, the mabolong performer must create the conditions of his own authority.

Given the challenges of constructing ritual authority, it is revealing that the contemporary mabolong appropriates *salia* elements. As seen in Part Three, the mabolong performer's journey upward on behalf of individual patients may have been lifted directly from the *salia*. Although the Wana no longer offer tribute to coastal lords, in this segment the shaman and his familiars, in the manner of a basal and his following, carry tribute to a rajalike deity at a place called an *opo*, a term associated with a ruler's locality. In so doing they must observe the etiquette for approaching royalty to ward off the debilitating condition of *buto* brought on by violations of rank. Even the word *pue*, or "lord," applies to both a *raja* and a high god.

In the ritual more generally, the shaman is the leader of a spirit entourage and negotiates on equal terms with the spirit leaders of other followings composed of "many handsome dependents"—a phrase recalling *katuntu*, epic stories of the mythical past, and the *molawo* ritual, itself apparently an offshoot of the *salia*. Among the spirit familiars touted by contemporary shamans, moreover, are those that figure in the *salia*. Even though there are no more basal to initiate regionwide rituals, by making vows (*pantoo*) for their patients, mabolong performers initiate future mabolong that may attract audiences from afar to celebrate their own mediation with higher powers.

Contemporary Wana shamanship is a vital link between a glorified past and an uncertain future. To create and sustain their authority, shamans must continually innovate. At the same time, their activities must be rendered comprehensible and compelling in cultural terms. By acting as leaders of spirits in the manner of war leaders and chiefs, shamans can couch their present-day initiatives in the terms of leadership carried over from an earlier age of glory.

MILLENNIAL DREAMS IN ACTION

To what end? This question was posed in a conversation I had with several of the least fortunate members of a Wana settlement, one a crippled widow, another a semi-invalid. All were deeply dependent on others for assistance with food and health. "What is the goal to be sought?" one asked rhetorically. "The life of food? Each day one eats

and the result is excrement." The point of the search, the three agreed, should be a "life of another sort." Their remarks implicitly criticized the leading shaman of their community, a prosperous farmer whose commitment at the time was to the status quo. His spiritual quests were limited to sustaining the health and well-being of his local settlement. Yet his critics wanted more—at the very least, a release from their present travails. They personally were seeking a fundamental transformation of the conditions of their existence. Should they do so collectively and pin their hopes on the spiritual endeavors of someone less conservative than their current leader, the result could be a millenarian movement—what Wana call a *ngua*—a tradition dating back at least to the arrival of the Dutch.

The Wana saw very quickly the futility of resisting the Dutch with violence. (Wana claim to have fought Dutch troops at a site called *Pindu Loe* in *Bungku Utara*.)¹⁶ Soon convinced that blowguns and spears were no match for rifles, they adopted a different strategy. From Kruyt's perspective, the strategy was simply to flee—but in fact, the organization of Wana disappearances was internally more complex than the act of fading into the woods would suggest.

These disappearances were organized around leaders who people hoped could provide an escape from their present plight. The leaders of such gatherings—what today are called *ngua*—were thought to have special access to information about the fate of the Wana land, information that would be predicated on the scenario outlined in Chapter 2. In a prior age, the Wana homeland thrived. Then, however, "knowledge, power, and wealth" were carried off to the "end of the earth." At some point they will return to their source, a return that will be accompanied by war and cataclysm. Those who heed the portents and take proper precautions will survive to participate either in the revitalization of the Wana land or in a paradise removed from the destruction.

Ngua leaders were and are those whom others view as possessing special knowledge about what is to come and what is to be done about it. This knowledge and its accompanying action are typically reworkings of Wana stories and rituals. For example, one prized form of esoteric knowledge at Wana *ngua* has consisted of the names of the "powerful people" who left the Wana land along with "knowledge, power, and wealth." In the past *ngua* participants have recited these names over an offering table to summon back these beings and revital-

ize the Wana land. They have also performed rites at the alleged gravesite of the culture hero Pololosio, in anticipation of the millennium. In this way ritual "foreshadows" (*mampolengke*) old stories in the hope of changing the present order. These old stories, associated with an earlier age, were expressly intended to counteract the present one.

In the 1930s a Wana named Nau, the appointed district head of Bungku Utara, hiked in the company of a village secretary and a basal into the interior to break up a *ngua*. The three men met their deaths at the hands of *ngua* participants who hoped that, with this sacrifice, the new order should arrive. (This incident was told to me early in my fieldwork by an old man who had hosted the trio on their fateful journey. I did not grasp its significance at the time and hence did not pursue the matter of murdering a former basal.) Violence is rare at *ngua*, but its possibility heightens tensions between Wana who remain in the villages and those who go off to join a particular gathering.

In 1941 a great *ngua* was held in the Barangas region. It was so large that it attracted not only the Dutch troops but also the raja of Tojo, to whom the northern branch of the Wana paid tribute, who made the long hike in from his coastal residence. One might suppose that the raja went to prevent violence and put an end to the gathering, but I was told repeatedly that he actually went to side with his people if this was indeed the moment for the fighting to begin, the Dutch to be vanquished, and a new order to be installed. One story alleges that the raja crafted a metaphor (*ligi*) to request that the women and children be removed from the scene so the battle could take place; according to my source, however, his meaning was missed, and the gathering was peaceably dispersed. But the Dutch troops guided the hands of village heads who had joined in the *ngua* and forced them to sign their names to documents they did not understand.

Within a year the Japanese had overtaken Sulawesi and executed the raja of Tojo. During my fieldwork it was widely believed that this action had been taken because Wana village leaders had signed a deposition implicating him in the insurrection against the Dutch. (That the Japanese would punish the raja for opposing Dutch rule is an inconsistency of which my companions were unaware.) People anticipated the return of the raja to call in the "debts" of those who had betrayed him, and a *ngua* held while I was in the field had the return of the raja as its theme.

Although *ngua* often anticipate a new order on earth ("after the dogs have swum in blood on the Old Mountain"), some feature hopes of escape to another realm—either heaven (*saruga*) or the realm of the Bolag spirits. Here the wish is literally to vanish, to leave this earth. People tell a story of a *ngua* held in a house suspended on the edge of a cliff. When the desired deliverance by spirits did not come, someone cut the bindings, and the building with its sleeping occupants tumbled into the ravine. In this way they achieved collective salvation, albeit not in the manner they had planned. One person stated the matter flatly to me: Death, he said, was the best way to escape the government.

The *ngua* is the one form of collective action, apart from the staging of more conventional rituals, that can cause Wana to gather together in a concerted endeavor. Potentially they can do so on a larger scale than in ordinary ritual. When a government official asked a Wana acquaintance of mine how the Wana could be got to cooperate with a government plan, my friend proposed that the plan be turned into a *ngua*. One millenarian movement, in the plot of which Indonesian officials may or may not have been involved, was built around a coastal resettlement project in the 1970s. A Wana man prophesied that the end was coming, that the Wana land would soon be consumed in flames, and that only those who joined the project would be saved. What sound like religious texts, with pictures of people burning in hell, were offered as demonstrations of what was to come, and the movement leader promised goods—supplies furnished by the Social Ministry—to lure prospective members. Here we see a *ngua* leader drawing on the external resources of the state to attract a following.

Millenarian leadership resembles closely the forms of political leadership outlined in Chapter 13. People pin their hopes on a leader who appears to possess special knowledge from exogenous sources. The leader must continually demonstrate to his following that their trust is warranted. This is often achieved through innovations based on conventional ritual forms. The offering table mentioned earlier is an example. At one *ngua* in the 1960s, participants held periodic celebrations on *eo jamaa* ("jamaa day," a twist on the Indonesian term *Hari Juma'at*, or Friday, the Muslim sabbath) as well as a *salia*. *Mabolong*, too, are a standard element of *ngua*. Another *ngua* developed a new and more democratic form of shamanizing, in which all the participants could experience shamanic vision; the

movement died, but the style of performance, called *walia makore*, "the standing spirit familiars," persists in some areas.

Ngua leaders sometimes receive material support from their followings, somewhat in the manner of the basal of old. When people so assemble, it is generally in the hope that the present world order is at an end. They abandon their farms, kill their chickens and pigs (if they have any), and pour their rice beer liberally at the ngua festivities. Some people stay for a day, a week, or a month. Only when the anticipated end is not in sight do they grow cynical and leave, although others may be persuaded to stay longer and after a time make new farms in the vicinity. Sometimes these communities last several years. One ngua leader I knew stopped farming altogether and was supported by his followers, until a scandal involving his sexual relations with a number of young girls at the ngua caused others to become disillusioned.

Although not every ngua organizer is a shaman, both are charismatic leaders who through negotiation with hidden agents generate a sense of community and common purpose for their followers. Both shamanic and millenarian enterprises are framed culturally as struggles against the centrifugal tendencies inherent in the order of things. What shamans attempt for individuals and farming settlements—namely, reintegration and revitalization—ngua leaders attempt in times of crisis for the Wana homeland. Thus the same form of charismatic leadership, one based on negotiation with hidden agents, can serve more or less simply to sustain a farming community; or, when constituencies require leaders to manage eschatological traumas rather than merely quotidian concerns, it can inspire escalation into a wider social movement.

MILLENARIAN PROSPECTS

I have argued that in the twentieth century shamanship has served as a means of creative and effective local leadership. It has operated in the wake of a system that had privileged noble birth, tributary relationships, and achievement in warfare and has offered an alternative to an alien system that privileges education, wealth, and knowledge of—not to mention connections in—the nationalist culture.

Center-periphery relations in the 1980s reveal a new twist. The New Tribes Mission, an evangelical organization devoted to con-

veying the Christian gospel to Fourth World peoples, established three bases in the Wana area. The people of Ue Bone, once the seat of the paramount Wana chief, were the first to receive New Tribes personnel. The mission magazine, evocatively entitled *Brown Gold*, published the following account of the missionaries' welcome in Ue Bone, which begins with a Wana story:

"Many years ago, long before our time, two men came flying into Uebone [*sic*] on an umbrella. These two men came to make the Wana people prosperous. The Wana people, of course, welcomed these two men and were very happy to have them live here. One thing these men did not seem to like was a lot of noise. The people were warned to be careful around these men and not to disturb them. On a particular day, a lady warned her husband that when he brought the firewood into the house he should be quiet and be sure not to drop it. The husband did not pay much attention to his wife's words and came into the house noisily and dropped the firewood on the floor. The two men then got on their umbrella and flew away, to the regret of the Wana people."

We here have been overwhelmed at the reception these people have given us. Many times we have wondered why they are so happy to have us here. One day we asked a Wana fellow down at the coast the reason for all of their kindness and the above is the story we got. These people evidently believe Vic [another New Tribes missionary] and I are the two umbrella men and have returned to live among them. Our airplane undoubtedly is our umbrella in which we have come. This story answers our question of why at times they have apologized for making noise and why they always lay the firewood down quietly. I guess we have come to make them prosperous, too. Some day, Lord willing, in the near future, these folks will have the Gospel, "as having nothing, and yet possessing all things." We just praise the Lord for the way He has prepared their hearts for us.

(Ed Casteel and
Jeanne Casteel 1980, 8)

This account gives a fine sense of the intersection between two millenarian traditions. The tale of the umbrella people, as recounted by the missionary couple, fits the genre of Wana tales of the departure of "knowledge, wealth, and power" from their land. Like other *tau baraka*, or "people of power," the two "umbrella men" take offense and depart by magical conveyance, presumably to the end of the world. Like some characters in epic stories, theirs seems to be what Wana call "the path of the *toru*," referring to the Wana *toru*, or broad-brimmed hat.

The story also recalls the tale of Ampue, the elder whose thoughtless son repeatedly jostled his father by dragging firewood over his rooted limbs and thereby provoked his father's departure from the Wana land (see Chapter 10). Strangely, however, the two umbrella people in the Casteels' account do not have their origins in the Wana homeland, and in this respect they are quite unlike Ampue and the other tau baraka of the epic age and more like the succession of high-status foreigners with whom Wana have had dealings in historic times. The benefits these umbrella people bring, moreover, are of foreign, not autochthonous, origin.

By this report, the people of Ue Bone regard themselves as having a second chance to benefit from the presence and prosperity of these foreign visitors. In 1974, their fear of two Americans resulted in the pair going elsewhere—a consequence that many residents of Ue Bone subsequently regretted. The next time they had a chance to host people from afar they acted differently, and in so doing precipitated the possibility of vast changes in their world.

In the last century, a Kasiala leader took an initiative that significantly altered political relations in the region. The joint initiative of the New Tribes Mission and the Kasiala people may once again transform relations between centers and peripheries in the region. High-status representatives of a world religion—one strongly opposed to the magical and shamanic nature of traditional forms of powerful Wana knowledge—are now locally based. Advanced technology in the form of airplanes, radios, and computers challenges the physical isolation of the Wana people, and a missionary presence offers mediation between the Indonesian government and the upland population. The possibility for education in the national language at last seems genuine. It remains to be seen whether and how these new conditions may further shape the ritual and politics whose historical development this book has traced.



